119. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, July 21, 1965, 11:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Telegrams. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Initialed by Harriman and Kohler.

216. For President and SecState from Harriman. I met with Kosygin for one hour forty minutes this afternoon with same group except Troyanovsky was present as well as Smirnovsky.

He first asked me what I had been doing since we last met. I took this opportunity to explain my discussions with Matskevich and Rudnev,/2/ emphasizing mutual desire to expand exchanges. I added that they had told me of the areas in which they would like to increase trade. I mentioned also my talk with Plotnikov of Economic Institute./3/

/2/A memorandum of the conversation with Vladimir V. Matskevich, Soviet Minister of Agriculture, July 17, was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A-143, July 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 US-USSR) A memorandum of Harriman's conversation with Deputy Prime Minister Konstantin N. Rudnev, July 19, was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A-157 from Moscow, July 27. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN)

/3/A memorandum of the conversation with V.N. Plotnikov was transmitted as an attachment to airgram A-161 from Moscow, July 30. (Ibid.)

I then stated the following: "I am glad to be able to inform you that the President has read with great care my report on our conversation. The President shares your view that the US and USSR have heavy responsibilities for peace. You may be assured that US action in Vietnam will be what is necessary but only what is necessary to stop the armed attacks which have been mounted under the direction of Hanoi against the people and government of South Vietnam. The President agrees with your emphasis on (1) the tasks of disarmament; (2) the importance of direct bilateral relations between our two countries; and (3) the advantage of personal contact in appropriate circumstances. The President is now making a final review of our disarmament position for the meeting in Geneva. He hopes very much that the Soviet Union will join in a constructive approach to these problems and he agrees with the Chairman as to the special importance of non-proliferation"./4/ As you see, I did not state the above as a message from the President.

/4/A guidance along these lines was transmitted to Harriman in telegram 227 to Moscow, July 20, for the talk with Kosygin. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. X)

In this connection, I told him that Mr. Foster would head the US Delegation at Geneva and asked him whether he could inform me who would head theirs. He said he couldn't because the decision had not been reached but he could assure us that it would be a responsible official fully empowered to act and report and "not just sit on the fence". Commenting on my statement as a whole, he said he was pleased to learn President is concerned about same problems that bothered him. He was personally convinced progress could be made on the questions which we had discussed and to which President had reacted if it were not for Vietnam. The Vietnamese problem is an impediment to the solution of many important problems such as disarmament, nuclear weapons and the like. It was his personal opinion that if it were not for Vietnam issue many approaches could be found to disarmament, possibly by a high level meeting, not necessarily in the Soviet Union or the United States, prior to a disarmament conference-a meeting of two or more heads of states or governments might reach prior understanding in principle and make conference more productive. On questions relating to nuclear arms and disarmament, no side can be dishonest since the truth will come out and destroy mutual confidence. Naturally, progress could be made by conventional methods but faster progress might be made by unconventional methods. The Vietnam problem which is a small problem in itself thus becomes large and influences all important issues.

In answer to my query as respects meeting, he replied his ideas were not worked out but he would not exclude either bilateral or multilateral high level meetings. For example, in connection with non-proliferation both forums could be useful. He emphasized real relief throughout the world if agreement in these fields could be reached.

I referred to the fact that UK, France and unfortunately Peiping now involved in nuclear question and asked him whether the problem of dealing with Chinese might be discussed bilaterally. Kosygin replied the Chinese were not the major issue. It was correct to say US and USSR are only real owners of nuclear weapons. Others are not now important. Today, however, science is developing inexpensive methods which will enable many to make nuclear weapons and then there will be no guarantees that a mad man like Hitler could not come along. This is why steps must be taken to prevent any proliferation and that is why American proposal to pool nuclear weapons which amounts to giving weapons to Germans, arouses such emotional opposition in USSR. Soviets would be forced to respond by sharing weapons with their own allies.

I commented President would fully share first part of his statement. But as respects MLF Secretary Rusk had pointed out to Gromyko Soviets should sign non-proliferation treaty and thus prevent forever independent possession nuclear weapons by Germany. Kosygin must believe that we do not want Germany to possess independent nuclear weapons, as we, like Soviets, had twice suffered from aggressive German leadership.

Kosygin replied that we are mistaken when we say our policy would prevent acquisition nuclear weapons by Germany. He was convinced we are profoundly wrong and our policy has its effects in France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and indeed all over Europe. He stated: "The US pretends GDR does not exist. But it does exist and develops and a whole new generation has grown up which does not even know West Germany. US sets West Germans against East Germans and this puts us into conflict. US is particularly active in supporting West Germans against us, saying you do not wish offend the West Germans. I know many leaders in Western Europe; they are absolutely not interested or concerned about reunification of Germany." He concluded that US support to this non-existent problem generates tensions. Question of Germany cannot be solved in a day. However, it could be handled in such a way so as to create difficulties or it could be handled so as to preserve quiet until the Germans themselves get together.

I pointed out US policy in support of unification of Germany had been established in 1946 and had not been changed since. We agreed this was matter that could not be settled at today's meeting.

I then inquired just when he thought a high level meeting could be held on nuclear questions. Kosygin replied this would only take place when Vietnam issue leaves the scene. It would not be possible earlier since everybody would think meeting only discussing Vietnam. He believed such a meeting possible and necessary but only after achievement of political solution of Vietnam. What is immediately necessary is to end war in Vietnam as soon as possible.

I replied this is exactly what President wants as he has frequently stated. However, I had gathered from Kosygin Soviets would not consider this a matter in their hands but rather for Hanoi. I stressed again President does not consider US in conflict with USSR on Vietnam but only with aggression from North Vietnam against South Vietnam and hopes this issue will not interfere with progress in bilateral relations. I agreed meeting before Vietnam settlement would probably bring about world reaction he described, but stressed it was thus all the more important to get Vietnam issue to conference table as soon as possible.

Kosygin commented we had different approaches to Vietnam and he did not want to rehearse last talk. He was sure however that US was to blame for whole issue and all that is happening in Southeast Asia. He cited my reference to danger of conflict from miscalculations and said maybe this is exactly what is happening in Vietnam. I repeated that President would take necessary action--but only necessary action--to stop aggression. I respected Kosygin's sincerity and supposed necessary let time and events and possibly intervention of mutual friends work matter out. However, I again stressed hope everything would be done to minimize influence this issue on our bilateral relations. I then referred to his observations in previous talk re military budget and presented statement giving figures in Deptel 190./5/ (For record am submitting full text statement as made in septel.)/6/ Some discussion followed with Kosygin trying to insist $700 million Vietnam appropriation was an increase. I asked him to study carefully figures and he would see that Secretary Rusk's statement to Gromyko of December 5 was valid./7/ During discussion he claimed US and Soviet systems different since funds not expended by end fiscal year are terminated in USSR whereas US funds continue available. I immediately said Secretary McNamara was ready to appoint expert to meet either in Moscow or Washington to consult with Soviet expert re budgetary structure and practices, in order that there could be mutual understanding of each other's methods. Kosygin responded that if issue were connected with disarmament measures then need might arise to examine each other's procedures.

/5/Dated July 17. (Department of State, S/S-I Limdis/Exdis Microfilm, Reel 96)

/6/Dated July 21. (Ibid., Reel 97)

/7/See footnote 6, Document 76.

I then turned to questions of commercial and other bilateral relations. I pointed out progress in Congress on consideration of Consular Convention with hope for Civil Air Agreement to follow. I quoted from President's May 7 statement that he plans recommend measures to Congress to increase flow peaceful trade./8/ I said bill had been drafted and is now in the White House and I hope it will soon be sent to Congress. I then briefly described provisions of legislation, including authority to accord MFN in connection with trade agreements. I added President had authorized review of licensing policies. I then said if legislation were attained at this session it would make possible have serious negotiations which we hope would lead to an increase in trade between us.

/8/For text of the statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 505-509.

I stated that we quite satisfied exchanges in space and desalination and hoped that this kind of cooperation could be expanded. In general, I hoped we could move ahead in scientific and cultural exchanges in all areas, regardless of unfortunate differences on Vietnam.

Kosygin replied he was grateful for what I had to say about status of such issues as Consular Convention, Civil Air Agreement and trade legislation. He said "we do want to develop cooperation and have no wish to restrict or limit it." However, Vietnam issue cannot but have its reflection on all these matters. This is inevitable as situation "hamstrings us and you as well all along the line." Soviets would like to do all they can to broaden and expand cooperation and hope US will do everything possible to end conflict in Vietnam.

I assured him President's efforts were in that direction. While Soviet Union not responsible for Vietnam, President would welcome any quiet help to bring question to conference table, even though not publicized and Soviets not even able to speak about it. Kosygin reiterated Soviets are not authorized negotiate re Vietnam but again stressed "Vietnamese comrades would not exclude political settlement, bypassing the Chinese" (pomimo kitaitsev). He advised us to think over and study Pham Van Dong's four points and if we wish, make counter-proposals to these ("think them over, turn them around, and send them to the North Vietnamese"). However, you will never settle the question by force, he said. You will only have more bloodshed and in end Vietnamese will finally liberate themselves from dependence on US, as people have elsewhere. It would be a blot on US and responsibility would inescapably lie on your President who by force of circumstances is responsible for all American actions. This would not be in his interest or in interest of American people.

I picked up his references to China and asked whether he could enlighten us further on Chinese attitudes towards settlement. He replied he could only repeat Vietnamese comrades do not rule out political settlement, but that is important, and naturally it would be on basis of retention 17th parallel. I asked whether he thought Peiping encouraged Hanoi to continue conflict. He replied, at first "Ask the Vietnamese." Then, after prompting by his associates, added, "Or ask the Chinese yourselves in these talks you have in Warsaw, about which we know nothing." I replied I could easily tell him about our talks with Chinese as they amounted to so little, and briefly described character of discussions.

As we were parting I thanked him for his reception and his frank talk. I stated it had always been my belief that with good will we could find solutions between us to difficult problems. To this he said he completely agreed, and added he believed that President felt same way. He asked me to convey his personal regards to President and state that if President could "extract himself from Vietnam" then he believed real progress could be made on the important problems between us.

Kohler

120. Intelligence Note/1/

Washington, July 22, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret; Exdis. The note bears no drafting information, but it was sent as a memorandum from Hughes to Rusk.

SUBJECT
Kosygin's Second Conversation with Harriman

Following are the points that seem to us most significant in Governor Harriman's latest talk with Kosygin./2/

/2/See Document 119.

1. Much more clearly than in the first conversation,/3/ Kosygin establishes a link between a Vietnam settlement and prospects for progress on other issues, including, in particular, disarmament and summit level talks. Despite this more explicit linkage, however, the conversation (as well as those with Matskevich and Rudnev) still leaves the impression of a Soviet readiness to proceed on bilateral issues. Indeed, in view of Kosygin's remark that the Soviet representative at the Geneva disarmament talks will be empowered to act, the Soviets do not appear to rule out at least some substantive disarmament exchanges.

/3/See Document 118.

2. On Vietnam, there were three noteworthy points: first the suggestion that Hanoi would be ready for a settlement that Peiping did not approve; second the proposition that we make a counter-proposal to Pham Van Dong's four points; and third the point that a settlement should be based on the 17th parallel. All of these are of course in line with Moscow's repeated insistence that we deal with the Vietnamese directly. The last one gives some substance to Yugoslav assertions that Moscow is prepared to accept a divided Vietnam, but nowhere did Kosygin give any assurance of precisely how the Vietnamese would respond to a US overture. Kosygin's whole approach on this, including his omission of a demand for cessation of bombing and his abstention from any threat of greater Soviet involvement, seems intended to urge the US in the most persuasive way to end its involvement in the Vietnamese war. (With others, e.g., the British, who the Soviets judge are sensitive to threats, Kosygin has played a much more ominous tune.)

3. In line with the "persuasive" approach, Kosygin was remarkably warm toward President Johnson. Some weeks ago the Soviet leaders, privately and publicly, were becoming personally abusive of the President. Lately, however, this has been turned off in public speeches, although Kosygin had been acerbic in his first conversation with Governor Harriman.

4. On disarmament, Kosygin indicated no new impending Soviet initiatives, though Soviet intent to dwell on non-proliferation in terms of insisting that NATO nuclear sharing is inconsistent with it, was underscored. Apparently judging that on this issue a more threatening stance might be effective vis-á-vis the US, Kosygin went further than any other Soviet leader in threatening nuclear sharing among Communist states.

In line, however, with his approach on Vietnam, Kosygin seemed intent to hold out to Governor Harriman a rather glowing, if ill-defined vista of progress on disarmament (including even technical talks on military budget cuts), if only Vietnam went away. It was in this context that he threw in the prospect of a summit (with an advance assurance there would be no haggling over locale), which the Soviets seem to judge would appeal to us.

5. On Germany, we detect no novel substantive line, but note that Kosygin was playing on what he must judge are trends in US thinking when he argued that our advocacy of reunification raises tensions.

6. We think it interesting that in both talks, Kosygin permitted himself to make anti-Chinese remarks in franker terms than is the wont of top Soviet leaders in talking with us. Here again, Kosygin was no doubt hoping to encourage US thinking and policy in directions favorable to Soviet interests (Tito may have made a persuasive pitch to the Soviets on this score when he was in Moscow recently). At the same time, however, Kosygin's remarks probably do reflect Soviet recognition that their relations with China have small prospect of improving.

7. Looking at the Harriman visit as a whole, Moscow's intent seemed to be to convey the message that it was up to the US to take the initiative in order to return US-Soviet relations to their earlier, more hopeful course. The Soviet leaders will now presumably await the results of their line on US policy, remaining free, meanwhile, to preach the cause of communist unity against the US, as currently at Bucharest, and to keep alive the specter of a deepening crisis by their assurances of support for Hanoi and the Front.

121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, August 20, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret. The telegram bears no time of transmission, but it was received in the Department of State at 8:01 a.m. on August 20. A notation on another copy of this telegram indicates that President Johnson saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. X) The cable was also summarized for the President in the items for his evening reading on August 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164)

524. Ref: Embtel 2920, Apr 5, 1965./2/ Vietnam and Soviet American Relations II.

/2/Document 105.

1. In reftel's analysis we stated Soviet Govt had clearly decided apply "freeze" to Sov-American relations as result Vietnam, specifically:

A) To take no new initiatives themselves and to accept none from American side;

B) To allow presently arranged exchanges to continue but accept no extensions or additions; and

C) To avoid or at least play down, both direct negotiations with United States and negotiations in which two countries are main protagonists.

2. This Soviet decision has given us a rugged six months, during which Embassy's activities could best be described as "holding action" designed to keep as much as possible going, to minimize long term damage, but at same time not to compromise US policies. Following are typical features this period:

A) Continued anti-American campaigns in press and other media, including mass meetings.

B) Attacks on Vietnam policy by Soviet leadership even at official invitational receptions has obliged me depart one such and avoid others.

C) Refusal to invite or permit me to speak on Soviet TV on July 4 as I did last year.

D) Foot-dragging across the board on implementation of ex-change programs, which despite endless prodding on our part have fallen seriously behind schedule. Architectural exhibits in Leningrad and Minsk got off to successful start only because we forced Soviet hand all the way, by such methods as sending word in advance to local authorities I would open personally and sending them copy speeches I proposed to make. In both cases hesitations were obvious but they finally came through correctly, albeit reluctantly, after much checking with Moscow. In case of track meet in Kiev, in which such advance effort not made, I got cold-shoulder from local authorities.

3. I believe we are now seeing first steps in the implementation by the Soviet Govt of a harder policy toward the US. This tougher line undoubtedly represents Soviet Govt's considered reaction to worsening of the war in Vietnam and more specifically to President Johnson's July 28 decision to raise the ante there./3/ It also marks an abrupt shift away from posture which Soviets were taking as late as seven weeks ago when Gromyko, for example, was encouraging us to believe that Soviet Govt wished to pursue closer bilateral relations and that it was only US which was stopping progress.

/3/For text of the President's press conference on July 28 at which he announced that he was raising to 125,000 the number of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 794-803.

This new line is beginning to be evident in number of ways:/4/

/4/See Document 115.

A) One of the most striking is Soviet decision to violate our exchange agreement by canceling space and hand tool reciprocal exhibits originally agreed for later this year. This and other evidence of new and sharply negative attitude on exchange is reported in Embtel 503./5/ These developments on exchanges are, in fact, bunched together in such a way as to suggest that they result from single decision probably taken at end of last week to call off exchanges already contracted. These developments also may mean that Soviets will not be willing to enter into negotiations at this time about new exchange agreement on expiration of present agreement December 31, 1965.

/5/Dated August 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, EDX US-USSR)

B) New line is also reflected--although less strikingly so--in some of statements now appearing in Soviet press. Given importance of President's July 28 decision, initial Soviet reaction to it was notably restrained but a more strident note is now being heard in Soviet commentaries and Shelepin's speech in North Korea was very tough indeed. It will also be recalled that Pravda, in its authoritative foreign policy review on Aug 8, again implied inevitability of deterioration US-USSR relations in its reiteration of past warnings that "USSR cannot agree with approach some circles in West who hope coexist with Soviet Union and simultaneously pursue aggressive course toward Socialist countries. . . ." This was clear echo in public of what Kosygin had told Gov. Harriman and me in private on July 21 when he said:

". . . Vietnam issue cannot help but have its reflection on all these (bilateral) matters. This is inevitable as the situation hamstrings us, and you as well, all along the line."/6/

/6/See Document 119.

C) There have been other recent straws in the wind such as Foreign Ministry's refusal to permit Pillsbury visit to Sevastopol or Yalta in reciprocity for Soviet ship visit already made to Honolulu, slightly tougher travel control policy, increasing difficulties with Soviet customs, and apparently freer hand being given KGB operations against Embassy (Embtels 158 and 339)./7/ I should emphasize that some of these events by themselves are not particularly significant (life being what it always is in Moscow) and some or all may be unrelated to any top-level policy decision.

/7/Telegram 158, July 17, reported that the KGB had detained and attempted to recruit a member of the Embassy staff on July 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 9 US) Telegram 339, August 2, summarized a series of harassments of the Embassy. (Ibid., POL 17-6 US-USSR)

4. I still believe that Soviet Govt will find it in its own best interest to keep deterioration of its relations with US within carefully defined limits. All evidence available to me continues to suggest that Soviet Govt is proceeding with great caution to avoid direct confrontation with US in Vietnam. Indeed, it may be precisely the unwillingness of Soviet Govt to react in kind to our military moves in Vietnam that forces it, in sense of frustration, to turn to exchanges and bilateral relations as only form of retaliation which still provides it with "self respect" of punishing us for our actions. This posture is all the more important to them as long as they continue to vie, as they are doing now, with Peking for dominance among the militant Communist groups of Asia.

Nevertheless, trend which I believe we are now seeing will make it progressively more unlikely that Soviets will allow themselves to be seen holding hands with US in public. This will probably mean, for example, the Supreme Soviet will not now ratify consular convention even if US Senate ratifies,/8/ that exchanges will be whittled down to bare bones program, and that we can generally expect refusal of any proposal which would link US and USSR in cooperative action before public eye. It will also necessarily have further negative implications for such multilateral issues as disarmament.

/8/Responding to this statement by Kohler, the President called Ball on August 23 and told him to tell Fulbright "that the cable shows it was unlikely that they would act, and in light of things we should let sleeping dogs lie." Half an hour later Ball told Fulbright about the cable and said that he "felt for the moment we ought to let it alone; let it go until January and then get another reaction from Moscow." Fulbright "agreed this was the best judgment." Memoranda of the two telephone conversations, dated August 23, are in the Johnson Library, Ball Papers, USSR II.

5. At same time I do not believe that we should allow sharpening of Soviet attitude to move us from our present policy of seeking improvement in Soviet-US relations wherever this may be possible, and to make it clear for all that any deterioration in our relations proceeds from their actions and not ours. This is certainly policy but designed to keep our relations below boiling point in uneasy days ahead, and will make it easier for both sides eventually to resume more favorable course in our relations.

Dept please pouch to interested posts.

Kohler

122. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, August 21, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CON 4 US-USSR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, but it was received in the Department of State at 10:29 p.m. on August 21.

539. Deptel 475./2/ I am deeply disappointed to learn from reftel and related newspaper accounts arriving here of possibility postponement ratification Consular Convention. I recognize Congress has been hard pressed with many matters during this session. However, understandable decision postpone East-West trade legislation, combined with possibility of long delay in ratification of Consular Convention with inevitable corollary of postponement action on Civil Air Agreement would literally remove all substance from our reiterated professions of desire to seek more normal relationships with the Soviet Union.

/2/Dated August 19, it reported that Senator Mansfield had said he would not call up the Consular Agreement for a vote in 1965. (Ibid.)

The Secretary's testimony which I have just received admirably presented basic advantages of treaty to us./3/ However, it was necessarily low key since it is tactically not possible to present publicly extent of these advantages without having undesirable counteraction here and I would wish there were some way of presenting these privately and convincingly to key Congressional opponents.

/3/For text of Rusk's statement on the Consular Agreement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 30, see Department of State Bulletin, August 30, 1965, pp. 375-378.

I consider the breakthrough in accomplishing a major change in the police practices followed by this society for forty-eight years as a major gain for the US and indeed for the entire world. Moreover the protection provisions are of inestimably greater value to us not only because of the differences in our systems but because the comparative flow of persons to this country from the US is of an order of sixty to one. As to immunity provisions I think historic practices began to become obsolete when the US combined its diplomatic and consular services in 1924. Moreover in view of Soviet practices this immunity has greater value for our personnel in this country than for their personnel in ours. While it is true that the treaty itself does not provide for the establishment of consulates, I would certainly anticipate that we would move as rapidly as possible to establish consulates after ratification. Here the order of magnitude of advantage is in my mind beyond calculation. The main hope of making this an easier society to live with is the extension of our contacts and influence on the evolution of this society by every means we can conceive of. What the Soviet Government will gain in our open society is infinitesimal in comparison. Certainly the KGB will make use of any new Soviet mission in the US and I can appreciate that from the point of view of his responsibility for internal security, the Director of the FBI evinces some concern. However, I thought the Secretary's testimony dealt very effectively with this question.

I cannot, of course, from here judge the mood of the Senate but do feel that rejection of the treaty would be serious setback. Also as I said in Embtel 524, Aug 20,/4/ I consider it probable that Soviet side would defer ratification unless or until there is a change in Vietnamese situation. However, ratification on our part would give substance to our policy of seeking any possible improvement in US-USSR relations and make even more clear that any deterioration is due to Soviet and not American action or inaction. It seems to me that this would not only be consistent with but would strongly support our general posture in the Vietnamese crisis.

/4/Document 121.

Kohler

123. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, August 21, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CUL 8 USSR. Confidential; Priority. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, but it was received in the Department of State at 5:31 p.m. on August 21.

551. Ref: Embtel 458./2/ I met with Gromyko at noon today to discuss Soviet Union's unilateral cancellation of space and hand tool exhibits. Recounting for him the history of our agreement, I noted that we had more or less made our preparations for our hand tool exhibit, that we had already invested about $250,000 and over 50 US companies had been working with us on it. I said that we simply did not understand in light of foregoing the Romanovsky committee's decision to cancel exhibits because of "current international situation." I noted this was violation of intergovernmental agreement which we regarded as very serious development. I said my government trusted this was a mistake which would be immediately reconsidered so that we could go ahead with these programs.

/2/Dated August 13, it reported that the Soviet Union, in view of the current international situation, was canceling the Soviet space exhibit in the United States and the U.S. hand tools exhibit in the Soviet Union. (Ibid., SP 8 US)

After a few asides to Kornienko indicating that he was less than fully familiar with matter, Gromyko asked me if we wanted fulfillment of arrangements on both sides. I replied that we very much wanted this, but said that if Soviets for any reason wished to change character of their exhibit, they were of course free to do so. Delays were not unprecedented, I said, and it would be possible to carry out their exhibit next year if they wished.

Gromyko responded that the motives for their action were quite convincing in present situation. He said that he would consider situation in light of what I had said, but that he would make no promises at moment as to their decision. I said that we all recognized that we had our political difficulties but I thought we both had a responsibility to keep our programs going, and that I found it difficult to reconcile cancellation of these exhibits with fact that they were going ahead with plans for their children's creative art exhibit in US, with their plans to send the Moscow philharmonic to US, the film festival, and track meet which had just taken place, and other continuing exchanges. I said I also found it hard to reconcile with his own conversation with Amb Kennan and me at lunch on June 25/3/ (when Gromyko encouraged us to think that Soviets wished to move ahead on bilateral relations) and with spirit of remarks recently made by Kosygin to Gov Harriman./4/

/3/See Document 115.

/4/See Documents 118 and 119.

In an obvious reference to Vietnam, Gromyko said that question of exhibits could not be "put away in a steel box" and isolated by itself. He concluded, however, that he would think over the question and see what could be done. I thanked him for this, and said we would hope for prompt reply as we were continuing to invest a lot of time and money in our exhibit.

I also left with Gromyko President Johnson's letter to Mikoyan/5/ enclosing copy of first photograph of Mars. This led to concluding pleasantries about our respective space accomplishments in which he wished us luck on the Gemini flight, and I congratulated him on their excellent moon pictures.

/5/Not found.

Kohler

124. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of the Treasury (Barr) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, August 27, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, INCO-WHEAT USSR. Confidential. The memorandum bears no drafting information. Copies were also sent to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Labor, and Commerce, and to the Under Secretary of State.

SUBJECT
Wheat Sales to Russia

1. Estimate of Situation

On August 11, 1965, the Canadians announced a sale of five million tons of wheat to Russia for approximately $345 million. This brought total Canadian sales to Russia this crop year to $415 million and for the last three crop years to $945 million (all figures expressed in U.S. dollars). The latest Canadian transaction was widely publicized and has generated queries from the Congress, the financial community, industry and farmers as to why the United States is not getting its share of this business. The Congress is acutely aware of our balance of payments problems, and industry and banking are participating in our voluntary balance of payments restraint program. So it is only natural they should raise this question. It is equally understandable for the American wheat farmer to ask why he is being held back when his Canadian counterparts are being asked to increase their production.

The answer, of course, is very simple. The administrative regulation of the Department of Commerce issued at the time of the 1963-1964 sale to Russia stipulated that 50 percent of all wheat sales to Russia must be shipped in American bottoms. This jumps the delivered price of the wheat by $6 per ton (for the wheat delivered in American ships), and it is our conviction that short of a catastrophe the Russians will never agree to this discriminatory treatment.

2. Balance of Payments Potential-Long-Range

Estimating in this area is tricky and difficult because future U.S.S.R. wheat purchases depend on such variables as weather, Russian attitudes, availability of wheat in other countries, and the unknown factor of Russian gold reserves. However, in the judgment of those who have analyzed the Soviet agricultural picture most closely, there appears to be a sales potential for the United States in certain years of up to roughly one to two million metric tons. The direct U.S. balance of payments gain from such sales would be in the range of $60 to $120 million a year. (This assumes that the Russians would buy U.S. wheat only after having exhausted all other sources of supply.)

3. Balance of Payments Potential-Fiscal Year 1966

For the current fiscal year there is an outside chance of a one million ton or $60 million sale to Russia. This estimate is based on the possibility that the U.S.S.R. may contract for another two to three million tons in addition to the eight million tons already under contract. The U.S. and France are the only nations with wheat available for export. France could spare up to two million tons, but if this did not fully meet Russian requirements, they would be forced to turn to us for anything over that amount. We think this is an outside chance, but it is a chance. There is a very remote chance of a two million ton sale.

4. Budgetary Savings

If we use the potential sales range of one or two million tons per year, the budgetary savings to Commodity Credit Corporation would amount to $50 to $100 million annually in storage, acquisition and related costs.

5. Outlook for the American Farmer

Based on the U.S. Department of Agriculture's current wheat export estimate, the farm price of wheat may be five to ten cents per bushel above the $1.25 per bushel Government support price in 1965-1966. A one to two million ton wheat export to the U.S.S.R. under these circumstances could increase prices slightly and thus raise wheat farmers' income by about $25-$50 million over the presently estimated level of $2.2 billion.

6. Jobs and Freight Revenues

The Commerce Department estimates that a two million ton export of wheat to Russia would provide 12,300 man-months of employment.

Commerce estimates that the movement of this wheat across the country would generate $14 million of revenues to U.S. railroads.

7. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations (Supplied by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball)

It would be a substantial contribution to the improvement of relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. for us to be in a position to sell on a competitive basis because it removes an abrasive element of discrimination.

Conclusion

(1) We recommend that it should be an Administration objective to remove by administrative action the current Department of Commerce regulation involving the commercial shipment of grain to the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet bloc with the 50 percent U.S. bottoms limitation. We further recommend that our target date be as soon as possible but, in no event, later than the next four months.

(2) There are two routes of attack in reaching the objective of eliminating the Commerce regulation and getting out of the commitment to organized labor:

A. You could negotiate directly with Mr. George Meany and possibly with Mr. Hall and Mr. Gleason./2/

/2/Paul Hall, president of the Seafarers International Union, and Thomas Gleason, president of the International Longshoreman's Association.

B. This issue could be wrapped up in an Administration package proposal on national maritime policy. As you know, negotiations are proceeding on this package in the Department of Commerce at this time.

(3) We recommend that the Administration follow alternative B at this time for the following reasons:

A. There is only an outside chance of substantial wheat sales to the U.S.S.R. this year.

B. This issue could well be a bargaining item in the total package on which the maritime unions could recede without serious difficulty. (We believe that Mr. Gleason and Mr. Hall are fairly relaxed on this problem, but that it is a matter of concern to Mr. Meany.)

(4) We ask to reserve our option to come back to you and urge your personal intervention with Mr. Meany if--

A. Substantial sales of wheat (two million tons or $160 million) appear a real probability in the next few months.

B. No progress is made in resolving the issue within the framework of a maritime policy package in the next four months-the latest reading indicates that probably no progress will be made in this direction. (Supplied by Secretary Connor.)

Joseph W. Barr/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates Barr signed the original.

125. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Moscow, September 9, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; it was transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram A-425 from Moscow, September 13. The meeting was held at Kohler's residence.

SUBJECT
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations

PARTICIPANTS
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Ambassador Foy D. Kohler
John C. Guthrie, Minister-Counselor

Ambassador Kohler told Ambassador Dobrynin that he had been shocked at the Soviet decision to postpone the staging of the Soviet Achievements in Space exhibit in the U.S. and the U.S. Hand Tools exhibit in the U.S.S.R. He said that it was most important that we not let our political differences interfere with what we had going in other fields. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to recover lost ground.

Ambassador Dobrynin responded with by now familiar references to events in Vietnam. He asserted that Soviet public opinion would not understand it if the Soviet Government permitted the staging of an American musical comedy such as "Hello, Dolly" while at the same time American planes were bombing North Vietnam, a friendly country, at the rate of a plane every few minutes. Every day, he said, the Voice of America carries news items on just such massive raids. To the people of the U.S.S.R., who had known massive air raids during World War II, these news items carried far greater significance than they did to the American public, which regarded them as statistics. He had just returned from a month's leave near Yalta where people, upon learning that he was the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, constantly asked him to explain U.S. actions in Vietnam.

Ambassador Dobrynin carried his argument further to criticize U.S. unwillingness to ratify the consular convention or to sign the civil air agreement. While stating that the convention in itself was not very significant, nevertheless he had been assured by Secretary Rusk, he said, that the convention would be ratified and had so reported to his government. Now that ratification was put off, people in the Soviet Government were asking how there could be any agreement with the U.S. on important matters if the U.S. was unwilling to ratify so unimportant an agreement as the consular convention.

Ambassador Kohler replied that the U.S.S.R. made it extremely difficult for the U.S. to take such steps. Hostile propaganda attacks against the U.S., including attacks on the President personally,/2/ created a climate which militated against intergovernmental agreements.

/2/In Research Memorandum RSB-92, September 13, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research noted that personal attacks on the President by top Soviet Leaders, which had ceased in late June, were resumed in a speech by Brezhnev on August 27. The paper concluded that the reasons were obscure but suggested that the renewed attacks may have been an effort to reassure North Vietnam or to counter mumblings in the neutralist and socialist worlds that the USSR was not doing enough to aid Hanoi, or may have been an expression of Soviet frustration at being unable to take effective action to counter the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XI)

Dobrynin sought to distinguish between newspaper attacks and those of the government. He also asserted that if positions were reversed and the U.S.S.R. were bombing a country friendly to the U.S., there would not be one U.S. Government official who would dare to say anything good about the U.S.S.R.

When asked why the Supreme Soviet did not ratify the convention without waiting for the U.S. Senate to act, he said that the U.S.S.R. had its pride and would not seek a public rebuff, knowing that the Senate did not plan to take up the convention this year. In reply to Ambassador Kohler's request for his opinion as to Soviet action if the Senate did ratify the convention at this session, Dobrynin expressed the view that there might be some deferment of action under present circumstances, but that the Treaty would be ratified.

126. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 18, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CON 4 US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on September 20. Memoranda of their conversation on the India-Pakistan dispute and Moscow's Foreign Office personnel are ibid., POL 27 INDIA-PAK and POL-USSR.

SUBJECT
Consular Convention

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

Dobrynin asked me what had happened on the Consular Convention. I said that we had been anxious to have the Senate approve ratification by a substantial margin and our estimate was that this could not be obtained at this particular time. In addition to reasons of which he was aware, the President had pressed Congress very hard for a number of important pieces of legislation during this session. I said that we were hopeful that early in the next session we could obtain approval of ratification.

Dobrynin seemed to be relieved that we still hoped to go ahead with ratification.

127. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 26, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin/Thompson Memcons, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S/AL on September 27. Also discussed were the cultural exchanges agreement, leadership problems in the Soviet Union, the location of the new Soviet Embassy, non-proliferation, Pravda and Izvestia, Arthur Schlesinger's articles on Secretary of State Rusk, the Soviet economy, and Vietnam. A memorandum of the discussion on Vietnam is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. III, Document 154. Memoranda of the other conversations are in Department of State, S/S-I Files: Lot 73 D 154, S/AL Memcons.

SUBJECT
Special Channel Communications

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

Ambassador Dobrynin asked me to lunch with him alone yesterday. Dobrynin said that several times the Soviet leaders had discussed the possibility of sending a personal message to the President but they had decided that since their last two communications to the President had not been answered, it was up to the United States to reopen this channel. Dobrynin said he thought it would be helpful to reopen this personal contact. I asked to whom these messages would be addressed. He first said he thought they might be addressed to both Brezhnev and Kosygin, but then said that if I could let him know a couple of days in advance of an actual message, he would find out for me how it should be addressed. He said he did not want to raise this question with Moscow unless there was actually going to be a message.

In the course of this discussion, he made clear to me that Brezhnev was the more important of the two so far as policy decision making was concerned. He also told me that while there would be some changes announced at the Supreme Soviet meeting which opens on October first, that these changes would not be startling, and indicated that they would not affect Brezhnev or Kosygin./2/

/2/In a September 3 Intelligence Note, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research commented on the "persistent rumors for the past several months of top-level changes in the Soviet hierarchy" and speculated that important personnel changes might be in the offing. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 USSR) In a September 9 memorandum for the President's evening reading, Under Secretary Mann noted that there had been "a spate of rumors, some from Communist sources, about an impending major shake-up of the top leadership," and while "such rumors are virtually impossible to confirm," there were "numerous signs of fluidity and jockeying." (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164) Thompson told French Ambassador Alphand on September 15, however, that while there would be some changes next spring if not sooner, "we do not expect anything big." (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL EUR)

128. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)/1/

Washington, September 29, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret.

1. Thanks for sending me a copy of your account of your short discussion with Dobrynin on special channel communications./2/ I feel an obligation to report to the President on this matter and to give him our current recommendations. Would it be too much trouble to check the record on the two communications which Dobrynin says the President did not answer? My own recollection is that we gave informal replies, but I think your record will be better than mine.

/2/Document 127.

2. I must say I feel that there is a certain difficulty in addressing personal communications to an unidentified person, but on the other hand, I think there is always a chance of learning something about Soviet attitudes by using this somewhat different channel. Could I have your views and recommendations at your convenience? This is a matter on which of course the President will want the Secretary's opinion before he makes a decision, but I think your own informal comments might be interesting to him even while the Secretary is in New York./3/

/3/On October 4 Thompson replied that he believed the communications were oral messages of February 1 (Document 89) and February 9 (see Document 91). Thompson reported that he had discussed both these messages with Dobrynin and concluded that the United States had therefore informally replied to them, although not all the issues they raised had been commented on. He concluded his memorandum by saying:

"I do believe it would be useful to resume the use of this channel for communications between the President and the Soviet leaders but only when we have something specific to say which could be done better in this channel than in regular diplomatic notes or public statements. It may well be that the Kashmir problem will lend itself to this type of communication but this will depend upon how the matter develops." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163)

McG. B.

129. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

US/MC/1

New York, September 30, 1965, 6:30 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, INCO-WHEAT US. Secret. Drafted by Thompson on October 1. The conversation was held during the Secretary's reception at the Waldorf Astoria.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTIETH SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September-October 1965

SUBJECT
Possible Soviet Purchases of U.S. Wheat

PARTICIPANTS U.S.	USSR
Amb. Llewellyn E. Thompson	Amb. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

At the Secretary's reception, I took Dobrynin aside and asked if he knew whether or not the Soviet Government was likely to want to purchase wheat from us this year. He said he had not talked to their top people on this subject but, from his conversations with other officials, he had the impression that they had covered their requirements by purchases in Canada and elsewhere. I said that if they were likely to be interested, it would be well that they let us know promptly in order for us to see whether or not we could do anything about the current requirement that 50 percent of the shipments would have to go in American bottoms. He said he understood that I was mentioning this unofficially, and I confirmed that this was correct. He said that the 50-50 requirement had prevented them from buying from us, and said that it was not only a question of price, but also one of prestige. He said that he would inquire of his Government and let me know what the current position was.

130. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, October 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, USSR, November 1963-March 1966. Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Bundy wrote on the original, "You have it about right."

McGB:

In response to your query on the status of Soviet Jews,/2/ State and CIA intelligence confirms that the post-Khrushchev leaders have relaxed a few minor restrictions. But there's no ground for expecting a big breakthrough. Though the recent concessions are probably mostly window-dressing they may make Jewish life a whit easier. They don't change the Communist purpose of forcing Jews to forget their heritage and assimilate, but the fact that they've been made at all suggests the climate may improve, at least for a time.

/2/Bundy's query followed a meeting that he and President's Special Counsel Lee White had at the White House on September 20 with a delegation pleading for Soviet Jews. The President met very briefly with the group. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Other documentation generated in connection with the meeting includes a September 22 CIA report on "The Current Position of Jews in the USSR" and a State Department report on the "Policy of the United States Concerning the Situation of Soviet Jews" that Benjamin Read forwarded to Bundy on September 27. (Both ibid., National Security File, Komer Files, USSR, November 1963-March 1966)

Concessions this year simply allow bakeries in some cities to make matzoh for Passover, printing a few secular and prayer books and a monthly magazine in Yiddish and reopening a religious school in Moscow. (Khrushchev had clamped down on all these in 1962-63.) Also, Kosygin has spoken out against anti-Semitism, but mainly in the context of debate over economics and policy toward intellectuals (Jews are leading liberals in both fields).

However, the basic restrictions on all nationality groups and religious sects go on, applied a bit more harshly to Jews than to others (e.g. they're the only national minority without their own schools). Survival of Jewish practices depends on the local synagogue; there are no nationwide religious or cultural institutions such as other sects have to promote cohesion and pass on the heritage.

It looks as if world opinion may have helped prod Soviet leaders into making these concessions. For instance, we attribute relaxation of the matzoh restrictions to the worldwide press furor in 1964. In fact, we probably have to read most of concessions chiefly as image-polishing. Radio Moscow's international service in English played up the concessions but the domestic official press made no official announcement.

But we've hit a stone wall on all official approaches. The Soviets flatly refuse to deal with the issue on grounds it's their own business, though this needn't keep us from hitting them again if the time seems riper. VOA is the one official channel open to us, and it consistently gives straight news coverage to such events as the Washington vigil/3/ (4 spots in Russian-language broadcasts). But even VOA nervously walks the line between getting our story across and provoking jamming or jeopardizing its general respectability among Russian listeners. Radio Moscow and Tass responses to the vigil showed Moscow is touchy and would like to scare us off. (Radio Moscow: "The White House has again publicly dealt a crippling blow to its much advertised idea of building bridges to the Soviet Union.")

/3/The Eternal Light Vigil for Soviet Jewry at Lafayette Park across from the White House, September 19, 1965. The President's message to the participants is included in a report on "Presidential Statements on Soviet Jews" that Saunders forwarded to Bundy on September 20. (Ibid.)

So the best bet is to plug away in quasi-official ways. Receiving Jewish groups here and sending Presidential messages to them annoys Moscow, but we don't see any evidence that this kind of thing causes these Soviet leaders to crack down all the harder on their Jews (as we feared with Khrushchev). We'll push the issue in UN committees (Committee III is considering a convention on eliminating racial discrimination) and in the Commission on Human Rights (eliminating religious discrimination). The embassy can help informally by trying to straighten out specific problems, like arranging matzoh shipments (another form of pressure). The Senate may pass a resolution condemning Soviet restrictions.

Unfortunately, we're pretty much on our own. We have no evidence that the Moslems or Buddhists are worried enough about their brethren in the USSR to do anything, so there's not much chance for kicking up a wider storm. The Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists here are concerned about their people too, but they just add a small local voice.

This approach won't satisfy the Jewish groups; their public comments on State's policy are caustic. On the other hand, it's the only one that holds out hope for even limited results. We also have to balance our connivance in these limited pressures against our larger Soviet interests. So the range of debate is really over how actively State pushes versus how much it follows. The initiative so far has come from the Jewish groups, and they don't miss many openings. State has clearly decided it shouldn't lead on this one but will lend a hand to private efforts. Given our limited ability to achieve anything officially and our other priorities, the balance seems about right. Our alternative is to tell State to seek out opportunities to needle Moscow unofficially, but I question whether we want to go that far. [1 line of source text not declassified] Radio Liberty Committee and Radio Free Europe also help. But we can't say much about those.

HHS/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

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