Moscow, April 17, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to New Delhi. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. Passed to the White House.

3093. Delhi's 2922 April 15 to Dept, rptd Moscow 247./2/

/2/In this telegram, dated April 15, Ambassador Bowles suggested that if the Soviet Union could be persuaded to make a clean break with China over Vietnam, the United States would be well on the way to a "global political breakthrough." On the other hand, if this were not possible, the United States was headed for major trouble. Bowles argued that logically Soviet national interests lay in better relations with the West and dampening inflammatory conflicts around the world rather than in ideological posturing. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

1. Much as I would like to be able to agree with thesis advanced by Amb Bowles in reftel it will be clear from my own reporting that I cannot do so. Soviet leadership has already "come down on other side," not because of "ideological slogans" but because they regard this posture as fundamental to justifying the very existence of Communist Party monopoly rule in this country and of the Communist system in the world.

2. Soviets have never been prepared to change their policies in response to appeals to reason from outside. Historically any shifts in Soviet outlook have come about because of changes in their assessment of what Marxists call objective conditions. Any influence that we might have on situation must be directed to these conditions. In Korea Soviets learned that use of overt military force across national boundaries would not be tolerated. In Berlin, Soviets recognized that we are prepared to go to bat in defense our vital interests. In Cuba, Soviets learned additional lesson that we have will and determination to use nuclear force in order defend our basic interests. In other words, it was what we did and not what we said that forced Soviets to "come to their senses" in past crises in East-West relations.

3. In Vietnam, basic issue is Soviet determination to aid "national liberation movement" from outside and our equal determination to prevent this. I see no hope of change in Soviet policy this regard until Moscow convinced that to achieve their objectives they must be prepared risk military confrontation with us. In other words, in my view, situation in Vietnam must get worse before it gets better.

4. Meanwhile, we must reckon with fact that Soviets and their Socialist allies are confident that we in time will be forced by weak political base in Saigon as well as pressures both within our own country and by our allies, to temper our own objectives in the area. So long as this confident assessment of situation persists there is certainly nothing we can do in way of rational appeal to Soviets that would force them to retreat.

5. Added to this, of course, is the imperative upon Moscow at the present time to demonstrate its loyalty to a socialist ally and its militancy in backing national liberation movements in its contest with Peiping for leadership of world Communist movement. In my view, this is not a question of making Soviets realize perils of continuing alliance with Peiping. To me it is clear beyond any question that Soviets have already made up their minds on China, that they know that the breach with Peiping is deep and permanent. What they are not prepared to do is recognize their defeat by Peiping for control of world Communist movement.

6. In sum, there can be no "grand global deal" with Soviets at this stage of history. Best we can hope for is tacit agreement between ourselves and Soviets on means by which continuing conflict is waged. Our task at the moment is, as in Cuba, to demonstrate that we are firm but flexible; and in the longer run to convince Soviets that they, in fact, seriously jeopardize their national interests by continued revolutionary militancy and by centering their competition with Peiping on this element alone.

Kohler

108. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

A-317

Washington, April 28, 1965, 7:01 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CON 4 US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Jenkins on April 27; cleared by Owen, H, L, and EUR; and approved by Thompson.

SUBJECT
Ratification of U.S.-Soviet Consular Convention

REF
Embtel 2920/2/

/2/Document 105.

In view of the possibility that the Senate calendar might soon permit consideration of the Consular Convention, the Department has held discussions with interested officials and members of the Senate on this subject. While it is believed that we should press ahead for ratification of the Consular Convention at the first appropriate moment, it has also been agreed that this is not an appropriate moment, due primarily to the unfavorable atmosphere created by developments in Vietnam. It is the opinion of those concerned that the Convention would encounter considerable resistance in the Senate if submitted under the present circumstances. Therefore, the Department has decided to postpone any efforts to bring about Senate consideration of the treaty at this time.

The Embassy's views would be appreciated as to the outlook for the timing of Soviet ratification of the Convention./3/

/3/On May 7 the Embassy in the Soviet Union replied that it believed the Soviet Union would await U.S. ratification before acting on its own. (A-1465; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CON 4 US-USSR)

Rusk

109. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, May 12, 1965, 1305Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 US-USSR. Confidential; Limdis.

3386. Subject: Norris Garnett PNG Case./2/ We have following thoughts including those on possible retaliation against Soviet Embassy Washington in response to PNG action against Garnett.

/2/On May 11 the Foreign Ministry had declared Norris D. Garnett, Assistant Cultural Officer at the U.S. Embassy and the first African-American assigned there, persona non grata for carrying on work hostile to the USSR among African students.

1. Although Soviets undoubtedly hope by their move re Garnett and lurid publicity being given to case in Soviet media to discourage African students in Moscow from further contacts with U.S. and other embassies, we are not sure that this will prove to be case. Possibility exists that move may boomerang and serve to stimulate even greater discontent among African students. We will be alert to this situation in immediate future and believe it is factor to be considered in determining our own course of action.

2. So far as reaction in Africa and West is concerned, it seems likely that Soviets could receive bad black eye from their transparent attempt to place blame on Garnett for obvious and widespread discontent among African students in USSR. We should not deflect world attention from this aspect of case by immediate PNG action against Soviets.

3. On specific issue of reciprocity in Garnett case, we feel that at some point we should retaliate, and that PNG action to be most effective should be against relatively higher ranking member Soviet Embassy. However, in short term, there may be some deterrent value vis-á-vis Soviets in delaying such action and leaving threat of PNG move hanging over heads Soviet Embassy.

In sum, therefore, Embassy's view is that we should retaliate for Garnett PNG action but that move should be delayed for reasons suggested above./3/

/3/On June 1 the Department of State, following Kohler's suggestion, declared Soviet First Secretary Stefan M. Kirsanov persona non grata in return.

Kohler

110. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/

SNIE 11-11-65

Washington, May 26, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board. Bundy forwarded the estimate to the President under cover of a June 7 memorandum in which he stated that it was "unusually interesting, and I think you will want to read at least the first page and perhaps the whole thing. The net of it is that the Soviets made a policy decision to mend their Communist fences even at the expense of good relations with us. This is a point which is worth making publicly, and I will be making it to newspapermen who listen, unless you object." (Ibid.)

SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US

The Problem

To assess current Soviet attitudes toward the US, particularly in the light of the Vietnam and Dominican Republic situations, and to estimate probable Soviet foreign policy in the next few months./2/

/2/Unless otherwise specified, this estimate does not consider Soviet reactions to any major changes in US policies toward the DRV or the DR. [Footnote in the source text.]

Conclusions

A. Khrushchev's successors, seeking new ways to cope with the Chinese challenge to Moscow's authority, have altered the priorities of Soviet foreign policy. They began to do so very shortly after gaining power and well before present US policies in Vietnam went into effect. The new leaders did not set out deliberately to reverse the course of East-West relations which had developed after the Cuban missile crisis. Rather, they gave first priority to efforts to repair the USSR's position in its own camp and in the underdeveloped world, consciously accepting as a consequence a deterioration of relations with the US. (Paras. 1-4)

B. This revision of policy has led the Soviet leaders to re-enter the Vietnamese crisis and to assume increasing commitments there. Vietnam has now become a pivotal issue in Soviet foreign policy, setting narrow limits on Moscow's freedom of maneuver in other areas of East-West relations. (Paras. 5-7)

C. Nevertheless, Soviet conduct continues to reflect a concern to avoid high risks and a desire to remain in contact with Washington. In time, experience may persuade the Soviet leaders that competition with China on the latter's terms is unprofitable and that a hard-line foreign policy is inconsistent with efforts to promote domestic economic growth. During the next few months, however, we expect the USSR to give vigorous opposition to the US on a wide range of issues. We believe that present conditions, particularly the situation in Vietnam, virtually preclude Soviet willingness to improve relations with the US./3/ (Paras. 8-14)

/3/The intelligence community issued similar conclusions regarding the new regime's foreign policy innovations in National Intelligence Estimate 11-65, "Soviet Politics After Khrushchev," July 1, 1965. The estimate also concluded that though the new "collective leadership could endure for some time, we believe that there will be a strong tendency toward one-man rule" that could come to a head in 1966 or even sooner. (Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Registry: Job 79-R01012A)

[Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate comprising 8 pages.]

111. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/

New York, May 28, 1965, 0345Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 18 UN. Confidential. Repeated to Geneva.

4746. Disarmament.

1. Suslov (Soviet Under Secretary in Secretariat) expressed gloom over present state US-Soviet relations, accusing US of, in effect, forcing USSR close ranks with ChiComs. Said he particularly depressed as result his recent visit to Moscow, where he found people speaking language entirely different from what he had become used to over past several years. Complained Soviet advocates of US-Soviet rapprochement, in which group he included himself, were now in extremely difficult position and were accused of being "apologists of American imperialism." Said Dobrynin, whom he saw last week, also very depressed, and observed US "lucky" have man such as Dobrynin as Soviet Ambassador in times like these. Expressed surprise USSR has been able maintain restraint thus far, but was worried it might run out soon. Felt next several months would be crucial, but in spite of his pessimism, hoped for the best. Claimed Soviet solidarity with Socialist countries overriding factor in Soviet foreign policy, and suggested US should keep that in mind. Nevertheless, he believed basic precepts Sov foreign policy as expounded by Khrushchev in his "simplistic" way still valid but had to be handled differently in view changed circumstances (e.g., Soviet-US bilateral deals not now possible). Stressed need for either USSR or US making a good-will gesture, but realized both extremely limited in their freedom of action at this time.

As to prospects for peaceful settlement Viet Nam, thought no negotiations could take place unless US stopped air raids in North Viet Nam. Suspension of raids for just a few days insufficient.

Commented no disarmament talks possible while bombs falling in Viet Nam. Opined solution UN financial problem would depend on general state US-Soviet relations, rather than on what happens in Committee of 33.

[Here follow 3 paragraphs on disarmament.]

Stevenson

112. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, May 30, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FT US-USSR. Confidential. No time of transmission appears on the telegram.

3599. At Spaso luncheon yesterday honor visiting MIT management professors, Gvishiani (Kosygin's son-in-law and Deputy Chief powerful State Coordinating Committee) expressed disappointment lack progress U.S.-Soviet trade relations. Admitting temporary lull in Soviet foreign procurement activities due reassessment priorities, he nevertheless complained American companies with few exceptions did not follow through despite fine talk business international round table conference and numerous visits by businessmen to Moscow.

I replied international situation undoubtedly affecting business decisions but expressed confidence many large American companies prepared do business; licensing policy offered ample opportunities for purchases.

Gvishiani then expressed disappointment that U.S. Govt, despite earlier statements on improving economic relations, was not taking action in trade field. He criticized what he described as greater U.S. interest in political aspects of trade than in actually increasing trade.

I replied the President was moving our trade policy forward despite the tense international situation.

He had appointed Miller committee to help pave way for Congressional action. At this point, Kuznetsov (member State Coordinating Committee) interjected Miller committee's report not helpful./2/ Gvishiani nodded agreement. I said I understood they might not like certain aspects report, and I have my own reservations about certain parts, but report was part of process which would enable USG eventually negotiate on economic matters. I stressed our policy on improving relations with USSR had not changed; present tension not of our making but decision of Soviet Govt which cited Vietnam situation as incompatible good relations.

/2/On April 4 the White House announced the formation of a Special Presidential Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with Eastern European Countries and the USSR, headed by J. Irwin Miller; see Document 25.

After brief recital Soviet Govt position, Gvishiani said this was matter outside his field, for politicians and diplomats to settle, but expressed hope business contacts would continue. This interest, he said, was demonstrated by his very presence at Spaso.

Kohler

113. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, June 3, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 US-USSR. Confidential. No time of transmission appears on the telegram.

3637. Embtels 3595 and 3596./2/ Subject: Nedelya Attack on Embassy Staff.

/2/Both dated May 29. (Ibid.) The former reported that Nedelya, the weekly illustrated issue of Izvestia, carried a full-page article entitled "Spy Mania and Naked Kings" describing the spy activities of the American Embassy. The latter transmitted a translation of the article.

I had hoped to jump Gromyko personally on this subject at Kremlin reception for Norwegians last night but turned out he was not detachable from official group. However, I did have chance take up Nedelya attack with Smirnovsky, head American Department, and Zamyatin, head Press Dept Foreign Ministry.

I told both I had wished remind Foreign Minister my protests against physical attacks on Embassy earlier this year and protest vicious press attack on Embassy and its officers as even more damaging to Embassy operations and to U.S.-Soviet relations. Soviets knew as well as I Nedelya article complete fabrication and allegations against Toon and Logan entirely untrue.

Neither undertook any defense substance article or any rebuttal my charges re falsity its content. However, both immediately cited Stewart Alsop article May 22 issue Saturday Evening Post as requiring response.

Smirnovsky indirectly expressed some regret, saying he recalled many conversations with me over the years to effect we should not approach political problems in terms of personalities or personal attacks. However, our political relations had deteriorated and in this case first offender had been United States in form Alsop article.

Zamyatin, who unlike Smirnovsky, said speaking personally and not for Foreign Minister, was more explicit in analyzing Nedelya article as precise reply to Alsop piece, pointing out in particular, Toon number three in American Embassy as is Lukyanov in Soviet Embassy. When I indignantly pointed out Nedelya, as supplement Izvestiya, official Soviet Govt paper, not comparable private writer for private American weekly, he argued Nedelya had separate independent editorial staff, could not be considered as directly-controlled govt paper like Izvestiya. In end, he said: "to use old Russian expression, (sic) we're even".

Comment:

(1) As suggested reftel, Nedelya article was clearly calculated riposte to Hoover testimony and more specifically Alsop article.

(2) Article stands on own as part of campaign of intimidation against African contacts with U.S. Embassy. I am sure it does not foreshadow any further action against Toon, whom Soviets realize experienced, objective expert with whom they will be dealing for long time to come; and at risk being disproved tomorrow, I believe PNG action also not likely against Logan.

(3) I must say that I regard provision information on Soviet Embassy personnel to Alsop as singularly irresponsible and I trust steps are being taken to establish responsibility. This is game at which Soviets with totally controlled press can always do us more harm than we can do them.

(4) I am sure my protests to Smirnovsky and Zamyatin will be reported to Gromyko and other members apparatus involved. I hope Department officers will make similar remarks to Dobrynin and associates. However, I doubt that more formal protest would serve useful purpose, especially in view obvious official source material in Alsop article.

Kohler

114. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 15, 1965, 5:30 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on June 16. The conversation was held in Rusk's office.

SUBJECT
Discussion on Broad Policy Aspects

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Secretary said he thought that it would be useful to have a good discussion before the Ambassador returned to Moscow on consultation. He would suggest that such discussion deal with the broad aspects of policy, rather than details. We had a feeling that there had been a change in attitude in Moscow and we had received some indications that Moscow thought there had been a change in attitude in Washington. We ought to discuss the issues between us in some depth. As illustrative of the change of attitude, the Secretary pointed out that Soviet leaders had recently attacked the President personally, by name. We had been rather careful on this score and thought this was a rather important point. It had been a surprise to us when the President suggested that we go down the road to peace together, the Soviets responded by accusing him of double talk./2/

/2/In a memorandum to the President for his evening reading on June 15, Rusk summarized this paragraph of the conversation. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164)

The Secretary referred to the fact that in an earlier conversation on Southeast Asia, he had mentioned the possibility of our repeated statements that we did not want a large war might have been misunderstood. He suggested that perhaps Hanoi thought they could have a larger war without any reaction from us. He suggested that the Ambassador check when the 325th DRV Division moved and where. He thought this would help the Ambassador understand our feeling that Hanoi may have misunderstood. He went on to say that we wanted better relations but that there were some things we could not accept. He did not know whether there were other issues than Viet-Nam which may have affected the atmosphere. He knew that the Soviets did not now want to discuss Viet-Nam in detail, but as the two largest and most powerful nations in the world, we had great responsibilities and must do everything possible to avoid misunderstandings.

Dobrynin said he wished to ask a personal question; namely, whether the State Department participated in the drafting of the President's Victory Day speech./3/ When the Secretary replied in the affirmative, Dobrynin said he was disappointed. He said this was a day of memorial in which the Soviet people had lost twenty million killed. He said the speech had been particularly badly received because it had been made on that day. It was difficult from the speech to know who had been fighting whom and it almost looked as if it had been commemorating a war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

/3/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 506-509.

The Secretary said it had seemed to us that the Soviets were planning not a day of recollection of the agony of man that the late war represented, but an anti-German campaign. The Soviets had worked out arrangements on a theme that had made it difficult for us to participate along with them. The speeches that the Soviets had made on this day were not helpful from our point of view.

Dobrynin interjected that at least the Soviet speeches showed that they and the United States had been together in the conflict. The Secretary went on to say that the Soviet speeches and propaganda had engaged in bitter attacks upon the West German Government and the people and that this had not been helpful.

Dobrynin countered by stating that the Soviets had particularly resented the references in the speech to the liberation of East Germany because of the day on which it was made.

Dobrynin said he had raised the question of drafting of the speech from a professional point of view. Ambassador Thompson said that from a professional point of view, he thought the Soviets had made a mistake by sending out invitations referring to the celebration of the victory of the Soviet Union over Fascist Germany. Dobrynin replied that his own invitations had not been so worded, and that he had nevertheless had few representatives of the State Department present.

In reply to the Secretary's question as to what significance should be attached to the personal attacks upon the President, Dobrynin hesitated for some time but then said that he supposed it was because the Soviets realized that the President was the center of power and was responsible for the policies that raised issues between us. He reverted to Viet-Nam and said he knew nothing about the 325th DRV Division, but pointed out that we had over fifty thousand men in South Viet-Nam and that even if there had been a Division from the North, the rebellion could not have been carried on unless it had been an indigenous one.

The Secretary stated that this argument could be used the other way because our people were interlaced with the South Viet-Namese, working with them in the countryside on agricultural and other projects and that they would not be sustained in this work if the people of South Viet-Nam did not want them there. He stated it was the intervention from the North that brought in American troops.

Dobrynin asked the Secretary how he saw the end of the story.

The Secretary said he could not predict the end because this depended upon two sides, but that there could be peace very quickly if Hanoi would stop doing what it was doing in the South. He said that there could be elections in both parts of Viet-Nam and that these people could live in peace. He then expressed his great disappointment over developments in Laos. We had thought that we had agreed to let the Laotians alone. They were not a warlike people and we were convinced that if they were left alone they would stop killing each other. The numbers of the North Viet-Namese in Laos never fell below six thousand and the International Control Commission was never allowed to come into Pathet Lao-held territory. He said this problem would have created a greater issue between our two countries if we had thought that the Soviets had had greater influence on the ground.

Dobrynin replied that we could not say that the Soviets had violated any agreement, but the Soviets could produce a whole list of actions on our part. When the Secretary suggested that we should talk about that list, Dobrynin said that the Soviets' conscience was very clear. He went on to say that this was true even of bilateral relations. There had been no movement in this field but all of the matters were held up on the American side. When the Secretary referred to the Blagonravov/Dryden talks,/4/ Dobrynin replied that there never had been much cooperation in space, but that there had been no retreat on the Soviet side. He then mentioned that he had been awakened at three o'clock in the morning to assist us in stopping signal interference with our satellite communications. The Secretary said that their cooperation in this matter had been very much appreciated.

/4/On June 8, 1962, Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA, and A.A. Blagonravov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences reached an agreement on cooperation in outer space. Talks on various projects had continued between Soviet and U.S. officials since that time.

The Secretary concluded the conversation by suggesting that they meet in about a week's time, which would give the Ambassador an opportunity of finding out whether Moscow had any points to raise.

115. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, June 25, 1965, 1800Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 86. Confidential; Limdis.

3863. FonMin Gromyko accompanied by Smirnovsky came to Spaso today for lunch in honor of George Kennan./2/ Stoessel and Toon were only other guests present. I had originally invited Keldysh, MGU Rector Petrovsky and several other historians and academicians but all for various reasons declined. On behalf Gromyko, Foreign Office had initially expressed doubts that FonMin would be able to attend but subsequently called Embassy to advise that after rechecking his calendar Gromyko had found it possible to accept. I suspect that when Gromyko reached this decision word was passed to other invitees they should decline in order permit FonMin engage in private, frank conversation which in fact took place. Conversation ranged over wide spectrum and throughout Gromyko was affable and gave impression of genuine desire to resume dialogue on basic issues which initiated in post-Cuba period. Following are significant points in exchange relating to Vietnam and US-Sov relations.

/2/A 7-page memorandum of the luncheon conversation is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XII.

After general discussion and frank exchange of views with Kennan on national liberation movement thesis-in which Kennan proved to be able and effective advocate our position-Gromyko turned to me and said he wished to convey two basic points. In first place, he said, Soviets are not authorized and cannot negotiate on behalf of North Vietnam. Vietnamese situation must be discussed with DRV. He would point out that so far as Soviet position is concerned, 4-point statement by DRV/3/ would be reasonable basis for negotiations. As he had told Secretary Rusk in Vienna,/4/ Gromyko would caution the US that no progress could be made if any future approach to DRV should be cast in "insulting" terms as it had been previously. For US to announce suspension of hostile action against DRV and simultaneously to inform DRV that unless it behaved according to our prescription the punishment would be resumed was bound to lead us nowhere. Secondly, Gromyko stressed that it has been and continues to be fundamental Soviet policy to seek improvement in US-Soviet bilateral relations. He was compelled to observe, however, that Soviet Government had been disappointed by drastic change in US policy since elections, and Soviets could not avoid feeling that policy now pursued by President Johnson in most instances paralleled that endorsed by Goldwater in electoral campaign. I made following comments on Gromyko's remarks. I said US Government fully recognized difficulties faced by Soviet Government in dealing with Vietnamese situation; obviously Soviet maneuverability was restricted by attitude of Hanoi and to certain extent Peking. On other hand we had hoped that Soviet Government would be prepared to bring its influence to bear on Hanoi in effort to bring about peaceful settlement of Vietnamese problem which neither of us, I felt, wished to see escalated to a dangerous degree. Meanwhile, I thought Gromyko should recognize that current US policy of support for South Vietnam was laid down 10 years ago and had been followed consistently by three administrations. Recently, of course, degree of US support had increased but this had only been in response to step-up in hostile and terroristic activities of forces controlled by North Vietnam rather than change in our basic policy. Equally, there had been no change in US policy with regard to our bilateral relations with Soviet Union. We have consistently taken position that despite current difficulties, particularly in Vietnam, we desire continuing improvement in US-Soviet bilateral relations on which such significant start had been made in 1963. It was our impression from public statements of Soviet leadership and Soviet press comment that it was Soviet attitude that in this respect had undergone a basic change. They had in fact flatly stated both privately to me and then publicly, that US activities in Vietnam were incompatible with continued improvement US-Soviet relations. It was therefore reassuring to me personally to have Gromyko restate in positive terms his government's position in favor of improvement of US-Soviet bilateral relations. I could assure him that we would do our part toward this end.

/3/For text of the 4-point North Vietnamese statement, April 8, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 245.

/4/For a summary of Gromyko's conversation with Rusk in Vienna, May 15, see ibid., Document 303.

Comment: It is entirely possible of course that reason for Gromyko's appearance at Spaso was simply to satisfy his curiosity about Kennan whom he had met only briefly shortly after the war, to make appropriate official gesture following 1952 PNG action, and to attempt to influence views of a prominent representative of American academic community. However, it became obvious that Gromyko had come specifically prepared to make to me statement summarized above. It is obvious from this account that Gromyko was not prepared or authorized go much beyond officially stated Sov position, particularly on Vietnam. I had impression, however, particularly from his positive comment on US-Sov relationship (which does, of course, differ from official position), his affable mood, and his almost wistful recall of 1963 atmosphere that there is perhaps some new flexibility in Sov posture. It seemed to me that he was trying to suggest that Soviet Government finds itself in extremely awkward position, that it genuinely desires to see the heat taken out of Vietnamese situation, that this can be done only by direct approach to Hanoi accompanied by cessation of bombing. He seemed to imply some hope that if this should be done Hanoi's response would be positive and the Sov Gov would then find it possible and desirable to resume the dialogue with US and restore the hopeful relationship which existed in 1963./5/

/5/In a memorandum to Bundy on June 26, Klein commented that Gromyko's statement was a watershed in U.S. relations with the new Soviet administration on which he hoped Rusk could build in his next conversation with Dobrynin. To help the situation along Klein suggested that Senate action on the consular convention and movement on the East-West trade act could be helpful. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. X)

Kohler

116. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 28, 1965, 7:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-

McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11. Secret. An "L" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. A handwritten notation at the top of page 1 reads, "Put on desk."

Agenda for Tuesday Lunch

There are a number of special issues which need brief discussion in order to have your guidance clearly understood, and it may save you time to list them this evening.

[Here follow items on Vietnam, Disarmament, the India-Pakistan Problem, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.]

7. Communication with the Soviets-I continue to be troubled by the fact that you yourself are not in direct communication with any member of the Soviet Government, and I would like to raise for consideration the possibility of an interview between you and Dobrynin after his interview with Rusk. I believe myself that it would have a helpful holding effect in a relatively cool period. The alternative would be a Pen Pal letter, but I see no good basis on which to generate such a message right now./2/

/2/The President met for lunch with Bundy, Rusk, and McNamara from 1:25 to 2:35 p.m. on June 29, but no record of the discussion has been found. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

[Here follows item 8 on China.]

McG. B.

117. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, July 3, 1965, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 USSR-US. Secret. Drafted by Thompson, initialed by Rusk, and approved in S/AL on July 3. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

SUBJECT
Miscellaneous Matters

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

In reply to a question from the Secretary, the Ambassador said that he was sailing from New York early Thursday morning, July eighth and planned to leave Washington Tuesday evening. If necessary, he could stay over until Wednesday.

The Secretary said that the President might wish to see the Ambassador before he departed, but this would only be known after the President returned to Washington. The Secretary said he would let Dobrynin know as soon as he found out anything.

The Secretary inquired what questions about the United States the Ambassador thought he would get when he returned home.

Dobrynin said that he was sure he would be asked what the plans of the American Administration were, particularly with respect to Viet-Nam. The United States talked of its readiness to settle the conflict but its actions took the ground out from under such declarations. Until the bombing of North Viet-Nam stopped, it was difficult to imagine how one could even approach negotiations for a settlement.

The Secretary said that as a matter of broad Government policy, the United States would like to see improved relations with the Soviet Union. There had been no change in this policy. He said this was why in their last talk he had mentioned the personal attacks on President Johnson./2/ The President has tried to keep from arousing feeling in the United States against the Soviet Union. These attacks on him, however, aroused feelings among the American people against the Soviet Union. If we were not careful, opportunities to improve relations would be closed because of the aroused feelings of our people. The Secretary pointed out that his own language was always moderate on such issues.

/2/See Document 114.

The Secretary continued that in the broadest sense, the key problem between us at the present time was that of Southeast Asia. We have conflicting impressions with regard to the Soviet attitude toward discussing these issues. Mr. Gromyko in Vienna/3/ had indicated he had no desire to discuss these in any formal way and the Secretary had the same impression with respect to Ambassador Dobrynin. On the other hand, the Secretary was aware that the Ambassador had discussed these issues with many others.

/3/See footnote 4, Document 115.

[Here follow 7 paragraphs of discussion on Vietnam.]

Mr. Thompson said that with reference to bilateral relations which the Ambassador had mentioned, he thought he might like to know that Senator Fulbright was initiating closed hearings on the Consular Convention in order to ascertain whether we could move on this matter. He said, also, that the President and Senator Fulbright were actively considering the possibilities of trade with the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had reported his last talk with the Secretary in which the Secretary had said he had the impression that Moscow thought our policy had changed. He said frankly that Moscow did think there had been a change of policy from that of President Kennedy and from the position taken in the election period as well as from the talks that he had had with the Secretary. By way of example, he cited the ever increasing United States involvement in Viet-Nam, the bombing of a socialist state, the United States intervention in the Dominican Republic, and in the Congo. He also referred to the financial question in the United Nations and the different plans that had been developed for an MLF or similar arrangement. He also cited the President's statement of May seventh,/4/ which Moscow had considered was hostile to the Soviet Union. He pointed out that all of this had affected our relations. He said that Moscow still supported the policy of peaceful coexistence and thought that the deterioration in relations was not the fault of the Soviet Union. He pointed out, however, that one could not look at bilateral relations in a vacuum. The United States Government must have known that its decision to bomb North Viet-Nam would result in a worsening of relations with the Soviet Union. The United States action against North Viet-Nam had no perspective and was very dangerous. The Viet-Namese people were determined to fight for their freedom and the socialist countries were determined to help and to oppose aggression.

/4/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 506-509.

The Secretary interrupted to ask if the first step was not to pull North and South Viet-Nam apart militarily.

Dobrynin repeated that the United States bombing and the increase in our troops in South Viet-Nam pulled the ground out from under our peaceful statements. The Soviet Union thought that the four-point proposal of North Viet-Nam was a good basis for solution. He added, however, that the Soviet Union does not represent North Viet-Nam nor the National Liberation Front. They had not asked the Soviet Union to represent them.

The Secretary said it would be a mistake for the Soviet Union to conclude that there had been a change in the United States policy since the Kennedy days. In those days we had had serious crises and he mentioned tension over Berlin initiated at the Vienna discussions. He said that our attitude in the United Nations was based upon our interpretation of the Charter. We hoped the matter could be settled. We had led no crusade during the two years that the Soviet Union was behind in paying its assessments but when Article 19 came into operation, we had serious problems. Even if the Soviet Union had paid, we would have had a serious problem with France. It was not only a question of Charter interpretation, but a question of our relations with the Congress because of the legal differences between voluntary and compulsory payments. We had encountered difficulty this year with regard to the appropriation for the regular United Nations budget because of this matter. The Secretary also pointed out that this question of United Nations dues was not a recent development but was due to the fact that the Soviets had let their arrears go beyond the two year rule. The Secretary also pointed out that the MLF had been initiated under President Kennedy. It would not be correct for Moscow to conclude that because we do not abandon the MLF that we are following a policy hostile to the Soviet Union. We know that the MLF does not represent a proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government takes a different view. It would be a great tragedy if we can't find some way to move ahead on the question of proliferation.

Dobrynin inquired how this could be done and asked if the United States position was basically the same.

The Secretary replied that the question would be reviewed after the German elections, but without an international understanding, many nations could move in this direction. Nuclear weapons were becoming easier and cheaper to make. Perhaps nothing could be done for the time being, but it would be tragic if we could not halt the spread of nuclear weapons, and, in any event, there was no basis for concluding that there was a change in United States policy.

With respect to the Dominican Republic, the Secretary said we were fully informed on the activities of the two Communist parties in that country. Both were in touch with Castro, and this constituted a problem. We would not permit them to arm civilian bands to take over the country by force. There would be elections there and a constitutional government would be formed.

With respect to the Congo, the Secretary said that the upper circles in the Soviet Union know that we are aware that Soviet arms were sent to the Congo rebels through Egypt, Algeria, and other countries. We concluded that this was a change in the policy of the Soviet Government. The Soviet leaders should know that we are not naive in this matter.

The Secretary said, as he had indicated in the previous conversation with respect to the President's speech on May seventh, that we were well aware of the plans of the Soviet Union to use this occasion for sharp attacks on the German Federal Republic. This got in the way of any joint commemoration of the day we should have celebrated together.

Dobrynin pointed out that the Soviet Union had particularly resented the references in the speech to liberation, presumably of Eastern Europe. He pointed out that this harkened back to a policy of one of the Secretary's predecessors. The Soviet Union had given us no grounds to reopen this question.

The Secretary observed that when we talked of building bridges, we had in mind improved relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. He reminded the Ambassador that there was a flood and torrent of talk constantly coming out of the socialist countries with respect to Wars of Liberation. These ideological differences between us exist, but the Soviet Union devoted much more propaganda and activity to these differences than we do.

In reply to a question, the Secretary said that our recent talk with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw had taken the usual course. He said, however, that some messages we had received from the Chinese seemed to mean that they wanted to get the Soviet Union and the United States into major conflict with each other. This should not be allowed to happen. When Dobrynin asked what these messages were, the Secretary said he was not at liberty to go into details.

Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary believed that our bombing of North Viet-Nam would lead somewhere. He referred to the wartime experiences with bombing and said that the Soviets did not think that this activity could lead to a settlement.

The Secretary said the Ambassador must realize that the 325th Division in South Viet-Nam was killing South Viet-Namese and Americans. We were not going to allow them to do this and to bomb our Embassy and people in restaurants, and then sit in a safe haven and be secure in carrying out such operations.

Dobrynin pointed out that the Secretary seemed to consider that everything was the fault of the North. He did not appear to recognize that there were forces in the South opposed to the Government. He cited an article by Gordon Walker to the effect that the Viet Cong enjoyed considerable support of the people of South Viet-Nam.

The Secretary said that the United States forces were in South Viet-Nam only because of what the North was doing against the South. He said that when the sects in the South were opposing the Government as well as some other elements there, we did not put in United States forces-nor, for that matter, did we do so as a result of the activities of the indigenous Viet Cong.

Dobrynin said that we were fighting the Viet Cong now.

The Secretary said that we were also fighting the North Viet-Namese and fighting Viet Cong, supplied with arms and direction from the North. Why should we talk to the NLF in regard to the North Viet-Namese Division in the South? We did not go into Viet-Nam until the North intervened.

The Secretary said that we had many prisoners that came from the North. He asked whether the 325th Division would go home if we stopped bombing.

Dobrynin noted that the Secretary said "if."

The Secretary asked if we should leave those who are supplying the arms and matériel and directing the operations in the South to sit safely in the North. That was why he had asked the Ambassador some time ago what else would happen if the bombing stopped. Referring to Dobrynin's remark that we should stop and see, the Secretary inquired how long does one have to stop. He repeated that both countries must be interested in better relations. This was an imperative of history. He observed, however, that some Soviets seemed to follow the line that "what is mine is mine, and what is yours must be discussed and divided up again." Gromyko had told him that North Viet-Nam was socialist and would remain so, and that he would talk only about South Viet-Nam. The agreement we had reached about Laos had not proved to be worth anything. When Dobrynin said that we had violated the agreement, the Secretary replied we had not done so until we had found out that it was being violated by North Viet-Nam. He said we could accept full compliance with the agreement on both sides and would be very glad to know how to get to that position.

On the question of safe haven, Mr. Thompson pointed out that we had thought it important that Peking take note of the fact that this kind of activity could not be carried on without any reaction.

In concluding the interview, the Secretary wished the Ambassador a good journey and said that he would be in touch with him about the possibility of his seeing the President./5/

/5/No record of any meeting with the President has been found, although Bundy sent Johnson on July 4 a 1-page memorandum recommending it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12, Pt. 2)

118. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, July 15, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret; Immediate. According to another copy this telegram was drafted by Harriman, initialed by Kohler, and transmitted at 7:55 p.m. (Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Telegrams) Bundy forwarded the text of the telegram to the President under cover of a July 15 memorandum that stated: "What is striking is the rather routine character of Kosygin's comments: a standard list of disarmament objectives, a standard attack on the MLF, a standard speech in favor of national liberation movements, and a standard exchange on Vietnam. I fully concur with Harriman's judgment that Kosygin was working from an agreed Soviet line." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12)

138. For President and Sec State from Harriman. I had three hours and a quarter talk with Kosygin this morning in Stalin-Khrushchev old office in Kremlin. He was alone except for Smirnovsky, head of USA section Foreign Office and a notetaker. Sukhodrev interpreted for both of us. Kohler and Emb Off Brement accompanied me.

Kosygin was completely negative, in fact at times insulting though occasionally with a smile.

I told him I had no message or authority to negotiate but would gladly explain US position on any subject he wished and answer any questions. It was important to avoid any misunderstanding of each other's intentions. For example, I gathered from Soviet press that they thought President Johnson had changed President Kennedy's policies, whereas the fact was President Johnson was carrying on the same policies and objectives. I explained that President Johnson had sincerely desired to come to Soviet Union, meet and talk with him and his colleagues, that he believed in values of personal discussions and that he was anxious strengthen objective of peace by finding ways to overcome differences and settle disputes.

Kosygin commented that if I was finished with my statement, he would expound the Soviet positions in confidence and with expectation his remarks would not reach press. They had voted for Johnson against Goldwater although their ballots could not be counted, as they had hoped President Johnson's election would make possible progress in our relations. Our bilateral relations, he maintained, were the most important subject in maintaining peace. He then listed six points which he considered most important (1) non-proliferation; (2) ending all nuclear tests; (3) reduction nuclear weapons; (4) reduction overall military expenditures; (5) increase in our commercial transactions; and (6) closer personal contacts. These problems were difficult of solution, but they had been hoping for progress and that trust and confidence between our two countries could be developed. Frankly they had lost confidence and he would state why. He said there were dangerous forces at work and mentioned West German revanchism. He also stated that there were others who want to bring our two nations at loggerheads.

Since President Johnson's election antagonism had grown. The multilateral nuclear force in Europe was aimed at Soviet Union and US was thereby protecting German revanchism.

He went so far as to say the US had become a symbol of revanch-ism in Europe, (possibly having Eastern Europe in mind).

Furthermore the United States was trying to strangle national liberation movements everywhere in world. In this we would fail as attempts to strangle NLM's had never been successful. Another factor, he said, is that unlike US, Soviet Govt always strictly abides by all understandings even informal and mentioned as example understanding with President Kennedy on voluntary arms reduction by mutual example. USSR had done its part in accordance with statement of Dobrynin to Secretary Rusk in cutting expenditures by 500,000,000 rubles, whereas we had increased our expenditures $700,000,000 to pay for "your war in Vietnam." President Johnson had also made statements against the Soviet Union (he mentioned that I had done so also) and had ignored the Soviet Govt wishes in regard to MLF and other matters. He concluded this part of this statement by saying US cannot dictate to others by force.

I refuted his charges emphasizing MLF as a means of preventing proliferation in Europe of individual national nuclear capability. I tediously went through post war history of Soviet aggressive attitude in Europe under Stalin as basis for formation NATO.

A lighter touch arose when I pointed out MLF was a method by which a number of fingers had to pull the nuclear trigger. Kosygin asked why arrangement should not be truly multilateral thereby including the Soviet Union as well. I agreed that was an objective to which we could well address ourselves.

I underlined the dangerous situation that arose in Latin America and other areas where the Soviets support NLM's that were in no sense indigenous but imported from outside. I referred specifically to Venezuela where terrorists were trained outside the country and were sent back with arms to attempt to overthrow a democratically elected government. This led at last to Vietnam. Kosygin asked if I truly believed there was a legitimate government in Saigon. I countered by asking him if he truly believed the NLF was an independent movement or aided and abetted by North Vietnam.

This led to another prolonged discussion in which he accused first me and then President Johnson of pretense contending "you can't believe what you say." I explained the hard information gained over last three and half years of Viet Cong direction and support by North Vietnam and questioned the validity of the sources of his information. He maintained that he knew the facts. At this point he indicated he had another engagement and had nothing more to say unless I had some constructive proposal. I referred to the fact that we hadn't discussed our bilateral problems he had mentioned, including normalization of our commercial relations. He responded to this and asked how long I was remaining in the Soviet Union explaining he would be away till Monday evening on visit to Riga. It was arranged I would see Matskevich, new Agricultural Minister, whom I had known in 1959 and possibly take a trip outside Moscow. He agreed to see me on his return-hopefully Wednesday.

The conversation was tense at some moments and Kohler and I gained impression he was following a line agreed upon with his colleagues in advance.

I emphasized several times that he must understand President Johnson had overwhelming support of the Congress and the American people and that he would stand firm on the commitment taken by President Eisenhower a decade ago to the people of South Vietnam to protect their right to determine their own future and that North Vietnam would not be permitted to take over SVN by force. President Johnson was ready to undertake discussions without preconditions. Kosygin, however, said they could not influence this question. Hanoi was the responsible party and that we should approach them. He added "of course people with the noise of bombs in their ears are not anxious to negotiate." He also complained that our actions are helping Peiping in its dispute against the Soviet Union.

More detailed blow by blow account follows./2/

/2/The more detailed account was transmitted in telegram 139 from Moscow, July 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR) A memorandum of the conversation was transmitted in airgram A-120 from Moscow, July 22. (Ibid., POL 1 US-USSR)

Kohler

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