Washington, March 12, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, Vice Presidential Memcons. No classification marking. Prepared by Humphrey on March 15 as a memorandum to the President. For Dobrynin's summary of the meeting, see In Confidence, p. 138.

SUBJECT
Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy, March 12, 1965

Tonight Mrs. Humphrey and I dined alone and informally with Soviet Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin, finally accepting an invitation that had been scheduled and cancelled several times during the last few months.

Dobrynin had a question to put which he repeated several times: "How much importance does the United States give to its relations with the Soviet Union? Do you consider relations with the USSR to be of high priority? Of highest priority?"

Dobrynin professed puzzlement by U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam. He reviewed briefly US-USSR relations during the Johnson Administration. When President Johnson assumed the Presidency his policy toward the USSR was unknown. Gradually the Soviet Union had come to respect him as a supporter of the Test Ban Treaty, of non-proliferation of weapons and the voluntary cutback in the production of fissionable materials. The Ambassador said the Soviet people had developed a sympathy for the President, partly because the Soviet press had given broad coverage to the President's positive steps for peace.

But, said Dobrynin, why did the United States bomb Hanoi while our new Premier was there? Before his visit we were not committed to heavy support of North Vietnam: but we were now. We thought the President was a man concerned about relations with the Soviet Union-that he had put them at the top of his list. When the President defeated Goldwater we looked forward to better relations. But we can't understand why you are testing us now. We are in a quandary. Don't you think your relations with the USSR are of high priority? If you do, then why do you bomb North Vietnam? Why do you test us?

Or, asked the Ambassador, is it because you base your policy on Soviet-Chinese differences and you don't think we'll aid Hanoi? If so, you're wrong. Why do you do this? Our relations, continued Dobrynin, seemed to have improved. What's gone wrong? The President had said he might come to Russia and he wanted our leaders to come here.

I try to cable the truth to Moscow, including things the Foreign Office doesn't like. I say the good things when I think they're good. I try to tell the truth. But why are you testing us now? Don't you understand as a Socialist State we are morally and ideologically bound to come to the assistance of a sister Socialist State? We can't be a leader and stand by and ignore the bombing of the North Vietnamese.

Is it because your policy is based on Soviet-Sino differences, he asked. These differences are real. But you are pushing us together. You will force us to admit there can't be peaceful co-existence. If you continue to bomb and aggress against North Vietnam, we lose the argument. You're forcing us to agree with the Chinese who say to us, "Look at that brutal bombing! And you speak of peaceful co-existence?"

Dobrynin here returned to US-USSR relations. We don't want to admit we're wrong, he said. But I can't understand why you bombed when Premier Kosygin was there. I can't understand what your government was thinking of. Do you care about your relations with the Soviet Union? The fact that you bombed while our new Premier was present leads us to the opinion that you don't care, or is it because you're trying to confront us? Can you imagine the USSR bombing another country being visited by President Johnson? If we wanted to confront you, then perhaps. But for any other reason? Kosygin is a new Premier; do you seek to embarrass him?

At this point I said, you know the President used every means at his disposal to prevent embarrassment to Kosygin. He ordered US Military to take no provocative actions and to use all influence possible to dissuade South Vietnamese counterparts from taking any actions that might embarrass your Premier. We were of the opinion that it was Peking and Hanoi who sought to embarrass not only Prime Minister Kosygin but also President Johnson. They tried to embarrass us both.

Dobrynin said that surely the United States did not think the Soviet Union so stupid as not to have understood what was going on in Hanoi. But if your government had only said to us, "There's been an attack on our men and material at Pleiku and Camp Holloway. We know Kosygin is in Hanoi. We feel we must retaliate. But out of respect for Kosygin, we won't do it when he is there." What did the United States have to lose?, he asked. North Vietnam had no air force; the United States could strike North Vietnam at any time against little opposition.

We understood what they were doing, the Ambassador continued. Why didn't you credit our intelligence? Up until that incident on February 7, Kosygin was not committed to North Vietnam. He was new and his government was new. There are always uncertainties with new governments. And then your action caused great concern back in Moscow. When the Soviet people read that 150 bombers took off in Saigon and bombed North Vietnam they remembered that only 5 or 10 Luftwaffe bombers wiped out or burned whole villages. When they heard bout 150 American bombers, what were they to think? The people asked what's happened? What were we doing to make the Americans stop?

Then Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union had understood the vital interests of the United States. The Soviet Union respected them. It respected the power of the United States. But by bombing North Vietnam the United States might force a confrontation that could grow more serious and painful every day.

Then I replied. I drew from my pocket the statement of the President on August 10, 1964./2/ I read that statement carefully to Ambassador Dobrynin. I made it clear that President Johnson's policy and Congress' policy were one. The policy of the United States was published to the world and understood by the entire world. Surely it was understood by the Soviet Union before the trip by Prime Minister Kosygin to Hanoi and to Pyongyang. I said we considered relations with the USSR to be very important. Every decision the President makes is made in the light of these relations. The Soviet Union knows we have a commitment to defend South Vietnam. We intend to keep that commitment.

/2/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, Book II, pp. 946-947.

President Johnson refrained for a long time, I continued, from responding to attacks upon Americans in South Vietnam. There had been an attack upon Americans during Christmas. President Johnson refrained from responding to that attack for two reasons: he did not want to accelerate the struggle; he hoped it was only an isolated incident and not a broad pattern.

Then I cited the White Paper which indicated the seriousness of the infiltration of men and arms across the border into South Vietnam./3/ (Dobrynin did not then, or later, seek to deny Hanoi's command and direction of the war.)

/3/See footnote 5, Document 100.

Dobrynin agreed for the moment to assume the correctness of the facts of the White Paper. But even if there are 30,000 North Vietnamese infiltrators, that number is still only about the same as your 24,000 U.S. soldiers. Further, it's obvious you've put much more military material into South Vietnam than has Hanoi, he said. But the war continues. Therefore, there would be a civil war whether North Vietnam were engaged or not. The Vietnamese do not want the regimes of Saigon. It is the view of the Soviet Union that South Vietnam, if left free to make a choice, would become Communist, sooner or later.

For a considerable period of time, Dobrynin said, the USSR had not been disinterested in an international conference. It had not closed the door on United Kingdom or French initiatives. "But we're not interested anymore," he said.

I said we had reliable information that Hanoi boasted it was going to win anyhow and saw no reason to go to a conference. I considered that talk a threat to peace.

I said I wanted to direct his attention again to what President Johnson has said. We had no great desire to have our boys killed anywhere in the world, but the North Vietnamese must leave South Vietnam alone. If what you say is true, it is a civil war that is going to end in a victory for Communism anyhow--what do you risk by insisting that North Vietnam cease and desist its infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam? Why does not the USSR, acting in its capacity as Co-Chairman of the Conference that set up the general guarantees, take some initiatives, exercise its leadership, and persuade North Vietnam to stop? What have you got to lose? You say your sister state is going to win anyway, what can you lose? Use your influence, and you have influence, and demand that Hanoi stop its command, direction, and above all, infiltration. If infiltrations stop, and it can be verified, then there is something accomplished. At least there would be a step toward conditions for a peaceful settlement.

You know, responded Dobrynin, you can't police a jungle border.

I know you can't be absolutely sure every rifle has stopped coming across, I partially agreed, but if you really put the pressure on Hanoi, it would stop.

Dobrynin said the United States could not expect that while its bombings were going on.

I said that North Vietnam should be willing to respect its agreements. The first Geneva Accord was now eleven years old. We are not going to stop our bombing while North Vietnam continues to ignore its agreements. If North Vietnam gave any indication by positive action, particularly by cessation of its flow of subversives and arms into South Vietnam, we then might have the beginning of possibilities for diplomacy. If we could see twenty-years ahead we would hope that US-USSR were working together more closely. The most dangerous threat today was not between the world's largest powers but from skirmishes between smaller states which might back powerful Allies into a corner. The situation today was somewhat like 1914.

Dobrynin said that we were much more mature now. We had learned a lot. He didn't think we would let 1914 happen again.

There were some differences now between 1914 and 1965 I agreed, but small powers seemed to get larger Allies into interesting positions.

Why don't you stop injuring, Dobrynin asked, the vital interests of the US and USSR? Surely the United States understood that the USSR knew there were certain things it must never do when it came down to the vital interests of the U.S. And surely the U.S. knew the USSR could not back away from a Socialist country. If it did, the whole Communist camp would say the USSR was weak-that the USSR put United States interests above those of the Socialist system.

I then pressed him hard. He must understand the United States is a major power. It was sensitive about being attacked by others. Our people would accuse us of having no courage if we didn't respond to illegal and outrageous attacks upon American soldiers and airmen. What else could the Soviet Union expect us to do after this long line of bloody incidents? You recognize we are in South Vietnam. We are committed to its defense. South Vietnam is being attacked by North Vietnam. The Viet Cong are agitators, terrorists, subversives, infiltrated, directed and commanded by Hanoi. They might not have crossed the border in a formation of ten divisions in the old fashioned way, but they have crossed and they have aggressed. Perhaps the United States still had something to learn about what you call wars of national liberation, but we are learning. We will win the war in Vietnam. We all know there have been certain instabilities in South Vietnam, but the margin of the difference between its stability and instability is the infiltration by North Vietnam. That infiltration must cease.

Dobrynin said he knew the U.S. was a major power. "Why don't you believe we know you're strong," he said. "We know what you can do. We know you could probably destroy us. You have massive strength. Whatever you do, you do as a very strong state."

I said that he might say that. But Hanoi seems to see nothing of the sort. They call upon us to get up and to go home. We are not going to get up and go anywhere as long as Hanoi continues its aggression against South Vietnam.

Dobrynin said he knew the United States did not want to negotiate. Right now the USSR did not want an international conference. That was the declared position. But there were other ways, he mused. During the Cuban confrontation, his house had been used for various things, not for negotiations, but for things that have been instrumental in getting a settlement. There were many other ways.

I asked him to assume that North Vietnam and the United States were locked together; tied down on a track from which they could not get loose. According to Dobrynin, this situation had led to trouble. Now shouldn't the USSR exercise some initiative in this situation? Wasn't the USSR concerned about its relation with the United States? If our relations were of the highest priority, should not the USSR use its strong position in the Communist camp and persuade the North Vietnamese to cease and desist forthwith?

104. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, March 26, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 USSR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S and S/AL on March 26. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 2587, March 27. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VIII)

SUBJECT
Call on the Secretary by Ambassador Dobrynin

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Ambassador began by congratulating the United States on the achievements of our cosmonauts and on the Ranger lunar probe. He then made the following oral statement, which he said was on the instructions of his Government.

"I informed Moscow about our conversation on March second, Mr. Secretary./2/ Now I have been instructed to convey to you some considerations in connection with your statements, made during that conversation.

/2/A copy of the memorandum of Rusk's March 2 conversation with Gromyko, primarily on Vietnam and Laos, is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-1 ASIA SE. The portion of the memorandum on Laos is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII, Document 170. The two also briefly discussed resumption of the Geneva Disarmament Conference and East-West trade.

"1. Careful study was given in Moscow to what you said on a number of questions concerning international affairs and our bilateral relations as if in continuation of the talks held last December between you and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

"To your statement that the Government of the United States continues to be interested in the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union, we can give a plain answer:

"The Soviet Government, as it has already declared, stands consistently for the development and improvement of relations with the United States of America. And we agree when you, Mr. Secretary, say that, as the U.S. Government believes, our countries must pay a constant attention to every possibility of improving the understanding between them and to the search for ways of settling outstanding problems. And it was with this view, in particular, that we held the exchange of opinion with the American representatives during the December talks, mentioned by you, Mr. Secretary. In the same spirit we, as is known, had also an exchange of views later, including exchanges through other channels.

"It would hardly be right, however, to pretend that since the time of the December meetings nothing has happened in the world and that the international situation as well as the atmosphere of the Soviet-American relations have not undergone any changes. It would mean to depart from the reality and to close eyes to the actual state of affairs. One cannot but admit that the international tensions have again increased in the recent months and that a certain damage has been caused to the relations between our countries.

"First of all, we have in mind, of course, the actions of the U.S. against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, our attitude toward which was given in the statements of the Soviet Government of February 9 and March 4./3/ Such actions by the U.S., and we deemed it necessary to say it also publicly, are incompatible with the statements about an intention to improve relations with the Soviet Union. It is hard to imagine that the leaders of the U.S. foreign policy would not have realized this and would not have taken into account that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is a socialist country to whose fate the Soviet Union cannot and will not remain indifferent. How then should we view the American bombings of the DRV territory? In any event these aggressive actions of the U.S.--and they cannot be defined otherwise--cannot serve as an example of a 'constant attention toward all possibilities of improving the understanding between us.'

/3/For text of the two statements, see The New York Times, February 9, p. 12, and Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 24, 1965, p. 17.

"The Soviet Government has warned the U.S. Government that the Soviet Union together with its allies and friends will take measures to protect the security and to strengthen the defense capability of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. There should be no misunderstanding on this point: all necessary measures are already being taken and will be taken for defending the brotherly socialist country.

"It should be said straightforwardly: the armed provocations by the U.S. against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam are undermining the very foundation on which the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. can only be based, namely-the principle of peaceful coexistence. One may not accept this terminology, one may use other words-but what is important is strict observance of this principle in international affairs and, especially, by the great powers. In our times, no less than before, it is true that 'the world is indivisible' and that creation of a hotbed of tension in one point of the globe inevitably entails new dangers, new deterioration of the whole international situation. It would be also a mistake to proceed from an assumption that it is possible to apply different standards to one's own actions and the actions of other powers and to believe that one may do what the other may not.

"2. In our conversation, Mr. Secretary, you said a great deal about the situation in Southeast Asia. The U.S. Government believes, as one can understand your words, that the interests of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. do not collide in that region and that therefore our countries should both apply their efforts to finding mutually acceptable solutions to the problems of that area. First of all, it should be noted that the first point would be correct provided neither of the sides interfered into the affairs of the countries of Southeast Asia. We find it necessary to state quite definitely that open military interference of the U.S. in South Viet-Nam, the American bombings of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam affect the interests of all socialist states and all peace-loving peoples.

"We, of course, absolutely do not agree with your evaluation, Mr. Secretary, of the situation in South Viet-Nam and of the reasons that have created the present situation. In the talks last December you, Mr. Secretary, were informed in detail about our view with regard to the developments in South Viet-Nam and it was shown that the assertions about the so-called "aggression from the North" against South Viet-Nam were without foundation. Precisely the U.S. policy which in the past wrecked the Geneva agreements that provided for a unification of Viet-Nam on the basis of free elections, gave start to the deterioration of the situation in Viet-Nam. It was emphasized that the U.S. does not have any rights to dictate to the Vietnamese people as to how they should decide their domestic problems. We warned at that time that by trying with the help of bombs to solve this problem, the U.S. was taking a very dangerous path and that the American actions in South Viet-Nam were in contradiction with the statements of the U.S. Government about the desire to contribute to the lessening of tensions in Southeast Asia.

"The recent events show that the U.S. has taken the course of escalating the war in Indo-China. The increasing armed intervention of the United States in South Viet-Nam, the landing there of combat units of the U.S. Marines, the sending of new American military units and armaments to that region, the concentration of U.S. Navy forces off shores of Viet-Nam--all these are acts of overt aggression creating a threat to peace and security of the peoples. Having taken the course of bombings of the territory of the DRV the U.S. has crossed all the limits in its aggressive acts and actually started military actions against an independent and sovereign state.

"If the United States assumes that by its provocative aggressive actions in Viet-Nam it will be able to intimidate anybody, it is a gross miscalculation. Calculations of this sort are without any real ground. By such kind of actions, by direct and gross violation of the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China and of most elementary norms of international law it is impossible to find 'a mutually acceptable solution of the problem of this region' of which you, Mr. Secretary, spoke. It is the course aimed not at finding a settlement, but at a dangerous widening of the military conflict, a course fraught with most serious consequences for the entire international situation. The U.S. Government is assuming a very grave responsibility for all the consequences of such a course.

"When you, Mr. Secretary, say that we should, perhaps, discuss respective evaluations of the situation in Viet-Nam, at least, for the purpose of clarifying this question and when you state that the U.S. is prepared to do this, one can answer as follows: if the U.S. Government really desires to look for ways for a peaceful settlement, then it is necessary to strictly carry out the Geneva Agreements and, first of all, cease the aggressive acts against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

"The U.S. Government knows how we view the situation in Laos. We have repeatedly drawn the attention of American representatives to the fact that the aggravation of the situation in that country is caused by continuous interference of the U.S.A. into her internal affairs which recently has taken an absolutely inadmissible form of American bombings of various points on the territory controlled by the Pathet Lao forces. Is it not a most rude violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos?

"Whether Souvanna Phouma can come to an agreement with Souphanouvong is an internal matter of Laos. We hold the view--and we have repeatedly stated it to the U.S. representatives--that an agreement between Laotian factions would have become possible had it not been hampered by American interference into the affairs of Laos. You, Mr. Secretary, suggest that in the efforts to settle the problem of Laos the starting point should be the signing of the 1962 Geneva Agreements and not the situation which had developed in that country before the Agreements, since otherwise, as you said, there would be little hope for success. In reality, however, the actions of the U.S. are leading to the pre-Geneva situation if not to an even worse situation. At the same time the United States rejects proposals on the necessity to convene an international conference on Laos. The question arises what is the true position of the U.S.A.?

"We believe that if the Geneva Agreements on Laos are to be considered, as you suggest, 'a symbol of a possibility to achieve not only a bilateral agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. but of broader agreements,' then it is necessary first of all to strictly observe the Geneva Agreements.

"As to giving recommendations by the co-Chairmen to the participants of the Geneva conference, in accordance with Article 19 of the Protocol, concerning further activities of the International Control Commission, this question is under study now. However, one cannot but see that the development of events in Laos hampers making of a decision.

"3. You put forth considerations why the American Government thinks it useful to resume the work of the Committee of 18 on disarmament.

"As is known, the questions of disarmament were rather thoroughly discussed during the exchange of opinion between the Soviet Union and the United States in New York and Washington last December. On December 7, 1964, the Soviet Government submitted for the consideration by the 19th session of the U.S. General Assembly specific proposals on the measures for further relaxation of international tensions and limitation of the armaments race./4/ The U.S. representatives said that these proposals would be thoroughly studied. So far, however, we have not received any reply from the Government of the United States. Due to the well-known circumstances, the responsibility for which rests not with the Soviet Union, the problem of disarmament has not been discussed at the 19th session of the U.N. General Assembly either.

/4/See footnote 4, Document 78.

"We consider negotiations on the problem of disarmament to be important and necessary. However, speaking about the work of the Committee on disarmament, it is necessary to recognize that it has not produced any tangible results. Besides, it can be said that tensions that recently increased in connection with the United States' acts in Southeast Asia create the atmosphere which by no means facilitates negotiations on disarmament. One cannot ignore in this connection also the plans for creating the NATO nuclear forces in any of their variations-in the form of 'multilateral force' or 'Atlantic Force.' Such plans are absolutely incompatible with the need to solve the disarmament problem and, in particular, of the problem of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. If these plans were realized this would inevitably cause a new intensification of the armaments race.

"4. There are also other important international issues which are on the agenda and which must be solved. Among such problems is first of all the problem of European security and German peace settlement.

"It should be pointed out that your statements on the questions which you raised do not contain any constructive proposals.

"As to us, our proposals, in particular on such questions as the German problem, disarmament and Laos, are well known to the American side. The position of the Soviet Government in connection with events in Viet-Nam are also well known to the Government of the United States. We can only repeat that first of all it is necessary to stop aggressive acts against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, to withdraw the U.S. Armed Forces from South Viet-Nam and to strictly observe the Geneva Agreements.

"We shall not conceal that we are under impression that in Washington they apparently underestimate all the seriousness of the situation which is developing in this connection, all the burden of responsibility which the United States is assuming for its aggressive actions in Indo-China."

The Secretary said that he would wish to study his statement carefully and would be in touch with him later about it, but would make certain preliminary comments. He said that with respect to Laos, the sole object of our policy and attitude was complete compliance with the 1962 Accords. He wondered how we could make progress unless there was a common understanding of facts. We knew that at no time after the signature of the 1962 Accords did the North Viet-Namese strength decline below six thousand men and that they have continued sending men and arms into Laos contrary to the Geneva Agreement. The present situation was that the Soviet Government supported the Geneva Accords and this was important. We did the same. The problem was now how to get to the result that that Accord was implemented for. To be frank, since the Kennedy/Khrushchev talks in 1961,/5/ and the conclusion of the 1962 Agreements we felt that the Soviet Union was acting in good faith. When major violations of those Agreements occurred, we did not attempt to hold the Soviet Union wholly responsible since we realized that they did not control the Pathet Lao or the Viet-Namese. Nevertheless, violations did exist. The problem was how could we and other signatories bring Laos back to compliance. The Secretary referred to the events in 1964, when the Pathet Lao moved in the Plaines Des Jarres to destroy the position of the neutralist forces there. Then there was the difficulty of the position of Souvanna as Prime Minister, which the Pathet Lao treated with contempt. In addition, there was the continued paralysis of the International Control Commission, which was unable to find out the simplest facts about the situation. He wished to suggest that the question facing us in Laos was how to make the 1962 Accords effective. We were prepared to do everything possible to bring the situation back to compliance with the Geneva Agreements. He doubted, however, that Hanoi was interested. The Secretary concluded his remarks on this subject by saying that he would give further study to the remarks which Dobrynin had made.

/5/For records of Kennedy's conversations with Khrushchev, June 3 and 4, 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. V, Documents 83-85 and 87-89.

With regard to Viet-Nam, the Secretary said we should distinguish between two different aspects of the matter. If the Soviet Union felt it has a commitment to support the security of a socialist state, then we have no quarrel on that issue. We have no desire to destroy any socialist state and, on the contrary, we would use our own influence against the use of force to interfere with socialist countries. In Southeast Asia, however, we have a different problem. North Viet-Nam is attacking its neighbors, sending military men and arms into Laos and into South Viet-Nam. For the Soviet Union to say it is going to support socialist countries in such activities does bring us into a situation in which we have a real issue. We have said to all capitals concerned that peace can be restored almost overnight if North Viet-Nam stops its activities directed against South Viet-Nam. We do not ask the Soviet Union publicly to confirm the facts as we know them to be, but we do ask them to believe us when we say that North Viet-Namese men and arms are being sent regularly to Laos and South Viet-Nam. Yesterday the Secretary had seen reports of prisoners identifying their North Viet-Namese units. We knew that there was a North Viet-Namese divisional headquarters in South Viet-Nam.

The Secretary said we recognize the fact that the Soviet Union had some problems within the Communist world that make for complications in settling these matters, but they should be settled. We were not asking North Viet-Nam to surrender, but only to stop shooting.

Dobrynin broke in to ask if they were shooting at us. The Secretary replied that they were. He went on to say that we saw no suggestion that the North Viet-Namese were interested in stopping the conflict. He said that if the North Viet-Namese forces had moved as divisions across the border, the whole problem would have been quite clear, but clandestine infiltration did not change the matter. We did not believe that the problem of the divided countries such as Korea, Germany, and Viet-Nam should be changed by force. We did not know what capabilities the Soviet Union had to get Hanoi to settle the South Viet-Nam problem promptly. We had hoped that the Soviet and British co-Chairmen could have ascertained the views of the parties so that the co-Chairmen and others could have examined these views to see whether there were possibilities to solve the problem. We were disappointed that the Soviet Union decided it could not act in that capacity. It was hard to believe that there was any basic conflict of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. At least we hoped that it was the case. The ability of these states to live at peace with each other was all we asked as we had no specific United States interest in this area.

The Secretary said we hoped it would be possible to solve this question without undue delay, but he had to add that we have undertaken direct, simple, and clear commitments to South Viet-Nam and we would meet these commitments. He only hoped that the necessity for meeting them could be avoided by prompt restoration of peace in the area.

With regard to disarmament, the Secretary said we attached real importance to the continuation of the discussions in Geneva. Each side had made a number of proposals to the other. There had been a little progress and he cited the Test Ban Treaty and some steps taken by mutual example. He thought we should not be discouraged because we have not accepted the Soviet proposals nor they ours. Each side was disappointed by the response of the other, but the efforts should be continued. In this respect, we had an obligation to our own peoples and to the rest of the world. He pointed out that conditions had not been good when Mr. McCloy and Mr. Zorin had made progress in 1961. There had also been tension while the Test Ban Treaty was being considered. He hoped both Governments would continue to work on the subject of disarmament.

On the German question, the Secretary said he did not have much to add at the present moment. He had raised with Gromyko the possibility of informal discussions at the Ambassadorial level but Gromyko had not been receptive to Four-Power talks on this issue.

Dobrynin pointed out that the Soviet Government had also made a proposal for discussions.

The Secretary concluded the interview by saying that he would later give the Ambassador a more systematic reply to his statement.

105. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, April 5, 1965, noon.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VIII. Confidential. A handwritten note at the top of page 1 of the telegram reads, "Bundy: Kohler's estimate of US-USSR relations and his recommendation."

2920. Vietnam and Soviet-American Relations.

I. When new Soviet leadership decided, several months ago, that conduct their conflict with ChiComs required reversal Khrushchev line and reversion to active role in Southeast Asia, they must have realized this could entail deterioration their relationship with U.S. They apparently hoped damage could be limited both in scope and in duration, and assumed normal relationship could then be restored.

After Kosygin in Hanoi found Ho Chi Minh and company confident with respect outcome South Vietnam and negative with respect negotiations, Soviet dilemma sharpened. It has since been aggravated by mounting American support of South Vietnam, on one side, and continuing ChiCom attacks on Soviets, on other. In circumstances, they have now clearly decided imperatives their commitment and influence in Communist world at this stage are incompatible with and predominate over interest in continued development relations with U.S.

II. More precise import this decision is now emerging, both in word and in deed. As regards deeds, it now seems clear that there will be no new initiatives on Soviet side or acceptance of initiatives from American side (with possible exception a few non-political matters of tangible interest or value to Soviets). Presently arranged exchanges will be allowed to continue but will not be extended or added to. Not only will direct negotiations at least be played down, if not avoided, but same will apply to international forums where U.S. and U.S.S.R. are main protagonists.

Following are principal matters in which this decision has played major role to date:

1. Bilaterals.

A. Rejection of national war college visit and postponement of U.S. visit of Sov military officers.
B. Inaction on leased line request.
C. Refusal of requested extensions to U.S. exchange students.
D. Stalling on other bilaterals such as exchange of meteorological data. (Exception for King Crab discussions and fishing inspections which Sovs must regard as of commercial advantage.)

2. Negative decision on resumption of ENDC.

3. Color TV deal with French.

Unless and until situation changes, this line of action (or inaction) will continue to be followed, with negative implications for resumption progress in bilateral field, and further aggravation already negative attitudes with respect such international problems as disarmament, UN finance and peace-keeping, and Germany.

III. As regards words, all stops are now being pulled out in major political and propaganda campaign designed to justify course adopted by Soviet leadership in eyes own people and to undermine U.S. position throughout world. This has gone through several stages:

1. Initial reaction to airstrikes against North Vietnam, while shrilly reflecting official anger at coincidence with Kosygin visit, was relatively controlled. Main feature this phase, demonstrations Feb 9 and March 4 against Embassy, boomeranged so violently they could only add to embarrassment and frustration leadership (and hopefully, may finally have persuaded them this not useful instrument of diplomacy).

2. After fiasco March 4 demonstration, campaign of more peaceful protest meetings launched in factories, institutes, universities, trade unions and other organizations throughout country and similar activities promoted abroad. These have produced shower of petitions to Embassy, telegrams to White House, and continuing flow of material "branding shameful aggression American imperialists" which now constitute substantial portion reading matter offered Soviet people in daily press.

3. World-wide interest in Voskhod II was exploited to initiate sharper phase of campaign, with Brezhnev on March 24 branding "American aggressors" as barbarians and bandits who should not think "time will wash off disgrace [of] their crimes." Polemical style of professional party propagandists was apparent in subsequent note delivered to and returned by this Embassy March 26 stating as fact "confirmed by official U.S. spokesmen" that "poison gases are being used in South Vietnam by the U.S. armed forces with approval U.S. State and Defense Depts" and charging that "Today United States has passed over from experiments to combat employment these inhuman weapons" which even "Hitler and his generals did not dare to put into use."/2/ Particularly scurrilous cartoons have subsequently developed theme of rejected note, though this aspect may in time be inhibited by our setting record straight and paucity foreign reaction for local quotation. Campaign in general, however, continues and likely be sustained indefinitely, blending into anti-U.S. and anti-FRG themes being developed for 20th anniversary World War II victory.

/2/Regarding the use of riot-control gas by U.S. forces in Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Documents 210, 211, 215-217, and 248.

4. Top officials from government ministries were instructed not attend social functions U.S. Embassy February and March but lower ranks were allowed to come and no effort made cut off scientists, journalists, artists and other "intellectuals." In encounters at various ceremonies elsewhere, leaders and high officials have been personally cordial but have seemed almost studiously avoid substantive talk, particularly about Vietnam.

IV. Current period seems likely be much more protracted and harder [to] live through without serious damage than Cuba crisis, especially in view relative weakness and sense of frustration of present Soviet leadership. However, some salutary forces are at work and may help so:

1. A knowledgeable Soviet source has told us that while "tough" sections top leadership want complete stoppage Soviet-American activities, including exchanges, "you have some influential friends who do not allow this to happen." This seems confirmed by continuing friendly attitude members Soviet elite, who while apprehensive about possible escalation and confrontation, seem anxious continue contacts and keep things going forward.

2. As nearly as we can judge, people generally are apathetic and skeptical. Somewhat disturbed by sense of increased war danger and by "poison gas" charges but with basically curious and friendly attitudes toward United States unchanged. Embassy travelers have been in north, in central Asia and in south during past two weeks visiting many institutions where "protest meetings" had been staged by party agitators. Reception invariably friendly, practically no mention Vietnam, some expressions regret damage to Embassy and hostility toward Chinese.

V. I see little we can do which would bring about substantial change current Soviet policy in short run. However, I consider essential for longer run to maintain posture on Vietnam reflected in President's statement of March 25/3/ and to demonstrate in word and deed we desire continue course of sound improvement Soviet-American relations of recent years. Indeed, while I recognize deteriorated atmosphere presents problems, I hope we will push forward such pending matters as ratification of consular convention, East-West trade legislation, and provision suitable premises for new Soviet Embassy, all of which are in our net interest, and encourage private interests similarly carry on as normally as possible, for example by participation in upcoming Soviet film festival and chemistry exhibition. In word, I think we should persistently reiterate themes that (a) U.S. policy of helping in past ten years; (b) U.S. policy of improved understanding with Soviet Union continues; and (c) if there is deterioration relations this result of changes in Soviet, not American policy. Soviet controlled media will not publish American side of story, but this becomes known here through VOA and other foreign media and local grapevine and will have salutary effect.

/3/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, p. 319.

Dept please pouch to interested posts.

Kohler

106. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

SC No. 00665/65A

Washington, April 9, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VIII. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. A report along similar lines, RSB-30, April 5, prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, USSR.

THE SOVIET UNION SINCE KHRUSHCHEV

After six months of consolidation and transition, the new Soviet leaders remain committed to the broad policies and goals established by the three party congresses of the Khrushchev era. However, they have introduced a new style of leadership which emphasizes a careful approach to basic economic problems and a greater regard for expert judgment, in contrast to Khrushchev's penchant for panaceas and quick solutions which often proved to be unworkable. The new agricultural plan revealed by Brezhnev in late March testifies to the collective leadership's ability to make bold and far-reaching decisions on fundamental policy questions. It not only represents a thoughtful, concerted attack on the problem of agricultural productivity but also acknowledges that the necessary resources to solve this problem can be found only by cutting back on budgetary allocations to other claimants.

In contrast to this generally successful performance in domestic affairs, the new leadership's first major departure from Khrushchev's course in foreign and international Communist affairs has miscarried. Developments in the Vietnam conflict over the past two months have led to a deterioration in Soviet relations with the US, a potentially dangerous involvement in Indochina, and an aggressive Chinese reaction which has again thrown the USSR on the defensive in the struggle with Peiping.

How to Deal With Khrushchev

The most immediate question facing the new leaders last October was what attitude to adopt toward Khrushchev. Their decision to forgo a full-scale denigration campaign and to stand on the official explanation that he was relieved of his duties because of his advanced age and the deterioration of his health-was probably influenced by a variety of reasons.

The new leaders undoubtedly recognized that direct attack would be hailed by the Chinese Communists as confirming their indictments of Khrushchev's "revisionism." They probably also saw that detailed charges against Khrushchev would tend to commit them to a wholesale repudiation of his policies and predetermine their future lines of movement. It seems unlikely, moreover, that any move toward sustained public denigration would have encountered strong opposition within the leadership and jeopardized the collective facade at the very outset. Finally, the Soviets were probably aware that a "de-Khrushchevization campaign" would sharply aggravate the delicate relations with the Eastern European governments and foreign parties, whose initial criticisms of handling of Khrushchev's dismissal raised a clear danger signal.

Collective Rule

As in the initial period following Stalin's death, Khrushchev's successors have rediscovered the "sacred and immutable" Leninist principle of collective leadership and have vowed to prevent the emergence of a new "personality cult." In contrast to Khrushchev's demagoguery and flamboyance, they have made a studied effort to appear businesslike and dignified. In informing the US Embassy, for example, that the traditional New Year's Eve party in the Kremlin would not be held, Soviet officials implied that this spectacle was considered too Khrushchevian.

Collectively, particularly in the early stages, was carefully observed in protocol matters, with greetings to foreign leaders signed by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Mikoyan. In day-to-day matters, party leader Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin seemed rarely to intrude into each other's sphere. Both government and party were represented in missions abroad and in consultations with foreign visitors in Moscow. Care was taken that no single leader monopolized public attention. Personal publicity in the press was carefully balanced.

This partial and probably temporary closing of ranks, however, does not mean that maneuvering for advantage, competition, and policy differences were not under way within the leadership. There have, in fact, been some indications that the period of relative political truce is coming to an end. But the unprecedented overthrow of a Soviet leader by his erstwhile protegés and lieutenants with the stated purpose of restoring "Leninist norms" of collective leadership appears thus far to have imposed a substantial barrier against the emergence of the kind of earnest struggle for power that marked the early post-Stalin period.

Division of Responsibilities

The process of defining the relative power and positions of the ruling group is still very much in flux. Brezhnev is showing signs of emerging as "first among equals" and his position as party first secretary affords him a powerful advantage. But Premier Kosygin seems to rank not far behind in the external symbols of authority. Although Podgorny's status has recently become ambiguous, his public actions, at least in the first four months, suggested that he was acting as the senior party secretary immediately below Brezhnev. Publicity accorded Mikoyan, as titular chief of state, is intended to place him in this inner circle, but the record so far gives the impression that neither he nor Suslov is in the first rank.

The Top Three

In the first months following the Khrushchev coup, Brezhnev seemed to be playing a cautious hand. He avoided firm commitments to any controversial positions and his speeches revealed little except a desire to avoid giving offense to any of the various competing power hierarchies.

At last month's central committee meeting, however, Brezhnev-by acting as spokesman for the bold new agricultural program-created the strongest impression of personal leadership since the fall of Khrushchev. Although the new program was undoubtedly worked out through the efforts of a large number of leading officials, including several members of the party presidium, it will be identified with Brezhnev and he will reap the political benefits of whatever success and popularity the program achieves.

The fact that Brezhnev has been willing to gamble his political career on a program so heavily dependent on touchy shifts in resource allocations suggests his mandate is a strong one and that he is confident of his ability to surmount any opposition from the military or heavy industry forces.

Unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev has assumed an unobtrusive style which is consistent with other indications that he is very much an "organization man." He is apparently attempting to build a machine manned by a personal following and there are already signs of a Brezhnev clique in the party presidium composed of some of its younger and more energetic members. Shelepin, Demichev, and Kirilenko probably are included in this group. While there is no assurance that this alignment will persist indefinitely, it provides a power base which might enable Brezhnev to establish a commanding position in the party apparatus over a period of a year or two.

There have been only a few signs of a similar power grouping around Premier Kosygin. His strength seems to lie primarily in the respect he commands as an able administrator with an unrivaled knowledge of planning and industrial problems. As such, he may well be the most indispensable member of the present leadership. He has emerged as the leading exponent of a "scientific" and businesslike conduct of affairs. His report to the Supreme Soviet session in December on the 1965 economic plan was free of the usual ideological incantations.

Kosygin has manifested no tendency to emulate Malenkov's ill-fated attempt to aggrandize the governmental machinery at the expense of the prestige and authority of the party apparatus. Although Kosygin probably could command wide support within the managerial elite, his performance and power base to date seem to rule him out as a major contender in a contest for supreme power. Since he rose through the government and economic apparatus, not through the party, Kosygin would appear to have little chance of competing successfully with Brezhnev and Podgorny for control of the crucial levers of party power.

Podgorny represents the most uncertain quantity in the present power equation. He was generally considered to be Brezhnev's principal rival for the succession in Khrushchev's last years. In contrast to Brezhnev, who holds no governmental office, Podgorny has used his position as a member of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet to inject himself into foreign relations. In this capacity, he headed a widely publicized delegation to Turkey earlier this year.

There were numerous indications during the first months after Khrushchev's fall that Podgorny was one of the major forces in the leadership. He joined Brezhnev in consultations with foreign Communist delegations. The regime seemed to be trying to demonstrate a near equality of status by designating Brezhnev to give the traditional anniversary speech on 6 November and Podgorny to propose-in the main address at the central committee plenum on 16 November-the reunification of the party organizations for industry and agriculture. The detailed reporting in the Soviet press on Podgorny's activities in Turkey seemed strong evidence of his importance in the leadership.

Podgorny's status, however, has taken on a degree of ambiguity since his return to Moscow in mid-January. For some unexplained reason, he did not give the television report on this trip until 6 February. Although he continued his role in consultations with foreign party leaders by accompanying Brezhnev to Budapest at the end of February, he did not participate in the 19-party "consultative meeting" in Moscow in the first week of March.

The first tenuous evidence that Brezhnev or other members of the leadership might be attempting to undermine Podgorny's position appeared in the newspaper Economic Gazette in late February. Two articles in one particular issue drew a rather startling contrast between the poor economic performances of the Ukrainian oblast of Kharkov, with which Podgorny is most closely associated, and the excellent performance of the rival Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, which is Brezhnev's old bailiwick.

If Podgorny has in fact become the target of the kind of oblique sniping that marks the early phases of a power struggle, one of his vulnerabilities may be the fact that he, probably more than any of the present leaders, was regarded as a confidant of Khrushchev. It would be premature, however, to underrate Podgorny's prospects for survival in this kind of internecine warfare. He is an experienced and shrewd politician and undoubtedly has a sizable personal following in the central committee.

Other Signs of Strain

There have been several indications that the question of personnel appointments is one of the very sensitive issues facing the new leaders. While some of the earlier changes suggested that Brezhnev was beginning to get his own way in this field, later developments indicated a renewed effort to maintain a balance of forces.

No one has clearly emerged as the master of party personnel matters. Speculation that Podgorny, whose specific responsibilities are still not certain, had taken over this potent position has proved so far to be unfounded. Suslov, on one occasion, and Shelepin, on another, represented the hierarchy at important personnel meetings at the provincial level, but Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny have not been associated publicly with any aspect of cadres work. It seems likely that this responsibility has been diffused among the top leaders in some form of collective control and handled by horse trading and compromise.

This was brought home most markedly as a result of the shifts announced at the March central committee session. The only promotion to full membership in the presidium-that of Mazurov, the former Belorussian party boss-involved a man with a conspicuous lack of ties to any of the prominent contenders for power. In addition, Mazurov also became Kosygin's chief assistant as first deputy premier-a job for which he has absolutely no experience. In another part of this balancing act, Kosygin's former first deputy, Ustinov, was transferred from his home ground in the government to work in the party secretariat under Brezhnev. It is unclear whether Ustinov's transfer indicates an effort to break the Kosygin orientation in the government or whether it reflects the policy of bringing expert opinion closer to policy-making levels.

The latest shifts also failed to clarify the situation in agricultural leadership where vacancies have existed for several months. The question of a replacement for party secretary Ilichev and the ideological and propaganda sphere was also bypassed.

Another possible sign of strain is the failure to appoint a successor to Khrushchev as chairman of the party bureau for the Russian Republic (RSFSR). This post in the past has belonged to the party first secretary. It was created in the Khrushchev era and had become one of the symbols of his undisputed leadership. It is not clear whether Brezhnev has not claimed this post out of deference to collectivity or whether he lacks the political strength to take it in the face of opposition. It is possible that some leaders favor abolishing the bureau entirely in order to remove this post from contention.

[Here follow sections on the economy and administration, the Secret Police, and the military establishment.]

Foreign Policy

The new leadership's first major departure from Khrushchev's course in foreign and international Communist affairs has miscarried badly and has plunged the USSR into its most serious policy dilemma since the Cuban crisis of 1962. The calculations underlying an ambitious program to reassert Soviet leadership in the Communist world while maintaining a détente line toward the West were abruptly upset by the chain of events precipitated by the Viet Cong attack on US installations in South Vietnam in early February and the US air strikes against North Vietnam. The Soviet leaders now find themselves faced with a deterioration in relations with the US, a potentially dangerous involvement in the Vietnam conflict, and an aggressive Chinese reaction which has again thrown the USSR on the defensive in the contest with Peiping.

This costly venture appears to have been based on the conviction that Khrushchev had drifted too far in the direction of rapprochement with the US at the expense of the Soviet Union's standing in the Communist world. The new leaders, therefore, assigned first priority to restoring a more even balance. To gain freedom of maneuver in coping with the delicate problems of disarray in the Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement, they sought to ensure against serious complications with the West by stressing that foreign policy differences were not involved in Khrushchev's downfall and by reaffirming their continuing commitment to peaceful coexistence and a further reduction of tensions. The new policy, however, not only required a general standstill in relations with the West but a more aggressive posture toward the "imperialists." Appeals for Communist unity in the face of a growing imperialist threat were accompanied by an upsurge in Soviet denunciations of US policy around the world.

In developing this policy, the new leaders had no illusions about Peiping's ambitions and antagonism. Their objective was not to seek a reconciliation but to find more effective means of combating the Chinese challenge. Peiping has tried to discredit the new Soviet line by charging that "in replacing Khrushchev, the new leaders of the CPSU simply changed the signboard and employed more cunning methods and subterfuges in order the better to push through and develop Khrushchevism. . . ."

The main feature of the new Soviet course was to disengage from Khrushchev's penchant for unilateral initiatives and pressures on foreign parties and to wrap Soviet moves in the mantle of multilateral consultations and decisions. Foreign parties were given to understand that the new leaders felt Khrushchev was responsible for bringing the dispute with China down to the level of personal antagonism. They conveyed the impression that although there would be no concessions on long-contested substantive issues, the USSR intended to abandon Khrushchev's "collision course" tactics and work toward a modus vivendi with China. Moscow dropped polemical attacks, called for "step-by-step" progress toward resolving difficulties, and constantly stressed the need for unity in the "common struggle against the common enemy-imperialism." It also professed interest in "activizing" state relations with China and announced that proposals had been submitted to Peiping for expanding trade and scientific cooperation.

The most urgent problem at the outset was to find a way to retreat, at the least political cost, from the Communist "preparatory meeting" which Khrushchev had unilaterally scheduled for 15 December. Although talks with Chou En-lai in early November produced no agreement, the Soviets worked out an arrangement with other parties to postpone this meeting. In contrast to the unilateral Soviet action last summer in convoking the December meeting, Pravda announced on 12 December that the meeting had been rescheduled for 1 March after "mutual consultations" with fraternal parties.

By far the most significant move in this unfolding policy was the dispatch in early February of the strong delegation headed by Kosygin to visit North Vietnam and North Korea, with two brief stopovers in Peiping itself. Subsequent events have painfully brought home to the Soviet leaders that they greatly underestimated the strength of Peiping's reaction to what it was bound to consider impudent interference in China's exclusive sphere of influence.

The Russians apparently considered that the success of their new program depended to a great extent on a vigorous assertion of Soviet influence in and support for North Vietnam-the only socialist state engaged in active, although indirect, hostilities with the leader of the imperialist camp. It would have been difficult to evade this test since the Chinese had made an issue of Khrushchev's equivocal reaction to the Tonkin Gulf incident last August. Talks with the North Vietnamese delegation to the Soviet revolution celebration last November may have encouraged the Russians to believe that opportunities existed for drawing Hanoi back toward a more "neutral" posture in the Sino-Soviet conflict, thus scoring a significant gain against the Chinese.

The decision to abandon Khrushchev's policy of disengagement from the Indochina conflict probably was also motivated by the belief that a stronger Soviet presence was essential to discourage the possibility of direct US attacks against North Vietnam and to gain a greater voice in Hanoi's conduct of the war. There were indications last fall of Soviet concern that both sides were contemplating actions which could lead to a rapid escalation and confront the USSR with awkward and dangerous decisions. Kosygin's mission was thus partly to warn the North Vietnamese not to underestimate US determination to prevent a Communist victory in the South and to urge them to avoid actions which might provoke US retaliation and to play for time to allow political disintegration in Saigon to ripen.

Foreign Minister Gromyko's soundings of US policy in the first half of December apparently persuaded Moscow that the risks of this new policy were acceptable. The USSR sought to place inhibitions on US actions by responding favorably, at first privately and later publicly, to the President's suggestion in his State of the Union message that Soviet leaders visit the US.

The initial Soviet reaction to the Viet Cong attack at Pleiku the day after Kosygin arrived in Hanoi displayed not only shock and indignation but a clear lack of foreknowledge of this operation. Private remarks by Soviet officials showed immediate recognition that the USSR had been placed in a very difficult position of having to choose between giving North Vietnam military support or opening itself to Chinese charges of capitulation to the imperialists. While a few Soviet officials termed the US air strike which followed the Pleiku attack an unfriendly act toward the USSR, a more widespread reaction among the Soviets was that the Chinese had inspired the Viet Cong raid in order to embarrass Kosygin and disrupt Soviet-US relations.

As this new phase of the Vietnamese war began the Soviets at first adopted a noncommittal posture, recognizing that the US air strikes and Chinese attacks on proposals for negotiations had at least temporarily closed the option of any specific Soviet proposals for a conference to deal with the crisis. They cautiously associated themselves with the French position on the need for negotiations, but insisted that talks would be impossible as long as US air attacks continued.

Kosygin's carefully drawn statements in his 26 February report/2/ on his Asian mission represented the limit to which the Soviets felt able to go at this stage. He avoided commitment to any specific proposal but voiced the desire of "peace-loving countries" for a solution "at a conference table" and called for an end to US strikes in order to create conditions for exploring "avenues leading to the normalization of the situation." But even this cautious formula drew an angry retort from Peiping that China would never bow to US blackmail and that "no socialist country should."

/2/For text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 24, 1965, pp. 3-6.

The mutual recriminations between Moscow and Peiping over the 4 March anti-US demonstration in Moscow, which Chinese students turned against Soviet police, destroyed what little remained of the new leadership's attempt to erect a facade of Communist unity.

The combined pressures of Chinese maneuvers to discredit Soviet policy in this crisis and the intensified pace of US-South Vietnamese air strikes in March forced the Soviets to retreat to the position that even preliminary discussions to arrange negotiations are impossible as long as bombings continue and that the USSR, in any event, will never make North Vietnam's interests the "subject of a deal with anyone."

Even Soviet attempts to regain influence in Hanoi by pledging military assistance apparently have run into trouble. Although Kosygin and Brezhnev have announced that this commitment is being implemented, Soviet officials have recently complained that the Chinese are interfering with military shipments to North Vietnam.

Policy Toward the West

Although the Soviet leaders recognize that the Vietnam impasse will lead to a further deterioration in relations with the US, they seem to believe that this will not lead to serious complications elsewhere. They have taken care to keep channels open to the US and have privately stressed their interest in joint efforts to find a way out of the crisis.

The new regime, moreover, has continued to express interest in expanding trade and contacts with the US and has avoided pressures on sensitive points such as Cuba. Although the new Soviet leaders immediately reaffirmed Khrushchev's pledges of support and assistance to the Castro regime, they have continued to urge a "normalization" in US-Cuban relations and have refrained from reviving last year's campaign to halt US overflights. There are some indications of a more critical Soviet attitude toward Cuban economic failures and mismanagement and of greater pressures on Castro to support the Soviet position in the conflict with China.

Khrushchev's successors have been too preoccupied with domestic problems, the Vietnam crisis, and the abortive venture in international Communist affairs to give much attention to other major foreign policy questions. Their concern to reduce Soviet vulnerability to Chinese attacks in the present crisis atmosphere has been reflected in an apparent reluctance to resume the Geneva disarmament talks and to set a specific data for Kosygin's visit to Britain.

The Soviets appear to be generally satisfied with the status quo in Central Europe. There are no signs of any major departures in their policy with respect to Berlin and a German peace treaty. They have continued the trend during Khrushchev's last two years of stressing the importance of European security as a means of covering the abandonment of the long Soviet campaign for a Berlin settlement and a peace treaty.

In seeking ways to further erode four-power responsibility for German reunification, the Soviets have recently shown greater interest in President de Gaulle's proposals for placing a German settlement in the broader framework of European security. They signaled their interest in beginning a dialogue with the French by appointing Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin as ambassador to Paris. Pravda has praised the "candor and realism" of de Gaulle's views and stated that they "open interesting prospects."

Afro-Asian World

There have been no significant modifications in Moscow's orientation toward the Afro-Asian area. The new leaders emphasized the continuity in their policies, particularly on such key issues in the Sino-Soviet conflict as military assistance to India. Their attempt to develop a more effective strategy for dealing with the Chinese challenge, however, appears to have placed an even higher premium on strengthening Soviet influence in countries such as Indonesia, the UAR, Algeria, and other radical African states. The Soviets have continued Khrushchev's policy of establishing close relations not only with neutralist, anti-Western governments but with non-Communist ruling parties, such as those in Algeria and Mali.

The new leaders have maintained Khrushchev's policy of exploiting the Cyprus crisis with the aim of disrupting the southern flank of NATO, bringing about the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases on the island, and complicating efforts to achieve a political settlement. They have persisted in efforts to please both sides without committing the USSR to full support of either. Moscow has carried out the military aid agreement with Cyprus signed two weeks before Khrushchev's downfall and has continued vigorous opposition to any foreign military intervention. But it has balanced this policy by adopting a more favorable attitude toward Turkey.

International Communism

Although the Soviets managed to avoid a complete debacle in their moves to liquidate Khrushchev's project for a new world Communist conference, the failure of their program to reassert Soviet leadership behind a facade of Communist unity against imperialism and the inconclusive results of the 19-party "consultative meeting" in early March have aggravated the manifold problems of dealing with the erosion of Soviet authority in the Communist world. Although the new leaders apparently intend to continue sporadic efforts to isolate and discredit the Chinese by demonstrating Peiping's unwillingness to participate in bilateral and multilateral consultations to resolve differences, this course holds little prospect for success in view of the reluctance of important foreign parties to join in any collective condemnation of China. Faced with this impasse, it seems likely that the Soviets will concentrate greater attention on cultivating ties with non-Communist leftist regimes and parties in Africa and Asia and encouraging Western Communist parties to form alliances with social democratic parties and other groups primarily on domestic issues which will minimize Communist ties with Moscow. This strategy is a continuation of Khrushchev's efforts to counter Chinese claims to Communist orthodoxy by developing a loose grouping composed of pro-Soviet parties and non-Communist parties committed to a "noncapitalist" course in national development.

Outlook

The new agricultural program testifies to the collective leadership's ability to make bold and far-reaching decisions on fundamental policy questions. It confirms that Khrushchev's successors have managed so far to avoid the kind of stultifying discord and immobility that caused previous ventures in collective leadership to fail. But the new regime will face a formidable array of problems over the next year or so in both domestic and foreign policy, which almost certainly will increase pressures on this inherently unstable power structure and strengthen the tendency to disruptive intrigues and divisions.

The agricultural program will require adjustments in the economy, particularly on the vital matter of resource allocations. It will be difficult to prevent the transformation of these decisions into issues of power and prestige among competing power hierarchies. These inherent conflicts of interest are likely to be sharpened by the process of formulating the line to be presented to the 23rd party congress which, under party statutes, should be held sometime this year. The drafting of the five-year plan which becomes effective next January will also require decisions that cannot fail to influence power relationships. The selection of new central committee members prior to the party congress seems likely to intensify competition and discord among the top leaders.

In the foreign policy field, the new regime will not be able to evade decisions in the Vietnam crisis which are bound to have profound effects on the struggle with China and on the future orientation of Soviet relations with the West. The issues in Vietnam far transcend immediate tactical questions of support for Hanoi and attitude toward negotiations, because the Chinese leaders are exploiting this conflict to discredit the USSR's position on "national liberation wars" and its "peaceful coexistence" policy toward the West.

In surveying the wreckage of their design to restore Soviet leadership in the Communist world, Khrushchev's successors have good reason to entertain some rueful thoughts about the wisdom of his policy in dealing with the Chinese and avoiding involvement in the Indochina duel between the US and Peiping and Hanoi. Khrushchev had recognized that the USSR was operating at great disadvantage vis-á-vis China in this area and that no Soviet interests would be served by political or military intervention in this duel.

The difficult position in which the Soviets now find themselves seems likely to intensify the hazards in trying to pursue simultaneously the conflicting requirements of domestic reform and growth, which favor stability and a détente line with the West, and the drive to outbid and outmaneuver the Chinese in a vain quest for "leadership" of the Communist world. This condition of political schizophrenia has long been at the root of Soviet frustrations and abrupt swings in policy lines. Although it is beyond the capacity of any Soviet regime to make a clearcut choice between these conflicting purposes, Khrushchev's decisions in the last year of his rule tended to fall on the side of defending and advancing the USSR's interests and need as a great power at the expense of its pretensions to Communist leadership.

The new leaders now are faced with the same problem of determining the order of priorities in dealing with foreign and Communist affairs. Their uncertainty and hesitation in handling the Vietnam crisis reflects awareness of the high stakes involved. But the miscarriage of their first major foreign enterprise has resulted not only in a painful demonstration of the incompatibility between Soviet and Chinese objectives but in a forceful reminder of the coincidence of Soviet and US interests in blocking an expansion of Chinese power. Moscow will have little freedom of action as long as the Vietnam crisis remains acute. But the experience of the past two months, coupled with the urgent requirements of domestic economic reform and growth, seems likely over the longer term to strengthen the Soviet leaders' incentive to move back toward détente and accommodation with the US as the main focus of their policy. (Secret)

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