91. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 9, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret; Exdis. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on February 9. Also initialed by Rusk. During the conversation Thompson informed Dobrynin that he had also been instructed to officially protest the demonstration against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. (Memorandum of conversation, February 9; ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 USSR)

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

The Ambassador referred to the conversation which I had had with him on Sunday, February seventh at the direction of the President/2/ and said he had been instructed to make the following oral reply:

/2/For a memorandum of this conversation, during which Thompson and Dobrynin discussed the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 82.

"The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state that it cannot recognize as well-founded the attempts to justify the bombing by American aircraft on February seventh and eighth of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It expressed its appraisal of these actions and necessary warnings in the February ninth statement of which the United States Government is aware./3/

/3/For text, see The New York Times, February 9, 1965, p. 12.

"If one takes seriously the repeated statement of the United States Government to the effect that it is striving for a strengthening of peace, for an improvement in American-Soviet relations, then the motives for the actions undertaken by the USA do not lend themselves to rational explanation.

"References were contained in the February seventh White House statement/4/ that these bombings were undertaken in connection with the fact that some sort of plans for actions against American military installations were being hatched by Hanoi. However, to use this type of argument for armed actions in international affairs would mean only an attempt to assume for oneself the right, at one's own discretion, to resort to arbitrary acts which, even expressing it mildly, it is impossible to characterize other than as provocative. It is clear that there can be no justification for such actions which do not conform to elementary norms of international laws.

/4/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 238-239.

"We are told such thoughts were also conveyed from you personally, Mr. President-that the American bombings were undertaken in reply to an attack by guerrilla forces on a camp near the South Vietnamese town of Pleiku, where many American military personnel are located. Consequently, if such an attack took place, it was undertaken on the territory of South Viet-Nam. But can this be a basis for an armed attack on another state? After all, if we are guided by such logic, then it is possible to justify any aggressive actions, to subject any country to bombing. If, for example, affairs are going badly for the USA in South Viet-Nam, then it is somehow permissible for it today to bomb the DRV, tomorrow Laos, Cambodia or other countries. Such a course in international affairs could create very dangerous consequences for peace (the world). [The Russian word can mean either peace or world.]/5/

/5/Brackets in the source text.

"We should like to say directly that it is impossible to solve the problem of South Viet-Nam by such a course. And the Soviet Government would like to hope that greater realism will prevail in the policy of the United States. If the matter stands differently, if in the future also the policy of the United States is made without regard to reality, then it could lead to unfortunate results.

"In a conversation with our Ambassador on February seventh, the question of visits was raised.

"When you, Mr. President, raised in your recent message to Congress the question of exchanging visits between the leading figures of the USSR and USA, we were inclined to regard this as evidence of the intention of the Government of the USA to seek ways to improve Soviet-American relations. Now there has been brought to our attention your words to the effect that the recent developments do not signify changes in your policy, that you are not seeking and do not wish a widening of the conflict. We were informed that in advancing the proposal for the exchange of visits you proceeded and are proceeding from really serious intentions. We are taking these communications into account.

"Unfortunately, there exists an obvious contradiction between the statements of the American side regarding the desirability of meetings for the purpose of seeking possibilities for improving relations and actions like those being undertaken in Viet-Nam; and the Soviet Government in all frankness calls this to your attention.

"We should like to hope that an end would be put to the actions which were undertaken by the United States with regard to the DRV. This would be to the advantage of all and would contribute to the establishment of peace in Southeast Asia. This would also facilitate the development of better Soviet-American relations, toward which the Government of the Soviet Union is, as previously, striving.

"On the USA, on you, Mr. President, depends what turn events will take."/6/

/6/A draft translation and the Russian-language text of this oral statement are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.

92. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, February 9, 1965, 11 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 USSR. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to London, Paris, Saigon, and Hong Kong.

2311. Immediately after demonstration I asked for appointment with Gromyko soonest but since unavailable I saw Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin at 1730 to lodge strong protest./2/

/2/At 7 p.m. Kohler reported that the Embassy was "attacked this afternoon by a mob of at least 1500 persons" including some Soviet students but mainly Asians, despite assurances earlier in the day from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs that protection would be provided. The demonstrators carried placards bearing slogans protesting U.S. action in Vietnam. (Telegram 2308 from Moscow; ibid.)

I told Zorin I wished most strongly to protest fact of demonstration and extensive resultant damage to Embassy premises because of inadequacy of police protection. I indicated that the demonstration obviously had been staged with foreknowledge of Soviet authorities since public announcement of demonstration had been posted on Moscow University bulletin board this morning and it was because Embassy had been informed of this that we had requested Ministry for adequate protection and informed Ministry that Embassy would hold Soviet authorities responsible for any damages incurred. Demonstration had resulted in breakage of about 200 windows, serious defacing of Embassy facade and bombardment of hundreds of missiles--some of such type as to be of danger to life and limb. I had with me samples of such missiles including iron bolts, steel pellets and rocks which I left with Zorin. I also told Zorin that a French correspondent had been seriously injured in demonstration (Ullmann of AFP)/3/ and an American correspondent turned up missing (Clymer, Baltimore Sun). I told Zorin that I expected Sov Govt to compensate Embassy for damages incurred and to make arrangements for immediate repairs to Embassy premises in order to permit carrying out of normal Embassy functions. I also asked him to ascertain whereabouts of missing American correspondent and inform Embassy soonest of results Ministry's inquiry.

/3/Bernard Ullmann, Chief of the Moscow Bureau of Agence France Presse.

Zorin pointed out that the demonstration was direct reflection of strong feelings held by Soviet people and foreign students resident in Moscow toward aggressive action by American forces against DRV, an independent state and friend of Soviet Union. In Zorin's view there was more justification for protest of US actions in Vietnam by those genuinely interested in preservation of peace and normal international relations than for protest against demonstration by people genuinely and deeply disturbed by recent events. With regard my remarks concerning damage to Embassy premises Zorin said that Soviet administrative authorities at request of Ministry had taken ample measures for protection of Embassy including significant reinforcement of militia. He regretted damage to Embassy but insisted that Soviet authorities had made maximum effort to guard against such damage. With regard my remarks re correspondents Zorin failed understand why I should make representations with regard to a French national but he undertook to ascertain whereabouts of missing American correspondent and inform Embassy of results of inquiry. Meanwhile, he was happy to learn that no Embassy personnel had been injured in demonstration and promised to take immediate measures to ensure adequate repairs to Embassy property. In fact, Zorin said UPDK had already been given the necessary instructions and he was sure that they would actively and completely cooperate with Embassy to effect immediate repairs. My additional requests (presumably referring to request for compensation) he said would be promptly examined by appropriate authorities.

I told Zorin I saw no need to debate with him question as to who was real aggressor in Vietnam since I was sure he was familiar with statements issued by White House, Stevenson letter, and statement to Dobrynin./4/ I then said it was perfectly clear from damage caused Embassy that protection accorded by Soviet authorities had been grossly inadequate; while it was true that the militia had been reinforced, no efforts had been made to keep demonstrators away from Embassy and to prevent them from damaging property as well as hurling--in some cases by sling--deadly missiles capable of causing serious injury, into Embassy offices and living quarters. In connection his remarks re French correspondent, I told Zorin that certainly Ullmann had right to be in vicinity American Embassy, that Embassy personnel had interceded in order to rescue him from crowd and had given emergency medical care to obviously seriously injured man; I felt that in this case Ullmann's condition was more important consideration than his nationality. In stressing seriousness with which we regard such demonstrations, I reminded Zorin of statement made by Secretary after November incident/5/ and also remarks by President in State of Union message with regard to need for respect and protection of American property and personnel abroad, handing him a typewritten excerpt of this passage./6/ I said Zorin, of course, aware that in the United States we effectively protect Soviet installations against damage and demonstrators and in fact our regulations preclude demonstrators from approaching diplomatic missions closer than 500 feet. I felt compelled to seek assurances from Ministry that similar adequate measures would be adopted in Moscow and, failing such assurances, I would have to recommend a reexamination of our own procedures.

/4/For text of Stevenson's letter, February 7, see Department of State Bulletin, February 22, 1965, pp. 240-241; for the statement to Dobrynin on the same day, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 82.

/5/See footnote 1, Document 75.

/6/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1-9.

Zorin said he also did not wish to enter into detailed discussion of question of guilt in Vietnam and in this respect would rest on assessment of situation set forth in Soviet Govt statement published in Pravda today. He insisted that protective measures had been adequate and he could assure me that Soviet administrative authorities would continue to apply necessary measures in order protect Embassy property since Soviet Govt considers this solemn obligation. While he would, of course, report my remarks to Gromyko, he wished stress need for removal causes for international misunderstanding and he urged US in particular to bear this in mind. We should recognize that actions incompatible with preservation of peace and normal international relations are bound to give rise to such incidents and demonstration. He felt first task both our governments was to seek avoid cause for such unpleasantness. He hoped US Govt would correctly interpret Soviet Govt's statement published today as well as additional remarks which Dobrynin will be making in Washington on subject.

I again took issue with Zorin's insistence that protective measures had been adequate, stressing that damage to Embassy and behavior of crowd which imperiled life and limb Embassy personnel belied Zorin's assertions. With regard to his remarks on causes on misunderstanding I could agree that it should be mutual responsibility of our two governments to work toward their removal and I hoped that at this very moment Kosygin was using his influence to prevent the kind of aggression that led to the incident today.

Zorin said he could not agree with my assessment of situation and wished point out simply that it was US planes and US personnel and not Soviet planes and personnel that had attacked Vietnamese. He felt we should understand that continued actions of this sort could not but lead to serious consequences./7/

/7/On February 11 the Embassy in Moscow again protested the attack on February 9. On this occasion Smirnovsky stated that he had nothing to add to what Zorin had already said. (Telegram 2323 from Moscow; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 USSR)

Kohler

93. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, February 11, 1965, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

2324. While I continue to believe that Sovs are anxious to avoid escalation of hostilities in Vietnam and this morning's joint statement on the Hanoi visit supports this view, I think we must recognize that if Viet Cong attacks and our retaliatory moves multiply, pressures on Sovs to "put up or shut up" mount accordingly. I would think it likely that the Sovs themselves are now seriously examining possible countermeasures which in their view would promise some prospect of compelling us to temper our reaction to Vietnam developments without running real risk of US-Soviet confrontation. Obviously one of principal reasons for such soul searching exercise on part of Sovs must be recognition that in context their obvious interest in demonstrating their reliability as socialist ally in face of goading commentary by ChiComs, they must at some point be prepared to do more than make statements, attack this already battered Embassy and offer defensive military equipment to North Vietnam.

In this connection, I would call attention to development reported Embtel 2320,/2/ when Embassy officers who planned visit Kiev, Minsk and Lvov on book buying trip were told trip could not be registered for temporary reasons. We have asked British Embassy to make application for similar trip to ascertain if temporary ban applies to them as well. If it does, we should consider the possibility that Sovs are trying to give us the impression that they may be up to some military move in Eastern Europe (e.g. a move against access to West Berlin backed by troop reinforcements) responsive to increased tension in Southeast Asia and in Soviet-US relations. Alternatively, they may be starting some military moves which they wish to conceal at this juncture. Our military attachés inform me that this is not the normal time for winter maneuvers and if troop movements are reason for temporary closing of normally open areas, then they must be of an extraordinary nature.

/2/Dated February 10. (Ibid., POL 17-2 US-USSR)

If Sovs are in fact thinking on these lines they may be making a bad miscalculation. The effect may well be just the opposite of what they hope. On other hand, Sovs may be intrigued with possibilities inherent somewhat less than enthusiastic support of our policy in Southeast Asia by majority Western European countries and may think that by presenting them with possible choice between facing nasty flareup in Central Europe and exerting pressure on us to temper actions in Vietnam, they have real opportunity of causing serious intra-alliance friction.

Other possible pressure points are, of course, Laos and Korea. In latter connection the announcement this morning of Kosygin's trip to Pyong Yang bears close inspection. While we assume for the moment that the principal reason for Kosygin's change in plans is related to the March 1 meeting (and could even be reaction to ChiCom pressure on North Koreans to move South in a diversionary effort), we cannot exclude the possibility of Sovs themselves being intrigued with Korean theater as a vulnerable pressure point. Moves in Laos, of course, would be easier logistically and might be regarded as safer from Sov point of view and perhaps more difficult from US point of view.

As I indicated at outset, I still think Sovs are anxious to avoid any dangerous increase in tension and do not want to be alarmist. However, Sovs do face a real problem in present circumstances and probably feel selves under increasing pressure not to appear weak and ineffective. Their assessment of what they can do with minimal risk and how this may affect Western public opinion is obviously a very tricky exercise. We should be considering what we might do to influence their thinking in a healthy direction./3/

/3/On February 14 Kohler reported that additional indications supported the idea of extraordinary military movements into East Germany. (Telegram 2362 from Moscow; ibid.)

Kohler

94. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, February 15, 1965, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to White House.

2377. Deptel 2196./2/ Reftel, particularly para 11, prompts me to venture following observations on current and predictable Soviet posture and behavior in wake of Southeast Asian developments:

/2/Dated February 13, it summarized a conversation between Indian Ambassador Nehru and Acting Secretary of State Ball on that day in which the Ambassador read extracts from reports of Brezhnev's conversation with Indira Gandhi. In paragraph 2 the telegram noted the inability of the Soviet Union to understand U.S. policy since its military actions in Vietnam contrasted with the President's public statements and that the Vietnam issue was inseparable from the general issue of U.S.-USSR relations. (Ibid.)

1) I believe Kosygin went to Hanoi/3/ fully aware of suspicions we might entertain as to motives for his trip and complications it might introduce into the US-Soviet equation. It was with this in mind that Sovs publicized simultaneously their favorable reaction to President's suggestion exchange of visits and announcement of Kosygin's trip; similarly Soviet release of Landerman was timed to make favorable impression on us./4/

/3/Kosygin visited Hanoi for several days starting February 6 and was there when U.S. forces carried out a retaliatory airstrike against North Vietnam following the Viet Cong raid on the U.S. base at Pleiku on February 7. For relevant documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, especially Documents 55 and 82.

/4/Peter Landerman, who had been sentenced to 3 years on September 25, 1963, for killing a Soviet citizen in an automobile crash, was released on February 4. Documentation on his case is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, PS 7-1 US-USSR/LANDERMAN, PETER N.

Once in Hanoi, however, Sovs became a victim of DRV plot and Kosygin was genuinely on spot. I tend to believe that Vietnamese them-selves and not Chinese were primarily instigators of action against installations in South Vietnam since while Chinese may reap benefits in long run from episode, at moment Sovs have gained considerable tactical advantage in their struggle for Communist leadership. Vietnamese undoubtedly felt reasonably sure that their militant action could not but work their advantage whether US reacted or not since in either case pressure would have been on Kosygin. In one case, US would have been proved "paper tiger," in the other case, Kosygin would be faced with a "fish or cut bait" situation. Latter is in fact what happened and Kosygin was probably forced expand original Sov military commitment to DRV.

Moreover, Sov commitment, while perhaps qualitatively the same as before, was forged in fire of conflict and carried with it a psychological entanglement which may in end force the Sovs to face up to fatal retreat or risk of confrontation with US. In other words, the Sovs may well be heading for sort of dilemma always inherent in duality of Sov policy which they have assiduously sought to avoid i.e. ideological considerations which require militancy and national interests which require avoidance of US-Soviet confrontation. Sovs have thus embarked on perilous path and are being propelled by ChiCom pressure and imperatives of developing situation itself perhaps faster and more recklessly than they themselves wish or their own security considerations would dictate. Joint statements following Hanoi and Pyong Yang meetings do not in themselves seriously extend Sov commitment in area but they do provide basis for increased pressure on Sovs to act in event deterioration of situation. Thus there is real danger in development situation and we can only hope that along with deeper commitment Sovs have managed to acquire some means of control over future DRV and North Korean (possibly even ChiCom) behavior.

2) That Sovs are aware of this danger seems reasonably clear from restraint of their message contrasted with militancy of the ChiCom message exchanged on occasion 15th anniversary Sov-Chinese defense treaty (similar contrast marks Sov Feb 9 and ChiCom Feb 13 declarations) as well as from current exercise in which they engaged in effort to assign full blame to US for deterioration US-Soviet relations. Most dramatic evidence of latter was warning to US contained Sov Govt Feb 9 statement which was elaborated subsequently in Korionov's Pravda article reported Embtel 3236./5/ This could be simply propaganda ploy in context current Soviet efforts demonstrate militancy to eastern brethren. It could, on other hand be reflection of official Sov assessment and against this possibility we should correct potentially serious miscalculation.

/5/Dated February 13. (Ibid., PPV 7 US-USSR)

3) I have been giving serious thought to what we might do or say in order to provide clear signal to Sovs that course on which they now embarked is fraught with danger and that they should be under no delusion that bee is on them rather than us if there is to be improvement bilateral US-Sov relations. I would not think much could be done of a salutary nature before March 1; Sovs maneuverability obviously strait jacketed by requirements on them to do nothing which could be interpreted as weakness until March 1 meeting and immediate aftermath safely out of way. For this reason I would think any direct high-level action would be wasted until Sovs are out of their current ideological bind. At some later point, however, we must make clear to Sovs that any serious defeat of US foreign policy objectives in any part of the world would render impossible any substantial improvement in US-Soviet bilateral relations; we recognize this as an imperative for Sovs and they must equally recognize this as a condition for our own policy maneuverability.

4) I do think, however, that even prior to March 1 we should set record straight on the price tag which the Sovs are publicly placing on improvement our bilateral relations. This could probably best be done in upcoming speech by major American spokesman. This is important even if exercise I have referred to above is simply propaganda ploy; it is vital, of course, if Sovs are in fact victims of own propaganda and are being seriously deluded. Major points should in our view be:

A) That US interest in continuing forward progress in bilateral relations recorded during past couple of years has been vigorously reaffirmed by Pres Johnson since election and beginning of new administration;

B) This program, however, has been based on cooperative effort and can only continue on such basis; at present it is Soviet side (not United States) which has taken initiatives which have caused deterioration; and

C) While we have genuine interest in improvement bilateral relations this cannot be at expense of principle or basic interests.

Kohler

95. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 15, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 USSR. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on February 15.

SUBJECT
Demonstration against our Embassy in Moscow

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

I took the occasion of the Soviet Ambassador's visit to tell him I thought he ought to know how strongly the President felt about the demonstration against our Embassy in Moscow, and particularly the failure of the police to furnish adequate protection. I said we were also concerned here about the involvement of an American correspondent. I said I certainly hoped they did not intend to pursue the bringing of charges against him.

Dobrynin said he understood that the correspondent had hit a policeman. He said possibly the correspondent had become angry, but this was a serious matter. I said that I understood there was a scuffle, but our information was not that he had deliberately hit the policeman and, in any event, I thought that the best thing would be for this to not go any further./2/

/2/During this conversation Thompson also explained further U.S. policy on Vietnam stating in particular that the bombing of North Vietnam had not been an attempt to embarrass Kosygin.

"In discussing Soviet/American relations, Dobrynin said that the Soviet Government had made several gestures toward the improvement of relations, not that they felt President Johnson needed them, but they were genuine. He emphasized that contrary to press statements, the Soviet Government was not in a position of having any need to improve relations, although they thought that this was in the mutual interest of both countries. He said it was not a question of desiring to worsen them, but was simply one of fact that if our present policy continued, our relations would be adversely affected. I said I could recognize this fact but it seemed to me they were attempting to use the threat of worsening relations as a deliberate move to affect the Vietnamese situation. I pointed out that after the Cuban affair we had been able quickly to resume our progress in bettering our relations."

For full text of the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 120.

96. Memorandum Prepared in the Policy Planning Council/1/

Washington, February 15, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VIII. Secret. Drafted by John Huizenga. Attached to a February 15 memorandum from Walt Rostow to Bundy that stated it considered some of the basic factors that affected Soviet decision-making in the Vietnam crisis and might well be scanned in connection with telegram 2377 from Moscow (Document 94). Another copy, initialed by Rusk, was sent to him on February 17 with the same covering memorandum. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, USSR) Copies were also sent to Ball, Harriman, Tyler, and Thompson.

SUBJECT
Soviet Policy in the Light of the Vietnam Crisis

In the four months since the fall of Khrushchev the effects which this event might have on the general course of Soviet foreign policy, and in particular on relations with the US, have been far from clear. There have been some signs of a willingness to continue the phase of reduced tensions which began in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis and which brought some constructive developments in Soviet-American relations. But there have been other signs-in Soviet handling of the Congo and UN crises, in the virtual standstill on bilateral issues, and in the generally more militant and at times even hostile tone of propaganda-of an inclination to terminate the post-Cuba phase and to return to a harder stance in relations with the West.

The intensification of the Vietnam crisis over the last week, preceded as it was by Soviet moves to resume an active role in that area, has brought what is apparently the first major test of the succession leadership's conduct of external policy. This paper examines some of the questions posed by the USSR's involvement in the Vietnam crisis, primarily with a view to inferences which may be drawn about the general direction of Soviet policy in the current phase.

Why Soviet Policy Resumed an Active Role in Southeast Asia

Khrushchev had virtually disengaged Soviet policy from the Indochina problem, presumably because since mid-1963 Hanoi's alignment with Peking had been complete and the USSR no longer had any real influence on the conduct of the warfare in South Vietnam and Laos. Deeply preoccupied with internal economic problems, he was probably not willing to see a new increase of tensions in relations with the US develop from the sharpening confrontation in Vietnam which Hanoi and Peking insisted upon. He was moving in any case toward a rupture with the Peking-led parties in the Communist movement. His course manifested itself in tacit abandonment of Moscow's co-chairmanship responsibility under the Geneva agreements and in his tepid reaction to the US retaliatory attacks in the Tonkin Gulf incident last August.

It now appears that the Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership rejected this virtual ceding of Chinese hegemony over the Communist movement in Asia. Contacts with Hanoi were resumed in November, and new declarations of Soviet support "in the struggle against US imperialism" were then issued in the following weeks. Evidently the Soviet leadership was encouraged by these soundings and by a change of tone in Hanoi's utterances on the Sino-Soviet quarrel to believe that there was a chance of bringing North Vietnam back to something like the middle position it had held earlier in the struggle between Moscow and Peking. This possibility would be increased if Moscow could be helpful to Hanoi in what must have looked like the approach of the terminal phase of the war in South Vietnam. To play such a role would also deprive Peking of exclusive credit for having backed this crucial "national liberation struggle." This would offset the Chinese charges of Soviet lukewarmness toward such efforts, long one of the key issues in the dispute.

It was almost certainly this chance to win back the support or at least the neutrality of one of Peking's client parties, all the more important because of the reluctance of East European and other parties to proceed toward a showdown with Peking and its supporters, which drew Moscow into its courting of Hanoi. At the time the Kosygin visit was laid on with a view to capping this effort, it was probably believed in Moscow that there was little chance that a "wider war" would develop over South Vietnam and so involve the USSR in a risky commitment. Or it may have been thought that Moscow's renewed support to Hanoi would help to deter the US and so minimize this risk.

It cannot be excluded, of course, that Moscow did estimate that there was still considerable danger of escalation of the Vietnam war but chose deliberately to run the risk of injecting itself into the situation. In case of success, the prospective gains in the intra-Communist quarrel and in terms of prestige throughout the Afro-Asian world would be tempting. It is mainly Moscow's consistent record of caution in direct confrontations with the US which discredits this hypothesis.

Even if the US accepted defeat in South Vietnam without moving to enlarge the war, however, it must have been recognized in Moscow that the Soviet move to associate itself with Hanoi at the last stage could bring a sharp deterioration in US-Soviet relations. It may have been hoped that this could be overcome by a campaign of new gestures for relaxation of tensions culminating in an exchange of high-level visits. Khrushchev had similarly attempted to combine a Western reverse over Berlin with the healing effects of summitry.

If the foregoing reconstruction is reasonably accurate, it is clear that the Soviet leadership was willing, for the sake of possible gain in its struggle with Peking for leadership in the Communist movement and the Afro-Asian world, to put its relations with the US in serious jeopardy. This shift in priorities conforms with the impression that many observers have had of Moscow's behavior in recent months: that the primary preoccupation of the new leaders, apart from internal problems, was in coping with the challenge of China rather than in continuing the improvement of relations with the West.

Possible Consequences of Soviet Support for North Vietnam

The problem posed for the Soviet leaders by the sudden threat of escalation in Vietnam is probably felt as an agonizing one: If the "wider war" develops after all, what risks of serious confrontation with the US should they assume to fulfill their new commitment to Hanoi? To appear to renege would be extremely costly in the struggle with Peking. On the other hand, the Soviets must see one particularly dangerous feature in this crisis; they will not be in full charge, but can have their hand forced by Hanoi and perhaps also by Peking. It is probably this that explains the still somewhat hazy formulation of the pledge to Hanoi, unchanged even after Kosygin's visit and the US attacks.

Whenever Soviet freedom of maneuver is narrowed in a major crisis, the hypothesis is advanced-and deserves examination-that Moscow might try to force the US to back off by bringing pressure to bear in another theater. In the present case, a new threat to Berlin access, a push against South Korea, or in Laos are all conceivable.

The device of instigating a diversionary crisis to maximize pressures has never been employed by the Soviets in the past, although they had this option in both the Berlin and Cuban cases. The compelling reason against it has probably been that to present the US with what would then appear as a generalized threat rather than a limited local demand might raise tensions beyond control. At a minimum, it would greatly complicate the tasks of crisis management. It could also overextend US conventional capabilities and so increase the incentive to resort to nuclear weapons. In the present case, with some degree of escalation already taking place, and with the Soviets not in complete control of their partners, resort to a diversionary crisis seems even less likely than in previous cases.

Almost certainly the course which the Soviets prefer would be to combine a strong display of support for Hanoi with diplomatic action to contain the crisis. The critical unknowns affecting this possibility are the intensity of Hanoi's desire for early victory even in the face of major dangers and the degree of Moscow's leverage on the North Vietnamese leadership.

It is possible that Kosygin argued successfully that if Hanoi was patient some while longer and refrained from raising the level of action in the South to a point which would provoke further American attacks, the process of decay in Saigon would eventually bring victory through negotiations. He might have pledged that Moscow would take a line in such negotiations that would ensure that control of South Vietnam would not in the end still elude Hanoi. Promises of substantial military and economic aid might have made such an offer more persuasive.

The declaration terminating the Kosygin visit is not clear as to what further line of tactics might have been agreed, or even whether there was actually agreement on this at all. It would not be surprising, however, if the Soviets now pressed hard for negotiations, perhaps privately to avoid any inference that Hanoi was cowed by the threat of further US attacks.

At this juncture, it appears that the Soviet move into the Vietnam problem can hardly fail to worsen US-Soviet relations. To avert this, either the US would have to accept a defeat gracefully and without rancor, or the Soviets would have to curb their support for Hanoi once again.

Implications for Sino-Soviet Relations

It has been suggested that one consequence of intensified crisis over Vietnam could be a healing of the Sino-Soviet rift, and that Moscow might be willing to take greater risks of confrontation with the US because of this possibility. Already declarations of Bloc solidarity in the face of US aggression have issued from both sides and the anniversary observances of the Sino-Soviet defense treaty have solemnly reaffirmed its continued validity.

Against the background of the whole prolonged quarrel with Peking and the issues that have been at stake in it, it must be seriously doubted that any hope of reconciliation figures in Moscow's calculations at this time. The courtship of Hanoi was undertaken precisely in order to undercut Chinese influence there, and Kosygin's appeals during his travels for unity in the international movement have found no resounding echo in Peking. One purpose of his stops there may have been to persuade those parties which were reluctant to come to the March 1 meeting in Moscow that new bilateral approaches by the Soviets would be futile.

Both sides, of course, have an interest in playing down polemics when situations of crisis arise, and in this case both wish to show solidarity with Hanoi. To do otherwise would appear unseemly in the eyes of brother parties for whose loyalties the Chinese and Soviets are contending. But the central issue between them remains. That issue is authority-who has power to promulgate the general line and to command on tactical decisions. The conflicts arising from this issue have in effect become non-negotiable between the two Communist great powers. In a situation of crisis with the US this issue is more likely to be sharpened than it is to be attenuated.

Prospects for Soviet-American Détente

The USSR's moves over the last several months to involve itself once again in the Vietnam problem with support for Hanoi obviously endangers the détente which has been assumed to exist in Soviet-American relations. It had been frayed already by the Congo problem, the UN crisis, Soviet reaction to MLF, and the sometimes quite violent propaganda accompanying these developments.

There is always a tendency to hope that a period of reduced tension accompanied by some constructive agreements, even if these are only marginal and symbolic, will build on itself and lead on to more substantial accords. This tendency arises from the nature of the West's aims in the cold war and expresses its view of the value of continuing détente.

Until now, the Soviet view has been different. Historically, the function of détente for the Soviets has been to provide a period of pause in offensive action whenever the relation of forces turned unfavorable. The aim is a temporary truce and there is no Soviet assumption that this can or should be built into a solid peace.

After the offensive over Berlin miscarried and ended in the humiliating setback of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets clearly felt the need for a period of diminished risk in which they could deal with internal economic troubles, correct the imbalance in military power, and repair the damage to their prestige and political influence. It would obviously be incorrect to say that they have accomplished all this, and it would be an oversimplification to conclude that they have now deliberately entered on a new "hard line" phase which terminates the détente begun in 1963.

In some respects, however, the Soviet leaders probably do feel that their relative power position has improved since 1963. They have increased their influence in the underdeveloped world, and can now command wider support there on at least a certain range of issues. The troubles in the Western alliance have deepened and there is particular doubt about European support for US policy in Asia. Khrushchev's successors may feel that they have begun to get a grip on their economic problems, and that their military programs are moving forward with diminished strain on the economy. It is true that the deep divisions within the Communist movement continue, but these are in part the result of détente and might be ameliorated by withdrawal from it.

Altogether it appears likely that the combination of such factors has led the Soviet leadership, if not to terminate détente abruptly and deliberately, at least to place a lesser priority on its continuance. In recent months they have been willing to make a number of tactical choices at the expense of the détente: Their effort to compete with China has brought a new note of militancy to their propaganda. They have refused any compromise on the Article 19 issue. They intervened by proxy on the side of the Congo rebellion in order to stimulate and profit from radical nationalism in Africa. And they have now undertaken to renew support for Hanoi's "liberation struggle" in South Vietnam.

"Peaceful coexistence is the form of struggle appropriate to the present epoch," a policy to expand Communist power without major war. It always combines elements of hostility and reassurance, advance and withdrawal, as tactical advantage indicates. Currently the Soviet leaders may be changing the mix. The outcome of the Vietnam crisis will obviously now have a major influence on whether the détente phase begun in 1963 proves to have run its course.

97. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, March 3, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin. Top Secret; Sensitive.

McGB--

SUBJECT
Talk with Ambassador Thompson about Pen Pals

I talked with Tommy about the pen pal series-the importance of the channel and the apparent Soviet sensitivity about the way it is being handled.

Tommy clearly has reservations about the exercise under present Soviet management. He feels it has become too much of an impersonal Soviet Government enterprise. It is focusing on issues better serviced by regular diplomatic communications and without personal Presidential involvement. He also is miffed by the fact that Kosygin breached the rules of conduct for handling the series.

In response to my suggestion that a reply be drafted so that the President, the Secretary and you could see what it would look like-mentioning such subjects as those you raised earlier, the exchange of visits, disarmament, Vietnam-Tommy said (1) the Foster-Fisher disarmament proposals were non-starters and given the present state of affairs in Vietnam made almost no sense; (2) the Secretary had handled Vietnam with Dobrynin yesterday afternoon/2/ and he, Tommy, wanted to see what that produced before taking the exercise further; and

/2/A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 86.

(3) the Soviets seemed to be persisting in wanting to discuss Berlin and the mutual withdrawal of forces from Europe, both non-starters from our side at this time.

After I repeated for the nth time the importance which I was sure you attached to keeping this channel open and working, particularly in the present context, Tommy agreed to put something together, but after he saw the substance of the Secretary's exchange with Dobrynin.

I will follow through again./3/ In the interim I think it might be useful for you to raise this general subject with the Secretary. A go-ahead signal from him will get Tommy moving with less resistance. As far as the subject matter is concerned, part of the input, particularly on disarmament, will have to come from this end of town because there is little sympathy for it on the 7th floor at State.

/3/On March 16 Klein forwarded to Bundy summaries of the pen pal exchanges with the "Kosygin-Brezhnev regime" and suggested the subject matter for a reply in his 4-page covering memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Pen Pal Material) The next day he sent Bundy another 4-page memorandum on the "Pen Pal Exchange" that summarized communications with the Soviets on several issues since January. (Ibid.) In a June 21 memorandum to Bundy, noting that he was "forever looking for means to reestablish the pen pal exchange-which in my view has tremendous psychological as well as political importance in our relations with the Soviets, particularly during times of crisis," Klein proposed a pen pal message on the President's forthcoming (June 25) address to the United Nations. (Ibid., Head of State Correspondence, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin)

DK

98. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, March 4, 1965, 3 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 USSR. Confidential; Immediate. Passed to the White House.

2583. Ref: Embtel 2579./2/ I saw Deputy FonMin Kuznetsov at 12:45 pm and handed him letter to Gromyko (reftel) noting I had thought I might not get to see him in time.

/2/At 11 a.m. on March 4 the Embassy in Moscow reported that it had been informed that another demonstration was scheduled for 3 p.m. that day. (Telegram 2577; ibid.) In the next telegram it reported that the Foreign Ministry had been unresponsive to requests for an urgent meeting with Gromyko but that shortly after noon Toon had been granted a meeting with Kuznetsov for 12:45 p.m. (Telegram 2578, March 4; ibid.) Telegram 2579, March 4, transmitted the text of the letter from Kohler to Gromyko, advising him of the coming demonstration, reiterating President Johnson's statement of February 9 that protection for the Embassy in the previous demonstration had been "wholly inadequate," and asking the Soviet Government to provide the full protection required by international law. (Ibid.)

After reading letter Kuznetsov said that he would pass it to FonMin as requested, and remarked that he had nothing to add to my previous exchanges with MFA reps re past events.

I reminded Kuznetsov that I still awaiting reply to earlier representations and asked that MFA provide guarantees for future to protect Embassy and staff against criminal acts by rioters armed with lethal weapons who are permitted by militia to attack Embassy and go unpunished. I contrasted this with practice in Washington and New York where demonstrators kept 500 feet from buildings.

Kuznetsov, obviously uncomfortable, responded with account of 1956 demonstrations Soviet UN Mission. He then asserted that Soviets observe international law strictly and that we have no ground to demand special assurances or to present demands as ultimatum, which can only worsen relations.

I emphasized again that I was asking for and expected protection for Embassy and personnel, that we had informed Ministry of impending demonstration, and that past gives sufficient ground for concern. I reminded him that I had handed Zorin samples of dangerous weapons used in last demonstration and that Soviets had acknowledged obligation to protect Embassy. I urged him to consider effect of Soviet failure to do this.

Kuznetsov ended meeting with statement that he would transmit request to FonMin and it would be considered.

Kohler

99. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, March 4, 1965, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 USSR. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to London, Paris, Saigon, and Hong Kong. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.

2586. Embassy was again attacked this afternoon by mob in excess of 3000 persons mostly Asians in what developed into most aggressive and nastiest demonstration here in recent memory. Damage assessment not yet complete but probably 150 to 200 windows broken on all floors except ninth and tenth, and many ink splotches defacing building. No injuries to American personnel although one officer on tenth floor struck in face by flying but spent steel ball bearing.

In apparent response to our representations earlier today, protective measures were much more in evidence than in previous demonstration. About 100 yard long line of snow plow trucks were parked bumper to bumper down center of Chaikovskiy Street in front of building about thirty minutes before mob arrived. About 300 militiamen also on hand before crowd arrived. Perhaps 70 mounted militia also on hand.

Mob arrived at 1540 from Krasnaya Presnenskaya metro station north of Embassy where had gathered about half hour earlier. Within minutes several hundred had broken through earlier-erected barrier of trucks and portable steel fencing erected by militia approximately 30 meters in front Embassy gates. Most of missile damage done at close range by those who broke through lines.

Militia made serious effort to hold back majority of crowd. We estimate many demonstrators were at least slightly injured as they crushed through and over line of parked trucks. Many individual battles observed between demonstrators and police. Crowd eventually appeared nearly out of effective control at which time, about 1600, some 300 ground forces troops, under command general officer, moved in from north of building. These troops, plus action of mounted militia appeared to turn tide and take most of enthusiasm out of very hostile crowd.

At least ten militiamen and several horses were injured, some apparently seriously, and many demonstrators were hauled off in Soviet paddy wagons.

Bulk of demonstrators moved south of building about 1610 where permitted to regroup. Stood there in formation nearly one hour, chanting slogans and waving banners, with militia and military troops standing by. At 1710, this nucleus, perhaps 1000 strong, moved back in front of building and troops immediately moved out between mob and building.

Press corps judiciously was not in front of building although they had heard of impending event earlier in day. One correspondent reports that damage from ink and sling-shot propelled missiles more extensive than demonstration February 9.

At 1800 crowd still in front of Embassy but under control of military and militia units. Additional reporting follows when demonstrators have dispersed./2/

/2/The President and Rusk briefly discussed the demonstrations and U.S. reaction to them during a telephone conversation that began at 10:41 a.m. on March 4. A recording of the conversation is in the Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Rusk, Tape 6503.01, PNO 16.

Kohler

100. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, March 4, 1965, 10 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 USSR. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London, Paris, Saigon, and Hong Kong. Passed to the White House.

2595. I opened meeting with Gromyko by telling him we at Embassy had just taken another beating at Soviet Govt's hands. I then handed him protest letter (Embtel 2592). In response Gromyko read and handed me statement of regret (Embtel 2594)./2/

/2/Both telegrams dated March 4. (Ibid.)

I expressed appreciation for statement but said I must repeat that Sov measures today were inadequate despite advance notice to MFA; that 175 windows broken and damage worse than in last demonstration. Reminded Gromyko that these demonstrations do not happen by themselves in USSR and US Govt will take serious view. Gromyko did not contest.

Gromyko then said he wished to make oral statement by Sov Govt then read statement re Vietnam (next following tel)./3/

/3/Telegram 2596 from Moscow, March 4. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S)

In reply to my question Gromyko said statement will be published tomorrow morning.

I asked if Gromyko considers statement responsive to Secretary's March 2 meeting with Dobrynin. He replied that it is not reply but reaction of Sov Govt to latest US actions against DRV./4/

/4/In telegram 2598 from Moscow, March 4, Kohler cited "Gromyko's almost flat admission, in reply to my question, Soviet 'Declaration' handed me tonight was propaganda piece and not considered reply Secretary's statements to Dobrynin." (Ibid., POL 3-8 USSR) For a memorandum of Rusk's conversation with Dobrynin on March 2, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII, Document 170.

I then asked why Sovs therefore included reference to Laos and Cambodia. Gromyko said because that is factual situation, that gross US interference in Laos testified to by latest USAF attacks taking place there. Re Cambodia he referred to statements by Cambodian Govt.

I then said I would forward statement to my govt but that this indicated in no way that I accept allegations and I trusted Sovs will not imply otherwise. I went on to say that Secretary has given Dobrynin true facts re situation in Vietnam, which also contained in US document just issued and of which I offered him copies./5/ I would like to see Sovs give true facts to their people as to who is aggressor in Vietnam.

/5/A reference to Aggression From the North: The Record of Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam, released on February 27. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 22, 1965, pp. 404-427. For more information on the report, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 171.

Gromyko said he rejects US claim categorically, that facts re US aggression are irrefutable.

I pointed out that states have right of defense against aggression, and repeated that I did not accept Sov allegations. I added that US had hoped USSR would use its influence to stop aggression by DRV.

Conversation closed with expressions of regret that our relations affected by such unpleasant things.

Kohler

101. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, March 5, 1965, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 USSR. Confidential; Immediate. Passed to the White House.

2607. Deptel 2360./2/ For Ambassador Thompson from Ambassador Kohler. Yesterday's attack on Embassy followed this morning by minor flurry of actions of "make-up-with-Americans" flavor, notably expressions of regret by UPDK and prompt initiation of restoration work under personal supervision chief engineer./3/

/2/Dated March 4, it asked for full details on the demonstration and Kohler's recommendations for the U.S. response. (Ibid.)

/3/In telegram 2598 from Moscow, March 4, Kohler reported that "we have had many expressions, direct and indirect, of sense of shame on part of Russians, and indications that massive anti-American campaign of party-organized meetings falling pretty flat." (Ibid.)

Prompt White House comment was helpful/4/ and I assume Dept will follow up with appropriate remarks today.

/4/On March 4 the White House Press Secretary made a statement insisting that U.S. diplomatic establishments and personnel be given the protection required by international law and that expressions of regret were no substitute for adequate protection. (Telegram 2365 to Moscow, March 4; ibid.)

Locally:

1. Staff and I will continue freely express our feelings about outrageous, uncivilized treatment at hands Soviet Government;

2. We are refusing visas to Soviet tourist-propagandist group, informing FonOff that in present circumstances they could not expect friendly reception and visit would harm rather than help US-Soviet relations.

Dept might wish look into public appearances scheduled for Soviet Embassy staff in United States and suggest cancellations to sponsors, make sure U.S. Govt officials and others associated with exchange programs are adequately briefed with appropriate remarks for Soviet contacts, and the like.

One would wish for more and perhaps more effective measures. On the other hand, I believe our own interests require that:

1. We target our response toward Soviet Government and Communist Party, not against the many Russians who are both ashamed and sympathetic, as well as anxious not to allow progress made in exchanges go down the drain; and

2. Desirability keeping channels of communication open during fluid and critical period.

Kohler

102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, March 8, 1965, 6:55 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Henry, cleared in draft by Davis and SES, and approved and initialed by Thompson.

2400. For Ambassador from Ambassador Thompson. Embtel 2607./2/ Appreciate your suggestions and particularly agree with last two paragraphs. All of us here feel deeply that we must, as you suggest, keep "channels of communication open during fluid and critical period."

/2/Document 101.

With regard to your suggestions, there are no forthcoming public appearances by Soviet Embassy staff except one of which sponsors are left-wing groups which would be unlikely to cancel. We shall, however, attempt to ensure that exchange program sponsors point out to their Soviet contacts on appropriate occasions that attacks on Embassy can damage exchange program and U.S.-USSR relations. However, our position has been somewhat weakened by recent attack on Soviet Embassy here.

In general, we consider it important to avoid getting into a visa war with the USSR. We are glad for that reason that you merely postponed the Soviet group rather than refusing visas outright. Serious as these attacks are, they are less important than such substantive issues as S.E. Asia, disarmament and European security, on which progress requires free U.S.-USSR interchange. Therefore, we must strive in our own interests to keep a dialogue going even in the face of Soviet actions against U.S. policy in third areas or unpleasant incidents like the attack on the Embassy.

Rusk

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