77. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)/1/

Washington, December 4, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Staff Memos. Secret. Drafted by Jenkins on December 3 and cleared by Henry, Jones, and USIA.

SUBJECT
US-Soviet Exchanges-Soviet Political, Economic, and Military Leaders

With the advent of a new regime in the USSR and the completion of our own elections, it would appear particularly timely to seek methods of increasing the political impact of our efforts through the exchange program with the USSR. It is too early to be certain that the new Soviet leaders will, as they claim, continue on their present course. However, on the basis of their statements, the outlook for more significant exchanges now seems somewhat improved.

While we can look with satisfaction at the number of Soviet technicians, cultural figures and agricultural specialists who have visited the United States, a striking gap in our efforts to open up the USSR exists in the lack of visits by Soviet political, economic and military leaders to this country. We consider it is highly desirable to move now to fill this gap. We would hope to thus achieve a better appreciation by Soviet political, economic, and military leaders of United States strength and provide them with a firsthand comprehension of the dimensions of the problem which they face in the pursuit of a basically hostile policy toward us. At the same time we would seek to portray to them the benefits of genuine peaceful coexistence and even cooperation.

In the post-election period we assume that domestic American receptivity to the types of visits we are proposing is enhanced not only by the completion of the election, but also by a record of several months in which the Soviets have behaved with relative restraint.

In general terms we recommend preparing a program specifically designed to bring to the United States as many members of the Central Committee as possible, and a cross section of top level and second echelon Soviet military and economic officials. It would, of course, be necessary to bring Central Committee members in some capacity other than their Communist Party position. Since most of them have dual roles this may be accomplished under programs such as those listed below as well as others which would be suggested from an examination of the CC membership in detail. While the exchanges program is the most obvious vehicle for such an endeavor, a number of extra-agreement programs might be considered and some traditional taboos within the exchanges program might be reconsidered. The following examples are illustrative of what we have in mind:

Political Exchanges

1. Parliamentary Exchange. We have long resisted any exchange between Congress and the Supreme Soviet on the basis that the two bodies are not equivalent. It has been assumed that Congress would object strenuously to any such exchange. However, we have had several indications in recent years that many Congressmen, if not most, would not oppose such exchanges. The Soviets of course have assiduously sought to establish exchanges of this sort. If a review of the question with selected Congressional leaders shows general support for such an exchange, it would provide broad opportunities to bring a large number of present and potential Soviet leaders to the United States. In such an effort the Inter-Parliamentary Union might prove useful.

2. Trade Union Exchanges. This also is a category which we have avoided because of reluctance to accept the Soviet trade unions as a genuine labor movement and the possible complication of our efforts to promote the ICFTU. Our position has also been in deference to the hostility of most American trade union leaders to the Soviet trade union movement. The Soviets have persistently attempted to develop exchanges in this field. It would seem to be worthwhile to discuss this question with American trade union leaders and urge them to reconsider their opposition to controlled exchanges on the grounds that it would expose important Soviet leaders to the power of United States and our democratic trade unions. It has been amply demonstrated that American union officials are well equipped to out-argue Soviet visitors and present the United States point of view with impressive conviction. Dealing with individual Soviet unioners certainly need not amount to endorsement of the WFTU at the expense of the ICFTU.

3. Information Leaders. While a number of prominent Soviet journalists including Adzhubei have visited the United States, we have so far only skimmed the barrel in this field. We would recommend that, with the cooperation of RSB, we single out present and potential Soviet leaders in the field and through devices such as regional and city publishers and editors exchanges, get as many of them as possible to the United States.

4. Local and Provincial Government Leaders. A careful analysis of the paths to top-level political authority in the USSR would probably indicate that tomorrow's Presidium members are today's provincial leaders. Because of the barrier posed by the Communist apparat as opposed to the governmental track of authority, it may often be difficult to define the actual seat of power in such a way that we can get at such people and arrange their participation in exchanges trips. However, one promising vehicle would be to exploit mayor to mayor, governor to governor, pairings. This type of exchange has often been approached with legitimate tenderness because of presumed domestic political back-lash. It would seem that careful selection and proper persuasive briefing could reduce this to a marginal problem, and permit us to exploit Soviet interest in such contacts.

5. Review Present Programs. A few Central Committee members have already visited the United States under functional programs. An analysis of the Central Committee membership would in many instances provide functional and professional interests of the members. This in turn would enable us to attempt to get them to the United States under professional or technical exchange auspices.

6. Economic Leader Exchanges. A reverse Business International Conference is only one of many possible techniques for attracting top-level Soviet economic figures.

Military Visits

Plans have already been made for a Soviet military delegation to visit the United States early next year in exchange for our latest National War College trip to the Soviet Union. We also "owe" Marshal Vershinin a visit in exchange for General Twining's 1956 trip to the USSR. Beyond that, we consider that a number of possibilities exist to bring significant numbers of Soviet officers to the United States under a program deliberately designed to exploit exchanges and other devices to achieve this end. Such things as Civil War centennials, military athletic contests, space launchings, and military academy functions could be considered. Finally the oft proposed Red Army Chorus visit might also prove appropriate (in exchange for an appropriate American feature) within this context.

In all these programs two important restraining factors obviously have to be kept in mind. First, if handled with too much publicity or in too grand a fashion, suspicion would inevitably develop. Thus the broad outlines of the program would perhaps better remain veiled. Timing would also be a critical factor. Too much at once-too many visits within too short a time, obviously would increase the possibility of the programs being misunderstood. As a general rule of thumb it would seem desirable to avoid drawing attention to the fact that a program as such is involved. Secondly, it would be essential to clear individual aspects, if not the overall design, with our interested allies. This is particularly true of military projects. Since discussion of a project in general terms would raise the possibility of publicity through leaks and the very domestic hostility which we seek to avoid, allied interests would probably be best handled on a case by case basis. A purely bilateral coloration should be avoided as far as possible to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation. However, even though a certain amount of criticism would inevitably develop, we are convinced that the potential gains to primary United States objectives are clearly overriding.

Recommendation:

If you agree, SOV together with SES will undertake discussion of these objectives with appropriate DOD, CU and USIA offices. We will also review these ideas with RSB and elicit their assistance in preparing a study of areas and individuals suitable for attention. SES has seen this memo and agrees with its objectives. They do have, however, certain reservations about a few of the specific proposals./2/

/2/On December 5 Thompson replied saying that he thought it would be a good idea to expand exchanges at that time. However, he expressed reservations about both the trade union and military exchanges and suggested that an exchange allowing the Soviet Union to see the role of regulatory agencies in the United States and the placing of a Russian-speaking American in a Soviet factory would be valuable. (Ibid.)

78. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, December 9, 1964, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Gromyko Conversations, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on December 15 and by the White House on December 16. The conversation took place at the White House.

SUBJECT
U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	U.S.S.R.
The President	Foreign Minister Gromyko
The Secretary	Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
Ambassador Kohler	Ambassador Dobrynin
Ambassador Thompson	Mr. Smirnovskiy, Chief, American
Mr. Akalovsky	Section, Foreign Ministry
	Mr. Sukhodrev

The President opened by expressing his pleasure at seeing Mr. Gromyko in Washington. He said that the Secretary had reported to him on his conversations with Mr. Gromyko;/2/ he was glad they had taken place and knew they were helpful. The President also said he was pleased to have occasional discussions with the Soviet Ambassador, whom we liked very much.

/2/At a luncheon at the Soviet Embassy at 1 p.m. on December 9, Rusk and Gromyko discussed the Soviet Embassy building in Washington, the MLF, disarmament, Germany, Southeast Asia, U.S.-Soviet trade, and Article 19 of the UN Charter. Memoranda of these conversations are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. For the memorandum on Southeast Asia, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. I, Document 443; the memorandum on Germany is ibid., vol. XV, Document 74.

Mr. Gromyko said he first wished to thank the President for giving up some of his time for the purpose of this meeting. He also wished to convey to the President greetings and best wishes from Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Mikoyan, who had asked him to do so in case he had occasion to meet with the President. Mr. Gromyko said he would like to touch upon certain questions which the Soviet Government believed to be important from the standpoint of U.S.-Soviet relations. He would not go into any details, but would deal with them only in general terms. If it was agreeable to the President, he would raise those questions one by one, hoping that the President would comment on each of them.

Mr. Gromyko said that the first and the main question which was of interest to the Soviet Union was that of the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations. The policy of the Soviet Union had been and continued to be a policy of peace, of developing friendly relations with all states, and of peaceful coexistence with all states regardless of their social structure. The Soviet Union was ready and wished to develop U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union was prepared to seek agreement on outstanding questions, both those directly related to U.S.-Soviet relations and broader international problems as well. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. were poles apart from the standpoint of their social structures, but the Soviet Government believed this should be no obstacle to the solution of outstanding questions, both those directly related to the U.S.-Soviet relations and other international problems. Briefly, this was the general course of Soviet policy, including the Soviet Union's policy towards the U.S. He would appreciate it if the President would state his views on the prospects for development of U.S.-Soviet relations and on the possibilities for agreement on outstanding questions. In the view of the Soviet Government, this was a question of primordial importance; it was the question of questions.

The President observed that he had been President about a year. As he looked back over that year, he was pleased at the absence of any serious disagreements or differences between our two countries in their day-to-day work. Of course, our two countries had differences of opinion and we approached matters from a different standpoint. However, he believed there had been a feeling of interest, respect, and concern for our position, and we had also attempted to reciprocate. The President recalled his meeting with Mikoyan shortly after he had assumed the Presidency,/3/ and also said he had enjoyed the various meetings and conversations, both official and social, with Ambassador Dobrynin. After the change of leadership in the Soviet Union, he was glad to learn, through Ambassador Kohler, that there had been no change in Soviet policy and that the Soviet Union would pursue a policy aimed at maintaining peace in the world. He was glad to have received that expression from the new leaders. As he had told Mr. Mikoyan and as he had reiterated to Ambassador Dobrynin, the primary objective of this Administration was to live peacefully with the rest of the world. This was not the attitude just of the present Government, but also of the American people at large. In the November elections, the American people had clearly indicated that they wanted their government to pursue a policy aimed at maintaining peaceful relations with all. The American people had rejected a leadership that would have substituted power and force for reason and patience.

/3/See ibid., 1961-1963, vol. V, Document 381.

The President continued that in the period of the Democratic administrations, we had been encouraged by the progress made in some fields. Agreement had been reached on the hot line, on the Limited Test Ban, and the Consular Convention now pending before the Senate. Also, there had been reciprocal actions by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in cutting back the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and substantial reductions had been made in our preparedness effort. We had observed with pleasure the desire of the Soviet Government to reduce its military budget. As far as we were concerned, in the brief period between 1964 and 1966, there would be a reduction in our military spending by some $2-3 billion; this was a substantial reduction, particularly if one took into account the military pay-raise, which obviously would not add to our military effort but would only make it easier for military personnel to acquire goods for their own use, such as housing, etc. Mr. McNamara's plan provided for the closing of 566 military installations; just recently, he had announced the closing of 95 such installations. This trend towards economy caused hardships in certain areas, but generally speaking the American people were pleased with it.

The President then noted that he had tried, notwithstanding occasional failure, to understand some things he saw in the papers. He had tried to refrain from criticizing Soviet leaders personally, even though sometimes he read in the papers about their views on what he did in certain parts of the world. He simply took the papers home, showed them to his wife, and tried to forget, without replying. He did so because he sincerely believed that both of our countries wanted peace if they could only find it. They were like children hunting for Easter eggs, and it was important that both of them searched until they were found. Things would be all right if both of our countries showed patience and understanding and if they adhered to the principle of "do unto others as you would have them do unto you."

Summarizing, the President said we wanted to do everything in order to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. He reiterated his pleasure at the hot line agreement, and said he was also pleased with the Exchange Program and the understandings reached in the field of outer space. He noted that he had received an excellent report from his Science Advisor, Dr. Hornig, who had been very well received in the Soviet Union and who had greatly enjoyed his discussions there. He had also received a good report from the U.S. businessmen who recently had visited the Soviet Union. Reiterating that the Consular Convention was pending in the Senate, the President also noted that the U.S.-Soviet Air Agreement was ready for signature; however, we didn't want to kill the former by signing the latter prematurely. The President reiterated that the November elections clearly showed that the American people rejected the course advocated by Goldwater, a course which was opposed to the one the present Administration was following. Some people had said rather ugly things about Mr. McNamara in connection with his economy drive. But we believed that the American people at large supported the policies of the present Administration.

Mr. Gromyko thanked the President for his views and said he would convey them to the Soviet Government. He thought there were two main questions relating to the U.S.-Soviet relations. The first one was that of the arms race. Arms were constantly piling up; indeed, stockpiles were as high as the Mont Blanc. However, what was important was not only their quantity but also their destructive capability. The Soviet Government believed it would be important if both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as well as other countries, were to find a radical solution to the armaments problem. In such a case, all would gain-both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and also the U.K., France, and others. Of course, this was a very complex problem and even if there was a will to resolve it, its solution would require time. Therefore, partial steps were needed. He did not wish to enumerate the individual steps which the Soviet Union believed would lessen tensions and facilitate disarmament, inasmuch as he had discussed them with the Secretary. However, he did want to draw the President's attention to one area where the Soviet Union believed there was possibility of agreement. The Soviet Union believed that it should be possible to reduce U.S. and Soviet troops, as well as foreign troops generally, in Europe. Such a step would not be important from the standpoint of the existing correlation of forces since such correlation would remain unchanged; however, such a step would reduce tensions in Europe and in the world at large. Referring to the President's remark about the closing of 95 bases, Mr. Gromyko said he wished to point out that one could close 95 obsolete bases and build two new ones which would be more powerful than all the 95 taken together. He thought this point only emphasized the importance of disarmament.

As to the President's remark about some statements aimed at him personally, Mr. Gromyko said they were probably an incorrect interpretation by the American press. There had been no statements by Soviet leaders aimed at personalities; they spoke only in terms of the principles of policy. Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to turn to the European problem, and particularly the German question. However, perhaps the President might first wish to comment on the arms race problem.

The President noted that both sides had had a great number of discussions about disarmament and had submitted their respective proposals at various times. He said only today he had suggested to the Secretary that the Soviet December 7 statement on disarmament/4/ be fully explored in order to see whether it contained any hope of agreement. Earlier this year, the President continued, he had made a statement expounding the views of our Government on the subject of disarmament. He hoped progress could be made in this area. We were particularly concerned about the problem of non-proliferation. He had spent the past two or three days discussing this very problem; namely, how to keep nuclear weapons from getting into the hands of others. As to the bases we were closing, they were not essential to the state of preparedness we believed was required, and we would save the salaries of 50,000-60,000 men who would be released as a result of that action. The President reiterated his pleasure at our intended reduction in military spending by $2-3 billion between 1964 and 1966, and at the Soviet-announced cut of 500 million rubles in their upcoming military budget. He said the U.S. would be willing to consider any suggestions regarding disarmament and repeated that we would evaluate the Soviet December 7 disarmament statement with a view to fully exploring the possibilities for agreement, if there were any.

/4/For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 509-517.

Regarding the remarks made about him personally, he did not mean that there had been comments about his height or looks, but he did wish to stress the desirability of not questioning the motives of other governments and of knowing what one was talking about. We had always refrained from questioning the motives of the other side and we believed this was better for our relations.

The President then stressed the concern we had about the nuclear explosion conducted by the Chinese Communists. He said we were anxious to avoid a situation where others might follow in the footsteps of the Chinese. We were doing all we could to discourage others from embarking upon a nuclear weapons program.

Mr. Gromyko said that since the President had stated the U.S. Government's support for disarmament and non-proliferation, he wished to state that it was the Soviet Government's firm position to do everything to facilitate disarmament and to prevent proliferation.

Turning to Europe, Mr. Gromyko said World War II had left behind it a very complex situation. The Soviet Union did not regret the results of the War. Both of our countries had been on the same side of the barricades in World War II, and it was as a result of their joint struggle that Nazi Germany had been forced to its knees. However, now the situation was different. In the light of past experience, the Soviet Union wanted to create a situation in Europe where no seeds of a new world war could be sown. Thus, the Soviet Union believed it to be most important for the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the other states concerned to draw a line under World War II and to have a German peace settlement on the basis of the situation which exists as a result of that war. That would be in the interest of both of our countries.

Mr. Gromyko said that the second point he wished to make was related to non-dissemination and to the general situation in Europe as well. The Soviet Union saw a great danger in the plans for providing the FRG with access to nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was not concerned over this because the existing correlation of forces would change. The FRG would not become stronger as a result of the implementation of those plans, but the possibilities for provocation by the Germans would greatly increase and the situation in Europe would become much more acute. He continued that the Soviet Union would welcome it if common language could be found on a German peace settlement and on the question of non-proliferation. He wondered whether the President could state his views on these points, noting that he had another brief point to raise later.

The President reiterated that we were greatly concerned about the fact that the Chinese had developed and exploded their nuclear device, and that we wanted to do everything possible to prevent any other power from following the Chinese example. We realized that the more nations possessed nuclear weapons, the greater the danger, and we would not do anything which would increase that capacity. The U.K. now wished to minimize its effort in the nuclear weapons field, and we did not want to stimulate the Germans to exercise the capacity we knew they could possess. The President said he had tried to be very patient during his service as President, and we now had the U.K. discussing the problem with the Germans rather than Uncle Sam having to indicate any particular conduct. Of course, there were some who wanted to encourage the Germans to build up their own capacity. We were trying to counter this because we saw what happened in China. Thus, Mr. Gromyko could be sure that we were genuine and sincere in our attempts to keep nuclear weapons from spreading. We recognized the tremendous power the Soviet Union had, and we also recognized our own tremendous power. We were not anxious at all to see the number of nuclear powers increase. He assured Mr. Gromyko that we did not want to encourage the proliferation process. The President said he was happy that both sides now seemed to be in agreement as to the importance of non-proliferation, and his people would be encouraged by what Mr. Gromyko had said on this point. As to Germany, we would be glad to receive any new ideas the Soviet Union might have on the German problem. Of course, we were familiar with the standing Soviet position that both German states should be recognized. The President said he did not believe much progress could be made on that basis. If the Soviet Union had any new ideas, he would ask the Secretary to stop traveling all over the world and get busy studying them.

Reverting to non-proliferation, the President said we did not have in mind to give the Germans nuclear technology or to encourage nuclear aspirations in any other way. What we were trying to do was to deter them from seeking an independent capability and to forestall any pressures that might develop in that direction. The U.K. was now prepared to give up its independent capability and to get out of the picture; what we wanted to do was to prevent the Germans from getting into the picture. In this effort, we needed Soviet encouragement and maybe even their prayers. For, as frequently is the case in negotiations, we were not in complete agreement with our partners in the course of the past two days' discussions. The pressure for an independent nuclear capability in Germany was not strong today, but it could become so quickly in the absence of our leadership.

Mr. Gromyko commented that while it was true that both sides said they were in favor of non-proliferation, they were in agreement only in theory and their actions were in different directions. The President had said the Germans might follow the Chinese example; however, the Soviet Union was providing an alternative, namely, a broad non-proliferation agreement. As to new ideas on the German problem, Mr. Gromyko said that if the exchange of views on the German problem continued, he did not exclude the possibility of the Soviet Union's putting forward new considerations on some points, particularly on the question of the Western forces in West Berlin.

The Secretary remarked that he would have discussions with his colleagues shortly and that he would be in touch with the Soviet side.

Mr. Gromyko then said he wished to comment on the situation in the Caribbean. He said the Soviet Union did not want to cast any doubt on the President's statement that nothing would be done with respect to Cuba and that Cuban internal questions should be decided by the Cubans themselves. Neither did the Soviet Union question the President's attitude towards the understanding reached by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the Cuban question. However, on behalf of the Soviet Government, he did want to draw the President's attention to the fact that the situation in that area was not normal and that provocations continued there. The U.S. Government denied that it was associated with those events, but the Soviet Government believed that if the U.S. Government wanted to put an end to those provocations, they would cease. Another factor was that there was an actual economic blockade in effect in that area. All this complicated the situation and also indirectly-and he wished to repeat indirectly-complicated U.S.-Soviet relations. Mr. Gromyko said he wished to point out that the Cuban Government, and Fidel Castro personally, had on numerous occasions expressed a desire for good relations with the U.S., something the Soviet Union would only welcome. Consequently, the ball was now in the U.S. court. Mr. Gromyko said he was drawing the President's attention to all this in the sincere hope that the U.S. Government would take steps to improve its relations with Cuba.

The Secretary noted that the President had an engagement in a few minutes and that there might not be enough time to discuss thoroughly this complex problem here and now. He suggested that, if this was agreeable to Mr. Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin and he discuss this matter at a later date. He pointed out, however, that we were greatly concerned by Cuban actions and that concern had also been expressed at the July meeting of the Foreign Ministers. As far as we were concerned, we had repeatedly expressed our interest in peace in the Caribbean area, but that was something that depended on all sides.

The President agreed that in view of the limited time available, it would not be possible to discuss this problem in sufficient detail at this time. If he were to go into detail as regards Cuban activities directed against other countries, he would keep seventy freshman Congressmen waiting for a full hour. He stressed, however, that we had no aggressive designs with respect to Cuba and that he wished the same were true the other way around.

The meeting ended at 6:30 p.m.

79. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, December 12, 1964, 1:15-1:55 p.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on December 17. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)

SUBJECT
Discussion with the President on Saturday, 12 December

In addition to personal matters, covered in a separate memo,/2/ the following subjects were discussed:

/2/Not found.

[Here follows material on the Congo and foreign aid.]

2. I told the President we had completed our series of estimates of Soviet Military Posture/3/ and I had concluded the Soviets were pursuing a dynamic military program and seem to be oriented more toward quality improvements in their offensive and defensive capabilities as contrasted with quantitative conditions. I said this did not imply a crash program but we saw no evidence that their program was being cut back, diminishing, or resources diverted from the military to private sectors. I said I viewed with considerable suspicion Kosygin's statement about a reduction in budget for 1965 and 1966 and noted that their military expenditures could easily be hidden in other segments of the budget. At this point I said we had noted a continual construction of plutonium-producing reactors and the continual expansion of U-235 facilities, despite Khrushchev's commitment of January, 1964 to cut back. The President asked about the two reactors on which construction was reportedly stopped and I said this was very possibly the dual purpose reactors now obsolete which were displayed in Geneva in 1958 and were to be built at Tomsk in Siberia. I said it was very possible the construction of these two reactors had been halted, but we knew the construction was proceeding on more modern and more efficiently designed reactors.

/3/The summary and conclusions of NIE 11-8-64, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," October 8, and the conclusions of NIE 11-3-64, "Soviet Air and Missile Defense Capabilities through Mid-1970," December 16, are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume X.

The President asked if my remarks implied a criticism of our policies and a recommendation that they should be reviewed. I said that I had none but that I had not studied our own program in detail, except for the stockpile availability of plutonium and U-235. With respect to these materials, I had concluded that our resources would vastly exceed the Soviet Union's by 1970 even though we cut back our program and they did not cut back their's. Furthermore, I felt we had more than enough to meet our military requirements and had advocated a cut back when I was Chairman of the AEC in 1960. With respect to our overall program, we must be alert to possible breakthroughs in delivery systems and in Air Defense.

3. The President raised the question of South Vietnam and I responded that the actions he approved were being taken and I would prefer he receive reports through appropriate channels.

4. The President expressed satisfaction with the intelligence reporting.

80. Memorandum for the Files/1/

Washington, December 14, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Confidential. Copies were sent to S/S, EUR, H, SOV, E, EE, and the Embassy in Moscow. A note from Assistant Secretary Tyler to Secretary Rusk transmitting Kohler's memorandum is marked with the notation "Sec saw."

I visited with Senator Fulbright alone for about an hour this morning./2/ The talk opened with a discussion of the recent Party and governmental changes in Moscow during which I replied to the Senator's questions along the lines of the analyses in the Embassy's reports./3/

/2/Kohler was in Washington for consultations.

/3/See Documents 52, 57, 60, 65, and 74.

Senator Fulbright expressed hope that we would find ways to continue the forward movement in Soviet-American relations of the past couple of years. He felt that the first six months of the new Congress would be a particularly favorable period for a forward movement including pertinent legislative action, saying that some of the more difficult elements had been eliminated during the recent elections and that the Republican membership is in a somewhat chastened mood.

We discussed the possibilities of increased trade relations. I found that the Senator was very favorably inclined toward legislation which would give the Executive Branch more flexibility in conducting trade negotiations with Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. He said there would be some flak from people like Senators Mundt and Lausche but did not rule out legislation to give to the President authority to extend MFN treatment. In this connection we exchanged observations with respect to visits both of us had had with the President of Business International, Mr. Eldridge Haynes, who had recently led a group of outstanding American business figures to the Soviet Union. He felt that the members of this group could be very helpful in improving the climate in this country with respect to increased trade with the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European countries. He felt that a lend-lease settlement would be a very important step in clearing the atmosphere and suggested that if a compromise figure of approximately $500,000,000 could be reached, we might be able to find means of making it easy for the Soviets to pay over a long period. He had one specific suggestion arising out of his conversation with Mr. Haynes, namely that a large part of the lend-lease settlement could be made available in rubles for investment by American business enterprises in joint projects with the Russians. He was referring in this connection to the interest which had been shown on both sides during the Business International seminars in joint research projects and joint licensing and world-wide distribution arrangements. Senator Fulbright said he had in mind particularly the example of the method used by the Brazilians in compensating American companies for sequestered properties; as in the Brazilian case, American firms could reimburse the government for rubles advanced after the ventures had become operative and profitable. I undertook to ask the Department to staff out the possibilities of this idea and to keep him informed about their conclusions.

Senator Fulbright indicated that he planned to proceed with the ratification of the Consular Convention in a normal way shortly after the inauguration. I informed him that the Executive Branch was prepared to go ahead with the signature and implementation of the long postponed Civil Air Agreement after consulting with him, particularly as to whether any problems might be created with respect to the ratification process of the Consular Convention. He did not appear to see any real problems though I told him I was not myself specifically consulting him on this matter and was not asking for his answer at this time. (I assume this will be followed up.)

When the conversation touched on our respective plans to play a bit of golf over the holidays the Senator deplored the lack of golf courses in the Soviet Union and expressed the view that it would do much to calm down the Soviet leadership if we could get them interested in playing the game. I told him of my efforts to persuade Deputy Prime Minister Novikov to build a golf course in the vicinity of Moscow. The Senator suggested that the Department might interest the U.S. Golf Association in this venture. He was sure that the Association would be interested in doing some kind of joint project under which it might design and lay out a golf course and provide some of the necessary equipment while the Russians would provide the land and do the grading and other construction. I told him we would look into this and that this suggestion would give me new material for continuing my efforts with Novikov.

The Senator inquired about my own plans for being back in this country, indicating that he was thinking in terms of possible usefulness of my testimony in connection with legislative proposals, including the ratification of the Consular Convention and a possible East-West trade legislation. I replied that I had no specific plans though normally I got back at least twice a year. I assured him, however, that I could be available on short notice to return if this were considered desirable. During the conversation the Senator referred several times to his recent visit to Yugoslavia and his talk with Tito and other Yugoslav leaders on that occasion. He was impressed by the fact that Tito had been informed of his recent speech in Dallas (December 8) and had commented favorably upon it in his (Tito's) remarks to the Yugoslav Party Congress.

Foy D. Kohler/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

81. Editorial Note

At 1 p.m. on December 19, 1964, Secretary of State Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met at Rusk's suite in the Waldorf Astoria in New York City for luncheon and discussion. Also present were Ambassadors Thompson and Stevenson, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov, and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Topics included the just-concluded NATO ministerial meeting in Paris, Vietnam, disarmament, Israeli-Arab relations, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and a possible new isthmus canal. Memoranda of conversation are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110.

Concerning Vietnam, Gromyko stressed that "a continuation of the tense situation in the area and the actions the U.S. seemed to plan with respect to North Vietnam would complicate the situation and create great danger. The Soviet Union believed that withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam would be in the interest of South East Asia and of the world at large, as well as in the interest of U.S.-Soviet relations. The President had expressed a desire to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. It would be a wise move on the part of the U.S. if it were to decide to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam."

82. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, January 5, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. I. Confidential. An "L" on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

SUBJECT
Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin

1. At a private luncheon given by Bill Foster for Tsarapkin today, I spoke to Dobrynin and told him that you meant every word of what you said last night and we hoped very much that the Soviet leaders would wish to come to the U.S./2/ I told him that you would be eager to extend a formal invitation if such an invitation would be welcome (this is the standard next step in a dance of this sort). He said that while he had no instructions, his government might think that in protocol terms the next visit should be by the President to the Soviet Union. I told him that we did not think protocol was the point, and he informally agreed.

/2/For text of the State of the Union address, January 4, in which the President expressed the hope that the new Soviet leaders could visit the United States, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 1-9. For text of his address on February 3 in which he expanded this suggestion to an exchange of visits, see ibid., pp. 126-129.

2. He then reminded me that he has asked me about your interest in visiting the Soviet Union in a most informal way last summer. I reminded him that I had pointed out the problem you faced in 1964, and the further problem that any visit to the Soviet Union would have to come after a visit to our Allies in Europe. He then asked if any time had been set for a visit to Europe, and I said no. I added that of course in principle I knew you would be interested in a visit to the Soviet Union some day if you should be invited, but I repeated my suggestion that he should impress upon his government the sincerity of your expressed hope that his leaders might wish to visit the U.S. Ambassador Dobrynin said he would deliver this message.

3. The Ambassador then raised the question whether a visit to the U.S. would be just a sightseeing expedition or whether there could be serious talks. He said that the impression he had in the papers was that we might be merely thinking of seeing the country, and while he agreed that this was a good thing, he thought talks might be helpful too. I told him that of course you would expect to have serious conversations on serious matters with the Soviet leaders if they came here, but I did not think that either side should talk of a visit of this kind as if it were going to be a matter from which great conclusions and new decisions would emerge, because neither of us would wish to run the risk of disappointing the hopes of our peoples and other peoples by such large anticipations. He agreed.

4. I think the ball is now safely and clearly in Dobrynin's court, and that the likely answer will be some form of invitation or half-invitation to you to go to the USSR. That will then leave you quite free to make a decision as to which way to play it, and of course it is possible that we will get a more affirmative response about the Soviet leadership coming here.

5. The one thing I have not done is to turn your expression of hope into a formal invitation, but I can do this if you would like. My own feeling is that it is better to leave the thing in its current informal position for the moment, and Tommy Thompson agrees.

McG. B.

83. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, January 7, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VII. Secret.

McGB--

SUBJECT
Discussion on Things Soviet at CIA Last Night

We had another of those periodic Soviet dinners at CIA last night, this time drawing two stellar attractions-McNamara and McCone.

This was better than most of the sessions. There was more give and take and some points-some old and some new-were even developed.

Recognizing that no one really knew who was in charge in Moscow at this time and reluctant to bet on who might be, the consensus was that so long as the leadership was collective, Soviet policy would be marked by orthodoxy, avoiding both risky confrontations and new initiatives. Policies would be relatively stable, with the Soviet Union reacting rather than acting in international affairs.

In order, Soviet priorities were (1) internal political maneuvering for leadership; (2) concentration on Soviet bloc developments; (3) concern with the struggle between Moscow and Peking; (4) the direction and effectiveness of Moscow's ideological leadership over the Communist parties of the world, particularly those outside the bloc; (5) collaboration with the underdeveloped world; and lastly, and down at the bottom of the order of priorities, contacts with the West.

The point was made several times (and there was no dissent) that Soviet leadership of the Communist bloc had been seriously fractured, and the Soviets could not hope to recoup the lost ground. In fact, the situation would inevitably get worse from the Soviet point of view, whether or not the Soviets did anything about it.

An immediate case in point is Moscow's March meeting of the Communist parties, with the evidence becoming increasingly clear that Moscow was going to come out second best, whether or not it actually held the meeting.

The struggle with Communist China goes on. The break is irreparable. Moscow has been trying to reduce the noise level, to avoid forcing attention on its progressively weaker position. But a final split was inevitable and the March meeting was bound to make this fact clearer.

A look was taken at Moscow's role in Vietnam and the Congo. The consensus was that what we were seeing here was Moscow reacting rather than acting. The Congo situation was tailor-made for Communist exploitation. Tshombe and the white mercenaries had undone much that had been accomplished since 1961. The Soviets had no choice but to participate if only to limit the Chinese role./2/ In fact, the moral drawn was that in its struggle with China, the Soviets under given circumstances would tee off on the West to improve its position vis--vis Peking. This is the rationale for Izvestiya's attack on LBJ.

/2/For documentation on the situation in the Congo, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXIII.

The discussion then moved on to the implications for U.S. policy. Thompson and McCone formed a minority of two-but for different reasons-arguing that nothing should be done in the short term. McCone's argument was that the U.S. position was so much stronger than the Soviets. By doing nothing we could exploit our strength and avoid the pitfalls of helping the Soviets inadvertently. This smacked of U.S. policy of the 1950's and the assembled guests told McCone so. Thompson also called for no action, but his argument was that the Soviets were so beset with other problems, they could not begin to consider Western proposals at this time. No one else agreed. Indeed, there was a long discussion on what could be done on the assumption that in Moscow's present predicament-before some positions become too solid-there might be Soviet receptivity in some areas so long as the Soviet requirements were not ignored or their interests apparently jeopardized.

The conversation then moved to a long discussion of German reunification and the need from the U.S. point of view for doing something. Professor Lowenthal for one argued long and effectively that there was enough in the Eastern European revolution, the gradual deterioration in the GDR and Soviet security interests, to arrive at a formula that might interest the Soviets and the Germans. He denied categorically Thompson's assertion that the GDR is becoming stronger economically and politically. Lowenthal admitted some economic improvement but stated that the political situation was deteriorating and the process of deterioration was likely to be accelerated as Soviet control of Eastern Europe (minus GDR) became less effective.

The consensus (minus Thompson and McCone) was that allowing for the fact that the Soviets could not do very much between now and the March meetings of Communist parties, it would be a mistake for the West to let the Soviets drift by failing to keep them engaged on matters which over the long term mean much to us and them.

Ray Cline promised notes on the meeting which I will pass to you as soon as I have them in readable form./3/

/3/Not found.

DK

84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, January 8, 1965, 8:04 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VII. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Jenkins, cleared by Henry and Vedeler (EUR), and approved by Thompson. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

1890. Ref: Embtel 1971./2/ At Department's Crab Fishing reception January 7 several Soviet Embassy officers expressed apparently genuine surprise at suggestions Soviet reaction to State of Union address was unusually harsh. They said they considered Soviet reaction to speech was not unusual in that address contained some things they disliked and some they liked. They contended Soviet press treatment in natural way criticized those things which they disagree with and praised those they approved of. Was quite apparent in number of individual conversations that the one most difficult ingredient for Soviets in speech was section directed to Eastern European countries. Ambassador Dobrynin said to Ambassador Thompson that his government was disturbed that the question of improving relations between the US and Eastern European countries always seemed to be in the form of separating these countries from the Soviet Union./3/ This section President's speech was described by other Soviets as "robbing much of value" in President's remarks in support of US-Soviet trade. Several officers also expressed "strong disappointment" President's use of self-determination in reference to Germany.

/2/Dated January 7, it summarized Soviet press reaction to the President's State of the Union address. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-2 US)

/3/A memorandum of Dobrynin's conversation with Thompson is ibid., POL EUR E-US. Memoranda of their conversations on the possible visit of Soviet businessmen to the United States and the Indonesian withdrawal from the United Nations during the reception are in the Department of State, S/S-I Miscellaneous Files: Lot 79 D 246, Microfilm Box 50 and S/S-I Miscellaneous Files: Lot 73 D 154, S/AL.

In general Soviet officers indicated optimistic expectations for "improvements" in coming months including Consular Convention, air agreement, opening up consulates, trade. Some expressed surprise at US press interpretation President's remarks as "invitation" to Soviet leaders. They suggested the new Soviet leaders could not appropriately "rush off" to Washington so soon after coming to power.

Rusk

85. Message From President Johnson to the Soviet Government/1/

Washington, January 14, 1965.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret; Sensitive. The original of the message was handed to Dobrynin by Thompson at 4 p.m. on January 14. A memorandum of their conversation at that time is ibid. The draft approved by the President on January 12 included the salutation, "Dear Mr. Chairman," but the source text does not. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin) Thompson indicated to Bundy in a January 14 memorandum that he omitted the salutation in the retyped version passed to Dobrynin; Thompson later referred to the message as "the President's message to the Soviet Government" (see Document 89). Dobrynin discusses the message in his memoirs, In Confidence, emphasizing that Johnson addressed his suggestion of a visit broadly to the Soviet leadership and not to Brezhnev or Kosygin personally (pp. 133-134).

Now that Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Rusk have had a series of discussions of our mutual problems, I wish to reply to the message from your Government of November 3, 1964,/2/ which was transmitted through Ambassador Dobrynin. I was particularly pleased to have the expression of the interest of your Government in first restraining and limiting the arms race, and then decisively reversing it. I think that we can take some satisfaction in the fact that both our Governments have been able, without formal agreement, to reduce our military budgets by amounts which may be small in relation to our total arms expenditure but are nevertheless of some significance in that we have both succeeded in putting an end to the annual increases in this heavy burden. I am able to tell you now that our budget for the fiscal year 1965 will call for expenditures in our Department of Defense of $47.9 billion, which is more than $2 billion less than was requested in my budget submitted to the Congress in January 1964.

/2/Document 67.

As I have already touched upon disarmament questions in my New Year's message to you,/3/ I will not discuss them further at this time, other than to say that I continue to believe deeply that there would be advantage to us all in progress toward the specific arrangements I have proposed. In particular, we are convinced that the interest of our two peoples, and indeed of all mankind, would be advanced by steps beyond the limited test ban treaty to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons. I am able to confirm to you once again that it is this fundamental policy that underlies all our actions in this field, including those about which your Government has expressed concern, in the area of the nuclear defense of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. I remain convinced that if we work together with the common purpose of opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we should be able to eliminate misunderstandings between us and serve our common interests.

/3/For text of this message, December 30, 1964, see Department of State Bulletin, January 18, 1965, pp. 74-75.

I fully share your view that agreements reached between our Governments should be honestly observed by both sides, and I can assure you of our good faith on this score. Many of the problems which today plague the world, and which in one way or another involve the Soviet Union and the United States, are highly complex, both in their origins and in their ramifications. I am hopeful, however, that with good will on both sides, a steady and consistent effort to resolve them can succeed. We shall, of course, have to proceed step by step, but every success will, in my opinion, make the remaining problems easier to resolve. You may be sure that I am determined to persevere on this path.

I am concerned that the United Nations has not yet been able to resolve the problem related to Article 19 of the Charter. I can assure you that our position on this question is one based on both principle and a consideration of the practical consequences of a failure to uphold the Charter as we see it. Our position is not in any sense directed against the Soviet Union, and on the contrary, I regret that an issue of this seriousness has arisen and particularly that we are obliged to deal with it so soon after the constitution of new governments in both of our countries. In our handling of the matter in New York, we are seeking a solution which would not prejudice either your or our positions of principle.

I am hopeful that we can continue to make progress in our strictly bilateral relations. In this field, I intend to press forward in an effort to develop our trade relations. There are many difficulties, but if the international political atmosphere remains calm, I believe there is a good prospect of improvement. We consider that this field is important both because of the practical advantages of peaceful commerce and because of the high value of active, peaceful, and straightforward relations between the citizens of our two countries. For these same reasons I shall continue to give my strong support to the increase of cultural and technical exchanges between our peoples. And in this connection I have recently had most interesting talks with my Science Advisor, Dr. Hornig, and those who accompanied him on his important visit to the Soviet Union. I have also listened with great interest to the encouraging reports of the distinguished group of American businessmen which had the advantage of a meeting with you and many of your associates at the end of last year.

In this same spirit I have expressed my hope for a visit from your side to the United States. I believe that such a visit would allow us to have serious and constructive discussions together. It would also allow us a chance to show you the real dedication to freedom and peace of the American people, who share with the people of the Soviet Union such great responsibilities for the future of mankind. If this hope should meet with a positive response from the Soviet Government, it would be a great satisfaction to propose definite times and to offer a more formal invitation./4/

/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.

86. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, January 15, 1965, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Toon and initialed by Kohler. (Department of State, Kohler Files: Lot 71 D 460, Exdis Cables)

2050. I began meeting with Gromyko this afternoon by reminding that Secretary expected to take holiday after inauguration and hoped Gromyko would facilitate his plans by settling UN financial crisis and keeping lid on generally. Gromyko rejoined that this depended on US and said he assumed I had returned from Washington with lots of news.

I reported briefly on the results my conversations with regard to prospects early ratification consular convention and, as President had informed Gromyko,/2/ coordinated conclusion Civil Air Agreement. I felt compelled to inform Gromyko of concern which had been expressed to me both by President and Secretary over the recent sharp tone in Soviet press, particularly with regard to State of Union message.

/2/See Document 78.

Gromyko regretted that US press has seen fit to report almost exclusively on the critical aspects of reaction in Soviet press to President's message and to say almost nothing about positive Soviet treatment. Gromyko wished me to know that the Soviet Govt has reacted favorably to the President's remarks with regard to desirability of improving bilateral relations and readiness establish contacts in summit level. He suggested this would probably be reflected still more in press in future. Naturally the Soviet Govt had noted that the message reflected no change in US policy toward certain areas of the world--e.g. south-east Asia--but Gromyko had already fully expounded the Soviet Govt's views on these aspects of the message and he saw no need to repeat them at this meeting. He wished note absence in State of Union address of any reference to disarmament and desirability of ending arms race.

I pointed out to Gromyko that obviously time and broad scope of State of Union message limited what President could say and in any case President planned to deal with subject of disarmament in separate message being delivered today to Congress./3/ I handed him advance copy of text of message noting in particular President's request that Congress sanction a four year extension of ACDA. I told Gromyko I had particular interest in his reaction to the President's proposal for TV exchange since I hoped soon to pay a courtesy call on Mesyatsev (TV and Radio State Committee Chairman) and had considered raising subject with him. Gromyko said naturally Sov Govt had noted proposal, considered that it deserved close attention, and was now giving it appropriate consideration. He did not rule out possibility of reaching some understanding on mode its implementation and hoped be in position give me more concrete expression Sov Govt's position which might then be examined in detail in other channels.

/3/For text of the letter to Congress, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, pp. 51-52.

As I left Gromyko asked me relay his best wishes to Secretary for a good holiday and said that so far as Sovs were concerned nothing would occur which would disturb his rest. He invited me to call on him at any time when ready for further discussion various matters touched on in Washington and New York talks./4/

/4 In addition to the subjects raised in this telegram, Kohler and Gromyko also discussed the Embassy's request for a leased line and the site for a new Soviet Embassy in Washington (telegram 2051 from Moscow, January 15; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VII) and UN Charter Article 19 (telegram 2052 from Moscow, January 15; scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXXIII.

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