Moscow, November 3, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret. Attached to a November 3 covering memorandum from Thompson to Bundy that reads: "Ambassador came in to see me this morning at 10:15 and left the attached." In recalling handing the message to Thompson on Election Day, Dobrynin commented in his memoirs, "Brezhnev was so pleased by Johnson's favorable reaction to his accession to power that the Politburo then decided to send Johnson a detailed reply even before his election." (In Confidence, p. 133) Rusk told the President during a telephone conversation on November 3 that there was "nothing very significant about it except that it was a thoughtful message from the new team about a number of subjects." Rusk then briefly summarized its points about military budget reductions and troop pullbacks in Europe, concluding, "in other words they were exploring a little bit to see how much movement there is and the possibilities. But I was on the whole encouraged with it." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape 6411.01, PNO 10)

The Soviet Government received with satisfaction the statement of President Johnson in his discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin/2/ that the desire of the Government of the U.S.A. for peace has never been so strong and decisive as at present, and that the President hopes upon his reelection for another term for the possibility of progress in the reduction of tension, in the field of disarmament, and in the reduction of military activity. We likewise do not wish to bury anyone or be buried, and we are convinced that the difference of views over whose social system is better should not be an obstacle to the development of relations between the Soviet Union and U.S.A. in the interests of broadening international cooperation and strengthening peace.

/2/See Document 55.

The President said in that discussion that the U.S.A. needs to do many more necessary things than the production of bombs, and that it is in no way pleasing to him to spend $50 billion per year solely in order to be prepared to destroy someone. We understand this train of thought. It goes against our grain as well to divert enormous resources to military purposes, which however we must do since the U.S.A. and its allies continue to expand their armaments. We are convinced that many other countries as well, which now strive to follow the greater powers, would likewise prefer to cast from their shoulders the burden of military expenditures. Must we together acknowledge impotence in the face of the arms race, admit its inevitability instead of first restraining and limiting it, and then decisively reversing it? The Soviet Government advocates this.

Why not for instance pursue a further reduction of military budgets, and a more substantial one than was done by the Governments of our countries in the last budgetary year? This could be accomplished without any formal agreement as parallel measures by the governments of our countries.

To give concrete form to the expression of President Johnson concerning the desirability of reducing military activity, in our view the possibility of a further mutual reduction of troops in Europe deserves attention.

In this connection we would like to inform President Johnson that the Soviet Government has already reduced its troops stationed outside Soviet borders in Europe by 15,000 men, i.e., it has fulfilled the intention concerning which it informed the President in June of this year./3/ In its turn, as could be understood from the statements of Secretary of State Rusk in his recent conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, the Government of the U.S.A. has also undertaken a similar reduction of its troops in Europe. Why don't we follow this path further? We believe that in this case also it is not the form of agreement which is important but the concrete results, and if it suits the Government of the U.S.A. more, then appropriate measures can be undertaken in the form of mutual example.

/3/See Document 36.

In a word far from all possibilities have yet been exploited to move forward the reduction of international tension which has been noted since the signing of the Moscow treaty on the banning of nuclear tests in three environments. In our belief there are still large potentials, for instance, in the field of disarmament, problems of effective security in Europe and the peaceful regularization of Germany, as well as in other current international questions.

We share the opinion of the President on the necessity for a display of greater flexibility in the approach to the resolution of problems on our agenda and in reaching agreements on questions which arise touching the interests of our countries. It is also very important that an agreement reached between us on one or another question be honestly observed by both sides. We are sure that the President will agree with this, since departure from this principle in our relations would not only deprive our efforts to seek genuine mutual understanding of a real basis but could result in situations the consequences of which it would be difficult even to foresee now. We speak of this not because any doubts have arisen on our part for example concerning the observance by the American side of certain obligations concerning non-attack on Cuba, we trust the word of the President and trust the agreement which was reached between the U.S.A. and the USSR on this score. What is at issue is that the fruits of an easing of international tension must be enjoyed by all states--large and small, friends of your country and friends of our country, no matter how far removed they may be from the U.S.A. or the Soviet Union. The state of affairs in the world at the present time is such that any infringement of the sovereign rights and legitimate interests of small countries is inadmissible in and of itself, inevitably creates or intensifies centers of tension and introduces additional complications in relations among large powers, and primarily between the USSR and the U.S.A.

Speaking about the necessity for manifesting flexibility in policy, the President mentioned the so-called problem of UN financing. In Moscow, attention was paid to Secretary of State Rusk's statement in a recent conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin/4/ to the effect that the U.S. Government is not interested in a confrontation with the USSR on this question. The Soviet Government also would not want this.

/4/Presumably a reference to the meeting on October 20, also attended by Ambassador Stevenson. The text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXXIII.

We have already said more than once and emphasize again that the USSR advocates the strengthening in every way possible of the United Nations in its activity aimed at the maintenance of peace and security in conformity with the UN Charter. In this we are prepared for the closest cooperation with the U.S.A. However, the way out of the "financial crisis of the UN" should be sought not by means of violating the UN Charter, i.e., of the arbitrary application to one or another state of Article 19, but on the basis of strict observance of the UN Charter.

Unfortunately, there are manifestations of U.S. foreign policy which cause an exacerbation of the international situation, lead to the creation of centers of tension, including also in relations between our states. But at the present time we would like to emphasize not those questions on which there are differences of opinion between us, but those areas where there are points of convergence between us.

On the whole we feel that it is necessary to seek agreements, to achieve concrete decisions on unsettled questions, to eliminate everything that hinders mutual understanding, to expand the spheres of Soviet-American cooperation, including in the exploration of outer space, about which the President has spoken, and we note with satisfaction that the intentions expressed on this score by the leaders of both of our governments coincide. We think that a useful and practical beginning could be made in this matter by continuing the exchange of opinions on questions of interest to both sides between the U.S. Secretary of State and the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs during the forthcoming UN General Assembly Session.

We would like to say once again that the Soviet Government values relations of trust with President Johnson and considers it mutually useful to maintain and develop them, using all the channels which have been established.

There have been different periods in the history of Soviet-American relations. There were times when our countries conducted mutually profitable trade. In the recent past we were allies in the grim war against the forces of fascism. The Soviet people treasure the memory of the great American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who did much to create the anti-Hitlerite coalition and under whom the principle of mutual respect and understanding of the interests of one another was laid as the basis of relations between our countries. We speak about this, knowing how highly President Johnson values the activity of President F.D. Roosevelt, and believing, that if both our countries will adhere strictly to this tested principle, Soviet-American relations will attain the character of genuine good-neighborliness and mutually advantageous cooperation./5/

/5/A draft reply to this message, dated November 24, addressed to Mr. Chairman, and marked "Not Sent," is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.

68. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 6, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 2-3 USSR. Confidential. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on November 6. Dr. Sergo A. Mikoyan, the son of Anastas I. Mikoyan, was in the United States for a month-long stay under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council.

SUBJECT
Soviet Affairs

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Sergo Mikoyan of the USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

The following are the highlights of a long conversation with Mr. Mikoyan:

I did not myself directly raise the question of Sino-Soviet relations, but Mr. Mikoyan volunteered the fact that everyone else he had talked to had raised this question. He said that the Chinese Communists were now pretending that all of their difficulties with the Soviet Union were attributable to Mr. Khrushchev which he said was, of course, not the case. He said that while they did not desire to quarrel with the Chinese, the Soviets would not abandon their positions of principle. He said this issue had really been decided by the American election. If Mr. Goldwater had been elected, he thought his Government would have been obliged to review and reconsider its policies. He indicated that one of the most strongly held Soviet policies involved was that of peaceful coexistence.

Mr. Mikoyan seemed convinced that the new regime would follow a more sensible and consistent policy in dealing with Soviet economic problems. He strongly implied that the economic reorganization would be along the lines of the Liberman proposals./2/ He said that Mr. Khrushchev had tried to solve all economic problems through organizational changes, but what was needed was to deal with substantive matters. He did indicate, however, he thought the bifurcation of the Party had been a great mistake and would be changed to the extent that it had been implemented. He said that the fact was that it was unworkable and the reform had by no means been fully carried out. He thought that the Government would try to do away with the duplication and overlapping that existed between Party and State organizations.

/2/For text of Soviet economist Y.G. Liberman's article on the role of profit earning capacity and profits in general in the Soviet economy, see Pravda, September 9, 1964.

In discussing our own economy, I suggested that most Soviets did not understand the role of the regulatory agencies in our economy and that they would be well advised to make a study of this.

We discussed trade matters at some length and I explained that our trade relations with the Soviet Union were being seriously examined. He inquired whether, in the event that economic obstacles were removed, political questions would prevent the development of trade. I replied that obviously if the Soviet Union embarked on an aggressive policy along the lines advocated by Communist China, there would be little prospect of developing active trading relations. In this connection, I referred to the role of Congress and existing legislation. I said, however, that I thought we recognized that there would always be political matters on which we did not agree and that trade could be developed despite these differences if the overall attitude of both countries was one of attempting to resolve problems and not create new ones.

69. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Davis) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, November 9, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AV 4 US-USSR. Secret. Drafted by Henry and Jenkins and cleared by Harriman, Thompson, H, and E/OA. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Rusk saw it.

SUBJECT
Signing of Bilateral Air Agreement with the Soviet Union

The long-standing draft bilateral air agreement with the Soviet Union provides an excellent vehicle for an initial step forward in our relations with the new Soviet regime. As you recall, the agreement was negotiated and initialed in August 1961 but signature was postponed because of the general deterioration in our relations with the Soviet Union. It is ready to be signed at any time and the Soviets have continuously indicated their desire to complete the agreement and initiate passenger service. If signed this winter, the agreement would permit the initiation of flights between New York and Moscow early next summer. In view of the significance of a final decision on this question you may wish to discuss it with Senator Fulbright and confirm our impression that conclusion of the air agreement should not jeopardize ratification of the consular convention. If Senator Fulbright believes that it would, then presumably we would wish to delay signature until after the Senate has acted on the consular convention.

/2/Rusk, together with McGeorge Bundy, met with the President for 2-1/2 hours on November 10 at the LBJ Ranch in Texas. McNamara and Vance joined them part way through the meeting. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary)

For purpose of your discussion with the President tomorrow/2/ you may wish to recommend that he authorize you to conclude the air agreement subject to Senator Fulbright's concurrence in terms of timing.

The advantages of signing the air agreement would be:

1. Signing would be an important psychological step in improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

2. At a crucial juncture in Sino-Soviet relations, it would provide the Soviets with evidence of the success of their "peaceful coexistence" policy as an alternative to the Chinese hard line. Since major multilateral agreements with the Soviets seem unlikely, bilateral agreements take on added importance.

3. Additional Russian tourists and other visitors should be able to come to America, it will be easier for United States travelers to visit the Soviet Union, and a significant expansion of professional contacts in the civil aviation field will ensue--all these represent important strengthening of our program to increase and improve communication.

4. There are a number of secondary advantages, such as familiarization with Soviet aviation techniques, improved courier service to the Embassy, a modest enhancement of Scandinavian bargaining position against the USSR on aviation matters.

On March 4 of this year in a memorandum to the President/3/ on this subject you recommended that the question of signing the agreement be reassessed once prospects for OAS action against Cuba had been exhausted. In addition, in discussing the disadvantages it was assumed that the Brazilian Government under President Goulart would immediately follow our action by permitting Aeroflot to gain entry in Brazil. Both of these disadvantages have been reduced or removed since that time. Remaining disadvantages would be:

/3/Presumably a reference to Document 22.

1. Our efforts to restrict air contact with Cuba might be impaired.

2. Bloc airlines might exploit the signature to gain access to Latin America, although this seems somewhat less likely given the change of government in Brazil.

3. Our ability to prevent air agreements by Communist countries which would permit their operation to other less developed countries would be reduced. However, this capability is already seriously diminished in Africa and the Middle East.

Should your talks with Gromyko at the UNGA proceed favorably, you may wish to consider signing the air agreement together with Gromyko in New York at that time.

ARA is sending you a separate memorandum expressing its dissent in terms of the effect on Latin American interests./4/

/4/A copy of this memorandum, also dated November 9, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AV 4 US-USSR.

70. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, November 11, 1964, 10 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US-USSR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to London, Paris, and USUN.

1465. I saw Gromyko this afternoon at 2:30 (appointment postponed at his request) and had conversation with him on broad range of subjects lasting hour and a quarter. Gromyko took initiative in raising Article 19 issue to which much of conversation devoted and made clear that the Soviet Govt's position is unchanged. While I cannot be sure from his treatment of subject, I had impression that probably his attitude toward participation in bilateral talks, if not his attendance in GA session may be affected by outcome Article 19 issue. At least, he tried leave that impression.

I started conversation by expressing hope Hornig and I would be able conclude desalinization agreement before our departure on 19th,/2/ pointing out that DCM this morning had handed Smirnovsky our tentative revision of original Soviet draft text which I stressed had not yet been cleared by all interested agencies US Govt. Gromyko indicated some familiarity with problem and said that he hoped MFA would be in position to give us their reaction to revised text beginning of week in time for signature of agreement before our departure. I then referred to Gromyko's promise of last Feb to provide us with leased line and said I hoped be in position report to principals in Washington that our needs had been met. Gromyko said he too hoped problem "with long beard" would be resolved soon and MFA would probably be in position to give us more specific info in near future. I then discussed briefly certain details with regard to social activities in connection with upcoming business international meeting and then asked him if he were in position inform me as to his own plans with regard opening of GA on Dec 1. I pointed out that as in past the Secy hoped to have opportunity for talks with Gromyko on major problems including bilateral issues and noted Sov Govt had also expressed such wish.

/2/For text of the Agreement of Cooperation in the Field of Desalination, including the Use of Atomic Energy, signed at Moscow on November 18, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 663-664. Donald Hornig, Director of the Office of Science and Technology, traveled to Moscow to sign the agreement with Kohler.

Gromyko said he had planned to be in New York on Dec 1 but outlook for GA opening may affect his plans. Sov Govt had great difficulty in understanding why Article 19 problem had been posed in such sharp terms immediately after elections. Sovs had welcomed Pres Johnson's expressed desire to continue former policies directed toward development of US-Sov relations, and they were at loss to understand why in immediate post-electoral period US had stirred up so much agitation over "so-called financial crisis in UN" and "so-called Soviet arrearages." Certainly the Soviets intend to direct their policies toward continued improvement US-Sov relations, as reflected in statements by both Brezhnev and Kosygin, but they had impression that the US Govt on contrary is pursuing action which can only result in increased tensions.

I told Gromyko that so far as US Govt was concerned our position on Article 19 issue was exactly the same now as before elections. As he would recall from my conversation with Kosygin,/3/ which I reaffirmed to him, US Govt did not regard issue as cold war question but one which affects very survival of UN. We certainly had no desire to exploit any possible arrangement the Sovs might be able to work out which would meet their own political requirements as well as avoid automatic application of Article 19. In fact as Stevenson had already demonstrated to Fedorenko in NY, we would be prepared to cooperate with the Sovs in preventing issue from coming to head.

/3/See Document 63.

Gromyko said Sov Govt does not regard UN Charter as scrap of paper and would do nothing to violate or weaken Charter. This is precisely what would happen if Sov Govt should accept US position on arrearages. Sovs had never said they would pay expenses incurred by other powers or accede to decision imposed by mechanical majority in UN. In Sov view all questions relating to peacekeeping forces are matter for decision by Security Council alone. Gromyko regretted that US had adopted position on question which could only be obstacle to development of good US-Sov relations toward which Sovs have indicated readiness to do all in their power.

I said we too were genuinely interested in improvement mutual relations but not at price of UN Charter. We were convinced that if members of UN should be permitted to select assessments they prepared to pay this would be death of UN. I recognized there was very real difference between our points of view but I hoped some way could be found to avoid issue coming to head.

Gromyko said it was simply impossible for Sov Govt to agree to payment and at same time maintain position of principle. This would be contrary to Charter and Sovs not prepared to do anything in violation of Charter. Sovs are deeply convinced their position is correct one, beyond reproach.

I said I regretted the Sov attitude since I had hoped some way might be found of preventing issue from being joined before opening of GA. I then suggested we leave this problem and discuss issues of which Gromyko might wish raise with Secy on assumption he would be in New York.

Gromyko said that in Sov view primary question is to ascertain how administration and Pres Johnson personally views prospects of US-Sov relations. Sov position in this respect had been made clear by Brezhnev in his cosmonaut and Nov 6 speeches/4/ as well as by Kosygin in his recent statements. Sovs intend to pursue "Leninist course of peaceful co-existence between states regardless of differing social systems" which had been established as Sov foreign policy line at 20th, 21st and 22nd Party Congresses. This, in Gromyko's view, should be first question for discussion with Secy in NY.

/4/For text of Brezhnev's October 19 speech hailing the achievements of three Soviet cosmonauts, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, November 4, 1964, pp. 5-6. For text of Brezhnev's November 6 speech, see ibid., November 18, 1964, pp. 3-9.

I said I could assure Gromyko that we hoped to continue and expand progress which we had begun last year with signature Test Ban Treaty. We had noted favorable references in Brezhnev's and Kosygin's speeches to desirability of progress particularly in disarmament area and I was sure Secy would wish discuss with Gromyko concrete issues with hope of injecting new life into disarmament discussions. Meanwhile there were certain questions which I would like to put to Gromyko on which I would be expected to comment on my return to Wash. First of these related to Cuba. Gromyko would recall past refs to Cuban problem and I had recently noted the significant remark by Castro to Sulzberger that the Sovs retained veto on use of surface to air missiles deployed in Cuba. I thought it would be useful to have Gromyko's comment on this statement by Castro, as spokesman for other interested party.

Gromyko said since he had not read the full text of Sulzberger's interview he would prefer not to comment and in any case he felt it desirable avoid discussion of questions directly affecting Cuban-Sov bilateral relations. Reverting to my request regarding concrete issues which might be considered in talks with Secy, Gromyko noted a little progress had been made as the result of past exchanges of views in ENDC and elsewhere. It is Sov desire to see such basic problems as disarmament and European security on road to solution. If radical solutions of problems not immediately acceptable then approach through partial measure should be tried.

This approach could be implemented in number of ways--either formal agreements or through mutual example. Specific subjects (not exhaustive) which Gromyko had in mind were: 1) cuts in military budgets; 2) reduction in forces stationed abroad (although Sovs of course favor complete withdrawal); 3) non-aggression pact (on which no progress had been made despite certain promises made by US and UK negotiators during test ban talks to take action aimed at bringing matter to positive solution); 4) nuclear free zones or Polish variant which encompassed limitations on both nuclear and conventional forces; and finally, bilateral relations, especially economic relations. Re latter Gromyko wished make clear Sovs do not intend "beg" for improvements in economic field; Sov position is based on ideas that development of trade of mutual benefit. Gromyko recalled conversations with Rusk, Ball and late Pres Kennedy on problem in which US spokesmen had indicated interest, made certain promises, but pointed out action on question should be deferred until after election. If US side now has proposals or observations to make, Gromyko would be happy to hear them.

I said that Gromyko's catalog was illustrative of the broad range of questions which might be discussed at talks in NY. Meanwhile I was glad to note Gromyko's confirmation of Sov acceptance of step by step approach in disarmament. Without going into substance, I said I had list of nine Soviet and eight American proposals in disarmament field; we would be prepared discuss all and assumed from his remarks he would too. Re bilateral issues we would be prepared to discuss trade and related questions, and, of course, we hoped to take early action on consular convention ratification. I then reverted to questions on which I might be expected to comment in Wash and asked Gromyko for his views on recent Chinese nuclear explosion, particularly why there had been no Sov public reaction to event.

Gromyko said important thing was to recognize fact of nuclear explosion by China and draw appropriate conclusions therefrom. If he were asked what conclusion US should draw from event he would say first of these should be renunciation of traditional US policy toward China. He recognized that certain aspects of Chinese policy may be unpalatable to US but this was no basis for unreal non-recognition policy. In Sov view China should be admitted to UN and should be participant in all negotiations on international problems, particularly those related to disarmament, nuclear weapons and security. Gromyko said that such advice of course was pertinent before explosion but in his view this conclusion was made more obvious by event.

I said that there might be logic in Gromyko's advice if we could be sure that China itself were aware of need for more rational approach to world problems. I wondered if in course of conversations in recent days with Chinese, Sovs had received any reassuring indications of this.

Gromyko said Sovs could not speak for Chinese and no one was authorized to do this except China. If US had certain questions with regard to Chinese policy such questions should be put to Chinese directly. I said we do this regularly, but with negative results. I had hoped to hear their talks were more reassuring.

I then said final question on which I would be asked to comment in Wash was who manned Sov end of hot line.

Gromyko was taken aback, hesitated and then said I had put very concrete question to him which he was not prepared at moment to answer. He suggested we could return to question at later date. Obviously, he said, if a nation has a govt it certainly has to have an authorized spokesman./5/

/5/On November 19 Kohler raised the question of the hot line again with Gromyko. The Soviet Foreign Minister stated that the matter was under consideration, but the Ambassador could be sure that the person who responded on the hot line would be authorized to speak for the Soviet Government. (Telegram 1561 from Moscow; Department of State, S/S-I Limdis/Exdis Microfilm)

Kohler

71. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, November 13, 1964, 12:30 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Harriman on November 17. The conversation was held during a luncheon at the Harriman residence.

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
W. Averell Harriman

The most striking aspect of the lunch was Dobrynin's insistence on drinking several martinis while I had a glass of vodka.

Ambassador Dobrynin expressed gratification at the outcome of the U.S. elections, and I gave him some details on the extraordinary landslide for the President in New York State and the repudiation of Goldwaterism. I said now that there had been three elections--the U.K., U.S.S.R. and the U.S., the atmosphere might be clearer.

He expressed regret that we had not been able to make more progress since the signing of the Test Ban Treaty, and contended that the non-aggression pact had been selected by the Soviets for a next possible step, as after considerable discussion it was thought to be the easiest for Western countries to accept. I explained the difficulties caused by limitations placed on it by Gromyko's refusal to include access to Berlin.

In reply to his question as to how to make progress, I suggested that each side analyze carefully the other's proposals for arms limitation, and see whether some program would not thereby develop.

He, himself, had no specific suggestions, although he contended that the new Government would wish to find a basis for further understandings.

I asked him why Khrushchev's idea of voluntary retirement hadn't been carried out. He contended the meetings had been orderly, with Khrushchev in the chair, and the votes taken in his presence. I commented that the publicity around the change certainly did not give it the impression of as orderly a decision as he maintained. Although he threw no new light on the reasons for Khrushchev's removal, he appeared to want us to accept the view that Khrushchev's independent methods were the basic reason.

He pointed to the need in the present circumstances of getting Party approval in the Presidium. In answer to my direct question, he maintained that the two jobs would be kept separate. When I suggested that Brezhnev, as Party Secretary, would call the signals for Kosygin, Dobrynin dodged by stating Brezhnev as Secretary would preside over the Communist Party meetings.

He brought up Article 19 and argued for discussion at the end of the General Assembly meeting. I reiterated the impossibility of any delay from our standpoint. He argued also about the difficulties which this created for the UN. I underlined the need for the Soviets to face the issue, and accept voluntary payment compromise.

MLF came up for its usual argument. At one point, I asked him why the Soviets didn't propose MLF for China. He replied that China was now a nuclear power, which I scoffed at. In spite of my pressing, he threw no new light on Sino-Soviet relations, although he tried to get me to believe that their unity was based on both countries being communist.

He kept coming back to further progress in settlements of outstanding issues, so I asked him how soon the Soviet Union would get tired of its vast expenditures in Cuba, and reiterated that we would never accept a Cuba as a base for communist subversion. He dodged this one.

The conversation throughout was genial and at times jocular. I had to break it up early as I had a 2:30 engagement to speak to the Counter-Insurgency Course of the Interdepartmental Seminar.

72. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)/1/

Washington, November 18, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rusk on November 19. Copies were sent only to Thompson, Ball, and Tyler.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET
AMBASSADOR ANATOLIY DOBRYNIN

Mrs. Rusk and I had dinner last evening (November 18) with Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin. Following dinner the Ambassador and I had a rather long and wide ranging talk while the two ladies went off to look at movies.

I called Ambassador Dobrynin's attention to news stories indicating that, as we now see it, the prospect is that our defense budget, to be presented to the Congress, would show a continuation of a slightly downward trend and that the total would be just under $50 billion. In addition to the slightly more than billion dollar decrease in the over-all total, I said that he should take into account that this also represented an absorption of a substantial military pay increase of approximately a billion dollars. I reminded him that in commenting on this public information I wished to underline that we were not talking about any agreement or understanding or any loss of freedom of action but that if the information I had discussed was relevant to decisions being made in Moscow he could call it to their attention. I added the comment that we were still interested in some technical talks about the comparability of our two defense budgets. I told him that we were not at all clear about the meaning of the defense cuts announced by the Soviet Union last year because we were under the impression that their research and development budget had been significantly increased. He said he was not aware of the latter point but would check into it.

We then had a long and inconclusive discussion of Article 19. I pointed out to him, in connection with the Soviet charge that we were whipping this up into a great issue, that Moscow had apparently overlooked the fact that we had made no special campaign of the matter on the basis of failure of the Soviet Union to pay these assessments during the past two years. Were their arrearage moved beyond the two year level a constitutional issue under the Charter was raised and this issue very much affected our own interests and our own constitutional arrangements here at home for obtaining the necessary support for the United Nations. I said that we were surprised and disappointed that the Soviet Union presented us with this problem through a failure to keep their arrearages within the two year limit. He repeated the well worn Soviet position. We agreed that it would be better for the discussions to continue in New York with the informal committees working on the problem, with the Secretary General and between our delegations. He seemed to press rather hard for the idea that the issue ought to be deferred until the end of the General Assembly to give more time to work out an agreement on the "present and future aspects of the problem." When I questioned him about the "present" aspects of the problem, he backed away fast and indicated that he saw no chance for a change in the Soviet position on that portion. I told him I thought it would be very difficult to postpone the Article 19 problem if the General Assembly expected to go ahead with its business, including voting procedures.

He left me the definite impression that he expected Gromyko in New York about the 29th of November.

We talked somewhat about non-proliferation and I told him that it was my information that both Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Mikoyan had commented to foreign visitors in recent weeks that the Soviet Union had provided the Chinese with information and materials suitable for a nuclear explosion and that the Soviets had been somewhat surprised that the explosion had not occurred much earlier. I told him that this had not coincided with earlier information which the Soviets had given to us about having limited their cooperation to the peaceful uses field. He said he was not aware of the point I raised but that he would "check into it."

We then discussed Cuba along standard lines. The only thing of any particular interest was that, in connection with my strong emphasis upon Castro's interference in other countries in the hemisphere, he seemed to be trying to say that this had been stopped in recent months. I called his attention to the special importance of the most recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS and pointed out that the Foreign Ministers exchanged information among themselves about Castro's activities in the hemisphere which went considerably beyond the particular Venezuelan case and that the Foreign Ministers had taken all of the "peaceful" measures that were available to them under the Rio Treaty. I emphasized that we hoped that Castro got the clear message that such activities must stop. In connection with the Soviet military personnel in Cuba I told Dobrynin that we were aware that there has been a considerable reduction of their military personnel but that those who remain are too many. He said that they were there to train Cubans in the use of large quantities of Soviet military equipment which the Cubans did not know how to use.

In connection with talks with Mr. Gromyko in New York I suggested that it might be useful for us to "box the compass" to see where there might be any points in which we could make some headway. I described our attitude as like "an infantry advancing on a broad front." Where we could move forward we were prepared to do so but if we encountered difficult problems or obstacles it might be necessary to take more time.

Throughout the conversation Dobrynin tried to leave the impression that Moscow was expecting some real fresh starts from the Johnson Administration following the election and that they hoped that this would affect more things than possibly some increase in trade.

Dean Rusk/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

73. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Acting Attorney General Katzenbach/1/

Washington, November 19, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-6 USSR. Confidential. Drafted by the Acting Legal Adviser, Leonard C. Meeker, and cleared with Thompson and Davis.

Dear Nick:

Ambassador Thompson has reviewed with me the course of the proceedings in the Ivanov espionage trial, and has reported on his talks with you in May 1964 and again last week. As the trial of Ivanov comes to a close, I believe we should consider carefully what disposition of the non-American defendant would best serve the national interest. As you know, the Soviet Government pressed strongly for the release of Ivanov following his arrest and indictment last spring. We made it clear to the Soviets that release could not be considered at that time, and that Ivanov would have to stand trial.

In the event of conviction, the question arises whether he should serve whatever sentence may be imposed by the trial judge, or whether he should be permanently expelled from the United States following imposition of sentence. I believe it would be in the over-all interest of the United States that Ivanov's sentence be suspended and that he be permanently expelled from this country.

We have, from time to time, cases of Americans who are arrested and held in the U.S.S.R. and other Soviet Bloc countries on a variety of grounds. It is a continuing concern of the United States Government, and indeed a statutory responsibility of the Executive Branch under 22 U.S.C. 1732, to afford all reasonable protection and assistance to American citizens imprisoned abroad. While, of course, we would not want to adopt a policy of deportation for Bloc nationals in all cases, I believe that in present circumstances action to deport Ivanov following a criminal conviction would be helpful to our efforts at safeguarding the rights of Americans and securing their release when detained.

As you know, the relations of the United States with the U.S.S.R. extend over a very wide range of questions. Taking into account the whole spectrum of those relations at this time, and considering the Ivanov case in their context, I believe it would best serve United States interests to expel Ivanov after conviction and sentence rather than require him to serve a prison sentence in this country.

I write now to ask your concurrence in such a course of action, so that arrangements may be made for an appropriate recommendation to the trial judge by the United States Attorney following completion of the trial. I would hope that the case might be terminated and Ivanov deported very promptly, without any substantial lapse of time between conviction and sentencing.

If you would be prepared to proceed as suggested above, I should like officers of the Department of State to work out with officials of your Department the further steps which might appropriately be taken./2/

/2/On December 1 Katzenbach replied saying that the release of Ivanov, a career officer in the KGB, for an American tourist, Peter Landerman, would be a bad bargain, and he could not concur in the suggestion made in Rusk's letter. (Ibid.) On December 8 Rusk raised the issue again saying that the reason for expelling Ivanov was not to gain the release of Landerman but to help in protecting and assisting all American citizens abroad and would be in the overall interest within the broad spectrum of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. (Letter from Rusk to Katzenbach; ibid.) One week later Bundy sounded out the President on Ivanov. Johnson told him that "on the facts as presented, he would incline to the side of Justice." (Memorandum from Bundy to Katzenbach, December 15; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VII)

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

74. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, November 19, 1964, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

1559. Embtel 1333./2/ Developments since submission reftel have helped to point up some of trends which I then discussed, and provide further indications of shape of Sov foreign relations in coming period.

/2/Document 65.

1. Internally, this week's organizational and personnel changes reflect leaderships preoccupation with need to establish control of party and administrative apparatus. In general, they seem not only to be reworking party structure, but continuing search for economic reforms and improvement of methods of industrial management.

2. Chou visit and related statements (Embtel 1546)/3/ have reinforced indications that basic differences between USSR and CPR will continue and that Soviets will be faced with need to try to avoid complete fragmentation of world movement, while trying to forestall airing of dispute which would help bring this about.

/3/Dated November 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, CSM 1-1 CHICOM-USSR)

3. Responses of EE leaders and of such major free world CPs as Italian and French to Khrushchev's removal, while varied, have given current Sov leadership little reason for confidence that CPSU's leading role in movement is enhanced or even undamaged by last month's events. Soviets may well be able to improve relations with some friendly bloc parties, utilizing argument that they have amended tactics in Sino-Soviet dispute along lines recommended by Poles, Rumanians, Italians in order establish modus vivendi without sacrifice of principle. However, with bargaining position weakened, Sovs likely to be unable to restore fully their central role and will continue to face pressures for greater autonomy.

4. To extent that Soviet policy toward free world has been thought out and restated in past month, it consists of cautious repetition of main lines with increased emphasis on peaceful coexistence and improved relations with West. This appears most clearly in latest Brezhnev speech (Nov 6) and Pravda leader (Nov 13). Latter while essentially exegesis on former, increasingly highlighted positive aspects of E-W and underplayed anti-imperialism, military vigilance, etc. (Note that Gromyko's remarks at signing desalting agreement (Embtel 1557)/4/ were unusually positive.)

/4/Dated November 18. (Ibid., E 11-3 US-USSR)

It would be erroneous to infer shift in Sov outlook toward West, nor is there any reason to believe Khrushchev's departure from scene would cause such shift. With no change in goals or even in major policies Sovs have, however, signalled shift in tone and probable tactics. If nothing else, combination of private and public expression reflects desire for period of calm in E-W relations.

Reasons for this would seem to lie along two lines. First, with strong reiteration of peaceful coexistence line in confrontation with Chinese, not only are Soviets turning down alternative, vigilant, hardened line which Chinese would wish, but Moscow puts itself under pressure to demonstrate some success for its approach. Second, and probably more basic reason lies in totality of pressures in domestic and intra-Communist areas which enforce need for period of relative quiet in relations with non-Communist world.

If this so, we can expect period of some passivity in E-W relations coupled with interest in indications of détente, particularly in areas such as expansion of trade and exchanges, but lacking in serious initiatives leading either to improvement or to tensions.

On other hand, however, leadership can be expected to be more defensive and to show concern to avoid actions reflecting its weakness. This would include both sharp reactions to moves which seem to challenge Sovs and verbal restatement of firm position on contentious issues where this brought into question. This pattern of action likely to become most apparent on such major problems as Article 19, Berlin, SEA.

Forthcoming period may be one in which--even more than in past--Soviet actions in E-W relations will often seem contradictory or inconsistent. Most important, however, it promises to be period in which, while tactical shifts may occur, continuation of main lines of policy which current leadership has inherited will not be altered.

Kohler

75. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

/Sec/Del/MC/6

New York, November 30, 1964, 1 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FT US-USSR. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on December 8. The conversation took place in Rusk's suite at a luncheon at the Waldorf Astoria and the memorandum is Part IV of VI. Part V, concerning Article 19, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXXIII. Memoranda of the other parts, dealing with the UN Charter, the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on November 28, the Consular Convention, and disarmament, are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. The Embassy in Moscow described the attack by 400-500 people and its protest to the Foreign Ministry in telegrams 1654 and 1659 from Moscow, November 28. (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 USSR)

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, November 1964

SUBJECT
U.S.-Soviet Trade

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	U.S.S.R.
The Secretary	Mr. Gromyko
Ambassador Stevenson	Mr. Semenov
Ambassador Thompson	Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Cleveland	Ambassador Fedorenko
Mr. R. H. Davis	Mr. Smirnovskiy
Mr. A. Akalovsky	Mr. Sukhodrev

The Secretary thanked Mr. Gromyko for the good reception given to the U.S. businessmen who recently visited Moscow.

Mr. Gromyko commented that he had detected among U.S. businessmen considerable interest in expanding U.S.-Soviet trade and that it was now up to the State Department to adopt a more forthcoming attitude.

The Secretary agreed that there was indeed some interest in furthering trade between the two countries. Senator Fulbright was to have hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee aimed at this objective. While any significant expansion would require changes in the present legislation, there were certain things which could be done within the existing law. However, he wished to note the practical problem of what the two countries could be interested in buying and selling. As he pointed out to Mr. Kosygin at Mr. Nehru's funeral in New Delhi,/2/ the economies of our two countries are in many ways similar, so that it might be difficult to find commodities in which they could usefully trade. He remarked in a light vein that vodka and caviar were the obvious commodities we would be interested in buying from the Soviet Union, but one could not go very far only on that basis. In this connection, he thought it might be useful to have a strictly technical discussion of the commodities in which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could trade, putting aside for the moment the political aspects of the problem, such as lend-lease and the MFN question. Such a review should be conducted very quietly, perhaps at the Economic Counselor level and without any special delegations. Of course, the Soviet Economic Counselor in Washington could be supported by an expert sent from Moscow for this purpose. The Secretary thought that this study could be very useful in Congress, and particularly to Senator Fulbright in his hearings, since one of the first questions which was likely to arise would concern items the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could trade in.

/2/See Document 33.

Mr. Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin expressed interest in the Secretary's idea and observed that as far as U.S. businessmen were concerned, they seemed to be interested in a number of Soviet commodities. For example, U.S. businessmen seemed to regard Soviet equipment for hydro-electrical plants to be superior to that produced in the U.S. and might be interested in buying it. The same applied to Soviet equipment for transmission of electrical power, as well as the Soviet-developed continuous casting process.

The Secretary wondered whether the Soviet Union was now interested in selling technology as distinct from equipment to which Mr. Gromyko replied in the affirmative and noted that the Soviet Union had sold licenses to a number of countries.

The Secretary then pointed out that there was another problem which should be kept in mind. While the Soviet Union, with its centralized system, could undertake specific commitments to perform under a trade arrangement, the U.S. was in a different position. With our free enterprise system, the U.S. Government could not direct private companies to sell to, or buy from, the Soviet Union. We would be interested in the experience the Soviet Union has had in this respect in its dealings with other Western countries.

Mr. Gromyko asked whether the U.S. would be willing to consider a trade agreement, noting that Under Secretary Ball had mentioned such a possibility on one occasion some time ago. The Secretary did not exclude such a possibility, but stressed that there were a number of political and technical problems involved in this matter, including those he had mentioned.

76. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

New York, December 2, 1964, 8 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 US-USSR. Secret; Priority; Limdis.

Secto 7. Following uncleared, Noforn, FYI and subject to revision upon review.

Following summarizes general discussion at Secy's luncheon with Gromyko today./2/ Septel re Art 19 discussion full report will follow./3/

/2/Memoranda of the five parts of the conversation, SecDel/MC/7, are ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

/3/Transmitted in Secto 6, December 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2452)

At outset luncheon Secy paid tribute to Sobolev/4/ and expressed condolences. Gromyko responded appreciatively.

/4/Deputy Foreign Minister Arkady A. Sobolev, who had just died.

Gromyko referred to discussion of military budgets at previous luncheon Nov 30/5/ and his understanding U.S. military budget FY 66 would be further reduced. He stated that "taking into account" U.S. reduction USSR was prepared to reduce its own upcoming military budget by 500 million rubles. Since their budget preceded U.S. they would probably make their announcement first. Secy said he did not carry all military budget figures in head and would not wish mislead Gromyko. Referring to questions raised by Dobrynin during previous conversation Secy said he would ascertain exact figures planned as rapidly as possible and inform Soviet side more specifically. During ensuing discussion complexities military budget, Gromyko asserted military figures in Soviet budget included military research and development and denied separate research and development figures were in fact military.

/5/See Document 75.

Secy inquired whether Gromyko saw possibilities for further cooperation in field outer space, saying he himself believed actual cooperation in specific projects would be desirable: for example if we could have together launched Mars shot. Gromyko confirmed government interested in developing further cooperation in this field but suggested consideration would be easier if U.S. could put up concrete suggestions. Kohler mentioned subject had been discussed during recent visit President's Science Advisor, Hornig, to Moscow and suggested some specific ideas might emerge from this.

Secy thanked Gromyko for Soviet Govt decision to approve leased line for Embassy communications which led to some jocular remarks about long beard having finally been shaved off this question. Gromyko commented no force in Soviet Union strong enough to resist U.S. Ambassador's insistence.

Soviet aide raised question of premises for Soviet Embassy building in Wash. Secy assured them Dept was doing everything possible to move this forward and expressed hope favorable sites might be forthcoming near future. Fedorenko then registered complaint about tax problem on Soviet property ("my residence") at Glen Cove. Yost assured him USUN doing utmost resolve problem but Fedorenko suggested that housing problems should be reciprocal. Gromyko commented on latter Fedorenko was going too far and U.S. Amb in Moscow would remain where he is.

Secy raised question of moving forward to comprehensive test ban and asked whether responsible colleagues should get together on subject. Gromyko responded "at any time" and it was agreed Tsarapkin and Foster should meet in NY. Secy emphasized U.S. does not and will not take part in any French testing program and asked if Gromyko could say same with respect to Peking? Gromyko replied Soviets have nothing to do with China program; "we have no relations" in this field. Question of Chinese participation in test ban is hypothetical one which should not interfere with Soviet-American cooperation this field. Positive advantages would outweigh other considerations. However, to prevent misunderstanding Gromyko wished to say verification should be by national means. Kohler commented U.S. had been experimenting in improving seismological methods and he had invited Soviet participation in experiments. Invitation had been proffered and he hoped USSR would still agree. Dobrynin nodded affirmatively but no commitment was made. In this connection Secy remarked Soviet side had sometimes refused invitations for example to visit Cape Kennedy. He hoped this was not out of fear that U.S. would claim reciprocity since if we issued specific invitation we had no such intention.

Gromyko raised question of reduction of foreign troops in Europe. This discussion inconclusive except both sides agreed there had already been some reduction.

Stressing that he was engaging in personal exploration, Secy expressed hope time approaching when we might find bold, broad concept for settlement of situation in Central Europe. Gromyko responded that pending bold and total solution we should not exclude partial solutions as we had done in case of reduction of military budgets and Limited Test Ban Treaty. However Soviets were also prepared for bold approach to solutions of problems including Germany. Still speaking personally Secy asked whether there might be any point in quiet undramatic four-power conversations, citing as encouraging in this connection recent pass arrangements in Berlin and in respect of trade. U.S. could not move very far without agreement its allies so problems of procedure as well as substance arose. As illustrative example said four-powers might suggest that Germans get together to consider humanitarian measures. Gromyko responded if reunification of Germany were to be considered USSR would say at once this is matter for two German states to discuss. Procedure should be subordinated to substance. He did not know what other countries involved would do. U.S. and USSR had come closer together on certain respects as regards German problem in 1961-1962 discussions. Perhaps we should start again from where we then left off. Secy replied obviously he was not speaking for France but "we can't go very far without others." Suggested specific small steps might include movement of people exchanges, reunion of families. In reply to Gromyko's query as to whether U.S. really prepared make forward progress on German question, Secy agreed we had made some progress in previous bilateral talks but could not move on certain irreducible points. He expressed interest in knowing whether Gromyko thought there were perhaps more important points where progress would be possible, commenting that he would be talking with his allies in Paris in the near future.

In absence of further response from Gromyko, Secy asked if he were planning to make new proposals on disarmament in his GA speech. Gromyko replied nothing drastic planned; Soviet proposals already made were good but of course could be improved.

Following luncheon Secy reverted to subject of Germany. For twenty years this has been most difficult problem involving confrontation two powers and imposing on both great arms burden when they have unfinished business at home. It would be good to have real solution to German question perhaps with security features attached. However he saw no possibility except on basis self-determination for people involved. Seventeen million Germans should not have decisive influence on relations of nearly one billion population NATO and Warsaw Pact powers. If East Germans should freely choose remain as they are in separate state U.S. would accept. If East Germans selected to go other way, then even from Soviet point of view it seemed to him other desirable possibilities would open up and this major question could be removed from our agenda. Perhaps it was not yet time for such bold approach and still necessary deal with smaller questions. Gromyko replied either radical solution of German problem or partial steps were possible. The question was what does radical solution mean? U.S. view contemplated reunification under term "self-determination" as used by West. This was becoming less and less possible as two states developed and FRG pursued hostile line toward GDR. In Soviet view two German states existed with deep watershed between them, especially as regards social systems. FRG and Western attitude toward GDR makes watershed deeper. FRG pursuing line remilitarization and acquisition nuclear weapons which made prospects reunification or even rapprochement increasingly difficult. Reunification could only be considered on basis decision both German states. If we were realistic radical solution would be by German peace settlement and solution related questions which we had discussed previously and on which our views at end came closer together. Though it was true we had found no common language on some problems and some knots remain, especially relating to presence Western forces in West Berlin and access thereto, Soviets believe that formalization two German states would contribute toward eventual reunification. However this of course would depend on will of both states and settlement problems involved such as sovereignty, frontiers, renunciation of nuclear arms. He did not mean by this to say that humanitarian questions mentioned by Secy were not of proper significance. If he were asked how to move forward he would say we should explore and seek agreement starting from point where previous exchange of views ended. As to role of other powers specific questions arose, for example France did not want to discuss disarmament. Question was whether things would develop in peaceful fashion or militaristic discussion as in FRG. MLF question related but has independent significance of its own. MLF plans prejudiced talks on disarmament, complicate European situation and Soviet-American relations. However we could talk separately on that subject. Soviets had noted with satisfaction U.S. declaration U.S. would not allow Germany to lead it into ventures in Europe. Serious aspect was FRG access to nuclear weapons. Secy agreed further meeting needed to discuss these questions in detail while Gromyko in New York. However before turning to UN problem he wished clear up one serious misunderstanding. U.S. had no intention facilitate proliferation nuclear weapons; quite the contrary as our acts have shown for example with respect to France. Problem had become acute during past ten years because of Soviet development of nuclear weapons and targeting of hundreds of such weapons on Western Europe. Those about to be incinerated had a legitimate interest in having right to be consulted as respects nuclear weapons./6/

/6/At their third meeting on December 5 Gromyko and Rusk discussed military

budgets again briefly, Laos, and nuclear dissemination. A memorandum of the conversation on nuclear dissemination is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 53; the one on Laos is ibid., vol. XXVIII, Document 147; a memorandum of the conversation on military budgets, SecDel/MC/8, is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

Rusk

[Continue with the next documents]

Volume XIV Index | Foreign Relations Volumes Online Released Prior to January 20, 2001