Moscow, October 18, 1964, 6 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Paris.

1183. While ouster of Khrushchev was sudden and complete with Khrushchev overnight becoming unperson in best Communist tradition, we should not assume that present installation is a stable one, nor that jockeying for position among power contenders will not soon become apparent. The successive steps in the removal process reveal some notable developments in the system relating to the method of rule and process of changing leadership which would tend support idea that what we have seen is perhaps only first of a series of moves, exact nature and intensity of which at moment unpredictable. The experience of and precedents established by the 1957 ouster of the "anti-party" group and the principles of rule touted in the de-Stalinization campaign have had their impact and were reflected in the current crisis in the leadership. Paradoxically, Khrushchev was the prime mover of both these events and, therefore, planted the seeds which eventually facilitated his own fall.

In reflecting on Khrushchev's ouster in the context of the pattern of rule since Stalin's death, the following points emerge:

First, Khrushchev himself established principle that the party's Central Committee is a custodian of legitimacy, although its policy-making role remains limited. In 1957 a majority of the Presidium attempted to unseat Khrushchev and were outmaneuvered by the latter's summoning of the Central Committee and military backing to support him. This experience was not forgotten by the other leaders on this occasion (as well as in the shake-up of May 1960) and an advance sounding out of the key figures and provincial party bosses who are members of the Central Committee undoubtedly was completed before Presidium members initiated their removal action. While the vote in the Central Committee then became a perfunctory rubberstamp of a Presidium decision, the legitimizing role of the Central Committee has been further institutionalized.

Second, the power to initiate such a removal action, on the other hand, as well as the basic policymaking power remains concentrated in the hands of the dozen or so Presidium members. While the Presidium now is constrained to legitimize major personnel shift with Central Committee endorsement, such endorsement of policymaking moves is not so apparent. Central Committee discussion of policy in its plenums in the last five years or so has increasingly become a mass gathering of members of the Central Committee plus many non-members, convoked to listen to a series of non-controversial speeches followed by approval of a prepared resolution. There are still many decisions issued in the name of the Central Committee without the convoking of a plenum.

Third, there is a certain encouragement of conspiracy in present leadership arrangement. The role of the First Secretary is not always the all-powerful one that Stalin had made it and the situation develops at certain points (and may continue to in the future) where the next ranking secretary can acquire the power and prerogatives to engineer the overthrow of the top leader. It became obvious in the successive cases of Kirichenko and Kozlov that Khrushchev had to delegate and entrust powers to the next subordinate and each aggrandized his authority thereby. The significant factor in Brezhnev's case is the speed with which he was able after only a few months as a fulltime secretary to line up the Presidium members to support the Khrushchev ouster (although we have heard Mikoyan initially spoke out against the drastic action contemplated-which, if true, may bode ill for Mikoyan), probably almost unanimously.

Brezhnev, of course, now becomes subject to same pitfalls as Khrushchev. As First Secretary he is in a stronger position than other leaders to perpetuate his power for the near future, but it is still at the behest of the Presidium. If he aspires to wear two hats as First Secretary and Premier in the future (as he probably must in conformity with the power pattern set by his predecessors) he will have to worry even more about the conspiratorial activities which the next subordinate Party Secretary will be able to mount against him. A reversion to repressive action to preserve his position may only bring him down more surely in the end or convulse Soviet society.

Fourth, for all of Khrushchev's opening up of informational channels to the Soviet public and his use and manipulation of public opinion by grassroots tours and public appeals, no ground swell of public reaction has yet been apparent on his behalf. Thus far the precipitate action has evoked less popular reaction than that of Stalin, Beriya and the anti-party group (this may, of course, be a function of the almost total lack of support among the apparatchiks for Khrushchev's mode of rule). Again, paradoxically, Khrushchev is the victim whose ouster demonstrates the correctness of his apparent belief that a great deal more relaxation and license could be granted Soviet society without a resultant significant increase in its political participation or role which would jeopardize the party's political monopoly.

Lastly, the affair is not ended. As indicated in Embtel 1178/2/ Brezhnev's power is limited and collective leadership of the Presidium is the dominant feature of the regime at this moment. This collectively solidified in recent months although its origins probably go back as far as 1960 at least, at the time of the U-2 incident, and was augmented sporadically in the following years by successive failures of foreign and internal policies, which swayed individual leaders in their loyalty to Khrushchev. The ambitions and views of various leaders, however, will eventually break this calm of collectivity. The role of Podgorny, who was the most obvious of Khrushchev's favorites in the past year, is unclear and unless he soon falls in the wake of Khrushchev, he may represent a curb and even a threat to the power of Brezhnev in the future. Similarly, other leaders, some of a younger generation, are undoubtedly waiting to find their opening to increase their personal role in the post-Khrushchev rearrangement of power. Polyansky, who reportedly also spoke at the Central Committee meeting on Khrushchev's agricultural failures, could be a strong contender for either a party secretaryship or Kosygin's job. In the background are also Voronov, the RSFSR Premier, Kirilenko, the virtual boss at present of the RSFSR Party apparatus, and candidate Presidium members and lesser party secretaries such as Yefremov, Polyakov and Andropov whose stature has been rising in the past few years. In sum, the arrangement of the top leaders devised for the near future is not necessarily permanent and is only the reflection of the present collective leadership which will erode as the dynamic of Presidium politics begins to operate again and as the immediate need for closing of ranks recedes in importance.

/2/Dated October 17, it reported that Khrushchev over the past year seemed to be grooming Podgorny as his successor at the expense of Brezhnev. (Ibid.)

Kohler

61. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)/1/

Washington, October 20, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Bundy Files, President's Meeting with Congressional Leadership, 1/19/64. Confidential. Attached to McGeorge Bundy's memorandum for the record of the President's meeting with the Congressional leadership on October 19. In the memorandum Bundy states that "Ambassador Thompson discussed the developments in the Soviet Union, along the lines of the attached memo of his talking points." The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room from 1:34 to 4:05 p.m. and was attended by 10 Senators and 7 House members. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)

BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR THOMPSON

We have had cables now from our Embassies in all of the principal capitals and all of our Allies seem to be in agreement with us on what we know and don't know about what has happened.

I think we are all agreed that Khrushchev was forced out and that health and age was not the real reason for his removal. There are a number of things which support this. One of them is the fact that they announced that they had put him off the Presidium of the Central Committee. Kozlov has been off with a heart attack for many months and he is still a member and there was no reason to kick Khrushchev out if his removal had not been forced.

We have, of course, known for a long time that Khrushchev's style of leadership was bothering his other colleagues and we think that that is probably the basic cause for his removal, although obviously some particular issue must have triggered it at this particular time. One thing that supports this thesis was the Pravda editorial which came out a few days ago. Without mentioning him by name, it listed his faults. It accused him of subjectivism, drifting in communist construction, hare-brained scheming, immature conclusions and hasty decisions and actions divorced from reality, bragging and phrasemongering, commandism and unwillingness to take account of the achievements of science and practical experience, using armchair methods, personal decisions, disregard for practical experience of the masses and finally the practice of personality cult. All of those with the possible exception of the mention of science are about method rather than substance, so it leads us to believe that this was the main thing that was bothering them. What triggered it at this time, so far we have no clues. It is rather curious because Khrushchev was himself obviously surprised. He was seen by Palewski the day before and told him he was leaving suddenly for Moscow but it was presumed it was because of the cosmonauts. Brezhnev was in Germany for the Fifteenth Anniversary celebration during the preceding week. This is rather curious for if they had been planning it one would have thought Brezhnev would have been there. There must be something we don't know that kicked this off.

There have been a whole series of controversial issues being debated in the Soviet Union and this could have been kicked off by any one of them. The two main ones I would think were the problems related to the disintegration of the Communist Bloc and particularly their quarrel with Red China. The Italians came out and published the Tagliatti memorandum, a sort of declaration of independence. The French Communist Party made a similar statement. Khrushchev had gotten himself in a box by insisting on going ahead with the meeting of Communist Parties in December, which was going to lead to a complete break with the Chinese Party. This was opposed by a number of the Communist Parties in Eastern Europe and this change in leadership at least will now give them some maneuverability if they want to pursue a different policy. They have announced they are in favor of a conference but in a different context because the personal quarrel between Mao and Khrushchev is eliminated.

The other set of issues that we think was probably the most serious that they were facing were those that are related to the allocation of resources. There has been a fight going on about this; what it amounts to is who gets the big appropriations. Khrushchev made a speech in late September at a meeting to which had been called people from all over the Soviet Union in which he said that they had enough military strength now and had built up their basic industry so that they could now afford to expand the consumer goods industry. This is a policy which the Soviet military have long opposed as well as the people interested in heavy industry and it certainly would gain military support for his removal if they thought he was going to press this very far. Related to this is the question of military strategy in general. Mr. Khrushchev, for a number of years, has said that in an atomic age it doesn't make sense to have large conventional armies and air forces and navies and some years ago he announced a cutback in military forces of about a million and a half men. He told me personally at the time that he had to use all of his authority to get it across. Later on they dropped it because of the buildup in the Berlin crisis. Certainly the speeches and articles that have been written by military men in the Soviet Union show that there has been a real division among the military opposing reliance on military missiles rather than conventional forces.

There are also other issues that could have been involved. One is the German problem. The fact that Brezhnev was in Germany might have been indicative. The Germans were disturbed about Khrushchev's trip to Bonn. There was this rather mysterious attack on a West German diplomatic officer in Moscow with mustard gas which in some quarters was interpreted as an attempt on somebody's part to disrupt the prospect of Khrushchev's trip and there was a good deal of talk that he shouldn't come until it was satisfactorily explained. Before this change in Moscow took place, the Russians gave the Germans a conciliatory note. Another issue that could have been involved was the Cuban issue because Dorticos the President of Cuba was in Moscow at the time, although we think it is unlikely that this could have been the kind of thing to cause this change.

There are a lot of other things in which there is disagreement. Foreign aid is one of them. Lots of people don't think they should be giving aid to bourgeois governments. The Chinese have been criticizing them for this. There has also been a question there about the wisdom of spending so much money on space. Kosygin spoke to me about this once and showed he was well aware how much it was costing and he is interested in their economy.

It is rather interesting that there are several major divisions in the Soviet Union. One of the political ones has always been between Leningraders and Ukrainians. Each of these men come from a different part. Brezhnev is Ukrainian and Kosygin comes from Leningrad. There is also a more important division between the Communist Party professionals and the government bureaucrats which in the Soviet Union means all of industry as well as governmental functions. Brezhnev is the Party man and Kosygin is mainly an industrialist. He came up there in the light industry side of their economy. He was at one time head of their planning commission and would tend to be more interested in these problems so they have kept a balance in both of these things by naming these two men.

As far as these two men are concerned, I have had many talks with both, particularly Kosygin. They are, I think, very able administrators but neither of them is the type of man I would think would become a strong leader the way Khrushchev was so it seems quite possible that somebody else will eventually get power the way Khrushchev did. There are other strong figures in the Presidium, one of which might eventually come forward. We would expect these people to follow a rather more cautious policy. One of the attributes of Mr. Khrushchev that disturbed us as well as his own colleagues was his impulsiveness and tendency to launch into ventures without thinking them through. We think these people would be less inclined to do this particularly as they are less firmly in power. I would also think they are apt to follow a more orthodox Communist line. I don't think they have the imagination Khrushchev had. He is a pragmatic fellow and I think these men will be less inclined to deviate from the standard Communist line. One of the things we will be following more closely is how this is going to affect their relations with China. It is reported, but not confirmed, that Suslov presented the charges against Khrushchev. When the Soviets were having their negotiations with the Chinese, they had two sets of them. Khrushchev had Suslov and Kozlov handle them and it would seem likely that they would take the positions Khrushchev took and are pretty well tagged with them. Suslov is their top theoretician and is mainly interested in relations with other Communist parties and because of that and the fact that they are losing control of these parties in Eastern Europe we would think that he would want to moderate the quarrel with China; but, basically, as an ideologist he would want to stick with the positions he has already taken. We will have to wait and see. They have already announced that they still advocate a meeting of the Communist parties but with the object of unity rather than apparently what Khrushchev was going to do; that is, force the break.

I think they have begun to realize what this quarrel was costing them. In meetings of front organizations the Chinese were coming in and making shambles of them. It almost pays them not to meet rather than have public quarrels.

Mr. Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador, came in and told the President/2/ that their basic foreign policy was going to be unchanged and they have done the same thing in other foreign capitals around the world. We don't know if its true. He mentioned foreign policy would be based on the XX, XXI, and XXII Party Congresses and explained it meant consolidating peace, relaxation of tensions, developing peaceful coexistence. I would think myself that their primary concern now will be first of all to consolidate their position in the Soviet Union, deal with some of these internal problems; two, to address themselves to the problems of the Communist Bloc and only in the third category to deal with foreign affairs. In any event, toward the last three or four months they have been on dead center so far as the West is concerned. They were waiting for the British and American elections and were showing no disposition to want to tackle any important problems. The President, when he saw Ambassador Dobrynin, gave him an excellent and strong presentation of our policy which could be summarized with the phrase his guard is up but his hand is out. He emphasized flexibility on their part and particularly with the coming problem in the United Nations--Article 19--but the Ambassador had obviously no instructions other than this little piece which he had said, and all he did was to listen.

/2/See Document 55.

62. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

No. 2051/64

Washington, October 22, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VI. Secret. A cover sheet, not printed, indicates that the memorandum was prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence. A one-paragraph summary is not printed.

KHRUSHCHEV'S FALL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The Grievances

1. The official complaints against Khrushchev's style of leadership clearly have great substance. If this were all, however, the result would be irritation, not a coup. Given the man's incessant initiatives, opposition must have coalesced around the need to thwart his current projects. Even so, it could only succeed because so many of Khrushchev's policies had both injured or upset every important group in Soviet politics and produced a long record of failures.

2. One immediate cause was probably the raising of the long-contested question of economic priorities. There are indications that Khrushchev in late September made a major bid to break the stalemate on this issue. The abridged account of his speech claimed that "now when we have a powerful industry" and defense "is at its proper level," the "main task . . . is the further raising of the people's standard of living." He may have given notice that he meant to press a decision at the November plenum. When he thereupon left for Sochi, his colleagues, who had long resisted him on this matter, apparently decided that cause and opportunity conspired.

3. Another immediate cause probably was Khrushchev's handling of the split in the Communist movement. It seemed clear that, in pressing for the 15 December meeting which was to prepare for a world Communist conference, Khrushchev was heading for another failure: a number of demonstratively empty chairs and further concessions to those who seek a loosening of international discipline, with no palpable gains against China. His successors can hardly have a different basic attitude to Peiping, but a tactical change probably seemed necessary.

4. We know of no equally tense issues in relations with the West, but it is possible that Khrushchev's handling of the German question contributed to his downfall. The early 1965 visit to Bonn, with its hint of a new German policy, was clearly disquieting to the East Germans (and Chinese attempts to play on Ulbricht's fears confirm this). Reservations were reinforced by Adzhubei's deliberate indiscretions about Ulbricht's health.

The Opposition

5. Deposing Khrushchev must have required a heavy Presidium majority and, below that level, a broad anti-Khrushchev consensus. Khrushchev's repeated reorganizations had given offense to both the party and state apparatuses. He kept the military constantly busy coping with his attempts to hold down defense spending and shift funds from the ground forces to the missions of strategic attack and defense. His successors' early endorsements of military priorities suggest the way in which the marshals were enlisted, or at least neutralized. It was also necessary at least to neutralize the police.

6. Soviet succession politics is inherently unstable. In the present case, some of the specifics are:

a. The Brezhnev-Kosygin team is not merely a duumvirate of personalities, but a combination of two bureaucracies--party and state--with a history of conflict. It is possible to interpret some of the postcoup evidence as reflecting, already, the beginnings of personal competition.

b. Podgorny is a potent rival to Brezhnev in the party apparat.

c. In the filling of vacancies, the impulse to factionalism is practically irresistible. Replacements are needed now for those who may have fallen with Khrushchev (apparently a small group so far) and for the unlucky Marshal Biryuzov and General Mironov,/2/ who were killed in an air crash in Yugoslavia. Several new appointments to the Presidium also seem due.

/2/Major General Mironov, a veteran secret police official who had close ties to Brezhnev, was the chief of the watch dog department in the party apparatus charged with overseeing the activities of the KGB, the judiciary, and probably the military establishment. [Footnote in the source text.]

d. All the civilians have a group interest in keeping the military and police in their places, yet each has an individual temptation to make factional use of them.

7. The best guess is that a struggle for power, among both interest groups and personalities, cannot be avoided.

The Consequences

8. In formulating policy over the next several months, and in the years ahead, the new leaders face a wide set of policy problems which have not been eased by Khrushchev's fall.

9. Internal Affairs: The complaints about Khrushchev's style of rule, together with the character of his successors, suggest a return to a less impulsive, more cautious approach. Some in the new leadership, such as Kosygin, may wish to concentrate on regularizing administrative procedures; others, such as Suslov may seek to give policies a greater ideological cast; Brezhnev's initial statements exalt the role of the party. The question of how fast and how far to pursue de-Stalinization, and now "de-Khrushchevization" as well, may not yet be resolved. But there will probably be strong pressures from within the regime for caution concerning the Stalin question (and this could spell cooler weather ahead for the intellectual dissidents), and there has already been considerable pressure from other Communist parties for caution in handling Khrushchev's record.

10. The major question affecting the economy is the future division of resources between defense and defense-associated industries on the one hand, and agriculture and consumer goods on the other. There are some clues that Khrushchev's programs for the chemical industry and agriculture may lose some of their "crash" nature. In the main, however, it seems likely that the present pattern of allocations will be frozen for a time. Thus the main problems of the Soviet economy will continue unsolved. A year hence, the record of economic performance may move some politician to return to something akin to Khrushchev's initiatives.

11. Eastern Europe: It is in this area that major consequences have already registered themselves, and they are negative. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany have praised Khrushchev's merits instead of following the Soviet line on his failings. East European leaders are simply unwilling to weaken their domestic positions by repudiating their established line at the behest of a Soviet leadership which--who knows?--may itself be short-lived. These reactions serve notice that they will resist any Soviet efforts to reverse Khrushchev's relatively liberal policy in this area. The impulse to look to national interest has received powerful encouragement.

12. The reaction from Western Communists has been analogous but even more explicit. Several parties have ostentatiously dissociated themselves from the decision and demanded a full public explanation. Further losses in Soviet authority seem inevitable, and some of these losses will also be Chinese gains.

13. China and the Communist Movement: Whether to proceed as planned with the 15 December meeting poses an acute tactical question to the new leaders. Many important pro-Soviet parties have not favored this meeting because it seemed certain to aggravate the split. The Soviets now may modify the terms of the meeting, defer it, or leave it open while seeking bilateral talks with the Chinese. Meanwhile, there probably will be some moderation of polemics.

14. Beyond this, the successors have little room for maneuver. The removal of Khrushchev, plus the Chinese atomic feat, practically ensure that any substantial rapprochement would be on Mao's terms. Both sides are wary and quiet at present, but the USSR is at a tactical disadvantage because China can afford to wait and to make large demands.

15. The Neutrals: Khrushchev personified the Soviet policy of cultivating the nonaligned, and his successors have had to move quickly in confirming his commitments. It will take time (and money) to overcome the nervousness of these countries and repair their confidence. Meanwhile, any suggestion of reneging will be costly, and this will give the new regime extra incentive to sustain its support of, for example, Indonesia and the UAR.

16. The West: Peaceful coexistence has been reaffirmed, and indeed the factors which commend tactics of détente--strategic inferiority, economic faltering, the dispute with China--have not lost force. Some of specific consequences may be:

a. The USSR, pleading a new government, can probably get increased support for postponing any showdown in the UN on the Article 19 issue which confronts the USSR with the loss of its vote in the General Assembly because of Moscow's refusal to pay peacekeeping costs.

b. On the Cuban overflight issue, the successors are in a somewhat poorer position to resist Castro if he urges a showdown. But they are also in a somewhat poorer position to take on the US in an early crisis. There is a good chance that Castro will be less inclined to press the matter soon; he will need time to convince himself that the Soviet commitment is unaltered.

c. There are no strong reasons to expect a change in Soviet policy in Southeast Asia.

d. Policy toward Germany will probably be immobile. It is worth remembering for the longer run, however, that an alternative German policy probably was developed (by Beriya) in the last succession struggle, and that Khrushchev may have had in mind a shift here which, at least to his colleagues and to Ulbricht, seemed risky. Further, the likely trend in Eastern Europe will sharpen the contradictions in the traditional Soviet position on Germany.

Conclusion

17. Factionalism in the USSR has a way of hurting the Soviet state. De-Stalinization is a case in point; Khrushchev's secret speech was in great part a blow against his rivals, but the USSR is still paying for its larger consequences. The present display of the uglier side of Kremlin politics has weakened party prestige at home and Soviet prestige abroad. It has set internal politics on an unfruitful course which stores up future troubles. It has produced another lurch westward in Eastern Europe. It has played into Chinese hands. It has provoked second thoughts among many Soviet friends and clients abroad. Khrushchev's departure may remove a certain disorderly and erratic quality from Soviet policy-making, but at the expense of losing the dynamism of his personal leadership. All in all, his ouster may prove to be a costly move for the USSR.

18. For the US, the meaning of the change is uncertain. Within the limits imposed by the world relation of forces, the new men and their jockeying for power could move Soviet policy in directions that would be either less troublesome or more dangerous to the West.

63. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 23, 1964, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential; Flash; Limdis. A summary of this conversation was sent to Paris for the Embassy and USRO, London, Bonn, and Tokyo and was pouched to all other U.S. diplomatic posts in circular telegram 746, October 27. (Ibid.)

1267. I called on Kosygin at 1130 this morning and had 35 minute talk with him. I was accompanied by Toon. Kosygin was attended by an unidentified aide and Vinogradov as interpreter. (Troyanovsky met us in outer office, thus presumably putting end to speculation as to his downfall with Khrushchev.)

I told Kosygin I deeply appreciated opportunity he had accorded me to pay my respects and again convey my personal congratulations to him on his designation as Premier since I recognized that at this time he must have a very busy schedule. As he was aware the President had been pleased that Dobrynin had called on him/2/ promptly after change in Soviet Government and was glad to receive the message through Dobrynin that the new government intended to follow previous policies especially those affecting bilateral relations between US and Soviet Union. I felt sure Dobrynin had reported in detail on his meeting with the President and if Kosygin now had anything further to say with regard to govt change and to policies of Soviet Government, I should be glad to convey any message he might have to Washington.

/2/See Document 55.

Kosygin said he would ask me to transmit his personal deep gratitude for the congratulatory message from the President/3/ and to reassure him as Dobrynin had indicated in his first meeting with the President and as has been expressed in public statements in Moscow the Soviet Government contemplates no changes in its internal and international policies. The government would remain the same except for the fact that the former Chairman of the Council of Ministers had retired.

/3/Transmitted in telegram 1139, October 17, it reads: "I extend greetings to you on your designation as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Our countries bear heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of world peace. It is my hope that our governments will work constructively in attempting to resolve the urgent international problems facing us and the world." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. VI)

I commented that we had noted with satisfaction the public statements by the new Soviet Government to which Kosygin had referred particularly the speeches by Mr. Kosygin himself as well as Brezhnev.

Continuing, Kosygin said that the basic line which the new government intended to follow was the line laid down at the 20th, 21st and 22nd Party Congresses. All in Central Committee and government staunchly support the principles of peaceful coexistence with states of different social systems and do not contemplate any change in this policy. Furthermore, new government hopes to preserve all existing channels of communications with President Johnson and would like to continue friendly and confidential conversations if this is also the wish of the President. Kosygin felt that in current world context system of our relations is not a bad one and he hoped it would be continued.

I said I was sure that President shared Kosygin's view on need and desirability maintaining existing channels of communications and as President had already indicated to Dobrynin, was gratified that new government intended continue previous policies, especially those affecting our two countries which we had found mutually useful. I personally considered it my duty as well as a privilege to report accurately and sympathetically on Soviet Government's attitudes with a view toward improvement our mutual relations. I was devoted to the concept, I had worked assiduously toward this aim and would continue to do so.

Kosygin said he was glad to hear this and he would welcome any continued efforts in this direction. He felt we were engaged in a number of useful pursuits in the mutual interests of our two countries and he hoped that we would continue our efforts and contacts toward this end.

Recognizing that he was preoccupied with a number of pressing problems at present time I said that I did not wish to discuss any substantive problems in detail at this meeting. I felt he should know, however, that the President and Secretary of State wished me to return to the United States for consultation after the elections and I hoped before then to have a substantive talk with Foreign Minister Gromyko and perhaps with Kosygin himself on specific issues. Meanwhile, I would like briefly to refer to a major and topical problem which had been discussed by the President with Dobrynin and subsequently by the Secretary of State and Stevenson with the Soviet Ambassador. This problem related to the question of UN arrearages./4/ I wished to reaffirm to Kosygin that while there are differences between us on this question my government does not regard the question as a Cold War issue between our two countries and hopes sincerely that the Soviet Government will re-examine the problem in the light of their stated intention to strengthen the United Nations. It was our sincere desire to help resolve the problem before the GA meets in order to avoid a sharpening of our conflicting views in the early days of our two new administrations.

/4/See footnote 2, Document 42.

Kosygin said that the Soviet Government's point of view on this issue remains unchanged. With regard to expenses of the Congo operation, he wished emphasize that Soviets did not participate "in this war" and they would not pay any assessments in connection with it. Kosygin hoped we would give serious thought to possible ways out of impasse. Meanwhile, he wished point out that whatever our motivation might have been, it was we who raised the matter in such "acute and active" way. Soviet Government did not understand, saw no logic in and were puzzled as to purpose of our actions. What did we intend to accomplish by posing problem in this way? Is purpose to force USSR out of UN? Kosygin personally doubted this. In any case, he wished to make crystal clear that Soviet Government attitude on this is matter of deep principle which they intended to defend to end.

I said I did not wish to enter into a detailed discussion of issue but I felt I should clarify one point. We had not taken any initiative to raise this question; the question arises automatically in accordance with Articles 17 and 19 of UN Charter. Kosygin would recall that the General Assembly had endorsed Congo operation through five resolutions four of which the Soviet Union had voted for. We felt strongly--also on grounds of principle--that the UN would be finished, would no longer be a viable institution if members should be permitted to choose assessments which they were prepared to pay. The initiative we did take was to enter into discussions with Soviet representatives in order to attempt to find way to prevent problem from coming to a head. I reiterated that our purpose was simply to preserve the UN Charter and in no sense was our action directed deliberately against the Soviet Union or any other country. Our position thus was a pro-UN position, not an anti-Soviet position. I felt strongly that we and the Soviets had a shared interest in maintaining the strength of the UN through preserving the Charter as well as UN financial stability. In no sense did we seek to embarrass the Soviet Government by our position on the Article 19 issue and if the Soviet Government could find some way to strengthen the financial stability of the UN while at same time maintaining their political position, we would, of course, be glad to cooperate in their efforts.

Kosygin said he too did not wish to be drawn into a detailed discussion of this issue at this meeting, but he felt I should understand clearly that Soviet Government maintains unchanged its previous position. The war waged in the Congo was not the Soviet Government's idea, it was not popular with the Soviet people and the Soviet Government is not going to pay for any expenses in connection with Congo operations. With regard to the UN itself, Kosygin could assure me that the Soviets were prepared to spare no efforts and use all possible means to preserve the institution and to facilitate cooperation among states within the framework of the UN Charter. He must emphasize again that the Soviet Government's position on the Article 19 issue is shared by "all here" and represents the interests of other states as well.

I apologized for raising the question at this meeting but explained that both the President and Secretary of State felt deeply that our position should not be misunderstood by the Soviet Government. Specifically, I wished Kosygin to understand that we did not regard the problem as a Cold War issue, our position was not anti-Soviet. I felt it important to clarify this point in view of Kosygin's remarks which could be interpreted as questioning our motivation.

Kosygin assumed that we would each draw our own conclusions from the conversation. He felt I would agree that the question tended to aggravate our relations and he personally failed to understand why we had raised the problem in such a "sharp" way. For this he felt we must assume full responsibility.

I said I could not accept this charge.

Kosygin said that while perhaps I could not agree we were at fault, I would recognize that each side regards the issue from its own point of view. I would perhaps also agree that if we changed positions with the Soviet Union we would take the same attitude as they.

I said I would simply restate my hope that we could resolve problem before it came to a head. Meanwhile, leaving this problem aside, I would hope to do everything possible to advance good relations between our two countries and toward this end I would always be at disposal Kosygin in order convey his wishes and receive his advice.

In concluding conversation Kosygin noted that President at present time is deeply preoccupied with electoral campaign. He and all his colleagues wished him every success in the hard and arduous task which lies ahead of him; this was not simply Kosygin's personal view but the view of the entire collective leadership of the Soviet Union--the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. He hoped that the Soviet's Nov 7 holiday would also be cause for celebration of the President's victory and the President's personal holiday would coincide with the Soviet national day./5/

/5/With his Presidential campaign in mind, the President proposed in a telephone conversation with McGeorge Bundy on October 27 that Bundy "blow up" Kohler's October 23 visit with Kosygin by saying that Kosygin called in the U.S. Ambassador and notified the President that there would be no change in policy and that Kosygin was "communicating with us" and "courting us"--"it puts us on a little different level from Barry [Goldwater]." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Bundy, 1:59 p.m., Tape 6410.13, PNO 24) In a campaign speech in Salt Lake City on October 29, the President noted that Kosygin had informed him "this week" that the Soviet Union "would maintain its present policies" and would "continue its communication with the United States." For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book II, p. 1516.

I said I would be pleased to transmit Kosygin's wishes to the President and I was sure he would be glad to receive them./6/

/6/In telegram 1268, October 23, Kohler commented that Kosygin "habitually looks worn and morose" and that he did at their meeting, although he was affable and friendly throughout it. In commenting further the Ambassador said there would be no "freewheeling by the new Soviet leaders, and they would avoid in both public and private statements any remarks that did not accord precisely with the view of the new collective leadership." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 USSR)

Kohler

64. Telegram From the Embassy in Austria to the Department of State/1/

Vienna, October 26, 1964, 4 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential.

887. From Smyth/2/ for Llewellyn Thompson. Ref Embtel 813, Oct 19./3/ Conversation with Emelyanov Oct 24, 1964.

/2/Henry De Wolf Smyth, U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

/3/It reported that Smyth had invited V. S. Emelyanov, Soviet Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, to come up to his room to discuss the recent events in Moscow. (Ibid.)

Pursuant to the brief talk with Emelyanov on Oct 19 already reported I asked him whether we could continue and he agreed to come to my room at The Imperial Saturday morning. He came about 10:00 and talked for about two hours. In making the appointment he had said that he would speak for my ears alone therefore I didn't feel I could take notes. At the end of our conversation I pointed out that much of what he had said would be of interest to my colleagues. He replied as long as nothing he said was given to the news media he had no objection, in fact felt it desirable that responsible officials should know what had happened. It is essential that the source of my information be protected for the sake of future relations. I have every reason to believe that what he said was honest reporting of facts observed or beliefs held.

The talk was roughly in two parts, the first having to do with the Chinese bomb, Indian activities and intentions and related subjects. The second part a specific account of recent events in Moscow.

Most of the material in the first part was familiar and need not be reported.

As to the Chinese bomb he did not pretend to know much. In fact he was assuming that it was a plutonium bomb and apparently had not seen US press reports that it was U-235. He spoke at considerable length of the concentration of Chinese scientists in China made up of senior men trained in Europe or the USA and younger men many of whom were trained in the USSR.

He stated that the Russian scientists in China before the break in relations were aware that there was a major installation to which they did not have access.

On the whole he appeared to have little or no direct knowledge of the Chinese affair. He has not been there.

On the events in Moscow recently his account was approximately as follows:

He had been having some disagreements over many months with Petrosyants, his nominal boss, and concluded he had to clarify his position. Therefore shortly after his return to Moscow from the IAEA general conference (probably Sept 25 or later) he had attempted to see Brezhnev who is a friend of his. This he found impossible since Brezhnev was continually reported out of his office or busy.

This became understandable when one afternoon late (presumably Tuesday, Oct 13) Emelyanov got word that the Central Committee was to meet at six o'clock. Emelyanov went and found the whole Committee assembled (three categories, he belongs to the middle category, candidate member). After they had all gathered there were still several chairs vacant which were then filled by the leaders coming in led by Mikoyan and including Suslov, Brezhnev, Kosygin and a few others. (Emelyanov gave me the list in order of appearance but I cannot reproduce it nor can I remember whether Khrushchev came in with this group. I think so. Certainly he was there because Emelyanov frequently referred to the fact that Khrushchev was sitting with his head in his hands.)

Apparently Mikoyan presided but shortly turned the meeting over to Suslov. Mikoyan (or possibly Suslov or both) referred to troubles in the Presidium which they had been unable to resolve over a period of many months and about which they had just been meeting for two days. Suslov then described the nature of these difficulties. According to Emelyanov this was done in a very quiet restrained but systematic and devastating way.

The kinds of charges against Khrushchev which Suslov made in his speech (or which Emelyanov mentioned) were the kind reported in the N.Y. Times European edition during the last few days (i.e. Oct 21, 22, 23), i.e. arbitrary exercise of power, unwillingness to accept advice, nepotism, rude and violent reaction to any criticism or suggestion.

In this connection, Emelyanov described a row about agriculture that had taken place last February where Khrushchev had supported Lysenko against other scientific agricultural experts in the academy, had told the opposing faction they were stupid ignoramuses and had threatened to disband the academy.

(Because of such digressions as the above I find it difficult to be sure of the order of events he related.) To resume the account of the meeting:

Suslov gave the conclusion of the Presidium meeting that the present one-man rule must end, that there must be new men appointed as Premier and as Secretary.

He then said there was agreement that policies should not be changed, that the recommendations of the 20th, 21st and 22nd Party Congresses should continue to be carried out. At this statement there was general applause including applause by Khrushchev himself.

Either at this point or earlier Suslov stated that the conclusions of the meetings of Presidium had been unanimous.

Shortly after this Suslov said that the business of the meeting was to approve the recommendation of the Presidium, nominate a new Secretary of the Party and recommend a new Premier.

(Emelyanov made quite a point of distinguishing between the right of the Central Committee of the Party to name a party official but only to recommend someone for Premier.)

(At this point the account began to sound more and more like an account of an American party convention.)

When the question of nomination for Secretary came up there were shouts of Brezhnev, Brezhnev from all over the hall and apparently no other nominations. Emelyanov says the voting was unanimous but he was so excited he didn't notice how Khrushchev voted or whether he did. This comment implies vote by a show of hands but Emelyanov did not actually say how the vote was taken.

When the question of recommending Premier came up, the process was similar, shouts of Kosygin, Kosygin and then a unanimous vote.

Emelyanov mentioned two documents (presumably accounts of proceedings in the Presidium meeting, the Central Committee, or both) one of which he said had been made public, the other he thought should be and probably would be. At least he hoped so. He may have been referring to two sessions of the Central Committee but I had the impression he was reporting one continuous session.

Apparently the reports by Suslov of Khrushchev's inequities were echoed and reinforced by speeches or interjections from the floor voicing grievances from various groups all over the country. There was apparently no defense of Khrushchev in the committee although I have the impression he had been given a hearing in the Presidium.

One comment that Emelyanov made was that it had become increasingly difficult to know whether Gromyko or Adzhubei was Foreign Minister. He also complained about Khrushchev taking not only his immediate family but a variety of relatives on trips at government expense.

In speaking of relations with China Emelyanov said he did not believe that there would be any basic change but that if Suslov were to go to China he would be less violent, much "smoother" than Khrushchev which might lead to an easing of strain. Emelyanov clearly feels that the basic split is at present irreconcilable particularly in the light of their difficulties along the border.

I received no impression as to what determined the timing of the ouster action.

With reference to the subsequent public vilification of Khrushchev, Emelyanov said he thought it was mostly from individuals giving vent to personal spite based on grievances.

He said he did not know where Khrushchev was, probably in his apartment near the university or at his country house.

Emelyanov gave me quite a speech about the time having passed when Russia or any other country could be ruled by a single czar or king. This was along the same lines as his earlier remark to me about the need for them to move toward greater "democracy." Though these appear to be his own views he obviously feels the recent action is consistent with them.

In a later conversation in a general group he said things have changed since Stalin's time, now if you are out of favor you lose your job but not your head.

We did not discuss the cosmonauts at any point.

Brandin

65. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 28, 1964, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.

1333. While too soon to draw firm conclusions, I would venture some tentative propositions which seem to emerge from ouster of Khrushchev fortnight ago.

I. Internally. As a political system, Soviet Communist Party rule has been weakened and has acquired a new kind of institutionalized instability. The principle that Central Committee of the Party is the custodian and source of legitimacy, established by Khrushchev (in self-defense) in 1957, has now been successfully used against him, and thus confirmed. The door is thus open for maneuver, intrigue and conspiracy among rivals for power within this 170-odd member body, as well as within the Presidium proper.

Brezhnev is presently in best power position as Party First Secretary, but has been there too short a time to be in full control of party personnel and machinery. He is vain and ambitious and, in due course, may well be tempted to follow Khrushchev's example by combining top party and government roles. Strongest challenger presently visible within leadership is Podgorny, whose toughness and ambition are both evident. Younger aspirants, like Polyansky, Kirilenko and Voronov, will probably remain in wings while rivalry of older group is played out.

Both governmental and party organizations have been disrupted by Khrushchev's tactics. As he groped for ways to make an increasingly complex society work, economic management was first decentralized, then partly recentralized and then reorganized. The party was split functionally into agricultural and industrial sectors, a reform which, though still not fully implemented, clearly involved extensive dislocation and disgruntlement of party personnel and will probably be abandoned by the new leadership.

The Soviet elite in general--bureaucrats, managers, scientists, intelligentsia--was practically unscathed by the changes. Indeed, the reaction of its membership ranged from indifference to pleasure. It is this elite which collectively keeps Soviet society ponderously rolling forward, and it will presumably continue to do so under almost any conceivable conditions.

Since the dismissal of Marshal Zhukov, the military seems to have been brought under firmer party control and they played no direct role in the Khrushchev ouster (other than as individual party figures). However, the marshals loom in the background, representing a power potential which must be satisfied and contained. In a condition of continuing struggle for party power, they might be called upon for support by one or the other aspirant. However, the military establishment is unlikely to play an independent political role unless the party situation should deteriorate beyond anything now foreseeable.

The Communist Party system of rule is farther removed from the people. The extent to which they were already conditioned by the de-Stalinization campaign was visible in the widespread apathy to recent events, and the ouster and obliteration of the image of Khrushchev can only increase popular skepticism, even cynicism, toward their Communist rulers. It is paradoxical that such should be the net result of the efforts of the first ruler in Russian history who actively sought public favor and support.

II. In the Communist World. In the Communist world, there is likely to be a truce in the Sino-Soviet conflict, but no real reconciliation. The conflict is basically national in nature, and in the struggle within the world Communist movement, the Soviet position has been weakened by the change. With the disappearance of Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung remains the only old-line world-known Communist figure, with no visible Russian rivals of significant stature. His works circulate everywhere, at a time when Khrushchev's declarations are being withdrawn and discredited in his own country. It is not credible that Mao will offer terms for settlement of the conflict which the Soviet side could possibly accept.

While the main immediate purpose of Khrushchev's ouster was to check the increasing loss of influence and support inside world communism, the new leadership has in fact only avoided a looming crisis at the cost of weakening the Soviet position for the continuing struggle. If Khrushchev could not exert authority over the Eastern and Western European parties, a Brezhnev or a Kosygin cannot be expected to deal successfully with the more prestigious figures in the Soviet family, such as Gomulka, Kadar, Tito, and even Gheorghi Dej. That this is the case seems already confirmed by current European Communist reaction to recent events here.

III. In the Outside World. I believe the fears of the Afro-Asians that the Soviets might shift from supporting "national, democratic" governments to supporting local Communist parties are unjustified. Not only has the new leadership reaffirmed its policies of a united front against "imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism", but the dynamics of Moscow's continuing struggle against Chinese orthodoxy requires the Sovs to continue along this line in practice. On the other hand, it is clear that one of the major charges against Khrushchev was his lavishness with foreign aid and his successors will examine much more carefully just what they can expect from their investments in such places as India, Egypt, Algeria and Cuba.

The immediate implications for us of the changed leadership seem fairly obvious; the long-range ones less so. The new regime will be more cautious in its approach to the West in the dual sense that it will eschew policies which may result in direct US-Soviet military confrontation and at the same time will be less enthusiastic than Khrushchev in finding areas of common interest, with the US in particular. Latter, of course, will be function of changed Sov tactics in their dispute with Peiping. In sum, there will be no 1962 Cuba, nor will there be any spirit of Camp David.

We do not envisage any substantive change in Sov positions on major issues, but style of diplomacy will be totally different, at least until collectivity phase runs its course. We have seen the last of personal, off-the-cuff remarks on major policy issues. Soviet spokesmen will follow carefully prepared briefs, whether in public or in private. Such more orthodox diplomacy may, in fact, be an advantage for us in that we should have a clearer understanding of Soviet positions, undiluted by Khrushchevian bombast.

IV. Far Horizons. If one dares look far into the future, the long-range prospect, after a period of temporizing and muddling, would seem to be for the evolution of Soviet society in the direction of a national socialist state in loose association with Communist Parties which have won power or lost their revolutionary elan, while the ChiComs develop a small but tight and expanding organization dedicated to perpetuating Marxist-Leninist-Maoist revolutionary orthodoxy.

Kohler

66. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/

Washington, October 31, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 USSR. Secret. Initialed by Thompson and Rusk. Copies were also sent to Ball, Tyler, Rostow, and Hughes.

SUBJECT
Soviet Affairs

There are many controversial issues in the Soviet Union and it seems clear that the Soviet leadership divides in different ways, depending upon the issue concerned. Although most of the leadership appears to have been agreed upon the necessity of dropping Khrushchev, this does not mean that they will hold together on other issues. One of the most important divisions is between what might be called the Stalinists on the one hand and the Revisionists or Modernizers on the other. The Stalinists do not, of course, advocate a complete return to the methods and policies of Stalin but do believe in strict Party control and minimum tampering with the ideology.

Although the new regime will doubtless be at pains to conceal the direction of their policies as long as possible, the few clues we have would appear to indicate that the Stalinists are in the ascendancy. Future developments in Soviet policy will be importantly affected by the success or failure of the efforts of the new leadership to resolve, or at least diminish, their differences with Communist China.

Although the United States and other Western countries can probably not determine the outcome between the contending factions in the Soviet Union, they can, to some extent, at least influence developments. Until the trends of Soviet policy become more clear, it would be advisable for us to keep open the option to the Soviet Union of continuing the broad lines of Khrushchev's policies toward the West.

One of the most important steps which we could take in this direction would be a serious attempt to develop our trade relations with the Soviet Union to which they appear to attach an exaggerated importance. It is suggested that we be prepared to move promptly after the election in this direction.

It would appear to me that undue attention has been focused upon the personalities of Brezhnev and Kosygin. Although I consider Kosygin the more competent of the two, I do not think that either one is capable of establishing himself as the sole leader, and I suspect that even now other members of the Presidium have more influence in the formulation of policy.

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