Washington, July 11, 1964, 9-9:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. I. Secret.

Ambassador Dobrynin came in at his own request today to have an informal talk before his return to the Soviet Union for consultation and holiday. The Ambassador was in his usual cheerful frame of mind, and the conversation was not of great moment. The principal point which he made on his side was that he supposed nothing much would happen in the coming months because of our election. I said that with respect to larger initiatives this might be correct, but that we should press forward our discussions in Geneva and that in our view it was important also to make progress in Laos, as I was sure he knew from his conversations with Secretary Rusk.

I took advantage of the occasion to tell the Ambassador that he should not suppose that the campaign would make any difference in the main thrust of American policy. We would continue in the search for peace, just as we would also continue to hold up our end in issues where we had differences with the Soviet Union. I warned the Ambassador against any Soviet intervention in our election campaign, and the Ambassador indicated his understanding./2/

/2/In his memoir, In Confidence, Dobrynin recalls a meeting with Bundy on July 12, but it is apparently the same meeting. Dobrynin notes, among other things, that Bundy warned him "Johnson might have to say some things [during the campaign] that might displease Moscow," but that Bundy also "hinted that the Johnson camp would not mind if the Soviet side, too, sometimes criticized Johnson, although he requested it to be kept 'within reasonable limits.'" (p. 122)

With respect to Southeast Asia the Ambassador pressed me specifically on the question of the Cambodian border and our reluctance to engage in 14-nation discussions of this question./3/ I told him that we were at least as interested as his government in stabilizing Cambodia's borders, but that we were not encouraged by the reaction of some of the friends of the Soviet Union to the UN efforts in this direction. I said further that it was unreasonable to suppose that we should side with Cambodia against her neighbors on the ways and means of moving toward such stabilization. The Ambassador in effect suggested that we should give Sihanouk more of the benefit of the doubt.

/3/The Cambodian border issue is documented in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXVII.

The conversation touched briefly on the MLF, and I pressed upon the Ambassador that it was not a matter of MLF or no MLF, but rather a matter of the MLF or an opening for men like Strauss, possibly in collaboration with de Gaulle. I told the Ambassador that if all of Europe were willing to leave the entire nuclear responsibility with the U.S., we would have no problem, and there would be no need for an MLF. But this was emphatically not the case, and in any event the Ambassador should remember that the question was created by the very heavy concentration of Soviet rockets aimed at Western Europe. The Ambassador then remarked that the MLF was really not very important in military terms, and I said that if this were the case I was surprised at the strength of Soviet opposition to it. The Ambassador repeated again that the question was one of the role of the Germans, and I repeated that it was a question of having the Germans in and safe, or out and dangerous. The Ambassador said nothing, but it is my strong impression that he himself understands and respects this argument.

The Ambassador explained at length the Soviet view of Drew Pearson's request for permission to publish his interview with Khrushchev, a matter which I have reported separately./4/

/4/In a memorandum to the President, July 15, Bundy reported that Pearson had agreed not to do a story on his interview with Khrushchev. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6)

McG. B.

40. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, July 20, 1964, 3:35 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Owen on July 21 and approved in S on July 27. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

SUBJECT
Possibilities for Increased US-Soviet Trade

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. David Rockefeller
Mr. Russell Dorr
The Secretary
SOV--Robert I. Owen

Mr. David Rockefeller came to the Department for discussions pertinent to his pending visit to the U.S.S.R. as one of a group of prominent private Americans who will have informal talks on current problems of mutual interest with a comparable group of Soviet intellectuals and public figures. Following the unofficial conference in Leningrad, July 26-31, it appears likely that Mr. Rockefeller will be granted an audience with Premier Khrushchev.

Much of the conversation during Mr. Rockefeller's courtesy call on the Secretary concerned the possibilities for increased U.S.-Soviet trade and the related credit and other problems which make any substantial increase unlikely in the foreseeable future. The Secretary said that the Russians could be told that both in and outside of Government we are looking very seriously into the matter of increased bilateral trade. However, there is a wide variety of problems which suggest that any major increase is doubtful. He observed that the economic bases of our two economies are so much alike that neither has a ready market for a large range of commodities produced by the other. Furthermore, there are problems of financing, differing trade practices and also legislative problems.

The Secretary said that despite such difficulties we have been seeking ways to facilitate some increase in U.S.-Soviet trade. For example, we recently have granted an increasing number of licenses for specific exports to the U.S.S.R.; also we have not raised barriers to U.S. tourism there, thus providing exchange usable in trade. Essentially, we are interested in increased trade and quite prepared to take some steps in specific instances, but cannot give cause for hope of any major increase.

Mr. Rockefeller wondered whether he should ask the Soviets if, in return for increased trade, they might be willing to take a more favorable position on other issues outstanding between the two countries. For example shouldn't we have a right to ask they cut down on the export of subversion in return for trade? The Secretary replied that this might be all right if posed as the kind of question which many Americans will ask. However, one gets in a kind of chicken-and-egg argument with the Soviets, with their claiming that improvement of relations follows rather than precedes an increase in trade. He said it was his conviction that political concessions for any increase in trade are out of the question as far as the Soviets are concerned.

When Mr. Rockefeller asked if there might not be some Soviet concessions with regard to patents or lend lease, the Secretary observed that as the Soviets now have more interest of their own in trademarks and patents they have started piecemeal to make some bilateral arrangements on these matters. The Secretary went on to draw attention to a particular Soviet sensitivity to any implication that their export market bag doesn't contain sufficiently sophisticated export items. Consequently, they may stress to Mr. Rockefeller that they can offer steel mills and advanced technology, not just vodka and caviar. The Secretary emphasized that it is most difficult for a free enterprise system to have satisfactory trade relations with a state trading system.

In response to an inquiry, the Secretary touched briefly on credits, saying that we would have no real problems with regard to granting normal commercial credit, i.e., up to five years, depending on the items, but that long-term credits would cause difficulties. It was noted that the Soviets had paid cash for the U.S. wheat sales.

On the future use of U.S. bottoms in U.S.-Soviet trade, the Secretary said that any change in the present posture could come only within the larger context of a general increase in trade. It can be expected that the U.S. shippers and maritime unions will continue their strong opposition to the use of foreign shipping.

41. Editorial Note

During the first 2 weeks of August 1964, President Johnson and Chairman Khrushchev exchanged messages concerning two crises in Southeast Asia. Responding to a Soviet statement on the deteriorating situation in Laos, Johnson sent Khrushchev a message on August 1 urging the Soviet Union not to withdraw from its co-chairmanship under the 1962 Geneva Agreements. Khrushchev replied on August 7. Johnson's message and a summary of Khrushchev's reply are printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXVIII, Documents 118 and 121. On August 5 Khrushchev wrote Johnson expressing his concern over events in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 and the U.S. air strike against North Vietnam. The President replied on August 7. Both messages are ibid., volume I, Documents 295 and 302.

42. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, September 1, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL US-USSR. Secret. Drafted and initialed by Thompson and approved in S/AL on September 12.

SUBJECT
Miscellaneous Matters

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

Ambassador Dobrynin invited me to lunch following his return from leave in the Soviet Union. He said he had a talk of about an hour and a half with Chairman Khrushchev shortly before his departure. In the course of the conversation, I asked Dobrynin what their estimate was of the possibility of the Chinese Communists conducting an atomic test. He replied without hesitation that the Soviets thought the Chinese could conduct a test at almost any time now.

Dobrynin seemed quite interested in learning whether we were working on any postelection plans, particularly with respect to Germany. He asked me directly whether or not the Ambassadorial Group was working on any papers. I replied that we had not had a meeting for several months.

There was considerable discussion of the American electoral campaign. When I said that in the course of the next month or so he would probably read statements that would not be particularly pleasing to them, he asked why it was that people like the Secretary felt it necessary to discuss publicly such subjects as the Eastern European Communist countries. I said that as he knew it was our policy to improve our relations with all countries but as he must be aware we frequently ran into difficulties because Congress sometimes put specific legal restrictions on some of our activities. I said therefore it was necessary to do a certain amount of public education. He appeared to understand my point.

I asked the Ambassador if he had any indication of the timing of the Chairman's visit to Bonn. He replied he did not, but when I pressed him, he expressed his personal opinion that it would not take place in the next month or two.

In return, Dobrynin asked if the President had any plans for travel after the election. I said I understood that the President did not wish to leave the country until there was a Vice President, and pointed out that this would not happen until the end of the year. Dobrynin raised the question of a possible visit by the President to General de Gaulle and said that perhaps the President could visit de Gaulle, Erhard, and then the Soviet Union. I said I had no idea of what the President's thinking was on this subject.

On his own initiative, Dobrynin asked what I thought of Soviet relations with Communist China. I said that I was unable to understand Communist Chinese policy and said that in view of all the difficulties they were having internally, it was difficult to understand why they pushed their quarrel with the Soviet Union so vigorously. I tried to get him to discuss the border quarrel, but without success. When I mentioned that the Chinese leadership was far from young, he said that this was true. He mentioned that some of the leaders, such as Chou En-lai, were somewhat younger but he said that Chou had little influence on Chinese policy and that it was Mao who made the decisions. I inquired whether he thought the Chinese would arrange a separate meeting of the Communist Parties supporting them, and he said he thought this was quite possible.

Dobrynin asked me whether there was any truth in the rumors about various moves in our diplomatic service, including my own transfer to Rome. I replied that this was pure newspaper speculation and so far as I knew there was nothing to these rumors whatever.

Dobrynin asked several questions regarding the nature of my duties as Acting Deputy Under Secretary and said that there was no equivalent position in the Soviet Foreign Office.

When I referred to rumors of Ulbricht's illness, Dobrynin merely said that for a good many years there were repeated rumors of this kind and implied that there was nothing to them.

I asked him if the remodeling of our Embassy in Moscow had been completed, thinking that he would then raise the question of their desire to obtain a new location in Washington, but he did not mention this problem.

Dobrynin said that in the Soviet Foreign Service there was no compulsory retirement age. He said that they could apply for retirement after age fifty-five. He said that most of the people he knew who had retired soon regretted it and tried to get back into Government service. He said that Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov was about sixty-three or sixty-four years of age but was in good health and had no intention of retiring.

Dobrynin asked me what I thought would be the main issues in the American electoral campaign. I said that although Senator Goldwater and other Republicans had said that foreign affairs would be the main issue, that I personally did not think, in the absence of some unusual event, that foreign policy issues would affect many voters. I said that my own opinion was that domestic issues would be more important. The Ambassador said that he hoped that for the next couple of months he and I could take things easy and that there would be no critical issues raised in our bilateral relations. I pointed out that there were a number of serious problems, such as Cyprus, Viet-Nam, Indonesia, and Laos, but he was disinclined to discuss these questions.

I also drew attention to the Article 19 problem in the United Nations./2/ Dobrynin said that his impression in Moscow was that if they were deprived of their vote in the General Assembly, they would probably withdraw. I said that if this problem were not solved, it was a question of whether or not we could continue our membership. The Ambassador seemed quite surprised at this and asked me if I seriously thought that such a development was possible. I pointed out that it was the Congress that had to authorize our contribution, and said that there had long been a feeling in the Congress and throughout the country that we were carrying more than our share of the expenses of the United Nations. I said that we were not trying to exploit this issue against them but merely wanted to solve it. I reminded him that almost a year ago I had emphasized to him the seriousness of this problem and the firmness of our position, and said that as he knew Ambassador Stevenson had made a sincere effort to work out with their representatives some solution.

/2/The United States had raised the issue of applying Article 19 of the UN Charter to the Soviet Union-and thereby depriving it of its vote in the General Assembly-because it was in arrears. The Soviet Union had refused to pay for peacekeeping operations in the Congo and Palestine, claiming that they were illegally authorized. The controversy over the issue during 1964 and 1965 is documented extensively in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXXIII.

43. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)/1/

Washington, September 4, 1964, 2 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Dobrynin, Tape 6409.04, PNO 8. No classification marking. Transcribed in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.

[Here follow opening comments, during which Dobrynin indicated he had spoken with Chairman Khrushchev several days earlier.]

Dobrynin: And he asked me to give you personally, Mr. President, his regards and his best wishes.

President: Fine, well I appreciate that very much.

Dobrynin: The Chairman frankly thinks, of course, that Tonkin Gulf, Cyprus, or the Congo do not necessarily, in his words, you know, decorate the U.S. policy. Yet, he added, apparently during the election campaigns some unfortunate things occur.

President: Now wait a minute, let me see, I'm not understanding. You said the Tonkin Gulf, Cyprus, and what?

Dobrynin: And the Congo.

President: Yes, Congo.

Dobrynin: Congo, as he puts in his words, do not necessarily decorate, as he frankly thinks, the U.S. policies, but he--

President: Do not necessarily what? Now, I didn't understand that.

Dobrynin: Do not necessarily, in his words, decorate, decorate the U.S. policy. Yet, he added, apparently during the election campaigns some unfortunate things occur. The Chairman asked me, in conclusion, to tell you, Mr. President, that he, Khrushchev, vote for you, so to speak.

President: Uh-huh.

Dobrynin: Though, he said, that we are not going at all to interfere in the American election campaign-he jokingly added that we are not going at all to interfere in the American campaign, but he said, that he vote for you, so to speak. And once again the Chairman gives you, Mr. President, his personal regards and best wishes.

President: Fine. Well, I think that you understand our situation here. It's better to leave the election matters up to the American people themselves. We never know how they'll handle them. Those of us that are candidates always want everybody to support us that will in our elections here, but we never can tell how their support will go, how they'll vote, and it may look good in September and be bad in November, but we'll just have to wait and see, and we hope that everything works out, and I appreciate your bringing me the Chairman's good wishes.

Dobrynin: Yes, and I want you [unintelligible] that asked me to tell you in a personal way, just between him and you.

President: Thank you very much.

Dobrynin: This is necessary.

President: I understand that.

Dobrynin: May I extend to you, Mr. President, my personal regards and give best wishes to you.

President: Thank you, I sure will. Bye.

Dobrynin: Thank you very much.

President: Bye.

44. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, September 12, 1964, 10-11:30 a.m.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-BO1285A, DCI McCone Memos for Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office on September 13. The memorandum is marked "Noted by DCI."

SUBJECT
Discussion with Rusk in his office Saturday, September 12th--10:00 to 11:30 a.m.

1. I told Rusk of my increasing concern over the evidences of dynamic military effort on the part of the Soviets, the appearance of more single silos, the continuation of the testing of new and larger missiles, evidences that they are engaged in an extensive radar development which may mean ABM deployment or an anti-satellite effort--we could not tell, continuing improvement of their nuclear submarine program, etc. I said that I was so concerned about all of this that I felt immediately upon the completion of 11-8 and 11-3/2/ that the President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy and I must sit down and review those estimates and concern ourselves with the consequences. I said that it was apparent to me that the Soviets were saying one thing in Geneva publicly and doing quite another thing privately, from the standpoint of the arms race. Rusk agreed and said the meeting was necessary. He hoped that the issue might not get into public print prior to the election.

/2/National Intelligence Estimate 11-8-64, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," October 8; and NIE 11-3-64, "Soviet Air Missile Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1970," December 16. Both are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume X.

[Here follows material on the Chinese nuclear weapons program and other topics.]

7. Rusk asked what I thought was going on in the Communist world. He noted that growing indications of independence on the part of satellite leaders, deepening rift between Russia and Communist China, and he wondered just what Khrushchev had in mind trying to organize an international conference. I said that we too had observed the indicators. I was particularly interested in Tito's trip to Hungary and I didn't think Tito was trying to mend Khrushchev's fences, that on the contrary, he was trying to increase his own independent strength. I also said that we agreed that the Sino-Soviet rift was deepening, we had noted the deployment of the Soviet division to the Chinese border and also the differing positions of local Communist parties, such as North Korean castigation of the Russians and their apparent cooperation with the ChiComs.

8. Rusk questioned the publication of the Togliatti letter/3/ in Moscow which I could not explain. I agreed that our demonologists would take a fresh look at the situation and report from time to time on our analysis as the situation evolved and unfolded.

/3/For text, see Pravda, September 10, 1964. Palmeiro Togliatti was the late Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party.

[Here follows material on Vietnam.]

45. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)/1/

Washington, September 25, 1964, 1-3:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. 1. Secret. Prepared by Bundy on October 1.

I had a long and cordial lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin in which we touched lightly on a large number of topics of only casual interest. The points of principal importance are as follows:

1. The Ambassador told me that he had conveyed to Chairman Khrushchev my private warning against intervention in the political campaign,/2/ and that the Chairman fully understood the message. I told him that David Rockefeller had reported the Chairman's remark that he was impressed by Scotty Reston's argument to the same effect, and the Ambassador indicated his own belief that his message from me had been more influential (I'm not so sure myself).

/2/See Document 39.

2. The Ambassador's principal preoccupation was with the MLF. While he did not come to the topic until near the close of the lunch, he rang all the changes on the subject, representing his views as not only those of his government but his own personal deep convictions. Perhaps the most interesting formulation was his claim that the U.S. was damaging its own best interests and allowing itself to be dragged along by the West Germans. I made the usual argument-and to me the fundamental one-that if the Germans were not kept solidly tied to the U.S., very strong political pressures would develop for another line of policy that would be dangerous both to the Soviet Union and to us. I found it interesting that the Ambassador simply did not comment on this possibility. I also pressed upon the Ambassador that if the Soviet Union really found the MLF dangerous, it was quite free to move in two directions that would promptly undermine the pressure for the MLF: (1) it could reduce the number of rockets aimed at Western Europe; and (2) it could give the Germans a real prospect of reunification. Without saying so directly, I implied strongly that the plan for the MLF was a reply to Soviet nuclear deployment and Soviet political intransigence. The Ambassador did not appear to be persuaded.

3. My own principal effort was to direct the Ambassador's attention to the problem of Communist Chinese nuclear weapons. I made it very plain that in our judgment the Chinese nuclear weapons would be real dissemination, while the MLF was nothing of the sort. I also made it plain that we would be ready for private and serious talk on what to do about this problem if there were any interest in the Soviet Government. The Ambassador gave no direct reply, but he gave me clearly to understand that in the thinking of the Soviet Government the Chinese nuclear capability was already, in effect, taken for granted. He argued that Chinese nuclear weapons had no importance against the Soviet Union or against the U.S., and that therefore they had only a psychological impact in Asia, and he implied that this impact had no importance for his government.

4. On China in general, the Ambassador admitted and indeed emphasized the depth and strength of the existing split between Moscow and Peking, but he took the view that the primary cause of this split was the personal megalomania of Mao. He said that Stalin at his worst had never insisted upon the kind of personal worship which was now accorded to Mao. He said that while in the Soviet Union younger men (like himself) were coming into positions of responsibility, and were able to argue openly and honestly with Khrushchev, in Communist China the older generation and, above all, Mao himself, were still in full charge and were inaccessible to reasonable argument. He told me at some length of the dismal experience of Soviet advisers trying to warn against the technological nonsense of the Great Leap Forward. But he asserted calmly, but strongly, his conviction that in the long run there would be a restoration of harmony between the two countries. And at one point, in discussion of our American differences with Communist China, he gently remarked on the continued existence of the treaty between the USSR and the Chicoms.

5. The Ambassador was much interested in knowing what I thought would be the timing of renewed U.S. diplomatic activity after the election-would it wait until January, or would it come in November? I told him that while we would not be in any spectacular rush, neither would we be forced to wait until after the inauguration. I indicated my own belief that discussions within the Western alliance would be necessary before anything very serious could be done between East and West (though at the same time I made clear our benevolent attitude toward an early meeting between Khrushchev and Erhard).

McG. B.

46. Memorandum From David Klein of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/

Washington, October 1, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. V. Secret.

McGB--

SUBJECT
Attach Incidents in the Soviet Union

This is to bring you up to date on the developments of the September 28 incident in which Soviet officials forcibly entered the hotel room in Khabarovsk occupied by our military attachs and made a thorough search of their effects-including cameras, files, notes, etc./2/

/2/A detailed debriefing on the incident was transmitted in telegram 1175 from Tokyo, October 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17-2 US-USSR)

On September 29 a formal protest was made in Moscow (Tab A),/3/ which the Soviets rejected, charging that the attachs "engaged in activities incompatible with their diplomatic status."/4/

/3/None of the tabs is printed.

/4/Telegram 908 from Moscow, September 29, reported on the meeting between Toon and Smirnovsky when Toon delivered the note verbale. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17-2 US-USSR)

Yesterday Bill Tyler called in Dobrynin (Tab B), repeating the charges made in Moscow and pointing out that such actions "will inevitably have an unfavorable effect on relations between the U.S. and the USSR". He also told Dobrynin that we expected the Soviet Government "to respond in a manner which will keep the damage to these relations . . . to a minimum". Dobrynin made no comment but promised to report Tyler's remarks./5/

/5/The Department of State informed the Embassy in Moscow of the meeting and Dobrynin's statement in telegram 893, September 30. (Ibid.)

In addition, a protest was made to the Soviet attachs by Army Intelligence on behalf of the three Services.

The powers are trying to keep the matter quiet, at least until after October 6 when the attachs should be back in Moscow. (They are concerned that premature publicity may force the Soviets to expel the officers involved.) The attachs are now in Tokyo and will return to Moscow via New Delhi. In the meantime, the Department is trying to get more precise information about the developments. What we have had thus far is sketchy information received in Moscow via a tapped telephone line from Khabarovsk.

A contingency press statement (Tab C) has been prepared in case the story leaks before October 6./6/

/6/For text of the press statement, issued on October 5, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 667.

There is debate between State and Pentagon on possible retaliatory action. State's reaction is negative-feeling retaliation is uncalled for and politically unwise. The general tendency at State is to play the incident down, or better yet, try to wish it away.

Personally, I think this would be a mistake. The Khabarovsk affair is not an isolated episode. The British were also involved. Moreover, it was preceded by a weird German incident (the mustard gas). In my view, the Soviet antics call for a sharp response rather than noiseless acquiescence. I do not think we can hope to keep the lid on this story for long. When the episode hits the press our stance should be defensible.

We cannot acquiesce in such nonsense. An appropriate reaction would not jeopardize our basic relations with the Soviets. The Soviets must know they cannot play this kind of cops and robbers and come out unscathed. If we are going to get anywhere with Moscow, the Soviets must know that this kind of nonsense will not be tolerated, no matter how strong our desire for understanding. And if we make clear the rules of the game, the Soviets are likely to play it intelligently. For unless they are interested in some understanding too, there really is no deal.

Moreover, I think there is an advantage in our taking the lead in putting the story out. We used this formula in the microphone and East Berlin shooting incidents and came out well-and should do so here. We don't want to be in a position of attempting to cover up for the Soviets.

When October 6 rolls around we should put out the story frankly, and with a position that makes sense. I do not think we need be overconcerned about putting the Soviets on the spot. They put themselves there and we will be in a difficult position politically if we do not react with sense and vigor./7/

/7/On the same day Bundy replied that he "fully" agreed with Klein's analysis. He instructed Klein to "feed this back as a strong White House view," and if the State Department wanted to act differently, Rusk should bring it up with the President. (Memorandum; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. V)

DK

47. Report Prepared in the Department of State/1/

Washington, October 2, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17-6 US-USSR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. No drafting information appears on the memorandum but it is attached to a letter of transmittal from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, George C. Denney, Jr., to the Director of Security of the Central Intelligence Agency, Howard Osborn. None of the 28 attached annexes is printed.

ESTIMATE OF DAMAGE TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS
(From Net of Listening Devices in U.S. Embassy Moscow)

Summary

The results of our review of the political effects of the bugging of our Moscow Embassy are paradoxical. On the one hand, in the judgment of the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Soviets achieved a major intelligence breakthrough, i.e., for a period of years they had the capability to read most, if not all, of our telegraphic messages between Washington and Moscow and between Washington and posts in Eastern Europe. On the other hand an extensive review of major crises and negotiations over the past twelve years does not provide evidence that the Soviets made use of knowledge thus gained to the detriment of our interests.

An explanation for this paradox may be that the Soviets valued the source far more than the use of any particular piece of information they got from it. In order to keep us from discovering their intelligence coup the Soviets appear to have sacrificed many of the specific gains they might have made, and eschewed actions that might have given them away. We have not found instances where a specific Soviet action can be clearly attributed to a particular American message they may have intercepted, and we believe it likely that Moscow avoided taking such actions out of fear that they might compromise their operation. But the fact that damage to American political interests was not so direct and gross as to be readily demonstrable does not mean that there was none. In considering the possible impact which information derived from bugging had upon Soviet policymakers' thinking, we find large unknown areas. In some instances Soviet awareness of American firmness may have redounded to our advantage. On balance, however, we must conclude that Soviet leaders gained considerable advantage in their dealings with us, and, over time, they may have felt free to pursue more assertive policies because they had a clearer idea of what our reaction might be.

Extensive Compromise

The NSA assessment, the assessments by State Department security experts and information which CIA acquired from a defector make it virtually certain that extensive quantities of classified information were compromised as a result of the Soviet microphone operation. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

The classified material compromised included Top Secret, Secret and Confidential information. According to the definition of these classifications contained in the Department's security regulations pursuant to law, the classifying officer is obliged to assign these classifications when in his judgment the unauthorized disclosure of the information could, with regard to U.S. foreign policy and defense interests, be "prejudicial" (Confidential), result in "serious damage" (Secret) or cause "exceptionally grave damage" (Top Secret). Thus, if a message was correctly classified in these categories, its revelation to the Soviet Union by definition could cause damage to the United States although the Soviets were inhibited from exercising to the full their potential to damage our interests. Some messages during this period 1952-62 were no doubt overclassified, but even if considerable allowance is made for the bad habits of many officers in this respect, small comfort can be derived.

Direct, Visible Damage

The damage review described above, which was based upon the worst-case assumption that everything had been compromised, found little evidence of political damage. Indeed, some of the officers working on the political assessment found it difficult to believe that an extensive compromise had in fact occurred. No instance could be found in which Moscow was shown to have made a specific decision detrimental to U.S. interest on the basis of information derived from reading particular messages.

Limits on Soviet Use of Information

The Soviets probably regarded their microphone installation as a major intelligence asset. Certainly if the circumstances had been reversed the United States Government would have thought so. Such a Soviet judgment would have led to a policy of self-denial of use of the information derived. Soviet intelligence officers may well have hoped that this source of information might give them advance warning in the event that the United States ever decided to attack the USSR, and they would have been reluctant to jeopardize the source. In fact the very thing the Department's reviewers looked for-a Soviet action directly attributable to an intercepted message-would be the very thing which a Soviet intelligence officer would have resisted hardest-the use of information in a manner which might make us suspect the source.

The one instance in which a Departmental reviewer concluded that an intercepted American message probably altered the course of negotiation involved possible initiation of hostilities. The review of the Korean armistice negotiations suggested that Soviet interception of a May 23, 1953 cable from the Department to Moscow revealing our contingency plans to resume hostilities if our forthcoming proposal was not accepted may have been the determining factor in prompting Moscow to accept a settlement.

We know that Soviet intelligence regarded information derived from our telegrams as especially sensitive, and we suspect that many of the lower-ranking officials who conducted negotiations on such issues as the hot line or the consular convention were never privy to the operation. When Khrushchev told Ambassador Kohler that he read his message opposing sale of a large diameter pipe to the Soviet Union (though Khrushchev did not describe the message accurately), he was doubtless guilty of a serious breach of security.

In addition to their reluctance to jeopardize their source of potentially invaluable information, the Soviets were probably also concerned-though to a much lesser extent-over possible embarrassment in being caught.

Operational vs. Background Information

Both our review of the messages themselves and inferences about Soviet handling of the information support the conclusion that Moscow derived very little, if any, operational information upon which they based specific actions.

They always had the hope that by preserving the source, they might one day derive extremely useful operational information, namely, advance warning of an American attack, and that very hope would have made them very reluctant to sacrifice their source in exploiting it for lesser purposes.

But apart from operational information, the Soviets did over the years acquire a good deal of background information. No single piece of this information would necessarily have altered particular decisions, but this kind of information would have given the Soviets some valuable knowledge of United States policymaking processes, some psychological advantages and may over the longer run have strengthened Moscow's capability for confronting the United States.

If the Soviets read our notes before they were delivered, they may have had a few extra hours to consider their responses which doubtless made their own decision-making easier, though that may well have been to our advantage at times. In reading our reporting messages, the Soviets would have learned no little about how our foreign service operates, about the personalities of various American officers and about the kinds of dmarches or talking points which did or did not impress us. Even though they refrained from taking any direct action on the basis of information in our messages the Soviets would have derived either confirmation or disproof of their estimates about our foreign policy based upon other sources of information.

In the aggregate, background information was probably useful to the top Soviet leadership. For example, in the period after the Sputnik and the firing of the first Soviet ICBM our estimates of Soviet strategic missiles were inaccurate. The Soviets would not have learned the details of our estimates from their microphone operations, but they probably would have had confirmation of their impression based upon other sources that United States policy was being made on the basis of estimates of the military balance which erred in their favor. Also of general background utility would have been the knowledge required of differences among the United States and its Allies.

In attempting to assess the impact which background information may have had on Soviet policy, we are faced with imponderables. We have no way of proving how much of a role background information derived from bugging played in the totality of information used by the Soviet decision makers. We suspect that in general Moscow derived a clearer impression of the limits of American tolerance for possible mischief. In many instances it was doubtless to our advantage that the Soviet leadership realized the dangers and stopped short of precipitating potentially grave situations. At the same time, a better estimate of the limits of safety may have tempted the Soviets to play a bit closer to the limits than they might otherwise have done.

48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, October 6, 1964, 1:16 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17-2 US-USSR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Henry; cleared by Thompson, Davis, BNA, FE, INR, P, NEA, and DOD. Repeated to London, Hong Kong, New Delhi, and Tokyo.

959. Toon should see Smirnovsky again earliest opportunity and make oral statement following points under instructions his government:

"1. Soviet note in response to our protest violation diplomatic immunity Embassy personnel in Khabarovsk is not satisfactory, particularly in that it offers no apology for violation./2/

/2/In telegram 994, October 6, Kohler reported that in a meeting that morning Smirnovsky handed Toon a note rejecting the U.S. protest of September 29 and made an oral statement that "Sovs prepared refrain from declaring attachs PNG if embassy itself would take measures to recall them from USSR." The note rejecting the protest was transmitted to Washington in telegram 995, October 6. (Both ibid.) For text of the note, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, p. 668.

2. Smirnovsky's oral remarks are equally unacceptable and are rejected.

3. U.S. Government has no intention of recalling attachs who were grossly mistreated by Soviet officials who violated their diplomatic immunity while they were sleeping in bed in middle of night.

4. We hope Soviet Government will consider carefully before taking any additional actions in this matter which will further harm relations between our countries."/3/

/3/On October 7 Kohler reported that Toon had made the oral statement as instructed to Smirnovsky, who said he would report it to higher authority and reiterated that the Soviet Government had ample proof of the espionage committed by the attachs. (Telegram 1017 from Moscow; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17-2 US-USSR) On the following day the Department of State instructed the Embassy to take no further action, leaving it to the Soviet Government to make the next move. (Telegram 990 to Moscow; ibid.)

FYI. At noon press briefing Oct. 6 Department spokesman will be prepared to answer inevitable questions with response that Soviet note has been received, it is unsatisfactory and we are reiterating our protest.

We are hoping to stall development this confrontation at least long enough to permit our men to return to Moscow for more easy and orderly departure. We assume, however, that PNG action or revocation of visas may result and we are prepared to retaliate with PNG action against three Soviet attachs of similar rank.

Would welcome any further suggestions or recommendations from Embassy. Does Embassy consider written reply desirable later? If so, pls suggest draft. End FYI.

Rusk

49. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, October 6, 1964, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17-2 US-USSR. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to London, Hong Kong, New Delhi for Colonel Aubrey, and DOD/DIA. Received in the Department State at 1:52 p.m. on October 6.

1010. Embtels 994, 995 to Dept./2/ Soviet action against attachs reported reference telegrams was predictable in view of rich dividends of Khabarovsk Hotel room raid and regrettable publicity of incident.

/2/See footnote 2, Document 48.

Determining nature of our tactical response to Soviet moves presents serious problems. In first place British requirements in pre-electoral period, as Dept aware, likely be somewhat different from ours. Secondly, Sovs have good case in light of pertinent international law as well as in eyes of world public opinion (which they could support if they wished to do so by public display of equipment, maps and notes seized in Khabarovsk) when they argue that activities of attachs were not only illegal under Soviet law but impermissible under accepted diplomatic practices.

Thus it seems to me that if we are to go to the mat with the Sovs on this case we must focus our fire not on activities of attachs but rather on behavior of Soviet agents toward attachs. Certainly we can argue cogently that invasion of hotel rooms, forcible restraint of personnel, and denial of request to contact Emb are all in contravention of requirements placed on host state by concept of diplomatic immunity. This is fundamental question of principle which cannot be breached by acquiescing in Sov demand or by failure immediately to take issue with Sov position. Thus it seems to me that first order of business should be to support formally and at high level line taken by Toon this morning with Smirnovsky.

In light these considerations it seems to me our choice of immediate course of action lies among following:

(1) Reject proposal contained in oral Smirnovsky statement thus forcing PNG action by Sov, and then retaliating in kind on one for one basis. This assumes attachs return to Moscow on schedule, which I regard as essential test, since Soviet prohibition of return would in fact amount to PNG action.

(2) Accept proposal made orally by Smirnovsky and then retaliate in identical fashion. If we follow this course of action, ideally we should muster similar charges and evidence against Soviet personnel to be withdrawn. I assume from my own experience in the Dept that evidence against particular Sov personnel necessary for PNG action is already on file and available for immediate exploitation.

(3) Reject or accept Soviet offer but in lieu of direct retaliation withdraw diplomatic immunity from all Soviet Attach personnel pending clarification through bilateral consultations of unprecedented Soviet statement on immunity concept made to Aubrey in Khabarovsk.

My own preference is of course one. Conclusive consideration, in my mind is that while we are in weak position to counter Soviet charges, we cannot put ourselves in worse position of appearing to accept them by unilateral withdrawal of personnel involved. However, any of three suggested courses would be acceptable from my point of view, provided action taken is prompt and unequivocal. In any alternative, I would repeat that it should be made clear that action is taken in accordance with our refusal to acquiesce in fundamental breach of basic immunity concept rather than our insistence that activities of attach personnel were legal and permissible in accordance with diplomatic norms.

Kohler

50. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, October 10, 1964, 1:59 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk.

1029. Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary. Regarding our recent attach problem, I want you to know that I have raised in USIB the question of giving better advice to attachs and other intelligence personnel about methods and conduct under the different circumstances of different countries to which they are assigned. Quite frankly, my impression is that our attachs acted with great naivete and that comparable conduct on the part of Soviet attachs in the United States would have been considered by us as unacceptable. For this reason, we have emphasized the violations of immunity through intrusion and searches by Soviet security personnel but I am not at all comfortable about the intelligence used by our own people in carrying out their mission. This is not the first instance where such cases have arisen and I have asked for a review of procedures./2/

/2/On October 11 Kohler replied that he, too, had long been concerned with the attach problem, feeling that the requirements for their activities were based on obsolete concepts of intelligence gathering. In the present case he feared that the loss of notes and information probably outweighed all the intelligence gathered by this means over a long period of time. (Telegram 1075; ibid.) Citing the Khabarovsk affair and an incident in Poland, Rusk wrote McNamara on December 24 proposing a review of policies and procedures governing intelligence gathering by military personnel in both the Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 9.

Rusk

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