Washington, March 26, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2. Secret. Drafted by Thompson.

I was quite fascinated by the Agency's study on the coming struggle for power in the USSR./2/ This is by far the best thing I have seen on this subject and I think, in the main, quite sound. I do have a few comments, however, which I hope will be of interest.

/2/Document 17.

Many of the judgments in this report would be affected by the circumstances of Khrushchev's disappearance from the scene. Most of them seem predicated upon his dying a natural death. Should, however, he voluntarily retire from his two principal positions and take the presidency, many of the appraisals in this report would, I think, be changed. This would be even more so if he were forced out or kicked upstairs.

I have always assumed that Khrushchev's positions as head of the Party and head of the Government would be divided with Brezhnev, Podgorny, and Kosygin being the principal contenders. If this happened, I should think the split between the Party and the bureaucracy could develop rapidly. If, in order to prevent this, one man gets both jobs, I should think it would be difficult, at least in the early stages, for the bureaucrats and technocrats to exercise their influence.

One subject which is not touched on in the study, but which seems to me important, is the influence the press would have at the time of succession. As matters now stand, Izvestiya tends to be a Khrushchev organ, while Pravda is more likely to carry opposition views. Adzhubei/3/ is a complete opportunist and would quickly jump on whatever he thought would be the leading bandwagon, but I should imagine that changes in the editorship of the leading papers might be one of our first clues as to who was succeeding in the power struggle.

/3/Alexis I. Adzhubei, editor of Izvestia and Khrushchev's son-in-law.

Although I agree that Brezhnev seems more likely than Podgorny to be tapped as the heir, I am inclined to think Podgorny would be more likely to come out on top in the long run as I do not believe Brezhnev has the qualities to hold a leadership.

Although Polyansky is very much the Party type, I think he was much impressed by his visit to the United States and might not be as much of a conservative as is indicated in your study.

Your study does not mention Ilichev,/4/ but I am afraid he might be a contender if the Stalinists should come out on top.

/4/Leonid F. Ilichev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Llewellyn E. Thompson/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

20. Summary Record of National Security Council Meeting No. 525/1/

Washington, April 2, 1964, noon.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File. Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, Johnson went to the Cabinet Room for the NSC meeting at 12:10 p.m., and the meeting adjourned at 12:35. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy Toward Brazil and Other General Topics

CIA Director McCone gave a briefing from prepared notes on the following items:

a. Soviet Space Activities--Another Soviet effort to reach Venus is now in flight. He expressed grave concern about a New York Times story by John Finney revealing that two previous Soviet efforts to reach Venus had been failures./2/ He said the USIB, which was now meeting, would probably recommend to the President that the Board be authorized to conduct an investigation to determine how this information reached the press. The Times story was similar to one which appeared in the Washington Post lending support to the thesis that the newsmen were briefed rather than having written their stories by astute reconstruction of information already in the public domain. (At the end of the meeting, and apparently in response to a written note which Secretary Rusk gave him, the President directed Mr. McCone to initiate an investigation of this matter.)

/2/Finney's article, "2 Venus Probes by Soviet Failed," which appeared in The New York Times on April 1, stated that the launch failures had not been made public by either the Soviet Union or the United States but "were detected by the electronic network maintained by this country to monitor Soviet space activities."

b. New Soviet Missile--There is recent evidence of a new Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile which will be watched with great care. The development of this missile is conclusive proof that the Soviet ICBM program is not a static program.

c. The Sino-Soviet Split--[1 line of source text not declassified] make it clear that the differences between the USSR and Communist China are even greater than those which have been made public. Even the person of Khrushchev is now attacked by the Chinese Communists.

[Here follows discussion of South Vietnam and Brazil.]

The President turned to Secretary Rusk and asked if he had any matters which he wished to raise. Secretary Rusk made the following points:

[Here follows discussion of Cambodia.]

b. USSR--Khrushchev's current visit to Hungary is being very closely watched./3/ The Premier's speech stressing the importance of goulash as contrasted to the support of revolution may be an indication that Khrushchev is giving priority to the unfinished business in the USSR. If he now chooses to put first emphasis on improving economic conditions in the Soviet Union, it may mean that he will adopt a moderate attitude toward international problems.

/3/Khrushchev visited Hungary March 31-April 10.

Secretary Rusk agreed with the great importance which Director McCone attached to the split between the Russian and the Chinese Communists. He said there would be a revolutionary change in world affairs if these two powers split completely. If the security tie between the two countries is cut, the Chinese would not be able to count on Soviet support if they attacked Southeast Asia./4/

/4/In his April 2 memorandum for the record, McCone summarized Rusk's statement on the Sino-Soviet split as follows: "Rusk stated that it was his and the Department's opinion that CIA was in no way overstating the depth of the Sino-Soviet split, indicating that the Department was studying carefully any evidence of actions by one party of the controversy against the other. He said no physical actions were discernible as yet but Rusk raised the question of the possibility of the abrogation of the Soviet-ChiCom Mutual Defense Treaty." (Central Intelligence Agency, O/DDI Files: Job 80S-00003A, National Security Council 1964-Part I)

[Here follows discussion of Egypt, Panama, and Cuba.]

Bromley Smith/5/

/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

21. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson/1/

Moscow, April 2, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret; Exdis. The source text is a translation done in the Division of Language Services of the Department of State. Dobrynin handed the Russian-language text to Thompson at an April 4 meeting. Thompson's memorandum of their conversation at that time is ibid.

Dear Mr. President:

I felt a need even earlier to send you a message of this content. But I put it off somehow, thinking that perhaps the reasons for which I decided to address myself to you would not be rightly understood. Now, I believe, you will understand me correctly.

During the last few months there have occurred one incident after another, causing much unpleasantness and adding to the tension in the already complicated relations between our two countries.

In the first place some member of the United States Armed Forces assigned to the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin wanted to change, without prior permission, the procedure for checking documents of military personnel on the routes of communication with West Berlin passing through the territory of the German Democratic Republic. To be sure, United States Government organs insisted in the correspondence carried on subsequently through diplomatic and military channels that the Soviet side had changed the conditions while the Americans adhered to the old rules that had been agreed upon. But I can assure you that this was not so at all. We did not change anything in the procedure for checking documents of the military personnel of the United States, Great Britain and France. On the contrary, the American command adopted some sort of internal instructions changing the practice agreed upon, and required that others take this into account.

Why do I come back to this question? If this were an isolated act, it could have been taken as constituting an unpleasant occurrence, but unfortunately similar acts are not few in number and it is not always easy to avoid the impression: are these not links in the same chain with which certain circles are striving to keep the United States of America and the Soviet Union from throwing off the shackles of the "Cold War"?

Incidents on the ground have finally been settled. Now they happen in the air./2/ On January 28, an American military aircraft intruded in the air space of the German Democratic Republic. In spite of the warning and of the order to land, the aircraft continued to fly deep into the GDR until it was shot down. The American side stated that this violation was unintentional, that this was not a military plane but a training plane which had lost its bearings.

/2/See Documents 9 and 16 concerning the incidents on January 28 and March 10.

It is difficult to agree that even a training plane could stray off course in such clear weather and over territory which is quite familiar to flying personnel. Nevertheless we took into account the statement made by your government that this was an accidental flight and that USA authorities are taking steps to prevent similar violations in the future.

But hardly six weeks had gone by and on March 10 there occurred a new violation of the frontiers of the German Democratic Republic. This violation was committed by a military aircraft, a reconnaissance-bomber equipped with air cameras as well as radio reconnaissance facilities which were in operation at the time of the flight. According to the official version, the RB-66 aircraft committed a navigational error and accidentally found itself over an area where something of interest to the American military command was taking place.

Can we fail to reach the conclusion, Mr. President, that the RB-66 intentionally violated the air space of the GDR and did so in order to engage in air reconnaissance, if a film on which important military objects had been recorded was found in the wreckage of the plane and if throughout its flight, the crew knew exactly where it was and maintained two-way communication with its land bases?

Mr. Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States, told the Soviet Ambassador, in your name, that the United States of America regrets the occurrence, that the US Government is in no way involved in the intrusion of the RB-66 within the GDR and that you had given strict instructions not to allow such violations in the future. Mr. Rusk also said that a careful inquiry will be conducted and the culprits will be called to account. In view of these assurances, the Soviet Government and the Government of the GDR have found it possible to return the crew members of the intruding aircraft to the American authorities.

I believe that the flight of the RB-66 was arranged without instructions from the President of the United States of America. But I declare to you that I do not accept the idea that this was an accidental border violation. I will say more: soon after the January incident, we received information according to which the American command in Europe, intended to continue reconnaissance flights over GDR territory. It developed that we did not have to wait very long to receive confirmation of the accuracy of this information. Therefore, accepting your declaration that the Government of the United States did not order aircraft of the American military air forces to fly over the GDR for reconnaissance purposes, at the same time, I exclude the possibility that what has happened is the result of an error of the pilot./3/

/3/After receiving the message from Dobrynin, Thompson glanced through it and responded, according to his memorandum of conversation, that "I felt absolutely certain that the Air Force could not be deliberately deceiving the President. I said that General Le May himself had investigated the matter and had assured us that this plane had orders not to go near the demarcation line. I said our preliminary investigation indicated that the plane had a faulty compass and that the crew had apparently carelessly not checked it." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163)

It remains to assume that among the American military command in Germany there are people, and perhaps such people also exist within the military departments in Washington, who seek a worsening of the relations with the Soviet Union and who use, to that end, the very areas where the absence of settlement for many questions related to the defeat and the destruction of the German Reich during the Second World War, is felt more acutely, where there are greater possibilities for all sorts of collisions and conflicts, where American forces located in West Germany confront the Soviet forces stationed in the GDR.

All this has prompted me to address myself to you and to express my concern that unless an end is put to the actions of those who provoke these incidents, our efforts to improve the relations between the USSR and the USA and to suppress everything that is a source of unnecessary complications and that maintains the Cold War climate, may prove to be vain efforts. It need not be said that the state of Soviet-American relations exerts a great influence upon the situation throughout the world. Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America will not be set completely right; we have only just begun to make real progress in the solution of the most important problems of our time. Can disarmament negotiations, for example, yield much result if instead of being accompanied by the day-to-day efforts of all parties striving to establish confidence, they are accompanied by sabre-rattling?

Then what is the result? American aircraft violate the borders of a Socialist state, authorities of the USA publicly protest against the defensive action of our military, and the American press launches a noisy anti-Soviet campaign. All this merely creates additional difficulties for the achievement of an understanding in those fields and on those problems where such an understanding now seems possible or favorable preconditions for it may be ripening. Apparently this is also the very intention of those who organize various incidents at one time on land and at another time in the air.

And it is not so much a matter of what material damage such incidents produce and even, perhaps, not in the incidents themselves as such, as it is in their dangerous political consequences for the interests of our two countries, for the interests of the entire world. People hear statements concerning the aspirations of statesmen for peace and for improvement of the international situation. At the same time incidents occur one after another which indicate that the statements remain statements and tension continues. Can these really create an atmosphere necessary for arriving at a proper normalizing of the situation?

The problems which confront us must be solved in one way or another if we are to promote the cause of strengthening peace and eliminating the causes of disputes which may entail the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. We are convinced that it is in our general interest not to postpone the solution of these problems and, at least, in any case not to complicate their solution.

I have already mentioned that certain American military circles are organizing incidents in that very spot where there is a great deal of power, and this cannot fail to emphasize the timeliness and importance of a German peace settlement. If such questions as the normalization of the situation in West Berlin, the formalization of the existing borders of the German states, respect for the sovereignty of the GDR and other such questions were solved, then tension in this key spot for the fate of world peace would no doubt decline, which would be reflected most favorably in the international situation.

I shall not enumerate here all the specific problems requiring solution and requiring no little cooperation on our part. There is first of all the problem of universal and complete disarmament. Of course, it would not be proper not to note with satisfaction that a good beginning has already been made and that during the past year some success has been achieved even in regard to those questions the solution of which not so long ago appeared to be almost unattainable. But this, of course, is only the beginning.

The fundamental position of the Soviet Union is the improvement of Soviet-American relations and strengthening peace, and we would prefer, of course, not to engage in demonstrations of force, of hard firmness, and in the elimination of the consequences of incidents provoked by the acts of American military forces, but to concentrate, with you, our efforts toward guaranteeing for the peoples of our two countries a durable peace.

I should like to hope that you will consider with understanding these words of mine which are dictated by a sincere desire to avoid the unnecessary complications for the interests of our two countries.

With respect and esteem/4/

/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.

22. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/

Washington, April 4, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Memos, Vol. III. Secret. The memorandum bears no drafting information but another copy has the clearances of Harriman, Thompson, DOD, SOV, and EUR, among others. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AV 4 US-USSR)

SUBJECT
The Air Transport Agreement with the Soviet Union

Signing would bring both advantages and disadvantages to the United States.

The advantages would be:

1. Although insufficient of itself to produce a more forthcoming attitude by the Soviets on more important issues, signing would be an important psychological step in improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

2. It would help to provide the Russians with an alternative to the Chinese hard line. Since any major multilateral agreements with the Soviets in the next year seem unlikely, bilateral agreements take on added importance.

3. More concretely, additional Russian tourists and other visitors should be able to come to America, it will be easier for United States travelers to visit the Soviet Union, and a significant expansion of professional contacts in the civil aviation field will ensue--all these represent important strengthening of our program to increase and improve communication.

4. There are a number of secondary advantages, such as familiarization with Soviet aviation techniques, improved courier service to the Embassy, modestly enhance Scandinavian bargaining position against the USSR on aviation matters.

5. Signing would be viewed by many of our friends as further reducing hostility, where failure to sign would reinforce the propaganda argument that we are implacably hostile to the Soviets.

The disadvantages would be:

1. Our efforts to restrict air contact with Cuba would be seriously impaired, and getting agreement of the OAS Foreign Ministers to cut sea and air contacts between Cuba and all OAS states would be virtually precluded, if signed before the American nations act under an OAS resolution. European countries will be encouraged to reinstitute air service to Cuba. In short, the precarious partial isolation of Cuba we have already obtained would be jeopardized.

2. Bloc airlines will almost surely gain entry for the first time to Latin America, particularly to Brazil and Mexico. This in turn would facilitate the movement of Cuban trained subversives and enhance Soviet bloc efforts and prestige within Latin America.

3. Our ability, limited in any case, to retard Communist aviation agreements for operations to other less developed countries would be reduced.

4. While there is a military risk from security aspects of possible emergency landings at United States military bases, this risk already exists to an extent, and can certainly be controlled.

Prompt signing could:

1. Let flights and tourist travel begin late this summer, rather than next year, and lay the ground for the other advantages.

2. But it would bring all the above disadvantages, and would involve Congressional and domestic opposition for following too closely on other measures increasing ties with Russia.

3. Chances of getting OAS action to stop air contact with Cuba would undoubtedly be lost.

Postponement of decision would:

1. Let us take full advantage of prospects of action by OAS members to cut air and sea contact with Cuba under any OAS resolutions.

2. Probably delay flights for a year.

3. Avoid having this agreement come too close on the heels of the other agreements with the USSR, or the T39 and RB66 incidents.

4. Let us pick the best time to get maximum net psychological benefits from signing while minimizing the psychological benefits to the USSR.

5. Permit a balancing of the extent of remaining disadvantages with advantages to be obtained.

I recommend:

That the desirability of signature be assessed again once prospects for action under an OAS resolution have been exhausted.

Dean Rusk

23. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 8, 1964, 11 a.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. III. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and initialed by Kohler on April 9. According to the President's Daily Diary, McGeorge Bundy sat in for part of the discussion. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
U.S.-Soviet Problems

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Foy D. Kohler, American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

I met with the President for approximately 50 minutes this morning from shortly after 11 a.m. until nearly 12 noon. After a few exchanges about my activities since I had seen him on March 6/2/ and during the picture-taking period I reported to him on my meeting with Senator Jackson's Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations this morning, mentioning in particular the off-the-record exchange I had had with Senator Javits about anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. I said I told the Senator that the recent meeting of Jewish societies in Washington and their subsequent meeting with the President and the Secretary of State/3/ were the kind of activities which, together with official efforts in the U.N. and maximum publication of the facts of the situation of the Jews in the Soviet Union, might influence the Soviet leadership toward alleviating the situation of the Jews there.

/2/See Document 15.

/3/A memorandum of Rusk's conversation on April 7 with Lewis H. Weinstein, President of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. The President's Daily Diary indicates that the President greeted a "Jewish Group" in the Fish Room at the White House at 5:45 p.m. on April 6, but no further information is provided. (Johnson Library)

After the photographers had departed I expressed my relief at the Soviet decision during my absence to release the RB-66 flyers who were held in East Germany and my appreciation of the action the President had taken to prevent recurrences. This led the President to mention his own apprehensions about the possibility of incidents connected with the CENTO military maneuvers and air exercises in Iran. He thereupon called Secretary McNamara and among other things asked him to make sure that maximum precautions were taken to insure against any incursions into Soviet air space, and then called Mr. McGeorge Bundy to report his conversation with Secretary McNamara and to ask Mr. Bundy to follow through with the Defense and State Departments. Mr. Bundy came to the President's Office and participated in some further discussion on this matter.

Subsequently the conversation followed the general lines of our initial talk on March 6, particularly as respects Soviet attitudes toward relationships with the U.S. during the current period. When I reported that I was sure that Chairman Khrushchev would be looking for an early opportunity to meet with the President following the November elections, the President indicated his own view that such a meeting would be useful. In this connection we discussed Khrushchev's personality and possible matters which might come up in such a meeting, agreeing however that the agenda of such a meeting would depend upon developments meanwhile and the situation at such a time. The President indicated his understanding that a meeting with Khrushchev would necessarily have to be coordinated with previous contacts with Allied leadership.

In discussing our current bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union I mentioned again the question of the Civil Air Agreement, saying that since our first conversation I had discussed this matter with the Secretary of State and others concerned, in particular Assistant Secretary Mann. I said that Mr. Mann had agreed that I report to the President that he would review his objections in the light of his current negotiations about Cuba and that he hoped to be able to reach a decision within the next couple of weeks which would allow him to withdraw his objections to the early signature and implementation of the Agreement. I again stressed my own view that the Russians regard this as a symbol of U.S. willingness to do business with them and pointed out also that the Soviet promise of improved communications facilities for the Embassy in Moscow was undoubtedly related in their mind to the question of the Air Agreement. I also reported to the President that I thought that we could expect to conclude negotiations for the Consular Convention within a matter of weeks after my return to Moscow. The President asked a number of questions in this connection including some about our expectations with respect to the subsequent reciprocal establishment of consulates. I described the nature of the Consular Convention and the expectation that after its conclusion we would ask for a consulate general in Leningrad while the Russians would probably ask for one in New York.

There was relatively little discussion of Cuba on this occasion but I did repeat my general view of the Soviet position on this question and said that I would keep very much in mind the President's concern about the Soviet presence there. The President asked a number of questions about the conflict between Moscow and Peiping to which I replied along the lines indicated in the memorandum of conversation on March 6. In this connection the President referred with some satisfaction to the reports of Khrushchev's remarks during his current visit to Hungary.

The President asked a number of questions about the economic situation in the Soviet Union and I reviewed Khrushchev's difficulties in this respect at some length along the lines reported by the Embassy, stressing that Khrushchev had a problem of resource distribution which made his, the President's, problem in this respect seem relatively easy. The President expressed considerable interest in this phase of the conversation and the hope that means could be found to make the Soviet difficulties both in the international field and in their domestic economy better understood here at home.

While Mr. Bundy was present and at the end of the conversation the President requested that I meet with the White House correspondents afterwards and give them as much of a rundown as I could on the nature of our conversation. Accordingly, after checking with Mr. Bundy and with the President's, Press Secretary, Mr. Reedy, I joined with the latter in his daily press briefing, made a general statement about my visit with the President and responded to questions for approximately 15 minutes.

Summary of Actions:

1. Secretary of Defense instructed by President to take maximum precautions to prevent incursions of Soviet air space during CENTO maneuvers.

2. Mr. McGeorge Bundy instructed by President to follow through with State and Defense Departments on CENTO maneuver precautions.

3. Assistant Secretary Mann to review his objections to signing Civil Air Agreement with U.S.S.R. within a few weeks in light of Cuba situation.

24. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)/1/

Washington, April 10, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret.

SUBJECT
Suggestions for Pen Pal

The President made the following comments on the pen pal which you may wish to bear in mind in preparing an answer./2/

/2/An answer to Khrushchev's April 2 letter; Document 21.

1. He believes that Khrushchev may well be suspicious of the RB-66 flight and is quite willing to respect this doubt as honest and to give it an honest answer, as full and complete as possible.

2. He would like to prove his own good faith by handing Dobrynin exact copies of the orders which he caused to be sent out by the JCS after the RB-66 episode.

3. He would like to be quite firm in arguing that such an errant plane need not be shot down. It could be wig-wagged and signaled and warned in a variety of ways without such a hasty reaction, and the President thinks we might wish to wonder whether Khrushchev's own military people are not letting their own itchy fingers make trouble for him.

4. The President wishes to be quite firm that on the matter of the Berlin convoy arguments either Khrushchev is fooling us or his people are fooling him, since there was indeed a clear-cut Soviet effort to change procedure.

5. The President wishes to take the occasion to review with Dobrynin the position on the nuclear production cutback and to explain that he is getting to the point where he will wish to announce the new American decisions, probably on April 20.

6. The President asks if you think it would be wise to use this occasion to wish Khrushchev a happy birthday, and to give the Ambassador an appropriate message in this talk, too.

McG. B.

25. Editorial Note

On April 16, 1964, the National Security Council met to discuss U.S. trade relations with the Soviet Union and the East European Communist countries. For text of the summary record of the meeting and McGeorge Bundy's April 14 briefing memorandum for the President, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume IX, Documents 153 and 154. For comprehensive documentation on East-West trade for 1964-1968, including the report of the President's Task Force on Foreign Economic Policy and material on the report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union, see ibid., Documents 148-196. The records of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union, also known as the Miller Committee, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Boxes 16-25.

26. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

SC No. 00615/64B

Washington, April 17, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. III. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by CIA's Office of Current Intelligence.

KHRUSHCHEV AT 70:
AN APPRAISAL OF HIS LEADERSHIP STYLE

Khrushchev arrives at his 70th birthday on 17 April with more than ten years' experience as leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. During this period he has developed methods of operation, a certain style of rule, and a personal impact on policy which cannot easily be disregarded by those who eventually succeed him.

This week's occasion, like the later decennial birthdays of Stalin, calls for a gathering of the Communist clan and dutiful tributes not only to the man himself but also to Moscow's special place in the Communist world. It is, then, more than a personal anniversary; it becomes a natural landmark from which to assess Soviet policy as a whole.

Unfortunately for Khrushchev, however, April 1964 is not the most propitious time for doing this. There is very little in the recent record which can be hailed as vindicating his policies and providing a special cause for celebration.

Khrushchev the Leader

No matter how other Communist leaders may assess the situation, Khrushchev most certainly sees his setbacks and disappointments as only temporary discomfitures. In this respect he epitomizes the old-time Communist revolutionary--holding always to the idea that it is only the long-term prospect which really counts. And fortunately for Khrushchev personally, he enjoys a special status which can accommodate this unbounded optimism. His political primacy no longer depends upon his achieving a continuing string of policy successes.

For Khrushchev at 70, the important thing--other than the maintenance of this special power position--is that he should be recognized as the very antithesis of Stalin, the one person who, while retaining the basic Communist framework, could bring the party back into full power, reform the secret police, reorient the economy and military services, and make the Soviet Union a first-rate world power.

Certainly by his own reckoning there are still good years left to continue this work, and to complete his programs for chemistry and agriculture and start any number of new major projects. Here again the natural Khrushchev optimism comes into play, and it may have been boosted by the feeling that he is more fit today than he was two or three years ago. In any case, by external appearances, he retains most of his stamina and drive, and his temperament--to the extent it has changed at all--seems more even than in earlier years.

As part of the process of maintaining his special seniority, there has been a steady effort, both by Khrushchev personally and by the propaganda machine, to refine the image he projects on the public scene. The picture intended is a composite of world statesman, benevolent father figure, and man of the people, with all traces of the party ruffian neatly erased. As a result, he has been elevated to become one of the great military leaders of World War II and currently the great hope for peace in the world. The crudities are edited from his speeches, and he is even shown to be merciful to old enemies such as Voroshilov and Bulganin.

Despite these various efforts to popularize the man, there are very few indications that he is in fact a respected leader. Although he is frequently credited with raising living standards or harnessing the police, it is more often Malenkov who is considered the real liberalizer. Even to the party hierarchs, Khrushchev is the "old man" who is both feared and distrusted. To the government bureaucracy, he often symbolizes the party agitator who forces through the temporary expedient in his quest for the short-term gain. To the proud army careerists he is the political commissar and military fraud. To many intellectuals he is an untutored tough. To the general public he is still essentially what is known in the Soviet Union as "one of them" -- the bosses who impose themselves arbitrarily on the people from above.

The Uncertain Succession

In part it is because he maintains himself to a large degree by means of entrenched personal power that Khrushchev is seemingly disinclined to face the problem of his own succession. Although he made gestures toward a settlement by singling out first Kirichenko and later Kozlov, there are hardly any indications at all that he provided them with the opportunities to develop their personal networks of operation. The big impediment has always been the fear of starting something which could eventually impinge on his own control. Then there is Khrushchev's ego and optimism, telling him that there is really no rush and that he can outdistance an Adenauer or anyone else for that matter.

Thus it was only a half-hearted move--reminiscent more of Stalin than anyone else--when Khrushchev brought two of his closest followers, Brezhnev and Podgorny, somewhat to the fore last summer, not only so that they could be assessed better, but probably also to compete at the highest operating levels. Perhaps one of them will be invested as second secretary at the party congress next year, but he is unlikely under Khrushchev to enjoy any major independent political power.

Yet even if Khrushchev decides to do nothing more about the succession, it is clear that he will leave behind him methods of operation and a certain style of rule which cannot be easily disregarded. He has brought the image of the leader out of the Kremlin and into the country and has made himself the continuing and almost sole spokesman on both foreign and domestic policy. He has fostered the impression that he is truly expert in his knowledge of practical problems and that he is actively engaged in improving the lot of the people. He has developed a system of rule which has succeeded in stabilizing the relative weights of the various power groups in Soviet society and he has been able to delegate day-to-day authority to free himself for long periods of rest, extensive trips abroad, and preoccupation with special problems when the need arises.

[Here follow sections on Party and State Administration, The Economy, and Control of the Intelligentsia.]

Foreign Policy

Khrushchev's conduct of foreign policy through most of the period of his ascendancy has been marked by the same ebullient self-confidence, bold innovations, and flexibility that have characterized his domestic programs. His intention to impose a new style and direction on Soviet policy was symbolized at the 20th party congress in 1956 by attacks on the "ossified forms" of Molotov's diplomacy and by major ideological reformulations on the issues of war and revolution. These themes were repeated at the 22nd congress in October 1961, when Khrushchev charged that Molotov and "his like" did not understand the changes that had occurred in world politics and Brezhnev hailed the abandonment of "obsolete methods and ossified dogmas."

While Soviet foreign policy under Khrushchev's guidance has displayed considerable versatility and resourcefulness in making pragmatic adjustments to the realities of the nuclear age, the Soviet premier's behavior since the spectacular failure of his Cuban missile venture has reflected a growing recognition that the wide-ranging political offensive against the West which was launched in 1957-58 has run its course without yielding the expected results. Events over the past three years, particularly the Cuban fiasco, have called into question the fundamental assumptions of this strategy--that time and long-term trends in the East-West contest were working to the advantage of the USSR and the socialist camp. Khrushchev's adjustments to this situation have been symbolized by the limited test ban treaty last summer and the relaxation of pressures on Berlin and other exposed areas.

One of the most important factors that has shaped Khrushchev's foreign policy outlook has been his strong desire to gain world recognition of the USSR's status as the great-power equal of the US. This impulse has been evident in his dealings with American leaders and public figures and in the pleasure he finds in personal contacts with other non-Communist statesmen. [18 lines of 2-column source text not declassified]

Another characteristic of Khrushchev's foreign policy approach is great confidence in his ability to determine accurately the risks in any venture and to control the course of events in such a way as to maximize advantages and minimize the danger of losing control of a situation. Throughout his long Berlin offensive, Khrushchev frequently voiced confidence that the West would not go to war over a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He has tried to impress Western visitors by displaying detailed knowledge of the policies and intentions of his opponents as well as his own ability to manipulate developments without risking a military collision. Following the confrontation between Soviet and American tanks at the Berlin wall in October 1961, Khrushchev told the West German ambassador that he had issued clear instructions to Soviet forces in Berlin not to get involved directly with Western forces even though this might require retiring and requesting further instructions.

Khrushchev has relied heavily on bluff and intimidation tactics and on his technique of alternating deliberate creation of crises with proposals for high-level negotiations and hints of Soviet concessions. His long campaign to alter the status of West Berlin and achieve some form of Western recognition of East Germany has been based on a combination of repeated pressures and inducements calculated to draw the West into negotiations under conditions favorable to the USSR.

Khrushchev has also shown a penchant for clever stratagems designed to entrap and confuse opponents and to increase pressures on them to grant concessions. His exploitation of the U-2 incident was intended to produce a storm of protests against US policy and to embarrass President Eisenhower on the eve of the Paris summit conference. Khrushchev confined his initial announcement of the shoot-down to bare details and then sat back to await the expected disavowal from Washington. After the US issued the cover story of a missing NASA research U-2, Khrushchev announced that he had withheld information that the pilot and aircraft were in Soviet hands, "because had we told everything at once, the Americans would have invented another version; just look how many silly things they have said."

In February 1962, after the US publicly announced detection of an underground nuclear explosion in the USSR, Khrushchev declared that this test had been staged deliberately to disprove the West's contentions that on-site inspections were necessary to enforce a prohibition on all nuclear tests.

There is reason to believe that Khrushchev has encouraged circulation of rumors abroad that his efforts to improve relations with the West were facing strong opposition within the top leadership. These hints of Khrushchev's political vulnerability clearly were intended to persuade Western governments that some concessions were necessary to help Khrushchev resist his domestic enemies.

The outcome of Khrushchev's attempt to exploit the U-2 incident and to deploy missiles to Cuba point up his greatest weakness in the field of foreign policy--his vulnerability to self-deception and his ignorance or disregard of the mentality and reactions of his opponents.

In the case of the U-2, Khrushchev's miscalculation derived from his gamble that by absolving President Eisenhower of all personal responsibility for the U-2 flight, he could prevent events from getting out of hand and endangering the summit meeting and his "dtente" policy of that period. But the President's assumption of personal responsibility shattered this scheme and exposed Khrushchev to charges by Communist critics that he had been deceived and that his peaceful coexistence strategy had been proved a failure.

Khrushchev's radical misjudgment of the probable US reaction to the deployment of missiles to Cuba appears to have been the product of two main factors. His misreading of the US conduct of the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961 and the shift in US policy in Laos represented by acceptance of a coalition regime pledged to neutrality seems to have led him into the fatal error of underestimating American resolution. Khrushchev also allowed himself to believe that the high stakes involved in the missile venture justified a sharp reduction in the margin of safety which had characterized his previous major foreign decisions. The great advantages he anticipated from using the threat of Soviet missiles in Cuba to force a major diplomatic showdown on Berlin made Khrushchev vulnerable to what one former Western ambassador in Moscow has described as "an incurable political shortsightedness which prevents him from foreseeing the remoter consequences of his words and actions." (Secret)

27. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 17, 1964, 1-2 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Secret; Eyes Only; No Other Distribution. Drafted by Thompson and approved by Bundy on April 24. Dobrynin describes the meeting in his memoir, In Confidence, pp. 119-120, calling it "My First Meeting Alone with Johnson." However, both the memorandum of conversation and the President's Daily Diary indicate that Thompson and Bundy were present during the meeting. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) In an April 16 briefing memorandum for the President, Bundy proposed discussing the RB-66 incident, the cutback in production of nuclear materials, and Khrushchev's 70th birthday, but not pressing Dobrynin "on other matters like Vietnam, Laos, or Cuba, on this occasion." (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. I)

SUBJECT
Private Channel Communications

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The President began the conversation by stating he hoped Ambassador Dobrynin observed the fruits of the mutual efforts of our two Governments as reflected in the attitude of our peoples. He said he thought that Chairman Khrushchev and Ambassador Dobrynin, as well as President Kennedy and Ambassador Thompson, deserved much credit for this development.

Ambassador Dobrynin disclaimed any credit, but he agreed that progress had been made. He said the Soviet Government had appreciated President Johnson's remarks to Mr. Mikoyan. He said that history had made our two countries responsible for much that went on in the world whether we wanted this or not. He said this power was personified in the persons of President Johnson and Chairman Khrushchev.

The President said he was very much aware of the awesome responsibility of the Office of the President of the United States. He had been in office only a few weeks, but his chief concern was how could he benefit the generations to come. He said that if only we were all allies and friends, instead of having suspicions of each other, what a wonderful world it would be. He was trying to find ways to use our vast resources for the good of mankind. What he sought was for our peoples and our governments to feel as comfortable as he felt today in speaking to Ambassador Dobrynin. The President said that his father had often said to him that man's judgment on any given question was no better than his information on that question. He said that so many world leaders made judgments based on inadequate information. He referred to the agreement on the test ban, the agreement on prohibiting bombs in orbit, and the installation of the direct telephone line, which were but small drops, compared to what needed to be done.

Ambassador Dobrynin said the question was how to proceed further. He said there were many problems, but the Soviet Union desired to improve relations with the United States. He said that speaking frankly, however, the Soviets sometimes felt that this was perhaps not the best year to make big progress, and said, frankly, he was thinking of our elections.

The President observed that this was, in fact, a problem. He said that when Chairman Khrushchev spoke on television on the CBS network in 1958, President Eisenhower had been indignant at the CBS for carrying the broadcast. He said that Eisenhower felt that Mr. Khrushchev was trying to propagandize our people. The President said he had told President Eisenhower that he thought this was a good thing, but there should have been an agreement for reciprocity so that each could have spoken to the other's people. The President said he called this the "Open Curtain" approach. He said that some day he would like Chairman Khrushchev to speak to the American people and have the American people speak on television to the Soviet people.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had been head of the American section at the time the President referred to and that he had been very much involved in the preparations for President Eisenhower's visit. He said that elaborate arrangements had been in preparation, but the unfortunate incident of the U-2 and other developments had made this impossible.

The President said that we had had other unfortunate incidents. We had had American planes shot down by Soviet planes. He said that he admitted that the Soviets were entitled to be provoked by the fact that our planes had strayed over the line, but the remedy was not to murder people just as the Panamanians should not have shot our soldiers in the dispute over the flag. The President said he had given strict orders that our planes were not to take off unless our Air Force was certain that they would stay on our side of the line. He added, however, that there were occasions when communications broke down, and said that his own plane had been lost for this reason. He said the proper procedure would be to oblige any plane that strayed over to land and the crew could be captured and questioned. He said that if Soviet planes ever came over Oak Ridge or sensitive areas in the United States, we would be provoked, but he thought that the appropriate action would be to force the plane to land. The President said he had gone thoroughly into this matter, which he regretted, and was satisfied that the intrusion was not intentional. He said that he had pointed out to our military that the Russian instruments did not seem to go wrong, and that perhaps our Air Force should get Russian instruments. He said that he had been told, however, that Soviet planes did have similar problems on occasion.

Ambassador Dobrynin said there were international rules to cover this problem and that planes should land when signalled. He said that the Soviet pilots had strict orders not to shoot unless the plane refused to land.

The President said that if any warning had been given, our pilots had not observed it, and it did not appear to have been adequate. He handed the Ambassador a letter to Chairman Khrushchev on this subject./2/

/2/Document 28.

The President then went on to say that he was speaking to the press next Monday/3/ and he wanted to say that he and Chairman Khrushchev had agreed to cut back on the production of fissionable material. The President said he would "catch it" from some of our own people, and pointed out that he was under pressure for more and bigger bombs. People would say that the Chairman had pulled wool over his eyes. The President cited a recent poll in North Dakota, which was a very conservative state. This poll indicated that eighty-one percent of our people approved our sale of wheat to the Soviet Union. This showed the progress which we had already made in improving relations. He said he hoped that Dobrynin could get an answer for him by Monday to his request to be able to say that Chairman Khrushchev was also cutting back on the production of fissionable material.

/3/For text of the President's address on April 20 to the Associated Press, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, Book I, pp. 493-500.

Ambassador Dobrynin then pointed out that he had just received Chairman Khrushchev's reply to the President's letter on this subject./4/ He only had the text in Russian, but, in brief, Chairman Khrushchev agreed that he would stop construction of two plutonium reactors and that we would shut down the four old American reactors. On uranium, the Chairman would decide after he knew what moves were proposed by Britain and France. The Chairman agreed that we could exchange statements on this subject. He did not agree to the proposals about control which should be based on mutual trust, similar to the agreement prohibiting bombs in orbit.

/4/For text of six messages on cutting the production of fissionable materials, exchanged between Johnson and Khrushchev from February 22 to April 20, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Documents 11, 15, 18, and 22-24.

The President emphasized that the best time for him to make this announcement was Monday, and he explained how important the editors to whom he would be talking were in relationship to what he was trying to do. He also referred to the reception in this country to his response to the Chairman's kind words about him when he had in turn welcomed Mr. Khrushchev's efforts for peace. He pointed out that the Washington Post carried a good headline, but the Chicago Tribune had headed its article "Johnson Embraces Nikita." The President said he wondered what made the Soviets think that he could get a commitment from de Gaulle on this subject, but, in any event, he appreciated the compliment. The President instructed Mr. Bundy and Ambassador Thompson to work out the text of what he would say on this subject on Monday, and what he would like to say about Chairman Khrushchev's intentions in this field. He hoped that he could get a reply in time for his speech.

Emphasizing his concern for progress in the lowering of tensions, the President said that the Soviet Union and the United States had been too close to each other in Cuba, and Ambassador Dobrynin nodded his agreement. The President said that our guard was up and our hand out, that we would not be dupes but that we were ready for further steps.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked what further steps could be taken this year, and made a reference to the Chairman's proposal of a reduction of troops in Europe. The President did not comment directly on this proposal, but referred again to his proposal for an exchange of television speeches, and said to the Ambassador that as he, the President, had now made two good proposals, it was the turn of the Soviet Union.

While waiting for the photographers to arrive, Ambassador Dobrynin said he had no instructions to raise the subject, but he wondered what had happened by the Civil Air Agreement. He said that it had earlier been indicated that an agreement might be reached by the end of last year.

The President asked Ambassador Thompson how this matter stood.

Ambassador Thompson said we had deferred a decision on this subject until the conclusion of the Consular Agreement, which appeared to be near.

The President, at the end of the conversation, reiterated his birthday greetings to the Chairman,/5/ and gave a Dobrynin a medallion, which he asked him to transmit to the Chairman.

/5/The birthday message was transmitted in telegram 2997 to Moscow, April 15. (Department of State, S/S-I Limdis/Exdis Microfilm)

After the meeting, Mr. Bundy and Ambassador Thompson gave Ambassador Dobrynin the following language for inclusion in the President's speech, if Chairman Khrushchev agreed:

"I have ordered a further reduction of our production of enriched uranium, fuel for nuclear weapons, by twenty-five percent over a four-year period. This reduction is in addition to the reductions which I announced in the production of both uranium and plutonium in my State of the Union message. And I am happy to say that Chairman Khrushchev has now indicated to me that he intends to make a move in this direction."

Also after the meeting, Ambassador Dobrynin asked Ambassador Thompson for further particulars about the proposed exchange of television talks.

Ambassador Thompson said that the President had not discussed this subject with him, but he assumed, from earlier consideration of this subject, that it would be important in the Soviet Union for the President's speech to be carried on radio as well as television since the Soviets did not have a nation-wide TV hookup. He said he also assumed that the text of the statements would probably be exchanged in advance and a date agreed upon. He said he felt sure the President did not wish in any way to embarrass Mr. Khrushchev by making the suggestion if for any reason it was difficult for him to agree to such an exchange at this time, but pointed out that the suggestion was in line with the President's efforts to achieve better understanding as he had described them during their conversation this morning.

28. Letter From President Johnson to Chairman Khrushchev/1/

Washington, April 17, 1964.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. The President discussed the drafting of the letter in two brief telephone conversations with McGeorge Bundy on April 17, emphasizing that he wanted the letter to make clear that "the provocation did not justify the remedy." Telling Khrushchev to quit "shooting down our planes," Johnson stressed, was the "most important part of the letter." (Recording of telephone conversations between the President and Bundy, April 17, 11:14 a.m. and 11:16 a.m.; Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 64.24, Side A, PNOs 4 and 5)

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I welcome your letter of April 2, 1964,/2/ because of the spirit in which it was written. It is certainly incumbent upon both of us to do anything we can to strengthen our relations and to prevent incidents which could adversely affect those relations.

/2/Document 21.

I found your letter particularly interesting because it seems to me it so clearly illustrates the ease with which misunderstandings can arise. You referred to the incidents on the autobahn which occurred last October. Our investigation showed that in the six months preceding these incidents, eighteen convoys with a configuration similar to those that were stopped were processed through your checkpoints without dismounting and without difficulty, except in the case of two which were delayed for short periods of time. It was, therefore, most natural for us to consider that it was your side that had changed procedures. But I am happy that this matter has now been resolved, and trust that there will be no further difficulties.

With respect to the airplane incidents, I can quite well understand your concern that within a short period of time two American airplanes crossed the demarcation line. There is little I can say about the incident involving a training plane, since the crew were killed and we are unable to ascertain what actually happened. I am disturbed that in both cases, however, there does not appear to have been justification for the rapidity with which there was a resort to force by Soviet planes. The American planes should not have been there, but I believe that this fast and violent reaction is quite unjustified. Avoidable acts of force which can bring death in peacetime do not contribute to an improvement of our relations. All of our pilots have long had rigid instructions that if by error they found themselves in East Germany, they should promptly obey signals to land.

The RB-66 was on a training flight from Toul Rosieres in France and was scheduled to pass over Hahn, Dortmund and Nordholz in Germany at high level, to descend to low altitude over Hamburg for a photographic exercise, and to return to high altitude on the return trip to its base. It is normal for planes on missions of this kind to test the cameras en route to see that they are in working order, but to use them only for the assigned mission. A thorough investigation has shown that the compass was faulty and that through a series of errors, adequate further checks of position were not made. Our Air Force has had procedures to prevent incidents of this kind, and when our radar station detected an unknown plane proceeding toward East Germany, the plane was ordered to turn back. The instructor navigator states he heard this instruction but says he thought that he was over Nordholz at the time and that the signal did not apply to him. Appropriate steps are being taken to deal with those responsible for the errors made.

From the debriefing of the crew, we can find no basis for the conclusion that "the crew knew exactly where it was." I was particularly interested in your statement that you had received information, according to which the American command in Europe intended to continue reconnaissance flights over Eastern Germany. I should be glad to have any additional information bearing on this statement. From our own most thorough investigation, I am convinced that any suspicion that this violation was a deliberate provocation is unfounded. I recognize that this is an astonishing series of errors, and upon my instructions the American military authorities have established the most rigorous procedure possible in order to prevent any repetition of such an incident.

I think it most important that we deal with each other frankly in matters of this kind. I shall be glad to cooperate with you in reducing tension in this most sensitive area of the world. In this connection, may I tell you that I have been disturbed that the East German press has for some time been carrying on a campaign of accusations of alleged violations of traffic regulations by our military vehicles in East Berlin. After most careful investigation, it appears that, with rare exceptions relating to quite accidental episodes, these allegations have no basis in fact. I was, therefore, disturbed when your military authorities protested to ours on the basis of these allegations. For my part, I have given renewed instructions that our military vehicles take every precaution to avoid any incident in the future, and I hope that your own authorities will carefully investigate and establish, to your own satisfaction, whether or not East German allegations of this kind are well-founded.

I have already sent you birthday greetings but I would like to repeat them in this message and to close by sending you again my best wishes for continuing health and strength./3/

/3/In an oral message delivered by Dobrynin to Thompson on May 15, Khrushchev welcomed President Johnson's assurances about the prevention of future incidents and assured him that the "Soviet Union firmly adheres to the position that our states must learn to live without quarrels and confrontations," but he also defended shooting down the U.S. planes and continued to insist that the RB-66 was on a reconnaissance mission. He again referred to evidence that after the January incident "the American command in Europe planned to continue reconnaissance flights over the territory of the GDR," and he indicated that Dobrynin would turn over "photographs of the readings of the radar indicator of the RB-66" that would convince Johnson "the crew could not be unaware of their location at any time during the fulfillment of its mission." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163)

Sincerely,/4/

/4/Printed from an unsigned copy.

[Continue with the next documents]

 Volume XIV Index | Foreign Relations Volumes Online Released Prior to January 20, 2001