

جونسون الى ويلسون
يخطر بهوده فى مجلس الأمن لوقف القتال
5 يونيه 1967

واشنطن يوم 5 يونيو 1967 الساعة الحادية عشرة و 9 دقائق مساء
يُرجى نقل الرسالة التالية المؤرخة فى 5 يونيو من الرئيس الى رئيس الوزراء ويلسون
عزيزى هارولد،

أقدر تعليقاتك (وصلت رسالة من رئيس الوزراء ويلسون الى الرئيس جونسون وسلمت لروستو أثناء اجتماع فى قاعة مجلس الوزراء. وأشار ويلسون فى الرسالة، الى أن الرئيس عبر خلال المحادثات الأخيرة التى جرت بينهما يوم 2 يونيو، عن اعتقاده المتشائم أن الحرب بين إسرائيل والعرب مسألة لا مفر منها، رغم الجهود التى بذلها وناقشها معا فى وقت سابق خلال هذا اليوم. وأشار ويلسون بصورة ملحة الى، " أننا بحاجة الى توجيه طلب واضح لمجلس الأمن الدولى لوقف إطلاق النار، يليه محاولة جديدة على المدى الأطول لمناقشة سبل تسوية الوضع جملة وتفصيلا". وكان ويلسون يفكر أن إمكانية توصل مجلس الأمن لاتفاق فى هذا الصدد غير واردة ولا محتملة؛ ومن ثم ينبغي لأعضائه وضع خطة للتعامل مع أية طوارئ أخرى ممكنة، حيث شدد على أهمية الاجتماع الذى عقد بينهما الأسبوع الماضى. وأضاف أنه مسرور لأنه استطاع أن يستعرض مع الرئيس جونسون الوضع على الأرض بشكل تفصيلى وشامل؛ بحيث يكون "واضحا على الأقل فى ذهننا موقف كل منا، وسط هذه الحالة من الارتباك وعدم التيقن فى خضم التطورات المؤسفة فى الشرق الأدنى. ونحن كنا نخشى أن يشعر أى منا أنه مجبر على توجيه ضربة عسكرية، سيما ولم يكن لدينا مؤشرات مسبقة على أن قرارا قد اتخذ بالفعل فى هذا الصدد. وكنا نعتقد فى الواقع أن لدينا على الأقل أسبوعا خاليا من الأحداث نتفرغ فيه للجهود الدبلوماسية).

لقد صادف آرثر جولدبرج وقتا صعبا فى مجلس الأمن؛ لأننا كنا نأمل مثلكم فى صدور قرار سريع لوقف إطلاق النار. ولكن كان علينا التعامل مع جهود حثيثة وجازمة داخل مجلس الأمن؛ كى يدعو الى انسحاب القوات بشروط تضى شرعية على الإجراءات التى اتخذها عبد الناصر فى مضيق تيران؛ وهذه مسألة اتخذنا نحن بصدها مواقف جازمة لا لبس فيها.

وقد فعلنا كل ما بوسعنا للحصول على تصريح منصف من مجلس الأمن، وسنعمل بالتعاون مع رجالنا في نيويورك للتشجيع على اتخاذ الأمم المتحدة إجراء مفيدا.

ولو كان السوفييت والفرنسيون أبدوا استعدادا وعزما أكبر وأقوى على التعاون، لاستطاع كل منا التعويل على هذا التطور من أجل العمل على التوصل الى تسوية مرضية.

ويحدوني في الوقت نفسه أمل، أن نتمكن من البقاء على اتصال أوثق مع تطور الوضع العسكرى، وأن نتمكن من توظيف أفضل العقول المتاحة لكلينا بغية العمل على مواجهة الحالات الطارئة التى قد تنشأ، ومن استغلال الاحتمالات البناءة التى قد تتكشف.

وأعتقد أنك تعرف مدى ارتياحى العميق المستمد من مناقشاتنا المشتركة.

مع أطيب تحياتى وتمنياتى،

ليندون جونسون

Washington, June 5, 1967, 11:09 p.m.
208406. Ref: State 202732.²The reference is in error; telegram 202732 to London, May 26, transmitted the text of Prime Minister Wilson's May 25 message to the President (Document 62). For the Charge—You should transmit following message dated June 5, from the President to the Prime Minister:

Dear Harold:

I appreciate your comments³A message from Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson, delivered to Rostow during the 11:30 Cabinet Room meeting, noted that in their last talk on June 2, “you expressed your sombre belief that war between Israel and the Arabs could not be avoided, despite the efforts we had been making and discussing together earlier that day.” Wilson urged, “What we need is a clear demand from the Council for a cease-fire: after which a

fresh attempt to thrash out a longer term settlement might be made.” Wilson thought that since it was unlikely that the Security Council would be able to agree, members would need to plan for other possible contingencies, underlining the importance of their meeting the previous week. He added, “I am indeed glad that you and I were able to go over the ground so exhaustively so that, in this situation of confusion and uncertainty, we at least are clear in our minds about each other's attitude.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, UK, Vol. 6, PM Wilson Correspondence) on the unfortunate developments in the Near East. We had feared that someone might feel compelled to strike. We had no advance indication that a decision had been taken.⁴In an earlier draft the two preceding sentences read: “We had feared that the Israelis might feel

compelled to strike, but we had had no advance indication from them that they had actually taken a decision to do so in the face of what they judged to be further Arab provocations.” Walt Rostow sent the revised draft to the President for “one more look”, noting that he had changed the first paragraph “so that we did not put flatly into the record a judgment that Israel had kicked this off from a standing start.” Johnson approved the revised draft. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 3) We believed, in fact, we had at least a clean week for diplomacy.

Arthur Goldberg has had a difficult time in the Security Council. Like you, we had hoped for a quick cease-fire resolution. But we have had to deal with a determined effort to have the Council call for a withdrawal of forces in terms which would legitimize Nasser's action

at the Strait of Tiran a subject on which we have both taken unequivocal positions.

We have done everything we could to get an even-handed Security Council pronouncement. We shall work with your people in New York to encourage helpful UN action. If the Soviets, and the French, are more forthcoming than they have been, both of us will want to build on that development to work toward a satisfactory settlement.

Meanwhile, I hope we can keep in closest touch as the military situation develops and put the best minds available to both of us to work on the contingencies that may arise and the constructive possibilities that may unfold.

I think you know the deep satisfaction I derived from our discussions.

Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson

Rusk

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Immediate. The telegram indicates the text was received from the White House. It was approved for transmission by Walsh; the message conveyed in the telegram was apparently drafted by Walt Rostow.

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