

كنيدى الى عبد الناصر عن أحداث اليمن

30 يوليو 1963

واشنطن فى 30 يوليو 1963

الموضوع:

رسالة الرئيس عبد الناصر بشأن انسحاب القوات من اليمن

فى يوم 29 يوليو اتصل سفير الجمهورية العربية المتحدة السيد كامل بمساعد وزير الخارجية تالبوت، وقرأ عليه ترجمة من العربية لرسالة شخصية تلقاها من الرئيس جمال عبد الناصر فى ما يتعلق بقاء الرئيس كنيدي مع السفير كامل يوم 19 يوليو.

وذكر الرئيس جمال عبد الناصر فى رسالته ما يلى:

أنه قرأ باهتمام كبير تقرير السفير كامل عن اجتماع 19 يوليو.

وأنه أعطى توجيهها للسفير كامل للإعراب، من خلال مساعد وزير الخارجية تالبوت لوزير

الخارجية وللرئيس كنيدي عما يلى:

(أ) تقديره لتبادل الرأى الودى والصريح بين الرئيس كنيدي والسفير كامل.

(ب) تقديره لتعبير الرئيس كنيدي عن رغبته فى إقامة علاقات جيدة وعن تحمسه لتبادل تلك

العلاقات بين الطرفين.

(ج) تبحره وإعجابه برسائل الرئيس ورغبته فى مواصلة المراسلات معه، و"حتى إقامة

علاقات شخصية أكثر ودية".

واستجابة لمناشدة الرئيس كنيدي من أجل سحب قوات الجمهورية العربية المتحدة من اليمن،

تنفيذاً للاتفاق المبرم مع السفير بنكر، وفى ضوء التوصيات التى قدمها السفير كامل، قرر الرئيس

عبد الناصر سحب عدد (كبير) من القوات من اليمن فى النصف الأول من شهر أغسطس. (عند

هذه النقطة أوضح السفير كامل أن الرئيس ناصر ذكر حجم القوات، ولكن البرقية جاءت غير

واضحة. ويعتقد كاتب السفارة أنها تشير الى 4/1 قوات الجمهورية العربية المتحدة، ولكن السفير لا

يرغب فى الإدلاء برقم معين قبل أن يتلقى مزيداً من التأكيدات).

وأنه اتخذ هذه الخطوة، على الرغم من اعتقاده أن المملكة العربية السعودية لم توقف مساعداتها لأنصار الملكية، وأنها لم تمتثل لالنص اتفاق بنكر ولا لروحه. وتلقى السفير كامل أيضا توجيهات للإعراب عن شكره للوزير تالبوت على الجهد الذي بذله في تعزيز النوايا الحسنة بين البلدين.

وقد صرح السفير كامل بأنه تلقى أيضا رسالة، تؤكد نية الجمهورية العربية المتحدة الانضمام الى المعاهدة الثلاثية الخاصة بالحظر الجزئي للتجارب النووية.

جون ماكيسون

305. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹. Source: [Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 UAR-YEMEN. Secret. Komer transmitted this memorandum to President Kennedy on July 31 under cover of the following note: "Nasser's attached message to you is welcome confirmation he's pulling out of Yemen. Some reports indicate 1,500 troops have already left. While this will damp growing criticism of our Yemen policy, I'd guess it may be 12-18 months before bulk of UAR forces are out. Until then we'll get recurrent flak from Saudis and others about UAR not living up to disengagement. But so long as UAR keeps gradually evacuating \(and we should keep pressure on\), we ought to be able to live with this. Having UN rather than US forces as the buffer in this exercise, taking the brunt of all the complaints and possible flare-ups, seems well worth the two-month delay involved in dragging in the UN. So I'm not impressed with Badeau's comment that the US itself should have gone in last April and policed disengagement."](#) (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, 6/63-8/63)

Washington, July 30, 1963.

- SUBJECT
- President Nasser's Message Regarding Withdrawal of Forces from Yemen

On July 29 UAR Ambassador Kamel called on Assistant Secretary Talbot and read in translation from Arabic a personal message he had received from President Nasser in regard to President Kennedy's meeting with Ambassador Kamel on July 19.

President Nasser stated the following:

1. He had read Ambassador Kamel's report of the July 19 meeting with great interest.
2. He directed Ambassador Kamel to convey through Assistant Secretary Talbot to the Secretary of State and the President: a) his appreciation for President Kennedy's friendly and frank exchange with Ambassador Kamel; b) his appreciation for President Kennedy's expression of desire for good relations which were warmly reciprocated; c) his esteem for the President's letters, his desire to continue the correspondence, and "even to establish the most cordial personal relations".
3. In response to President Kennedy's appeal for the withdrawal of UAR forces from Yemen, in implementation of the agreement concluded with Ambassador Bunker and in

light of recommendations submitted by Ambassador Kamel, he had decided to withdraw a (sizeable) force from Yemen in the first half of the month of August. (At this point Ambassador Kamel explained that the size of the force had been given, but the cable was garbled. The Embassy's code clerk believed it referred to 1/4 of the UAR force but the Ambassador would not wish to commit a figure until he had received further confirmation).

4. He was taking this step despite the fact that he believes Saudi Arabia has not stopped its aid to the royalists and has not complied either with the text or the spirit of the Bunker agreement. Ambassador Kamel was also directed to convey his thanks to Secretary Talbot for his work in promoting good will between the two countries.

Ambassador Kamel stated he also had a message confirming the UAR intent to adhere to the tripartite atomic test ban treaty.

John A. McKesson². [McKesson signed for Read above Read's typed signature.](#)

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 UAR-YEMEN. Secret. Komer transmitted this memorandum to President Kennedy on July 31 under cover of the following note: "Nasser's attached message to you is welcome confirmation he's pulling out of Yemen. Some reports indicate 1,500 troops have already left. While this will damp growing criticism of our Yemen policy, I'd guess it may be 12–18 months before bulk of UAR forces are out. Until then we'll get recurrent flak from Saudis and others about UAR not living up to disengagement. But so long as UAR keeps gradually evacuating (and we should keep pressure on), we ought to be able to live with this. Having UN rather than US forces as the buffer in this exercise, taking the brunt of all the complaints and possible flare-ups, seems well worth the two-month delay involved in dragging in the UN. So I'm not impressed with Badeau's comment that the US itself should have gone in last April and policed disengagement." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, 6/63–8/63)

² McKesson signed for Read above Read's typed signature.

<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d305>