

فيصل الى كنيدي بخصوص سياسة الولايات المتحدة فى اليمن
10 ديسمبر 1962

واشنطن فى 10 ديسمبر 1962، الساعة الخامسة مساء

استدعانى السيد عمر السقاف الى مقر وزارة الخارجية يوم 9 ديسمبر، وكان لديه رسالتان تلقاهما شخصيا من ولى العهد الأمير فيصل الذى أراد نقلهما الى. الرسالة رقم 1 (حرفيا تقريبا).

" نحن لا نرى أى ميزة فى نشر الرسائل الآن (الرسائل التى بعثها الرئيس الى الملك والى الأمير فيصل)، لا سيما وأن هناك اختلافات بيننا وبينهم (الولايات المتحدة) حول كيفية معالجة الوضع الناجم عن تدخل عبد الناصر فى اليمن، وما يخص المنحى الذى تنتهجه السياسة الأمريكية فى مساعدة ناصر بينما هو يوجه هجماته وتدخلاته ضد أصدقاء الولايات المتحدة فى المنطقة، فضلا عن تأليب شعوب المنطقة على أصدقاء الولايات المتحدة هؤلاء؛ ولذلك فنحن لا نرغب فى نشر تلك الرسائل لأننا نرى أن نشرها سيكون مخالفا لمصلحتنا". الرسالة رقم 2.

يقول فيصل: إنه إبان زيارته الى واشنطن، اتفقت جهات النظر المتبادلة بينه وبين مسؤولين أميركيين وعلى رأسهم الرئيس كنيدي، على أن سياسة ناصر تشكل خطرا على العرب وعلى السلام والأمن اللذين تسعى الولايات المتحدة الى توطيدهما وصونهما فى المنطقة. وتمحورت المناقشات (التي دارت فى الولايات المتحدة)، حول ما ينبغى القيام به لمعالجة الوضع الراهن. وأضاف فيصل، أن المسؤولين الأميركيين المعنيين قرروا أنهم سيعملون قدر الإمكان على تقليص المساعدات المادية والمعنوية المقدمة الى ناصر، وأنهم سيستمرون فى ممارسة الضغط عليه بحيث يمكن الحيلولة دون اتساع نطاق الضرر الذى يتسبب فيه. بيد أن فيصل لاحظ فى الأيام الحالية، اتجاها جديدا فى السياسة الأميركية نحو مساعدة ناصر من خلال زيادة المساعدات المادية المقدمة له، والتى ستعينه بدورها على تعزيز ميوله العدوانية فى اليمن. وأكبر دليل على هذا الاتجاه هو "المذكرة" (الخطاب الرئاسى) التى تلقيناها والشروط الواردة فيها، وهذا أمر لم يكن ناصر يحلم بتحقيقه. وتسعى الولايات المتحدة فى الوقت نفسه الى الاعتراف بالثوار، وهو أمر من شأنه أن يمنح العدوان الذى يمارسه ناصر وعصيان السلال صبغة قانونية. ولذلك يرغب صاحب السمو الملكى، فى الحصول على توضيحات بشأن ما إذا كانت الولايات المتحدة قد غيرت وجهتها السياسية عما استشفه صاحب السمو الملكى فى واشنطن. ويشعر صاحب السمو الملكى بانزعاج حقيقى فى الوقت الحالى، إزاء هذا الاتجاه الجديد الذى لاحظته فى سياسة الحكومة الأمريكية.

Washington, December 10, 1962, 5 p.m.

471. Omar Saqqaf summoned me Foreign Ministry December 9. He had two messages which he had personally received from Crown Prince Faysal who wanted them conveyed to me.

Message number 1 (practically verbatim).

"We see no advantage in publishing letters now (letters from President to King and Faysal) especially since there is difference between us and them (the US) about remedying situation resulting from Nasser's interference in Yemen and about direction which American policy is taking in helping Nasir at time when Nasir is directing his attacks and interference against friends of US in area, in addition to Nasir inciting peoples of area, against those friends of US. Therefore it is undesirable to us that these letters be published

because publication will be contrary to our interest.”

Message number 2.

Faysal says that when he was in Washington viewpoints between him and American officials headed by President Kennedy were in agreement that policy of Nasir constituted danger to Arabs and to peace and security of area which it is concern of US to create and maintain. Discussions (in US) revolved around what should be done to remedy situation. Faysal added it was decided by responsible American officials that they would as much as possible reduce assistance given to Nasir materially and morally and would continue to apply pressure on him so as to prevent extension of harm he is causing. Faysal however, has noticed these days new trend in US policy. Trend in direction of helping Nasir through increasing material assistance which in turn helps him in his aggression in Yemen. Greatest

evidence of trend is "note"
(Presidential letter) which we have received and conditions it contained. This is something which Nasir would never have dreamed of achieving. At same time US is trying to recognize revolutionaries with result that this recognition would give Nasir's aggression and Sallal's insurrection a legal face.

HRH would therefore like to have clarification on whether US policy has changed it's direction from way HRH understood it in Washington. HRH is truly disturbed these days by new trend he sees in policy of American Government.

Saqqaf mentioned that copy of second message was sent to Saudi Ambassador in Washington for his information. Saqqaf added that he was recommending that copy of first message also be sent to Ambassador Khayyal.

Saqqaf asked me to secure a quick reply to Prince's request for

clarification which occurred in second message. I said that frankly I could give him an immediate reply but would nevertheless pass Faysal's request to Washington for reaction. I made clear Prince's remarks constituted distortion of Washington talks. Saqqaf injected what he called a confidential piece of information, namely, that Foreign Minister of unnamed country had told Saudi Ambassador in that country that US as well as Egypt (sic) were pressuring government of the unnamed country into recognizing YAR. At this point I told Saqqaf emphatically that it did not matter what country was involved. I was sure report had no basis in fact and that US policy was to not apply pressure on any government. We had been approached by various governments who inquired as to our next move. Our stock reply was that other governments were free to follow their own choice. Saqqaf asked me whether he could cable my comment to

particular Saudi Ambassador who had reported the alleged "American pressure". I told him he certainly could. Saqqaf asked me whether I had received further reply from Washington to Faysal's reaction to President Kennedy's message (Embtel 444).²[Telegram 444 from Jidda, December 1, transmitted an oral message from Faysal passed on by Saqqaf that stipulated two requirements for a Yemen settlement: removal of all foreign elements from interference in Yemeni affairs, including the withdrawal of foreign forces, and no discrimination between the two disputant parties in Yemen. Faysal indicated that if these two requirements were not met there was no possibility for Saudi cooperation in a settlement. \(Ibid., 786H.00/12–162\)](#)I told Saqqaf that I had received no reply as yet.

Saqqaf (protect source) volunteered he had recommended to Faysal President's letters (to King and Faysal)

not be published. In explanation he said, "I gave this question great deal of thought and came to conclusion should you recognize YAR one day and have letters published the next day total picture resulting from these two actions would put us in a position of weakness and distress".

Saying it was off the record, Saqqaf said that as a friend he would not wish to see the situation of the Yemen create any lukewarmness or estrangement between US and Saudi Arabia. "To avoid this kind of taut relations is all I am striving for right now", he said.

Later in day I learned Japanese and Belgian Chargcalled to Ministry to receive rationale to SAG view on Yemen and complaint re US policy.

Comment: Faysal expected in Jidda in few days. Meanwhile, with Saqqaf and Sabbagh I am preparing notes to set record straight in Faysal's mind re Washington talks. Request Department not react to this message

via Ambassador Khayyal who, I have reason to fear, likely relay response in rather misleading or peremptory style. Suggest Department indicate—should he raise subject—that response will be made via Embassy Jidda in view fact Sabbagh, who prepared all memcons, is here. While we now have full story Washington talks I shall be glad of any comments as well as any further observations in response Faysal message transmitted Embtel 444.³[In telegram 332 to Jidda, December 12, the Department of State informed Hart that, in keeping with Faysal's wishes, the United States would not publish the letter from Kennedy to Faysal unless Hart recommended otherwise. The Department also disputed Faysal's recollection of his Washington conversations, noting that the President's objective was to contribute to area peace and stability by turning UAR attention toward domestic concerns, not by withholding assistance to the UAR or imposing](#)

other forms of pressure. (Ibid.,
686B.86H/12–1062)

Hart