

E
N
C
E
S
L
:

Already

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM
FROM ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir J. Bowker
No. 12 Saving
March 8, 1955

int. sec.
✓ 1073 / WFO
R: March 11, 1955

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 12 Saving of
March 8.

Repeated for information Saving to:

- | | |
|----------|------------|
| Cairo | Tel Aviv |
| B.M.E.O. | Washington |
| Bagdad | Damascus. |

Turco-Iraqi Pact.

Following is a summary of a statement made by a Turkish Government spokesman on March 5 to the semi-official Anatolian Agency in reply to misrepresentations by the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, whilst in Damascus.

2. Major Salah Salem had asked how Egypt could adhere to the Pact since this would mean submitting her army, foreign policy and economy to the control of Britain, the United States, Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq through the "Assembly" which would be set up when there were more than four adherents to the Pact. In fact, the Council, prescribed by article 6, did not differ from those in similar agreements; it would not interfere with the decisions and freedom of action of any state, and would have no supranational character.

3. A similar unfriendly act was the accusation published in the Cairo paper Al Ahram that there were secret clauses in the agreement including one by which Iraq undertook to recognise Israel de jure. The truth was that the whole of the text had been published and there were no secret clauses. This allegation was intended only to confuse public opinion and embarrass Iraq vis-à-vis the Arab League.

4. The Turkish Government once again deplored these immoral methods. They could not deny separately each line as it was uttered, but would from time to time enlighten public opinion. "Public opinion in the countries where people are trying to stir up trouble ought therefore to be vigilant against this rain of lies, and refrain from hasty decisions."

XXXX

E
N
C
E
S
L

1073/442 Mr Rose

FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARDS TURCO-IRAQI PACT

Flag A
-1403

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick has asked for a note on the Secretary of State's message in Rome telegram No. 127 which suggests that we should join with the Americans in speaking plainly to the French Government about their hostile attitude to the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

Flag B
-1439

2. This telegram was received shortly after the French Embassy in London had delivered an Aide-Mémoire saying that the French Government were opposed to the proposed new treaty between Syria and Egypt, intended to use all their influence in Cairo, Damascus and Beirut to prevent a further split in the Arab world and hoped that we and the Americans would join them.

3. It would have been difficult to make our immediate reply to these French representations a rebuke for their past hostility to the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

Which I hope we will not do. AS

4. It is certain that for some considerable time ~~after~~ ~~it was first thought of~~, the French were violently opposed to the Turco-Iraqi Pact and used all their influence against it. From what they have said recently, in particular the French Ambassador to Mr. Nutting and M. Roux to Mr. Shuckburgh, it seems that their hostility has abated: and that the object of their policy is now not to frustrate the Turco-Iraqi agreement, but to use the rift which it has caused in the Arab world as a means of persuading the Americans and ourselves to associate them with us in our Middle East policy.

5. For these reasons it was ^{thought} that that the Secretary

/of

E
N
C
E
S
L
-

of State might wish for further discussion of the matter on his return.

C. B. Sturdevant
7/3

I suggest that we ascertain from Beirut whether the French have in fact made any representations the against Egyptian machinations.

If the answer is no, I would send for the French Ambassador & lodge a protest complaint.
on all counts! AB

J. Philipatich
7.3.

1 copy; in process.
AB

E
N
C
E
S
L

V1073/442A

FRENCH ATTITUDE TO TURCO-IRAQI AGREEMENT

Flag C & 287 to Beirut
 On March 5 Sir I. Kirkpatrick suggested to the French Ambassador (our telegram to Damascus No. 160) that he should move his Government to send instructions to their representative at Beirut, urging him to instruct the Lebanese Government to resist any pressure to accede to the proposed Syrian-Egyptian Treaty. M. Chauvel promised to do so.

Flag D-1417
 2. In accordance with the Secretary of State's minute of March 7 I asked M. de Beaumarchais of the French Embassy to-day whether the French-Government had in fact sent such instructions. After consulting M. Roux in Paris, M. de Beaumarchais now tells me that they did so (although he could not tell me the date) and that the French Ambassador in Beirut has made representations to the Lebanese Government.

Flag E-1417
 3. Her Majesty's Ambassador at Beirut was instructed (Foreign Office telegram to Beirut, No. 287) to support the French representations; but we have not yet had a report from him on the subject.

I think we should instruct Sir A Chapman Andrews to make a parallel enquiry of his French colleague.

E.M. Rose

(E.M. Rose)
 March 8, 1955.

A. J. H. [Signature]

9/13.

Yes. Ask him to advise if

The representations have been made; or the result.

J.K.
 9.3.

I submit a draft.

E.M. Rose 9/iii.

[Signature]
 9/5.

ENCLOSURE

1073/443

TURCO-IRAQI PACT

V1073/399

Flag A - 399

Cairo telegram No. 350 records the Egyptian Prime Minister's plans for a "Little Arab" League excluding Iraq

Flag B - 402

and his request for our views. Ankara telegram No. 160 shows that the Turks would not understand our having anything to do with such a proposal.

2. In spite of Colonel Nasser's attempt to make his new plan sound attractive to us it is manifest that it has been thought up solely to counter the Turco-Iraqi Pact and restore Egyptian supremacy in the Arab world. This being so, we shall risk losing the confidence of our allies, the Turks and Iraqis, if we associate ourselves with it in any way. There is therefore no alternative but to oppose it and, first of all, to tell the Egyptians that we intend to do so.

3. It will be necessary to keep in line with the Americans about this. After discussion with Mr. Shuckburgh I accordingly submit a draft telegram to Washington.

4. This telegram also deals with the question of co-operation with the French. This question is raised in the attached Flag C - 402

Aide Memoire which, after the French Ambassador had told Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick about it, was left at the Foreign Office on March 5. The upshot of this Aide Memoire is that the French are opposed to the new Egyptian-Syrian treaty, that they propose to use all their influence in Cairo, Damascus and Beirut to prevent a further split in the Arab world and that they suggest we and the Americans should co-operate with them to this end.

The French have indicated badly, or I must be sure to tell them to St. Albans

I have slightly amended the draft in the light of Sir's comment this afternoon

W. Shuckburgh
1/3.

E. M. Rose
(E. M. Rose)
March 7, 1959
I. Kirkpatrick
7.3.

E
N
C
E
S
L

OUTFILE.
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP and
By Bag
V

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

D. 1.0 p.m. March 8, 1955.

No. 974
March 8, 1955.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 974 of March 8.

Repeated for information to Amman B.M.E.O.
Ankara Cairo
Bagdad Damascus
Beirut Paris
and Saving to Jeddah No. 63

Cairo telegram No. 350 [of March 5] and Ankara telegram
No. 160 [of March 6:] Turco/Iraqi Pact.

Egyptian proposal for new inter-Arab defence agreement is manifestly another attempt to frustrate Turco-Iraqi Pact and by neutralising Syria and Jordan to isolate Iraq. To approve or acquiesce in it would destroy confidence of our two allies. In spite of Nasser's attempts to make it attractive it remains a treaty which, unlike the Iraqi-Turkish Treaty, excludes cooperation with the West; and we are not therefore prepared to change our course.

2. Please inform State Department of these views. If they share them we suggest that we should both speak strongly to the Egyptian Government. There is just a chance that wiser counsels may prevail with Nasser, if he knows from the outset that his plan will bring him directly into conflict with British and United States policy. Needless to say, if Nasser could be induced to convert his pact into something which was genuinely designed to supplement rather than to isolate the "northern tier" pact, we might not have such strong objection to it.

3. We would propose to follow up our approach to Nasser with similar representations in Damascus, Beirut and Amman. Lebanese and Jordan Governments seem to be standing firm at present. But they will be under heavy pressure and will need all the support

/we can

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115497			87302			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

E
N
C
L
O
S
E

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office telegram No. 974 to Washington

- 2 -

we can give them. We might even be able to persuade the Syrians to halt in their course.

4. In dealing with Syria and Lebanon, French assistance would be useful. French Embassy recently left with us Aide-Mémoire of which a translation is in my immediately following telegram. From this it appears that French Government are hostile to new Egyptian proposal and willing to cooperate in opposing it. For our part we are prepared to take the French into our confidence on this issue, but we are not in favour of tripartite talks or joint representations and assume United States Government will not be either.

REDACTED

E
N
C
E
S
L
:

OUTFILE

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Cypher/OTP
and By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 975
March 8, 1955

D. 1.11 p.m. March 8, 1955

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 975 of March 8

Repeated for information to Amman B.M.E.O.
Ankara Cairo
Bagdad Damascus
Beirut Paris

and Savig to Jeddah No. 64

My immediately preceding telegram [of March 8] Turco-Iraqi Pact.

Following is translation of French Aide Mémoire:

For the same reasons that led them to indicate, after the conclusion of the Turco-Iraqi Pact, their concern at the effect this would have on the relations between the Arab States and between those States and Israel, the French Government now keenly regret that the Egyptian and Syrian Governments have reached agreement, with the evident approval of Saudi Arabia, on the conclusion of a treaty which, from the little information available about it, seems likely to increase still further the state of tension in the Middle East. Their concern is increased by the fact that this Egyptian retort to the Turco-Iraqi Pact coincides with the Gaza incident, which is itself evidence of the explosive character of the situation in that region.

The French Government does not approve of this response of the Egyptian and Syrian Governments to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. Wishing to do what they can to restore peace and to bring about increasing understanding between opposing points of view, they will use all the influence at their disposal in Cairo, Damascus and Beirut to avoid the emergence of two hostile blocs.

/The French

E
N
C
E
S
L
I

SECRET

Foreign Office telegram No. 975 to Washington

-2-

The French Government remains convinced that common action by the United Kingdom, France and the United States is necessary to prevent Middle East States becoming embroiled in more serious dissensions. Such a development could only serve Soviet ends and might perhaps lead the Arab countries to desire the renewal of war with Israel in order to restore their own unity.

bbbbb

E
N
C
E
S
L
:

~~SECRET~~

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 378

D:1.39 p.m. March 11, 1955

March 11, 1955

R:2.00 p.m. March 11, 1955

PRIORITY

V1073/445

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 378 of March 11

Repeated for information to: Washington Ankara
Amman Beirut
Bagdad Damascus
and Saving to: Paris B.M.E.O. Jeddah
Tel Aviv

My telegram No. 372. V1073/434

My United States colleague saw Nasser for over one and a half hours yesterday. Latter entirely unconstructive and appears to have used the interview to work off resentment.

2. Main points of Nasser's part in conversation were:

- (i) he professed to regard Iraq's move, which had taken him completely by surprise, as designed to further Nuri's and the Ruling House's fertile Crescent ambitions and to isolate Egypt.
- (ii) He suspected the United States Government of having agreed to support these Iraqi ambitions.
- (iii) He assured Byroade that Egyptians had now created a situation in Syria which could in any circumstances foil these schemes: he could count on Syrian army support, and, if the politicians did not toe the line, could conjure up the equivalent of the Egyptian Revolutionary/Command Council to take control.
- (iv) He recognised that proposed Egypto-Syrian-Saudi agreement was of no general advantage to Egypt, but it was of utility in foiling Iraqi schemes: the "unified command" in particular was calculated to serve this end. Egypt did not propose to station troops in Syria.

(v) He was..



E
N
C
E
S
L
I

SECRET

Cairo telegram No. 378 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

- (v) He was not particularly keen to see Jordan and Lebanon join this proposed agreement, since their propinquity to Israel would merely load Egypt with additional commitment. (This may have been sour grapes, but there is some sense in it in the light of (iv) above).
- (vi) In reply to a question he said he would not necessarily oppose an eventual association of federation of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan provided it was not under the aegis of Nuri or the Ruling House of Iraq.

3. Nasser apparently gave every appearance of sincerity in the above exposition of his intentions. He coupled it with a request for advice and invited Mr. Byroade to see him again soon.

4. United States Embassy particularly ask that it should not (repeat not) become known to Egyptians that above conversation has been communicated to us.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Ankara, Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus and Savign to Paris and Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos. 22, 53, 21, 55, 68, 18, 59 and 52 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Ankara, Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus and Savign to Paris and Tel Aviv]

2222



E
N
C
E
S
L

V

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND

Sir R. Stevenson

1073/446 WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 380
March 11, 1955

D. 7.12 p.m. March 11, 1955
R. 8.00 p.m. March 11, 1955

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 380 of March 11.

Repeated for information to Washington

Ankara

Amman

Beirut

Bagdad

Damascus

and Saving to B.M.E.O.

Jedda

Paris

Tel Aviv

My telegram No. 378. - V1073

I am not inclined to attribute great significance to Nasser's statements. They are a measure of the frustration which he feels at the dissipation of his dream of leadership of the Arab League and negotiation with the Western Powers on that basis. But at least they have the merit of tending to confirm that the Egyptians have no intention of giving any great international significance to the projected Egypto-Syrian - Saudi agreement, but design it as a local measure to block any tendency for Iraq to assume leadership of the Northern Arab States in Egypt's place.

2. It still seems to me incumbent on us to work towards the objectives discussed in paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 368 and to nurse Nasser through his bad patch, retaining so far as possible his goodwill and confidence.

Foreign Office please pass Washington, Ankara, Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus and Saving Paris and Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos. 23, 54, 23, 56, 69, 19 and Saving 60 and 54 respectively.

[Repeated to Washington, Ankara, Amman, Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus and Saving Paris and Tel Aviv].

F F F F



ENCLOSURE

1955

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT
 GENERAL

V1073/451 ✓

FROM Sir R. Stevenson,
 Cairo.
 No. 52 series
 Dated 11/3
 Received in Registry— 14/3

gives points made by United States Ambassador in Cairo at his Press Conference on Tech 10 a. about United States Policy in Middle East.

References to former relevant papers
 -/428
 -/429

MINUTES

The Counsellor of the U.S. Embassy told me today that the Syrian press had seized on and distorted points (i) (iii) and (iv) as U.S. as U.S. approval of the Egyptian attitude.

(Print)

JTBrewer
14/3

(How disposed of)

It was an unwise interview. we have already telegraphed to Wajden about the Baghdad article (see on file no. 1058 (429) 3 3 etc etc then in my name we can do. The text in the Jerusalem paper refers to (iii) in a Beirut letter in V1073/488. The relevant article should be typed as has been pointed out below

(Action completed)
 24/3

(Index)
 13/5

References to later relevant papers
 -/488

JPS
 45032b

WQ 19/iii

E
N
C
E
S
L
I

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

SAVING TELEGRAM

1073/451
For Whitehall

En Clair by bag.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir Ralph Skrine Stevenson.

No.52 Saving
March 11, 1955.

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.52 Saving of March 11, repeated for information Saving to:-

Washington	No.50
B.M.E.O. Nicosia	No.79
Tel Aviv	No.53
Ankara	No.15
Bagdad	No.32
Damascus	No.67
Amman	No.65
Jodda	No.74

At a press conference on March 10 my United States colleague made the following points regarding U.S. policy in the Middle East:

- (i) It was too early to comment on the Syrian-Egyptian Agreement but reports that the U.S. was displeased with it were incorrect.
- (ii) He was disturbed by a misunderstanding of the statement by Mr. John Jernegan (my telegram No.366) which had been interpreted to mean that Mr. Jernegan favoured the inclusion of Israel in a Middle East defence organisation. Mr. Byroade pointed out that Mr. Jernegan had said that in the absence of political co-operation it was out of the question to make plans involving military co-operation between Israeli forces and those of her immediate neighbours.
- (iii) The Turco-Iraqi Pact could not be sufficient for the defence of the Middle East without the co-operation of all countries in the area.
- (iv) In general it was not the purpose of the U.S. to try and convince Egypt of what was good for Egypt. Collective security pacts were free associations and the U.S. forced nothing.

14 MAR 1955
X X X X X
X X X X X
X X X X X

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/115497			87302				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

E
N
C
E
S
L
I

COPY

(V 1073/488)

Extract from speech by Mr. Jernegan
on March 6, 1955 (original entered
at V 1073/488)

Middle East Defence

What I have said so far applies more or less generally to the whole area. It would be unrealistic to pretend, however, that the State of Israel does not constitute something of a special factor and a special problem in the development of Middle East defence. Let us look frankly at the facts. They are very clear. On the one hand, in the past year or so the Government of Israel has made plain its willingness and desire to align itself with the West and to cooperate for the defence of the Middle East against outside aggression. Furthermore, Israel has military forces which could contribute to a considerable degree to the defence of the area. Looking at these two facts alone, it would seem highly logical that Israel should be incorporated in a collective defence arrangement at an early date. But there are other facts that must be considered. Much as we deplore it, we must admit that the relations between Israel and her neighbors are anything but good. They vary from time to time from a state of quiescent hostility to a condition almost of open warfare. So long as such circumstances prevail, there are lacking the necessary foundations for political cooperation between Israel and those states with which her defence must be linked in the long run. In the absence of political cooperation it is, of course, out of the question to make plans involving military cooperation between Israeli forces and those of her immediate neighbors.