

199

169

J

J 1865

4 - JUN 1945

45921

Registry J. 1865/3/16
Number

TELEGRAM FROM Lord
Killearn (Cairo)

No. 160 (S)

Dated 29th May, 1945

Received
in Registry 4th June, 1945

J: Egypt and Sudan

His Majesty's Ambassador's talk with Hassan Bey Youssef.

His Majesty's Ambassador reminded Hassan Bey Youssef that he had mentioned to King Farouk the appointment of an Ambassador in London and suggested Hussein Sirri and Sadek Wahba. Present Government was discussed and Lord Killearn said that H.M.G. were not prepared to open any really important issue with present Government. Question of Assuan Dam Scheme was discussed with Colonel Pope. Palace has pressed Nokrashi to proceed but Minister of Public Works opposes scheme. Folly of new Company's law was pointed out. Hussein Sirri Pasha thinks H.M.G. should intervene again in internal affairs.

Last Paper.

J 1848

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Cabinet Arranged
Yes. ~~to~~ Distribution.

The present Egyptian Govt. maybe a hopeless team, but I doubt if we shall get anywhere useful by cowardly telling them so. In the circumstances the invitation to come into the arena is not surprising, but that is precisely what we do not wish to do.

Reuter reports that the Brown scheme is going to public hands.

A. V. Crawley
4/6.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

27/6
14/6

J. 5/6.
See within amended distribution

Next Paper.

7/6/45

J

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be
retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

ATTENDED DISTRIBUTION (5/6/45)

[BY CLAIR]

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Fillearn
TOP SECRET

D.

29th May, 1945

29th May, 1945

R. 11.10 a.m. 4th June, 1945

Z - Z - Z

I had an opportunity for a long talk with Hassan Bey
Mussef on a river party last night.

1. He tells me that Hassanein is still being spared
as much work as possible. Hassan Bey reports to him twice
a week.

2. I reminded Hassan Bey that I had stirred up King
Farouk about appointment of an Ambassador in London. Hassan
Bey thought His Majesty had so far done nothing about it.
He mentioned name of Hussein Sirri. I said, "Admirable, but
perhaps better keep against other eventualities?" Hassan
Bey agreed. I mentioned Sadek Wahba - he thought, excellent.
I left it at that. I made it clear we had done our best
about Sirri but quite apart from age-old protocol, we had
not been able to put the nose of others (and more important)
out of joint. He saw the point of that.

3. He admitted present Government were pretty hopeless;
but argued Mokraschi Pasha himself was not so bad. I said
maybe, but his initial attitude is always negative, which does
not usually help matters. I quoted example of Civil Aviation
which still hung fire. Egypt risked missing a great
opportunity. The Americans were our good friends, but by
trying to play them off against us Egyptians were making a
big mistake as history showed. It would always be we who
would carry the baby finally. He admitted this readily
enough.

4. I told him I was not prepared to advise His Majesty's
Government to open any really important issue with present
Government. He admitted force of this, but asked what
could be done in a constitutional country like Egypt? It
was however clear he regarded Bedawi Pasha as hopeless as a
politician.

5. I drew Colonel Pope, who was passing, into the
conversation and brought up question of Assuan Dam scheme.
Colonel Pope explained in forcible Americanese, reasons why
he could not rally here indefinitely Hassan Bey said matter
could come before the Cabinet on 30th May. Mokraschi Pasha

7. I also rubbed in folly of proposed new Companies Law.

8. Later I ran into Hussein Sirri Pasha, who drew me aside and said present position was desperate. It was all very well for us to adopt lofty attitude of standing aloof; we must come down again into the arena and play a hand once more. I was naturally entirely non-committal.

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J 1883
7 - JUN 1945

45921

Registry Number } J 1883/3/16

Foreign Office
Date (Mr. Scrivener)

No.

Dated

Received in Registry } 7th June, 1945

J: Egypt and Sudan

Treaty Revision ✓

Submits memorandum on the Egyptian demands for revision of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and possible effects of emergence from San Francisco Conference of a charter of a new world security organisation.

✓ 1945 200 + 21.6.45 / 15
3.6.45

Last Paper.

J 1881

See within

(Minutes.)

J
11/6

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

62
11/6

2 m.
11/6

Next Paper.

Confidential

Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

It looks as if this question might be brought to a head by the emergence from the San Francisco Conference of the charter of a new world security organisation and by negotiations for the consequent winding-up of the League of Nations. To explain the part which it plays in Egyptian politics, a brief historical preface is necessary.

The aims of Egyptian policy were defined by Zaghloul Pasha twenty-five years ago as "the complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan". With Egypt as a British Protectorate, and in a world ringing with cries of self-determination, this slogan bore at any rate some relation to reality, so far as Egypt at least was concerned. It still had some meaning after the declaration of 1922: but it lost most of it after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, which proclaimed Egypt's independence and the end of the "occupation". Now, in a world in which, if one thing has been proved, it is that no weak power can hope to stand alone in face of a major aggressor, it has lost all sense (the more so as the Sudan is developing a healthy national spirit of its own and the Egyptian slogan really means the incorporation of the Sudan in Egypt). But - and this is the point - no Egyptian politician of any party has yet had the realism, or the courage, to proclaim the truth: and to advocate the one sensible policy for Egypt, viz. collaboration with His Majesty's Government in the international field on the basis of complete internal freedom and up-to-date military arrangements which in turn would leave Egypt free first to diagnose correctly, ~~another~~ ^{and then} to cure, the appalling social evils now flourishing in the country. Consequently "treaty-revision", aiming at the removal of British troops from Egyptian soil; the end of all present military obligations; and the union of the Sudan with Egypt, remains the policy of every Egyptian Government.

While Egypt was in danger of extinction, we heard nothing about treaty revision. But the reaction to Alamein (though an Egyptian would be distressed to hear it put so crudely) was a rising chorus of invitation to us to remove from Egyptian soil the successors of the army which had won that victory. Nahas Pasha never raised the question with any insistence: and though his successor did a certain amount of speechifying on the subject, and foreshadowed discussions about it prior to San Francisco, no actual step was taken. Nor has any direct action been taken now: but the Egyptian delegation's brief for San Francisco (the

fact/

fact that we know this is highly secret) foreshadowed an attempt to have placed on record the necessity of a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty on the legal grounds (1) that its articles referring to the League of Nations were out of date and (2) that the obligations it imposed on Egypt were incompatible with those arising out of the new security organisation. And in fact the Delegation has tabled motions which were in general accordance with this directive.

Our answer to this manoeuvre is shown in our telegrams Nos. 955 to San Francisco and 812 to Cairo (attached) which are self-explanatory; the former telegram should however be read as amended by San Francisco telegrams Nos. 487 and 488, (also attached) which show the latest position at the Conference. A copy of the revised paragraphs of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, to which reference is made in the telegrams, is also annexed. Legally, the Egyptians are justified in maintaining that the new world organisation and the disappearance of the League of Nations will necessitate some amendment of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty: but His Majesty's Government are determined that the charter of the organisation shall not be such as to invalidate the principles on which the treaty was based or to compromise their general policy of safeguarding their political and strategic interests in the Middle East by means of bilateral treaties.

Benvenue
7/6/45

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

2165/1543/9

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION

SAN FRANCISCO

No. 956.

28th May 1945.

D. 3.45 p.m. 28th May 1945.

Repeated to Cairo No. 810.

Washington No. 5537.

999999

SECRET

IMPORTANT

Cairo telegrams Nos. 992, 1092 and 1098 and your telegram No. 205.

It is clear that the Egyptian Government, probably in collusion with the Iraqi Government, are determined to utilise the legal position which will be created by the substitution of the Charter of the World Organisation for the Covenant of the League of Nations to promote revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty and if possible to escape from its obligations. This is the more troublesome in that (whatever may be the force of arguments purporting to show incompatibility between Treaty and Dumbarton Oaks Proposals) Egyptian Government have a sound legal case for claiming that consequential revision will be necessary when the above-mentioned substitution takes place.

2. From our point of view any revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty must be in the direction of even closer military collaboration with Egypt than at present (the arrangements now provided are out of date, particularly so far as the air is concerned). In these circumstances we consider, subject to your views which we should like to receive urgently, that our attitude should be as follows:-

The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 constitutes a "regional arrangement" in the sense envisaged by Chapter VIII A (3), B (12) and C(1) of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as now revised (your telegram No. 381 and previous correspondence). When the Charter of the World Organisation has been finally adopted consideration may have to be given to the necessary revision of the Treaty consequential upon disappearance of the League of Nations and to the possible inclusion of the military clauses of the Treaty in the system of "special agreements" contemplated in Chapter VIII B(5) of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would emphasise that the Treaty represents, in their view, the most efficacious means of preserving security in an area the strategic importance of which has been abundantly proved by the course of two world wars; and they would be unable to agree to any amendment of a nature to invalidate the essential principles on which the treaty is based.

Please see also my telegram No. 812 to Cairo.

OTP.

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

T 1651/1543/7

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 812
28th May, 1945.

D. 3.35 p.m. 28th May 1945

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation San Francisco No. 956
Washington No. 5538.

4 4 4

Your telegram No. 1092.

See my telegram No. 955 to San Francisco.

There is unfortunately no escape from the fact that, legally speaking, Egyptian Government will be justified in claiming that entry into force of Charter of World Organisation and disappearance of League of Nations will necessitate revision of Anglo-Egyptian treaty. But this is not to say that we do not fully share your dislike of their tactics.

2. Prospects of the rough approach to Nokrashi do not appear to us very promising; and we suggest that in this matter the person to work on is the King with his intense nervousness of Russian interference (and over-all responsibility for the present Coalition). It could be represented to His Majesty that the practical outcome of the success of his Government's policy (not that we propose to allow it to succeed) would be to undermine British influence in Egypt and throw open the country to international, and particularly Russian, influence, with results which have already been troubling His Majesty's imagination. His Majesty would, in consequence, be well-advised to ensure that his Government abandon their policy of legalistic sabotage of Anglo-Egyptian collaboration, and concentrate instead on working with His Majesty's Government in the framework of the new organisation with a view to the creation of conditions which would allow Egypt to tackle, undisturbed by external influence, the economic and social problems which call so urgently for treatment and in which His Majesty has so often expressed his interest.

3. You may if you think it useful approach His Majesty on the foregoing line. Such action would not, we think, compromise the source of your telegram No. 992 since by tabling the amendments in San Francisco telegram No. 205 (particularly references to "reconsideration of treaties" and military alliance) the Egyptian Government seem to have sufficiently disclosed their hand.

OTP

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION
FROM UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION SAN FRANCISCO
TO FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 487
29th May, 1945

D: 4.49 p.m. 29th May, 1945
(1.49 a.m.) 30th May, 1945 DBST
R: 3.30 a.m. 30th May, 1945

W W W

IMMEDIATE

Your telegrams Nos. 955 and 956.

1. We agree that it could be argued that the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty constitutes a regional arrangement within the meaning of Chapter VIII C 1 of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, but it is questionable whether it would be wise to invoke this paragraph in view of the fact that the Egyptian Delegation are still endeavouring to prove that bilateral treaties are not regional arrangements. Text of amendment that will come before Committee III 4 is in my immediately following telegram until this amendment has been cleared out of the way the simplest plan would be to proceed on Chapter VIII B 12 which holds good whether our treaty is considered a regional arrangement or not.

2. We doubt whether it would be possible to include military clauses of any Anglo-Egyptian Treaty among "special arrangements" contemplated in Chapter VIII B 5 of Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The matter is still under discussion but it is quite probable that these special arrangements will be negotiated between the Security Council and the nations collectively or individually. If they are not, it is probable that they would have to be multilateral, and they would mainly consist of provisions governing the making available of forces and the provision of facilities for enforcement action.

3. We entirely concur in line of concluding sentence of your telegram 955.

OTP

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION SAN

FRANCISCO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 488.
29th May 1945.

D. 5.00 p.m. 29th May 1945.
(2.00 a.m. DBST. 30th May 1945).
R. 2.40 a.m. DBST. 30th May 1945.

999999

IMMEDIATE

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of Egyptian amendment. It is likely to be considered in Committee III/3 to-morrow, and we hope to defeat it sooner or later.

"There shall be considered as regional arrangements organisations of a permanent nature grouping in a given geographical area several countries which by reason of their proximity, community of interest or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise between them and for the maintenance of peace and security in their region, as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and cultural relations."

OTP.

Nothing to be written in this

See suggested insertings KF 376

Reconstruction Dept

Mr. Backet. 1945

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Mr. Dumlars is anxious to be briefed on Egyptian "revisionism" & the attached is the result.

We should welcome amendments & suggestions.

JUN 18 1945

018 [unclear]

Registry
No.

Revision of The Anglo-Egyptian
Treaty

Draft.

6
15/

by negotiations
with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
in London

It looks as if this question might be brought to a head by the emergence from the San Francisco Conference of the charter of a new world security organisation. To ^{explain} ~~show~~ the part which it plays in Egyptian politics, a brief historical preface is necessary.

The aims of Egyptian policy were defined by Zaghloul Pasha twenty-five years ago as "the complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan" with Egypt as a British Protectorate, and a world ringing with cries of self-determination etc. This slogan bore at any rate some relation to reality, so far as ~~at any rate~~ ^{at least} as Egypt was concerned. It still had some meaning after the declaration of 1922: but it lost most of it after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, which proclaimed Egypt's independence and the end of the "occupation".

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

and the Egyptian slogan really means the independence of the Sudan

world in which, if one thing has been proved, it is that no weak power can stand alone in face of a major aggressor, it has lost all sense (The more so as the Sudan is developing a healthy national spirit of its own) — and this is the point —

It has the realism, or the courage, to
proclaim the truth: and to advocate the
one sensible policy for Egypt, viz collaboration
with HMG in the international field
on the basis of complete internal freedom
and up-to-date military arrangements
which in turn would leave Egypt free
to first to diagnose correctly, and then
to cure, the appalling social evils
now flourishing in the country. Consequently
"treaty revision", aiming at the removal
of British troops from Egyptian soil;
the end of all present military
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from Egyptian soil the successors of the
army which had won that ~~historic~~ victory.
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with any insistence: and though his
successor was a certain amount of
speechifying on the subject, and foreshadowed
dispositions about it prior to San Francisco,
no step was taken. Nor has any direct
action been taken now: but the Egyptian
delegation's brief for San Francisco (the

Registry No.

Draft.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Our answer to this manoeuvre is shown in our telegrams Nos 955 to San Francisco and 812 to Cairo (attached) which are self-explanatory. The Egyptians are justified in maintaining that the new world organisation with its disappearance of the League necessitate some amendment of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty: but HMG determined that the charter of the organisation shall not be such as to invalidate the principles on which the treaty was based or to compromise their general policy of safeguarding their political & strategic interests in the Middle East.

Handwritten notes in the left margin, partially enclosed in a circle. The text is mostly illegible due to fading and bleed-through, but appears to contain administrative or reference information.

Initials & Grades.



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

6
15

It looks as if this question might be brought to a head by the emergence from the San Francisco Conference of the charter of a new world security organization and by negotiations for the consequent winding-up of the League of Nations. To explain the part which it plays in Egyptian politics, a brief historical preface is necessary.

The aims of Egyptian policy were defined by Khalid Pasha twenty-five years ago as "the complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan". With Egypt as a British protectorate, and in a world ringing with cries of self-determination, this slogan bore at any rate some relation to reality, so far as Egypt at least was concerned. It still had some meaning after the declaration of 1922; but it lost most of it after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, which proclaimed Egypt's independence and the end of the "occupation". Now, in a world in which, if one thing has been proved, it is that no weak power can hope to stand alone in face of a major aggressor, it has lost all sense (the more so as the world is developing a healthy national spirit of its own) and the Egyptian slogan really means the incorporation of the Sudan in Egypt. But - and this is the point - no Egyptian politician of any party has yet had the realism, or the courage, to proclaim the truth: and to advocate the unpalatable policy for Egypt, viz. collaboration with His Majesty's Government in the international field on the basis of complete internal freedom and up-to-date military arrangements which in turn would leave Egypt free first to diagnose correctly, and then to cure, *(another)* the appalling social evils now flourishing in the country. Consequently "treaty revision", aiming at the removal of British troops from Egyptian soil; the end of all present military obligations; and the union of the Sudan with Egypt, remains the policy of every Egyptian Government.

While Egypt was in danger of extinction, we heard nothing about treaty revision. But the reaction to the Sudan (though an Egyptian would be distressed to hear it put so crudely) was a rising chorus of invitation to us to remove from Egyptian soil the encumbrance of the ally which had won last victory. When Farouk never raised the question with any insistence: and though his successor did a certain amount of procrastinating on the subject, and fore-shadowed discussions at San Francisco, no actual step was taken. Nor has any significant action been taken now: but the Egyptian delegation brief for San Francisco (the

fact/

fact that we have this in highly secret) foreshadowed an attempt to have placed on record the necessity of a revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty on the legal grounds (1) that its provisions referring to the League of Nations were out of date and (2) that the obligations it imposed on Egypt were incompatible with those arising out of the new security arrangements. In fact the Delegation has tabled motions which were in general accordance with this directive.

Our answer to this manoeuvre is shown in our telegrams Nos. 215 to San Francisco and 212 to Cairo (attached) which are still in effect; the former telegram should however be read as amended by San Francisco telegrams Nos. 427 and 428, (also attached) which show the latest position at the Government. Many of the revised paragraphs of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, to which reference is made in the telegrams, in any event, justify the Egyptians are justified in maintaining that the new world organisation and the emergence of the League of Nations will necessitate some amendment of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty; but His Majesty's Government are determined that the charter of the organisation shall not be such as to invalidate the principles on which the treaty was based or to compromise their general policy of safeguarding their political and strategic interests in the Middle East by means of bilateral treaties.