

246

J

J 3561

EGYPT and SUDAN

41 334

OCT 1944

Registry Number } 3561/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Mr. Shone, Cairo.No. ~~200~~ 2016

Dated 10th Oct.,

Received 11th Oct.,

in Registry } 1944.

J : Egypt and Sudan

Interview between Mr. Shone and Hassanein.

Refers to his telegram No. 2017 (J 3558/31/16). Gives account of his interview with Hassanein covering Egyptian claims of neutrality; internal state of Government formula to be used by New Prime Minister as regards Treaty alliance; dismissal of Wafd Government on Chazali issue, Almaza aerodrome and release of Ali Maher.

Last Paper.

J 3560

References.

J 3560

J 3464

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Mr. Dawhurst (W.6)
Mr. Oliver (W.6)
Mr. Gilbert (W.6)
Mr. Lyal (W.6)
Mr. Lawton (W.6)
Mr. Fourdain (W.6)
Mr. Hopkins (W.6)
Mr. Collins (W.6)
Miss Hobley (W.6)

Tel Cairo 1301

Oct 11
Oct 14

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

13/10/45

457

Next Paper.

(Minutes.)

We are beginning to get a picture of the new Egyptian Government. Inevitably the Cabinet contains some of the old gang of thugs (the P.M. and the M.F.A., for example, have particularly nasty spots in their records), and they are not likely on the face of it to let Nahas down lightly. Makram Ebeid Pasha has only just been released from internment and he cannot be expected to forgive Nahas, who had him incarcerated. The King, in his Royal Rescripts (Cairo telegram of the 9th October unnumbered), called the tune and the P.M. amplified with a violent attack on his predecessor (Cairo telegram No. 2011, para. 1). But he did also say that vengeance against a man who has destroyed himself was repugnant (Cairo telegram No. 2016, para: 6). Flag C.

The immediate release of a number of political internees was to be expected. The P.M.'s statement that the Cabinet will not adopt despotic or party rule (Cairo telegram No. 2006, Flag B) leaves hope that the places of those released will not immediately be filled by others. But Mr. Shone says that it is clear that the Government are out to attack the Wafd (Cairo telegram No. 2011, Flag B) and that they will make every endeavour to blacken the late administration; but he suggests that they and the King will be judged mainly by the success or otherwise of their efforts to provide a better administration.

Herein, however, lies a danger that some of the mud slung at Nahas may hit us. As regards mismanagement of supplies, Nahas may well seek to defend himself by blaming us.

In so far as words go, the new P.M. has indicated that his Cabinet will cooperate with us, at least in regard to Egypt's obligations towards us (Cairo telegram No. 2015, para: 6 and No: 2016, para. 3, Flags E and C), but he has not yet stated categorically that the Treaty will be fully executed (Cairo telegram No. 2014, Flag F).

41334

25

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on]

[CYPHER]

WAR COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

OCT 11 1944

Mr. Shone
No. 2018

D. 12.10 a.m. GMT October 11th, 1944.
R. 1.45 a.m. BST October 11th, 1944.

October 10th, 1944.

b b b b

IMPORTANT

My immediately preceding telegram.

I told Hassanein that I had been glad to receive King Farouk's assurance that he would do all he could to see we were not embarrassed now by Egyptian claims of neutrality [? grp. omitted] drew his attention to unwise remark of the new Prime Minister on the subject. Everyone's efforts in England were concentrated on winning the war and nothing could be more untimely than to talk of claims now. The new Government had made such a splash about alleged iniquities and maladministration of Wafd, that their first pre-occupation must surely be to set Egypt's house in order internally. Egyptian claims were in the nature of political propaganda and there were far more important practical things to occupy Egyptian Minister - health, to mention but one. How could the people seriously talk of Egypt's claims to Sudan when conditions here were what they are? Hassanein admitted force of all this and said he believed that the new Government would be occupied for many weeks with internal affairs.

2. I then tackled Hassanein about his failure to consult us about [grp. unde.? formula] to be used by the new Prime Minister as regards treaty alliance (my telegram No. 2014) Hassanein said he had inserted a reference to the treaty in the draft submitted to the Government but it had not gone through. He repeated the argument about Nahas having queered the pitch, but that what Ahmed Maher had said meant in fact that we should get full co-operation. I insisted that on some public occasions a reference should be made by Prime Minister to the treaty and Hassanein promised to tackle him about that.

3. I next reminded Hassanein that he had indicated Wafd Government would be dismissed on Ghazali issue. He had even spoken of lèse majesté (my telegram No. 1968). In Royal rescript their dismissal had in fact been based on other grounds. Hassanein agreed, as I expected [grp. unde.? he would,] that it was impossible to bring the King directly into cause of dismissal in rescript.

(This/

? change of

(This, I think, is not unreasonable and I have personally felt a change in His Majesty would not be wise as it might make it difficult even in Egypt for Mahas to resume office at a later date). I said one or two Egyptian friends whom I had seen yesterday had not seemed to realise Ghazali issue was final cause of dismissal, and I felt that it was important that this should be fully realised by the Egyptians. It was at all events of some importance from my point of view. Hassanein saw this, and while he felt there was no doubt in the minds of most of the people on the point he undertook to try by press articles or otherwise to bring it out. I propose to use our oral propaganda services to the same end.

4. I mentioned to Hassanein that there were several important questions which had been on the verge of settlement with the late Government e.g. Al.... and Egyptian airways, and it was urgent to get these settled. I should look to him for help if new Government proved difficult. He hoped this would not be the case, but said that in any case the Prime Minister and his Cabinet would now once again be in normal relations with the Palace.

5. Finally I told Hassanein of the line I had taken as regards Ali Maher (my telegram No. 2010) - he was confident that Ahmed Maher would implement a guarantee to keep his brother out of mischief and he assured me that in so far as Palace were concerned Ali Maher would not be in the picture again. *received today not yet returned*

6. As I was leaving Hassanein said he was pleased at the way in which the change of Government had been taken by the people. When it was announced, there had been genuine and spontaneous expressions of relief by the people of all classes and such demonstrations in favour of the new Government as had taken place could not have been organised at the time.

7. I told Hassanein that I should be going to Alexandria as soon as possible to take leave of Mahas, accordance with custom. (I saw Amin Osman this morning and he will try to make the atmosphere less inclement than I understand it might be at the moment!).

O.T.P.

J.3651/31/18

[CODE (R)]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 1531

D. 7.20 p.m. October 14th, 1944.

October 14th, 1944.

b b b b

Your telegram No. 2017

" " No. 2018

and " " No. 2025.

I approve your language.