

41333

76

CA

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CRYPTER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J 3464
6
1944

Mr. Shone.
No. 1968.

D. 10.23 p.m. GMT 5th October, 1944.

5th October, 1944.

R. 11.55 p.m. BST 5th October, 1944.

V V V

MOST IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Hassanein called on me this evening. The Oriental Counsellor was present.

He said that the Government had made no direct approach to him with a view to settling the Ghazali incident. He had information to the effect that Nahas Pasha, being doubtful of persistent British support against The King, was preparing the ground to go out on a nationalist issue e.g. treaties or other Egyptian national claims. If he resigned on such an issue an impossible situation would be created for King Farouk and indeed for the Opposition parties. Neither King Farouk nor they could oppose Nahas Pasha if he resigned on such an issue, indeed they would all have to follow his lead. A position of the greatest gravity would result and he wished us to know that he could not be responsible for what might happen.

2. On the other hand, if Nahas Pasha were to go out on the Ghazali incident it would be a term of lese-majesty which could not be successfully exploited as a national issue against Great Britain.

3. He had waited for three weeks without receiving any satisfaction from the Government. He felt that he must now demand the reinstatement of Ghazali and that if this demand were not immediately agreed to, Nahas Pasha must be at once dismissed and replaced by a Government under the [grp. undec. ? acting] premiership of Hamed Maher with a wide coalition composition. Action would have to be taken very rapidly i.e. within 24 hours of his communication to Nahas Pasha.

4. He undertook that the new Government, would co-operate with us as regards British interests, the war effort and the execution of the treaty and he maintained that they would be able to keep order and control the Wafd in the Opposition.

5. He wished to know definitely whether by saying that we did not desire to interfere in the Ghazali affair we meant that we would not prevent King Farouk from dismissing Nahas Pasha as indicated above and he particularly requested that you should be informed of the situation outlined above and especially of the

/danger...

REGISTRY

danger of Nahas Pasha resigning on an anti-British issue and thus damaging King Farouk.

6. He drew attention to an article which appeared in the organ of the Minister of the Interior "Al Balagh" yesterday, attacking those who made difficulties for the Government and the functioning of the constitutional régime. This he said was obviously aimed at the Palace.

7. I said that my instructions were that His Majesty's Government did not wish to interfere in the Ghazali issue. I had personally done my utmost within the limits of my instructions to bring about a solution; but I was not in a position to prevent his taking action on that issue. I would however like to report this conversation to you before he actually did anything. He promised not to act until October 7th provided that meanwhile nothing serious occurred which forced him to take immediate action.

8. I pointed out to Hassanein that he had originally said that his first step would be to ask Nahas Pasha for explanations regarding the suspension of Ghazali. He was now proposing to ask for Ghazali's reinstatement without any preliminary steps. Hassanein replied that too much time had now passed and it was impossible for him now to proceed by stages as previously contemplated.

9. The Government seems to have been very remiss in not getting into direct touch with the Palace immediately after my conversation with Amin Osman on September 29th (my telegram No. 1925). Instead of doing so they appear even to have made things more difficult by the above mentioned article in "Al Balagh". Moreover Amin Osman even suggested to me to-day that the Palace would be well advised to take no action on the Ghazali issue but to "let sleeping dog lie". The trouble is that it is anything but a sleeping dog and it has been made quite clear that the Palace, who have only held their hand at our request, will not do so indefinitely. It was again suggested to Amin Osman to-night that the Government should lose no time in getting into direct touch with the Palace in the hope of a compromise settlement.

10. If there is anything further you wish me to say to either side particularly to Hassanein please send me immediate instructions.

O.T.P.

11
OUT FILE

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

J

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO (AMBASSADOR)

No. 1294.

D. 2. p.m. 6th October 1944.

6th October 1944.

TTTTT

MOST IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 1968 [of 5th October: situation in Egypt].

I approve your language in paragraph 7 to which His Majesty's Government have nothing to add.

We rely on you to choose the best moment, if and when the time comes, to speak to the Palace on the lines indicated in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 1261.

O.T.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Shone
No. 1991

D. 11.25 a.m. GMT October 8th, 1944.
R. 1.05 p.m. BST October 8th, 1944.

October 8th, 1944.

J 3500

b b b b

OCT 1944

MOST IMMEDIATE

Hassanein asked me and Oriental Counsellor to call on him yesterday evening. Just as we were starting Amin Osman, who had just seen Hassanein arrived to see us.

2. Amin Osman said that he had found Hassanein unwilling to agree to anything but an unconditional reinstatement of Ghazzali. I pointed out that Hassanein, while insisting on this, had undertaken in conversation with me to consider sympathetically Ghazzali's transfer on technical grounds after he had been reinstated for a month or two. I reminded Amin Osman that I had acquainted him with this proposal on September 29th and explained that in view of my instructions I could not force Hassanein to accept what Nahas apparently wanted.

3. Amin Osman said that Nahas would not accept above solution and would only agree to a practically simultaneous reinstatement and transfer. I said previously that Palace would not accept this proposal.

4. Amin Osman then said that if a refusal to accept Hassanein's proposal was likely to involve a major crisis leading to dismissal of the Government he would like to tell Nahas so. In 1937 he had been accused by Wafdists of having restrained Nahas from taking self-protective action pending discussions with the Palace which had suddenly dismissed the Government over-night. He wanted to protect himself and us from a similar accusation this time. I said I could not say what the Palace might do but there was no doubt that the situation was critical. Indeed I had previously warned him (Amin Osman) more than once of its gravity.

5. I told Hassanein of Amin Osman's visit to me and said that as a result Amin Osman would no doubt tell Nahas that the situation was really grave.

6. Hassanein said that he had yesterday sent his second string Hassan Youssef to see Nahas at Alexandria and enquire what was being done about Ghazzali. Hassan Youssef had remarked that the Palace had been waiting for 3 weeks. Nahas said that delay had been due to his being occupied with the British

who/

who had interfered. He had had to resist their interference. In reply to a request by Hassan Youssef that Ghazzali should be reinstated Nahas said that he was prepared, if His Majesty wished, to have an enquiry as to why Ghazzali had not referred to his Ministers for instructions before carrying out order of King Farouk. Hassan Youssef remarked that Ghazzali had not had time to do so.

7. Hassanein said that from the above it was obvious that Nahas would not reinstate Ghazzali. Before proceeding with dismissal of Nahas he (Hassanein) wished to know whether our statement that we did not want to interfere in Ghazzali dispute meant that we would not interfere in [grp. undec. ? dismissal of] Nahas.

J3464/31/16 8. I read out to him first seven paragraphs of my telegram No. 1968 which he said contained an exact account of what he had said to me and wished repeated to you, and also first sentence of your telegram No. 1294.

9. Hassanein then said that King Farouk wished to see me to-day. I deprecated the idea on the ground that it was undesirable that the public should get the impression that we were taking part in the conflict. Hassanein explained that King Farouk after his experiences of black book and crisis of last Spring, no longer trusted Hassanein's versions of what we said to him. His Majesty wished to hear direct from me what we had to say. It could be arranged that I saw His Majesty privately in Hassanein's house tonight on his return from Alexandria. J3464/31/16

10. I felt I could not refuse to see King Farouk and said that I was at His Majesty's disposal if a time could be arranged.

11. Hassanein said that he had told Ahmed Maher that the new Government would be expected to co-operate as regards British interests and execution of treaty. Ahmed Maher had replied that there could be no question about that. I propose to tell King Farouk that we expect this from any new Government he may appoint.

12. I gathered from Hassanein that Nahas may be dismissed to-morrow.

O.T.P.

[This telegram must first be paraphrased if communicated to persons outside British or United States Government service or if retransmitted in a cypher system other than O.T.P.]

[CYPHER]

J / /

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

9 OCT 1944

Mr. Shone
No. 1992

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

8th October, 1944

D. 12.00 p.m. GMT. 8th October 1944
R. 1.30 p.m. BST 8th October 1944

n n n

J 3500
9 OCT 1944

MOST IMMEDIATE

My telegram No. 1991.

Following is line which we propose to take here with press correspondent in events of change of Government resulting from Ghandyali controversy.

2. The issue was purely an internal one between King Farouk and the Government in which His Majesty's Government saw no reason to be involved. The action of His Majesty's Embassy was accordingly limited to endeavouring in an unofficial manner to smooth matters over. We naturally regret that these efforts were unsuccessful.

3. Should Ahmed Maher be appointed Prime Minister you will no doubt be able to supply necessary biographical details etc. I feel sure you will agree however that it would be very unwise because of the Wafd's feelings to play up the new Government.

Handwritten notes:
1992
1991
1990

86

OUT FILE

J3500/31/16.

[CODE R]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 1308
9th October, 1944.

D. 3.20 a.m. 10th October, 1944.

[] [] []

Your telegram No. 1992 [of 8th October: guidance to press on Egyptian political crisis].

We are taking the same line here.

J 3501

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[The text of this telegram must first be paraphrased if communicated to persons outside British or United States Government service or if retransmitted in a cypher system other than O.T.P.]

[Cypher] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Shone. D. 12.10 p.m. GMT. 8th October 1944.
No.1995. R. 1.55 p.m. BST. 8th October, 1944.
8th October, 1944.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Hassanein informs me that he has received information to the effect that Nahas has summoned a cabinet meeting for seven p.m. and that he proposes to submit his resignation this evening as a protest against British intervention in the Ghazali question and to publish the letters exchanged with me.

2. Hassanein hopes to anticipate this step and arrange for revocation of Nahas this afternoon.

10 OCT 1944
RECEIVED
10 OCT 1944
10 OCT 1944

211

J

J 3325
25

1944

41333

Registry Number J 3325/31/16.

TELEGRAM FROM Mr. Shone, Cairo.

No. 1891.

Dated 25th Sept. 1944.

Received in Registry 25th Sept. 1944.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Situation in Egypt.

Refers to Cairo telegram 1879 (J 3319/31/16). Hassanein has informed Amin that Palace will not give way on Ghazzali must be reinstated as Director-General of Public Security unless this is done they will not agree to his transfer to another post. Matter is to be discussed again by Government and meanwhile Amin will endeavour to prevent Nahas committing any provocative act.

Last Paper.

J 3324

References.

(Minutes.)

A. V. Countryman
26/9

J. 26/9.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

27/9

(Index.)

M.H.
9/10

Next Paper.

J 3341

J

J 3340
27

1944

EGYPT and SUDAN
41333

Registry Number } J 3340/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Mr. Shone
(Cairo).

No. 1892.

Dated 25th Sept., 1944.

Received in Registry } 27th Sept.
1944.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Situation in Egypt.

Refers to Cairo telegram 1891 (J 3325/31/16).
Hassanein proposes to postpone making any communication to Prime Minister about Ghazali until preparatory Committee on Arab Unity has met. It is important that Nahas should mention the King's name in any formal speech. Amin states that Nahas will do this.

Last Paper.

J 3341

References.

(Minutes.)

B. V. Comley Rice.
27/9.

JH
27/9

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

M.H.
9/10

Next Paper.

J 3341

216

J

J 3366
30 SEP 1944

1944

EGYPT and SUDAN
41333

Registry Number } J 3366/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Mr. Shone
Cairo
No. 1924

Dated 29th Sep. 1944
Received in Registry 30th Sep. 1944

J: Egypt and Sudan

Situation in Egypt.

Refers to Foreign Office telegram 1261 (J 3345/31/16).

Hassanein was informed that His Majesty's Government could not become involved in the affair and stated that King Farouk must have satisfaction and nothing less than unconditional re-instatement of Ghazzali would meet the case. After reasonable time Palace would be willing to discuss transfer without reference to Masque incident. Will inform Amin as soon as possible. Hassanein complained that Palace had been given no information about Arab Unity. While Government continued this studied attitude towards the King the situation would remain serious.

Last Paper.

J 3353

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes) ...

I am afraid that the last paragraph accurately represents the situation; that relations between the King & the present Government have indeed deteriorated beyond repair - as we were inclined to think when this particular scandal started. - see J 3276.

JH 34/5.

(Action completed.)

Key 4/6

(Index.)

M.H.
9/10

Next Paper.

324

J

59

J 3455
4 OCT 1944

1944

EGYPT and SUDAN
41333

Registry Number } 3455/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Mr. Shone, Cairo.

No. 1941

Dated 2nd Oct.,

Received in Registry } 4th Oct.,
1944.

J : Egypt and Sudan.

Political situation in Egypt.

Refers to Cairo telegram 1828 (J 3246/31/16). Has received from Amin Osman Pasha, Nahas' reply to Embassy letter of 16th September. Gives more points of letter. Mr. Shone did not think it wise to discuss text of letter or to suggest amendment. After consideration he replied to the letter and gives summary of main points. Text follows by bag.

Last Paper.

J 3429

References.

J 3343

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

This looks like an attempt to make Mr. Shone commit himself to the Egyptian Gov. It is well that Mr. Shone decided not to discuss the letter. The arguments at (a) and (b) are rubbish.

A. V. Conolly, Secy.
5/10.

yes.

MB

5/10

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

620 5/10

S.O.C.
12/10/44

Next Paper.

J 3457

229

J

J 3464
5 OCT 1944

41333
EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number } J 3464/31/16.

TELEGRAM FROM
Mr. Shone (Cairo).

No. 1968.

Dated 5th Oct. 1944.

Received in Registry } 6th Oct. 1944.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Situation in Egypt: Ghazali incident.

CA
Gives account of his talk with Hassanein regarding possible resignation of Nahas, Pasha. Hassanein said that reinstatement of Ghazali was to be demanded and action required within twenty-four hours. He agreed to take no action pending receipt by Mr. Shone of instructions from His Majesty's Government. It was suggested to Amin Osman that Government should get into direct touch with Palace in hope of reaching compromise settlement.

Last Paper.

J 3463

References.

(Minutes.)

See minutes within.

C.P. 6/10.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Del Cairo 1294
Oct 6

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

2290
14/10

S.M.
12/10/44

Next Paper.

T 2493

I have discussed Cairo Tel: No 1968 into Mr. Scrivener (who is about indisposed), and also J 3455, 3457 and 3458. The comments are as follows:

"A mixture of threats and blandishments from Hammam. In fact both sides - see J 3455 so far as the Govt. are concerned - are endeavouring to get 17th. Govt. committed. I do not think we should be rushed by Hammam any more than by the Govt., and that our proper course is to approve Mr. Stone's language in para: 7 and to say that we have nothing to add. It is tempting to embroider Mr. Stone's reply in J 3455, but I think we had better refrain."

I submit dpt. tel. to Cairo.

As regards Cairo Tel: No 1959, attached below J 3458, Mr. Scrivener thinks that, so far as consulting Lord Killlean is concerned, Mr. Stone should do this direct via the U.K. High Commissioner (to whom he can telegraph direct in exceptional circumstances). If we do it,

Lord/

Minutes.

Lord Killearn will probably feel bound to return, which would be an undeserved compliment to the Egyptians.

His tel: attached.

A. V. Cowley Price.
6/10.

The Palace, by attributing certain anti-British intentions to Nasser, are trying to make us commit ourselves to a major intervention over an issue that is really trivial. I agree that we should not be drawn. In the final para. 20 of his tel. No. 168 Saving, Lord Killearn foresaw that a show-down between the King and Nasser was only a matter of time.

MJ
6/x

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Registry
No. J

Date 10/10

Despatched

2p

CP. 6710.
Draft Telegram.

most

OUT FILE

Immediate

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Charge d'affaires
H.M. Representatives,
Cairo.

No. 1294.
Cyprien.

W.C. Dietrich.

Oct. 6.

Your telegram No. 1968
[of 5th Oct. re: situation
in Egypt].

I approve your language
in paragraph 7 to which
H.M. Government have nothing
to add.

We rely on you to
choose the best moment,
if and when the time comes,
to speak to the Palace on
the lines indicated in paragraph 2
of my telegram No. 1261.

MB
61x

J

82

J 3500
9 OCT 1944

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number J 3500/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM Mr. Shone, Cairo.

No. 1991
1992

Dated 8th Oct.,
Received in Registry } 9th Oct., 1944.

J : Egypt and Sudan

Situation in Egypt. ✓

Gives account of his talk with Hassanein on the situation and the line it is proposed to take with press correspondents should events lead to change of Government.

Last Paper.

J3499

References.

J3464

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel Cairo 1308 Oct 9.

8) Mrs Olive Hogg
New Dept Oct 11

pp in dept copy of report (Minutes)

2 tel: Tel: No. 1991.

We have heard nothing further about an interview with the King mentioned in para's 9 and 10, and presumably it did not take place as things moved so fast.

Around Maher's reply to Hassanein in para: 11 might be read in two ways, but we must hope for the best interpretation.

Tel: No. 1992.

I have given this guidance to News Dept. and Mr. G. J. and we are informing Cairo by tel: that we are taking the same line here.

M: tel: sent.

A. V. Coulter
9/10.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

16/30/10

6/11
13/10/44

Next Paper.

J3501

The new Cabinet reported in today's Press

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

J 3500/31/46.

OUT FILE

3:20 am

10/10

85

Draft Telegram.

Mrs. Repman-Rabin,
Cairo,

No. 1308 ✓

Code: Oct. 9.

W.C. Dis. ✓

Copies to
News Dept.
Mr. Oliver,
St. J. S.

Your telegram No. 1992
[of 8th October: guidance
to press on Egyptian political
crisis].

We are taking the
same line here.

C.P.

G/M.