

41332

277

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

3310

[The text of this telegram must first be paraphrased if communicated to persons outside British or United States Government service or if retransmitted in a cypher system other than O.T.P.]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Shone  
No. 1861.

D. 2.25 p.m. GMT 22nd September, 1944.

R. 5.10 p.m. BST 22nd September, 1944.

22nd September, 1944.

JJI

IMMEDIATE

My telegram No. 1856.

J 3292/31/16

Amin Osman Pasha called on me yesterday evening. Interview, at which oriental counsellor was present lasted nearly two hours. Amin put forward Government view as follows:-

2. Nahas Pasha had, as usual, received an invitation from the Palace to be present at Mosque but not to accompany King from Palace as was customary. Nahas had asked explanations from Chamberlain who had replied that Hassanein would accompany King Farouk in car and that Prime Minister should go direct to Mosque. This slight had irritated Nahas who had decided not to attend ceremony. Amin argued that this had really started the present controversy in which removal of streamers had been added slight to Nahas. Government, he went on, maintained that constitutionally the King cannot give orders direct to officials and that such orders must go through responsible ministers. Ghazzali should have got into touch with the Minister of Interior and not have acted on direct instructions from His Majesty. Moreover everyone realised from action taken that King Farouk did not want his name coupled with that of Prime Minister. This was further slap in face to Prime Minister.

3. As regards my letter to Nahas, Amin said he had taken line that Ghazzali had only been helpful to us because he, Nahas, had wished to be helpful. Amin said that Nahas was very worked up over the whole controversy and was insisting on dismissal of Ghazzali. Picture was very black for Government side and doubted whether any compromise would be possible.

J 3266/31/16

4. I then spoke to Amin on lines of your telegram 1228 and asked him to make position clear to Nahas. I told him that immediately after I had written to Nahas on September 16th I had urged Hassanein strongly to hold his hand. I had done this because I had feared that next provocation might come at any moment from Palace. Hassanein had promised to do nothing and had so far kept his word, although Palace had since been further irritated by omission of any reference to King in Nahas' speech on September 18th. I continued on lines indicated in paragraph 2 of my telegram 1856 - and I read to Amin paragraph 2 of Lord Killearn's telegram No. 168 Saving. Amin at once admitted that present issue did not fall within its terms. Sir W. Smart

J 3292/31/16

and/...

J 3193/31/16

and I used every argument we could think of to induce Government to come to terms with Palace.

53245/20) 5. Amin then suggested that he should try to get Nahas to agree not to press for the dismissal of Ghazzali (which would let fat in the fire - paragraph 5 of my 1827) but acquiesce in continuance of his suspension, during which efforts could be made to smooth things over and get Ghazzali reinstated. Amin said continuance of suspension might be matter of hours, days, weeks or months and he was very doubtful whether Nahas and Cabinet would accept even that.

6. I told Amin that according to present indications Palace were unlikely to agree to do nothing during an indefinite suspension.

7. We finally agreed we should sound Hassanein (whom I was to meet at dinner arranged some time ago) as to possibility of no move by Palace while efforts were made to settle matter during an indefinite suspension of Ghazzali and that Amin should see Hassanein afterwards. If it was found Palace would agree to delay on this basis Amin would then get Nahas to agree also.

8. Later I spoke to Hassanein and urged him to give Amin ample time to work on Nahas. I got no undertaking from him but he said he would see Amin tomorrow. Hassanein said Nahas had not been asked to accompany King Farouk to Mosque on this occasion because although Minister for Foreign Affairs, he had previously refused, without apology to attend Iftar banquet at which Moslem diplomatic representatives were present. After dinner Hassanein treated Lord Moyne and me to long tirade against Government and our past insistence on keeping them in office.

9. Question seems to turn on how far and how soon Nahas will pipe down now that he knows our attitude and on how long Palace will continue to hold their hand.

J 3325

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

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[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Shone.  
No. 1891.

D. 9.35 a.m. GMT 25th September, 1944.

25th September, 1944.

R. 11.50 a.m. BST 25th September, 1944.

3 3 3

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 1879. 9-3319/21/16

Amin telephoned last night that he had had [gp. undec: ?long] talk with Hassanein who had said that the Palace would not give way on this issue and that Ghazzali must be reinstated as Director-General of Public Security. Palace would not consider his transfer to another post unless that were done. Amin had suggested that Hassanein should see Minister of the Interior [gp. undec: ?who] was after all Minister primarily concerned. Hassanein had agreed but Amin had impression that Minister of the Interior would decline to see Hassanein. He intended to return to Alexandria to-day and discuss position further with Nahas and Minister of Interior. He thought there was scarcely any chance of Nahas agreeing to reinstatement of Ghassali but he hoped to induce Minister of Interior to see Hassanein which would gain a little more time. He said he would do all in his power to prevent Nahas from any provocative act in the meantime.

REC'D  
SEP 25 1944  
REGISTRY

J 3340

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

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[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Shone  
No. 1892  
25th September 1944

D. 11.20 a.m. GMT 26th September 1944

R. 12.50 p.m. BST 26th September 1944

Z-Z-Z-Z

IMPORTANT

My telegram 1891. *J 3325/31/16*

Informant in touch with Hassanein states that latter, knowing our interest in Arab unity proposed to postpone making any communication to Prime Minister about Ghazali until end of this week by which time he expected preparatory committee's meetings.

2. Informant suggested importance of Nahas mentioning King's name in any formal speech he might make at opening of committee proceedings. Amin, to whom this suggestion was passed on, said he would mention it to Nahas. He later telephoned that Nahas would do this.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[CYPHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Shone D. 9.03 p.m. GMT. 29th September 1944  
No. 1924 R. 10.58 p.m. BST. 29th September 1944.  
29th September 1944

QQQQQQ

J. 3368  
30 SEP 1944

IMPORTANT.

Your telegram No. 1261. *J 3345/11/16*

I am grateful for the discretion given me, the more so as I hear it is being put about in Governmental circles that I have been "anti-Wafdist" in this matter.

2. Hassanein Pasha came to tea with Oriental Counsellor and me to-day and I spoke to him on lines suggested in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 1,904, making it clear that I was doing so in my personal capacity and that His Majesty's Government did not intend to become involved in details of this affair. Hassanein said that he did not wish to have a clash with the Government, but he again emphasised that King Farouk must have satisfaction and that nothing [gp.undec. ?less than] unconditional reinstatement of Ghazali would meet the case. When this had been done, and provided nothing were said about Ghazali's future transfer to another post, he would be willing after a reasonable time, to discuss [gp.undec.] such transfer with Government "on a technical basis" i.e. without reference to Mosque incident.

3. I shall inform Amin Osman as soon as possible of this conversation with Hassanein and [gp.undec.] to make it clear to Nahas Pasha that I have done all I can to make the Palace receptive to a solution and that I can only suggest that the two parties get together to find a way out.

*programme* 4. Hassanein complained that the Government had given the Palace no information in advance about the Arab Unity Conference and had not submitted a denial although requested to do so. King Farouk naturally wished to receive in audience and entertain representatives of Arab countries and Hassanein had only been able to make necessary arrangements after he had got the programme from one of the visitors. He claimed that this was a further instance of Government's studied attitude towards the King; and that even if Ghazali incident were resolved, this sort of thing would go on, with inevitable result that the situation would continue to be serious.

O.T.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

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[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION  
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Shone,  
No. 1941

D. 6.54 a.m. GMT 4th October 1944

2nd October 1944

R. 9.07 a.m. BST 4th October 1944

IMPORTANT

My telegram No. 1828. *93246*

Amin Osman Pasha sent me yesterday Nahas Pasha's reply to my letter of September 16th. Reply which was marked personal was dated September 23rd. In a private covering note Amin said that if there were anything in the letter that I did not like he would get it altered. He considered that it was a good letter and added that it was intended to cover the Government's position.

2. Following is substance of main points in letter text of which goes by to-day's bag.

(a) Nahas says he would like to believe that I share his view that Ghazali was guilty of grave dereliction of duty in executing an order which was illegal and injurious to prestige of Government and its members and head. At least he could have acted with more tact and delicacy.

(b) Nahas emphasises that helpful attitude of Ghazali to British military authorities to which I had drawn his attention is to be ascribed to co-operative policy of himself and Government and not to any personal merit. Any other person in Ghazali's office would have had to do the same.

3. The fact that this letter has now been sent seems to indicate that Government still contemplate standing firm against Palace on this issue. I am informed they have not yet made contact with Palace with view to a solution. (My telegram No. 1925). — *53342*

4. I did not think it wise to embark on discussions of text of letter or to suggest any amendments. I was in two minds whether or not to reply to it at all. But as failure to reply might be regarded by Nahas as implying acceptance of his point of view regarding Ghazali's action I decided to reply to following effect:

(a)/

(2)

(a) In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding I felt bound to say that on facts as known to me I could not depart from opinion that Ghazali was placed in position of great difficulty or from views which I had expressed to Amin on this aspect of the matter.

(b) That in referring to Ghazali's services as I did in my letter of September 16th I merely intended to record appreciation of British authorities of manner in which Ghazali in his own sphere had given effect to consistently friendly and co-operative policy of Government over which Nahas presides.

5. Text of my reply by bag as soon as possible.

J

J 3310  
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1944

41332

Registry Number } 3310/31/16.

TELEGRAM FROM Mr. Shone, Cairo.

No. 1861 Cypher.

Dated 22nd Sept; 1944.

Received in Registry 23rd Sept; 1944.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Situation in Egypt.

Refers Cairo telegram No. 1856 (J 3292/31/16). Gives government's views put forward by Amin Osman Pasha at an interview which lasted nearly two hours and at which the oriental counsellor was present. Question seems to turn on how far and how soon Nahas will quieten down, now that he knows the Embassy's attitude and on how long the Palace will tolerate them.

Last Paper.

J 308  
~~J 3298~~

(Minutes.)

See minutes on J 3311.

References.

- J 3266
- J 3292
- J 2793
- J 3193

CP. 23/9.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)  
M.N.  
20/10

Next Paper.

J3311



J

J 3298  
22 SE 1944

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EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number } J 3298/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM Mr. Shone (Cairo)

No. 1855

Dated 21st Sept 1944

Received in Registry } 22nd Sept: 1944

J. Egypt and Sudan

Situation in Egypt.

Hassanein gave account of series of incidents alleged to have been provoked by Wafd Government. He confirmed reports that Ghazzali was to be tried by Council of Discipline on charges other than that of mosque incident. Hassanein considers only way out of difficulty is for His Majesty's Government to tell Nakas that Ghazzali must be reinstated. He said situation was getting serious but if Nakas went out of office he would soon work up a case against the British.

Last Paper.

J 3292.

References.

J 3193

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

6/10 2/9

(Index.)

M.H. 9/10

Next Paper.

J 3302

(Minutes.)

I do not think that this telegram calls for any action on our part.

According to Abboud, Nakas has been suffering from insomnia for some time past.

W. W. W. 22/10

No doubt. But there seems a certain inconsistency between 8 and 10 and of the 10. If they want to blame us for having N. in, they do they tell us that he will be dangerous outside.

22. 1X

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[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION  
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J 3298

Mr. Shone  
No. 1855

D. 2.50. p.m. GMT 21st September 1944

21st September 1944

R. 4.00. p.m. BST 21st September 1944

8 8 8 8

MOST IMMEDIATE

Hassanein last night gave Oriental Counsellor a long account of series of incidents which he said had been deliberately provoked by the Wafd Government. List of these, the more important of which have already been reported, follows by saving telegram.

2. Hassanein asserted that Nahas was deliberately trying to give King Farouk public slaps in the face with a view to asserting his (Nahas's) declining prestige. All these incidents were outside picture of the constitutional or international affairs. There really remained little for Nahas to do except to intern King Farouk.

3. As regards Ghazzali incident Hassanein said that if it were not previously arranged he would have to write Nahas [grp. undec. ? very seriously] and ask for reasons for arrest.

4. Hassanein confirmed reports we have received to the effect that the Government's intention was to have Ghazzali tried by a Council of Discipline on charges other than that of [grp. undec. ? mosque] incident. (By telegram No. 1845) he did not believe such charges could be adequately substantiated. Incidentally he considered Ghazzali knew too much about [grp. undec. ? Wafd] irregularities for such a procedure to be safe for them.

5. Hassanein remarked that the public was quite aware that Nahas would not dare to flout King Farouk in this manner unless he (Nahas) felt sure of our support. The result inevitably was that public resentment turned against the British.

6. Hassanein said that the only way out of Ghazzali difficulty was for us to tell Nahas that Ghazzali must be reinstated. He considered Nahas would not disregard our advice.

7. Hassanein said that he had been blamed in the past for not giving us timely notice of trouble. He wished now to warn us that the situation was getting very serious.

/ 8. ....

STP

53193/31/66.

8. He added that he had information to the effect that Nahas was much upset by our communication about the Sudan (see Lord Killearn's telegram No. 168 Saving) and was suffering from insomnia. If he went out of office he would in twenty four hours work up a case against the British.

9. O.C. said that as he had only returned the previous day from England, he was not in a position to comment adequately on all this story but he would report conversation to me and hoped meanwhile Palace would do nothing provocative. Hassanein replied that no provocation would come from the Palace and he hoped we would stop provocation from Government side.

O.T.P.

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J 51  
CC

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

J 3276  
SEP 1944

FROM CAIRO (HIS MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRS)

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Shone.  
No. 1,844.

D: 10.25 p.m. GMT 19th September, 1944.

19th September, 1944.

R: 12.15 p.m. BST 20th September, 1944.

مصر / 19 / 9 / 1944  
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IMMEDIATE

My telegram No. 1,859. J-2266/31/16

I venture to submit the following further observations in case the matter should come before you.

2. I have drawn attention to the disadvantages, as I see them, of coercing King Farouk on the present issue. On the other hand we must take due account of services already rendered to us by the present Government and of their potential value to us in the future, and in a situation which may result in the fall of the present Government the question of an alternative is an important factor in our calculations. So is the potential danger of the Wafd in opposition. The problem is not easy when one has to deal with so many imponderables. It would be easier if there were a strong, well organised and well followed opposition party with a large measure of popular support and a leader of the calibre of the late Mohammed Mahmoud and if free election were possible in Egypt. Unfortunately this is not [grp.undec: ? possible] and the monarch who ought to be outside and above the arena of party strife, is in the position of competing for popular favour with the leader of by far the best organised political party which moreover has always been the popular party.

3. We have insisted on keeping Nahas Pasha in [grp.undec: ? office] against King Farouk's wishes in order to maintain a stable base in Egypt and to ensure that the Treaty is fully observed; and also because we have been convinced that he enjoys the support of a majority of the Egyptian people. It has in many ways been useful to have in office a Government so dependent on support. But we have not been able to keep them there without recourse to constant intervention [? grp.undec: ? in] Egyptian internal affairs. Nahas Pasha has done us well in both above respects and if he were to go we should have to insist on like behaviour on the part of his successor. He could not reasonably claim that we have failed to back him fully up to the present and we are not bound to support him on any issue which we consider to be bad or on which we are not fully taken into his confidence.

4. If Nahas Pasha ceased to be Prime Minister his successor whoever he were, would be dependent upon the goodwill of the

/King

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SEP 20 1944

King as well as of ourselves-as was Hussein Sirry Pasha-and it is in the nature of things that he would fall more and more under the influence of the Palace. In so far as King Farouk is concerned, I do not think that he would now dare even if he wished to range himself against us on major issues. From our point of view therefore a Government largely under Palace control ought to be less of a danger in the present circumstances than it was in the early days of the war. The popular support which such a Government would enjoy would be derived mainly from the King. His popularity in the country generally - despite all his faults - is not inconsiderable but it is a changeable quantity dependent largely on his own behaviour.

5. Apart from considerations of general policy, change of Government would have other disadvantages. There are some matters of importance which we have been negotiating with the present Government, e.g. release of surplus rice, the Almaza airfield and [grp.undec.] Anglo-Egyptian Airways, but which are not yet fixed up. It would be tiresome to have to start all over again with another Government which might be less content to fall in with our requirements.

6. On the other hand several ill-invented measures have been put through Parliament by the present Government or are on the stocks, which have caused difficulty and concern to the British community and British trade interests and on which we have not so far got satisfaction despite repeated efforts. The Wafd is essential to the Nationalist party and Nahas Pasha, even though dependent to the extent he has been on our support has had to humour the temperament of the party, many of whom to say the least, are very unenlightened men. Whether we should do better in these matters with another Government would depend mainly on how far that Government could put the brake on Nationalist power and anti-foreign feeling. One might at least hope for better administration from another Government.

7. In office Nahas Pasha has so far taken as reasonable a line as we could expect of him on such major issues as treaty revision and the Sudan having regard to public opinion. In opposition, Wafd would be likely to exploit the majority and to make a minor issue against us. They might also [grp.undec.] disorders. But it is generally considered that the Egyptian Army and Police would be loyal to the King and to any other Government he approved. I presume that so long as war continues we shall have to insist on retention of état de siege. This in itself provides any Government with wide powers for maintenance of public order and security.

8. We should make King Farouk responsible for seeing to it that any new Government was friendly to us and would fully implement the Treaty.

9. While I hope things will not come to this pass, I have felt bound to put the above considerations before you in case they do.

O.T.P.

3276/31/16)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. 53

OUT FILE 23rd September, 1944.

Personal and  
Confidential

My dear Terence,

I have been asked to thank you for the most useful and illuminating appreciation of the Egyptian political situation contained in your telegram No. 1844 of September 19th.

It looks to us very much as if relations between King and Government have at last gone beyond repair, and that we may well have a change before very long. We agree with you that a Palace Government cannot, and will not, do so much harm as things are now; and that it might well administer the country better. Moreover the King would then be directly responsible for what happened and, if we have to have a show-down with him, we should have it under rather more favourable conditions than those which have obtained recently.

*Yours truly*

Sgd. (P. Scrivener)

T.A. Shone, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Cairo.



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry  
No. J3276/31/16

Mr. J. P. Whone  
Cairo

Telegram.

from  
Mr. Scriver

~~Personal~~  
~~& Conf.~~ FILE + 1c

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Despatched

M.

23rd Sept.

My dear Terence,

I have been asked  
to thank you for the most  
useful and  
illuminating appreciation of  
the Egyptian political situation  
contained in your telegram  
No: 1844 of September 19<sup>th</sup>

It looks to us very much  
as if relations between King &  
Government have at last gone  
beyond repair and that we  
may well have  
~~short in fact~~ have a change  
before very long. We agree  
with you that a Palace Govt  
cannot, & will not, do us much  
harm



have as things are now; that it  
might well administer the country  
better. Moreover, if we have  
to have a show-down with ~~the~~  
~~him~~ <sup>him</sup>, we should ~~probably~~ <sup>rather</sup> have  
it under more favourable conditions  
than those which have obtained  
recently.

Yours Ever  
Sgd) P. Brunner

The King would  
then be directly  
responsible for  
what happened  
and,

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

41332

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[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO (AMBASSADOR) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Shone.  
No. 1818

D. 8.25 a.m. GMT 16th September  
1944

15th September 1944

R. 11.05 a.m. DBST 16th September  
1944

J 3245

IMPORTANT

Another row started between King Farouk and the Government today.

2. Following account of incident is based on direct reports from Director of Public Security Ghazzali Bey and Sir T. Russell Pasha.

3. King Farouk went to pray this morning at Amr Mosque (last Friday in Ramadan and rather a special occasion with large crowds present). Near the Mosque were some streamers bearing inscriptions "long life to King Farouk" and "long life to Nahas Pasha". Before the King arrived at the Mosque an Egyptian police officer suggested to Ghazzali that this would offend His Majesty who had complained of it before. Ghazzali replied that nothing could be done at this late moment without orders. On arrival at the Mosque King Farouk said to Ghazzali in the hearing of many other notables "I do not wish to see these streamers on my way back". Ghazzali not unreasonably took this as a direct order from His Majesty to have streamers removed and instructed Russell Pasha to do this quietly. Russell Pasha states that it was so done although Minister of the Interior is reported to have alleged that removal was done "violently" and "against the people's will".

4. Ghazzali was subsequently instructed by Minister of the Interior (who is with Nahas Pasha in Alexandria) not to proceed on leave tonight pending an enquiry into the incident and later on he was told that he was suspended from his post.

5. This is another example of frequent incidents which, however childish, may give rise to serious trouble and which makes any improvement in relations between the King and the Government seem hopeless. On the face of it, King Farouk was needlessly provocative in asking for removal of streamers which, I am told, were put up by the people in the district. On the other hand the Government seems to have acted unreasonably in suspending Ghazzali and if they now proceed to dismiss him they will still further incense King Farouk. According to Ghazzali, Minister Wakfs, who was representing the Government at the ceremony and the Governor of Cairo said that he could not have acted otherwise after what King Farouk had said to him.

6. Perhaps tempers will subside; but I feel you should have this preliminary report betimes in case of further trouble. I shall do all I can to prevent that.

O.T.P.

SEP 17 1944  
FO

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION  
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J 3246

17 SEP 1944

Mr. Shons.  
No. 1828.

16th September, 1944.

D. 6.50 p.m. GMT 16th September, 1944.  
R. 10.10 p.m. DBST 16th September, 1944.

V V V

IMMEDIATE

My immediately preceding telegram. *J 3245/31/46*

Following is text of my letter to Nahas Pasha.

Urgent and Personal.

[Begins.]

Dear Prime Minister. I am concerned to learn that Ghazali Bey has been suspended from the post of Director of Public Security. I have reported to my Government incident which took place yesterday and which resulted in Ghazali Bey's suspension. I have also discussed the matter with British Federation as Ghazali Bey has rendered valuable services to them in his capacity as Director of Public Security. His Majesty's Government share my concern and I am sure that His Majesty's Government would regard it as most unfortunate if Ghazali Bey were penalised in any way for acting as he did in circumstances, which as I am confident that Your Excellency will agree, placed him in a position of great difficulty.

I am confident that Your Excellency will appreciate the importance at a time when forces of the United Nations are concentrated in bringing the war to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible moment of avoiding any action which might have the effect of hampering that effort.

As representative of Egypt's ally and having regard to continuing importance of Egypt as an allied base of operations at this time when the war effort is of primary concern to the United Nations, I have no hesitation in writing personally to Your Excellency in all frankness on this subject and I would add for your own information that I shall speak to Hassanien Pasha in a similar sense.

[Ends.]

O.T.P.

SEP  
17 1944  
FO. REGISTRY

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Shona  
No. 1829  
16th September, 1944

D. 7.54 p.m. GMT. 16th September, 1944.  
R. 10.30 p.m. DBST. 16th September, 1944.

kkkkk

IMMEDIATE

By immediately preceding telegram.

It is clear that if we are to avoid a major conflict between King Farouk and the Government we must act quickly. I see no reason to change my view that King Farouk acted injudiciously in calling for the removal of streamers but I consider that the Government acted most unwisely in suspending Ghazali and particularly in making suspension public. In so doing, they have needlessly added fuel to the flame and I fear they may be seeking to make this a major issue with King Farouk. At all events they have put themselves in a position from which it may be very hard to withdraw and the issue seems to be one on which it is likely to be difficult for us to support them. In my opinion it does not on the present evidence fall within terms indicated to Nahas Pasha by Lord Killearn (see paragraph 2 of his telegram No. 168 Saving). Government might seek to argue that King Farouk's action in giving direct order [group undec: ? to] Ghazali was unconstitutional but I am advised that it is very questionable whether in the circumstances of the case this argument is tenable.

2. Amin Osman who is always so useful as an intermediary with Nahas Pasha in these situations is unfortunately on leave in Palestine. As I cannot go to Alexandria to-day to speak to Nahas Pasha I have sent him a letter (text in my immediately following [sic ?preceding] telegram) which I hope will serve as a warning and perhaps stave off a major clash on this issue. I have discussed the situation with Minister Resident who approves letter to Nahas Pasha. I trust it will also have your approval. But before long I may have to go further and tell Nahas Pasha that you do not consider him to be on strong ground in this case and must insist on the reinstatement of Ghazali. Have I your authority to do this at my discretion? And is there anything else you would wish me to put to him? It is of course not impossible that if a way cannot be found of saving his face he may resign.

3.....

NO. REGISTER

3. I shall see Hassanein Pasha as soon as possible, tell him frankly my view that King Farouk acted unjudicially and urge him with all force to do nothing to precipitate a crisis. But there is a limit beyond which we cannot expect the King on his side to go in the way of accommodation and on present evidence, I and my advisers regard the Government as more to blame in this case than it is reported.

4. MOST CONFIDENTIAL. Thanks to Lord Moyne I hope to find means of informing Amin Osman of the situation and of putting it to him that his early return would be useful.

OTP.

J. 3266

19 SEP 1944

842

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[The text of this telegram must first be paraphrased if communicated to persons outside British or United States Government service or if retransmitted in a cypher system other than O.T.P.]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION  
FROM CAIRO (CHARGE D'AFFAIRES) TO  
FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Shone  
No. 1839

17th September 1944. D. 5.37 p.m. G.M.T. 18th September 1944.  
R. 6.02 p.m. B.S.T. 18th September 1944.

228

IMMEDIATE

My telegrams Nos. 1828 and 1829.

J 3246/31/16

I have not yet had reply from Nahas Pasha to my letter of September 16th which His Majesty's Consul General at Alexandria delivered to His Excellency in person on that evening. Nahas Pasha read the letter and said he would reply to it in writing.

2. In previous troubles of this kind Nahas has seen that we were informed at an early stage. After the warning so recently given to His Excellency by Lord Killearn (paragraph 2 of his telegram No. 168 Saving) we were surely entitled to expect to be consulted at the earliest possible moment on an issue which may so obviously lead to a show down with King Farouk.

J 3243/31/16

3. If the reply to my letter is unsatisfactory or the Government do anything further to provoke the King, I think the time will have come to warn Nahas definitely that His Majesty's Government consider him to be on poor ground in this issue and that they would not feel justified in supporting him against the King on the merits of the case. Otherwise he may go ahead, despite the note of warning in my letter on the assumption that in the last resort he will have our support as on previous occasions.

4. It is possible that this may lead sooner or later to the Government's resignation. It is even possible that they will, in any case, force the issue with the King to the point of resignation or dismissal. I should mention here that just before he received my letter on 16th September, Nahas Pasha had the second of two interviews with Mr. Hoare, the Times correspondent which had been arranged by Lord Killearn in agreement with His Excellency and at which he gave him for publication two satisfactory statements on the Sudan and on Egypt's continued support of our war effort after the.....

the defeat of Germany. (Text by bag). Nevertheless before His Majesty's Government decide whether or not to back the Government against the King on the present issue, I feel bound to submit the following considerations.

5. I doubt whether even strong "advice" to the King to yield (with the implication behind it that we should not hesitate if necessary to enforce our will) would bring His Majesty to heel in the present case in which - however unwisely he may have acted in the first instance - the Government have publicly affronted him in a way which must surely affect not only his personal prestige but also that of the Throne. I may be wrong, but even if His Majesty did yield we should, at the best, have so embittered our relations with him as to make further co-operations with him most difficult. At the worst we might drive him from the Throne on a case in which most of the cards are with him - trivial though this controversy is in itself wide issues may spring from it.

5. [sic] While it is no doubt desirable that Government in Egypt should evolve on lines more akin to modern constitutional and democratic systems, we must surely bear in mind that we are dealing with a backward oriental country which is not yet ripe for democracy with a big "D" and in which the Throne is (or ought to be) a valuable brake on the activities of self-willed political leaders and unfledged political parties. In such circumstances the personality of the occupant of the Throne is clearly of great importance. The present incumbent is far from ideal. But I submit that our doubts about his fitness for his high office ought not to lead us into a course which might gravely impair the utility of the office itself.

6. King Farouk is criticised, even violently, by many Egyptians but in my view there is no doubt that he is more popular in the country generally than he was in 1942. Strong action against him now would be correspondingly more difficult and more dangerous than it was then. On the other hand, if Nahas and the W.A.F.D. still enjoy a large measure of popular support, their popularity and prestige is certainly not what it was. They too are violently criticised by many Egyptians and two and a half years is a long time for any Government to remain in office in Egypt.

7. I hope that we may once again stave off the major clash, but I have felt bound to put the above considerations to you in case it should come. I shall submit some further observations in a subsequent telegram.

8. Since drafting the above I have received your telegram 1209 for which I am most grateful. I shall endeavour in the first instance to expedite the reply to my letter and if necessary make the further communication authorised in order to hasten it.

J. 3246/31/46

192

25

1944

J

X

J 3245

1944

41332

EGYPT and SUDAN

17 SEP 1944

Registry Number } J 3245/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM  
Mr. Shone, Cairo.

No. 1816

Dated 1827  
15 & 16 Sept.,

Received in Registry } 17th Sept.,  
1944.

J : Egypt and Sudan.

Dispute between Government and Palace. ✓

Gives account, based on reports by Director of Public Security, Ghazzali Bey and Sir T. Russell Pasha and Palace Informant, of incident which occurred on Friday when King Farouk drove to Amr Mosque and which led to suspension of Ghazzali Bey.

فأورد في تقريره الذي قدمه لوزير الداخلية  
في 17/9/44 ما يلي من نص الرسالة التي  
أرسلها له الملك في 15/9/44

Last Paper.

J 3242

(Minutes.)

See on J 3246.

References.

J. 8/9

(Prints) 22/9  
Egypt vol. 1

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

on 18  
12/9

(Index.)

M.N.  
9/10

Next Paper.

J 3246



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Shone

No. 1827

16th September, 1944

D. 5.46 p.m. GMT. 16th September, 1944

R. 8.55 p.m. DBST. 16th September, 1944

.kkkkk

IMPORTANT

My telegram No. 1816 <sup>within</sup> [sic].

Informant in touch with the Palace called on Oriental Secretary this morning to discuss the suspension of Director General of Public Security.

2. Mr. Ravensdale asked him whether King Farouk's order to Ghazali was given on the spur of the moment or whether His Majesty had fore-knowledge of the fact that streamers had been put up. Informant said that according to Hassansin Pasha, whom he had just seen, His Majesty knew that these streamers had been put up an hour or two before he was due to leave the Palace. His Majesty had therefore told Hilmi Bey, his chief chauffeur, to telephone to Selim Zaki (the "Egyptian Policier Officer" mentioned in paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference) to let Ghazali know that these streamers were to be taken down before the King passed along the street to the Mosque. Selim Zaki was presumed to have passed this [2 groups undec.: ?on to him] from the King and Hassansin's view was that Ghazali had time to telephone to Alexandria and inform Minister of Interior about this order and ask for instructions. Ghazali, however, neither asked for instructions from his Minister nor did he take steps to have streamers removed. (Ghazali's version differed from this in certain essential respects. He said that Selim Zaki had intimated to him that the King would not like these streamers as he had complained about them before).

3. Informant said that the King would not have given such an order if the streamers had only displayed "Long Live Nahas" but he could not tolerate having his own name displayed in conjunction with that of Nahas. Informant's account of what His Majesty said to Ghazali at the Mosque coincided with Ghazali's version.

4. Informant took the line that the Government had made a big mistake in communicating to the press the news of

Ghazali's.....

ED. REGISTRATION

Ghazali's suspension thereby making the affair public property and showing that the Government had given a slap in the face to the Palace. He said that if a public announcement had not been made an enquiry could have been held and a way out for the Government might have been found by establishing that Ghazali had no time to seek the covering authority of his Minister to carry out the King's order. (This might still provide a face-saving arrangement for the Government but the whole affair has now been made public property).

5. Informant continued that Hassanein was resolved not to give way to the Government. If the Government decided after enquiry that Ghazali should be dismissed he (Hassanein) would refuse to let the decree dismissing him be signed by the King. (Directors General are appointed and dismissal by decree signed by the King). Therefore either the Government must conclude that Ghazali had no time to consult Minister of the Interior and reinstate him or a major clash was inevitable. Informant stated that Hassanein felt strongly that he could not yield on an issue which directly and publicly affects the King's dignity; if it were a matter of some political issue affecting Great Britain, Hassanein would do everything possible to find a satisfactory solution without upsetting the whole apple cart. Ravensdale pointed out here that from the point of view of military security British interests were very much involved and informant replied that Hassanein wished to discuss the matter with me as soon as possible. When I see him, as I hope to do to-day, I shall rub this in.

6. Informant also said he had reason to believe that the Government had decided some time ago to get rid of Ghazali as being too much with us and to appoint his deputy instead. Deputy is a bristling Wafdist said to [group undec.: ?abhor] the English; and from all I can gather his appointment would be very undesirable from our point of view.

See my immediately following telegrams.

OTP.

J K

J 3246

EGYPT and SUDAN

17 SEP 1944

Registry Number } J 3246/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM Mr. Shone, Cairo.

No. 1828 1829

Dated 16th Sept., Received in Registry 17th Sept., 1944

Dispute between Palace and Government.

Refers to Cairo telegram 1827 (J 3245/31/16). Gives text of letter sent to Nahas Pasha expressing concern at action taken in suspending Ghazali Bey, and requests approval and instructions as to what he should say to Nahas. Considers King Farouk acted injudiciously but that Government acted unwisely in suspending Ghazali and especially in making it public. Government is regarded as more to blame than is reported.

J: Egypt and Sudan =

Last Paper.

J 3245

(Minutes.)

See within.

J.P.

References.

(Print) 22/9

Egypt vol: in out.

(How disposed of.)

Tel Cairo 1209 Sept 17

(Action completed.)

6/20 22/9

(Index.)

M.H. 20/10

Next Paper.

Cairo Telegrams Nos: 1816,  
1827 - 1829.

This is a typically Egyptian incident,  
but its development shows quite clearly the  
state of nerves to which both the King and  
the Government have worked themselves up.  
The direct British interest involved is that  
the Director of Public Security is an  
extremely staunch friend of ours, and is  
very valuable to the military. That he  
should thus be treated by Nakhas is no  
kindness to us.

I agree with Mr. Shore that  
the Government are on the worst  
possible ground here. Even if the King's  
action were strictly unconstitutional, it  
would be folly, in the case of an  
oriental monarch, not to meet him in  
such a matter. This case proves  
abundantly that we have been right  
in refusing to commit ourselves in  
advance to support Nakhas in a  
show-down with the King, so we have  
been pressed to do.

Mr. Shore's letter is all right for  
a start, but I should rather not  
go any further <sup>as from 1816</sup> until matters develop  
at any rate not so far as insisting on  
this or that.

I submit a draft. Reviewer  
MB. 17/ix. 17/9

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

K

32

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No.

Draft.

HM King's Affairs

Cairo  
Telegram NO. 1209  
Sept. 17.  
Cipher

War Cabinet Dis.

OUT FILE

Despatched 2-30/10 11/9

Immediate

Your telegram No. 1529 and preceding telegrams.

We approve your action and text of your letter to Mahas.

While we agree with you that this is <sup>we</sup> a dispute in <sup>some</sup> which it will be difficult <sup>for us</sup> to support the Government, and which does not fall within the terms of HM Ambassador's definition of a <sup>clear</sup> constitutional issue, we should prefer to await results of your letter and (as we hope) of Amir's influence before going further. But you may <sup>if necessary</sup> <sup>indicate</sup> as your personal view that, however unreasonable the King's <sup>may have been,</sup> the

X

The Government have acted with  
altogether ~~and as a result of~~  
excessive precipitancy given the  
obvious delicacy of the circumstances  
and the general political situation  
~~prevailing at the moment.~~  
background against which they  
should have been viewed.

NB

17/12

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

33

OUT

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO (CHARGE D'AFFAIRES)

No. 1209  
17th September, 1944

D: 2. 30 p.m. 17th September, 1944

P P P

IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 1829 and preceding telegrams.

We approve your action and text of your letter to Nehas.

While we agree with you that this is a dispute in which it will be difficult for us to support the Government, and which does not fall within the terms of His Majesty's definition of a clear constitutional issue, we should prefer to await results of your letter and (as we hope) of Amin's influence before going further. But you may if necessary indicate as your personal view that, however unreasonable the King may have been, the Government have acted with altogether excessive precipitancy given the obvious delicacy of the circumstances and the general political background against which they should have been viewed.

O.T.P.

J

K

1944

EGYPT AND SUDAN

J 3266

12 SEP 1944

Registry Number } 3266/31/16.

TELEGRAM FROM Mr. Shone, Cairo.

No. 1839.

Dated 17th Sept; 1944.

Received in Registry 19th Sept; 1944.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Dispute between Palace and Government.

Refers to Cairo telegrams 1828 and 1829 (J 3246/31/16). Has received no reply to his letter to Nahas Pasha of 16th September; should this be unsatisfactory or government do anything further to provoke the King considers that Nahas should be warned that His Majesty's Government cannot support him in the matter. Submits facts which should be considered before His Majesty's Government decide whether or not to back Nahas against the King. Hopes it will still be possible to avoid a major clash.

Last Paper.

J 3262.

References.

J 3193

(Print) 22/9  
Egypt (in & out)

(How disposed of.)

tel Cairo 1228  
Sept 20<sup>th</sup>

(Minutes.)

I personally agree entirely with everything in this telegram. Please see also Mr. Shone's telegram No: 1841 within.

So far as action is concerned, please see 23 of No: 1839. It is for consideration whether we should not authorize Mr. Shone to give the proposed warning if and when he thinks it necessary. Draft at back.

Perivener.  
19/9

We have heard all this before and all these comings and goings seem to me rather silly, especially if, as appears from paragraph 4 of telegram No. 1841, the result has been to obtain, via Jerusalem, an expression of Nahas's disapproval of Mr. Shone's letter, on the ground that it constitutes interference in Egyptian affairs.

1/

(Action completed.)

M.H. (Index.)

6/26/9

20/10

Next Paper.

J 3269



X  
I wish the Embassy could learn to take a more detached view of these bickerings and be a little less inclined to confront us with a crisis.

Nevertheless, Mr. Shone is right when he points out that the Monarchy is of great value to us in Egypt, whatever may be the case as regards the Monarch.

I have made Mr. Scrivener's draft telegram a little more explicit.

19th September, 1944.

K

OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

44

Registry  
No. J 3266/31/16.

M.P.

Draft.

H.M. Chargé  
d'Affaires  
CAIRO.

Telegram.

No. 1228

Cypher. 20

War Cabinet  
Distribution.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Despatched

September

1944.

Immediate

7/5/44 M 10/10

Your telegram No. 1839, paragraph

2:

We have no intention of bringing strong pressure to bear on the King over this matter and generally speaking, we are anxious to rule out the idea that H.M.G. may be invoked by either side over bickerings which are in themselves completely unimportant.

2. Nevertheless, you may, if you think it necessary, convey some such warnings as that proposed in your paragraph 3. Nahas Pasha can have no reason to count on our support in this instance and it has been made clear to his <sup>Commissary</sup> ~~Commissary~~, Aboud, even in the last few days, that we cannot pledge ourselves in advance even on an issue of constitutional importance. Much less on this kind of undignified squabbling in which, so far as we can judge, Nahas is mainly in the wrong.

AR scio

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

J.3266/31/16

[GYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO (CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES)

No. 1228

20th September, 1944 D. 7.05 p.m. 20th September, 1944

g g g g g

IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 1839.

We have no intention of bringing strong pressure to bear on the King over this matter and generally speaking, we are anxious to rule out the idea that His Majesty's Government may be invoked by either side over bickerings which are in themselves completely unimportant.

2. Nevertheless, you may, if you think it necessary, convey some such warning as that proposed in your paragraph 3. Nahas Pasha can have no reason to count on our support in this instance and it has been made clear to his emissary, Abboud, even in the last few days, that we cannot pledge ourselves in advance even on an issue of constitutional importance. Much less on this kind of undignified squabbling in which, so far as we can judge, Nahas is mainly in the wrong.

OTF.

275

J

56

J 3812

31 OCT 1944

41334

FROM I.C.E.  
(communicated).

No.

Dated 25th July, 1944.

Received in Registry 31st Oct., 1944.

J:EGYPT & Sudan.

Ikhwan el Muslimeen.

Transmits revised version of P.I.C. Paper No.49, on the Foundation, Aims and Objects, etc. of the Moslem Brotherhood.

Last Paper.

J 37 & 8 (J/K 40)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

1/10/44

(Index.)

J.M.  
12/10/45

Next Paper.

(Minutes.)

copy for reference.

The account.

X The 2/11

1/11

*Duplicate,  
not required  
back in F.O.P.D.*

*Mr. Covel Price,  
Egyptian Dept.  
F.O.*

*Mr. Bowman  
51*

**SECRET**

P.L.C. Paper No. 49 (Revised)

**SECRET**

Ikhwan al Muslimeen

FIC/117

*Have an already for them!  
If work please enter CP 25/10.*

Foundation

1. The Ikhwan al Muslimeen (Moslem Brotherhood) was founded by Sheikh Hassan el Banna about 1930. Hassan el Banna, who was born about 1897, was originally employed in 1919 as a school teacher at Suez and later Ismailia. He founded the Ikhwan while he was still in the Canal Area and it was not until he was transferred to Cairo in 1934 that the Society became of any real importance. An enthusiast for the Moslem way of life, he gradually gained influence owing to his undoubted ability as an orator. El Banna's sincerity was unquestioned by his followers in the early years of the movement and it is possible that at that time their faith in him was not misplaced. As the power and influence of the Society grew in the war years, the character of their leader underwent a change, and from a religious leader el Banna has developed into a clever and by no means scrupulous politician. Nevertheless he lacks courage, and it is considered unlikely that he himself would deliberately provoke an uprising led by his Ikhwan. In the event of another 1919, El Banna would undoubtedly throw his powerful following into the struggle and would endeavour to gain the leadership; but the initiation of trouble would have to come from others. Apart from the Wafd, the Ikhwan al Muslimeen is the only well organized political machine in Egypt and as such it lies a menacing shadow across the political life of the country.

Aims and Objects.

2. The aims of the Ikhwan are to form a new generation that will understand Islam and follow its teachings, and to direct attention towards the revival of Islam so that the whole life of the nation will benefit from its influence. Modern Western civilisation, it is considered, depends entirely on materialism only. This materialistic civilisation degrades human life in both the West and in the East, but in the East moral standards were lowered and ethical values were debased in the attempt to copy the West. Western culture is regarded as being responsible for the present evils in Egypt, for having brought about an abasement of morals, conduct and character, and for having exposed the people to poverty and misery, and must therefore be excluded by re-establishing the Government and institutions on pure Koranic principles.

3. In a speech to his followers in April 1943, Hassan el Banna is reported to have stated that the whole governmental system in Egypt was rotten and needed a complete reorganisation in which the Ikhwan should play a prominent part. Islam, which did not tolerate domination by peoples of other religions, must be applied to practical politics, and it was the task of the Ikhwan to rid Egypt of foreign influence in both political and economic spheres. In order to accomplish this task, the Ikhwan would try to create a strong body of anti-foreign feeling that would support them irresistibly in the demand for Egyptian independence, and they would "rely on bringing about the desired change by influencing people's minds".

4. The Ikhwan considers that these aims can be realised by presenting the beauty of Islam and the reverence of its law, both practically and theoretically, by creating a Moslem public opinion that will firmly believe in these ideas, and by convincing the legislative and executive authorities so that these ideals may be fulfilled. "We are waiting for a suitable time. We believe that the hour of victory of Islam is sure to come."

/5. In order

J 3812  
21 OCT 1944

5. In order to achieve these aims, the movement is organised for social, educational and charitable work among Moslems throughout Egypt, and funds are forthcoming from the most respectable Moslem circles. At various times the Ikhwan have put forward schemes designed to improve the lot of the poor Moslem; but few of these plans have developed and many have hardly outlived their inception. Lectures, educational classes, scouting, sporting clubs, primary and elementary schools, cooperative societies, free clinics, are among the schemes envisaged. Mosques have been built in many provincial towns and many have been repaired. Comparative failure to put these theoretical schemes on a practical basis, however, constitutes one of the fundamental weaknesses of the Society, since it has little to offer its members except promises for an indefinite future.

#### Membership

6. The membership of the Ikhwan has been variously estimated at from one hundred thousand to five hundred thousand. The movement is essentially a working-class one, and the membership is drawn largely from the small town workers. It also includes some of the more educated elements of the lower middle class, especially school teachers, to whom its genuine ideals as much as its actual achievements in social and educational work make an appeal, and a small section of the student population. There are, however, many instances of fellahin joining the Ikhwan only to resign membership on discovering that the organisation had political connections that might bring them into opposition with the Government and local officials. Landowners are not generally enthusiastic over the society since they fear that they might lose authority over the fellahin if the principles of the Ikhwan were too closely adhered to.

7. The wording of the plight of fealty reads as follows: "I undertake to adhere to the principles of the Moslem Brethren, and to endeavour to fulfil their aims, adhere to the morals of Islam and safeguard the dignity of the organisation. I rely upon God for He will help me to perform this." Once having been accepted, the Moslem Brother has many moral obligations to fulfil. He must have a definite aim in life, and a pure faith; he must try to secure the knowledge that is essential to this faith; he must follow the example of the prophet and worship God in the right manner; he must join the Rover group (Gawwala) if eligible. He must propagate the principles of the Brethren among his friends, colleagues and relatives, and he must contribute financially according to his ability - poor members being exempted from making any payment.

#### Organisation

8. Hassan el Banna has made a careful study of the Nazi and Fascist organisations. Using them as a model, he formed within the Ikhwan the Gawwala (or "Rovers") and Kataib, specially trained and trusted men who correspond respectively to the Brown Shirts and the Blackshirts (Hitler's bodyguard). Each branch had its own Katiba (plural Kataib) composed of its most enthusiastic and trusted members, and Hassan el Banna used to have his own special Katiba. Certain elements of the Kataib were also reported to form a suicide squad. It appears, however, that the Kataib principle, like many of the schemes for social improvement or for developing the organisation of the Ikhwan, has fallen into disuse.

9. The Ikhwan is now believed to have been reorganised on the following lines: the branches, which are estimated at over a thousand, are grouped into Shubas or districts, each Shuba being controlled by a President and eleven councillors. The Shubas are arranged in a series of zones of which there are /seven teen,

- 3 -

seventeen, each possessing its own administrative body of four officials. This decentralisation means that the activities of the organisation should no longer be handicapped or disrupted by the closing of meeting places or by the arrest of leading members, and many of the smallest sections are now able to operate without the direction of a senior body. The whole association is directed by a supreme committee of eighteen members presided over by Hassan el Banna. A number of committees also exist at the headquarters of the Ikhwan to control the activities of the Gawwala, the workers and students, to organise propaganda, cultural and religious teaching, and deal with other administrative matters.

10. On paper, there are three consultative groups to look after the activities of the whole organisation, but it is known whether this system is actually in force. These groups are the General Consultative Council, the General Advisory Council and the Central Consultative Council. The whole organisation can be likened to a school, the curriculum of which is the Koran. The General Consultative Council representing the Administration; the General Advisory Council, the headmaster; the Central Consultative Council, the teachers; villages, towns, clubs and mosques are the classrooms; and the members of the Ikhwan are the students.

#### Financial Organisation

11. The funds of the Ikhwan come from subscriptions, contributions, pious bequests (Wakfs) and subsidies. Although each branch is financially independent and its property is registered under its own name, borrowing between the branches and other forms of cooperation are permissible, for the branches "have one aim in common".

#### Brief History to 1942

12. The Ikhwan entered the political arena during the time of the Palestine troubles (1936-1939) when they played a prominent part in anti-British agitation, the Moslem character of the Ikhwan tending to make it anti-European and therefore anti-British in outlook. In 1940, Hassan el Banna was associating with Ali Maher, then Prime Minister, and the Ikhwan received his support and that of the anti-British group of which he was the head. The Palace, too, with whom the movement was in contact almost since its inception, realised that it might be useful and gave it protection and financial help. In 1941, Hassan el Banna was relegated from Cairo to a school at gona for having criticised Hussein Sirry Pasha's Government; but within a few months he was transferred back to Cairo. Members of the Ikhwan became less guarded in their anti-British pronouncements; reports were received of attempts at sabotage, collection of information about British troop movements and increasing anti-British propaganda, and the British authorities finally requested the internment of both Hassan el Banna and his Vice-President, Ahmed as Sukkari. The arrests were carried out in October 1941. In November 1941, the police also apprehended a number of students who were trying to hold a protest meeting, but Hussein Sirry took fright and ordered the release of the two leaders. Since his internment, Hassan el Banna has been more cautious in his public declarations.

#### Relations with the Wafd

13. The Ikhwan reacted unfavourably to the British insistence on the installation of Nahas Pasha as Premier, and decided to put forward a number of candidates in the forthcoming elections, including Hassan el Banna himself for Ismailia. Nahas, however, threatened Hassan el Banna that unless he withdrew his candidature he would be reinterned, but at the same time offered to help the Ikhwan if they would work in with him. Nahas, moreover, gave Hassan el Banna £450 to compensate him for his forfeited deposit and to cover any incidental expenses. Although at a meeting of the Ikhwan it was

/resolved to

resolved to support Hassan el Banna and defy the Prime Minister, Hassan el Banna declared in an open letter to Nahas published in 'Al Ahram' his loyalty both to the Government and to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. His sincerity to either has yet to be proved. Hassan el Banna's act brought on him widespread criticism from some of his followers, resulting in a temporary split within the society which seriously affected its activities.

14. Thus a truce existed between the Wafd and the Ikhwan. It was expedient for the Ikhwan to maintain good relations with the Wafd, since opposition might lead to branches being closed, leaders being interned and the future of the Ikhwan being jeopardised. In public, Hassan el Banna fulfilled his part of the agreement by refraining from provocative criticism of the Wafd, though his mental attitude towards the Wafd remained unchanged.

15. The Wafd, for its part, still regarded the activities of the society with suspicion and kept a close watch on its activities. This suspicion was justified, for reports were received that branches of the Ikhwan, particularly in the provinces, were once again indulging in political activity and anti-Wafdist propaganda. A Government Order was consequently issued at the end of January 1943 banning all meetings of the Ikhwan except at the Headquarters in Cairo (Helwiah el Guedida), and even for these special permission had first to be obtained from the Public Security authorities. The Prime Minister's decision thus to curtail and control the activities of the organisation naturally caused a great deal of discontent among its members and it was generally felt, quite wrongly, that it was due to British instigation.

16. On 29 March 1943, Makram Ebeid Pasha produced the "Black Book of the Black Age", containing allegations of the corrupt activities of Nahas Pasha and the Wafd administration. To have arrested Makram would have amounted to a confession of weakness. To have referred the matter to the Courts would have involved long and protracted litigation. After having consulted H.M. Ambassador, Nahas decided to reply in Parliament to the accusations levelled at him and at the administration, which he did at great length. Nahas, searching for support decided that the Ikhwan might once more become an ally. The most vulnerable point on which Makram could be discredited in the eyes of the general public is the fact that he is a Copt, and as the popularity of the Ikhwan is based largely on its appeal to religious feeling, this may have influenced his choice. Negotiations between Nahas and Hassan el Banna were therefore resumed.

17. The ban which had been imposed on meetings of the association was raised on 8 May for Cairo and the following week for the large provincial towns. Hassan el Banna, anxious not to prejudice the chances of having the ban completely lifted, instructed his supporters to be careful to avoid hostile references to the Wafd in public, and he himself publicly affirmed on more than one occasion that the "Black Book" was a deceptive document and that he hoped that no one would be led astray by its lies. On 16 May 1943, a large meeting of the Ikhwan was held at the association's headquarters at Helwiah el Guedida, at which four Cabinet Ministers (Fuad Sorag el Din, Abdel Hamid Abdel Hak, Ahmed Hanza and Mahmoud Soliman Ghannan) were present, the first three of whom spoke in eulogistic terms of the Ikhwan and expressed the desire to join the Brotherhood. Subsequent reports indicate that a definite bargain was struck and that in return for various privileges, Hassan el Banna was prepared to instruct the leaders of all branches of the Ikhwan to render the greatest possible assistance to the Wafd.

18. The advantages which would accrue to Hassan el Banna were not at first apparent for, on the face of it, he had undertaken to

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champion the cause of a discredited regime, and should the Wafd fall (which at the time appeared likely) Hassan el Banna would have been sitting on the wrong side of the fence. One of the reasons which influenced Hassan el Banna to make a pact with the Wafd was, of course, the desire to avoid the recurrence of repressive measures against the Ikhwan. He was also looking further to the future. When he formed the Brotherhood in 1930, he stated that he would require fifteen years to bring it to maturity, but in the thirteen years that had passed it was not yet as powerful as he would have hoped. To continue to develop the Ikhwan undisturbed, it was essential he should not only come to terms with the Wafd but also to render himself so indispensable to them that they would be prepared to oppose any subsequent British demand for repressive action against his organisation.

19. Hassan el Banna's first task was to convince his supporters of the wisdom of his support of the Wafd, for he was severely criticised for having undertaken to assist a corrupt and possibly doomed administration. Many of his supporters deserted him and it appeared that by pledging his allegiance he had committed a grave mistake. With the aid of his subordinates who had been taken fully into his confidence, however, Hassan el Banna slowly but steadily overcame the opposition. The benefits which would accrue by the freedom from official intervention which had been promised by the Government were stressed, and it was also repeatedly emphasised that Hassan el Banna had no intention of adhering too strictly to the terms of the agreement. The rank and file of the Ikhwan were finally won over and by the end of September 1943, Hassan el Banna was able to take advantage of the situation and concentrate on the fulfilment of his plans for the future. He intensified the recruiting campaign and made a thorough overhaul of the administrative system of the organisation. Regular meetings were held, members of the Gawwala paraded at least once a week and were given elementary semi-military training, membership of the Ikhwan increased, new branches were inaugurated and subsections of those already in existence were formed.

20. Towards the end of October 1943, Nahas began to feel some qualms at the increasing strength of the Ikhwan and warned Hassan el Banna of the dangers of any failure to observe his part of the bargain. Hassan el Banna protested that he had not forgotten his undertaking and assured the Prime Minister that he had no intention of breaking his word. Both parties apparently appreciated that the rapprochement was merely a matter of political expediency for each.

21. Thus, sheltered by the Wafd's policy of non-intervention, Hassan el Banna was able to accomplish more in twelve months than he had previously achieved in twelve years. There are now thought to be over a thousand branches, Gawwala bands have been provided with semi-military training, and certain sections are reported to have been issued with fire-arms and to have received preliminary training in their use. Nahas, on the other hand, appears to have realised that his benefits were only negative - members of the Ikhwan refrained from open criticism of the Wafd but equally refrained from attacking the opponents of the Wafd as had been promised. In fact, with the exception of complaints to the representatives of the Allied powers against the activities of the French in Algiers and against the attitude of the American senators towards the Palestine problem, the Ikhwan have done nothing to aid the Wafd, and not a finger was lifted to aid Nahas during the April 1944 crisis.

22. The release from internment of prominent members of the Young

Young Egypt Party and the eventual release of its leader, Ahmed Hussein, has disquieted Hassan el Banna, and he fears that the Ikhwan may be dislodged from its favoured position.

#### Relations with the Opposition

22. The attitude of the Ikhwan to the Opposition is reported to be one of charitable tolerance, for the leaders of the Ikhwan cannot see any advantage in either opposing or supporting the Opposition parties as long as they are considered not powerful enough to be regarded as serious rivals. Hassan el Banna is said always to have maintained that he did not regard either the Liberal or the Saadist Party as a serious obstacle to his ambitions. While welcoming any of their members who might wish to join the Ikhwan, he otherwise takes little interest in them, for cooperation with any Opposition party has been considered by Hassan el Banna as fatal to the Ikhwan.

#### Relations with the Palace

23. Although the Palace seems to have taken an interest in the Ikhwan almost from its inception, financial help is not thought to have been given until about 1940. Palace subsidies were cut off at the time of Hassan el Banna's setback at the hands of Nahas Pasha and it would appear that at present there is no definite understanding between the Palace and the Ikhwan. It appears, however, that the initiative in any move towards closer relationship between the Ikhwan and the Palace has generally come from the latter.

#### The Future

24. As long as the Wafd is in power, Hassan el Banna will probably remain comparatively quiet and concentrate on taking advantage of the freedom accorded by Nahas to convert his already powerful organisation into a yet stronger force. When the Wafd eventually leaves office, however, he will be faced with two alternatives: he can either throw in his lot with the Wafd, or he can offer the services of the Ikhwan to the new Government in the hope of obtaining equally favourable treatment. If Hassan el Banna adopts the former course, the lot of any future Ministry would be made very much more difficult and the security of the country might be seriously endangered. Should he adopt the latter course and, in exchange for various privileges, help to withstand the attacks of the Wafd in Opposition, the resulting clash might well be equally endangering to public security. It seems clear that the Ikhwan is destined to play a prominent part in future political developments.

25. The militant and xenophobic characters of the Ikhwan, and the fact that there are throughout Egypt a large number of arms (largely obtained from abandoned dumps in the Western Desert) that could be brought into use should feeling be sufficiently aroused, make the Ikhwan a potential danger that cannot be discounted. Its weakness, however, lies in its leadership. Hassan el Banna is not only the undisputed leader of the Brotherhood but he is its only outstanding personality. The society is completely dependent on him, and although he may be dangerous because of the power he can wield the dependence of the Brotherhood on his leadership may yet be the cause of its downfall. Despite the new policy of decentralisation whereby the Ikhwan hopes to be able to continue its activities if premises are closed or leading members arrested, should Hassan el Banna for any reason be removed, the Ikhwan, in the absence of any successor of comparable driving force and inspiration, might easily crumble away.

P. I. C. M. E.  
25 July 1944.

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