1944

J1482/G

J1482/31/16

Cairo
No 816
Dated April 23
Rec'd April 24.

King Farouk: political situation in Egypt.

Gives details of military forces available in case of necessity. Discusses question of succession in case of King Farouk's abdication; suggests mode of travel & final destination.

Last Paper.
J1469

References.
J543/133/9 - 1942

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)
P.A. 27/4

(Index.)
Wpt.

Next Paper.
J1498

(Minutes.)

pp. in Egypt

The Ambassador has half deposed King Farouk already. I still feel personally that such an outcome of the present issue would have most unfortunate consequences from the point of view of Anglo-Egyptian relations.

I attach J543 of 1942, which shows the steps taken to find a home for King Farouk if required on that occasion, and also our suggestions for the succession. Since the Embassy may well have broached that telegram in the flap, we should perhaps repeat it now.

For the rest, I shall be inclined to copy this telegram to the DO (for information) only, & to take no further steps unless & until the issue becomes more immediate. (I think we rejected South Africa last time on the ground that it was too close to Egypt).

Warrisner.
24/4.

It will need discussion. This leads in Cairo. I would reject J543 & should wait.

The King appears now to have retreated.
AC. April 25.1944.

No action J 27/4.

24.4.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[CYPHER] DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Killearn
No. 818 D. 4.52 p.m. 23rd April, 1944
23rd April, 1944 R. 6.50 p.m. 23rd April, 1944

g g g g g

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

On my instructions, His Majesty's Minister and Oriental Counsellor discussed yesterday evening, very tentatively, details of military measures in the event of force having to be used in emergency.

2. General Stone emphasised the importance of our being assured that Nahas Pasha would fully co-operate and that Prince Mohammed Ali would accept the succession if King Farouk were to abdicate or be deposed.

3. General Stone also stressed the importance of the time factor. Though he could provide guard for various essential points in Cairo by April 24th, enough troops would not be available for full military action in Cairo before April 27th at the earliest. Even with the force then available there would be an element of gamble.

4. General Stone said that it was desirable to decide beforehand where King Farouk should be sent in the event of abdication or deposition. He greatly favoured his being sent by air from Cairo west as that would involve the shortest passage through parts not in our military control. May I be informed on this? I remember that in 1942 Canada expressed willingness to take him but South Africa would be easier.

OTP.

1944

41328
CRYPTIC

J1439 /G
26
12

9

J1439 / 31/16 / 314/9

Cairo
No 801
Dated April 21
Rec'd April 21.

King Farouk: proposed change of govt.
Rep to F.O. tel No 560. (J1440)
Will act upon instruction in this tel. when i audience with the King
Nahas pasha is willing to go to the electors if required to do so.

Last Paper.
J1425

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

21/4

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
P.U. 27/4	

Next Paper.
J1448.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

J 1439

[CYPHER] DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET).

FROM CAIRO (AMBASSADOR) TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Killearn. D: 1.15 p.m. 21st April, 1944.
No. 801. R: 1.10 p.m. 21st April, 1944.
21st April, 1944.

555

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No. 560. J1410/314/G.

I have applied for audience this afternoon to act upon your instructions. I shall stick to the original wording, not that contained in your telegram No. 563. J1410/314/G.

2. I have ascertained in advance that Nahas Pasha, if requested by King Farouk to go to electors, will be willing to do so. His Excellency gave this reply with no hesitation.

O.T.P.

1944

10

CONTRAIL

J1448 /G

24

J1448 3/514/16

Cairo
No 809
Dated April 21
Rec'd April 22

King Farouk: proposed change of govt

Rep to F.O. tel No 560 (J1410)
Records conversation with King Farouk of April 21, when War Cabinet message was considered.

Last Paper.
J1439

References.
J 1380/31/16.

(Print.)
Egypt vol.

(How disposed of.)
Copied to Chiefs of Staff April 22

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
P 4 13/5	Mpt.

Next Paper.
J 1449.

(Minutes.)

See on J1449.

J 22/4.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER] DEPARTMENTAL SECRET

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Killearn
No. 809 D. 10.10. p.m. 21st April 1944

21st April 1944 R. 11.40. p.m. 21st April 1944

* * * *

MOST IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 560.

Top Secret.

I was received by King Farouk at 5.p.m. this afternoon. I gave him the message from the War Cabinet.

2. His Majesty at once observed that for reasons already stated in writing (my telegram No. 722) it was quite impossible to hold an election under Nahas Pasha. There was in fact nothing new to tell me since his written note. He had only contemplated a Palace Ministry to make "free" election possible. In short repeated His Majesty once more, everything he had to say was already contained in his written note.

3. His Majesty then said that he had a question to put to His Majesty's Government; thus at his dictation I took down as follows:-

"Is the British Government prepared to choose definitely between the King of Egypt and Nahas Pasha staying in power?" When I asked for elucidation His Majesty dictated the following:- "this means that King Farouk, apart from acting as he thinks best in the interest of his country, is thinking essentially of defending his honour."

4. His Majesty added that if the answer was in favour of Nahas Pasha he trusted that our exchange of letters with the latter of February 5th, 1942 would "be withdrawn." To which I replied that in such event that would presumably be a matter for Nahas Pasha's consideration.

5. I said that I must crystallise His Majesty's answer into a form I could submit to you. Surely he would like to ponder a little? His Majesty said no, his reply was clear. So I put him these two questions:

"(a) Are you prepared to let Nahas Pasha himself go to the country?" Reply: "I could not think of inviting him

/ to go

to go to the country at present owing to complete lack of free election."

6. I then put my second question (b) "Is Your Majesty prepared to carry on with the existing Government?" To this His Majesty replied that he must first know the answer to the questions he had put earlier to His Majesty's Government.

7. Pending such answer His Majesty renewed his formal undertaking that no action should be taken meanwhile.

8. His Majesty was calm and collected - and friendly throughout - he explained that he was absolutely detached. It was fate and not he himself which had made him King of Egypt and faced him with these problems.

9. I pressed him repeatedly to give an affirmative answer to me on other point in War Cabinet message. He said that he had nothing to add to what he had already stated.

10. Before leaving I said that with His Majesty's permission I proposed to see Has... Pasha and tell him of your message and of what had passed with him. He agreed. For account of that conversation see my immediately following telegram.

11. Copied to Lord Moyne and Commanders-in-Chief.

O.T.P.

19

J1469 /G 16

J1469 / 31/314 / 9 16

War Cabinet Offices.
W.P. (44) 213
Dated April 19
Rec'd April 22.

Kuwait: constitutional crisis.
Memo by P.M.
Circulates note by the F.O.
dated April 17, for consideration
of the War Cabinet.

Last Paper.
J 1468

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)
Minute to P.M.
No P.M./44/265
of April 20

(Minutes.)

J. 22/4.

See within 1) D.O. tel. No 610 of 22/4
2) D.O. tel. No 614 of 22/4.
3) D.O. tel. No 628 of 25/4
4) P.M. minute of May 4.

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
P.H. 27/4	

Next Paper.
J1482.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

265

Minutes.

77

K
P.M.

I understand you have asked)
~~The Prime Minister has asked~~ for a note on the part played by King Farouk in provoking the present crisis in Egypt.

For some months past His Majesty and his Government have been accusing each other of slighting behaviour, and jockeying for position; and it would be difficult to apportion the blame clearly though His Majesty has throughout adopted a very off-hand manner with his Prime Minister. His Majesty appears, however, to have been finally provoked to action by the circumstances of Nahas Pasha's recent tour of Upper Egypt; and to have indicated to his entourage, for general oral circulation, that he had had enough and that the time had at last come for a change of Government. (We heard these reports a week before the King acted). The next step was His Majesty's action in sending for the Ambassador and handing him an indictment of Nahas Pasha's administration in support of his decision to dismiss it. A copy of this indictment is attached.

[A.C.]

20th April 1944.

approved by Sir A. Cadogan.

P.M./44/265.

Relevant Memo for Macdonald

PRIME MINISTER.

I understand you have asked for a note on the part played by King Farouk in provoking the present crisis in Egypt.

2. For some months past His Majesty and his Government have been accusing each other of slighting behaviour, and jockeying for position; and it would be difficult to apportion the blame clearly though His Majesty has throughout adopted a very off-hand manner with his Prime Minister. His Majesty appears, however, to have been finally provoked to action by the circumstances of Nahas Pasha's recent tour of Upper Egypt; and to have indicated to his entourage, for general oral circulation, that he had had enough and that the

time ....

time had at last come for a change of Government. (We heard these reports a week before the King acted). The next step was His Majesty's action in sending for the Ambassador and handing him an indictment of Nahas Pasha's administration in support of his decision to dismiss it. A copy of this indictment is attached. *

(Signed) A. CADOGAN.

20th April, 1944.

* Cairo (Ambassador) telegram 722.

With the compliments of the
Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

CYPHER (O.T.P.) R.D.

FROM: D.O.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA "
NEW ZEALAND "
SOUTH AFRICA "

Sent 3.00 p.m., 22nd Apr., 1944.

D No. 610 TOP SECRET

Following for Prime Minister.

My telegram D No. 586 of 19th April.

War Cabinet considered Egyptian crisis on April 20th. As result His Majesty's Ambassador was instructed to deliver following message to King Farouk.

2. Begins. The War Cabinet have heard with much concern that Your Majesty contemplates dismissing from office the Government of Nahas Pasha, although this Government has a large majority in the Chamber which has still three years of its lawful term to run. From a parliamentary and constitutional point of view this would appear to be a very doubtful and possibly dangerous course to embark on. If however Your Majesty feels that an immediate General Election would clear the air, and if the Prime Minister is persuaded to submit himself to the electors, a dissolution forthwith would not be a subject on which the United Kingdom Government would feel it right to express an opinion. The one course which the United Kingdom Government feel it would be especially necessary to avoid would be the installation in office of a Palace Minister or other Minister not possessing a majority in the Legislature, and the keeping of this new Minister in power for the purpose of managing the Election. The United Kingdom Government would find it impossible to defend such procedure in public, and would feel bound to instruct their Ambassador to tender formal advice against such a course. The War Cabinet desire me to say that they would appreciate an expression of Your Majesty's views upon this matter, which might become exceedingly grave, before any further steps are taken to bring it to a head. Ends.

3. Please see my immediately following telegram.

Copy to:- W.C.O. Sir E. Bridges
F.O. Sir B. Newton
Mr. J.D. Campbell
Mr. G. McKereth

SPECIAL

Please read reference as Dmy D610.

80

J1469

(This telegram must be paraphrased if the communication of its contents to any person outside Government service is authorised.)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

AMENDED COPY
CYPHER (TYPEX)

21 APR

R.D.

FROM: D.O.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA "
NEW ZEALAND "
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 11.55 p.m., 22nd Apr., 1944.)

D.No. 614 TOP SECRET

Following for Prime Minister.

My *telegram D. No. 610.*

His Majesty's Ambassador delivered message to King Farouk on 21st April having first ascertained that if requested by the King to do so Nahas Pasha would be willing to go to the electors.

2. The King at once observed that it was quite impossible to hold an Election under Nahas Pasha as it would not be free. He then said that he had the following question to put to the United Kingdom Government. "Is the United Kingdom Government prepared to choose definitely between the King of Egypt and Nahas Pasha staying in power?" When asked for elucidation he said "this means that King Farouk apart from acting as he thinks best in the interests of his country is thinking essentially of defending his honour".

3. His Majesty's Ambassador then enquired whether the King was prepared to carry on with the existing Government, to which the King replied that he must first know the answer to the question he had just put to His Majesty's Government. Pending such answer the King renewed his formal undertaking that no action should be taken meanwhile.

Copy to:- W.O.O. Sir E. Grigges
F.O. Sir H. Newton
Mr. J.D.Campbell
Mr. W.D.Allen

With the compliments of the
Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

25 APR 1944

(This telegram must be paraphrased if the communication of its contents to any person outside Government service is authorised)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

CYPHER (TYPEX)

FROM: D.O.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA "
NEW ZEALAND "
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 7.00 p.m. 26th Apr., 1944.)

D. No. 628 TOP SECRET.

Following for Prime Minister.

My telegram D. No. 614 of 22nd April.

In answer to War Cabinet message communicated to King Farouk on April 21st, latter has now replied that he has decided to leave the present Government in office for the time being.

Copy to:-

W.C.O. Sir E. Bridges
F.O. Sir B. Newton
Mr. J.D. Greenway
Mr. G. McKeroth

SPECIAL

A5

J

82

10, DOWNING STREET,
WHITEHALL,

J 1469

4th May, 1944.

COPY OF MINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

Reference: P.M./44/265: April 20. part played by King Farouk in providing personal crisis in Egypt.

"Thank you.

W.S.C.

4.5.44."

Put with J.

J 1469 / 314 / 9

- 5 MAY 1944

Copy also sent to:

1944

21

CORRESPONDENCE

J1498 /G

5

J.1498/31/16
5/4/5

Cairo
No 827
Dated April 24
Rec'd April 25

King Farouk: proposed change of govt.

Gives text of King Farouk's answer to the War Cabinet's message of April 21, stating that "he has decided to leave the present govt in office for the time being". Discusses possibility of meeting between King Farouk & Nahas Pasha. Discusses the members of the Govt.

Last Paper.

J1482.

References.

(Print.)

Egypt no 6

(How disposed of.)

Copied to Chiefs of Staff April 25

(Minutes.)

Copies to Chiefs of Staff.

We should perhaps consider instructing the Ambassador to convey to the King an expression of H.M.G's appreciation of his wise decision.

This surrender by the King will ensure another period of tranquillity which is particularly desirable at this juncture. But it will be generally known throughout Egypt that we have once again maintained Nahas in power; and we shall be held more than ever responsible for the acts of omission & commission of the Government. When the next crisis occurs, I hope that the general war situation will be such that we can stand aside and enable responsibility to return to the King.

Churchill
25/4.

I agree that this is not entirely satisfactory. I should have liked to have pressed for an election and to let it be known that we had done so.

If we are to send a message to King Farouk (I do not know that he particularly deserves one) I think that at the least we ought to add an expression of our view that tension so acute as has recently been the case/

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
P.H. 13/5	Mytt.

Next Paper.

J1499

case is best resolved by allowing the government in power to go to the country (a procedure which, although we need not say so, affords us some opportunity quite apart from the actual results of the election of gauging feeling in Egypt).

25th April 1944.

I shouldn't have been very keen on a message to the King, myself. But if we do send one, I don't hope it might take the form of expressing gratification at H.M. having been the wisdom of our advice.

Ought we not now, on the other hand, to start twisting the tail of Nahas? We have assured to him a further period of the sweets of office, and he ought to listen to us. Can't we press him to settle various matters and undertake reasonable reforms? I understand from P.M. today that he was thinking of sending something on these lines.

AE.

April 25th 1944.

I am sorry that this has got hung up — I meant to submit it but must have sent it back to Dept. by mistake.

Meanwhile we have rec'd minute from P.M. at Flag A. Actually, of his 3 proposals, he has already acted on 1 and (rather sketchily) 3. (He has not sent a message to Nahas, and I don't know though we might leave the letter out of this.

As regards his 2, I am still rather doubtful, but Lt. K. has told us he is proposing to see the King again: he will have to say something of gratification at the passing of the crisis, and if desired we might

See now Cairo tel 835

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Draft

might authorise him to say it in the name of the War Cabinet. It could not be very helpful and must be rather patronizing and would be in the nature of "nothing it in."

AC.
April 27. 1918.

I agree.

AJB April 27

91

J1498

26 APR 1944

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[Cypher] DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

FROM MINISTER TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Killearn. D. 7.08 p.m. 24th April, 1944.
No.827 R. 7.40 p.m. 24th April, 1944.

24th April, 1944.

- - - -

MOST IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

Hassanein Pasha has just handed me attached message from King Farouk.

J1448/G

[Begins]

In answer to War Cabinet message communicated by Your Excellency to His Majesty the King on April 21st, I am commanded by His Majesty to inform Your Excellency that he has decided to leave the present Government, [grp. undec.] office for the time being. [Ends].

2. I asked His Excellency to thank His Majesty for this wise decision which I was sure you would receive with the greatest relief.

3. I agreed on the other hand with his Excellency that cock-crowing on either side should be avoided. To that end I suggested that the indication that crisis was over had better come at first from the Palace, and we agreed that Nahas Pasha should be urged to ask for an audience at which His Majesty would have a frank discussion with him but be scrupulously gentle with him taking the line that whilst the conduct of the Government, had not been pleasing to His Majesty they should now make a fresh start. King Farouk would say there had been criticism of what the Government had been doing and he hoped that that would be put right. I emphasised that [? grp. omtd.? if] such an audience took place there should be no provocation by His Majesty who must use the utmost restraint. Being a born optimist what I still hoped for was genuine friendly co-operation between the two. Egypt must really show the world that she was grown up.

5 [sic] Has.... said that Nahas Pasha on his side must also co-operate. His Excellency urged that Nahas Pasha should cease his inflammatory [grp. undec.] [grp. undec. ? rebellious] [grp. undec. ? speeches] and he spoke of the desirability of getting rid of Ministers of Defence and Education. Of course until they [grp. undec.]ed it was essential that things should first slip back into normal.

6. I said that as regards the Minister of Defence he was past his work and the Chief of the General Staff also was not up to his job. My own view was that both should go.

...[grp.undec.?But]

F.O. REGISTRY

[grp. undec. ? But] I agreed that time must be allowed to arrange both palatably. As to the Minister of Education I was clear that it was not practical politics to expect the Government to part with their ablest member and technician. Has.... said why not make him President of the Chamber - a suggestion which I did not follow up.

7. We left it that I should at once see Amin Osman (Has... preferred this to me going to Nahas Pasha himself at his house owing to the flutter it would cause), tell him to inform Nahas Pasha of King Farouk's communication, impress upon Nahas Pasha importance of avoiding any cock-crowing, and endeavour to arrange Nahas Pasha should ask for audience on the lines proposed.

OTP.

22

EGYPTIAN
REGISTRY

J1499 / G

J 1499/31/16
~~344~~/9

Cairo
No 834
Dated April 24.
Rec'd April 25

King Fouad: reconciliation with Nahas Pasha

Reports that it has been decided to discuss details after King Fouad & Nahas Pasha are in friendly relationship.

Last Paper.
J 1498

References.

(Print.)
Egypt vol.

(How disposed of.)
Copied to Chiefs of Staff. April 25

(Action completed.)
D.H. 26/4

(Index.)
W.H.

Next Paper.
J1612

(Minutes.)
PP
Copied Chiefs of Staff.
These tels will be given War Cabinet distribution in future.
25/4.

93

J1499

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Killearn
No. 854.
24th April, 1944.

D. 10.55 a.m. 25th April, 1944.
R. 10.30 a.m. 25th April, 1944.

JJJ

MOST IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

Action taken with Amin accordingly. He said that he had already been approached by an emissary of the Palace with a suggestion of a reconciliation between the Palace and the Prime Minister on various conditions. Amin had replied that the first thing to do was to get the two principals i.e. King Farouk and Nahas Pasha into friendly relationship and then details could be discussed between Hassanein and Amin in a spirit of give and take. I agreed that this was a sensible line to take and precisely what I had urged upon Hassanein.

[O.T.P.]

8 1944

41328

J1425 /G

J1425 / 31/316 / 16

Cairo
No 788
Dated April 20
Rec'd April 21

King Farouk: proposed change of govt.

Ref. to F.O. tel 519 (J1318/316/G)
Conveys message from King Farouk to the Prime Minister, asking that action be taken against Nahas as he is reported to be holding meeting against the King. Has asked that Govt. refrain from provocation

Ref. to Dept. - (Minutes.) copy of tel. attached.

2/4.

Last Paper.
J1410.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)	(Index.)
P.H. 27/4	W/N.

Next Paper.
J1439

J

25

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[CYPHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Killearn
No. 788
April 20, 1944

D. 4.25 p.m. April 20, 1944
R. 4.30 p.m. April 20, 1944

& & &.

MOST IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 519.

Hasanein asked the Oriental Counsellor to call on him and handed him at 2.00 p.m. the following message from King Farouk for me to communicate to the Prime Minister.

[Begins:]

In telegram from the British Prime Minister which Your Excellency handed to me on April 18 I was asked to refrain from taking any action against Nahas Government and was told that His Britannic Majesty's Government "would almost certainly range themselves against whoever strikes first".

It has now come to my knowledge that Nahas Pasha intends at tonight's sitting of the Chamber of Deputies, very likely to be transformed into a secret session, to question the King's constitutional rights which have been applied and enforced since the promulgation of the Constitution and to argue that the King will be acting unconstitutionally in the event of his taking any action within the limits of his rights.

All reports reaching me agree that whatever the nature and [sic ? of] discussions this evening may be Nahas Pasha's intention is to deliver an attack on the King.

I would therefore request Your Excellency to telegraph the situation as set out above immediately to Mr. Churchill and to say that in this case Nahas Pasha "is striking first" and that action must at once be taken to prevent any parliamentary debate or decisions which would infringe the King's prerogatives or be detrimental to his dignity or prestige. [Ends].

2. The Oriental Counsellor told Hasanein that we had already received similar reports and that Amin Osman on being asked about them had categorically denied any such proceedings taking place in the Chamber this afternoon. The deputies Amin Osman said, had been summoned for this afternoon's unusual session (as a rule they do not meet on Thursdays) in case the political situation became critical to-day. But as things were, only ordinary business would be transacted.

3.....

3. Hasanein reminded the Oriental Counsellor of the occasion when Amin Osman had conveyed us an assurance from the Prime Minister that Hilali would not continue discussion of Hasanein's private debts and nevertheless Hilali had continued. He begged that the Ambassador should again get a categorical assurance from Amin Osman that no direct or indirect attacks would be made on the King in the Chamber this evening.

4. I have since spoken once more to the Secretary General emphasising the urgency of avoiding anything provocative or which might be interpreted by the Palace as giving pretext for action. He has assured me categorically that only normal business will be transacted in this afternoon's session: that Nahas Pasha will not himself attend: and begged me to add that unlike the Palace the Government stuck to their word.

[OTP]

41328

13

✓ 9.57 pm 20/5

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL TELEGRAM

10, Downing Street, Whitehall.

SERIAL No. T.892/4.

~~MOST IMMEDIATE~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~ DEDIP. ✓

Following from

PRIME MINISTER TO LORD KILLEARN, ~~LORD MOYNE AND THE THREE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF.~~

Please repeat this telegram to LORD MOYNE and the THREE COMMANDERS in CHIEF.

Diff. telegram H.M. Ambassador CAIRO No. 560 20.5.44 CYPHER PRISEC. Copy to Mr Churchill

The War Cabinet had under consideration to-day various telegrams from the Middle East about the dispute between King Farouk and his Government. They also re-read the telegrams which had passed on a very similar occasion almost exactly a year ago. They recommend that all parties should re-read these telegrams. They show most clearly the quite needless fears entertained by the then Commanders-in-Chief, and the gloomy prophesies which were made by the military authorities. They also show the anxieties expressed by the then Minister of State, the decisions which were taken here to over-ride these points of view, and the happy results attained by firm action by His Majesty's Ambassador, not excluding the threat use of force.

2. A new complication has arisen on this occasion in the Greek trouble, which involves some of our troops, and which I should like to get settled

before undertaking further labours. On the other hand, the improvement in the Allied war position is very great since this time last year. While therefore the use of force upon the King cannot be excluded, it is not probable that it will be required. It is however desirable to gain a little time to wear down the Greek mutineers.

3. The following message should be delivered, at his discretion, by Lord Killearn to King Farouk.

Begins. The War Cabinet have heard with much concern that Your Majesty contemplates dismissing from office the Government of Nahas Pasha, although this Government has a large majority in the Legislature and has still three years of its lawful term to run. From a parliamentary and constitutional point of view this would appear to be a very doubtful and possibly dangerous course to embark on. If however Your Majesty feels that an immediate General Election would clear the air, and if the Prime Minister is persuaded to submit himself to the electors, a dissolution forthwith would not be a subject on which His Majesty's Government would feel it right to express an opinion. The one course which His Majesty's Government feel it would be especially

necessary to avoid would be the installation in office of a Palace Minister or other Minister not possessing a majority in the Legislature, and the keeping of this new Minister in power for the purpose of managing the Election. His Majesty's Government would find it impossible to defend such procedure in public, and would feel bound to instruct their Ambassador to tender formal advice against such a course. The War Cabinet desire me to say that they would appreciate an expression of Your Majesty's views upon this matter, which might become exceedingly grave, before any further steps are taken to bring it to a head. Ends.

4. Meanwhile the Commanders-in-Chief should take all necessary steps to make sure that their forces are marshalled and ready to give support to the Ambassador should he require it.

WL
20.4.44.

Copy Nos
Sir A. Cadogan
Sir M. Peterson
Egyptian Dept.

[CYPHER]

P.R.P.S.E.C

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 560
20th April, 1944

D. 9.55 p.m. 20th April, 1944

dddddddd

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

DEDIP

Following from Prime Minister to Lord Killearn.

Please repeat this telegram to Lord Moyne and the three Commanders-in-Chief.

The War Cabinet had under consideration to-day various telegrams from the Middle East about the dispute between King Farouk and his Government. They also re-read the telegrams which had passed on a very similar occasion almost exactly a year ago. They recommend that all parties should re-read these telegrams. They show most clearly the quite needless fears entertained by the then Commanders-in-Chief, and the gloomy prophesies which were made by the military authorities. They also show the anxieties expressed by the then Minister of State, the decisions which were taken here to over-ride these points of view, and the happy results attained by firm action by His Majesty's Ambassador, not excluding the possible use of force.

2. A new complication has arisen on this occasion in the Greek trouble, which involves some of our troops, and which I should like to get settled before undertaking further labours. On the other hand, the improvement in the Allied war position is very great since this time last year. While therefore the use of force to bring pressure upon the King cannot be excluded, it is not probable that it will be required. It is however desirable to gain a little time to wear down the Greek mutineers.

3. The following message should be delivered, at his discretion, by Lord Killearn to King Farouk.

[Begins]

The War Cabinet have heard with much concern that Your Majesty contemplates dismissing from office the Government of Nahas Pasha, although this Government has a large majority in the Chamber which has still three years of its lawful term to run.

From/

From a parliamentary and constitutional point of view this would appear to be a very doubtful and possibly dangerous course to embark on. If however Your Majesty feels that an immediate General Election would clear the air, and if the Prime Minister is persuaded to submit himself to the electors, a dissolution forthwith would not be a subject on which His Majesty's Government would feel it right to express an opinion. The one course which His Majesty's Government feel it would be especially necessary to avoid would be the installation in office of a Palace Minister or other Minister not possessing a majority in the Legislature, and the keeping of this new Minister in power for the purpose of managing the Election. His Majesty's Government would find it impossible to defend such procedure in public, and would feel bound to instruct their Ambassador to tender formal advice against such a course. The War Cabinet desire me to say that they would appreciate an expression of Your Majesty's views upon this matter, which might become exceedingly grave, before any further steps are taken to bring it to a head. [Ends].

4. Meanwhile the Commanders-in-Chief should take all necessary steps to make sure that their forces are marshalled and ready to give support to the Ambassador should be require it.

O.T.P.

✓ 10.7 pm 20/4 18

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL TELEGRAM 10, Downing Street, Whitehall.

✓ MOST IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET
✓ DEDIP

SERIAL No. T.893/4

(following from)
PRIME MINISTER TO LORD KILLEARN.
SECRET, PRIVATE AND PERSONAL.

T.892/4

Dft. telegram
H.M. Ambassador
CAIRO
No. 561
TO CYPHER
PRIMEC.

You will have seen my No. 560 of the present date. Let me know exactly what you would like to do, and what you think can be done. It is curious how so far, exactly what happened last year has been repeated. However the Palace may have learned mischief by experience. General Stone exercised a defeatist influence last year. Is he playing any under part now?

20.4.44.

19

[CYPHER] PRISEC

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 561
20th April, 1944

D. 10.07 p.m. 20th April, 1944

dddddddd

MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

DEDIP

Following from Prime Minister to Lord Killearn.

Secret, Private and Personal.

You will have seen my No. 560 of the present date. Let me know exactly what you would like to do, and what you think can be done. It is curious how so far, exactly what happened last year has been repeated. However the Palace may have learned mischief by experience. General Stone exercised a defeatist influence last year. Is he playing any undue part now?

O.T.P.

Copy No 10
Sir A Cadogan
Sir M. Peterson
Egyptian Dept.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No.

Draft.

Hon. Ambassador Cairo

Telegram.

No. 563

Cypher

Priority

Copy to Mr Scrivener

Despatched 22 April 21/M.

Most Immediate
DEDIP
TOP SECRET

My tel. No. 560 [of 20th April: dispute between King Farouk & Egyptian Govt.]

Following should be added at end of para. 4. Begins:

"If you think "managing the election" too strong, you are at liberty to substitute "preparing for the election".

W.I. 20/4

[Sent on instns of W.C.O.]

21

[CYPHER] PRISEC

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 563 D. 12.22 p.m. 21st April, 1944.
21st April, 1944.

0 0 0 0

MOST IMMEDIATE

DEDIP

TOP SECRET

My telegram No. 560 [of 20th April: dispute between King Farouk and Egyptian Government].

Following should be added at end of paragraph 4.

[Begins]

If you think "managing the election" too strong, you are at liberty to substitute "preparing for the election".

O.T.P.

Copy No 50.
Sir A. Clydesmith.
Sir M. Peterson
Egyptian Sp.

Ret. to Egyptian Dept

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the War Cabinet. April 1944.

SECRET.

W.P. (44) 213.

19*th April*, 1944.

Copy No. 102

WAR CABINET.

EGYPT.

MEMORANDUM BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

I circulate herewith, for consideration by the War Cabinet, a note by the Foreign Office on the political crisis which has arisen in Egypt and is described in recent telegrams from His Majesty's Ambassador.

W. S. C.

19*th April*, 1944.

NOTE.

In May of last year King Farouk endeavoured to get rid of Nahas Pasha and his Government on the ground that they had been shown by the famous so-called "Black Book" (published by one of Nahas' ex-Ministers) to be corrupt and unworthy to continue in office. His Majesty's Government were unimpressed by these charges; they regarded a change of régime as definitely undesirable having regard to the war situation and the loyalty of Nahas to the Allied cause; and they advised King Farouk—who accepted their advice—to retain his Prime Minister in office and to collaborate with him.

2. This collaboration has proved increasingly difficult. For his part Nahas Pasha has continued to work loyally with us; but his administration has deteriorated and in particular mismanaged supplies, with a consequent loss of a measure of public support, though it remains the only party with a substantial public following. The King has now, without warning, confronted us with written proposals that he should dismiss Nahas and install in his place a Government composed of His Majesty's nominees to conduct a so-called "free election." The charges against Nahas are corruption, maladministration and an attempt to usurp the King's position and prerogatives. While there may be substance in some of these charges (though probably little in the last) we do not consider that they should be used at this stage of the war to oust Nahas Pasha and launch Egypt on a period of political uncertainty under Royal auspices.

3. Lord Killearn has indicated his preference for a policy of insisting, by force if necessary, on the retention of Nahas in power, though he warns us that conditions are less favourable to such a policy than in 1942. Having regard to the undoubted fall in Nahas Pasha's stock in the country, and to the fact that the questions at issue are largely those of Egyptian internal politics, we feel that every effort should first be made by oral representation to dissuade His Majesty from his present course; and that as an alternative to a blunt refusal of his present proposals we should urge on him the necessity of preparing for a general election, conducted by the present Government, though with such safeguards of freedom of voting as His Majesty may desire to suggest.

Foreign Office, 17*th April*, 1944.

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