

1944

J1398/G

41327

170
112

J1398/31/16
31/16
31/19
R/M Cairo
No 994
Dated April 18
Rec'd April 19

King Fouad; proposed change of gov.
Refo to Ambassador Cairo tel No 731.
(J1318). Reports special meeting of
Defence C'ttee when the problem of
interference was discussed & the probable
effects on Egypt & other M.E. countries
were considered.

Last Paper.

J 1390

References.

(Print.)

Egypt vol.

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

copy of ref. attached.
Department fully agree as regards the
inadvisability of using force.
under Article 119 of the Constitution
"Le roi nomme et révoque ses Ministres."
See also J 1399.

✓
Darius
1944
A J

(Action completed.)

P.H.
27/4

(Index.)

W.H.

Next Paper.

P. 200

J 1398

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

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[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO (MINISTER RESIDENT) TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Moyne.

D. 12.35 a.m. 19th April 1944.

No. 994.

R. 4.25 a.m. 19th April 1944.

18th April 1944.

0:0:0:0

IMMEDIATE

Ambassador's telegram No. 781.

TOP SECRET

A special meeting of Defence Committee was held to-day to consider the consequences resulting from situation as exposed in above-mentioned and preceding telegrams.

Service members of the Defence Committee were strongly opposed to the use of force in any way to impose a course of action on the King as they consider the probable results would constitute a greater threat to the security of our base in Egypt and to the general war effort in the Middle East than any disturbances which might arise from the Waif being out of office. They considered we should almost certainly have active opposition from the Egyptian Army if the King were coerced and at the very best we would lose the services of 20,000 men now co-operating in securing our base. Commander-in-Chief is telegraphing his views to the War Office separately.

The effect also on other Middle East countries might well be serious. The spontaneous and unanimous reaction of all Arab countries to French action in Beirut last November shows the increased extent to which the Arab world is now susceptible to events in any one member of it. Admittedly, the reaction in other states to strong measures in Egypt on our part is unlikely to be so violent as that displayed on the occasion of the Lebanon crisis but it would be unwise to count too much on this. We are however in Egypt on considerably weaker ground legally than were the French since her independence has been fully recognised by us since 1936. Furthermore Nahas Pasha when taking office on February 5th 1942, insisted on an exchange of letters of which the following are relevant sentences. He stated in his letter "I accept this mission on the basis that neither the Anglo-Egyptian treaty nor Egypt's situation as a sovereign and independent country permit her Allies to intervene in her internal affairs and particularly in the constitution and

/resignation

[Handwritten notes in left margin]



resignation of Cabinets." The Ambassador's reply contained the following words "I assure Your Excellency that the policy of His Majesty's Government is to secure sincere collaboration of the Government of Egypt as an independent Allied country in the execution of Anglo-Egyptian treaty without interference in internal affairs of Egypt or in the constitution or changes of her Government." It would be hard to make out now a case of overriding military necessity as we could in 1942. We should also lay ourselves open to strong criticism on the part of the French. What the King wishes to do is, I am informed, within his constitutional rights whereas the action of the Lebanese Government, if mandate is held to be legally operative, could have been regarded as ultra vires. *7

Finally, possible Egyptian reactions should not be lost sight of. *

In view of the opinion of Service Chiefs and of other considerations advanced above it seems to me that the use of force is not practicable.

An additional alternative to those in telegram No. 781 was discussed, namely to explain to Nahas that considerations no longer exist which would justify our acting in contradiction to our undertaking given him in the Ambassador's above quoted letter. We can therefore only support a retention of office by persuasion. If however he wishes us to press his claims it was thought that we should not do so to the extent of threatening the King and should if need be, accept dismissal of the Government on basis of last paragraph of the King's aide memoire.

The Ambassador said he would consider it an unwarranted risk to attempt bluffing the King by suggesting coercion unless we were prepared to fulfil our threat.

[Copies sent to Mr. Wiltshire]

O.T.P.

J1399 / G

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1944

EGYPTIAN

J1399/31/16
514/9

Cairo
No 767
Dated April 18
Rec'd April 19

King Farouk: proposed change of Gov^t
Refs to R/m Cairo tel 994 (J1398)
Insists on retention of Nahas Pasha
or that Nahas be allowed to go to
the polls. Lord Killearn told Re
meeting of the Defence C'tee that
a free election was not practicable

Last Paper.

J1398

(Minutes.)

pp - Dept

See J1398.

References.

J194

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

P.H.
27/4

(Index.)

W.P.

Next Paper.

J1410

J1399

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]. 173

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

Evo

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Killearn
No. 767

D. 7.15 p.m. 18th April, 1944
(G.M.T.)

18th April, 1944

R. 10.20 p.m. 18th April, 1944
(D.S.T.)

X X X X

IMMEDIATE

Memorandum telegram No. 994.

I do not propose to comment as my views are already fully before you. My only modification would be to insist upon course C of my telegram No. 751 i.e. either retention of Nahas Pasha or allow Nahas Pasha himself to go to the pells.

2. I did however tell the meeting that I should most warmly welcome a really free election were such possible. But that in my opinion this idea was not practical politics - least of all under a government headed by Hassanein, well-known as out and out henchman of the Palace who would see to it that Nahas Pasha - who by his dismissal would stand automatically condemned in the eyes of the electorate - did not get any support at the pells.

O.T.P.

F.O. REGISTER

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J 1394

EGYPT and SUDAN

41327

Registry Number } J 1394/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM Lord Killearn, Cairo.

No. 761

Dated 18th April

Received in Registry } 19th April 1944

J: Egypt and Sudan =

Political situation in Egypt: His Majesty's Ambassador's interview with Amin Osman.

Refers to Cairo telegram 760 (J 1393/31/16). On return from Palace His Majesty's Ambassador saw Amin Osman and conveyed gist of Prime Minister's message emphasising warning against provocative action by Government. Lord Killearn said that whether or not he returned to Cairo was for Nahas himself to decide, although it is fair that he should know that drastic action by Palace might be imminent. Amin undertook to inform Nahas immediately.

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

J 1393

See on J 1395

References.

J 1394

(Print) 21/4

Encl. vol.

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

6429 25/4

h.w. (Index.)

11/5/44

Next Paper.

J 1394
14 APR 1944

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Killearn
No. 761
18th April 1944

D. 2.30 p.m. GMT 18th April 1944
R. 4.45 p.m. BST 18th April 1944

Z-Z-Z-Z-Z

MOST IMMEDIATE

My telegram No. 760. *J 1393/31/16*

Immediately on my return from the Palace I saw Amin Osman at 2.30 p.m. and conveyed to him gist of the Prime Minister's message emphasising the warning against any provocative action by the Government. I had told King Farouk I would do this.

2. Amin Osman said Nashas Pasha was still in the country and was not proceeding to Alexandria until tomorrow, and I think that Nashas Pasha should return.

3. I replied that was a matter Nashas Pasha must judge for himself; but it was fair Nashas Pasha should know that drastic action by the Palace might be imminent. Meanwhile my position remained that I was awaiting your instructions.

4. Amin Osman said he would get into immediate communication with Nashas Pasha, tell him what I had said and, I gathered, suggest he should return to Cairo.

OTP

APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
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DEC
REGISTRY

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J. 1393
18 APR 1944

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a

41327

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number } J 1393/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM Lord Killearn, Cairo.

No. 760

Dated 18th April
Received in Registry } 19th April 1944

J: Egypt and Sudan =

Political situation in Egypt: His Majesty's Ambassador's interview with King Farouk.

Refers to Cairo telegram 759 (J 1385/31/16). His Majesty's Ambassador saw King Farouk and left with him a copy of the Prime Minister's message he remonstrated with him for having broken his pledge but His Majesty contended that circumstances forced his hand. Lord Killearn again wanted His Majesty against any hasty action before views of His Majesty's Government were received and stated that he was getting into contact with Nahas and warning him against provocative actions. Hassanein was also warned.

Last Paper.

J 1390

References.

(Minutes.)

See on J 1395.

J 1394

(Print. 7/4)
Egypt vol.

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

M. H. (Index.)

Next Paper.

J - 4 Telegram J 1393

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION. 162

FROM CAIRO (AMBASSADOR) TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Killearn. D: 2.24 p.m. G.M.T. 18th April, 1944.
No. 760. R: 4.55 p.m. B.D.S.T. 18th April, 1944.
18th April, 1944.

5 5 5

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 759. J 1385/31/16

I saw King Farouk at 1.45 p.m. today and gave him the Prime Minister's message, leaving him a copy in full.

2. I remonstrated with His Majesty for having broken his definite pledge to me through Hasanein on Saturday evening that he would take no action before seeing me again and learning the views of His Majesty's Government. His Majesty admitted his pledge, but argued that circumstances had forced his hand. The news had got out (he did not blame us for that) and it had become imperative to act immediately as Nahas Pasha was due today in Alexandria where there would be a repetition of his Upper Egypt performance.

3. I observed that this seemed on the face of it to be jumping to conclusions ahead of events. Anyway I must [grp: undec: ? warn] him formally of the unwisdom of hasty action before knowing the views of His Majesty's Government which might reach me at any minute now. And I drew his special attention to paragraph 6 of the Prime Minister's message.

4. His Majesty said that he would ponder this message and would send me an answer within the next hour.

5. I warned His Majesty that, as stated in the Prime Minister's message, I should forthwith be getting in contact with Nahas Pasha and warning him once more against any provocative actions.

6. On my way out, I saw Hasanein Pasha and repeated the same language to him.

O.T.P.

APR 19 1944
F.O. REGISTERED

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J

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16

41327
EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number } 1343/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Lord Killearn
No. (Cairo).
748

Dated 15th April, 1944.

Received in Registry } 16th April,
1944.

J: Egypt and Sudan

Activities of Wafd.

Refers to Foreign Office telegram No. 510 (J 1318/314/G) and states that Hassanein reaffirmed to Oriental Counsellor that Palace was not responsible for leakage of news and reported that Wafd were preparing Workmen's and Provincial Committees to cause trouble, producing as evidence report by Wafd organ "Al Misri" of sermon by Iman in Mosque in workmen's quarters. Oriental Counsellor stressed disastrous result of any action taken by the King at present. Hassanein pointed out possibility of disorders which might be used as proof that Wafd had some backing. In event of disorders action must be taken at once. States that in spite of warning to Amin there is still possible demonstrations. Requests instructions.

(Minutes.)

See minutes within

J. 16/4

Last Paper.

J1342

References.

(Print) 21/4
Egypt vol:

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

W.H. (Index.)
17/5/44

*CM-20
25/4*

Next Paper.

J. 13 70

Cairo telegrams Nos: 746, 748

749.

In those circumstances it would be well if the ^{copy attached} instructions which we propose to send to

Lord Kilbram could be sent on the Prime

Minister's authority with awaiting Cabinet approval.

An outbreak of disorder at this juncture might be more dangerous than the more routine (if

I can so describe it) election brambles, & we wish to bring control of the situation.

V. Curzon.

8/4

I don't know whether P. M. will have seen them yet. Private Secretary at Chequers might be asked to draw his attention to them, and suggest that he might suggest an instr. to Lt. K. without waiting for the Cabinet.

I have spoken to Private Secretary at Chequers.

Nothing to be written in this margin.

Minutes.

Chequers. These tele. will arrive here here
about 1 pm. Mr. Martin has promised
to draw P.M.'s attention to them at once.

The line which the P.M.'s minute
(which ought to be in London by now) takes is
that we must suggest L.K., that we
can't let down our friends (Nahes etc.),
that in any case we can't have Halsheim,
that with the fresh timber we have not
got enough for available at
the moment, and that elections should be
held in fair conditions later in the
year.

He wants to refer to the Cabinet, but
not to take a decision ^{first} on Monday,
and refer it to Cabinet on Wed.

I'm afraid this won't do.

Ab.
April 16. 1944.

Seen P.M.'s minute. I have
discussed with Sir A. Cadogan.

J. G.

Nothing to be written in this margin.

1343
16

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Killcarn
No. 748.
15th April, 1944.

D. 7.58 p.m. 15th April, 1944.
R. 10.50 p.m. 15th April, 1944.
GMT
DBST

JJJ

IMMEDIATE.

Before receipt of your telegram No. 510 Hassanein asked Oriental Counsellor to call on him and repeated his explanations to the effect that the Palace was not responsible for news getting out, that the Ministers themselves had been expecting trouble after Nahas's visit to Upper Egypt etc. Hassanein then went on to say that he had information to the effect that Wafd were preparing Workmen's and Provincial Committees to make trouble. He showed Oriental Counsellor a report by Wafd organ "Al Misri" of sermon made by Imam in Mosque in Workmen's quarter at which Nahas paid his devotions yesterday. Imam addressed himself to Nahas as leader of the people. It was, Hassanein said, always recognised that only the Sovereign's name was mentioned in ceremony at Friday prayers. It was evident he argued, that Wafd were organising trouble and the Palace could not wait long. Four days had already passed since the audience, and the Palace might be forced to act over the week end.

2. Oriental Counsellor pointed out that His Majesty had undertaken to do nothing while I was referring to London. Any action taken by King Farouk now would be disastrous. Hassanein replied that he was not afraid that Wafd would do anything effective but if left undisturbed to prepare elements of trouble they might well provoke some disorders which would have to be suppressed and would then perhaps be cited as proof that Wafd had some backing in the country. After Oriental Counsellor had repeated his previous warning more strongly Hassanein finally said that nothing would be done until the King saw me again, provided that answer was not long delayed and there were no disorders. He said that in the event of any disorders action would have to be taken at once.

3. It is evident that the situation is of an explosive nature. In spite of my warning to Amin the possibility of Wafd demonstrations cannot be excluded, and they might give the King an excuse to take sudden action. I earnestly hope therefore that I may receive my instructions with least possible delay.

OTP.

REC-105-10000

J 1385
13 APR 1944

1944

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number } J 1385/31/16.

TELEGRAM FROM Lord Killearn, Cairo.

No. 759.

Dated 18th April, 1944.

Received in Registry } 18th April, 1944.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Political situation in Egypt

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 754 (J 1374/31/16). King Farouk has signed rescript revoking present Ministry which is breach of faith of Palace pledge to take no action pending further interview with Lord Killearn. Is seeing His Majesty on 18th April when Prime Minister's message will be delivered with warning that action must be held up or full consequences taken by King Farouk.

Last Paper.

J1374

References.

(Print) 21/4

Egypt vol.

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Apparently the rescript has not been published, though no doubt H.M. will see to it that its existence is known.

We can but wait & see what is the effect of the Prime Minister's message.

Donisner

18/4.

Now see Cairo tele 760 - 763

J. J.

(Action completed.)

6/10
2/4

m.h. (Index.)

12/5/44

Next Paper.

J1390

J

1365
13 APR 1944

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Killearn
No. 759
18th April, 1944

D. 12.12pm GMT. 18th April, 1944
R. 2.15 p.m. BDST. 18th April, 1944

kkkkk

MOST IMMEDIATE

My telegram No. 754. J/1374/21/16

Hassanein has just (1.50 p.m.) rung up the Oriental Secretary to say that King Farouk has signed rescript revoking the present Ministry.

2. This is clear breach of faith of the Palace pledge to take no action pending seeing me again.

3. I am seeing His Majesty this afternoon when I shall deliver the Prime Minister's message in your telegram No. 519 and emphasise the gravity of precipitate action by His Majesty which he must hold up or take full consequences.

OTP.

J/1314/21/16

16 APR 1944
H.M. SECRETARY
G.O. REGISTRY

J

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EGYPT AND SUDAN

J 1342
16

Registry Number } J 1342/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Lord Killearn
(Cairo).
No 749

Dated 15th April, 1944.

Received 16th April,
in Registry } 1944.

J: Egypt and
Sudan.

Relations between Palace and Government.

Refers to Foreign Office telegram No. 510 (J 1318/314/G) and states that contents were communicated to Massanein, who was informed that failing King's assurance not to act pending reply from London H.M. Ambassador must ask for audience with King. Massanein agreed this would be inexpedient and gave assurance no action would be taken except in case of disorders when Palace would first communicate with H.M. Ambassador. Emphasises urgency of reply in view of possible clash, and states that he has warned Amin to avoid any pretext.

Last Paper.

J/34/

(Minutes.)

See on J1343

References.

J 1344

(Printed) 2/4

Expt vol:

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

M.H. (Index.)
17/5/44

2/2/44

Next Paper.

J1343

1342

[THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR SECRECY AND SHOULD BE RETAINED BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON].

[CYPHER]. WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Killearn.
No. 749.

D. 12.41 a.m. April 16th, 1944.

April 15th, 1944.

R. 4.50 a.m. April 16th, 1944.

JYJYJY

IMMEDIATE.

Substance of your telegram No. 510 communicated to Hassanein for King Farouk's information this evening with a strong message to the effect that I counted on His Majesty's doing nothing pending receipt of instructions. Failing such an assurance I would have to ask for an audience to-morrow with His Majesty which I particularly wished to avoid in view of the flutter it would inevitably cause among the public at such a juncture.

Hassanein entirely agreed that an audience would be inexpedient at this moment and gave an assurance that no action would be taken before receipt of instructions unless disorders occurred in which case the Palace would communicate with me before doing anything. He expressed the earnest hope that His Majesty would not be kept waiting much longer for answer. I venture again to emphasise the need for speed in view of the possibility that one side or the other may get out of hand.

I am putting a discreet word of warning through Amin to avoid anything which might furnish any pretext.

O.T.P.

APR 17 1944

J 1300
15 APR 1944

1944

EGYPT and SUDAN
413 27

Registry Number J 1300/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM Lord Killearn, Cairo.

No. 721 and 722

Dated 12th April, 1944.
Received in Registry 13th April, 1944.

J : Egypt and Sudan

Last Paper.

J 1243

References.

(Print) 2/4
Egypt vol

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)
M.H. 17/5/44 (Index.)

Next Paper.

J 1307

Political situation in Egypt: proposed new Government.

Gives text of memorandum handed him by King Farouk at an audience on 12th April. His Majesty stated that with Hassanain at the head of new government relations could be put on basis of mutual understanding. His Majesty's Ambassador stated that it was a pity His Majesty's Government had not been warned and it was most inopportune moment to change government which had fulfilled their role as war-time ally to His Majesty's Government's satisfaction. King Farouk undertook to prevent any leakage until His Majesty's Ambassador had received instructions and seen him again. H.M. did not favour suggestion that Nahas should go to the country. Gives names of proposed Government and states that his comments will follow.

(Minutes.)

The King's memorandum is an able document and the greater part of it is quite accurate. The first sentence of 83 is a matter of opinion, but 84 is broadly true, even if everyone would not endorse the last sentence. There is probably something in 85, though we have insufficient information to say how much. Personally I agree with 86 - the administration is widely regarded as being in a state of disintegration. Its weak point is of course 81. A "free" election cannot be imagined in Egypt. But the new Government proposed by the King is too indecently Royalist and politically inexperienced to be a serious proposition (in parenthesis Amr is not a nonentity).

Pending the Ambassador's comments, the Department stands by its minute on J 190, but with seriously shaken confidence in the desirability of pressing the King very strongly to let Nahas go to the country. So far as I personally am concerned this falling off of confidence is caused by the considerations mentioned in my minute in J 1208 viz that the maintenance of a Nahas Government (and Nahas would certainly come in again) is becoming more of a danger than an assistance to us. I am sure that in any event we should not go to extremes in support of this course.

If the King rejects our advice to let Nahas go to the country and insists on a change, the Ambassador could give the warning suggested in J 190. He could at the same time press for a more neutral and more experienced "holding Government" and should also, I think, urge the King to allow Nahas to resign, instead of sacking him as at present proposed.

Review

14th April 1944.

See separate minute

See within D.C. circular 2157 P.O.P. 5/9/44 17 April

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM CAIRO (AMBASSADOR) TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Killearn.
No. 721.
12th April, 1944.

D: 11.18 p.m. 12th April, 1944.
R: 11.55 p.m. 12th April, 1944.

J 1300
13 APR 1944

MOST IMMEDIATE. 5 5 5

King Farouk summonsed me this afternoon.

2. He read and handed me memorandum of which text is given in my immediately following telegram.

3. His Majesty followed this up with the following verbal declaration which I took down at his dictation:

[Begins]

"For the first time with this new government at the head of which is going to be a man known to be a friend of yours and of the British, I feel that it is more [sic ?now] possible to put an end to all misunderstandings between us and start with a new page and put once and for all our relations on the basis of mutual understanding." His Majesty added that he and I had crossed swords in the past; hence the above declaration.

4. Elaborating the above (our conversation was throughout on a most amiable basis on which I purposely kept it) His Majesty said it came to this:

There could not be two Kings of Egypt (I hurriedly interpolated to his considerable amusement that we had already found one was quite enough !).

5. I made it clear forthwith that I was not prepared to make more than purely preliminary comment.

6. My first:

That it was a pity His Majesty had faced us with this bomb-shell without preliminary warning through Hasanein or otherwise. That it might in the event have proved to make His Majesty's position easier had he known our view in advance.

7. My second:

That whilst no Egyptian Government or Prime Minister was perfect, the present administration had admirably fulfilled their role of loyal war-time ally and to our complete satisfaction: and when others were waivering they had robustly

[? grp: omitted]

[? grp: omitted] confidence in us and held firm during the testing months of 1942 when the enemy was at the gates. From our (external) point of view it was clear beyond dispute that Nahas Pasha and his government had not only been above reproach but done all in their power to sustain and help the war effort.

8. Along the same train of thought I could imagine no more inopportune moment than the present, when the fate of Egypt and the whole world hung in the balance, in cold blood to provoke a change in the government here. That simply did not make sense - and I imagine London would feel the same way.

9. Furthermore, was His Majesty so sure of his facts and of the truth of the allegations about Nahas Pasha's recent tour of Upper Egypt? I had been assured that the report(s) of his having insisted upon or being accorded royal honours by the army or receiving salutes were quite unfounded.

10. His Majesty insisted that he had ample grounds for his complaints that his Prime Minister was deliberately infringing upon his royal position.

11. I made His Majesty admit that the paper he had handed me could in no sense be regarded as a decision: and that nothing would be done upon it until I had had time to consult His Majesty's Government but that he begged for speed.

12. I said that I would naturally submit a full report of our talk but that it was fair to warn him the answer might be once more "a lemon" of a pronounced kind (referring to our earlier letter about Yemen). It was therefore all the more important that His Majesty should rigorously prevent any leakage of what he had proposed to me today until I was able to see him again and continue our "friendly and informal" exchange of view. His Majesty [?grp: omitted] he entirely agreed.

13. At one point he referred to my exchange of letters with Nahas Pasha of February 5th 1942 and seemed to argue [? grp: omitted ? that] that would eliminate all possibility of my anticipated lemon. I pointed out that if he read the text more attentively he would see that it had been carefully drawn up and that whilst our policy might be [? grp: omitted], and certainly was not to interfere internally, circumstances were quite conceivable where we might both be justified and have to do so in support of that very policy.

14. Finally, I drew from him list of members of his proposed interim Government. He was evidently somewhat reluctant to disclose these names and I was not surprised when he gave them: to wit:- Hasanein Pasha (Prime Minister), with a Cabinet largely composed of ex-officials and officials (Hassan Sadek, Saba Habashy, Has... Rifaat, Shousa, Under Secretary of Health) and nonentities (Amar Pasha the Racquets champion etc.) a collection obviously cutting no ice whatever in the country. I

at once pointed out to His Majesty that the idea of such a régime at a time like this was surely not serious? We had had enough of minority governments (Hassen Sadek and Hussein Sir...) and there must be in office someone carrying the country with him. Why not let Nahas Pasha go to the country and test the [?grp undec: ? people's] vote? This idea naturally did not at all smile [sic] upon His Majesty.

t/
delete

15. As I felt it undesirable to pursue the discussion, I repeated that my remarks must be regarded as strictly personal and preliminary. I must also emphasise that I thought this more [sic ? most] inopportune and likely to draw a sharp response from us. But as to that I must defer further comment until I had my instructions.

16. I repeat that our talk was throughout markedly friendly. But it is clear that His Majesty does not in the slightest degree appreciate that the war is still in the balance or that we need worry ourselves any further with the political stability of our base here in Egypt.

17. My considered comment will follow as soon as possible.

O.T.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYMER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

J 1300

FROM CAIRO (AMBASSADOR) TO FOREIGN OFFICE

13 APR 1944

Lord Killearn
No. 722
12th April 1944

D. 9.50 p.m. GMT 12th April 1944
R. 12.55 a.m. DBST 13th April 1944

I I I I I

MOST IMMEDIATE

Following is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.

[Begins]

Your Excellency will recall that in May of last year, I expressed the concern I then felt about the present Ministry on account of the grave accusations publicly brought against its integrity. The Ministry's attempt to defend itself in Parliament left public opinion unmoved and did nothing whatever towards dispelling doubts and suspicions with which its conduct of affairs was regarded throughout the country.

دوره
مجلس
مصر
1944

I drew Your Excellency's attention to loss of prestige and moral authority which the Ministry had suffered because of the reflection on its integrity and indicated that a change of government was desirable. In deference, however, to the British Government's wish that the Ministry should continue in office because of services it was rendering to the Allied war effort, and in order to demonstrate how much I had the successful prosecution of the war at heart, I undertook to keep the Ministry for the time being and to maintain official relations with it.

This engagement on my part has been fulfilled in letter and in spirit. It has been my constant endeavour, as a loyal Ally to Great Britain, to do everything in my power to encourage the Ministry to give all possible help to hasten victory of Allied Arms.

After agitation roused by charges of corruption, it was hoped that the Government would have the wisdom and prudence to put its house in order, and to govern the country with such propriety that the public conscience would no longer be troubled with doubts regarding all our administration. Unfortunately, the desired reforms have not taken place. On the contrary, the corruption of the administration is more flagrant than ever and has become a grave public scandal without precedent in the history of Egypt. This is a known and admitted fact by high and low throughout the length and breadth of the country.

دوره
مجلس
مصر
1944

But corruption is not the only charge now levelled against the present Government. Of late the Ministry has embarked on a course of action aimed directly and openly at bringing the throne into public contempt. Your Excellency has no doubt followed with concern the recent moves and

/utterances....

utterances of the Prime Minister. You will have noted his behaviour in forestalling my visit to Minieh and Assiut after this had been announced in the Press. Your Excellency may also have observed the royal ceremonial with which Nahas Pasha has arranged that he should be everywhere received, and you are no doubt aware of the forced collection of money from inhabitants of several provinces to be devoted to the creation of charitable institutions bearing the name of Nahas Pasha. I would also draw Your Excellency's particular attention to Nahas Pasha's speeches regarding the recent malaria epidemic and privation bordering on famine in Upper Egypt, speeches contain denials of gravity of the situation and by implication has threatened the veracity of the King who it is well-known took his Prime Minister and Ministers to task on this subject some time ago. That the situation was indeed grave is not open to argument nor need I dwell on this matter having in mind Your Excellency's own communiqué regarding distribution of supplies in stricken areas. I could give many recent examples of other improper and disquieting actions of the Government; public moneys have been used for propaganda purposes in favour of the Wafdist party. Attempts are being made to subvert elementary schools' teachers, Azhar University, police and army and to transform them into political instruments in the interests of the Wafd.

Your Excellency will, I am sure, agree that meetings and actions of the Prime Minister, of which I have given some instances, cannot fail to have a disturbing and disintegrating effect on the administration and may, if a termination is not put to them, affect the peace and tranquility of [group undec: ? Egypt.]

In the light of the above facts of widespread and notorious corruption, mal-administration of the country, subversion of certain elements of the community [? group omitted ? and] open and flagrant disrespect towards the throne, I have decided after careful reflection that my duty towards my country and its people compel me to make a change of government.

Your Excellency will perhaps be interested to know of my intentions as regards successors of the present Government. Before doing so, I would however like to say that a loyal and generous fulfilment of the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of Alliance is a matter on which His Britannic Majesty's Government may confidently rely.

It will be my constant and personal concern to ensure that my Government will at all times strive its utmost to help its Ally to bring the war to a victorious conclusion.

As an immediate successor to the present government, my intention is to appoint a Ministry composed of men of integrity with no marked party affiliations, known to be well disposed to Great Britain and who can therefore be relied upon to collaborate wholeheartedly with the Allied authorities worthy of the war effort.

This Ministry will with all due speed and in a matter of a few months hold free elections. It will thereafter resign and a government will be appointed in accordance with the will of the people of Egypt as freely declared in polling booths throughout the country. [ends]

OTP.

With the Compliments of the
Secretary of State for Dominions

118
17 APR 1944

(This telegram must be paraphrased if the communication of its contents to any person outside Government service is authorised.)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

CYPHER (TYPEX)

FROM:

D.O. *Porter*

S.D.

TO:

CANADA (GOV'T.)
AUSTRALIA "
NEW ZEALAND "
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 8.45 p.m. 17th Apr., 1944.)

INDEXED

D. No. 569 SECRET.

J1300 / 3 / 16
18 APR 1944

Following for Prime Minister

My telegram D. No. 556 of 8th March. Egypt.

As culmination intermittent bickering between Palace and King, latter recently handed His Majesty's Ambassador memorandum stating that present Government were discredited and that he therefore intended to appoint Ministry composed of men with no party affiliations and well disposed to United Kingdom who after a few months would hold free elections and then resign.

2. We have authorised His Majesty's Ambassador to inform the King that issue is an important one and will be considered here. In meantime we hope that King will take no violent action. He is to add that Nahas is also being asked to refrain from any such action. His Majesty's Ambassador maintains view that there is no satisfactory alternative to present Government which continues to meet our military requirements.

DISTRIBUTION OVERLEAF

1944

3

J1318 / G

127

J1318 / 31 / 16
314 / 9

Cairo

No 731

Dated 13 April

Rec'd 14

King Farouk: proposed change of government.
Rep. to Cairo tells Nos 721 & 722 (J1280/31/16)
Repts a/c for which Lord Killearn
approached Re suggestion of change.
inc. from Re point of view of war
interests. Suggests several courses of
action & comments on them.

Last Paper.

J895

pp - Dept (Minutes.)
copy of tel attached.
See within.

J.157.

References.

(Print.)

Expt vol: in a
out tel

(How disposed of.)

Tel to Cairo No 510

of April 15

of 25 of 8

Maj. Githurst M12

Tel to Cairo No 519

of April 16.

Tel to Cairo No 520

of April 16.

(Action completed.)

P. H.
13/5

(Index.)

W. H.

Next Paper.

Situation in Egypt

I should be grateful if my minute on J 1300 could be read in conjunction with the following.

In the first place the Department, for reasons of which it is the first to recognise the validity, is in the same position as that described by Lord Killearn in paragraph 4, first sentence.

Subject to this I should like to rule out course (d) for the reasons given (and in my opinion seriously under-emphasised) by the Ambassador himself. Course (a) is also ruled out, on general principles, and for the reasons given, though it can be argued that we have paid our debts to Nahas. Personally I should have no great objection to course (b) but in view of the Ambassadors insistence (and he has to play the hand) I submit we should approve course (c), though to my mind the Ambassador's remarks about "advice" are an argument in favour of (b) or even (a). And we should ascertain what His Excellency means by "made it clear to the public", which sounds rather sinister. And we might still press for a better new Government and more considerate treatment of Nahas as urged in my minute on J 1300.

In general the Ambassador seems to me to sweep far too lightly on one side a very well-prepared and presented case put forward, inconveniently but scarcely incorrectly, by the King.

Douglas

14th April 1944.

See also HE's personal tel: below.

It is an amazing thing that a King of Egypt should present a document of this gravity to the British Ambassador without preliminary warning of any kind. I cannot hold Lord Killearn wholly free from responsibility. If he had been
in/

Nothing to be written in this margin.

Minutes.

in the habit of seeing the King from time to time as he ought to do this kind of thing could not happen.

But now that we have got the document we have clearly to do something about it. We certainly cannot accept the idea or let Hassanein in, even (or perhaps particularly) for the purpose merely of holding elections. Lord Killearn's course (b) - verbal disapproval and standing aside - has nothing to recommend it; while I agree with Mr. Scrivener that course (d) (I fear Lord Killearn is hankering after tanks again) would be both reckless and unjustifiable at the present time. We have no sort of reason for turning Farouk off the throne merely because he is at loggerheads with Nahas, and were we to do so we should incur, in my opinion, the justifiable resentment of a large proportion of the Egyptian nation.

Beyond this I decline to be left with Lord Killearn's course (c) as the only surviving alternative. The right attitude surely to take is that the King's action represents a most unwelcome *démarche*, of which we should have expected to be given some prior notice before anything written was handed to us. Now, however, that His Majesty has taken the step we feel that matters cannot be left as they are. It is impossible for us to encourage, or even to agree with, His Majesty's suggestion; on the other hand we do not feel that a mere refusal to agree on our part is an adequate step in the interests either of Egypt or of ourselves, faced as we are with an apparently irreconcilable difference between the King and his present Government.


We must therefore insist, greatly to our regret, in view of the continuance of the war, that the King and his Prime Minister should prepare the country for a general election in the course of which His Majesty will no doubt have an opportunity of making his views on the conduct of his present Government known. While such an election can only be held by the present Government, we are fully aware of the difficulty of securing
the/

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

the fair conduct of the voting in Egypt and we are open to consider and to lend our support to any suggestion which His Majesty may have to put forward with this end in view. But we do not intend that our advice in favour of the holding of elections should be kept secret indefinitely and whatever the attitude of His Majesty and his Prime Minister may be, we shall see to it that within no great space of time the fact that we have tendered this advice to both is made known. Should there be opposition to the idea of an election we shall also make it plain from what quarter this opposition has come.

We should add a word about Hassanein. His Majesty might be told that we cannot hold it desirable that his Head of the Household (or whatever is Hassanein's official title) should be kept in cold storage as an alternative Prime Minister even for the limited purposes specified in the King's memorandum. We therefore advise His Majesty to let Hassanein know that he must choose between a political career and ~~retaining his position~~ in the Palace. We do not see that any Government in Egypt can ever hope to succeed if the King is going to keep a successor to office ready to hand in his private apartments.

It may be necessary to put a telegram drafted in this sense before Cabinet. In any event it would be necessary to consult the Chiefs of Staff, who will hardly like the idea of pressing for a general election, though I imagine they would dislike still more that of enforcing the abdication of King Farouk.


14th April 1944.

*I think the answer should be on the lines indicated by Sir M. Peterson.
In the S. of P.'s absence, I must put this*

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

to the P.M. So write the Dypt. dept. a tel.,
with information a short covering minutes to
the P.M. giving any necessary comment or
explanation. He will probably want to
consult the Cabinet on Monday.

It might be well to send Lt. K. a short
interim tel. explaining that considered view of
A.M.G. cannot be reported before early
next week.

This, if approved, will I imagine render
any immediate reply to Lt. K's tel. no
732 unnecessary.

Alb.

April 14, 1944.

J 1318

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Killearn.

No. 731.

13th April, 1944.

D. 2.26 p.m. GMT 13th April, 1944.

R. 4.45 p.m. DST 13th April, 1944.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

o o o

J 1280/31/16

My telegrams Nos. 721 and 722.

f white

MOST SECRET.

I approached this question from the angle of war interest. What are the facts? Leaving aside the question of their internal shortcomings present Government have given and continue to give all that we want from that angle. They stood by us in the bad days before Alamein. There could be no worse time for a change or the turmoil of an election. Wafd are far from perfect but they continue to deliver the goods and I believe (though I cannot prove it) that they still have a majority. They could and no doubt would be most tiresome in opposition. In short if the stability of Egypt as a base remains imperative and our policy holds good that we must have a loyal government backed by a majority in the country, it stands to reason it is better to keep them in.

2. Following seems the choice of courses of action:

a) To let King Farouk go ahead without opposition. This I rule out for reasons given in paragraph 1 above, out of loyalty to Nahas Pasha and particularly because our experience of minority governments is not encouraging.

b) Tell him we strongly disapprove and that whilst not prepared to prevent him his blood will be on his own head. This I like no better. It would weaken us and only lead to confusion.

c) Short of force use every argument and effort to deter him urging the inexpediency of forcing what threatens to be a crisis until the war situation is clearer. If he still insists on a change of government press him to allow Nahas Pasha to go to the country. If he refused that then hold him responsible for full implementation of the treaty and for the internal security of our war base. I do not like this either though preferable to a) or b) but it would mean [group undec. ?complete] disregard of our "advice" a most undesirable precedent. It would weaken our position. But we would at least have made it clear to the public that we had stood up for those who had stood by us.

...d)

Handwritten notes in Arabic script on the left margin, including "بالتوازي مع..." and "على ان..."

F. C. [unclear]

d) Be prepared if necessary to use force to prevent dismissal of the present government at least until the war situation is clearer and the moment more opportune.

3. This is the course I personally should prefer provided that we are prepared at this juncture and with a somewhat discredited government to take risks involved. For I am bound to point out that the situation is by no means so clear cut as it was in 1942. The enemy being no longer at the gates King Farouk has less opportunity for mischief. His Majesty is more popular than he was in 1942 and use of force against him would rouse more resentment now especially in the army. Moreover he is now offering us every assurance of loyalty including an interim government specially chosen from well known pro-British elements. There is also the difficulty of Nahas Pasha's own position created by the terms of his letter to me of February 5th 1942.

4. I find it difficult to be more specific in my recommendations without knowing the degree of importance now attached to this area by His Majesty's Government in the general scheme of things. I should hope that the actual use of force against King Farouk would not be necessary to bring him to heel.

Copied personal and secret to Minister Resident and Service Chiefs.

OTP

Registry
No.

J1318/317/4

12.05 p 10/4

131

Draft

Lord Killkern
Caird

File no. 510

gph.

April 15th
No....

Dep't. no. 1.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

A

Immediate
721, 722, + 731.

Considered views of HMG cannot
be telegraphed before early next
week. We rely on HMG to
preserve strict secrecy meanwhile

Copied
C.A.S.
Maj. G. G. G.
Ms 2.

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRONo. 510.

15th April, 1944. D. 12.05 p.m. 15th April, 1944.

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegrams 721, 722 and 731.

Considered views of His Majesty's Government cannot be telegraphed before early next week. We rely on His Majesty to preserve strict secrecy meanwhile.

(O.T.P)

Registry No. 1318/214/4

Date 16-4-44
Despatched 6-50 PM

I.O.

Draft.

April 16th

Rel. to Ad. Killean
Cairo.

Most immediate.

no. 519 ✓

(Cyprian)

Your tel. no. 731 [of April 13].
Following from Prime Minister:-
You may, if you see fit, give the
following message to King Farouk
from me:-

April 16th

New Cabinet Dislike.

"The issue which has unhappily
arisen between Your Majesty and
the Nasser Govt. is so important that
I must have an opportunity of
bringing it before the War Cabinet.
I have convened them for this purpose
for an early date next week.

I trust therefore you will not
take any violent action in the
interval.

I am instructing H. M. Ambr.
to take all measures available to
him to ensure that Nasser
Pasha equally refrains from
such action.

H.M.G. wd: almost certainly
range themselves against whoever
strikes first.

Considering that Egypt has
through

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Through our actions been spared the
horrors of invasion and of becoming
a battlefield, and remains an
unravaged peaceful and prosperous
land, we have a right to address you
on this subject.

Please see my immediately following
tel.

Alb.

April 16
1944

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO (AMBASSADOR)

No. 519

16th April 1944. D. 6.55 p.m. 16th April 1944.

222

MOST IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 731 [of April 13th].

Following from Prime Minister:-

You may, if you see fit, give the following message to King Farouk from me:-

"The issue which has unhappily arisen between Your Majesty and the Nahas Government is so important that I must have an opportunity of bringing it before the War Cabinet. I have convened them for this purpose for an early date next week.

I trust therefore you will not take any violent action in the interval.

I am instructing His Majesty's Ambassador to take all measures available to him to ensure that Nahas Pasha equally refrains from such action.

His Majesty's Government would almost certainly range themselves against whoever strikes first.

Considering that Egypt has through our exertions been spared the horrors of invasion and of becoming a battlefield, and remains an unravaged peaceful and prosperous land, we have a right to address you on this subject."

Please see my immediately following telegram.

OTF

Registry
No. J 1318/214/9

Date 16. 4. 44
Despatched 6-50 PM

Draft
Lord Killearn
Cairo
Tel No. 520
Cypher ✓
Opinion
16/4
War Cabinet Dis-

Most Immediate

My immediately preceding
telegram.

I am not sure how far
Nahas Pasha is aware of the
King's intentions nor how much
he knows of what passed
between the King and you, and
I must leave it to you therefore
to decide exactly the form in
which you put to Nahas the
request referred to in my message
to the King

J

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

1 c of each pre-136

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO
CAIRO (AMBASSADOR)

No. 520
16th April 1944

D. 8.50 p.m. 16th April 1944

I I I I I

MOST IMMEDIATE

My immediately preceding telegram.

I am not sure how far Nahas Pasha is aware of the King's intentions nor how much he knows of what passed between the King and you, and I must leave it to you therefore to decide exactly the form in which you put to Nahas the request referred to in my message to the King.

OTF.

8/6

137

J 1310/314/9

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 16TH APRIL, 1944.

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Killearn
No. 781

D. 2.26 p.m.G.M.T. 13th April, 1944.

15th April, 1944.

R. 4.45 p.m.D.S.T. 15th April, 1944.

T T T T T

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My telegrams Nos. 721 and 722.

TOP SECRET.

I approached this question from the angle of war interest. What are the facts? Leaving aside the question of their internal shortcomings present Government have given and continue to give all that we want from that angle. They stood by us in the bad days before Alamein. There could be no worse time for a change or the turmoil of an election. Waif are far from perfect but they continue to deliver the goods and I believe (though I cannot prove it) that they still have a majority. They could and no doubt would be most tiresome in opposition. In short if the stability of Egypt as a base remains imperative and our policy holds good that we must have a loyal government backed by a majority in the country, it stands to reason it is better to keep them in.

2. Following seems the choice of courses of action:

a) To let King Farouk go ahead without opposition. This I rule out for reasons given in paragraph 1 above, out of loyalty to Nahas Pasha and particularly because our experience of minority governments is not encouraging.

b) Tell him we strongly disapprove and that whilst not prepared to prevent him his blood will be on his own head. This I like no better. It would weaken us and only lead to confusion.

c) Short of force use every argument and effort to deter him urging the inexpediency of forcing what threatens to be a crisis until the war situation is clearer. If he still insists on a change of government press him to allow Nahas Pasha to go to the country. If he refused that then hold him responsible for full implementation of the treaty and for the internal security of our war base. I do not like this either though preferable to a) or b) but it would mean [group undec. ? complete] disregard of our "advice" a most undesirable precedent. It would weaken our position. But we would at least have made it clear to the public that we had stood up for those who had stood by us.

.....d)

d) Be prepared if necessary to use force to prevent dismissal of the present government at least until the war situation is clearer and the moment more opportune.

3. This is the course I personally should prefer provided that we are prepared at this juncture and with a somewhat discredited government to take risks involved. For I am bound to point out that the situation is by no means so clear cut as it was in 1942. The enemy being no longer at the gates King Farouk has less opportunity for mischief. His Majesty is more popular than he was in 1942 and use of force against him would rouse more resentment now especially in the army. Moreover he is now offering us every assurance of loyalty including an interim government specially chosen from well known pre-British elements. There is also the difficulty of Nahas Pasha's own position created by the terms of his letter to me of February 6th 1942.

4. I find it difficult to be more specific in my recommendations without knowing the degree of importance now attached to this area by His Majesty's Government in the general scheme of things. I should hope that the actual use of force against King Farouk would not be necessary to bring him to heel.

Copied personal and secret to M.E. Min. and Service Chiefs.

O.T.P.

63

J

J. 1208
4 APR 1944

101

1944

41327
EGYPT AND SUDAN

Registry Number } J 1208/31/16
FROM Foreign Office Minute (Mr. Scrivener)
No.
Dated 26th March
Received in Registry } 4th April 1944
J : Egypt & Sudan

Political situation in Egypt.

Submits report of the political situation in Egypt.

See within

Last Paper.

J 1195

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

See within

My reference to the Chiefs of Staff was based on the understanding that as long ago as 1940 the War Office had insisted that absence of political commotion ^{in Egypt} was a paramount consideration, and that our intervention to that end, if necessary, should be forthcoming. Alternatively we should refrain from any action with - or pressure on the Egyptian Government likely to lead to a crisis. On those terms it would not be open to us now to disinterest ourselves in the internal situation. I think Lord Wavell was the author of the policy. Libyan. Would you kindly see whether this understanding is correct or erroneous. Suggests action for the moment. J. 7/4.

(Action completed.)

M.H. 7/6 (Index.)

6/2/4
16/4

Next Paper.

whose business is to listen and not to interject one word. Stories of the abuse of censorship and martial law are uglier than ever. [It can be recorded by way of comic relief - my informant swears the story is true - that Madame Nahas had her cook interned for a fortnight for putting too many onions in the soup.]

↳ The disquieting feature in this situation is that owing to the circumstances of the Wafd's advent to office, H.M.G. are liable to be held strictly responsible for all their deeds of omission and commission. A year ago this did not matter very much - since the bad deeds were probably no worse than those of earlier Governments - and the really difficult part of the problem is to decide how much it matters now. It is not the slur - or alleged slur - on the honour of H.M.G. that matters - it is fantastic to suppose that the war record of the U.K. is going to be judged in the light of a policy of justifiable expediency carried out in Egypt - but the gradual shifting of the weight of public resentment from the Wafd to H.M.G. And I believe this shift to be taking place partly at any rate because the war is no longer being fought on or near Egyptian soil, and the Egyptian cannot see why we should now prevent his getting back to his dearly-loved political intrigues. He is blind to the wider aspects of allied strategy, and it would be idle to try to open his eyes. Incredible though it may seem, I am reliably assured that suspicions are arising that our present policy is part of a long-term scheme once more to take over the country. The safety valve is screwed down tight by martial law, and we must be extremely careful lest (a) the steam burst the boiler and (b) scald - as in 1919 - H.M.G. and not the Egyptian Government. Either of these eventualities - and worse still a combination of both - would be a complete negation of the policy described in earlier paragraphs. The task ahead is in fact to avoid reaching a point where the risks of maintaining Nahas in power will be greater than those anticipated from a change - a particularly delicate piece of appreciation for which we can only, I think, rely on the Embassy.

↳ It is obviously the game of the King, the opposition, and anyone else desiring a change of régime, for whatever reason, to make our flesh creep with stories of loss of prestige, loss of friends, the perils of insurrection, the appalling prospect of another 1919, and so on. (I had plenty of this served out to me). We must clearly not be stampeded by this, anymore than we should be unduly impressed by the other card which is now being forced by non-Wafdists on the listener to their political views, viz. the great anxiety of the King to be admitted to our/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

These are my feelings to, but without the experience of the folks. *OK*

I don't think Chiefs of Staff are imposing any policy on us? *OK*

I discount Hassanain more than N. Scirvan does, I think. *OK*

our warm friendship or, to put it more colloquially, nobbled by us, and his determination not to sway the Government of the country, whatever it may be, in accordance with his own plans [Hassanein puts this over particularly plausibly - so plausibly that I almost think he must believe it - he swore for example that the King had lost seriously in the public esteem by his identification with Ali Maher's regime and would not make that mistake again]. Moreover Englishmen with very long experience of Egypt and proved sound judgment have expressed the view that everything is being represented to be worse than it is, and that it is no good going out of our way to anticipate events at present.

8 These impressions in no way challenge the conclusions of paragraph 6 of Lord Killearn's telegram No. 393 attached - and my only comment on what H.E. says is that I should not be surprised if the time is very near when the Wafd's follies will render them not only useless, but a positive danger, to us. The parallel with 1919 is not used only to scare us, and it can be argued (and has been argued by one very good Egyptian friend of ours) that in 1918 H.M.G. were relatively blameless for the grievances which drove the Egyptian people to rebel against them in 1919, but that the fact did not save them ~~and then and~~ would not save them ^{now} when they are entirely blameless for the afflictions of e.g. the fellah in Kena province. It is an extraordinary paradox that the country which saved Egypt from extinction and ruin in this war should now be threatened - if distantly - with an outbreak of popular fury engendered by the ineptitude and venality of an Egyptian administration. But there it is. The conclusion is that - from the purely local point of view - the sooner the Chiefs of Staff will permit us to disengage ourselves, at the ultimate risk of some slight and transient political upheaval, from Egyptian internal politics, the better for Egypt and ourselves. As suggested higher up, I believe that if the war were still being waged near Egyptian soil we could go on getting away with our support of Nahas. But as it is we cannot do so indefinitely.

9 I should perhaps add in conclusion a word - based on conversations with Hassanain - on two points:- (1) the absence of a workable alternative to the present Government; (2) the danger to be apprehended from Nahas in opposition.

10 Hassanain maintains (1) that an alternative Government - of the coalition variety - could be formed in Egypt at present: his remarks on the King's alleged willingness - even readiness - to stand aloof/

aloof from politics have been mentioned earlier. He maintains that in a "free" election the Wafd could not now poll more than 30 - 40% of the votes. (I expected him to put the figure lower). As regards (2) Hassanein's view is (a) that if in 1937 Nahas with infinitely greater prestige and 30,000 organised thugs to back him could not create chaos when the King dismissed him, he certainly could not hope to do so now - and (b) if the censorship were raised Nahas would, a very short time after his resignation, be a fugitive from popular fury. The second part of the argument may be unfounded, but the first seems not altogether unconvincing. And whatever Nahas may say or do, he can scarcely hope to convince any impartial audience that we have not paid our debts to him in full.

1 → I don't believe it's the

T. Lawrence
26/3.

The conclusion, as regards Nahas, seems to be:
"Thou shalt not kill, but needs not stir."
Officially to keep alive.

We can afford to let him go. But it would still be difficult for us to urge Farouk (of all people) to sack him.

I should still be reluctant to see Nahas go. Great things he follows on that he has committed. He is not an enemy, Farouk is; and I have no confidence in Hassanein.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

AB

Because I haven't an idea what we put in his place. And there were then any firm estimate of what the result of our decision will be. Of course that depends on who manages the election. But is there any prospect of holding a "free" election?

Ab. March 29, 1944.

Now. This is a useful paper. But I hope that we shall be careful not to listen to the Syrian Song of Hassanein. I believe that we should be careful to us.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Killearn
No. 393

D. 1.55 p.m. 2nd March, 1944

1st March, 1944

R. 4.30 p.m. 2nd March, 1944

X X X X

IMPORTANT

SECRET

My telegram No. 390.

I was on the point of submitting to you an appreciation of the internal situation when I received summons to this interview with Nahas.

2. There can be little doubt that the Government handling of conditions in Upper Egypt has been deplorably bad: and that King Farouk on the other hand has been astute enough to profit fully and quite legitimately from it.

3. There can equally be no doubt that our published statement (which had to be issued with some promptitude to kill the dangerous lie that we had used up the peoples' supplies of food) has adversely affected their position.

4. It is also true that we having installed the Wafd in office are labelled as responsible for this and all and any of their shortcomings.

5. Nevertheless I cannot see for the present that we should modify our policy of supporting their tenure of office. Firstly because I still see no workable alternative other than perhaps a Palace regime. Secondly because without any doubt they have given and continue to give us whatever we want in furtherance of the war effort. There is a third reason that they stood by us in the black days of 1942 and that we should stand as long as reasonably possible by those who have proved themselves our friends in the foulest of foul weather.

6. At the same time I fully admit the situation has its serious embarrassments in that we are inevitably blamed for all their real or supposed stupidities. The indictment carries with it the corollary that from time to time I should have to pull them up or alternatively (as over Upper

/Egypt).....

Egypt) make our position clear to the public through the local press. And this does not in my opinion mean that the time is yet ripe to jettison them and fish for something better. That time must come sooner or later; but not until (a) the war situation is further advanced than at present or (b) by their follies they so undermine their position in the country that they no longer were of use to us in the furtherance of our war effort.

7. I should greatly welcome your comments on the above: and more especially if there is anything specific you would wish me to say to Nahas on our interview of this morning. It may to some extent have been bluff on his part: but I do not think we should take it as such.

8. As regard his attitude in regard to internal and press censorship, I have for long been greatly perplexed as to the best line to follow. It is singularly difficult to draw - or define - between legitimate application of these measures and their misapplication for internal political party ends. I should most certainly not welcome or advocate the abolition of martial law as war conditions now are; nor its replacement by recourse to ordinary courts which I feel little doubt would land us in perpetual difficulties and embarrassments far greater than those we at present have to face. In any instructions you may feel disposed to send me, I hope you can indicate your view on these two specific points - internal and press censorship.

O.T.P.

Green Divisions

105

Would you kindly
assist if possible?

Dear Samson

J. 17/24

A preliminary search has failed
to produce exactly what you require.
J1761 and J1866/31/16/1920 attached show
that General Howell did not want
political trouble in Egypt in which he
would have to take drastic action with
military support and that this view
was shared by Clanranon.

But I imagine what you require
is a C.O.S. or C.I.D. paper dealing
with the defense of Egypt, in which
the point under discussion was made.

ln

In that case, your best field is
"green" papers, and I suggest you
ask Green Division to make a search.
(The papers would not necessarily be
"J" Green, as this point could
easily have arisen in some more
general "Appreciation" - e.g. of
the Mediterranean, European or even
world situation). If Green Div.
cannot produce it, I suggest your
quickest way would be to ask
your Cabinet Officer - who has a
very good index to COS. etc. papers
(I know, because I recently consulted it).

11/4

43

J

J. 794
3 MAR 1944

12

1944

EGYPT and SUDAN
413 27

5

Registry Number } 794/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Lord Killearn

(Cairo).
No. 393

Dated 1st March, 1944.
Received in Registry } 3rd March, 1944.
J: Egypt and Sudan.

K

His Majesty's Ambassador's interview with Nahas Pasha.

Refers to Cairo telegram 390 (J 793/31/16). Government handling of situation in Upper Egypt was bad and King Farouk profited by it. Embassy statement did not improve the Government's position. Admits that His Majesty's Government having put Wafd in office are blamed for all its shortcomings. Gives reasons why policy of supporting their tenure of office should not be modified. Requests comments and requests that any instructions may contain views on internal and press censorship.

Last Paper.

J 793.

(Minutes.)

See also J 793 herewith.

References.

Tempers all round seem frayed in Cairo. It is obvious that Nahas is mightily incensed about the malaria communiqué, coming as it did on top of rumours he may have heard of more friendly relations between the Ambassador and the Palace; and that he has sent for Lord Killearn (who for reasons unknown does not appear to have had any intimate converse with him for two months or longer) to learn exactly where he stands.

(Print.)

Egypt vol (in out t/s)

It is also obvious that the Wafd do not enjoy the popular support of two years ago in the Ambassador's words, they are feeling the draught. On the whole the Ambassador's conversation with Nahas will have reassured the latter. Nahas will have sensed that we are not thinking of letting him down with a thump, or at least not now. This will presumably be our policy until one of the conditions (a) or (b) in paragraph 6 of the present paper obtains.

(How disposed of.)

Vol Cairo 345
March 8^e

Meanwhile, leaving aside the Azhar, there are two specific questions posed : internment and the press censorship. The practical application of these two measures is unpopular all round in Egypt. The department does not know the details of the application of either. But the press censorship is clearly used to manipulate the political scene, as the Ambassador recently experienced himself over the malaria business. In matters of internment many evil forces enter into play in an Oriental country : malice, rivalry, revengeful denunciation and the like; and, with infuriating results, security authorities always refuse to discuss or divulge their grounds for action.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)
m/b
24/3/44

We must accept the Ambassador's opinion that these two measures cannot be abolished. This should not preclude us from examining whether they cannot be relaxed. A step in that direction is anyway being made, since Amin Osman is to produce a full list of all internees and the reasons for which they are interned (paragraph 8 of telegram 390 an J 793). The Ambassador might also find out, and inform

Next Paper.

J 810

22

Egypt) make our position clear to the public through the local press. And this does not in my opinion mean that the time is yet ripe to jettison them and fish for something better. That time must come sooner or later; but not until (a) the war situation is further advanced than at present or (b) by their follies they so undermine their position in the country that they no longer were of use to us in the furtherance of our war effort.

7. I should greatly welcome your comments on the above: and more especially if there is anything specific you would wish me to say to Nahas on our interview of this morning. It may to some extent have been bluff on his part: but I do not think we should take it as such.

8. As regard his attitude in regard to internal and press censorship, I have for long been greatly perplexed as to the best line to follow. It is singularly difficult to draw - or define - between legitimate application of these measures and their misapplication for internal political party ends. I should most certainly not welcome or advocate the abolition of martial law as war conditions now are; nor its replacement by recourse to ordinary courts which I feel little doubt would land us in perpetual difficulties and embarrassments far greater than those we at present have to face. In any instructions you may feel disposed to send me, I hope you can indicate your view on these two specific points - internal and press censorship.

internment?

O.T.P.

Internment?

R

application of this measure also and report.

John
Wm.

ab.
March 7/44.

Abraham

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

J.794/31/16. 14

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 845

D. 10.0 p.m. 8th March, 1944.

8th March, 1944.

T T T T T

Your telegram No. 593 [of the 1st March: interview with Prime Minister on general situation].

I approve your language to Nahas Pasha set out in your telegram No. 890 [of the 1st March] and agree with your statement of the position as set out in paragraph 6 of your telegram under reference.

2. The principal question at the moment may be whether, without abolishing them, the time has not come to admit a relaxation of the internment and press-censorship measures taken by the Egyptian Government, or at least a review of the application of these measures.

3. In connexion with internment I am glad to learn that you are to receive a list of internees with reasons for their internment. Could these lists not be examined in private conference between Egyptian authorities, representatives of Embassy and military authorities and some impartial judicial personality? As a start you might consider following up action suggested in my telegram No. 107.

4. As regards press-censorship, we know of its wide unpopularity and generally that it is used to manipulate the political scene, but we have no details. If it is merely used to thwart opposition moves, why is the Prime Minister saying that he is ready to abolish it? I shall be glad if you will examine the application of this measure also and report.

O.T.P.

42

J

J 793

9

1944

EGYPT and SUDAN

41327

Registry Number } J 793/31/16.

TELEGRAM FROM Lord Killearn, Cairo.

No. 390.

Dated 1st March, 1944.

Received in Registry } 3rd March, 1944.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Last Paper.

J 776

References.

J 787

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

M.H. (Index.)

24/3/44

6/3

Next Paper.

X
His Majesty's Ambassador's interview with Nahas Pasha

Gives an account of his interview with Nahas Pasha on 1st March when the present political situation was discussed at length.

في 1 مارس 1944
التقى السفير
مع نحاس باشا
وتحدثا عن
الوضع السياسي
الحالي في
مصر والسودان

(Minutes.)

See minutes on J 794.

2/6
6/3

that we were always blamed for everything which the Government did; that was largely common sense and I was ready to put up with it as long as I was clear in my mind that they were not acting wrongly. For instance in Upper Egypt the Government had failed to take proper action in time, in spite of our frequent warnings and offers to help. The result of this negligence had been that they had put the ball between the King's feet and he had made the most of the opportunity. And we were blamed by the country.

10. It looks to me that Nahas Pasha is feeling the draught owing to the rising feeling over the short-comings of the Government, particularly in Upper Egypt, and that the real motive of his summons was the Azhar, in which Wafá have been trying to create a Wafdist party through which to get hold of this troublesome religious institution. In view of the protest against the King's position in the Azhar, it is obvious that such an attempt must lead to trouble, whether it succeeds or fails. I specifically warned him that I regarded the Government's action over the Azhar as ill-advised, the Azhar being a Royal stronghold.

11. My comments on this interview will follow.

O.T.P.

1944

J

138

1341

EGYPT and SUDAN

41327

16

7

Registry Number J 1341/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM Lord Killearn (Cairo).

No. 746

Dated 15th April, 1944.

Received in Registry } 16th April, 1944.

J: Egypt and Sudan

Relations between Palace and Government. ✓

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 731 (J 1318/314/16) and states that crisis has now become common knowledge and that Amin Osman has asked for facts of H.H. Ambassador's audience with King concerning reports of his wish to dismiss Government, and was told that matters of high policy were discussed and referred to London. Oriental Counsellor pointed out to Hassanain that reports, more or less accurate, had come from Palace, and reminded him of King's undertaking not to act pending reply from London. Hassanain replied that in interests of both King and of Government could not be allowed to creat disorders. Requests instruct. urgently

(Minutes.)

See on J 1343

J 1343

Last Paper.

J 1318

References.

(Printed) 21/4

Egypt vol

(How disposed of)

(Action completed.)

H. H. (Index.)

17/5/44

Next Paper.

J 1342

including Ahmed Hussein, leader of Young Egyptian Party, Hassan al Banna head of Muslim Brethren Society and Fathi Radwan formerly a member of Young Egypt and now a leading element in the extremist wing of Watan to which section the assassin belonged. Young Egypt and Muslim Brethren have been working in agreement with Wafd. Wafd has issued a statement condemning the crime.

5. It is generally felt Ahmed Maher's adoption of a liberal policy so immediately after the repressive Wafd régime was premature and was tending to let loose forces of disorder in the country. His assassination has resulted in a reversion to previous policy of repression as illustrated by immediate re-establishment of censorship as existing before recent relaxation and by the numerous arrests indicated above.

6. Lull in debates in Parliament interrupted by the assassination of Ahmed Maher were resumed on February 26th and Government obtained a vote of confidence in the Chamber by 214 to 2 and in the Senate by 66 votes to 35. The vote in the Senate is noteworthy as indicating a further reduction of the opposition (Wafdist) vote as compared with vote for the election of Vice President (see paragraph 4 weekly report 112). Total number of Wafdist senators is 65. The Chamber also approved a motion denouncing the attempts (i.e. of Wafd) to disturb public opinion and urging publication of Ahmed Maher's statement in the Chamber just before his assassination. Ahmed Maher in his statement which has now been published, outlined the case for a declaration of war without proposing any conditions regarding national aspirations but significantly suggested that after the declaration, the Egyptian Government should discuss national aspirations with the British Government before the San Francisco Conference.

7. On instructions from the Foreign Office a statement was issued to the press as from British authoritative sources to explain that Egypt's declaration of war would not in any way alter the existing situation as regards assistance to be furnished by Egypt in virtue of the Treaty. The statement added that there had never been any intention to call upon the services of Egyptian labour corps for the Far East or elsewhere. This suggestion had been encouraged by the Wafd. The statement had considerable effect in calming public apprehension and in facilitating persuasion of the Government's policy.

8. Declaration of war against Germany and Japan was notified to local representative of the Protecting Power immediately after the conclusion of debate in the Chamber.

9.

9. It is generally felt that Nokrashi is not of the calibre necessary for the premiership but that his appointment was inevitable in view of the fact that Saadists are the major party in the Chamber. His extreme susceptibility, his despotic nature and pettifogging mentality are likely to create trouble between him and his non-Saadist colleagues in the Cabinet particularly in handling of Anglo-Egyptian problems. Government supporters however think that his despotic nature may anyhow lead him to handle more drastically the elements of disorder.

10. A royal decree has been passed retiring Kamel Sidky, President of the State Audit Office on pension. He was appointed by Waft after Amin Osman's appointment as Minister of Finance.

11. Discussions of the sub-committee discussing the constitution of the League of Arab States are drawing to a conclusion. Apparently on the initiative of Azzam a resolution is being discussed to the effect that the League should help non-independent Arab countries to become independent and subsequently to join the League. It has been pointed out by the Embassy to the Egyptian Prime Minister that such a resolution would create difficulties for the Arab Union Movement. Nokrashi asked in reply whether the Atlantic Charter did not apply. He was told that this was a wide question and we were only suggesting the need of [group undec. ? greater] caution. He said he was quite alive to the necessity for caution but said that anyhow as regards Libya objection would not be the same as in the case of other non-independent Arab countries. It was pointed out to him that this would be pre-judging the decision of the Peace Conference regarding territories which under international law were merely under temporary British military administration. He said it would be very difficult to avoid this issue in view of the fact that he had received an official request from Idris Al Senussi for Libyan participation in the Arab Union. He finally said that he would examine the question and try and find a diplomatic way out of the issue without raising serious difficulties.

12. According to confidential information received, the sub-committee proposes also to pass a resolution that as the Palestine question is a danger not only for Palestinians but for all Arab countries a Palestinian delegate should be appointed to the Council of the League.

13.

J

J 3501

9 OCT 1944

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number } 3501/31/16

TELEGRAM FROM Mr. Shone, Cairo.

No. 1995

Dated 8th Oct.,
Received } 9th Oct.,
in Registry } 1944.
J : Egypt and Sudan

Situation in Egypt.

Understands from Hassanein that Nahas has summoned cabinet meeting for 8th October when he proposes to submit his resignation and publish letters exchanged with Mr. Shone. Hassanein hopes to arrange for revocation of Nahas before this occurs.

Last Paper.

J 3500

References.

(Minutes.)

CP.
Mo.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

W 30/6

(Index.)

S.M.
13/12/44

Next Paper.

J 3502

he welcomed the "many copts who have entered Parliament" and asserted that "they do not represent their community, but the country as a whole, with all its faiths". Although AHMED MAHER hinted broadly that the Ward was responsible for fostering these dangerous sentiments, it is generally realised, at any rate among the more astute sections of the population, that much of the blame rests with those who instructed local authorities not to interfere when this form of propaganda was helping to defeat the Makramists at the polls.

Dissatisfaction with the course of the elections was unmistakably manifested at El Azhar whose only candidate, Sheikh AHMED EL BAKHOURY, failed largely as a result of Government interference; a strike was called on 15.1.45 and an anti-Government demonstration staged; Young Egypt Party students who participated as a protest against AHMED HUSSEIN's defeat, raised cries against Great Britain. The strike continued until 20.1.45 when work was peacefully resumed. The police were out in force and were successful throughout in maintaining order. In the meanwhile studies have at last recommenced at the Tanta Masjed; there have been numerous dismissals and the authorities are hopeful that tranquility will now reign.

IKHWAN EL MUSLIMEEN

Thanks to the tireless efforts of his supporters in the area, and of others specially drafted in from Cairo and from the neighbourhood, HASSAN EL BANNA had, according to all information, succeeded, by 8.1.45 in building up a substantial majority over the other candidates at Ismailia. Although he had previously warned his associates at Helma el Guedida that he was anticipating considerable official interference, he appears to have been allowed almost complete liberty of action during his electioneering campaign; nor could he find legitimate cause for complaint on polling day itself; amid complete calm, he obtained a lead of nearly 500 over his closest rival; since however his total did not represent the required 51% of all votes cast, it was announced that the contest was to be resumed between himself and Dr SOLIMAN EID, the government candidate, on 14.1.45.

On 10.1.45 AHMED MAHER gave instructions that HASSAN EL BANNA's name was on no account to appear again at the head of the list; his orders were conveyed by telephone to the Sub-Governor of the Canal Zone by no fewer than three senior officials of the Ministry of the Interior. HASSAN EL BANNA received more than an inkling of what was afoot, and was reported to be preparing to offer fierce resistance.

Nevertheless on 14.1.45 proceedings were remarkably quiet. HASSAN EL BANNA's tactics were to ensure that all IKHWAN EL MUSLIMEEN votes were cast before noon; energies were then concentrated throughout the remainder of the day upon endeavouring to prevent Dr SOLIMAN EID's supporters from reaching the booths; the police however successfully foiled the scheme, on one occasion firing at a group of IKHWAN EL MUSLIMEEN youths, six of whom were wounded. All doubts regarding the issue were dispelled by the evening, and early on 15.1.45 it was officially proclaimed that Dr SOLIMAN EID had been elected by seven hundred votes.

Kindled in the first place by the defeat of all the other IKHWAN EL MUSLIMEEN candidates, in many cases due to some extent to government manipulation, anger against the Coalition flared up when this result was made known. On 15.1.45 several lorry loads of Ismailia IKHWAN EL MUSLIMEEN members drew up at Abdine Square. A demonstration was staged against the government and an official complaint was lodged at the Palace. At the same time students affiliated to the society took a prominent part in fomenting and keeping alive agitation at el Azhar during the four day strike.

In the meanwhile HASSAN EL BANNA returned to Cairo, and presided at a meeting of the executive committee on 18.1.45. He announced that his defeat had been due to the manoeuvres of AHMED MAHER who had in turn been

J 333
22 JAN 1947

207711A

J333/333/9. 38/16
Sir M. Lampson
Cairo
Tel. No: 272
Dated: 20 Jan
Received: 22 Jan.

King Farouk.

Reports that, due to a severe Vichy reprimand by King Farouk to M.F.B. the latter had tendered his resignation. Records an interview with P.M. following receipt of this report, when the seriousness of the King's behaviour was emphasized.

Last Paper.

1. War Cabinet (Minutes) Conclusion 10(42)6

See within.

22/1

J 23/1

References.

في 23/1 - في الله يوم الجمعة 23/1
- في يوم السبت 23/1 - في يوم الأحد 23/1

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

[Handwritten mark]

N

Next Paper.

J 333/333/9. 38/16

6. The Prime Minister then said that, having ended his official utterances, he would now speak with complete openness to me in my private capacity. The story of the King's action was true and he had had a most stormy interview with His Majesty whom [?grp. contd. ?he] had beaten into withdrawing his intervention in this matter. The Prime Minister added "the boy is an absolute coward: he has to be frightened from time to time - and saved from himself". He added with a smile that the French Minister would not expect to receive declarations on departure. I observed that if he had I could assure him that the pot which was now only simmering would most certainly have boiled over. Meanwhile, the prospect did not seem encouraging: must we go on having to frighten the boy at periodical intervals? If so, I felt myself that our patience might very easily give out. Persia should surely serve as a reminder to the King of what happened if it was overstrained. The Prime Minister admitted it and added that he was having a "hellishly" difficult time. But he hoped we would still be forbearing and help him in his task. I replied that, as to that, he certainly realised how forbearing and patient we had been up to date: we did not want to meet trouble half-way, but if trouble deliberately came out to meet us I personally had no shadow of doubt what advice I should give my Government as to meeting it.

7. At one moment the Prime Minister spoke of bad influences in King Farouk's immediate caravan, so I pressed him to insist at long last on the elimination of Abdul Wahab Pasha who was nothing but the tool and agent of Ali Maher. The Prime Minister was against this for the moment, though it was not clear exactly why.

8. Whether in view of this alarming incident ^{MATTER} we should not now take that ~~expulsion~~ up and make a test case of it, I am not sure. I will consider and report further.

INDIV

[Copies sent to Captain Clifford and Mr. Armstrong]

that embargo. The issue of exequatur might raise certain formal difficulties arising out of Condominium apart from undesirability on general grounds of having a foreign consular [group undecypherable: ? office] at Khartum. The appointment of foreign consuls might easily spur the Egyptians on to one of their periodic drives towards greater participation in the Sudan.

4. If the United States Government should raise the matter officially and it is felt undesirable to return a blank refusal, it might be possible to agree either (1) to the establishment in Khartum of an American military mission or of a branch of American military mission [group undecypherable] Cairo, or with a tacit understanding that they would be treated more or less like a consular officer; (2) to the appointment of an American civil liaison officer who would hold cyphers and, in general, have the same rights and duties as a consular officer without the title or exequatur. We could justify either alternative, at least in time of war, as a special appointment required by American war effort in Middle East area without extending similar privileges to other Governments. But I am myself doubtful of the wisdom of either.

5. May I have your views?

[J 3307/38/16]

No. 3.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 719.)

Sir,

Cairo, July 15, 1942.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the final figures⁽¹⁾ of the Population Census of Egypt, 1937, which has recently been published by the Egyptian Government. As indicated in the introduction to the census, the final figures differ little from the provisional figures published at the time of the census.

2. The present figures indicate that the total population of Egypt had increased by nearly 1,900,000 during the ten years preceding the census, the 1937 figure being 15,920,694.

3. Of 13,813,120 persons over five years of age 11,241,732 are stated to have been illiterate. Agriculture continued to absorb a greater number of the working population than any other pursuit, the 1937 figure being 4,308,201 as against 3,526,036 in 1927. 6,390,935 persons over five years of age are shown as unoccupied, an increase of about 90,000 over the 1927 figure.

4. About 14½ million persons are shown to be Moslems. Of the remainder, over a million are Copts and approximately 63,000 Jews.

5. Of the foreign communities the Greek was by far the largest, with over 68,000 nationals, though this figure represents a decrease of about 8,000 since 1927. The Italian colony was reduced by nearly 5,000 at approximately 48,000. The British community was the third largest at 31,523, as compared with 34,169 in 1927.

I have, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

(¹) Not printed.

[J 3592/333/G]

No. 4.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 2040.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, August 19, 1942.

NAHAS PASHA spoke to me this morning about serious clash which threatened to develop between the Government and the Palace over Chief of General Staff of Egyptian Army (Attallah Pasha).

2. His Excellency reminded me of various signs of danger of disloyalty in Egyptian army. Minister of Defence now found it quite impossible to work further with Chief of Staff, who, being a Palace man, submitted everything to King Farouk. It resulted that Government attempts to cleanse the army of bad elements were consistently blocked. Minister of Defence now wished to resign unless Chief of Staff were changed. Prime Minister had convoked Hassanein Pasha and, in the presence of Minister of Defence, had had this thing out. But Hassanein had since absented himself from Cairo and no answer had come from the Palace.

3. The Prime Minister spoke of recent arrest of two German officers and consequent arrest of certain Egyptian officers and of Aziz-el-Masri—also of flight to enemy of two Egyptian army aviators. He also referred to reports of a secret society amongst the army officers, which he believed to be true (see my telegram No. 1366).

4. I have for long felt that this clash was sooner or later inevitable. No Wafd Government was likely to tolerate indefinitely a Chief of Staff, however good in himself (and we ourselves having nothing against Attallah), who was a Palace man. Undoubtedly, ever since they came into office the present Government have been determined to take their measures to ensure having Egyptian army with them in the event of trouble with the Palace, especially after events of [group undecypherable: ? 4th February]. In effecting this their methods may have been crude—they usually are. But I can fully understand their feeling that the Government must be able to rely upon the army.

4 [sic]. Prime Minister did not this morning specifically ask for my support, but it was clear that he sought some indication of my reaction. So I reminded him of the assurance I had, on your instructions, given him when he assumed office, adding that, as I saw the matter, the Government of the country must be allowed freedom to govern and be masters of their own house.

5. After the loyal way in which Nahas Pasha has played up during recent events, I feel more than ever that we should support him if this matter cannot be amicably settled direct between himself and the Palace. I am sure that the Minister of Defence (who is a good man) should not be allowed to resign; and I believe, if I were to let him know the Palace knows that such is my attitude, the effect might be salutary. I propose in case of need (but not otherwise) to act accordingly. This is not a time to allow things to drift here or to permit the Palace to challenge the Government on what is clearly a matter within their legitimate competence. I shall therefore, if necessary, adopt a strong line.

[J 3731/36/16]

No. 5.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 2087.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, August 25, 1942.

THE Prime Minister, accompanied by C.I.G.S., Sir A. Cadogan, and personal staff, arrived in Cairo by air, 3rd August, and left again for Moscow, 11th August. On his return from Moscow he visited Cairo a second time from 17th August to 23rd August, when he left for London by air. The party were my guests at the Embassy during both visits.

2. The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa came to Cairo by air to meet Mr. Churchill, arriving 3rd August and leaving 8th August. Lieutenant-General Sir Pierre Spar Ryneveld, Commander-in-Chief, Union Forces, had preceded him. This was the first opportunity which Mr. Churchill had had since the autumn of meeting General Smuts.

3. General Sir A. Wavell, Commander-in-Chief, India, reached Cairo by air 4th August to take part in the discussions. He accompanied Mr. Churchill on his visit to Moscow and on his second visit to Cairo, returning to India, 22nd August.

4. Mr. Churchill was met by the Minister of State, the service authorities and myself. During his visit he presided over meetings of Middle East Defence Committee, and held numerous conferences with Mr. Casey, the Commanders-in-chief, and many other service and civilian authorities. He went to the El Alamein front and visited South African, Australian and Royal Air Force formations. He also inspected United Kingdom army and air units behind the lines.

5. Nahas Pasha was my guest at lunch, 3rd August, to meet Mr. Churchill. The conversation was most cordial. Mr. Churchill was received in audience by King Farouk, 5th August. The King showed himself friendly, but evaded serious conversation by adopting, as he often does, a jocular and pawky manner. Amongst others received by Mr. Churchill during his first visit were General de Gaulle, who was on his way to Beirut, General Catroux, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan (Prime Minister of the Punjab), and General Freyberg, Commanding New Zealand Forces.

6. Among those received by Mr. Churchill on his second visit were His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed Ali, M. Canellopoulo (Vice-President of the Greek Council of Ministers), and Lord Gort from Malta, Sir E. Spears from Beirut,

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Sir K. Cornwallis from Bagdad, and General Sir W. Platt from Nairobi. General Sir M. Wilson, Commander-in-Chief, 9th Army, was in Cairo during both visits. Mr. Churchill visited El Alamein front a second time, spending a night with the troops and seeing United Kingdom units. He also inspected numerous army and Royal Air Force units behind the lines, including New Zealand troops and a division just arrived from United Kingdom.

7. Mr. Averell Harriman arrived in Cairo by air from United States and accompanied Mr. Churchill to Moscow as envoy of President Roosevelt. He returned to Cairo two days after Mr. Churchill and flew with him to London. During both visits to Cairo, Mr. Churchill had numerous consultations with General Maxwell, Commanding United States Forces in the Middle East, and other American authorities.

8. Mr. Churchill came to Cairo at a moment when, following the retreat of of 8th Army, the enemy seemed to have established himself firmly on a line 60 miles from Alexandria before launching a further attack, and the news from Russia was discouraging. His presence has had a galvanic effect, and has infused fresh vigour and encouragement into all. The announcement during his visit of the appointment of General Alexander as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, and of General Montgomery to the command of the 8th Army, was well received. It was interpreted as heralding more ruthless and offensive military action. On the civilian side, Mr. Churchill gave a stirring address to a meeting consisting of senior members of the embassy staff, His Majesty's Consuls-General in Alexandria and Cairo, and leading members of the British communities in these towns. He also received all the staffs of the Minister of State's office and of the embassy, to whom he spoke of the importance of all the work which brings victory nearer in the Middle East, and addressed a meeting of accredited and other newspaper correspondents. That he found time for these and numerous other interviews and talks was deeply appreciated. I am receiving from all sides accounts not only of enthusiasm aroused, but of fresh and bracing inventive [sic. ? incentive] given in every sphere of effort.

9. Necessity of trying to conceal from the enemy in a country such as Egypt Mr. Churchill's movements and plans imposed a severe strain on all concerned with his security. To judge from results and from Axis wireless, effort was successful.

10. I am most grateful to the Prime Minister for having spared time to visit this area. The visit has been an immense success and came at a time when a tonic was badly needed.

[J 3658/833/G]

No. 6.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 2088.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, August 25, 1942.

MY telegram No. 2040.

The Egyptian Prime Minister has not spoken to me since in regard to the question of Chief of Staff.

2. Chief of the Military Mission tells me that the position is now as follows: Nahas Pasha will not allow the Minister of Defence to resign, and is trying to see King Farouk. The latter is evading the issue by absenting himself. Chief of the Military Mission understands that even Hasanein professes ignorance of His Majesty's whereabouts.

3. Chief of the Military Mission has been told by the Minister of Defence that there are three main counts against Attallah, which make the Minister's position impossible, namely: (1) Reference of every question and all instructions to the King before action is taken, and the receipt of orders from the King without reference to the Ministry; (2) an apparent inability to maintain discipline amongst the officers in the army; (3) alleged complicity in Officers' Secret Association.

4. Chief of the Military Mission's comment is that the first is undoubtedly true, though it must be remembered that the position in regard to the army here is not the same constitutionally as in Great Britain. The second is certainly true: for example, an officer undoubtedly guilty of stealing British Government stores was never brought to justice, but was merely transferred from the command of his unit to a more lucrative job on army headquarters; and there are other

similar miscarriages of justice, consequence being that discipline cannot be enforced. As regards (3), the Chief of the Military Mission doubts whether the Chief of Staff has any direct representative, though undoubtedly he would obey any orders he got from the palace on this subject.

5. From what the Minister of Defence has said to the Chief of the Military Mission, the position appears to be that Nahas Pasha is determined to force this issue. Generally, General Napier Clavering shares my view that his Excellency is perfectly right in doing so. That no Minister of Defence can carry on with the Chief of Staff who is not thoroughly loyal to him. Chief of the Military Mission adds that the present state of uncertainty is definitely upsetting the army, and that a quick solution, no matter what the solution, is what the army wants; even the Chief of the Staff himself as good as said this to General Napier Clavering.

6. It looks, therefore, as though the time for my intervention with the palace may have come. But before making any such move I shall, of course, first take counsel with Nahas Pasha and make sure it fits in with his hand. I shall do this forthwith. I regard it as most important politically that Nahas Pasha should not lose this battle with the palace.

7. I am, of course, keeping the Minister of State and the military authorities informed.

[J 3718/38/16]

No. 7.

Sir M. Lampson to Mr. Eden.—(Received August 31.)

No. 2124.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, August 31, 1942.

AMIN OSMAN gives me following account of Nahas Pasha's audience with King Farouk on 29th August evening:—

2. Minister of Defence did not accompany the Prime Minister as it had been agreed with Hassanein that question of Atallah should not be raised in view of a previous agreement between Nahas Pasha and Hassanein that the King would be given time himself to find some other suitable job for Atallah.

3. Nahas Pasha proposed to King Farouk the appointment of an Under-Secretary of State for Defence. (Wafd Government had some time ago desired to create this post for which Hassan Abdul Wahab [group undecypherable: ? Director-General] coast guards, was their candidate. Palace then successfully opposed the creation of this post presumably because they thought it would cramp the style of Atallah and the Palace in negotiations. Moreover Abdul Wahab is non persona grata to Palace). King Farouk agreed to creation of post for which Nahas Pasha then suggested Abdul Wahab, to whom the King objected. Nahas Pasha then suggested Abdul Hamid Hafez, a general at present on half pay. The King agreed.

4. Amin Osman thought the above ends the army crisis. If so, it looks as if it had been settled by a compromise, the Government getting its Under-Secretary of State for Defence and an oral promise eventually to displace Atallah.

[J 3207/3207/16]

No. 8.

Mr. Eden to Sir M. Lampson (Cairo).

(No. 2070.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 31, 1942.

YOUR telegram No. 1819.

If your United States colleague raises question again officially we shall feel unable to return blank refusal; and we do not consider that appointment of civil liaison officer would meet the case since it seems unlikely that he would be able to carry out various functions (e.g., notarial) the need for which presumably prompted Mr. Kirk's action.

2. We should, therefore, propose to reply that Americans are at liberty to send a consular officer to the Sudan, whose appointment would be notified to His Majesty's Government through United States Ambassador here. But the officer should present no commission; and the Governor-General would confine himself to stating, in reply to the notification, that he would be recognised as

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POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson
No. 240.
18th January, 1942.

D. 1.35 a.m. 18th January, 1942.
R. 5.30 a.m. 18th January, 1942.

JJJJJ

Weekly Appreciation.

5252/36/16

8/10
Saadists
re-formation

Failure of the Prime Minister to shuffle his Cabinet (see my telegram No. 197) and growing parliamentary dissatisfaction with Government's handling of supplies situation have left the impression of Cabinet instability. Prime Minister is still in consultation with party leaders with a view to re-formation of his Cabinet. Indications are that Saadists are becoming more obstreperous in view of Prime Minister's weakened position and that they are now inclined to press more energetically their desiderata regarding allocation of important ministries to Saadist Party.

Content

2. Bedawi has been so discredited that his return to ~~exp. undec. lieu~~ is, in spite of Prime Minister's desire, becoming problematical.

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3. The palace is reported (but report must be taken with full reserve) to be exploring with Mahas possibilities of an agreement with a view to strengthening Egypt against the feared encroachments of a victorious Britain on Egypt's independence.

4. Russian successes and our advance in Libya have inspired growing confidence in final British victory and salutary fears amongst 5th columnists. Far East set-back is taken calmly.

5. Decision of Government to postpone elections for Municipal councils, based on articles 114 and 115 of Constitution, is taken to foreshadow similar decision regarding Parliamentary elections when they become due.

6. Further limitation of cotton acreage has been proposed by the Government and the proposal is still before Parliament which is dissatisfied with conflicting information furnished by Ministers and varying proposals regarding areas and extent of limitation. Ahmed Maher is playing active part in framing of the scheme. He has recently had a mild stroke but I hope and gather not serious.

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