

J 1915 / G 154  
30 APR 1943

2 1943  
2

35532  
EGYPT 1943

J 1915 1433 R 16  
M/S basis  
no: 1033  
Apr. 27  
Apr. 30

Political situation in Egypt  
reports that in defence committee meeting  
60 - in - represented strongly that in  
connection with the current Egyptian  
political crisis, they cannot contemplate  
prospective use of force which would  
be highly detrimental to conduct of future  
military operations in the Mediterranean

Last Paper.

J 1433

References.

J 1857 / 2 / 16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

copied to Service  
minutes Apr. 29

(Minutes.)

2 pp

See on J 1916 / G.

J 24

ف 1 / 13 - تقریر استقامت جوہر لغو نہ ہو بلکہ اس کا ناسود  
ف 1 / 13 - تقریر  
ف 1 / 13 - تقریر  
ف 1 / 13 - تقریر

(Action completed.)

EC 14/5

(Index.)

N

Next Paper.

[ CYPHER ].

6c

1433

*Enter Receipt*

1915  
PRISEC.

155

30 APR 1946

FROM MINISTER OF STATE CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

No. 1033.  
April 27th 1943.

D. 12.10 a.m. April 28th 1943.  
R. 1.50 a.m. April 28th 1943.

IMMEDIATE.

Following personal and most secret for Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from Minister of State.

In [ grp. undec. ] defence committee meeting today with Sir M. Lampson present, Commanders-in-Chief represented strongly that, in connexion with the current Egyptian political crisis, they cannot contemplate prospective use of force which would be highly detrimental to conduct of future military operations in the Mediterranean.

O.T.P.

*sent 28/4*  
*P.M.*  
*Sir H. G. ...*  
*Sir M. ...*  
*Egyptian ...*

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

J.

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

TO: EGYPT

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 757

5th May, 1943

D. 1.45 p.m. 5th May, 1943

g g g g g

URGENT

J 1916/1433/G.

My telegram No. 745 [of May 2nd: situation in Egypt].

While I hope you are now equipped to deal with any crisis which may be precipitated by the King's persistence in his intention to turn out Nahas without allowing him to hold elections, you will no doubt feel that situation will remain unsatisfactory and dangerous even after a Wafdist electoral victory and still more if no elections take place and the King merely drops his immediate intention of evicting Nahas from office.

2. I shall therefore be very glad to be informed as fully as possible of information which may reach you as to state of opinion in the country and how far the decline in the influence of the Wafd may have gone. Particularly as regards feeling in the Egyptian army, evidence as to which ought to be available to the Military Mission.

3. Beyond this, ideas which occur to us and which may possibly be of assistance in the handling of future developments are as follows:

(1) As regards what you say in your telegram No. 868 of May 1st indicating that the issue has for the moment at least been shifted from the Black Book to the personal friction between the King and his Government, I entirely agree that it is neither desirable nor practicable that you should intervene in such petty and absurd difficulties as the incident at the Turkish Legation referred to in your telegram No. 867 (of May 1st).

As between the King and the Wafd your mediation should be reserved unless and until you see a favourable opportunity for securing a general and comprehensive settlement of the points of difference between them. Such a settlement might well involve on Nahas' side some reconstruction of his Government.

(2) It/

(2) It might also be worth suggesting to Nahas that the whole underlying idea of the Wafdist Party itself is now long out of date and that the moment is favourable for its conversion into a new political party. It would hardly fall within our province to suggest the principles on which such a new party should be based. But two planks in its platform might well be the maintenance of the alliance and the raising of the standard of living in Egypt by a national movement approximate to a war effort.

4. It ought not to be beyond Nahas' capacity to ensure that such prestige as attaches to the House of the Nation and even to the person of Madame Zaghoul herself should be transferred to the new party and not left to be snapped up by some dissident Wafdist rump.

5. Apart from these suggestions and assuming that elections are held by the present Government it is important to impress on Nahas that such guarantees as are possible of the impartiality of the elections should be afforded. I should not wish to suggest that a neutral Government ought to be appointed to hold the elections. But could Nahas be brought to consider some such guarantee as might be implied by the appointment of one or more independent and, so far as may be, impartial personages who, without taking over the functions of the Ministry of the Interior, could exercise some supervision over the degree of freedom with which the elections are conducted.

OTF.

170

Registry No. J 1916/1433/9  
M.P.

May 1943.  
Despatched 7-45p - M/S

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Draft.  
Sir M. Lampson  
Cairo.

Your tel No. [07].....  
.....].

Telegram.  
No. .... 767.

War Cabinet have reviewed the situation. While they would have preferred to defer <sup>final</sup> official decision for <sup>48 hours</sup> a day or two to permit of the receipt of the views of the Commanders in Chief on the military implications of the use of force, it was nevertheless decided to instruct you as follows:

War Cabinet Dis.

2. If <sup>within the next 48 hours, you consider</sup> you are of the opinion that ~~that immediate action is called for~~ the situation does not admit of any further delay, you have authority to offer formal advice to King Farouk on the lines set out in para. 5 (a) of your tel No. 855 (April 29th), namely that Nahas Pasha should be allowed to go to the country if he so desires. In tendering this advice to His Majesty you may be assured that it will if necessary and in the last resort be backed by force.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

3. Necessary instructions are being sent to the Commanders-in-Chief.

~~4. You will be kept by tel. when instrs. in §2 above are confirmed and extended beyond 48. hour period, whenever they are practicable.~~

al.  
NY 5743.

NY 5745

1002

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

171

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

TO EGYPT

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 767

5th May, 1943

D: 7. 45 p.m. 5th May, 1943

P P P P

MOST IMMEDIATE

War Cabinet have reviewed the situation. While they would prefer to defer final decision for 48 hours to permit of the receipt of the views of the Commanders in Chief on the military implications of the use of force, it was nevertheless decided to instruct you as follows:

2. If within the next 48 hours, you consider that immediate action is called for, you have authority to offer formal advice to King Farouk on the lines set out in paragraph 5 (a) of your telegram No. 855 [April 29th], namely that Nahas Pasha should be allowed to go to the country if he so desires. In tendering this advice to His Majesty you may be assured that it will if necessary and in the last resort be backed by force.

3. Necessary instructions are being sent to the Commanders-in-Chief.

O.T.P.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. J 1916/1433/e.

E.A.C.A.

Draft.  
H.M. Ambassador,  
Cairo.

Telegram.  
No. 778.  
May 7th.  
War Cab. Dist.

once you  
have finished  
check and

172

May 1943.  
Despatched 5.50/3

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My tel. No. 767 [of May 5th: situation in Egypt].

War Cabinet again considered situation to-day in the light of the appreciation received from the Commanders in Chief under date of May 5th.

2. It was decided to confirm instructions issued to you in my telegram under reference. War Cabinet wish to be kept informed of the position and, if the situation permits, to have an opportunity of commenting on the course of action which you may propose before such action is taken.

3. Commanders-in-Chief are being informed of the above decision.



[ This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on ].

[ CYPHER ]. WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.  
TO EGYPT.  
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 778. D. 5.50 p.m. May 7th 1945.  
May 7th 1945.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No.767 [ of May 5th: situation in Egypt ].

War Cabinet again considered situation today in the light of the appreciation received from the Commanders-in-Chief under date of May 5th.

2. It was decided to confirm instructions issued to you in my telegram under reference. War Cabinet wish to be kept informed of the position and, once you have offered advice and if the situation permits, to have an opportunity of commenting on the course of action which you may propose before such action is taken.

5. Commanders-in-Chief are being informed of the above decision.

O.T.P.

*Handwritten note:*  
C. 10. 10. 1945



(5)

SECRET.

10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall.

M 332/3

J 9/16

FOREIGN SECRETARY.

1. The Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, tell us nothing new when they say that a violent collision in Egypt, between the Imperial Forces and those who follow King Farouk, would be detrimental to our plans in the Eastern Mediterranean. It would evidently be a pity to have such troubles. <sup>The matter is capable of more refinement</sup> The following questions would arise:-

(a) What probability is there that King Farouk and his <sup>followers</sup> father would resist our decision by force of arms?

(b) In this event, what form would his resistance take? Are we to imagine the Egyptian Army falling upon our garrisons, and the Egyptian populations rising in Cairo and Alexandria? Or would there merely be a mutinous spirit, protests and the like, with a riot and a splutter of firing here and there? *Or not even that.*

(c) What forces have we got in the neighbourhood to overawe any such manifestations? Surely the movement of a few score of Tanks, of which there are a great number

in the Delta, through the streets or towards the Palace, or even an approach march of some Tanks towards Cairo would have the desired effect?

2. It is, above all, important that we should take a clear and simple line. If it is decided, as Lampson wishes, that Nahas should be given an opportunity to go to the country and conduct a general election, we should tell King Farouk plainly that it is our decision and that we tender our "advice" in the most formal and emphatic manner. It would follow that, on these lines, we should do everything to make our policy successful, and nothing that would hamper it. The Egyptian Executive should be given full opportunity to put their case before the people. There can be no question of an appeal by us to King Farouk. We must make up our minds what we want done, and get it done.

3. Notwithstanding the above, I see no reason why we should not warn Nahas, as the price of our support, that he must not "rig" the election in such a manner as to deprive the expression of the popular will of all

validity. This would be a becoming attitude on our part.

4. The only alternative is to stand completely aside and let things rip, looking for some later moment for intervention. After weighing both courses, I am against this, in view of the weighty opinion of Lord Lampson that we and our Treaty might thereby be found without a friend. It follows that General Wilson should be given orders to marshal the necessary forces. In practice, the Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief are not on the same footing with him, as they have no means of judging. It follows also that we should do nothing that will militate against the result which we have decided to seek.

LM  
30.4.43

Ref Sir M. Lampson's ltr No 855 of 29.11.



J 1916

10, Downing Street, 177  
Whitehall.

30th April, 1943.

My dear Cadogan,

I enclose, as arranged, a typed copy of the Prime Minister's telegram to General Wilson. I have sent a copy to the C.I.G.S. Will you let me know as soon as the Foreign Secretary has seen the telegram. It may be useful for record purposes for you to know that the Prime Minister's minute, of which you took away the top copy, should be M.332/3.

The tel.  
has now  
gone,

and has been Yours sincerely,

repeated to

Sir M. Lapsley,

The Honourable

Sir Alexander Cadogan,

G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I.

*T. Brown*

*with P.M.'s permission.*

*1/5*

FOREIGN SECRETARY )

C. I. G. S. )

To see before despatch.

178

PRIME MINISTER TO C.-in-C., M.E.

Personal and Secret.

With regard to the conclusion reached by the joint Commanders-in-Chief that the use of force in the present Egyptian crisis cannot be entertained, it is your duty to take all necessary measures to support H. M. Ambassador in the execution of the policy imparted to him by H.M.G. It seems to me very unlikely that anything more than a demonstration, if that, would be required and that you have ample forces at your disposal. H. M. Ambassador must be put in a position to tender formal "advice" to the Palace. Pray therefore consult with him and strengthen his hand.

W. S. C.

30.4.43.