

J

35531

J 1519
6 APR 1943

Registry Number } J 1519/2/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Sir M. Lamson
No. OR192
665

Dated 4th Apr. 1943.
Received in Registry 6th Apr. 1943

J: Egypt and Sudan
Last Paper.

J1518

References.
J1203/2/16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Mr Howtown Baswall
accra
Mr Mahins Algiers
April 6th
with Mr Forster's compo
Mr Brown No 10

April 14th
of Capt Reid (M.O.S.)
W.S.
Spec Press.
April 20th

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

6/15

16/1
20/1

Next Paper.

J1525

Weekly political summary. ✓

1) Details of "Black Book" presented to King Farouk by Makram Ebeid Pasha containing charges of corruption etc. against the Prime Minister and others. 2) Report on Nahas Pasha's health. 3) incidents in the Wafd party 4) Negouni's appointment 5) Position regarding Iraq and Arab unity.

(Minutes.)

The 'Black Book' is the sort of document one might expect Makram to produce. He will score a few points anyway because if it is ignored people will say he just doesn't take it up while if it is taken up a bit of public mud slinging will result. The opposition certainly seem at last to be beginning to show some signs of cohesion.

Nahas is apparently on the mend.

EA - 2/15

J/15

8 J

J 1519

[CYPRER].

DEPARTMENTAL No. 2.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 635.
April 4th, 1943.

D. 4.10 a.m. April 4th, 1943.

R. 3.40 p.m. April 4th, 1943.

YVYVY

Weekly appreciation.

Makram Ebeid Pasha has handed to Hassanein Pasha for submission to King Farouk a lengthy petition in the form of a "Black Book" containing detailed charges of corruption, favouritism, arbitrariness and so forth against the Prime Minister Nahas Pasha and his family, against various Ministers, Amin Osman etc. "Black Book" was secretly printed and thousands of copies distributed widely. It has caused considerable sensation largely owing to the precise nature of the charges made and includes documentary quotations and references which seems to indicate complicity [? omitted: ? of the] Government officials with access to the relevant papers. But Amin Osman who says that many of the charges are incorrect thinks that Makram Ebeid compiled most of this dossier before leaving office. According to agent in touch with Hassanein, latter is embarrassed because he is being pressed by the opposition to advise King Farouk to ask for explanations of these charges.

2. Important political lunch party given by Abdel Maguid Ibrahim Salah Pasha a Liberal, a relation of the late Khedmet Mahmoud and ex-Minister of Supply and Communications, was attended by the leading elements of all the opposition parties and of the independents including Sidki Pasha, Sirry and Barakat Pashas. Lunch is supposed to have been part of effort to unify the action of the opposition. It is reported that the "Black Book" was discussed and that the opposition who intend to exploit it as much as possible contemplate presenting a petition to the King about it and also to address a letter to the Embassy on the subject.

3. Nahas Pasha is now able to leave his house and has gone for a few days' holiday to Alexandria. He has not yet returned to his office.

4. Two members of Wafdist committee at Mellawi have been expelled for having entertained Maher during recent political visit there with Saadist colleagues.

5. Wafd has announced that it will celebrate 25th anniversary of Wafd on November 15th next by ceremonies all over the country to be followed by three days' congress in Cairo which will review Wafd's activities for the country.

6. Appointment of Director General of Frontiers Administration is still in suspense. Hassanein while confidentially expressing the desire to side-track Negoudi appointment says that in any case the Palace will not accept candidate of Minister of Defence. However he appears more disposed to acquiesce in the Army nominations hitherto held up by the Palace. (See paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 533).

7. King Farouk continues to make a show of special interest in the Egyptian Army by visits to the Army institutions and manoeuvres.

8. Discussions between Nehas Pasha and Iraq representatives regarding Arab unity seems to have ended in disagreement, former insisting on Governmental Congress, latter desiring inclusion of non-official elements.

Iraqis are said to have been annoyed by Nehas Pasha's statement to Parliament regarding this attitude before Iraq's agreement to his proposals had been secured.

O.T.P.

J

J. 1552

27

EGYPTIAN LEGATION
35531

Registry Number } J. 1552/2/16.

TELEGRAM FROM
Sir M. Lynamon (Cairo)

No. 676 Cypher.

Dated 5th April, 1942.

Received in Registry } 7th April, 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Political Situation in Egypt.

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 676 (J 1552/2/16) and states that there is a distinct possibility that King Farouk, incited by opposition leaders, may take Nohas Pasha to task over "black book", and that Nohas Pasha may lose his temper, with unfortunate results.

الملك فاروق قد يهجم على نوحه باشا بسبب كتابه الاسود، وقد يفقد نوحه باشا ضبطه، مما قد يترتب عليه نتائج سيئة.

Last Paper.

J 1547

References.

(Print.)
Egypt vol. 15/4

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

It is no use pretending (at any rate during the war) that Egyptian internal affairs are no concern of ours. That this was expounded on Feb 4th 1942 we have (with some success) managed to get improvements after relating matters to the Ambassador with the sole object of making it easier for them to be set together. Cairo here crises have been discussed to me but we must have a case in point. I fully agree that we must have hoped the King would make the move to consult the Ambassador before acting but we must remember that the King is a difficult & somewhat narrow minded young man, jealous of his position conscious of the Ambassador's attitude 'independence' & rather afraid of the Ambassador. The conversation with Hassan is reported here with the King's favour. I am afraid of letting the Ambassador know it was reported. I don't like to know it was reported. I don't like to know it was reported.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

J 1554

upon the King, say he has heard that
reports & talks the whole time
over. Obamacare here is clearly a
real danger of our middle & being
faced with a major crisis which to
and in the same ^{of} which he King is
the Secretary of War. This is not putting
the odds too high. Yet we have it
as ⁱⁿ front of our ^{eyes} out ^{of} ^{the} ^{place} to ^{meet}
serious ^{grave} contingencies.

I got from a tel. to be Arab.
pointing out the above v. tactfully
urging him to act accordingly.

Effect of Arab's
8/14

So should I: but I am rather at a
loss in view of the Ambassador's telegram in
J 1433/G. Perhaps a personal message could be
sent to HE to the effect that we rely on him to
warn us if serious trouble is imminent. Given a
combination of the King's hatred of Nahas; the
almost undoubted irregularities of his ^{Nahas'} family; Nahas'
ill-health, and the recent signs of cohesion amongst
the opposition, we may be on the eve of far-
reaching developments. I might add a fourth factor -
the present remoteness of the front from Egypt.


Verriener
8/14

We suggested to Sir M. Lampson some two or
three months ago, when Nahas' position first appeared
to be precarious, that it would be a good thing
in itself and a warning to Nahas to set his house in
order if the Ambassador were to extract from him
an/

an undertaking that he would not resign without giving us prior notice.

People are apt to forget that Egyptian politicians do not take major steps such as the resigning of office or (in the old days) breaking off Treaty negotiations, for the reason or reasons which are currently attached to these steps. They make up their minds to resign, or to break off negotiations, and then look for the most favourable issue on which to do so. In this case Nahas may well be influenced by ill health or waning popularity, and may himself regard a public dispute with the Palace as the best means of restoring the latter, if not the former, against the day of a return to power.

Sir Miles Lampson took no notice of our previous suggestion and, more recently, has rebuffed our attempt at exploring the possibilities with which Nahas' resignation might confront us. In his present telegram he himself raises these possibilities without any reference to the recent correspondence in J 1433/G. Assuming that H.M.G. have the implicit confidence in Sir M. Lampson which one would judge to be the case, I think we had better leave him alone.



8th April 1943.

It is true that, in J 1433, Sir M. Lampson declined our invitation to discuss a hypothetical question.

But in his tel. he does refer to possibility of King Farouk countermanding "action" in the shape of the "eviction" of Nahas

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Handwritten notes in the left margin, partially obscured.

3

Neha, and I think we can very well
make it a job in which to have an inquiry
of him whether; E.G., it would be advisable
to act on Mr. Chapman Anderson's
suggestion of a talk with the King.

A.B.
April 3. 1913.

I agree with Sir A. Cardigan;
so proceed.

RB April 9

See now J 1606 & 1607

J. 11/4.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

J. 1552

[Cypher].

DEPARTMENT NO. 2.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 660

D. 9.15 p.m. 6th April, 1945.

6th April, 1945.

R. 11.15 p.m. 6th April, 1945.

////

URGENT

11317/2/16

My telegram No. 665, paragraphs 1 and 2.

Both from conversation with Hassanein and report of agent in touch with the Palace, there seems distinct possibility that King Farouk, incited by opposition leaders, may be thinking of taking Nahas Pasha to task over "black book" and may be even contemplating possibility of his eviction on this issue.

3. The above [grp. under ? agrees with] the apprehension expressed by Amin Osman to the Oriental councillor that King Farouk was contemplating action with a view to getting rid of Nahas Pasha. Amin Osman thought that when Nahas Pasha returned from Alexandria the King might summon him to take him to task on a number of subjects e.g. censorship, about which the King has already spoken to him, the "black book", government proposals for credits and promotions, etc. There might be unpleasantness at interview and Nahas Pasha might lose his temper with unfortunate results.

5. Amin Osman easily gets on pessimistic strain and Palace no doubt throws out ideas with a view to sounding us. Nevertheless there are possibilities of trouble in intensive exploitation of "black book" by Palace and opposition.

4. According to agent, Hassanein will first approach Nahas Pasha on the subject on the latter's return.

O.T.P.

J

J 1606
11 APR 1948

35531
EGYPT AND SUDAN

Registry Number } J 1606/2/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Sir H. Lamson (Cairo)
715 Cypher.
No. 717 Cypher.
9th April, 1948 }
Dated 10th " " }
Received in Registry } 11th April, 1948.

Political Situation in Egypt. ✓

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 690 (J 1552/2/16) and summarizes the political situation in Egypt, with special regard to the King's attitude to Nahas Pasha and the "black-book".

في 11/4/48 تلغراف من السيد دروكم (جندة لطفة في سنة 1606/2/16)
في 11/4/48 تلغراف من السيد دروكم (جندة لطفة في سنة 1606/2/16)

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Last Paper.

J1605

2 666 - 1606 (Minutes.)

References.

Please see J 1607. - 11/4

(Print.)

Egypt vol: 15/4

(How disposed of.)

Tel Cairo 633 12
April 14
8) Mr Brown No 10
April 15th

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

J 1607

[THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR SECRECY AND SHOULD BE RETAINED BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABLES DISTRIBUTION

FROM: MEXPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J 1606

Sir M. Lampson
No. 715
9th April, 1943

D. 12.39 a.m. 10th April, 1943
R. 4.55 a.m. 10th April, 1943

addddd

IMPORTANT

My telegram No. 680. 9/1552 p/16

Hassanein Pasha came to see me [grp. undec.] last night on other business. As I expected he raised the question of the Black Book.

It was clear that King Farouk was impatient to take action and Hassanein professed to be having the greatest difficulty in holding him back. Owing to his effort to put the brake on, Hassanein was even being talked of now as "Chef de Cabinet of the British Ambassador". Hassanein professed to have been insistent with King Farouk that His Majesty must remain above party politics and tread warily: but opposition parties had got at His Majesty (not through Hassanein); and King Farouk was taking the line that certain of the charges in the Black Book were so clear and so conclusive of dishonesty that it was not a question of party politics but a matter of his "duty" as the Sovereign not to retain in office a prime Minister and administration guilty of such conduct.

3. I told Hassanein that he should at all costs prevent his Sovereign from taking any precipitate step. I reminded him of the fatal effects of the ejection from office of the previous Wafd government in 1937 though still at that time vastly the majority party. According to my most recent information the Wafd still commanded the majority of the electorate: and this belief was strengthened by my enquiries during my recent trip to Upper Egypt which was not traditionally so pro-Wafd as the Delta. King Farouk should on no account rush into a similar blunder now, the consequences of which might be incalculable. He must remember that as a constitutional monarch his functions were to rule and not to govern. Admittedly the Black Book smelt most unpleasantly: but it was product of a man out to down Wafis Pasha and a collection of ex parte charges. King Farouk should not commit himself on a one-sided document however damning it might

888/

2

seen to him. As to what King Farouk should do, I was considerably puzzled. But the normal constitutional procedure surely would be to pass on the petition to the Prime Minister and await the latter's reaction? The Prime Minister might either

- (a) run Makram Ebeid in for libel
- (b) or have the matter debated in Parliament: but I had not discussed the matter with Nahas Pasha and had no idea of his views.

4. Hassanein argued that Nahas Pasha would not adopt (a) and that even if he dared to no judge would dare to act impartially, nor witness to speak out. As to (b) Parliament was a farce as freedom of debate on any attack on the Prime Minister was futile. Hassanein's final attitude appeared to be that he would probably endeavour to move King Farouk to instruct him to send the petition to the Prime Minister.

5. Before Hassanein left I once more impressed on him forcibly the necessity of preventing any precipitate act by the King (who, we all know, is itching and long has been [?grp. omd. ?trying] to get rid of an unwelcome Prime Minister imposed upon him by us).

6. Later in the evening I sat with King Farouk in his box at the opera. He made no reference to the matter which I did not raise especially as there were others present: but he dropped one or two remarks about having prospect of a "busy time ahead" the meaning of which was pretty clear and I think meant to be.

7. This morning I sent for Amin Osman and told him I was seriously perturbed at the situation. How was Nahas Pasha proposing to deal with the Black Book? Amin Osman, after rather pooh-pooing some of the allegations in the book, said that as the petition had not yet reached the Prime Minister from the King, Nahas Pasha had not felt called upon to do anything. Amin Osman was pressing Nahas Pasha to have an open debate in Parliament which was obviously the course. He did not believe any judicial enquiry would be effective, as no judge would dare to act faced with charges against the whole Government. Nahas Pasha was not afraid of full investigation and would be quite ready to answer interpellations in Parliament.

8. I asked Amin Osman to enquire of Nahas Pasha whether it would be welcome if I told Hassanein, (whom I had seen on other business last night) that King Farouk would be well

advised/

advised to pass the petitions to his Prime Minister as the constitutional course. Amin Osman has promised to enquire: I shall probably be seeing Nahas Pasha to-morrow morning. He has now returned from Alexandria.

9. I fear there are the makings of a first class row ahead and that there may be serious developments at any moment. For the time being I shall try to keep in the background as far as possible, in the rôle of the middle man working for the goodwill of both parties - but there can be little doubt that King Farouk, having as he believes (and rightly) got on better terms with us, now thinks that he can turn and rend Nahas Pasha - and the Black Book is, prima facie, a pretty damning document backed in many cases by what purports to be actual official letters and other evidence. I have not however yet seen a [? pp. contd.] of the document (which is 320 pages long) and my first impression may be wrong.

for Babal
Translation

10. As I see it, what we want - and must have - is a government in Egypt both willing and in a position through adequate popular support, to implement wholeheartedly Egypt's treaty obligations to us. On that we are entitled to insist. Such a government we have had up to date in the Wafd. And as I still believe the country to be predominantly Wafdist, we must use our influence to see that Nahas Pasha is not sacked unless such is the popular will, I cannot say how events will shape, but the idea has crossed my mind that Nahas Pasha may conceivably find it expedient to go to the country, the snag in that is that the King may sack him first and instal some new Government which would do so which would mean the usual rigging of the electorate.

with the
Wafdist
Government

11. Subject to developments, I shall continue to work quietly on the lines reported in this telegram and will of course keep you closely informed: but meantime have you any comment?

O.T.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J 1606

Sir H. Lampson
No. 717
10th April, 1943.

D. 12.15 a.m. 11th April, 1943.
R. 2.25 a.m. 11th April, 1943.

:-:--:-:--:-:

IMMEDIATE

My telegram No. 715. *within*

Amin Osman called again this morning.

I explained to him that it was essential from our point of view that there should be some adequate refutation by Wahas Pasha of the charges made. Once that was done our task would be simplified. Our essential need from the point of view of the war effort was that we should have in Egypt a government loyally carrying out the treaty and having behind it a majority in the country sufficient to enable it to carry out that policy effectively. Hitherto Wafd Government had well filled that bill but we could not be put in the position of appearing to condone or shield corruption.

2. The idea of an appeal to the country was raised during our conversation and has attractions but unfortunately it would be almost impossible to get an impartial government to run free election: the King would object to Wahas Pasha running the election and any other government appointed by the King for that purpose would most certainly rig the election.

3. Finally Amin Osman confirmed this opinion [? grp. contd.] that the best way would be for refutation to be made in Parliament by the Prime Minister in reply to questions or interpellations. The Prime Minister himself inclined to that course.

4. It was settled that proper procedure was for Hassanain to communicate ~~to~~ Makram Ebeid's petition forwarding "Black Book" to the Prime Minister for consideration but it was not thought advisable that I should suggest this to him as our suggestion might subsequently be distorted e.g. to make it seem as though he had advised the King to demand explanations of Wahas Pasha. We agreed it would be better for Wahas Pasha himself to see Hassanain and discuss procedure.

2.

5. I am seeing the Prime Minister tonight.

6. At one moment Amin Osman told me Nuhus Pasha had spoken last night of throwing in his hand and concentrating out of office on refuting these charges. Did I feel Nuhus Pasha should go? I replied that Nuhus Pasha should do nothing rash and keep his head. I could not at the moment see any workable alternative to him: but he must clear himself.

O.T.P.

Registry
No.

7-506 / 14/4/43

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[Handwritten signature]

4
New telegram No. 715 paragraph 9

Draft. Sir M. Hampson

Cairo

Tel. No. 633

April 14

Exp. 115

In view of possible developments please
telegraph as soon as possible brief summary
of more serious charges contained in
this document.

Exp. no 1.

Copy M. Hampson 1/10/43
[unclear]

M.307
MARGIN.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[Cypher]

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 653.

14th April, 1943.

D. 7.50 p.m. 14th April, 1943.

:-:--:-:--:-:

IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 715 paragraph 9.

In view of possible developments please telegraph as soon as possible brief summary of more serious charges contained in this document.

O.T.P.

1000

102

J

J. 1607
11 APR 1943

49
10

35531

EGYPT AND SUDAN

10-3

Registry Number } J 1607/2/16.

TELEGRAM FROM Sir E. Kempson (Cairo)

No. 719 A Cypher.
720 A Cypher.
Dated 10th April, 1943.
Received in Registry } 11th April, 1943.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Last Paper.

J1606

References.

Political Situation in Egypt. ✓

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 717 (J 1606/2/16) and reports on the political situation arising out of the King's endeavours to get rid of his Prime Minister, Nahas Pasha. Telegram No. 720 A, states that Nahas Pasha will defend himself in Parliament on the 12th April.

(Minutes.)

Seen with J 1606 & J 1552.

The present position is that

- (a) the far reaching implications of this dispute are fully realised.
- (b) both Nahas (to less complete) & King have been sounding the Ambassador for reactions.
- (c) the Ambassador advised the King (thro' Hassanain) to "pass the petition on to the P.M. & await the latter's reactions". This has been done though the accompanying letter from Hassanain was "worded in disagreeable terms".
- (d) the P.M. is determined to face the accusations & will do so in Parliament & not in Court.
- (e) the Amb. asks for our comments, proposes to 'remain in the background' & only to play the part of the honest broker & when necessary to take strong action if necessary to force the P.M. to withdraw.

(Print.)

Egypt vol.

15/4

(How disposed of.)

Del Cairo 626

April 12

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

matrices may therefore be expected to remain where they are until the

in the matter. My inclination is to
get the King & the Ambassador together in the
meantime to talk the whole thing over.
I should like to have seen the Amb. follow
up the "busy time ahead" remark made
by the King at the open [para 6 of No 715] with
a suggestion that they might meet at the
King's over. The King was I think trying
to give the Ambassador a lead.

I submit a draft telegram.


E.A. [unclear]
11/4

I agree. The King has made the correct
opening move, but I am afraid that we are
in a bit of trouble over this.

Send tel (please see minutes
on J 1552).

by minute by 8/3 within

V. [unclear]
11/4.


12.4.

Egg

I regret that I did not submit our telegram No. 620 (J 1607/2/16) in draft. But with regard to the last paragraph to which the Secretary of State has drawn attention, I doubt whether it is possible to convince the King that he cannot dispense with Nahas unless His Majesty is pressed to disclose what alternative he has in mind. Our telegram No. 624 has now added specific authorisation to Sir M. Lampson to include a warning in his remarks to King Farouk. But this was surely implicit in the wording of the second paragraph of our telegram No 620, which authorised the Ambassador to let the King know that it was "against the interests" of H.M.G. that the Wafd should be turned out of office so long as they enjoyed the confidence of the country.

I do not think that anyone favours the idea of allowing King Farouk to evict Nahas from office. But in addition to the necessity for preventing this there are at least two other considerations which we ought perhaps to keep in mind. These are:

(1) Nahas is just as likely to resign himself as to be turned out by the King. He has done so on at least two occasions before when he found himself on a sticky wicket (and Makram Ebeid's "black book" has probably put him on one) in order to recover waning popularity by a period of opposition. And in addition, on this occasion the evidence seems to be fairly conclusive that Nahas is in a bad state of health,

(2) Our appreciation of Nahas' "friendship" must surely be qualified by his deplorable record over supply questions in the last nine months. ~~This is dealt with in my minute in~~ Following on an attempt to hold us to ransom over cotton prices, Nahas has made, or allowed to be made, similar efforts to hold us to ransom over the export of Egypt's wheat and other cereal surpluses to other parts of the Middle East where these surpluses are urgently required. It has been necessary to bring very strong pressure indeed to bear on him in order to make him realise that the continued supply of nitrate brought by Allied shipping from South America must be dependent on the availability for export of the surplus crops which the nitrate helps to produce. And more recently Nahas has allowed his companion Abboud to blackmail us over Egypt's sugar surplus which is urgently needed for the Sudan, Ceylon and other places. Here as illustrated by Sir M. Lampson's telegram No. 631. of 16.11.45, Nahas has personally intervened/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

See also minute of 16.11.45
on the subject of Nahas

(over)

(over)

intervened to keep Abboud from visiting this country, which the latter undertook to do as far back as the beginning of the year. The Egyptian attitude has reduced the Supply Departments to frenzy and, while we have to guard against a certain tendency on the part of these Departments to treat Egypt as a colony or as occupied territory, we are bound to sympathise with them. The latest information is that the Ministry of Food have some hopes of getting tonnage to fetch sugar from Mauritius which may enable us to prick the bubble of Abboud's monopoly and blow Egyptian prices sky high. But even if we succeed in this, it can hardly be counted as friendliness to Nahas, whose attitude remains that he is prepared to derive every possible advantage out of this war without participating in it.

or bring them down to cash!



14th April 1943.

Ab.
April 1943.

I can never think Nahas a plastic saint, and there is much free in Sirhan's criticism, observations. But as long as it is clearly understood that we want to keep Nahas in power & that we make the plain to H.M., I am content. I feared that the query at end of 620 might lead him to think we would discuss alternatives with him. I don't want to do this, which would be illegal to Nahas, I think.

Ab. April 15

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

88

The Secretary of State need have no anxiety on the score of our support of Mahas - the main object of our tel: no 620 was to forestall any possible precipitate move by Mahas - see also our telegram no 624 attached.

But a factor in the situation is the complete absence of any obvious alternative Govt should make lead (as they may, whatever we do) to Mahas' resignation and we do desperately want some appreciation of the situation in this respect. This is all that the last paragraph of 620 meant. And I think that our relations with the King have ~~not~~ improved at least to the extent of being able to listen to his views on this topic.

Actually, Mahas poses some in emergency - but he & his Government have

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes.

have - as we always foresaw - how
excessively difficult are a number of
matters, notably supplies - They have,
by refusing to face up to such elementary
necessities as petrol rationing -
in fact the Department could produce
something in the nature of a "black
book of its own," & was indeed on the
point of doing so. But there is
unanimity of view that Mahas must
be kept in power if possible.

J. Criswell

13/4

CO

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 728.

D. 12.46 p.m. 12th April, 1943.

R. 2.00 p.m. 12th April, 1943.

12th April, 1943.

IMPORTANT.

Crisis. ✓

I forgot to record that when I saw Has.... on April 9th (see my telegram No. 715) he spoke of a threat by King Farouk to "boycott" the Ministry. His Majesty further even contemplated not attending gala British welfare "Command" performance at the opera, given under his direct patronage [grp. undec. ? that] night, so as to avoid having to shake hands with his Prime Minister. Fortunately, added Has...., Prime Minister had excused himself from attending on the grounds of health. (In the event King Farouk went: but I noticed when I was with him during the entracte, that he never spoke to Osman Moharran who was in attendance on him as Senior Minister).

2. I urged Has.... to dissuade King Farouk and he promised to do his best.

3. He has evidently not been successful for King Farouk has let it be known that he will not meet the Ministers or have any dealings with them. His Majesty cancelled his attendance at a gala of the riding school yesterday in order not to meet the Ministers. Nahas Pasha spoke of this Royal attitude at an interview last night as another instance of irresponsibility and hostility. Of this there have already been practical examples; for instance members of the Palace staff cancelled their attendance at a formal lunch given by the Prime Minister yesterday to Iraqi Minister of Interior.

4. If this "boycott" continues it is difficult to see where it will lead.

O.T.P.

5/10
Surely Nahas
is our friend
& the King is not.
It is our friend
our friend
AZ

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 730.

D. 3.08 p.m., 12th April, 1943.

12th April, 1943.

R. 3.50 p.m., 12th April, 1943.

3 3 3

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 720. ✓

Following is substance of information communicated to me by Amin Osman this morning.

2. The Government has decided that proper constitutional course to follow is to let Parliament discuss the petition. Accordingly the Prime Minister proposes this afternoon to reply to a question regarding the "black book" put by an opposition member in the Senate that the Government will welcome any questions or interpolations on the subject. The Prime Minister then proposes to give freedom of discussion to any such subsequent debates even at the risk of some turmoil in the debates.

3. The Prime Minister thought it was a good thing that he should take the first step in the Senate where he was known to be less strong than in the Chamber.

4. Each Minister has been instructed to prepare refutations of the charges against him in view of the forthcoming debates in Parliament.

5. As regards King Farouk's continued boycott of Ministers (see my telegram No. 728) the Government has decided that henceforth only the Minister whose function designates him for attendance shall for the present be in attendance at functions at which King Farouk is expected to be present. This it is argued, while obviating humiliation for the Government, yet maintains respect for the King.

6. King Farouk's boycott of the Government is locally a serious factor as it weakens the authority of the Government among officials and general public who will presumably regard such boycott as prelude to the Government's downfall.

7./

7. Amin Osman was very anxious that we should definitely take action with a view to preventing King Farouk from dismissing Nahas suddenly before he has proper and reasonable opportunity to refute the charges against him. I should normally have an audience with His Majesty on my return from Upper Egypt, but have not so far asked for one, as I am not yet clear how far I should go with him. Fortunately I sat next to him at the Opera on April 8th, so there can be less ground for the charge of discourtesy at the delay. I should be grateful for urgent instructions as to whether I can tell His Majesty that he would be putting himself clearly in the wrong if he were to take action against Nahas before the latter has been given an opportunity to refute the charges against him thus far and that accordingly we must formally warn His Majesty against such premature action.

7. [sic] In order to obviate any danger of King Farouk forestalling us, I propose, unless I hear from you to the contrary, to send O... C... meantime to see Has.... and to convey [gp. undec: ?an] informal message in the above sense.

(OPP)

yes
Rr

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

J 1607/2/16

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

TO EGYPT

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 620.

D. 5.35 p.m. April 12th, 1943.

April 12th, 1943.

bbbb ✓

IMMEDIATE

Your telegrams Nos. 680, 715, 717, 719A and 720A.

I agree that there exist all the elements of a clash which might not inconceivably result in the elimination of the present Government, a contingency which, in view of the popular support it still enjoys, we should wish to avoid. I fully approve the language you have held towards all concerned, defining our own limited but essential interests (paragraph 10 of your telegram No. 715); but I am not altogether happy about the 'background' rôle you have assigned yourself. King Farouk has, it would appear, at least sounded Your Excellency on the subject of this dispute through Hassanein and His Majesty's remark at the opera may have been intended as an invitation to an informal discussion.

2. I am sure you will agree that nothing should be left undone that might prevent misunderstandings or false assumptions taking root in the King's mind. I suggest therefore that it would be a sound move for Your Excellency to seek immediately an opportunity for an informal discussion of the whole matter with the King. You could agree that the charges against the Wafd are serious and must be answered; but point out that they have been framed by a spiteful individual possibly himself not above reproach, for reasons other than the public good. It has generally been admitted in the past, even by his enemies, that Nahas himself is honest and sincere. So long as he and his party enjoy the confidence of the country it is against the interests as much of the King as of His Majesty's Government that they should be turned out of office.

3. The conversation might then possibly turn to a general discussion of possible alternatives to the present Prime Minister or Government. The King's ideas on this subject, if you could obtain them, would be of much interest.

O.T.P.

I don't like this. I should have seen

100

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[CYRIL]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J 1607

Sir R. Lampson.
No. 719
10th April, 1943.

D. 10.32 p.m. 10th April, 1943.
R. 11.35 p.m. 10th April, 1943.

999999999

MOST URGENT.

My telegram No. 717. J 1606/2/16

I saw the Prime Minister this evening. He was much worked up and spoke with vehemence. He said the Black Book had been promoted by the Palace in agreement with the dirtiest elements in the country to discredit a Prime Minister whom King Farouk wished to get rid of. It came at the end of a series of obstructive tactics of the Palace to bring the administrative machine to a standstill. He was determined to go to King Farouk and have it out with him regardless of the consequences, even that of dismissal.

Handwritten notes in left margin.

2. I explained to him that our policy as I conceived it was that there should be in power a government determined to carry out loyally the obligations of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and having a majority in the country enabling it effectively to do so. That being the case, I had no wish to see the Wafd Government go as long as it fulfilled these two conditions. There was however the question of a refutation of the charges made in the Black Book. We could not be put in the position of being accused of condoning charges of corruption which had not been refuted.

3. The Prime Minister replied that he proposed to refute the charges before Parliament.

4. As regards the question of procedure, the Prime Minister proposed to ask the King to communicate in the normal way to him, the Prime Minister, for consideration the petition which His Majesty had received. I suggested that it might be better to make this request through Hassanein to obviate the danger that King Farouk might provoke His Excellency at the audience and that words might be exchanged which would give His Majesty a pretext for dismissing Nahas Pasha.

The Prime Minister however refused absolutely to entertain this suggestion and said that he must go direct to King Farouk on this question. He finally promised however that he would not/

not allow himself to be provoked and would, if His Majesty were to make any provocative statements, say he reserved his answers.

5. He said that on April 12th he would ask for an audience. In all probability the previous engagements of the Prime Minister would preclude audience taking place before April 12th.

6. If King Farouk agrees at the audience to communicate the petition to the Prime Minister for consideration, subsequent refutation before Parliament will no doubt be arranged by the Prime Minister as soon as possible. If King Farouk were to refuse to communicate to the Prime Minister the petition for normal constitutional handling and were to decide to dismiss the Prime Minister without giving him an opportunity to refute the charges, His Majesty would be clearly putting himself in the wrong. In that event I think we should take strong action to force King Farouk to reverse such a decision and to give Nahas Pasha the opportunity of refuting the charges which are ex parte and have been formulated by a declared enemy of the Prime Minister.

7. I should be grateful for urgent instructions authorising me to make strong representations to King Farouk on the above lines if necessary.

8. In the course of conversation the Prime Minister referred to the Egyptian belief that policy was no longer centred in the Embassy but was dispersed in various centres e.g. Minister of State and British military authorities. I replied that this idea was absurd. In matters of policy regarding Egypt it was His Majesty's Ambassador who advised His Majesty's Government through His Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

9. Prime Minister also said that Egyptians were inclined to think that British easily threw overboard governments which had served them well in time of need once the need had become less serious. I said that such a charge was quite unjustified.

10. Minister of State has been kept fully informed.
Copied to Commanders in Chief.

G.S.P.

الملك
الخبر
الملك
الخبر
الملك
الخبر

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPRUS].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From EGYPT.

J 1607

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir E. Lampson
No. 720A.
10th April, 1943.

D. 10.56 p.m. 10th April, 1943.
R. 10.45 p.m. 10th April, 1943.

rrrrrrrr

MOST URGENT.

My immediately preceding telegram [719A]. *Within*

Amin Osman telephoned tonight to the Oriental Secretary that the head of Arabic [grp. undec. Bureau] of the Palace had just called on the Prime Minister with a letter from Hassamein communicating Makram Ebeid's petition to the Prime Minister for consideration. The letter was couched in disagreeable terms, referring to serious allegations and to the fact that they emanated from an important personality. The letter did not however demand a reply.

2. Amin Osman said that this communication obviated the necessity of immediate audience with King Farouk. Mahas Pasha proposed to state in Parliament on April 12th, in answer to a question which he would provoke, that he was ready to reply to any questions or interpellations on the Black Book.

OTF.

51

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BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM: EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir M. Lampson
No. 715.
9th April, 1943

D. 12.39 a.m. 10th April, 1943
R. 4.55 a.m. 10th April, 1943

aaaaaa

IMPORTANT

My telegram No. 680.

Hassanein Pasha came to see me [grp. undec.] last night on other business. As I expected he raised the question of the Black Book.

150
It was clear that King Farouk was impatient to take action and Hassanein professed to be having the greatest difficulty in holding him back. Owing to his effort to put the brake on, Hassanein was even being talked of now as "Chef de Cabinet of the British Ambassador". Hassanein professed to have been insistent with King Farouk that His Majesty must remain above party politics and tread warily; but opposition parties had got at His Majesty (not through Hassanein); and King Farouk was taking the line that certain of the charges in the Black Book were so clear and so conclusive of dishonesty that it was not a question of party politics but a matter of his "duty" as the Sovereign not to retain in office a Prime Minister and administration guilty of such conduct.

3. I told Hassanein that he should at all costs prevent his Sovereign from taking any precipitate step. I reminded him of the fatal effects of the ejection from office of the previous Wafd government in 1937 though still at that time vastly the majority party. According to my most recent information the Wafd still commanded the majority of the electorate: and this belief was strengthened by my enquiries during my recent trip to Upper Egypt which was not traditionally so pro-Wafd as the Delta. King Farouk should on no account rush into a similar blunder now, the consequences of which might be incalculable. He must remember that as a constitutional monarch his functions were to rule and not to govern. Admittedly the Black Book smelled most unpleasantly; but it was product of a man out to down Nahas Pasha and a collection of ex parte charges. King Farouk should not commit himself on a one sided document however damning it might

seen/

ness to him. As to what King Farouk should do, I was considerably puzzled. But the normal constitutional procedure would be to pass on the petition to the Prime Minister and await the latter's reaction? The Prime Minister might either

- (a) run Hakim Ebeid in for libel
- (b) or have the matter debated in Parliament: but I had not discussed the matter with Nahas Pasha and had no idea of his views.

4. Hassanein argued that Nahas Pasha would not adopt (a) and that even if he dared to, no judge would dare to act impartially, nor witness to speak out. As to (b) Parliament was a farce as freedom of debate on any attack on the Prime Minister was futile. Hassanein's final attitude appeared to be that he would probably endeavour to move King Farouk to instruct him to send the petition to the Prime Minister.

5. Before Hassanein left I once more impressed on him forcibly the necessity of preventing any precipitate act by the King (who, we all know, is itching and long has been [?grp. outd. ?trying] to get rid of an unwelcome Prime Minister imposed upon him by us).

6. Later in the evening I sat with King Farouk in his box at the opera. He made no reference to the matter which I did not raise especially as there were others present: but he dropped one or two remarks about having prospect of a "busy time ahead" the meaning of which was pretty clear and I think meant to be.

7. This morning I sent for Amin Osman and told him I was seriously perturbed at the situation. How was Nahas Pasha proposing to deal with the Black Book? Amin Osman, after rather pooh-poohing some of the allegations in the book, said that as the petition had not yet reached the Prime Minister from the King, Nahas Pasha had not felt called upon to do anything. Amin Osman was pressing Nahas Pasha to have an open debate in Parliament which was obviously the course. He did not believe any judicial enquiry would be effective, as no judge would dare to act faced with charges against the whole Government. Nahas Pasha was not afraid of full investigation and would be quite ready to answer interpellations in Parliament.

8. I asked Amin Osman to enquire of Nahas Pasha whether it would be welcome if I told Hassanein, (whom I had seen on other business last night) that King Farouk would be well

advised/

advised to pass the petitions to his Prime Minister as the constitutional course. Amin Osman has promised to enquire: I shall probably be seeing Nahas Pasha to-morrow morning. He has now returned from Alexandria.

9. I fear there are the makings of a first class row ahead and that there may be serious developments at any moment. For the time being I shall try to keep in the background as far as possible, in the rôle of the middle man working for the goodwill of both parties - but there can be little doubt that King Farouk, having as he believes (and rightly) got on better terms with us, now thinks that he can turn and rend Nahas Pasha - and the Black Book is, prima facie, a pretty damning document backed in many cases by what purports to be actual official letters and other evidence. I have not however yet seen a [?grp. omd.] of the document (which is 320 pages long) and my first impression may be wrong.

10. As I see it, what we want - and must have - is a government in Egypt both willing and in a position through adequate popular support, to implement wholeheartedly Egypt's treaty obligations to us. On that we are entitled to insist. Such a government we have had up to date in the Wafd. And as I still believe the country to be predominantly Wafidist, we must use our influence to see that Nahas Pasha is not sacked unless such is the popular will, I cannot say how events will shape, but the idea has crossed my mind that Nahas Pasha may conceivably find it expedient to go to the country, the snag in that is that the King may sack him first and instal some new Government which would do so which would mean the usual rigging of the electorate.

11. Subject to developments, I shall continue to work quietly on the lines reported in this telegram and will of course keep you closely informed: but meantime have you any comment?

O.T.P.

Registry
No.

J 1607/2/16

Draft.
Pol.

Mr. J. Kaufman
(Cajw)
No. 620

Cypher, April 12

Wm Cabot
Dir.

J

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Immediate ~~Response~~ 5:35p / 12/14/43

your tel Nos 680, 715, 717,
719A, and 720 A.

I agree that there exist
all the elements of a clash
which might not inconceivably
result in the elimination of the
present Government, a contingency
which, in view of the popular
support it still enjoys, we
shd ~~not wish to avoid~~ ^{wish to avoid} ~~some~~ ^{circumstances} ~~of~~
I fully approve of the language
which you have held towards
all concerned, defining our
own limited but essential
interests (para 10 of your tel
No 715); but I am not
altogether happy about the
'background' role you have
assigned yourself. King
Favonk has, it would appear,
at least sounded V.E. on
the subject of his dispute
through Hassenien & H.M.'s
remarks at the Opera may
have been intended as an
invitation to an informal

4:35p

I am sure you will agree that nothing should be left undone that might prevent misunderstandings or false assumptions taking root in the King's mind. I suggest therefore that it would be a sound move for Y.E. to seek immediately an opportunity for an informal discussion of the whole matter with the King. You could agree that the charges against the War Office are serious & must be answered; but ^{point out that} they have been framed by ~~a~~ a spiteful individual possibly himself not above reproach, for reasons other than the public good. It has generally been admitted in the West, even by his enemies, that the King is honest & sincere. So long as he & his party enjoy the confidence of ^{the} country it is against the interests as much of the King as of H. H. G. that they should be ~~seen~~ ^{purged} out of power. ~~of~~ ^{the} office.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

The conversation might be

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

Draft.

~~of one or
two~~


~~AD~~
11/4

possibly
then turn to a general ⁶⁰
discussion of possible
alternatives to the
present P.M. or Government.

~~is the~~ ~~unilateral~~ ~~movement,~~
~~for some unprosecutable~~
~~cause, of these arrangements~~
~~is the~~ ~~not~~ ~~distinct~~
~~feature.~~ The King's

ideas on this subject,
if you could obtain
them, would be of
much interest.

~~Please keep up~~
~~close, informal~~ ~~of~~
~~development.~~



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on]

J 1607/2/16

[CYPRER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

TO EGYPT

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 680.

D. 5.55 p.m. April 12th, 1943.

April 12th, 1943.

bbbb

IMMEDIATE

Your telegrams Nos. 680, 715, 717, 719A and 720A.

I agree that there exist all the elements of a clash which might not inconceivably result in the elimination of the present Government, a contingency which, in view of the popular support it still enjoys, we should wish to avoid. I fully approve the language you have held towards all concerned, defining our own limited but essential interests (paragraph 10 of your telegram No. 715); but I am not altogether happy about the 'background' rôle you have assigned yourself. King Farouk has, it would appear, at least sounded Your Excellency on the subject of this dispute through Hassencin and His Majesty's remark at the opera may have been intended as an invitation to an informal discussion.

2. I am sure you will agree that nothing should be left undone that might prevent misunderstandings or false assumptions taking root in the King's mind. I suggest therefore that it would be a sound move for Your Excellency to seek immediately an opportunity for an informal discussion of the whole matter with the King. You could agree that the charges against the Wafd are serious and must be answered; but point out that they have been framed by a spiteful individual possibly himself not above reproach, for reasons other than the public good. It has generally been admitted in the past, even by his enemies, that Nahas himself is honest and sincere. So long as he and his party enjoy the confidence of the country it is against the interests as much of the King as of His Majesty's Government that they should be turned out of office.

3. The conversation might then possibly turn to a general discussion of possible alternatives to the present Prime Minister or Government. The King's ideas on this subject, if you could obtain them, would be of much interest.

O.T.P.

J

J. 1664

96

1943

EGYPT AND SUDAN
35531

Political situation in Egypt.

Registry Number } J 1664/2/16

TELEGRAM FROM
SIR L. LARSON
Cairo

No. 742 Cypher

Dated 14th Apr. 1943

Received
in Registry 15th Apr. 1943

J: Egypt and Sudan

Refers to Foreign Office telegrams No. 620 and 624 (J 1607/2/16 and J 1635/2/16) and reports that Hassanein called to see him and begged to know that he was going to say to King Farouk. After considerable discussion Hassanein left stating that he remained decided to resign, if the British Ambassador spoke to His Majesty in this line.

مصر في 14/4/43
السياسة في مصر
الملك فاروق
الوزير باشا
البريد
البريد
البريد

Last Paper.

J 1654

(Minutes.)

References.

We know from Rember's (copy attached) that the Ambassador has seen the King. We will doubtless receive H.E.'s report in the course of the day.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

EA
1944

See J 1678.

J

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

6/19/43

Next Paper.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

TO: EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO. (MISSION)

No. 624.
13th April, 1943.

D. 12.30 p.m. 13th April, 1943.

£ £ £

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No. 730 [of April 12th: political situation] crossed my telegram No. 620 suggesting that you should ask for an audience of King Farouk. You may certainly add warning proposed in paragraph 7 of your telegram should it appear necessary.

O.T.P.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

98

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

J 1607/2/16

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

TO EGYPT

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 620.

D. 5.35 p.m. April 12th, 1943.

April 12th, 1943.

bbbb

IMMEDIATE

Your telegrams Nos. 680, 715, 717, 719A and 720A.

I agree that there exist all the elements of a clash which might not inconceivably result in the elimination of the present Government, a contingency which, in view of the popular support it still enjoys, we should wish to avoid. I fully approve the language you have held towards all concerned, defining our own limited but essential interests (paragraph 10 of your telegram No. 715); but I am not altogether happy about the 'background' rôle you have assigned yourself. King Farouk has, it would appear, at least sounded Your Excellency on the subject of this dispute through Hassanein and His Majesty's remark at the opera may have been intended as an invitation to an informal discussion.

2. I am sure you will agree that nothing should be left undone that might prevent misunderstandings or false assumptions taking root in the King's mind. I suggest therefore that it would be a sound move for Your Excellency to seek immediately an opportunity for an informal discussion of the whole matter with the King. You could agree that the charges against the Wafd are serious and must be answered; but point out that they have been framed by a spiteful individual possibly himself not above reproach, for reasons other than the public good. It has generally been admitted in the past, even by his enemies, that Nahas himself is honest and sincere. So long as he and his party enjoy the confidence of the country it is against the interests as much of the King as of His Majesty's Government that they should be turned out of office.

3. The conversation might then possibly turn to a general discussion of possible alternatives to the present Prime Minister or Government. The King's ideas on this subject, if you could obtain them, would be of much interest.

O.T.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

J 1664

FROM EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir H. Lampson
No: 742
14th April, 1945.

D. 2. 5 p.m. 14th April, 1945.
R. 3. 15 p.m. 14th April, 1945.

11111

MOST IMMEDIATE

Your telegrams Nos. 620 and 624.

J 1607/2/16

J 1635/2/16

On my asking for an audience with King Farouk Hassanein insisted on calling on me last night and begged me to let him know what I was going to say to His Majesty. I felt bound to acquaint him with the gist of your instructions. Hassanein said that if we took up this attitude he would have to resign. He was already being accused by the opposition leaders of letting the King down in favour of the British. Although many of the cases cited in "Black Book" were slanders there were four or five cases of absolutely proved corruption with documentary evidence which left no doubt that Nahas Pasha was a thief and that his régime was thoroughly corrupt. It was the constitutional right of the King when such suspicion fell on the Government to refer to the country which could decide whether or not it wished to return that Government to power. If the King now failed to take such action he would lose all his prestige in the country. If His Majesty on the other hand acted as he (Hassanein) just advise him to act, namely, send the Government before the tribunal of election, His Majesty would then be accused of being anti-British. A situation was developing in which we would find the country and the King aligned against the British and Nahas Pasha. Nahas Pasha was a finished man and whatever we did we could not keep him for long in power. Nahas Pasha himself realised this and was now organising childish demonstrations at the Presidency of the Council and before the Palace in order to intimidate King Farouk. These demonstrations if continued would inevitably lead to counter demonstrations, clashes and disorder.

2. I explained to Hassanein that it was not at this moment so much a question of supporting Nahas Pasha as of giving him a [grp. undec: ? decent] opportunity to refute the accusations which had been made against him by a declared personal enemy. On the receipt of Hassanein's letter communicating to him "Black Book" the Prime Minister had referred the matter to Parliament and promised free discussion. This was, I believed, normal constitutional procedure. It would not be fair play to discuss a man on charges which he had not been given an opportunity to answer. I reported that our policy was that we must have in power a Government which was determined loyally to implement Anglo-Egyptian treaty and had majority in the country to enable it to do so. These conditions had been fully and loyally

fulfilled/

fulfilled by the Wafd and my information was that even though the Wafd may have been weakened it still had a majority in the country. As I saw it (I did not know the Prime Minister's view) there would be no objection to appeal to the country on this issue if it were possible to ensure free election but King Farouk would not allow Nahas Pasha to conduct the election and an interim Government would, as we knew from past experience, rig the election. Hassanein's proposal therefore amounted to immediate condemnation of Nahas Pasha without his having an opportunity of [grp. undec.] explanation before Parliament or the electorate.

3. Hassanein rather half-heartedly maintained that it would be possible to get a neutral Government which would conduct the election with relative fairness but I refused to agree. He maintained strongly that a discussion in Parliament would be a farce. The Government majority terrorised the opposition minority, falsified records of Parliamentary discussions and reports given out to the press. It was a foregone conclusion that Parliament would accept any explanations Nahas Pasha might give.

4. I pointed out that after all Nahas Pasha's own answers would be published and as the public would know the charges in the Black Book and answers of Nahas Pasha in Parliament they should be able to form an opinion on the case.

5. Hassanein continued to maintain his position in an interminable discussion and argued that all the mud which would be slung at Nahas Pasha would go over his head to us. It would in the popular mind be an entire reversal of the traditional rôle whose special virtue in the Egyptian eye had been the stand they always made against corruption.

6. I again tried to impress on Hassanein that it was no question of condoning corruption but of giving the accused a chance to answer the charges made against him. Even a common pick-pocket was allowed to defend himself. As regards Hassanein's own position I said he would be doing his master a bad service by resigning at this moment. It would generally be said that he had resigned because the British were opposing the King's policy regarding Nahas Pasha. This could only be embarrassing to us and eventually dangerous to King Farouk who, left without restraining council, might do irreparable harm to himself.

7. I told Hassanein that I mean to see the King on April 14th at times His Majesty might fix and would convey to him my instructions as explained to Hassanein.

8. Hassanein left saying that he remained decided to resign.

O.T.P.

J. 1678

35531

EGYPT AND SUDAN

Registry Number } J1678/2/16.

TELEGRAM FROM

Sir M. JAMESON

No. (Cairo).
745 Cypher.

Dated 14th April, 1948.

Received in Registry } 16th April, 1948.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Political situation in Egypt.

Refers to Foreign Office telegrams No. 620 and 624 (J 1607, J 1635/2/16) and reports on his audience with King Farouk, during which the King made clear that he felt it his duty to follow up the allegations against his Prime Minister, and completely understood His Majesty's Government's attitude. Considers that the danger of seeking Nahas Pasha, has been removed pending Parliamentary proceedings.

الموقف السياسي في مصر
يرجع الى تليفونات الخارجية رقم 620 و 624 (ج 1607، ج 1635/2/16) و تقارير على جلسته مع الملك فاروق، اثناءها كان الملك قد اوضح انه يشعر بان واجبه ان يتابع الادعاءات ضد رئيس الوزراء، و قد فهم تماما موقف حكومتنا تجاهه. يعتبر ان الخطر من تعيين نحاس باشا قد زال بانتظار اجراءات البرلمان.

Last Paper.

J1664

References.

J1635/2/16

1664/2/16

(Print.)

Egypt vol. 27/4

(How disposed of.)

Tel Cairo 6/4/2

April 15th

Mr. Riddale (News Dept) 3

11 April

(Minutes.)

If para 6 is true, valuable time will have been gained. Another gain is that King Farouk has come out into the open with the Ambassador. The sinister 'Cyped paper' I don't like very much. I rather feel it calls for a 'Cyped paper' in respect of responsibility to point on which the Amb. spoke during the audience. The King gives the impression that he is fairly sure of himself. In view of course he is right that the electorate should be the jury (if it is found that the indictment is serious enough for it to go to a jury) but all concerned including the King must agree that a 'free' election is not possible. The Govt in power at the time tries to bring the elections

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

J1685

however but it would be possible to
set up a sort of 'neutral' front to be
express purpose of holding a general
election, where 'squabbles' would be minimized.
The trouble here would be that each
party would get its gang of hooligans
together & the whole country would
be given over to a series of free
fights. Indian divisions would be
everywhere but would be local in
effect, acting in different directions in
different localities.

E. A. [unclear] [unclear]
16/4

See minutes by Sir M. Peterson & Sir A.
C. [unclear] within. I think that Hassanani made
an attempt to bluff the Ambassador out of his
positions (in Tibet) & that the bluff was well
called. The King accordingly resorted to
more direct methods.

J. [unclear]
16/4

The Egyptian Situation - Sir M. Lampson's
Telegram No. 745.

I have discussed this with Mr. Scrivener and we are in agreement with the Secretary of State's opinion that the Lampson-Farouk interview has not gone off any too well. *But Jan. 6 is all to the good. Nahas is not to be dismissed*
Summary The Ambassador has necessarily been on the defensive. No one could afford to go banco on the absence of corruption in a Wafd Government and, while we have not as yet received even a summary of Makram Ebeid's Black Book, there can be little doubt that it will contain some highly circumstantial evidence of gross irregularities and self-seeking (I commented some months ago on Nahas' appointment of a dissolute nephew of his own to the post of special judge entrusted with the enforcement of the anti-black market laws under which this young rascal is at liberty to order the lash to be applied to practically any dealer who does not pay him blackmail). Similarly again it is very difficult for anyone to dispute the contention that the Egyptian Deputies, who are primarily actuated by reluctance to abandon their salaries in order to face a dissolution, and among whom the Wafd constituted an overwhelming majority, are not an ideal assembly before which accusations of this nature may be exposed for judgment.


Nevertheless even a discussion in the Egyptian Parliament is bound to ventilate to some extent the real accusations against Nahas and it is difficult to suggest any alternative course of action or court of appeal. But if we are to deplore, as we must deplore, the extent to which King Farouk has been able to take the offensive, I must again venture to dissent from the Secretary of State's second comment which applauds Sir Miles Lampson for refraining from drawing King Farouk as to His Majesty's intentions. I do not know how we can hope to put the King on the defensive unless he can be made to reveal his own plans - plans which it is reasonable to suppose will be even less satisfactory than a continuance of the present somewhat blown-upon Wafdist Administration. It should not, for instance, have been difficult to pick holes in any scheme for the return to power even of so friendly an ex-official as Hussein Sirry at the present time. Still easier would it be to explode any suggestion of a mediocre palace functionary like Hassan himself.

We feel therefore that there is now nothing to be done but to wait for the Parliamentary proceedings.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Hassan

proceedings. Meanwhile Mr. Ridsdale has just rung me up to say that there is a rumour in the House of Commons ~~to say~~ that King Farouk has abdicated!



15th April 1943.

The last sentence of the King's "dipped paper" is ominous...

I don't know how long the proceedings in the Parliament are to be expected to last, but we might have to anticipate a crisis at the end of them, though perhaps not before.

I think the conversation had been a little more definite & conclusive, but being as busy as they are, I don't think we can give Sir M. Longman anything further on which he can demand another audience.

Alb.
April 15/43.

102 April 15

1 agree
BR

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I don't like this... (u)
Handwritten notes at the top of the page.
 [This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]
 [CYPHER]
 WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION
 From: EGYPT
 FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
 Sir H. Lampson
 No. 745
 14th April, 1943.
 D. 11.46 p.m. 14th April, 1943.
 R. 3.15 a.m. 15th April, 1943.
 sssss

Handwritten notes on the right side:
 7. 102
 What was the...
 15 April 1943

IMMEDIATE

Your telegrams Nos. 620 and 624.

I saw King Farouk this afternoon. Audience lasted over an hour and was markedly cordial and informal throughout.

on the draft he would be up that we really mean

2. I took the line that His Majesty is probably as embarrassed as we by these developments. I defined our policy (as already recorded in earlier telegrams) which he admitted was both natural and proper: indeed with war on our shoulders it could be no other. I then gave him, [grps. undec. ?practically] verbatim, contents of paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 620 plus the entire phraseology authorised in your telegram No. 624. His Majesty took all this in good part saying he differed from none of it. After handing [6 grps. omitted] eye to eye - Prime Minister must be given the opportunity to clear himself and his Government of these allegations though His Majesty had little hope that they could do so: but possibly we might differ as regards the present Parliament being a suitable or sufficiently convincing forum. He was sure in his own mind it was not. His Majesty then handed me quite informally, typed paper from which the following is an extract

"Your Excellency is aware of serious allegations which have been brought against the Prime Minister and his colleagues.

As constitutional Monarch of this country obligation rests upon me both to safeguard and maintain the dignity and integrity of its political life and institutions.

Therefore I consider essential necessary steps be taken to enable the Premier and his Ministers to clear themselves of these allegations. In my opinion this cannot be achieved by a vote of confidence in the present Parliament".

3. As regards discussion by Parliament I admitted there might be some force in his attitude though much must

/depend

depend on coming debates, how they developed and their public reception. But surely fault lay in the system of Parliamentary Government in Egypt under which every Government was more or less expected to rig election machinery, anyway. Parliament was there and could not be ignored. If Nahas Pasha could go to the country for a vote of confidence it would clearly be best solution, but could he? (I was careful to explain that I had no knowledge of [grp. undec. ?Nahas Pasha]'s attitude on this). His Majesty replied that he believed not under the constitution: anyway, even if he could have, it would have been a case of the accused sitting in judgment. We had long discussion over difficulty of getting true feelings [?grp. omitted ?of the] country. He did not deny there was great force in your comment about Makram Ebeid of whom he had poorest opinion.

4. There was no reference to an alternative Government and I deemed it far wiser not to act on paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 620 as it would certainly have been regarded as an encouragement to replace Nahas Pasha which is surely premature.

5. As regards "Boycott" His Majesty said he was endeavouring to keep out of the way in order not to compromise himself with public. He would indeed have liked to go off on five days' desert trip but that was impossible.

6. Main achievement of our talk was that [grp. undec.] any danger of sudden sacking of Nahas Pasha has been removed pending Parliamentary proceedings.

7. As regards Hassanein (my telegram No. 742) I told His Majesty I thought that Hassanein was a bit overwrought last night and I hoped His Majesty would not let him go. King Farouk observed that Hassanein had a great responsibility and was much worried.

[Communications Department obtaining correction for omitted groups in paragraph 1]

OTF

AMENDED COPY

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYBER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir H. Morrison,
No. 725,
12th April, 1943.

D. 11.46 p.m. 14th April, 1943.
R. 3.15 a.m. 15th April, 1943.

999999999

IN ENGLISH.

Your telegrams Nos. 620 and 624.

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[*Correction received from Cable Company*]

O.T.P.

J

J 1703
129

EGYPT AND SUDAN

Registry J 1703/2/16
Number

FROM Private
Secretary to Prime
Minister to Sir A.
Cobden.

Dated 15th April,
Received 17th April,
in Registry 1943.

J : Egypt and Sudan.

Egyptian Black Book.

Prime Minister desires a summary of the "Black Book" in order to see details of charges against Mahas and his family. Asks whether it could be contained in 1,000 word telegram.

Last Paper.

J1702

References.

(Minutes.)

Handwritten initials and date 7/14

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel Cairo 641
April 15th

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Handwritten index numbers: 1143, 1144, 1145

Next Paper.

J1704

(J)

[Cypher]

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 621
15th April, 1943.

D. 2.10 p.m. 15th April, 1943.

:--:--:--:--:--:

URGENT

My telegram No. 633.

Prime Minister has now asked for summary about 1,000 words in length. Please include details of charges against Nahas' relatives.

C.T.P.

THIS
CARGIN.

J.

Sr. Hampson
Cairo

Tel. no. 641
April 15
Cypher

Dept. No 1.

2.10 pm / 15/4/43

131

ImmEDIATE
Mr. Nahas (33)

Prime Minister has now asked for summary about 1000 words in length. Please include details of charges against Nahas' relatives.

130



10, Downing Street,
Whitehall,
M. P. 1703
1/17/14.

Sir Alexander Cairns
The Prime Minister

Desires a Summary of
the Egyptian Black Book.
He would like to see the
details of the charges against
Nahas Pasha & his relatives.

Can all this information
be contained in a thousand
word telegram?

P.S. & P.M.