

J

J 4521  
NOV 1942

148  
22

1942

31574  
EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number } 452/38/16.

TELEGRAM FROM  
Sir Miles Lampson  
(Cairo).  
No. 2501.

Dated 2nd Nov; 1942. —  
Received 3rd Nov; 1942.  
in Registry }  
J: Egypt and Sudan.

Egyptian Army Crisis.

Refers to Foreign Office telegram 2337 (J 4378/38/16). It was felt that an interview with the King would have been useless if His Majesty's Government had no intention of resorting to force and would have strengthened his hand against His Majesty's Government and Egyptian Government. His Majesty's Ambassador considered proposed action with Prime Minister premature and is not yet convinced that allegations against Wafd Government are not exaggerated. The taking over of Defence Ministry by Nahas would anger the King and be more than he could manage.

Last Paper.

J 4514

References.

J 4390/38/16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

600  
10/11

(Index.)

95m  
12/11

Next Paper.

J 4539

(Minutes.)

It is not worth carrying his  
any further; but para 2 means  
in effect that it is useless for  
the Ambassador even to see the  
King personally to try & reason  
with him, no matter how sweetly,  
unless, in the event after King  
proving unamenable, he can  
produce the big stick. It is  
unsatisfactory to reason with the  
King via Hassanein or anybody  
else. I cannot escape the  
conviction that it would be  
better for the Ambassador to see  
the King more frequently & try &  
get on to common ground with him  
about difficulties before they  
become crises. E.A. [unclear]  
[unclear]

the present Government will not forfeit popular support by undue interference in the judicature and administration, by nepotism or favouritism. We consider that the Prime Minister would do well to overhaul his administration with a view to removing any just grievances of this sort that are found to exist. In the present dispute in which our own interests are involved the Government would have been on stronger ground if the allegations against Hamdi Pasha had been without substance. If therefore the King gives way over the three officers, Nahas might do worse than get rid of Hamdi and possibly take the Defence Ministry for a time himself.

Since the foregoing was drafted, I have received your telegram No. 2422. I fully approve your language to Hassanein, but I have little hope that your remarks will reach His Majesty with anything like their original force and, unless your conversation with Nahas convinces you to the contrary. I think that you should yourself see His Majesty as suggested in paragraph 2

O.T.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

TO: EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 2307  
22nd October, 1942.

D. 9.45.p.m. 22nd October, 1942.

£ £ £ £

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegrams Nos. 2416, 2417, 2418 [Egyptian Army].

I agree that it would be most inopportune to resort to force on an issue of this kind. This time we could scarcely stop short of removing Farouk altogether. Even if we were fully prepared for such a step, we should be unwise to take it if, as in this case, the result might be to unite a large proportion of the Army and the growing number of critics of the present Government against us. If there is any truth in the charges against the Minister of Defence, and in the general allegations of interference with the judicature and administration reported in your telegram No. 2406 we might easily turn Farouk into a champion of popular liberties over-night.

2. I feel therefore that the time has now come for Your Excellency to see the King and endeavour by persuasion to get the present trouble satisfactorily settled. You would explain that His Majesty's Government are following events in the present dispute with care and attention and confidently look to His Majesty to take no step likely to embarrass our military Commanders at the present juncture. The strength of the Egyptian Government and the discipline of the Egyptian army are matters of particular military interest and will remain so for us at least until we have succeeded in dislodging the enemy forces from the gates of Egypt. We therefore confidently ask the King not to shield delinquents who are guilty of an act of indiscipline affecting the authority of the Government and good order in the state. His Majesty's Government attach high importance to enforcing the Government's authority in this matter. Turning then to the more general question I think Your Excellency might say that in supporting the authority of the Government we are not unaware of certain criticisms of it and would wish to see just grievances remedied.

3. Before asking for this audience I think Your Excellency should see Nahas and inform him of what you intend to say. We employed forceful means to persuade the King to summon him because we believed that by so doing we were securing the return of a popular Government. We trust that

/the .....

n way over the three officers, Nahas might do worse than get rid of Hamdi and possibly take the Defence Ministry for a time himself.

21/10

Since the foregoing was drafted, I have received your telegram No: 2422. I fully approve your language to Hassanin, but I have little hope that your remarks will reach HM <sup>with</sup> anything like their original force and, unless your conversation with Nahas convinces you to the contrary, I think that you should yourself see HM as suggested in 37.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*[Handwritten mark]*

ab.  
Oct. 21/42.

BR Oct 22

discipline of the Egyptian army are matters of particular military interest and will remain so <sup>at least</sup> for us <sup>violating the</sup> until we have succeeded in <sup>gates</sup> evicting enemy forces from the neighbourhood of Egypt.

We therefore confidently ask the King not to shield the delinquents who are guilty of an act of discipline affecting the authority of the ~~the~~ Government and good order in the state. H.M.G. attach high importance to enforcing the Government's authority in this matter. Turning then to the more general question I think Your Excellency <sup>might</sup> should say that in supporting the authority of the Government we are not unaware of certain criticisms of it and would wish to see just grievances remedied.

3. Before asking for this audience I think Your Excellency should see Nahas and inform him of what you intend to say. We employed forceful means to persuade the King to summon him because we believed that by so doing we were securing the return of a popular Government. We trust that the present Government will not forfeit popular support by undue interference in the judicature and administration, by nepotism or favoritism. We consider that the Prime Minister would do well to overhaul his administration with a view to removing any just grievances of this sort that are found to exist. In the present dispute in which our own interests are involved the Government would have been on stronger ground if the allegations against Hamdi Pasha had been without substance. If therefore the King gives way....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry  
No. 4270/38/16

E.A. C-A.

OUT FILE

22 10 16  
Despatched 9.45 P M.

Draft.

*Immediate*

Telegram.

Your telegrams Nos. 2416, 2417, 2418

[Egyptian Army].

Sir Miles Lampson

Cairo.

TL No. 2307  
Oct 22

Was (British Dis?)

K/OTP

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

I ~~fully~~ agree that it would be most <sup>most</sup> inopportune to resort to force <sup>on an issue of this kind.</sup> on this occasion. <sup>(we could scarcely stop short of</sup> It could only result this time ~~in~~ removing Farouk altogether. Even if we were fully prepared for such a step, we should be unwise to take it if, as in this case, the result might be to unite a large proportion of the Army and the growing number of critics of the present Government against us. If there is any truth in the charges against the Minister of Defence, and in the general allegations of interference with the judicature and administration reported in your telegram No. 2406, <sup>might easily</sup> we shall, ~~unless we~~ ~~are careful,~~ turn Farouk into <sup>now</sup> the champion of popular liberties over-night.

2. I feel therefore that the time has <sup>now</sup> come for Your Excellency to see the King and ~~without even~~ <sup>by persuasion</sup> threatening to resort to force endeavour to get the present trouble satisfactorily settled. You <sup>should</sup> explain that H.M.G. are following events in the present dispute with care and attention and confidently look to His Majesty to take no step likely to embarrass our military Commanders at the present juncture. The strength of the Egyptian Government and the discipline...

Jylo  
at back

7.10P

For us to appear to connive at, if not to champion, these abuses. Unless we are careful, we shall find that we have put a popular king in the bag and that the Army and country are united against us. Once this business is settled, or even as part of the settlement, I think the Minister for Defence should go, if there is any truth whatever in the charges against him, irrelevant as they may be to the actual insubordination issue.

4. I think therefore that the time has come for the Ambassador to see the King and Nahas. I submit a draft telegram.

*E. A. Chapman*  
21st October, 1942.

*I agree, more particularly as regards the undesirability of having a show-down in the face of General Stone's opinion, & in view of the mess which - though we are not fully informed - Nahas' Government has got itself into.  
See now J 4292.*

*Sturges*  
21/x.

*P*  
21. X.

*ab.*  
Oct 21. 1942.

*BR Oct 22*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

It seemed odd at the time that the C.M.M. saw no objection to an enquiry but this obviously depended upon what an enquiry involved, regarding which the C.M.M. was, we assumed, the best judge.

It would be in our interest to have a well-disciplined, pro-British Egyptian army, but this could not be achieved over-night by Nahas in any case. The punishment of the present culprits and a general purge of the army would nevertheless be salutary. If the Ambassador and Nahas combined cannot achieve this by persuasion, we, i.e. the British acting alone, might have to use force.

2. Anything like a repetition of the events of February last would raise an outcry for even well-disposed Egyptians resent seeing their King man-handled. If, therefore, force is used, it must mean getting rid of Farouk altogether. Are we prepared for that? Who would replace him? What would be the reaction throughout Egypt and elsewhere? I personally would not face this issue with Rommel at the gates of Egypt and the war in its present pregnant state.

Even if it were politic to use force now, do we dispose of it sufficiently? General Stone (G.O.C.B.T.E.), General Napier Clavering (C.M.M.) and the B.G.S. Middle East are all agreed it would be "extremely inopportune". General N.C. and the B.G.S. consider it would be "extremely unlikely" that we should have to use it, but that it could be found if necessary. General Stone does not share these comfortable thoughts and since he knows more about the form than any other soldier involved, having been B.G.S. Sudan and C.M.M. Egypt before being G.O.C.B.T.E. and since, moreover, it would be his duty to handle the force, his opinion should carry more weight than that of the other two. To say the least, it is clear that we should be running a great risk if we resorted to force and removed King Farouk at the present time, and in my opinion we should not take this risk.

3. There is, moreover, the possibility that Nahas may be playing to force another show-down with the King to strengthen his own position. (Is this what the Ambassador means by the phrase "I do not see that we can serve as a pis aller"?). We know from the recent (somewhat sketchy) weekly summary that the situation of the present government is becoming increasingly uneasy, largely through their alleged interference with the judicature and administration by nepotism and favoritism. It would be a grave mistake

for....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*Handwritten notes in the left margin:*  
 ...  
 ...  
 ...  
 ...  
 ...

*I agree.*

*Handwritten notes at the bottom of the left margin:*  
 ...  
 ...



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]. WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.  
No. 2418.

D. 5.05 p.m. 20th October, 1942.

20th October, 1942.

R. 7.15 p.m. 20th October, 1942.

////

4290  
OCT 1942

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 2417. J

Later I saw Amin who explained that Nahas Pasha did not wish to take up an illegal [sic] attitude but thought the general state of the army was bad and that he was serving our interest in getting rid of the anti-British elements. He would drop the whole question if we thought it not worth while pressing it. On that he naturally looked for guidance to C.M.M. in consultation with Minister of Defence.

2. As arranged at the meeting with Deputy Minister of State this evening (see my telegram No. 2417) I expressed the view Nahas Pasha would be right to hold out for dismissal but not - without consulting me further - to the extent of burning his boats, which might at the moment be inopportune. Meantime I should myself see Hassanein and warn him we considered the Prime Minister was right in his determination to get rid of these men which he believed was covered by precedent and that I could hardly suppose King Farouk would wish to be regarded by us as having skidded, contrary to repeated and pressing advice of his Government, two notoriously anti-British officers guilty of gross insubordination.

3. Amin will see Nahas Pasha at Alexandria tomorrow and I expect to be charged with message to Hassanein pressing for dismissal. He will see me before he sees Hassanein to tell me the position.

4. Amin thought Nahas Pasha and Minister of Defence would in the last resort accept disponibilit  if we advised it.

I do not see that we can serve as a "Pis Aller".

O.T.P.

OCT 21 1942  
REGISTRY

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

J 4290

FROM: EGYPT

OCT 1942

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir M. Lampson  
No. 2417

D. 4.56 p.m. 20th October, 1942.  
R. 5.20 p.m. 20th October, 1942.

20th October, 1942.

0 0 0 0

IMMEDIATE

My telegram No. 2416. J

Subsequent meeting with Deputy Minister of State was attended on Military side by General Officer Commanding-in-Chief British Troops Egypt, C.G.S. Middle East and C.M.M.

2. Whilst C.G.S. confirmed extreme inopportuneness of any call for the use of force at the present moment both he and C.M.M. expressed the view that the need for actual recourse to force, once the Palace realised that we were solidly behind the Government, was extremely unlikely. This view I endorsed from my experience of Egyptian affairs whilst making it clear that no one would of course give any guarantee: as also did Oriental Counsellor.

3. General Officer Command-in-Chief British Troops Egypt expressed the opinion that he had no adequate force to repeat the action taken in February. C.G.S. and C.M.M. however considered that the forces that could be made available would be sufficient for any calls upon them.

4. Except for the General Officer Commanding British Troops Egypt the meeting was in favour of backing Nahas Pasha in pressing for the dismissal of officers, despite slight risk involved that it might lead to the use of force.

5. Deputy Minister of State was impressed by these expressions of view and feels with me that you should know of them.

OTF

OCT 21 1942  
F. O. REGISTRY

8. If Mahas Pasha, despite this, is driven back on dispo[n]ibilit , C.M.M. thinks it may lead to the resignation of the Minister of Defence. In that event, the matter assumes more serious aspect and becomes first class political issue: in which eventuality I feel despite the risks involved (see paragraph 5 [grp.undec] General Officer Commanding's comment) we should have to back the Prime Minister firmly, even if necessary threaten and possible [sic: ? possibly] use force.

O.T.P.

X and

J 4290  
OCT 1942

[THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR SECRECY AND SHOULD BE RETAINED BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON].

[CYPHER].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.  
No. 2416.

D. 4.56 p.m. October 20th, 1942.  
R. 8.00 p.m. October 20th, 1942.

October 19th, 1942.

YYYYY

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 2389.

J. 4240-38/10

SECRET.

Over the weekend Nahas Pasha sent word he could not agree to an enquiry which was open to the same political objections as court-martial.

2. Nahas Pasha himself is away at Alexandra for [grp.undec] week.

3. Amin who brought the message to the Oriental Counsellor suggested the case was even more our concern than that of the Egyptian Government because the two culprits are notorious and to our knowledge anti-British.

NOTE 4. I have discussed fully to-day with General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and C.M.M. and following are conclusions.

5. Owing to irregularities of Ministry of Defence we should not be on a good wicket in backing an ultimatum from Nahas Pasha for dismissal as we should risk laying ourselves open to shielding Defence Minister against charges which may be irrelevant to the charge of insubordination but some of which are probably true (e.g. special Army advancement to his own son etc.). General Officer Commanding-in-Chief BTE Defence points out that the King in asking for courtmartial has adopted perfectly correct attitude but one which it is inexpedient for us to agree to. [Grp.undec] important General Officer Commanding-in-Chief BTE [sic] made clear present would be most inopportune moment for drastic action.

6. On the other hand if discipline in the Egyptian Army is to be maintained all are agreed that disponibilit  is inadequate punishment: and should only be agreed to in the last resort. Accordingly Nahas Pasha should be advised to produce precedent previous analogous case of dismissal without courtmartial or enquiry if suitable one is available and should press the King strongly for it (short of ultimatum) on general grounds of discipline of the army and best interest of the country and throne: he should only accept disponibilit  if he cannot get better.

7. In advance I should remind Hassanein of the attitude of His Majesty's Government and let him understand clearly we know these two officers to be dangerously anti-British; [grp.undec] will therefore constitute a definite black mark if through King Farouk's attitude they remain in the Army despite repeated advice of his Government.

J 4290

Oct 1942

31574

Registry Number } J 4290/53/16

TELEGRAM FROM

Sir M. Lampson  
No. (Cairo)

Dated 2416. 2417.  
2418.

Received in Registry } 19th & 20th  
October,  
21st Oct.,  
1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Disturbances in Egyptian Army.

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 2389 (J 4290/53/16). Nahas is unable to agree to enquiry to which there are same objections as to Court Martial. Matter has been discussed with General Officer Commander-in-Chief and C.M.M. and account of conclusions is given. If Nahas is driven back on dismissal, Minister of Defence may resign, this would cause political issue and it may even be necessary to use force. At a subsequent meeting all were in favour of backing Nahas Pasha in pressing for dismissal despite risk of possible use of force. Nahas consider he is serving British interests by removing anti-British element.

Last Paper.

J 4260

References.

(Minutes.)

*Please see minutes within*

*on J 4292*

*J. 2/10*

*قائمة المراسلات الواردة من القاهرة  
في 19 و 20 و 21 اكتوبر 1942  
من السيد ناهاش باشا  
الى السيد كرايغ  
بشأن تعيين محكمة عسكرية  
للسيد ناهاش باشا*

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*Del Cairo  
no 1307 22 Oct.*

(Action completed.)

*67/10  
50/10*

(Index.)

*File  
6/10*

Next Paper.

J 4292

COPY FILE

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

TO: EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 2218.  
3rd October, 1942.

D. 11.55.a.m. 3rd October, 1942.

£ £ £ £ £  
74050/38/16 J4013/37/16

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegrams Nos. 2298 and 2303 [of September 29th and 30th: Egyptian army].

I agree that you should avoid being drawn into this dispute if it can be avoided, but at the same time I fully share the opinion that holding of court-martial would, for the reasons mentioned by you, be politically extremely undesirable. View of Chief of Military Mission should dispose of fear that Minister of War is "seeing bogies", and if former sees no reason to change it we hope you will let Nahas know informally that we take a serious view of the situation and hope that matters will not be allowed to slide.

O.T.P.

Registry  
No.

Sept 11-55 and

60

OUT FILE

3<sup>rd</sup> Oct.

Draft.

Sir M. Lampton  
Cairo

Immediate

Tel No. 2218. X  
cypher - O.T.P.  
War Cabinet Dis.

Your telegrams Nos 2298 and 2303 [of  
September 29<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> : Egyptian army]


I agree that you should avoid being  
drawn into this dispute if it can be  
avoided but ~~we~~ <sup>we</sup> are at the same  
time <sup>I fully share the</sup> ~~strongly of~~ opinion that holding  
of court-martial would, for the reasons  
mentioned by you, be politically extremely  
undesirable. View of Chief of Military

Oct. 3<sup>rd</sup>

Mission should dispense of fear that  
Minister of War is "saying dogies", and  
if former sees no reason to change it  
we hope you will let Nahas know  
informally that we take a serious <sup>that matter</sup>  
view of the situation and hope <sup>situation</sup>  
will not be allowed to slide.   
Oct 3<sup>rd</sup>

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

11.25am

ac.  
on 2/12. 



5

J 4065  
2 OCT 1942

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson,  
No. 2303  
30th September 1942

D. 12.25 a.m. 1st October 1942  
R. 1.55 a.m. 1st October 1942

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No. 2298. J 4050/30/16

I am seeing the Prime Minister tomorrow for a general talk not having had one for some time.

2. This morning Amin came with message that the Prime Minister particularly did not want to raise with me tomorrow question you had dwelt on as he felt that it was better, and that I should prefer to help in the background. At the same time Nahas did definitely wish to know for his personal guidance what my re-action was.

3. Nahas Pasha's own opinion was that this spirit in the army was not good and that it was being encouraged by the King. For instance, the principal offender in the present row was a poor man who could hardly have behaved as he did without some promise of support. Nahas regarded the army as not safe and feared that some day there might be trouble especially if the general situation became critical. On the other hand Nahas wanted to be sure that the Minister of Defence was not seeing bogies. Once he was sure of that he himself would be inclined to take strong line even if it involved a clash with the King (the latter has so far not agreed to dismiss the offending officers). Nahas wondered if I knew how Chief of Military Mission viewed this issue.

4. I said in fact I did: Chief of Military Mission's view was that in the interest of discipline in the army the Prime Minister was absolutely right in pressing for the dismissal of the culprits and not for court martial. But [grp. undec.] said and whilst if asked for my view I should agree with Chief of Military Mission. I did not wish to be drawn into this if it could be avoided: first because it might do great harm if any action the Prime Minister finally took could be attributed to our advice; secondly, because the delinquent officers had all played a hand in irresponsible agitation and I should be suspected of acting through spite. I added I heard Makram Ebeid had offered to act as counsel for the defence.

5. Finally Amin asked, for the information of Nahas informally [grp. undec.], whether in our view or that of Chief of Military Mission the spirit of the army was sufficiently dangerous to warrant the Prime Minister taking strong measures: or whether we thought it not worth a row with the King; and that the Prime Minister should therefore do his best but if necessary let this thing slide. I undertook to think it [grp. undec. ? over].

O.T.P.  
F.O.



360

J

58

1942

EGYPT and SUDAN

J 4063

31574

2 OCT 1942

Registry Number } J 4063/38/16.

TELEGRAM FROM Sir M. Lampson. Cairo.

No. 2303.

Dated 30th Sept. 1942.

Received in Registry } 2nd Oct., 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Present disturbance in Egyptian army.

Refers to Cairo telegram 2298 (J 4050/38/16) Amin Osman brought message from Prime Minister to the effect that he did not wish to raise matter at the interview but wished to know His Majesty's Ambassador's re-actions. Nahas consider that spirit in the army was not good and was being encouraged by the King. Nahas is prepared to take strong line even at risk of clash with the King. Amin Osman was informed that Chief of Military Mission considered Prime Minister right in pressing for dismissal rather than court martial. Nahas wish to know whether it was considered that attitude of army warranted severe action. His Majesty's Ambassador undertook to consider the matter.

Last Paper.

(J 4050)

*p.p in dept copy of report attached (Minutes)*

*See on J.4050*

References.

*J. 2/x*

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*7th) Cairo No 2218*

*October 3rd.*

(Action completed.)

*W.P. 8/10*

(Index.)

*Jan 6/7*

Next Paper.

(J4073)

vituperation. It is sincerely to be hoped that King Farouk will agree. Otherwise there is no certainty that these officers will be found guilty: the position might arise where the army had succeeded in dictating to the Government. Chief of Military Mission has no doubt that Prime Minister will be absolutely right in insisting on dismissal rather than court martial. So far I have avoided being drawn in. My inclination is to maintain that attitude unless the Prime Minister himself raises the matter with me.

(OTF)

J 4050

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.FROM: EGYPT.FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.  
No. 2298.

D. 2.32 p.m., 30th September, 1942.

29th September, 1942.

R. 2.55 p.m., 30th September, 1942.

3 3 3

IMPORTANT.

More trouble is brewing over Egyptian army. Following is report given to me by Chief of Military Mission.

2. According to account of the ceremony there were three army officers who took very seriously to heart the episode of February 4th. They tried at the time to arrange a demonstration of loyalty to the King among the younger officers and were reported to be planning a counter demonstration against the Embassy. They were dissuaded from these activities by senior officers of the army. Since then they have been watched and have been consistently anti-British and anti-Government.

3. Ministry of Defence decided to transfer them from Cairo. Two of them demurred and wrote letters of protest to the Minister. One accused the Minister in writing of taking this action solely because he was loyal to the King. Another asked to be put en disponibilité and threatened to take further action if his request were not granted. Receiving no answer to his protest he wrote a letter to the Army Headquarters with copies to the King and the Prime Minister accusing Minister of Defence of a variety of misdemeanours including nepotism. According to the information of the Chief of Military Mission, the King then ordered these two officers to be tried by court martial.

4. Prince Ismail Daoud on hearing of this went both to the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister to protest that such action would be to the last degree detrimental to the discipline of the army as it would lead to the army taking sides and to possible interference by the King with members of the Court. Minister of Defence found himself unable to object as he could not appear to try to avoid full investigation. Prime Minister on the other hand was persuaded by Prince Ismail Daoud that the only right course was for the King to dispense with the services of the second man and put the first on pension. And present position is that he is pressing King Farouk to agree and to act accordingly. The King's reply has not yet been received.

5. An additional complication is that Makran has offered his services free as counsel~~er~~ for defence. This of course opens a vista of infinite mud-slinging and political

vituperation/

1007  
REGISTRY


not least in the present attitude of Makram) that I think we should give the Ambassador discretion to intervene to let it stopped. or else the resultant discharge might seriously shake Nahas' position.

V. Srinivas  
/x.

See now tel no 2203 from Sir M. Lampon: J4063.

Copy attached, & draft telegram submitted. The Prime Minister "let the thing slide" over the Italians, with the results we know of. Given the view of the Chief of the Military Mission I think we should stiffen Nahas.

V. Srinivas  
/x.

  
/x.

Reg  
VIII

FE  
91

No.

Date

loc  
7

7:

tic  
lot

12  
12

J

J 4050  
1 OCT 1942

1942

31574  
EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number } J 4050/38/16.

TELEGRAM FROM  
Sir M. Lampson.  
Cairo.

No. 2298.

Dated 29th Sept. 1942.

Received in Registry } 1st Oct.,  
1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Report on recent events connected with Egyptian Army.

Three officers took the episode of February 24th seriously and tried to arrange demonstration of loyalty to the King but were dissuaded by their seniors and have been watched since. They made protests to various persons as a result of which King Farouk ordered their court martial. Prince Ismail Daoud has protested to Minister of Defence and Prime Minister and Makram has offered his services as counsellor for defence. It is hoped that King will agree to dismissal rather than court martial as otherwise army may succeed in dictating to Government.

Last Paper.

J 4045

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

*[Handwritten initials]*  
9/10/42

Next Paper.

(J 4063)


Minutes.

Whether a note to the two officers are found guilty of whatever charges are made against them is not so important as to prevent the court martial from taking place at all. It may well be that the Ambassador should not step in at this stage but I think we should tell him that we rely on him to see to it that the C.M. is not held.

Draft submitted.

*[Handwritten signature]*  
1/10/42

This is a particularly unpleasant sort of mess, of which one would like to keep clear if possible. And it reveals that the discipline of the army is so deplorable that it is doubtful whether the proposed Court-martial courts make it any worse. Politically, I agree with Mr Chapman-Andrews: there is such a lot of explosive about (not



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYMER]

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.  
No. 2110.

D. 8.32.p.m. 28th August, 1942.  
R. 9.20.p.m. 28th August, 1942.

28th August, 1942.

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No. 2098 and my telegram No. 15 to  
Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean.

Secret. Hassanein called this morning with the following answer. King Farouk gives his word there is no truth whatever in the suspicion of any communication between any submarine and the Montaza Palace.

2. His Majesty himself thought some months ago that he saw a submarine submerging. His Majesty feels it may be that enemy submarines think they are safer from pursuit in waters off the Palace: just as he suggests enemy planes assemble sometimes over the palace area believing there are no anti-aircraft guns there.

3. The two young princess are in residence at Montaza. His Majesty and Queen Farida went to visit them with a family party staying a week or ten days; the lights seen were probably due to negligent servants which will not occur again; but if it does we should at once call the attention of the officer commanding the Palace grounds.

4. As regards patrolling, the small harbour in the palace grounds is henceforth put at our disposal every night.

5. I have arranged with Has..... that an officer delegate by the Palace shall at once contact one of ours to arrange details of this patrol. I have informed Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean accordingly.

O.T.P.

45. 1942

EGYPTIAN

J3689 / C 37  
29 AUG 1942

J 3689 (333) (E) 38/10  
Sir M. Lampson  
(Cairo)  
no: 2110  
Aug. 28  
Aug. 29

King Farouk: suspected communication with enemy submarines.  
Refers to his tel. no: 2098 (J3682 (333) (E)).  
Hassoun has reported that King Farouk gives his word that there is no truth whatever in the suspicion of any communication between any submarine & the Montaza Palace.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

J3689

Copies DVI, DVI A.C.A.S (2).  
Submitted with J3689.  
King Farouk's compliance is so swift & unquibbling as to be somewhat suspicious.

References.

(Print.)

Verniers  
29/8.

(How disposed of.)

Copied to. of J.  
Aug. 29

W. Laundish-Bentrick (2 paps).

I hope that (4) is the answer.

P  
S.P.F.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

gh.  
3/9/42

N

Next Paper.

J 3828

J 3682/G  
28 AUG 1942

[CYPHER]

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET).

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson  
No. 2098.

D. 9.59 p.m. 27th August, 1942.  
R. 10.55 p.m. 27th August, 1942.

27th August, 1942.

JJJJJ

IMPORTANT.

SECRET.

Secret information reached me last night [grp. undec. ?from] Naval Commander-in-Chief that enemy submarine on night of August 25th was close in shore off Montaza Palace at Alexandria and that King Farouk might have done a "get-away".

2. By immediate local enquiry I was able to establish that King Farouk had been in Cairo since evening of August 25th and that this particular part of story was therefore unfounded.

3. Suspicion nevertheless remained that there had been communication - not for the first time.

4. Before I could ascertain from Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean if I was at liberty to use his information, I received this morning from General Officer Commanding-in-Chief B.T.E. letter reporting suspected communication with beach inside the Palace grounds; recording bright lights from the Palace had been seen seaward late into night; and asking if I could contrive that we should have means of patrolling Palace.

5. On strength of this I at once summoned Hassanein this morning and told him in full detail of contents of General Officer Commanding's letter. I emphasised extreme gravity of facts therein (apparently) revealed and urgent importance of clearing matters up. I added that it was not first time similar suspicions had been aroused. In His Majesty's own interest he would do well to authorise forthwith patrolling of Palace beaches.

6. Hassanein declared he was convinced that our suspicions of contact with shore were groundless. He would however at once enquire. As regards allegation about bright lights seaward from Palace windows, this might be true as King Farouk and Queen Farida had had a party late into night one night. I made obvious comment that it was in any case a most foolish and reprehensible thing to have allowed such evasion of black-out.

7. I will report further developments.

OTP.  
28 AUG 1942  
F. O. REGISTRY



1942

43

31574  
EGYPTIAN

J3682  
28 AUG 1942

35

2.

J3682/333/9.16<sup>35</sup>

Sir M. Lampson

Cairo

T.P. No. 5007

Dated: 27 Aug

Received: 28 Aug

King Farouk

Naval C. in C. has reported the presence of an enemy submarine on night of 25 Aug. close in shore off Montaza since at least 11.00 AM. Communication is suspected - not for the first time.

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

J3658

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Copied to D. of D.  
Aug. 29

I shd have prepared to have arranged es. through Admiral Wells or the Commandant of the Alexandria Police (if our Naval or military authorities themselves did not do it) a secret patrol of motor boats at night or a chain of watches in fellukas off Montaza, in an endeavour to catch her red-handed. The staff has now been blown over signals will be made more carefully possible from elsewhere.

F. A. Hopkins  
28/8.

(Action completed.)

Ah  
31/9/42

(Index.)

A

Next Paper.

4/2. Copies of this should be sent to the Intelligence Chiefs of the three Services.

✓  
Verisener  
28/8.

4. [sic] Prime Minister did not this morning specifically ask for my support, but it was clear that he sought some indication of my reaction. So I reminded him of the assurance I had on your instructions, given him when he assumed office, adding that as I saw the matter the Government of the country must be allowed freedom to govern and be masters of their own house.

5. After the loyal way in which Nahas Pasha has played up during recent events, I feel more than ever that we should support him if this matter cannot be amicably settled direct between himself and the Palace. I am sure that the Minister of Defence (who is a good man) should not (repeat not) be allowed to resign: and I believe if I were to let him know the Palace knows that such is my attitude, the effect might be salutary. I propose in case of need (but not otherwise) to act accordingly. This is not a time to allow things to drift here or to permit the Palace to challenge the Government on what is clearly a matter within their legitimate competence. I shall therefore, if necessary, adopt a strong line.

O.T.P.

J 3592

20 AUG 1942

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTIONFROM EGYPTFROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.  
No. 2040.

D. 12.12 p.m. 19th August, 1942.

R. 7.20 p.m. 19th August, 1942.

18th August, 1942.

- - - - -

IMPORTANT

Nahas Pasha spoke to me this morning about serious clash which threatened to develop between the Government and the Palace over Chief of General Staff of Egyptian Army (Attallah Pasha).

2. His Excellency reminded me of various signs of danger of disloyalty in Egyptian Army. Minister of Defence now found it quite impossible to work further with Chief of Staff who, being a Palace man, submitted everything to King Farouk. It resulted that Government attempts to cleanse the Army of bad elements were consistently blocked. Minister of Defence now wished to resign unless Chief of Staff were changed. Prime Minister had convoked Hassanein Pasha and in the presence of Minister of Defence had had this thing out. But Hassanein had since absented himself from Cairo and no answer had come from the Palace.


3. The Prime Minister spoke of recent arrest of two German officers and consequent arrest of certain Egyptian officers and of Aziz el Masri - also of flight to enemy of two Egyptian Army aviators. He also referred to reports of a secret society amongst the Army officers which he believed to be true (see my telegram No. 1366). J 239 2/3a 2/e

4. I have for long felt that this clash was sooner or later inevitable. No Wafd Government was likely to tolerate indefinitely a Chief of Staff however good in himself (and we ourselves having nothing against Attallah) who was a Palace man. Undoubtedly ever since they came into office the present Government have been determined to take their measures to ensure having Egyptian Army with them in the event of trouble with the Palace, especially after events of [grp. undec. ? February 4th]. In effecting this their methods may have been crude - they usually are. But I can fully understand their feeling that the Government must be able to rely upon the Army.

/4. [sic]

I agree.  
Vernicom  
20/8.

So do I. This is had to log:  
1926 "Army Crisis" with our role  
revised. But manuscript so.

  
21/8.

Wagner  
Aug 26

Tobert  
J. 2/8

AE Aug 23

1042

41

31574  
EGYPTIAN

J 3592

20 AUG 1942

49  
24

J 3592/333/9-38/16

Sir M. Lampson  
Cairo.

Tel: No: 2040

Dated: 18 Aug

Received: 20 Aug

Internal affairs: Egypt.

Records an interview with Nahas Pasha about the serious clash which threatened to develop between Govt. Palace over Chief of General Staff of Egyptian Army.

Last Paper.

J 3542

References.

J 3392/333/P.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel. 2038 to Cairo

24/8

Copied Major Kerwan

24/8

(Action completed.)

EC 23/8

(Index.)

AV

Next Paper.

J 3658

(Minutes.)

General Stone who was previous head after mid day mission towards Atallah Pasha well & we may assume that he will be with Sir M. L. in taking a strong line. It is important to keep in any way for our people have always got on well with Atallah; but in view of the disclosure in J 2392 to Ambassador must back Nahas & the President of Depree if called upon to do so against the Palace. If the President resigns the Govt. will be weaker & that is not in our interest. If Atallah goes we may presumably expect a pro-Wafdist C. G. S & consequently a peace after any & a weakening after King's control — all to our good. E.A. C. Andrews. 23/8

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

J.2199/38/16.

[CYFHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

TO EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 1333.  
13th May, 1942.

D. 7.0 p.m. 13th May, 1942.

999999999

Your telegrams Nos. 1262 and 1279 [of May 8th and 10th: Egyptian political situation.]

I share Sirry's estimate of Abdul Wahab to whose removal I have always attached no less importance than to that of the Italians (e.g. my telegram No. 931). But it does not seem to me that dissensions within the Wafd afford any reason for holding our hand in regard to the expulsion both of the Italians and of Wahab, particularly since these dissensions which we must deplore are very probably encouraged by the latter.

2. While, therefore, I agree that it would be most dangerous for you to attempt to intervene between Nahas and Ebcid, I hope you may feel able to press Nahas to insist on the expulsion of the Italians and Wahab. If Prime Minister appears to shirk the task I should be glad of your views as to desirability of our performing it ourselves.

INDIV.

Registry  
No. J 2199/38/16

M.P.

Draft.  
H.M. Ambassador,  
CAIRO.

Telegram.  
No... 1333.  
Cypher. *may 13*  
*KINDIV*

War Cabinet dist.  
and so amend  
dist. of both  
references.

*which we must  
deplora*

*B.P.*

*[Signature]*

3.15pm.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*[Handwritten signatures]*  
OUT FILE  
13 May, 1942.  
Despatched *7/* M.

Your telegrams Nos 1262 and 1279  
[of May 8th and 10th: Egyptian political  
situation].

I share Sirry's estimate of Abdul  
Wahab to whose removal I have always  
attached no less importance than to that  
of the Italians (e.g. my telegram No. 931).  
But it does not seem to me that dissensions  
within the Wafd afford any reason for  
holding our hand in regard to the ex-  
pulsion both of the Italians and of  
Wahab, particularly since these dissensions  
are very probably encouraged by the latter.

2. While, therefore, I agree that  
it would be most dangerous for you to  
attempt to intervene between Nahas and  
Ebeid, I ~~think that you must once more~~ *I hope you may feel able to*  
press Nahas to insist on the expulsion  
of the Italians and Wahab. If Prime  
Minister appears to shirk the task *of*  
~~must consider whether it is not incumbent~~ *should be clear of your views as to*  
~~on us to perform it ourselves.~~ *desirability of our*  
*my*

*AB 13 May 13*

*Palmyra*  
*Catrina*  
*should see* *AR*

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson,  
No. 1262.

D. 6.55.p.m. May 8th, 1942.  
R. 12.10.a.m. May 9th, 1942.

May 7th, 1942.

-----o0o-----

In long after lunch conversation with Hussein Sirry Pasha, His Excellency expressed the gravest fear of the approaching disintegration of the Wafd. It had been his personal hope that they would continue in office till the end of the war. But he felt bound to warn me that in his view the position was already serious. The rift between Nahas Pasha [?gr.omit. ?and] Mukram Ebeid was growing and he admitted that Makram Ebeid was increasingly "bitter" owing to having the Palace behind him. He himself had most strongly urged King Farouk to keep out of it; but Abdul Wahab Talaat was once more playing a bad role. In our place he would submerge the question of the Palace of Italians who were of little importance and concentrate on getting out Abdul Wahab Talaat.

(2) As to King Farouk himself, naturally, being only human, he was intensely resentful over [gr.undec.] but he, the Pasha, speaking after full consideration, believed that we had acted rightly not only in [gr.undec.] Wafd to office but in keeping King Farouk on the throne. Nevertheless the Pasha regarded the outlook as very black and was convinced that political trouble threatened in the near future. If the Wafd did founder - and he believed they would, largely owing to female influence - he felt that we should look to the Saadists.

(3) I told His Excellency that I personally deplored the present rift in the Wafd but it was not a matter on which I could safely intervene, though I had in fact let it be known in the proper quarters how dangerous I thought it was apart from other considerations Makram Ebeid was a Copt and there was always the religious angle to beware of. The Pasha agreed but speaking very solemnly said that there were two men who ought to be "inside" - Ismail Sidki and Sheik Maraghi who were doing the Allied cause untold harm. Small fry like Abbas Halim and Mohammed Taher were better ignored. He rejoiced that Mahmud Khalil, that despicable intriguer and snake in the grass, had at last been got rid of as President of the Senate. (He relinquished office days ago).

(INDIV).



J 2199

130

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson,  
No. 1262.

D. 6.55.p.m. May 8th, 1942.  
R. 12.10.a.m. May 9th, 1942.

May 7th, 1942.

-----oOo-----

In long after lunch conversation with Hussein Sirry Pasha, His Excellency expressed the gravest fear of the approaching disintegration of the Wafd. It had been his personal hope that they would continue in office till the end of the war. But he felt bound to warn me that in his view the position was already serious. The rift between Nahas Pasha [?gr.omit. ?and] Makram Ebeid was growing and he admitted that Makram Ebeid was increasingly "bitter" owing to having the Palace behind him. He himself had most strongly urged King Farouk to keep out of it; but Abdul Wahab Talaat was once more playing a bad rôle. In our place he would submerge the question of the Palace of Italians who were of little importance and concentrate on getting out Abdul Wahab Talaat.

(2) As to King Farouk himself, naturally, being only human, he was intensely resentful over [gr.undec.] but he, the Pasha, speaking after full consideration, believed that we had acted rightly not only in [gr.undec.] Wafd to office but in keeping King Farouk on the throne. Nevertheless the Pasha regarded the outlook as very black and was convinced that political trouble threatened in the near future. If the Wafd did founder - and he believed they would, largely owing to female influence - he felt that we should look to the Saadists.

(5) I told His Excellency that I personally deplored the present rift in the Wafd but it was not a matter on which I could safely intervene, though I had in fact let it be known in the proper quarters how dangerous I thought it was. Apart from other considerations, Makram Ebeid was a Copt and there was always the religious angle to beware of. The Pasha agreed but speaking very solemnly said that there were two men who ought to be "inside" - Ismail Sidki and Sheik Maraghi who were doing the Allied cause untold harm. Small fry like Abbas Halim and Mohammed Taher were better ignored. He rejoiced that Mahmud Khalil, that despicable intriguer and snake in the grass, had at last been got rid of as President of the Senate. (He relinquished office days ago).

(INDIV)

SECRETARY

J 2199/30/16

129

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.	D.	6.55 p.m., 8th May, 1942.
<u>No. 1262.</u>		
7th May, 1942.	R.	12.10 a.m., 9th May, 1942.

3 3 3

In long after lunch conversation with Hussain Sirry Pasha, His Excellency expressed the gravest fear of the approaching disintegration of the Wafd. It had been his personal hope that they would continue in office till the end of the war. But he felt bound to warn me that in his view the position was already serious. The rift between Mahas Pasha [?gp. omitted: ?and] Mukram Ebeid was growing and he admitted that Mukram Ebeid was increasingly "bitter" owing to having the Palace behind him. He himself had most strongly urged King Farouk to keep out of it: but Abdul Wahab Talaat was once more playing a bad rôle. In our place he would submerge the question of the Palace of Italians who were of little importance and concentrate on getting out Abdul Wahab Talaat.

(2) As to King Farouk himself, naturally, being only human, he was intensely resentful over [gp. undec.] but he, the Pasha, speaking after full consideration, believed that we had acted rightly not only in [gp. undec.] Wafd to office but in keeping King Farouk on the throne. Nevertheless the Pasha regarded the outlook as very black and was convinced that political trouble threatened in the near future. If the Wafd did founder - and he believed they would, largely owing to female influence - he felt that we should look to the Saadists.

(3) I told His Excellency that I personally deplored the present rift in the Wafd, but it was not a matter on which I could safely intervene, though I had in fact let it be known in the proper quarters how dangerous I thought it was apart from other considerations Mukram Ebeid was a Copt and there was always the religious angle to beware of. The Pasha agreed but speaking very solemnly said that there were two men who ought to be "inside" - Ismail Sidki and Sheik Maraghi who were doing the Allied cause untold harm. Small fry like Abbas Halim and Mohammed Taher were better ignored. He rejoiced that Mahmud Khalil, that despicable intriguer and snake in the grass, had at last been got rid of as President of the Senate. (He relinquished office days ago).

(INDIV)

J.S.L.

12/5.


ing must bury the hatchet before things go too  
far. I don't think therefore that we need  
dispute Sir M. Lampson's conclusion. though we  
might comment on it. I attach a draft.

Scrivener  
12/5.

All this is very Oriental. Taken in con-  
junction with telegram No. 1279 (J 2204) this shows  
that Sir M. Lampson is playing what I fear I must  
call his old game - having pressed strongly, and quite  
unnecessarily, for permission to go bald-headed for  
the Italians and Talaat, he now on getting the  
permission produces reasons why he should not act on  
it.

I see no reason to press Sir M. Lampson to  
wade into the middle of the internal Ward dissensions  
between Nahas, or Madame Nahas, and Makram Ebeid.  
But I do not think we can let him off the Italians  
with whom, as Mr. Scrivener points out, we have  
ourselves always associated Abdul Wahab Talaat.

I do not therefore like the draft put up by  
the Department, which seems to join too whole-heartedly  
in this Eastern game of splitting hairs and I  
suggest an alternative.

  
12th May, 1942.

1942

J

EGYPT AND SUDAN

2199

123

Registry Number } 2199/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir M. Lampson (Cairo)

No. 1262

Dated 7th May, 1942

Received in Registry } 11th May, 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan

Internal situation His Majesty's Ambassador's talk with Hussein Sirry Pasha.

Hussein Sirry Pasha felt the situation within the Wafd was serious. The rift between Makram Ebeid and Nahas was growing and Abdul Wahab Talaat was playing a bad rôle. He suggested that question of Palace Italians should be dropped in favour of securing removal of Abdul Wahab Talaat. If Wafd foundered the Pasha suggested the Saadists should be looked to. His Majesty's Ambassador felt that he could not intervene in this matter. Hussein Sirry thought Ismail Sidki and Sheik Maraghi were causing trouble and was glad that Mahmud Khalil had relinquished office.

ج ٢١٩٩ - ٣٨ - ١٦

Last Paper.

J 2192.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel Cairo 133/3  
May 13<sup>th</sup>

(Action completed.)

67/5  
13/5

(Index.)

67/5  
14/6

Next Paper.

J 2192

(Minutes.)

Sir M. Lampson offers no comment on this gloomy recital, which strikes me as a little premature.

We entirely share Sirry's views about Abdul Wahab Talaat. We have always regarded this individual as assimilated to the Italians, and we have told Sir M. Lampson, in terms admitting of no misunderstanding, that he must go sooner rather than later. See in particular J 1191 and later J 2068 to which Sir M. Lampson has now replied in his telegram no. 1279 (J 2204).

This (telegram suggests that Sir M. Lampson has forgotten our telegram no. 931 (J 1211/6), which in fact answers the last sentence of 1279. The present alternatives seem to be to increase, momentarily, Nahas' difficulties with the King with the object of "eliminating" an element which is promoting "disintegration" in the Wafd, or to do nothing & let those elements do their worst for a bit longer. Sir M. Lampson favours the latter course. At first sight it appears the more dangerous; but unless the instinct of self-preservation has completely deserted both Nahas & Makram then

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2.

FROM TEHRAN TO CAIRO.

Sir R. Bullard.  
No. 86.  
4th May, 1942.

D. 2.24 p.m. 4th May, 1942.  
R. 6.25 a.m. 5th May, 1942.

Repeated to: Foreign Office telegram No. 585.

& & &

J 2104

SECRET.

My despatch No. 672.

Mr. Perron, Swiss Personal Private Secretary of the Shah, leaves by air for Cairo May 6th, with personal letter from the Shah for King Farouk. He will be staying at the Persian Embassy and after delivering the letter to the King, will call on you to give you copy. In view of his Swiss nationality Perron should be treated with care.

2. Substance of the letter, copy of which goes to you by bag, is that national interests come before personal and that the Shah has decided to co-operate as closely as possible with the Allies. The policy of neutrality or isolation for Persia is impossible. It is dangerous to play with the destinies of one's country, and the policy of the Shah is to give, his full support and confidence to his Government in their heavy task.

In his letter the Shah has endeavoured to set an example for King Farouk to follow rather than give him advice which might only create annoyance and be rejected out of hand.

J

J 2104

102  
101

Registry } J 2104/38/16  
 Number }  
 TELEGRAM FROM  
 Sir R. Bullard,  
 (Teheran)  
 No. 585  
 Dated 4th May, 1942.  
 Received } 6th May,  
 in Registry } 1942.

Approach by Shah of Persia to King Farouk. ✓  
 Addressed Cairo 86. States that Mr. Perron, Swiss  
 personal private Secretary to Shah leaves on 6th May  
 with personal letter for King Farouk. In view of his  
 nationality he should be treated with care. Letter  
 states that national interest comes before personal  
 and that Shah has decided to co-operate with the  
 Allies. It is pointed out that policy of Shah is  
 to co-operate fully with his Government. The Shah  
 has endeavoured to set an example rather than to give  
 advice.

J: Egypt, and Sudan.

Last Paper.

J 2103 (J 2008)

(Minutes.)

References.

*It would be appropriate to hope that  
 the message will have been made clear in  
 my presence however it is possible  
 Copy Major General to a...*

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*May Kirwan (W. G. M. S. S.)  
 May 14*

*✓ 7/5  
 The encouragement given to the  
 Shah is likely to be the best  
 result.*

*W. G. M. S. S.  
 6.5*

tion  
leted.)

(Index.)

*Per  
26  
7*

Next Paper.

J 2107 (52355)

ONLY FILE

[THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR SECRECY AND SHOULD BE RETAINED BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON].

[CYPHER]. WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

To: EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 1198.  
April 24th, 1942.


D. 9.10 p.m. April 24th, 1942.

YYYYYY

Your telegram No. 1135 [of April 22nd: relations between King Farouk and his Government] paragraph 3.

I fully share your view of Palace prevarication over Italians. Who are two additional Italians now passed by security authorities? (c.f: your telegram No. 811). Please see also last sentence of my telegram No. 1005.

[INDIV].



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

From: EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J 1918

APP. 1912

Sir M. Lampson  
No. 1155  
April 21st, 1942.

D. 12.40. p.m. 22nd April, 1942.  
R. 4.05. p.m. 22nd April, 1942.

b b b b b

Your telegram No. 1008. *11446*

I spoke to the Egyptian Ambassador accordingly to-day.

2. I understand that he has been giving most sound advice to King Farouk since his arrival. Prince Mohammed Ali told me this some days ago: the Ambassador himself confirmed it to-day. He has seen King Farouk twice: the first time officially, the second privately. On the first occasion the Ambassador having been warned to be circumspect by Hasanein was discreet about what he said. On the second occasion he threw discretion to the wind and according to his account spoke with brutal frankness warning His Majesty to disinterest himself completely in Ali Maher who was the cause of all his troubles and who had almost cost His Majesty his throne. King Farouk appears to have been receptive.

3. I impressed on the Ambassador the folly of King Farouk working (as I knew he was still trying to do) against a Prime Minister with huge majority of the country behind him. Furthermore I knew the Prime Minister wished to work amicably with his sovereign so how silly not to respond. I hoped next time he saw King Farouk he would impress that on him. The Ambassador said he fully agreed: Nahas Pasha was transparently honest and King Farouk should try to work harmoniously with him - otherwise he might lose his job. I mentioned the matter of the Palace Italians as an example of continued idiocy of the Palace. They had promised the Prime Minister weeks ago to get rid of all but five that our security had passed for the time being. Now they were once more prevaricating which in all probability meant a row with Nahas Pasha.

4. The Ambassador has promised to keep me informed of any further discussions he may have with King Farouk.

INDIV

28 APR 1942  
F.O. REGISTRY



Registry  
No.

19-10-14

18

9

Despatched

M.

Draft.

A.M. Ambassador  
Cairo

Telegram No. 1198

April 24<sup>th</sup>  
cypher K/INDIV

War Cabinet Dis<sup>n</sup>

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Your telegram no: 1135 [of April 22<sup>nd</sup>:  
relations between King Farouk and his  
Government] paragraph 3.

I fully share your view of  
Palace pervarication over Italians. Who  
are two additional ~~to~~ Italians now  
passed by security authorities? (cf:  
your telegram No 811). Please see also  
last sentence of my telegram No: 1005.


*[Signature]*

2.20 pm

regard them as nothing but an official cloak for his real function, which is that of liaison officer between the Prime Minister and this Embassy. Nahas Pasha has in fact told me as much.

6. I have sent a copy of this despatch to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have the honour to be,  
With the highest despatch,  
Sir,  
Your most obedient, humble Servant,



710/3/42

/MH

J

96

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
CAIRO.

No. 297  
(710/3/42)

5-1799

25th March, 1942.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a Royal Decree appointing Amin Osman Pasha Auditor General.

2. This post has long been contemplated by different Egyptian Governments and was considered a future plum for rather senior statesmen with financial qualifications. It carries with it the rank of Minister and a salary of £2,500 a year. It is proposed that the occupant should be immovable except by a vote of Parliament.

3. The office is being organised by Sami El Lakani Bey, formerly financial Secretary of the Railways, now Chief Assistant to the Auditor General. I understand that the staff of the Office is being gradually collected.

4. Financially Amin Osman Pasha does not make a good bargain by accepting this post, as he has had to give up Directorships which brought him in some £7,000 a year.

5. It remains to be seen whether his financial qualifications are adequate for the office and whether, in view of his heavy work as liaison officer between the Prime Minister and the Embassy, he will be able to carry out his duties as Auditor General satisfactorily. Personally

/I .....

The Right Honourable  
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,  
etc. etc. etc.

1942

J

J 1799

95

EGYPT and SUDAN

15 APR 1942

Registry Number } 1799/38/16

FROM Sir M. Lamson  
(Cairo)

No. 297  
(710/3/42)

Dated 26th Mar, 1942

Received in Registry } 15th Apr. 1942

J; Egypt and Sudan

Appointment of Amin Asman Pasha as Auditor General. ✓  
 Transmits copies of Royal Decree appointing Amin Asman Pasha Auditor General. The post had been regarded as reserved for senior statesman of financial qualification. It carries rank of Minister and salary of £2,500 a year and it is proposed occupant should be immovable except by Vote of Parliament. Office is being organised by Sami El Lakano Bey. Amin Asman has had to relinquish Directorships yielding some £,7000 a year. The position is regarded as a cloak for position of liaison officer between Prime Minister and Embassy and it is doubtful whether in view of his work here he will be able to carry out his new duties satisfactorily. Copied Department of Overseas Trade.

Last Paper.

J1784

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

J1816

(Minutes.)

There is surely some risk of Amin Asman coming into contact with Mahmud Elbid if his office goes here any real control over finance. Mahmud is already jealous of Amin Asman's influence with Nakh.

*I doubt whether it does. My impression is that this post need to exist, was once held by*

*I doubt it. This post used to exist, & was once offered to Sidky, who was, however, prevented by the King from accepting it.*

*and has been angry ever since! Personally I wish Amin Asman would cut down his liaison work.*

17.4

5. I think that the Prime Minister has shown great firmness in dealing with this matter and that although we have not managed to get Ali Maher out of Egypt which would have been the ideal solution from the point of view of absolute security, we have got the next best thing. And there may well be advantages in our being relieved of all responsibility for the custody of Ali Maher as well as for his arrest.

INDIV.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

J 1707  
APR 1942

Sir M. Lampson  
No. 1044  
10th April, 1942.

D. 12.15 a.m. 11th April, 1942.  
R. 3.10 a.m. 11th April, 1942.

Repeated to Khartoum Saving.

rrrrrr

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No. 1033. J 1690/38/16

The Prime Minister decided to send Ali Maher (whose health an independent doctor had reported to be none too good) to Gharbaniyat, a small and lonely place west of Burg El Arab on the fringe of the Western desert. Dakhla was ruled out because there was believed to be malaria there. Ali Maher left for Gharbaniyat under guard this afternoon. He will be interned there in a suitable house under chosen guards of the Frontier Force under the orders of the Minister of Defence. Only telephone connected will be to the guard's house and all Ali Maher's correspondence in and out will be examined otherwise he will be treated as befits his station.

2. The Prime Minister is satisfied that the arrangements made for Ali Maher's internment will prove satisfactory but he has asked that our military authorities be warned of his whereabouts in order that they may keep a watchful eye on things. This request is being passed on to them.

3. According to Amin Osman the Prime Minister concluded that internment of Ali Maher in Egypt, for which the Egyptian authorities would be wholly responsible, would be less likely to give rise to complications, which might prove embarrassing to us as well as to him, than internment in the Sudan. In this he may well be right, more especially in view of Ali Maher's state of health.

4. Amin Osman said that an official statement regarding the interment of Ali Maher would be issued to-morrow and he emphasised that the really important action in this matter had been the arrest and imprisonment of Ali Maher without regard to constitutional or other niceties. This should serve as a potent warning to other undesirables. The Prime Minister, he added, was contemplating sending Saleh Harb, now under surveillance at Assuan, to Gharbaniyat as well (this would create an impression that a special place of internment had been instituted for all undesirables) and His Excellency also intended to send for Sidki Pasha and warn him that he must behave himself and not hamper the Allied war effort.

5./

154

J

J 1707  
APR

EGYPT AND SUDAN

Registry Number J 1707/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir H. Lampson (Cairo)

No. 1044

Dated 10th Apr. 1942

Received in Registry 11th Apr. 1942

J: Egypt and Sudan

Departure of Ali Maher for Gharbaniyat.

Repeated Khartoum Saving. Refers to Cairo telegram 1033 (J 1690/38/16). Prime Minister has decided to send Ali Maher to Gharbaniyat where he will be placed under chosen guards and all his correspondence will be examined. British military authorities are being warned. It is considered that his internment in Egypt will avoid embarrassing complications especially in view of Ali Maher's health. An official statement is to be issued. Saleh Harb may also be sent to Gharbaniyat and Sidki Pasha is to be warned not to hamper war effort.

Last Paper.

J1690

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

One could suggest various drawbacks to a place on the edge of the western desert, but since we wish this to be Maher's own affair there seems no alternative to accepting his choice. Nevertheless I shall be surprised if he is completely isolated from enemy agents.

Now that the big fish is landed, we must not lose sight of the fry. After an interval, therefore, we should perhaps raise once more the cases of Abdul Wahab Jalant & Pulli.

*Stevenson*

12/4

Yes: and we are still waiting to hear how many Italians are got out of the Palace.

Reminder sent 17/4

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

6/11/42

17/4

Next Paper.

J 1749

13.4 4  
BU on 24/4

night. The arrangements for his departure by train to-morrow night would meanwhile stand. On getting the doctor's report to-morrow Nahas Pasha would consider the question afresh and decide whether he would send Ali Maher to Sudan or to a place of confinement in Egypt. I suggested that Dakhla Oasis which is healthy and remote might be a suitable place, provided that adequate arrangements for guarding him were made.

[Note by Communications Department: Correction to follow regarding omitted groups.]



J 1690  
10 APR 1942

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson D. 12.55 a.m. 10th April, 1942.  
No. 1033 R. 4.25 a.m. 10th April, 1942.  
9th April, 1942.

Repeated to Khartoum telegram No. 119.

kkkkk

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 1026. J 1672/38/16

This evening Amin Osman called on behalf of the Prime Minister who wanted my views on a new development.

2. Ali Maher's doctor who had been allowed to see him, reported that he had gone on hunger strike against being sent to Sudan and was in a weak condition.

3. There was some opposition in the Cabinet to Ali Maher's being sent to Sudan on the ground that it would be regarded as handing him over to us but Nahas Pasha was quite prepared to go ahead. However, there was the consideration that if Ali Maher were to proceed with threatened hunger strike in Sudan, he would be regarded as a martyr for whose death we were responsible. The Prime Minister therefore was wondering whether I thought it would be better to keep Ali Maher in close detention in some remote place in Egypt, in which case the Prime Minister was quite prepared to face consequences of hunger strike(s) as it would then be an Egyptian affair.

4. I told Amir Osman that my definite view remained that it was far better that Ali Maher should be sent out of the country, as that was the only sure way of putting an end to his intrigues and striking a serious blow at fifth columnism. In the light of these developments I did not feel, however, that I could properly exert pressure on the Prime Minister to adopt a solution against his own judgement.

5. Meanwhile it was quite possible that this was merely a try-on by Ali Maher. I therefore suggested that Nahas Pasha should send a doctor in whom he had confidence [6 groups omitted] gives the latter to understand that his hunger striking did not affect the arrangements for his departure for Sudan on Friday

night/

J1690/38/16 in dept 69

(This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.)

[Cypher.]

\* AMENDED COPY. \*

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.  
No. 1035.  
9th April, 1942.

D. 12.55 a.m., 10th April, 1942.  
R. 4.25 a.m., 10th April, 1942.

Repeated to Khartoum telegram No. 119.

.....

IMMEDIATE.

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5. Meanwhile it was quite possible that this was merely a try-on by Ali Maher. I therefore suggested that Nahas Pasha should send a doctor in whom he had confidence \*tonight, and tomorrow morning to examine Ali Maher and give\* the latter to understand that his hunger striking did not affect the arrangements for his departure for Sudan on Friday night. The arrangements for his departure by train tomorrow night would meanwhile stand. On getting the doctor's report tomorrow Nahas Pasha would consider the question afresh and decide whether he would send Ali Maher to Sudan or to a place of confinement in Egypt. I suggested that Dakhla Oasis which is healthy and remote might be a suitable place, provided that adequate arrangements for guarding him were made.

F.O. REGISTRY