

19. 3/16/16

31569

J1149 61 25

J 1149 / 333 / G
Sir M. Lampson
(baird)
no: 460
Mar. 9
Mar. 10

Political situation in Egypt v
Refers to Fo. tels. no: 836 (Jagel/333 / G) &
no: 834 (J1010 / 333 / G). Has seen Amir Samara
the request of Nahas Pasha, who is indisposed
& asked him to press on in clearing up the
palace & in taking drastic action against
Ali Maher. Requests further instructions
about elimination of Pulli & Abdul Wahab
Jalaat from the palace. Nahas Pasha has been
instructed to return at once.
(Minister.)

Last Paper.
J1135

Pp. in D.P.
I do not think we need drive Nahas Sir M. Lampson
into a row with Nahas yet about Pulli & Wahab (whom
each new report dyes even blacker) but we must maintain
pressure, I submit, about Ali Maher.
I attach a draft reply.

References.

(Print.)

Verisener
12/3.

(How disposed of.)
Tel. Camps No 871
March 13

DeBargent Rich 2

Ab.
March 3. 1916.

(Action completed.)
Ah. 1/42
- 20/3/16

(Index.)
A

Next Paper.
J. 1153/0

N.P. 4.
and his gang. In the meantime Nashat has
been recalled for consultation and has asked
the Department to ^{secure an} arrange his passage to
Cairo and back. *Arrangements are being made.*

AB.

March 10/42.

AB March 10

MARGIN.

J.1070/333/G.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 858.

D. 3.20 p.m. 11th March, 1942.

11th March, 1942.

& & &

IMPORTANT.

SECRET.

My telegram No. 819 [of March 5th] crossed your telegram No. 720 [of March 5th] paragraph 6 of which, together with your telegram No. 719, suggests that Nahas may now have made up his mind irrevocably to replace Nashat.

2. I am not of course aware of the complete evidence at Nahas' disposal, but on general grounds I confess I should regard a change. Nashat's intrigues, as I stated in my telegram above mentioned, will cut no ice here; and we could easily find ourselves forced to accept someone far less satisfactory (though candidates mentioned in your telegram No. 719 would be acceptable). For instance, I am in a position to know that Nashat is actively loyal to the allied cause and is untinged by defeatism.

3. I realise that it would be useless, and indeed inopportune, to attempt to induce Nahas to retain a representative in whom he had definitely lost confidence; but I should like to be sure that he has weighed the matter really carefully, and that his decision is not the result of a fit of pique. Apart from everything else, it would be an absurd situation if Nahas'

and not of Pulli and his gang.

4. In the meantime Nashat has been recalled for consultation and has asked the Department to secure air passage to Cairo and back. Arrangements are being made.

[INDIV]

Registry
No.
J 1070/333/G

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

P.S.

Despatched 3.20 p.m.

Draft.

Important.

11 March, 1942.

Sir M. Lampson,
CAIRO.

SECRET.

Telegram.

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No. 858 ✓
March 11th
Cypher. *K/INDIV*

2. I am not of course aware of the complete evidence at Nahas' disposal, but on general grounds I confess I should regret a change. Nashat's intrigues, as I stated in my telegram above mentioned, will cut no ice here; and we could easily find ourselves forced to accept someone far less satisfactory (though candidates mentioned in your telegram No. 719 ^{would be} ~~are all~~ acceptable). For instance, I am in a position to know that Nashat is actively loyal to the allied cause and is untinged by defeatism.

Departmental
Secret.

Dedip.

3. I realise that it would be useless, and indeed inopportune, to attempt to induce Nahas to retain a Representative in whom he had definitely lost confidence; but I should like to be sure that he has weighed the matter really carefully, and that his decision is not the result of a fit of pique. Apart from everything else, it would be an absurd situation if Nahas' audience ^{with King F} ~~were~~ to result in the departure of Nashat and not of Pulli

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

2.3.42

7

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

J1070/333/G

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

TO EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 837

7th March, 1942

D. 3.00 p.m. 7th March, 1942

a.a.a.a.a.a

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No. 836 was drafted before the receipt of your telegram No. 720, from which I am glad to note that Nahas has now acted, and apparently with decision. It may, however, be useful to you as an indication of the misgivings which his earlier attitude was beginning to cause us. You will of course continue to press for results.

(INDIV)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. J1070/333/4.

3 for 7342 March 7th 1942

Draft. Sir M. Hampson
Cairo.

Important

Tel No. 837

cypher
March 7

Wanlabmit Dioⁿ

INDIV/K

My telegram No. 836 was

expressed drafted before the receipt of your telegram No. 720, from which I am glad to note that Nahas has now acted, and apparently with decision. It may, however, be useful to you as an indication of the misgivings which his earlier attitude ^{was} beginning to cause us. ~~I hope that~~ You will

^{no doubt} of course continue to press for results.

Al.
March 7/42.

Jf

7 3072

this King Farouk became furious. Whereon Nahas Pasha stated that he would not work with Ali Maher "out and about", that King Farouk was showing no change of heart: and also His Majesty must recognise there was a war on and that we were his allies - that as long as he was Prime Minister he was determined to see that Egypt was a safe place for every Englishman and specially for British troops. This drew from King Farouk the jibe that the English would not always stand by Nahas Pasha; they had not helped him in 1937 and they had not helped Hussein Sirri: and he referred to us as "Perfid Albion". Nahas Pasha answered that he did not care whether the English helped him or not. He had fully pledged himself and would stick to it. His task was very simple - to champion democracy and the help of democracy. His motto was the treaty in spirit and in word. To him the spirit was everything, the word unimportant; and if anyone knew what that meant it was he, Nahas Pasha.

6. He then told King Farouk that he heard there were mischievous rumours (referring to stories being put out by the Palace) of a cleavage in British ranks about recent events. Nahas Pasha would stick to Sir M. Lamson and trusted that King Farouk would too. If he, Nahas Pasha, heard anything of the sort "he would be very severe". And if anyone British or Egyptian wished to approach King Farouk it must be through him, Nahas Pasha. Which, he continued to King Farouk, reminded him that he did not trust Nashat and must insist on his immediate recall. He had no one in view and no one in mind to replace him. But he must recall him: it was a question of trust.

7. Nahas Pasha then spoke of Saleh Harb (President of Y.M. Association) whom he was going to treat as he did Ali Maher. King Farouk tried to drag in the question of Moslem Royalists. Nahas Pasha replied that Saleh Harb did not represent Moslem feeling which he, Nahas Pasha, was far better qualified to judge.

8. Finally King Farouk told Nahas Pasha to do what he liked about all of the above. He had undertaken the task and there was nothing more to be said upon which Nahas Pasha observed that he was King Farouk's best friend in that he was out to work for the interests of Egypt which should be those of his King. His Majesty snapped back "I do not want any lessons" and Nahas Pasha thereupon recapitulated his various points specifically one by one and took his leave.

9. The above is Nahas Pasha's own account pretty well in his own words. He expresses relief at having got it off his chest and is pleased with himself at having done so, so frankly.

10. He hopes to disband "the special constabulary" (a farcical body organised under Ali Maher as a Palace instrument) next Monday: and will deal with Ali Maher and Saleh Harb this Saturday.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

J1070

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 720.
5th March, 1942.

D. 5.23 a.m. 6th March, 1942.
R. 4.10 a.m. 6th March, 1942.

:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:--:-:

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No. 719. - *not received*

Nahas Pasha had an hour's audience with King Farouk this morning.

Handwritten notes:
...
...
...
...

2. He began by informing His Majesty (hoping it would please him) that he had arranged with me decently to bury the case of Aziz el Masri. King Farouk did not however rise and dubbed it pure propaganda. After this unpromising opening Nahas Pasha next raised the matter of the Palace Italians who he noted still remained. King Farouk said they would go but wished to retain three in addition to Pulli. (At Nahas Pasha's request I am going into this with our security: two of them are barbers, the third a kennel boy).

Swiss

4. Nahas Pasha next alluded to Pozzi and informed His Majesty of the preposterous situation now reached - King Farouk was astonished that neither Nahas Pasha nor we wished to remain friendly with France. Nahas Pasha retorted that Vichy was not France. He had now told Pozzi he would allow only the [Swedish] Chargé d'Affaires to visit him and that he had behaved very badly. He was to keep Pozzi out of harm's way.

5. Nahas Pasha then turned to what he described to King Farouk as his most serious subject - Ali Maher. King Farouk became furious and asked why? Nahas Pasha replied that he had disliked Ali Maher since 1937. The man had done grave harm to Egypt and to King Farouk. It was due to him that the events of 4th February had occurred. He had at one moment contemplated sending him to the Sudan but had decided better not. So would now order him to stay at his country house, see nobody and not go out without permission. It was only "informing" King Farouk of this since His Majesty had no status in the matter. His Majesty [sic: ? Ali Maher] had been using King Farouk's name either with or without permission. At

this/

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

~~Receipt~~

The draft reached me again today.

In the meantime we have received Cairo telegram No. 719 (copy attached D) which was sent off after No 720 which it should have preceded. This telegram alters the situation to the extent (1) that it looks more as if Nahas had really made up his mind to replace Nashat (2) that Nahas has probably by now dealt with Ali Maher, Harb + Co (but not Pulli). I have accordingly modified the draft in some respects, and have added the Secretary of States point.

Meanwhile Nashat has been recalled for consultation. He sent a Secretary yesterday (he was in the country himself) to announce this & ask for travelling facilities both ways. This is being arranged.

Warriner
10/3.

A. H. Hunt 10.

Ob. March 10. 1942.

This bl. can go off
Meanwhile, is there
anything we can do - or
ought we to do it - to keep
Nahas? I imagine we
cd: go a good deal further
& far & good deal worse.
But I suppose it's no use
keeping an Amb: here
in whom Nahas has no
confidence.

Ob.

March 7/42.

Further minute with

5.7.42.

Please see Sir Adolphus note attached. I should
certainly like to save Nashat if possible, and
attach a draft telegram for consideration. If,
as I fear may be the case, Nashat has definitely
made up his mind, the thing is hopeless. But
he is a temperamental creature, and he may
have got worked up by his hosts with Favont.
& started breathing fire against all & sundry,
Nashat included. In that event, Sir M.
Lampson could perfectly well enjoy caution. But
I am afraid that Sir M. Lampson himself is
so bristling with suspicion of Nashat that
he may not fancy the role of Nashat's
champion. I attach the more recent telegrams
about Nashat. ^{The role of Nashat's}
Veronica.

See att. rec. behind his
jacket, which I shd. like
to send.

Alb.

March 8. 1842.

I can think of Egyptians
who would be as good as Nashat
of Bap's Affi or Hussein Durr,
but it would be a ludicrous
anti-climax if the only result of
Nahas' fury were an infatuation
of Nashat. It is the Palace
game that I want to see broken
up and I shall not be content
until they are.

Dept may think this
point ~~was~~ worth adding to draft?

Alb March 18

Alb 9/3

15.

35/6

31569

11070

2

21

11070 / 333 / G
 Sir M. Lampson
 (bairo)
 no: 720
 Mar. 5
 Mar. 7

Political situation in Egypt
 refers to his tel. no: 719.
 Gives account of hahas pasha's audience with King Farouk. hahas pasha raised questions of Aziz el Masri, the Palace Stahais, Poggi, Ali Maher, rumors of a cleavage in British rank about recent events & Saleh Harb. King Farouk finally told hahas pasha to do what he liked in regard to all the above.

Last Paper.

T992

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel. bairo no: 637
 Mar. 7
 Tel. bairo no: 858
 Mar. 11

31569

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Handwritten initials

A

Next Paper.

Handwritten notes

(Minutes) 207 / 10 / 1942
 This is better. by the middle of next week we shall be able to judge how much better. In any event this conversation affords Sir McLampson every opportunity of re-venting to these various subjects. I note that Abdul Wahab Talaat has not yet (apparently) been mentioned.

The question of Nachat throws an interesting light on hahas' temperament. Not long ago he was quite ready to have him unless we wanted him changed. He now wants him thrown out at once, before he has made up his mind who to put in his place. We have warned Sir McLampson that Nachat may be the victim of intrigues from an Egyptian here; but it looks as if the matter had gone too far to stop. But I doubt whether, in any case, Nachat would have survived for very long.

I do not think that, on account of this telegram, we need hold up the telegram to Sir McLampson submitted yesterday. But we might send him the attached as well.

V. Perisener
 7/3.

Yes.

Ab.

March 7, 1942.

(Tel. has been sent) →

2.

was the most important of the Italians in the Palace.

11. I mentioned the existence of a wireless transmitter and the necessity of dealing with the question. Amin took note.

[INDIV.]

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

J1087
8-10-42
J

Sir M. Lampson,
No. 719
5th March 1942

D. 1.25 p.m. 6th March 1942
R. 7.02 p.m. 6th March 1942

Amin Osman Pasha informed me on March 4th as follows.

2. Nahas Pasha proposed that Ali Maher be confined to his country house near Alexandria, preferably with his own consent, but if not by force. He would be allowed no visitors or telephones.

3. Saleh Harb was to be relegated to Assuan. Has]grp. undec. ?eim]Al Banna and Al Sukkari were to be interned.

4. Nahas Pasha wished to deal with special constabulary as he thought they were a dangerous force under Taher. I suggested that it would be best, subject to the views of the Ministry of the interior, to dissolve the body which was of no serious use and might be dangerous.

5. Nahas Pasha wished to establish an unofficial Anglo-Egyptian Committee of propaganda so that Egyptian and British propaganda may work on the same lines. I said that we had wanted this for a long time. I am following up the matter at once.

6. Amin said that it was desirable that popular satisfaction with the British should be emphasised by some sort of popular demonstration apparently spontaneous. I am considering the idea.

7. Certain number of officials were being dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior.

8. Nahas Pasha wished to replace Nashat by another Ambassador in London and wanted to know whether we had any ideas on the subject. I said I would think over possible successors and suggested Hafez Afifi, Ali Shamsi and Hussein Sirry. Amin doubted whether the first two would accept. Sirry's Palace connexion might make him unacceptable to Nahas Pasha.

9. Amin stated that it was proposed to re-establish post of Military Under-Secretary for Defence and to appoint Lewa Hassan Abd Wahab, at present Director-General of Coastguards, in order to counteract Palace influence as represented by Attallah, Chief of the Staff. I welcomed the idea.

10. Amin understood that the King had agreed to get rid of Italians from the Palace but not Pulli. Nahas Pasha did not propose to press immediately for removal of Abdul Wahab Tallaat as he did not believe he would be dangerous once Ali Maher had been dealt with. I demurred to this and also pointed out that Pulli

was/

Please see the Secretary of State's query
within.

We have now telegraphed to Sir M.
Lampson about this transmitter. Please see
(1) telegram no: 869 to Cairo (2) note by
S.I.S. of March 12th (3) Secret report no 49
of March 12th, which seems to confirm our
suspicions and (4) Secret report of August 1941:
all at Jack.

Penicener.
12/14.3

D. G. B. Argent
June 15

H. B. Argent
June 16

D. G. B.
June 17/3

18.3.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

a transmitter at the Palace it is thoroughly alarming.
P.I.D have just drawn our attention to the fact that
a very accurate ~~report~~ account of the recent
crisis (omitting only the abdication demand) was
broadcast from Rome on about February 12th.
It was supposed that the message had got past the
censorship to Lisbon: my own suspicion was that it
had somehow been got out from the Palace; & if
there are transmitters there anything might get
out.

Thornycroft
s/p.

But none.
Cables & Airways Section.

I think we had better consult Cairo by
telegram in regard to Bowman's report.

Dy Sargent
Kuchel.

Alb.

March 11. 1942.

R. March 12

I heard his
rumor
was I was
in Egypt.
Should we
ask?

R

17.

31569
EGYPTIAN

J1087

12

2.

J1087/333/6.
38/16

Political Situation in Egypt

Sir H. Lampson
Cairo
719.

Dated March 31st
Recd March 7th.

Reports information given him by Amir Osman Pasha on action being taken by Nubar Pasha against undesirable in Egypt.

المراسلة رقم 31569 بتاريخ 31 مارس 1938
من السيد هـ. لامبسون الى السيد ...

Last Paper.

J1079

(Minutes)

231 - 5. Satisfactory.

References.

26. I do not like the idea of a popular pro-British demonstration "apparently spontaneous". In the first place I doubt whether anyone would believe in the spontaneity of the manifestation, and in the second place one sort of demonstration is apt to lead to another. I believe that in Egypt all the noisier forms of self-expression should be discouraged rather than the reverse. (But there is considerable humour in the

(Print.)

(How disposed of?)

idea of a pro-British demonstration staged by the Wafd of all people) These considerations will, however, be present in the minds of those on the spot.
27. There will probably be some victimisation, but to some extent no doubt a clean-up was necessary.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Ah.
29/3/38.

A
Consid 720

28. The question of Mashat again came up, & is being further considered, on another telegram. (Submitted yesterday) The question of the Palace clique has at

29. The question of the Palace clique has at last been brushed with King Farouk, but we shall have to keep the pressure up.

Next Paper.


J. 1135/2

30. I do not know to what this refers, but if it is a

of allotting seats to the other parties, but met with a blank refusal on his part, for the reasons already reported to you. To my mind there is unfortunately considerable force in them.

7. Dr. Heikal Pasha asked that he might be acquainted with my views on his suggestion, but in view of Nahas Pasha's attitude, it seems to me inexpedient to return to the charge with Dr. Heikal for the present, though in actual fact I am still pursuing the matter through Amin Pasha Osman. If the British press publish articles in the sense suggested in my telegram No.560 of February 11th, it will at least be clear to Dr. Heikal and the Saadists that we are sympathetic to the idea of their association in the machinery of Government.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble Servant,



MLB

BRITISH EMBASSY

CAIRO

No. 159
(1/55/42)

14th February 1942.

J. 1013

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 135 enclosing a copy of a protest addressed to me by Ahmed Maher Pasha as President of the Chamber of Deputies regarding our action on February 4th, I have the honour to transmit a protest on the same subject addressed to me by Abdel Aziz Fahmy Pasha, President of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party. This protest was handed to the Oriental Secretary by Dessouki Abaza Bey, Secretary of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party.

2. As I have not acknowledged Ahmed Maher Pasha's protest, I do not propose to acknowledge that of Abdel Aziz Fahmy Pasha.

3. On my instructions the Oriental Secretary called on Dr. Heikal Pasha, Vice President of the Liberal Party, who practically runs the party in the absence of the President, now a permanent invalid. In accordance with my instructions Mr. Smart spoke to Dr. Heikal in the same sense as he had spoken to Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha, see my telegram No. 535. Dr. Heikal, who was very friendly, did not seem to wish to discuss the past, but dwelt on the present and the future, which in his opinion, were presenting themselves in a sinister light. He said that the Wafd had refused every form of National Government during the discussions over our ultimatum. Now that they had come back to power they were violently attacking the other parties and had appointed a Wafdist Committee to rearrange the electoral districts in such a way as to exclude their opponents. (In this they follow good precedent - it was precisely what Mohammed Pasha Mshmoud did when he assumed office after the ejection of the Wafd in December 1937). All our friends, the Pasha said, were much upset, including Ahmed, Maher Pasha.

4. The Pasha then went on to refer to the difficulty of elections. The état de siège and the censorship would have to be raised. It would be impossible for the anti-Wafd parties to avoid fighting the Wafd on the issue that the Wafd had been brought into power by British bayonets. Was it, he asked, in our interests that such a struggle should develop? Speaking as a friend he thought it was to our interest that we should persuade the Wafd to associate the other parties with itself, inside or outside the Government, and thus avoid a nation-wide struggle on the foreign issue.

5. Mr. Smart said that he could only communicate his views to me, but added that it was not clear how we could induce the Wafd to do what he suggested.

6. As reported in my telegram No. 557 of 10th February, I took the first opportunity to urge on Nahas the advisability

/of ...

The Right Honourable
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.,
etc. etc. etc.