121 1015 1942 5٩ 31568 12:0242 3 10 1 S & P Protest from Abdel Aziz Fahmy Pasha, Registry Number 3 1013/38/16 Refers to Cairo despatch 135 (J 835/38/16). Transmits copy of letter from Abdel Aziz Fahmy Pasha President of Liberal Constitutional Party protesting against the FROM Sir M. Lampson, action of H.M. Government during the recent crisis. The Cairo. letter will not be acknowledged. Dr. Heikal Pasha Vice President of the Party expressed his anxiety over No. 159(1/55/42) the situation as Wafd had refused every form of Daled 14th Feb., 1942. National Government and were re-arranging electoral Brd March, districts to exclude opponents. The Pasha asked whether Received a struggle over elections was in British interests. Nahas has refused to allocate scats to opposition but matter is being persued through Amin Pasha Osman. Suggest comments to be made in British press on lines of Cairo telegram 560. in Registry f 1942. J: Egypt and Sudan. 2 new pp huswitch Copy Major Kirwan Ms. 2(a) W.O. Last Paper. J1012 The position now is That the opposition parties References. have residents boycott The elections - but that the J686/38/16 Waft are " karing a few seats" for a section 417/38/16 405/38/16 of the fiberals, + for the other parties, since apparently a certain number of opposition deputies (Print.) have decided to stand as adividuals. All this mates it extremely Isficult to promote any (How disposed of,) 8) maj Kirwan (10 6) MR20 place-making, but no soubt for Mfampson march 9 will take such opportunities as there may be of smoothing Things over. The suffection achim with the prens (27) was made impossible by the presence of more important events. Terrienes Oggangar Juch 5 (Action (Index.) completed.) 8913 al-March 6.542. Next Paper. 20324 11/39 F.O.F. J1033

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

DEPARTLENTAL (SECRET).

4.20 p.m. 7th March, 1942.

103

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

D.

<u>No. 836</u> 7th March, 1942.

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kkkkk

Your telegram No. 696.

I am inclined to share view expressed by Sirry in paragraph 2 that action against Ali Maher and the Palace should be carried through before the elections. Time is against us; and the effects of our action on February 4th are wearing off. Moreover I find it difficult to understand Nahas' insistence on first "establishing" a position the strength of which, even when he and his followers were out of office, was generally admitted. On the contrary, would not action against Ali Maher and his oreatures consolidate that position in the one quarter where such strengthening is required ? (See for example recent secret reports of intrigues against Nahas).

2. Apart from these considerations, is there not some risk that the sweeping electoral triumph now imminent will go to Nahas' head and render him, for a time at any rate, considerably more intractable than at present?

3. I welcome action reported in paragraph 4 of your telegram and hope in view of the foregoing that it will evoke an early response.

INDIV.

electoral triumph now imminent will go to Nahas' head and render him, for a time at any rate, considerably more intractable than at present?

3. I welcome action reported in paragraph 4 of your telegram and hope in view of the foregoing that it will evoke an early response.

se. Ale. March 8742

THIS MARGIN

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WRITTEN

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Not Jage 333 (G P.S.S. Draft. Sir M. Lampson. CAIRO MARGIN. Telegram. 836 THIS No.55 IND Z WRITTEN Dept- Sen Ш ٤ NOTHING sacraf reports es afamist Na

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.. Despalohed March, 1942. Your telegram No. 696 I am inclined to think view expressed by Sirry in paragraph 2-1s right, and that action against Ali Maher and the Palace should be carried through before the elections. Time is against us; and the effects of our action on February 4th are wearing off. Moreover I find it difficult to understand Nahas' insistence on first "establishing" a position the strength of which, even when he and his followers were out of office, was generally admitted. On the contrary, would not action against Ali Maher and his creatures consolidate that position in the one quarter where such strengthening is required, b? (see for trample 2. Apart from these considerations, is there not some risk that the sweeping electoral/

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

DEPARTAENTAL (SECRET)

101

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

<u>No. 819</u> March 5th, 1942.

, 1942. D. 2.10. p.m. 5th March, 1942.

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SECRET

Your telegram No.696, paragraph 5 [alleged intrigues of Nachat Pasha].

We learn from secret sources that on February 14th Zehia (see Mr. Norton's letter of March 8th 1940 and your telegram No. 164 of 1940 etc.,) telegraphed to Nahas that he had received "correspondence from important people proving Representative now using his status to influence decisions in high quarters against Wafd". It seems possible that when speaking to you Nahas had this telegram in mind.

2. I am aware of Nachat's capacity for intrigues, and you may be assured I know how to rate him; but it would be unfortunate if Nahas were to be influenced in his relations with Nachat by obviously spiteful reports such as the foregoing. I think therefore that you night take an opportunity of warning Nahas again about Zehia. You might say quite generally that you have been informed by this Department that there has been some **racrudescence** of Zehia's political activities, and that his standing in this country is certainly no greater than it was before

INDIV

2-1 to not interrate Nachats' usto please capacity for intrigue; and Ishall wat careful for any signs of it is but it 1 perso wonte be imfortimate if Nahas were anything the) to be influences in his relations with Nachat by obviously spiteful reports you may be assure y kano have to sate him show such as the foregoing. I think therefore that you might take an opportunity of warning Nahas again Ξ about Lehia. You might say fite generally that you have been informed by this Dept that there has been Some reourdescence of Lehra's political activities, + that his infortance + mil standing in this country is certainly no queater that it was AG. March 3/42. Silore.

luo Registry No: Jag 2 333 G 5/3/42 10 fm M. Despatched Draft. Si M Lampson ans Secret. Jowe telepan No 696, paragrafte 5 Telegram. No 81.9. MARGIN [alleper intrigues of Nachat Pasha] We learn Flore signation Excernad. from senet NARCH S.IC SHL sources that on February 14? YEhia Dept Sench Ζ (see Mr. Nortons letter of Harch 8th WRITTEN and your telegram No: 1940 164 of 1940 etc.) telegraphis to Nahas find Ë Moxle " correspondence JAJA had received ۴ that he 3/3 from important prople proving. DNIHLON using his status Representative now to influence recisions in high quartors in french ket afarist Wafd." It seems possible that the speaking to you Nahas 11.35 AM had this telegram in mind. 2

I was unable to press my point further for the moment: but will continue to do so.

5. Nahas Pasha added that he thought you should know secretly he suspected Nachat of making mischief especially against myself, in London. He would not be surprised if the Palace had been telegraphing direct to Nachat over his head. He proposed to put a stop to that and begged meantime you would pay no attention to anything that did not reach you - or any members of His Majesty's Government - save through himself as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He hinted that Nachat was very probably intriguing with important personalities in London but gave no names. Actually the same report has just reached me independently from my secret sources inside the Palace.

[INDIV.]

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

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[CYPHER] <u>DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)</u> <u>FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE</u> J992 Sir M. Lampson D. 10.32 p.m. 28th February, 1942 No.696 ZEth February, 1942 R. 5.15 a.m. 1st March, 1942

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SECRET.


J893 38/16

Hussein Sirry Pasha called this morning at his request. It is first time we have met since he resigned. He was as friendly as ever.

2. He spoke very freely. What we had done on February 4th was good: but it must not be left there. He then put this straight question "Do you want King Farouk to remain?" I replied "Naturally, if he will henceforth play loyally by us but that is an essential condition". Sirry Pasha said that in that case we must forthwith eliminate Ali Maher who [grp. undec. ? continues] his mischievous role. Other trouble makers were Maraghi, Saleh! Harb and Mahmoud Khalil.

3. I told him I believed Nahas Pasha intended to deal with Ali Maher but that I got the impression that he was waiting till his position in the country was consolidated by the election in March. Sirry replied that that was waiting too long: as long as Ali Maher was about (and he knew as a fact that he was still in communication with the Palace) we should continue to have "incidents" and our relations with King Faronk would never get right. In reply to my question he suggested that Ali Maher should be banished to his estate and cordonned off there. If Nahas Pasha would send him abroad so much the better: but if Ali Maher refused to go there was no legal way of compelling him to go. I said that I cherished the hope that Nahas Pasha might eventually ask him. Sirry, to accept the post of the King's Chef de Cabinet. Sirry replied that in no case would he accept until Ali Maher was disposed of.

4. An hour later I [? grp. onitted] Nahas Pasha at the Palace luncheon and was able to speak to him on the lines of your telegran No.791 just in. I had in fact sent him a message only last night renewing my pressure for the irmediate removal of Ali Maher. Nahas Pasha said to-day he was in complete agreement as to its necessity, but it was a question of timing. He wished to establish his position more firmly first. I told him I had heard twice from you in the past few days urging speed; and then added what I had heard from Sirry about Ali Maher this morning, of course not betraying the source. Nahas Pasha still pleaded for time - perhaps he could arrange for it after "two more audiences with King Furouk". As we were talking in near proximity to the King,



(I durit know yearty when) to done is eather that. If we are of he giving that the "chan . up " the. not wait in the Slickin (and I am include to think this is right) it is not dro carly to her in the famps This this is one niter, to that The he can be propand and in the look and for a farmable opportunity . G. March 3.1542. April BE hack 3 The elections for the Chamber of Deputies the Smale with be how on March 24th + 26" respectively. By that time, apost from mything the, Nahas will have been a power for some I Submit a draft. (Hease dee respecteto altachos) / weeks Viene AJ 1/2/un

.9 Jaga 14 31568 Political situation in Egypt Jaga 1333 /G gives account of intersness with Aussein Sir Mr. Lampson very lasha, who emphasized that if we wished Faront to remain we must forthwith. (barrio) eliminate ali maher, who is continuing his Ao: 696 mischeisons pole. Has spoken on these lines to habas Kasha, who is still pleading for Feb. 28 time, however (Minutes.) Last Paper. I am dealing separately with paragraphs 1875 5 of this belief am. For the rest, my own view is that we night to References. J893 38 16. try to get the Salace cleaned out Defore the J17/2/42/red Elections. Mahao fontion does not really repuise consolization for this profese ... nor in order to (Print.) get Ali Maher "consonnes off." He should (How disposed of.) conserver the position afain, I suffert next neek -Let bairs ho. 819 unles Napas has for started moving in The Char.s del. baing ho: 83 1 Mar. M Werniener. interim. 2/3 /aque : time is against us to force of the events of Tet 4" and is (Index.) (Action completed.) ahear begining to wan of . " On my hand q" The election are some time this much. (3/3/42 Next Paper. JIOYO WL 24772/717 18014

J. 813/38/16.

[CYPHER].

[THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR SECRECY AND SHOULD BE RETAINED BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

To: EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 752. February 22nd, 1942. D. 2.25 a.m. February 23rd, 1942.

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Your telegram No. 611 [of February 18th: Nahas Pasha's policy].

I agree that at this stage Nahas must be left free to tackle King Farouk as he thinks best; but it is desirable to ensure that Pulli and Abdul Wahab go sooner rather than later. I welcome proposed action against Ali Maher and Ikhwan.

2. I also agree as regards channel of communication and as regards Nachat.

[INDIV].

Veg/ 226an 23 41 Registry No. J 81 3/ 38/6. Draft. Sin Mampson Jown telegram No: 6" [of February anip MARGIN 18th : Matha Nahas Fashe's policy] Jel: No 152 I agree that at this stafe Nahas 1 HIG Jeb.n must be left free to tackle Knig cyphon . Ē Faronk as he thinks best; but it is desirable to ensure that with se necessary to ensure that will and About Wahab to Sooner the an INDIV K WRITTEN Warlabriet Dis " Tater. I welcome proposed action u Ø afarrist Ali Staher and Jkhwan ₽ ₽ 2. I also agree as refaits channel of communication, of as refaits Nachat: NOTHING al. J.b. 21/42 HS Leb 22 4.30 pm

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

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[Cypher] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM: <u>FGYPT.</u>

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson. <u>Mo.611.</u> 17th February, 1942. D. 12.25 p.m. 18th February, 1942. R. 4.25 p.m. 18th February, 1942.

VERY CONFIDENTIAL.

C C C C

Nahas Pasha is now contemplating getting down to work. General lines he has in mind are as follows.

2. He will start by pressing King Farcuk to get rid of all Italians from the Palace save Pulli, whose special functions as royal pimp he judges it best <u>for the moment</u> to allow to continue.

3. He will tell Ali Maher to go to his country estate where he will only receive visitors by permission and they will be searched as they go in and out. The telephone to be tapped. I have suggested that much the best solution would be to appoint Ali Laher Minister to Brazil or some distant post.

4. Same retirement to the country for Saleh Harb though destination still to be considered; Assuan might prove dangerous.

5. Ikhwan el Muslimin. Nahas Pasha askes to be supplied with the names of those we regard as most dangerous. These he will either shut up or buy over. I have reminded him of danger of these men and of Sirry Pasha's lapse from virtue in letting them out (see my telegram No.92) and that prima facie I should regard re-internment as best method. On this I am consulting our military igroup undec.] authorities.

6. Abbas Halim will be seriously warned to behave himself or worse will follow.

7. Nahas Pasha prefers to leave Abdul Wahab Talaat at the Palace for the time being so as to avoid appearance of dictation from us, but intends to have him out later.

8. His general plan of campaign is to get the Ali Maher elements out of key positions.

9. Nachat Pasha. Nahas Pasha disapproves of two channels of communications with you and intends to revert to his old system of dealing through me alone. He asks that you may be apprised of this and hopes that you will adopt the same system. I was questioned whether we would prefer to have Machat(restored?) I replied in the negative. T could not say I trusted Machat myself but I knew he got on well in London and that you were well aware that he was an intriguer.

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INDIV

ጚ፞፞፞፝ 42 ¢γ 31568 22.7 Policy of Nahas Pasha. Registry Number } J 813/38/16. Gives detailed account of the action proposed by Nahas Pasha. Pulla and Abdul Wahab Falaat will be left for present. It has been suggested that TELEGRAM FROM Ali Maher be appointed minister to Brazil, and Sir Miles Lampson Saleh Harb be retired to the country. Mahas wishes <u>(Cairo)</u> No. to know names of those regarded as dangerous 611. by His Majesty's Government. Abbas Halim has Dated 17th Feb. 1942. been warned and Nachat Pasha is regarded with suspicion and in reply to a question His Majesty's Ambassador stated that it was not desired to in Registry 🖇 20th Feb. restore Nachat although he got on well in London 1942. and was known as an intriguer. الما معاد العند بالله معالية عن معاد ، العام من عاد الما باع المله مناميا معاد عن معاد ، العام من عاد الما باع المله من الما معاد عن معاد . J : Egypt and Sudan. (Cop sent to Ma (Minutes.) (Ma for Kirnsan. M. 1. 2(43.) Last Paper. I very much hope that this comparatively cautions J804 approach will develop into something rather more drastic. References. (Nahas' agreement about Pulli is an example of the topsytumysom of Egriptian Afairs in feneral). However, if Ali Mahas the Jkhwan (who are tallaly reported to have been riscussing the old munder tacked are shackled (Print.) firmly it will be all to the food. I submit that it would be a fity to replace Nachet Intrigues he may be; but he is so far as we know, entirely loyal, and he is intelligent (very) and Will Million disposed res) comps. & Maj Kerwan (M. 9 2a) Feb 20th Jel. bairo 752 Jel 2019 apseable to deal with. For the seat, I submit That WE can appee to the first fampoon bring used as The Jok channel. Indeed, to far as Iknow, Madat has been very little user (except by King Farank) as - Perivene Such. Lattach Sft. (Action (Index.) 260-04 completed.) ુન્દ્ર છે. 15 Nashard is Som line Next Paper. al. 16.21.1/42. J.815 19088 4/39 F.O.F.

Registry J 705/38/16 66 VUI FILE Draft. Annesiate Sir Itfampson , Jowstehepan No 560 [of February 11th : suffects pero comment on Exoption internal actuation]. MARGIN. airo . Jeln 676 THIS f 12d Z Action is bring taken WRITTEN Holitical Dishi buku accordisty Ш 0 67 1 J.705/38/16. [CODE R]. POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION: : ; FILE EGYPT. <u>T0</u> FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CATRO <u>No.676.</u> February 12th 1942. D. 6.35 p.m. February 12th 1942. 6 HEJEDIATE. Your telegram No.560 [of February 11th: press comment on Egyptian internal situation]. suggested Action is being taken accordingly.

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM: EGYPT.

R.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN CFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson. No. 560.

D. 4.30 p.m., 11th February, 1942.

15

11th February, 1942.

10.50 p.m., 11th February, 1942.

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INSTEDIATE.

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(IIDIV)

I am doing all I can to prevent Saadists and Liberals, who are much disgruntled at return to power of the Wafd alone as the result of our intervention, from going out altogether against us.


2. It would be nost helpful if The Times and other leading newspapers, and also the British Broadcasting Corporation would, when commenting favourably on the return of the Mard, include sympathetic references to the loyalty of the Saadists and Liberals to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance in Parliament and in the late Cabinet. Special mention should be made of Ahmed Haher in his capacities of leader of the Saadist Party and President of the late Chamber of Deputies (and also signatory of the Treaty) than whom no-one in Egypt has been more whole-hearted in the cause of Allied victory. Hention might also be made of inster of Education in the late Cabinet, and of Hokrashi Pasha as right-hand man of Ahmed Haher and a signatory of the Treaty. The signal help which Egypt's Ally has received from Sirry Pasha in the spirit of the Freaty should also not be forgotten, and Hassan Sadek, late Himister of War, might also be mentioned in this connexion. The public might also be reminded of the manes of all signatories of the Treaty which was concluded by the nost fully representative Government Egypt has ever by the most fully representative Government Egypt has ever had.

5. The line should be taken that while for the moment it has not proved possible to form a Mational Government representative of all parties it is to be hoped that the turn of events will not prevent eminent political leaders, and their followers who have shown loyalty to the alliance and appreciation of the interests of Egypt, from continuing to play a helpful role in the common fight for democracy and in the political life of this country, and that it would be wise statesmoship on the part of Nahas Pasha and the Wafdist leader to work for this end. Nahas Pasha and the Wardist leader to work for this end.

4. There should, of course, be no mention of Ali Haher, nor of Mahmoud Bey Khalil, nor of Sidki Pasha.

5. I regard publicity on the above lines as really important at the earliest possible moment. Another leading article in The Times would be specially helpful.

19 55 835 3156-8 1942 SOYPT and SUDAR Frotest of Dr.Ahmed Maher Pasha at action of His Registry 835/38/16 Majesty's Government. Refers to Cairo telegram 502 (J 621/38/16). Transmits copy of translation of jetter from Dr.Ahmed Maher Pasha protesting against action of His Majesty's Government in regard to Nahas Pasha's appointment as Prime Minister. The letter has not been acknowledged as it was distributed to the public. FROMSir M.Lampson, (Cairo). No. 135 (688/1/42). Dated Received Feb. 1942. in Registry Zlat Feb.1942. الفراج / حطاء المكاني سراف ماه المان وشد عند بعان J:Egypt and Sudan. Copy Major Kirwan W.D. J.S. Lan Last Paper. 5834 References. (Print.) (How disposed of.) E) Maj Kirwan (10/6) 4) 22. Feb 25 (Index.) (Action completed.) 6 M . O W Next Paper. 5856



FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

11th February, 1942.

27

SECRET.

Sir, 👘

I have received and read with interest Your Excellency's telegram No. 491 of the 5th February recording the circumstances of your interview with King Farouk on the evening of that day, accompanied by the General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt.


2. I fully approve Your Excellency's decision to accept King Farouk's unconditional surrender and His Majesty's proposal to summon Makes Pasha to form a government of his own choosing.

> I am, with great truth and respect, Sir, Your Excellency's obedient Servant, (For the Secretary of State)

(sept) P. Seriverer.

His Excellency The Right Honourable Sir Miles Lampson, G.C.M.G., C.B., etc., etc., etc., Cairo.

16 Registry ما روم) - مرامه الاحسار D No. J608/338/4. ب تغرز ت : 50 Jul. 11", 1914. Seoret Draft. Sir, reas with interest Thave received E's telegram No: 491 of February 5th No.64 interview recordini q the circumstances of your MARGIN with King Faronk on the evening of that Day, accompanies by the GOC. Butich Troops **THIS** " Egypt./N.R. J fully offer approve TE's Copy N.O yet. Z (maj. Surpon M. J. a) Decision to accept King Faronko unconsistional WRITTEN has proposal to sun ш Д Surrendes * Pasha to form a foren ent of his own 9 NOTHING choosing: (sga) p. Serves CA 22M



an hour later Nahas arrived at the Embassy after having been received by King Farouk who had acted promptly on his promise. King Farouk had in fact charged Nahas to see we and make his form under 1 We had a satisfactory

on his promise. King Farouk had in fact charged Nahas to see me and make his [grp. undec.]. We had a satisfactory interview at which the Minister of State was present and I arranged that I should once more relapse into the background until Nahas had formed his Government when we must have a business talk. He agreed whole-heartedly that the evil elements both in the Palace and outside must be immediately eliminated. I emphasised that my desire was, as ever, to remain as much as possible behind the scenes and let him carry out the necessary measures on his own.

So much for the events of the evening which I confess 11. I could not have more enjoyed. It was sorely tempting to have insisted on King Farouk's abdication which I believe I could have extracted. But the course of wisdom seemed on the balance (very reluctantly I admit) to lie in allowing him to send for Nahas. After all if he had agreed at 6 p.m. we should be glad to have accepted this solution: the fact that his acceptance came three hours later would hardly have justified different sonction of ejection however tempting? Or strengthened our case before the public, both Egyptian and foreign, for more efficient remedy? Furthermore I was mindful (a point made just before I left for the Palace by Minister of State) that it was up to us of the civilian side to avoid any major embarrassmont for our military commanders (who, I repeat, have played up most nobly throughout). However regretfully, it seemed that the right course, all things considered, was to accept the abject surrender of King Farouk entailed by his unconditional acceptance of our original demand. The more so in that we had in fact scored a complete victory. It was a difficult decision but I hope that all in all you will think it was right.

 c^{7}

May I in conclusion record my warmest appreciation of the wide discretion you have been good enough to give me and my sense of gratitude to the Minister of State for his unfailing support and counsel.

(INDIV)

split, so I at once cut him short saying with rising indignation that matters were extremely serious and I took it as no. I would accordingly proceed with my business and I read him with full emphasis and increasing anger the statement contained in my immediately following telegram. At the end I handed him the text of the letter of abdication saying that he must sign it at once or I should have something else and more unpleasant with which to confront him.

6. King Farouk hesitated for a space and would I believe have signed the letter had not Hassanein intervened in Arabic. After a tense pause King Farouk who was by this time completely coved looked up and asked almost pathetically and with none of his previous bravado if I would not give him one more chance? I replied that I must know categorically what his proposal was? To which, on my repeated and peremptory question, he answered that it was that he should at once summon Nahas, in my presence if I wished, and tell him to form a Government. Having ascertained explicitly that he meant a Government of Nahas' own choosing, I purposely hesitated a while: and finally said, that moved by the desire to spare possible complications in the country, I was disposed to give him this one more chance. But his action must be immediate. King Farouk with considerable emotion said that for his own honour and for his country's good he would summon Nahas forthwith.

7. I said that I agreed.

8. Thereafter King Farouk was at pains to make himself agreeable and indeed affable. He even thanked me personally for having always tried to help him.

9. We then left him and passed through passages filled with British officers and Court Chamberlains, the latter a crowd of scared hens. The same in the entrance hall below where a vista at the entrance of grim armed British soldiers in their steel helmets with their rifles and tommy guns at the ready did nothing to allay their alarm. As we drove out of the courtyard we passed the dim shapes of tanks and armoured cars, drawn up and ready for action. Deeply impressive and I should like here to record my tribute to the efficiency of the military arrangements which could not have been better or more business-like. They worked without a hitch.

10. Arrived back at the Embassy there was the comic relief of an agitated telephone message from Hassanein whether the troops might be now withdrawn as all ingress to the Palace was cut off including Nahas. I promised to see to it. Half

/an

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

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[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGH OFFICE.

Sir M. Lempson. <u>No. 491</u>. 5th February, 1942.

D. 7.00 p.m. 5th February, 1942. R. 1.40 s.m. 6th February, 1942.

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DELEDIATE.

My telegram No. 489. J519 333 G

You may care to have a fuller account of this evening's events which are in themselves worthy of record.

2. At 9 p.m. I arrived at the Palace accompanied by General Stone and an impressive array of specially picked stalwart military officers armed to the teeth. On the way, we passed through lines of military transport looming up, through the darkened streets on their way to take up their positions round the Palace. I could see by the startled expression of the Court Chamberlain who received me at the Palace entrance that this imposing arrival registered an immediate preliminary effect. Whilst we waited upstairs I could hear the runble of tanks and armoured cars, taking up their positions round the Palace; and judging by the coming and going of the Palace aide-de-camps this caused no little stir and added to the growing anticipation of coming events.

3. As a result there was some five minutes delay in summoning me to the King's room and I was just on the point of indicating that I was not prepared to be kept waiting when I was invited in. The Chief Chamberlain attempted to obstruct General Stone accompanying me but I brushed him aside and entered the King's presence without further ado.

4. King Farouk clearly taken aback, proposed to keep Hassancin Pasha in attendance to which I agreed.

5. I went straight to business. I had expected a reply, yes or no by 6 p.m. to my communication of the morning. Instead at 6.15 p.m. Hassanein had brought me a communication which I could only regard as no. I must be told here and now without further prevarication whether it was no? King Farouk sought to

: 21 1608 N. S March States Sung Farouk J608 /333/600 hefers to his til. ho: 469 (J579 (333 (G) Sin In Lanpoon fives account of his interview, with thing (barro) Farsul, which ended in the King agreening Mo: 491 to allow hahas to form a fast. of his Jel: 5 Dairo tel. ho: 492 of Feb. 5" (154 Feb. 6 (Minutes.) Last Paper. (p. in Dupl. 1519 This was a spinted performance - and I think References. Si Mampson, having search the unconstional surrender of the King, was right not to press for his abrication as well. It would have been interesting to karn (Print.) of the miterview with Nahas in rather peater Detail ? Inform Si McCampson That we think he was (How disposed of.) right to accept the Kings proposal. Rft. Caine to: bu V Jeb.11 Heritener april & May: Ansian (ma) the What frighting m a little is that Sis M. Landson is fugured erm to defore the King without any male alternat to commit (Index.) (Action Nahas to suddant us completed.) ₩. Next Paper. 7.~ ab. J.b. J. 1912. J. 626/6 44489 5/41 F.O.P.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson. No.490. February 5th 1942. D. 5.20 p.m. February 5th 1942. R. 5.45 a.m. February 6th 1942.

1626

32

SECRET.

3

For purposes of record following is text of letter of abdication <u>put</u> before King Farouk last night. I am indebted to Sir W. Monckton for his assistance to the legal counsellor in its compilation.

[Begins].

We, Farouk, King of Egypt, mindful as ever of the interests of our country, hereby renounce and abandon for ourselves and heirs of our body, the throne of the kingdom of Egypt and all sovereign rights, privileges and powers in and over the said kingdom and subjects thereof as we release our said subjects from their allegiance to our person.

Given at our palace of Abdin this fourth day of February 1942.

1

[Ends]. (INDIV).

日 JMO2. W. C 31568 S STORE LAND Political situation in Egypt Jy02 1333 gives account of an intersients with Aassand Sin M. Lampson It was suggested that thing Farend should (bavio) make some immediate public gesture of allied solidarity to stop the dangerous anti ho: 550 british manifestations which are going Dated: Feb. 10 Hassenin was told that the Italiai Received: Feb. 11 Italiai Valace chque must go. Last Paper. J400 There will artainly be no little chance now of astablishing more satisfactory relations with this References. -in Majesty so long as the "Palace clique" romain - but 38 16. it is unlikely that King Faronk will let is of them 2401 J541 38116 on his own withative. Until they Disappear we must expect some unfleasantiers such as that huites at by Son JULampson ... and I would whether (Print.) any amount of firm language to Harsan will prevent it. For the moment, howaver, I to not Think (How disposed of.) that there is any action which we can take. Verivenar. (Index.) (Action completed.) Next Paper. J. 785/G 28469 5/41 F.O.P.

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION.

[Cypher].

FROM EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

R.

Sir M. Lampson. No. 548. 10th February, 1942.

D. 7.25 p.m. 10th February, 1942. 6.15 a.m. 11th February, 1942.

VVVVVV.

DPORTANT.

General Stone tells me that [grp.undec.] have caused a good deal of resentment in the Egyptian Army especially amongst [grp.undec: ?eminent] officers who while having no particular feeling of personal affection for King Farouk, considered an insult was offered to the throne by the imposition of force.

2. This found expression in a large meeting at the Military club at which various speakers proposed sending a declaration of [grp.undec. ?loyalty] to the King and a protest to myself. The senior officers present appear to have behaved very judiciously and poured water on these hotheads.

3. While the meeting was in progress, a telephone message was received from the Palace to say that His Majesty greatly appreciated the expression of loyalty on the part of the officers of the Egyptian army but enjoined them to remain calm. and peaceful and return to their duties.

4. General Stone's comment is that while a strain has undoubtedly been thrown on the Egyptian army by recent events, he hopes and expects that this will gradually ease off and will not produce any adverse effect on co-operation between British and Egyptian armies.

INDIV.