

J

1942

31568

J 1013
3 MAR 1942

121

CA

Registry Number } 1013/38/16

FROM Sir M. Lampson,
Cairo.

No. 159(1/55/42)

Dated 14th Feb., 1942.

Received 3rd March,
in Registry } 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Protest from Abdel Aziz Fahmy Pasha.

Refers to Cairo despatch 135 (J 835/38/16). Transmits copy of letter from Abdel Aziz Fahmy Pasha President of Liberal Constitutional Party protesting against the action of H.M. Government during the recent crisis. The letter will not be acknowledged. Dr. Heikal Pasha Vice President of the Party expressed his anxiety over the situation as Wafd had refused every form of National Government and were re-arranging electoral districts to exclude opponents. The Pasha asked whether a struggle over elections was in British interests. Nahas has refused to allocate seats to opposition but matter is being pursued through Amin Pasha Osman. Suggest comments to be made in British press on lines of Cairo telegram 560.

Last Paper.

J/1012

References.

J686/38/16

417/38/16

405/38/16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8) Maj. Kerwan (106) 14720
March 4

2 new pp. Kerwan. Copy Major Kerwan M.S. 2(a) W.O. (Minutes.)

The position now is that the opposition parties have decided to boycott the elections - but that the Wafd are "leaving a few seats" for a section of the Liberals, & for the other parties, since apparently a certain number of opposition deputies have decided to stand as individuals. All this makes it extremely difficult to promote any peace-making, but no doubt Sir M. Lampson will take such opportunities as there may be of smoothing things over.

The suggested action with the press (27) was made impossible by the presence of more important events.

W. Stevenson
5/3.

Offargent
Juchis

Ab.

March 6, 1942.

(Action completed.)

3 m/s
9/3

(Index.)

207
15/12

Next Paper.

J1033

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET).

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 836
7th March, 1942.

D. 4.20 p.m. 7th March, 1942.

kkkkk

Your telegram No. 696.

I am inclined to share view expressed by Sirry in paragraph 2 that action against Ali Maher and the Palace should be carried through before the elections. Time is against us; and the effects of our action on February 4th are wearing off. Moreover I find it difficult to understand Nahas' insistence on first "establishing" a position the strength of which, even when he and his followers were out of office, was generally admitted. On the contrary, would not action against Ali Maher and his creatures consolidate that position in the one quarter where such strengthening is required? (See for example recent secret reports of intrigues against Nahas).

2. Apart from these considerations, is there not some risk that the sweeping electoral triumph now imminent will go to Nahas' head and render him, for a time at any rate, considerably more intractable than at present?

3. I welcome action reported in paragraph 4 of your telegram and hope in view of the foregoing that it will evoke an early response.

INDIV.

electoral triumph now imminent will go to Nahas' head and render him, for a time at any rate, considerably more intractable than at present?

3. I welcome action reported in paragraph 4 of your telegram and hope in view of the foregoing that it will evoke an early response.

ab.
March 5/42

A. hand.
March 6

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. *Ja92/333/G*

P.S.S.

Draft.

Sir M. Lampson,
CAIRO.

Telegram.

No. ~~835~~ *836*

INDIV/K
march 7

Dept. Secret
War Cabinet
distribution.

Mr. Loxley, first
JMA
B/3

Nos 2255 and 2262
and other
recent secret reports
of intrigues against
Nahas)

P. 302

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

A

102

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

Despatched *4 20/4 M.*
2 3/4 42

6 March, 1942.

Your telegram No. 696.

I am inclined to ^{*share*} ~~think that~~ view expressed by Sirry in paragraph 2 ~~is~~ ~~right~~, and that action against Ali Maher and the Palace should be carried through before the elections. Time is against us; and the effects of our action on February 4th are wearing off. Moreover I find it difficult to understand Nahas' insistence on first "establishing" a position the strength of which, even when he and his followers were out of office, was generally admitted. On the contrary, would not action against Ali Maher and his creatures consolidate that position in the one quarter where such strengthening is required, *b?* (*see for example*)

2. Apart from these considerations, is there not some risk that the sweeping electoral/

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 819

March 5th, 1942.

D. 2.10. p.m. 5th March, 1942.

b b b b b b

SECRET

Your telegram No. 696, paragraph 5 [alleged intrigues of Nachat Pasha].

We learn from secret sources that on February 14th Zehia (see Mr. Norton's letter of March 8th 1940 and your telegram No. 164 of 1940 etc.,) telegraphed to Nahas that he had received "correspondence from important people proving Representative now using his status to influence decisions in high quarters against Wafd". It seems possible that when speaking to you Nahas had this telegram in mind.

2. I am aware of Nachat's capacity for intrigues, and you may be assured I know how to rate him; but it would be unfortunate if Nahas were to be influenced in his relations with Nachat by obviously spiteful reports such as the foregoing. I think therefore that you might take an opportunity of warning Nahas again about Zehia. You might say quite generally that you have been informed by this Department that there has been some recrudescence of Zehia's political activities, and that his standing in this country is certainly no greater than it was before

INDIV

2-1 am aware of ~~no not~~ Nachat's
capacity for intrigue; and I shall watch
careful for any signs of it; but it
would be unfortunate if Nahas were
to be influenced in his relations with
Nachat by obviously spiteful reports
such as the foregoing. I think
therefore that you might take an
opportunity of warning Nahas again
about Lehia. You might say quite
generally that you have been informed
by this Dept. that there has been
some resurgence of Lehia's political
activities, & that his importance &
standing in this country is
certainly no greater than it was
before.

Al.
March 3/42.
H. K. March

^{So} (though please
have no anxiety
on that score
as either as regards
your personal
position or
anything else)
You may be
assured I know
how to rate him

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. 7992/333/G

110

5/3/40

Despatched 2.10 p.m.

Draft. Sir M. Lampson
Camp

Secret.

Telegram No 819.

emphas. MARCH 5. IC K INDIV

Your telegram No 696, paragraph 5 [alleged intrigues of Nakhad Pasha]

Dept. Secret

We learn from secret sources that on February 14th Yehia (see Mr. Norton's letter of March 8th 1940 and your telegram No: 164 of 1940 etc) telegraphed to Nahas that he had received "correspondence from important people proving Representative now using his status to influence decisions in high quarters against Wafd." It seems ^{poss} ~~independently~~ possible that ^{he} when speaking to you Nahas had this telegram in mind.

M. Loxley
JMA
3/3

11.30 AM

I was unable to press my point further for the moment: but will continue to do so.

5. Nahas Pasha added that he thought you should know secretly he suspected Nachat of making mischief especially against myself, in London. He would not be surprised if the Palace had been telegraphing direct to Nachat over his head. He proposed to put a stop to that and begged meantime you would pay no attention to anything that did not reach you - or any members of His Majesty's Government - save through himself as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He hinted that Nachat was very probably intriguing with important personalities in London but gave no names. Actually the same report has just reached me independently from my secret sources inside the Palace.

[INDIV.]

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

7992

Sir M. Lampson D. 10.32 p.m. 28th February, 1942
No. 696
28th February, 1942 R. 5.15 a.m. 1st March, 1942

SECRET.

Hussein Sirry Pasha called this morning at his request. It is first time we have met since he resigned. He was as friendly as ever.

2. He spoke very freely. What we had done on February 4th was good; but it must not be left there. He then put this straight question "Do you want King Farouk to remain?" I replied "Naturally, if he will henceforth play loyally by us but that is an essential condition". Sirry Pasha said that in that case we must forthwith eliminate Ali Maher who [grp. undec. ? continues] his mischievous role. Other trouble makers were Maraghi, Saleh, Harb and Mahmoud Khalil.

3. I told him I believed Nahas Pasha intended to deal with Ali Maher but that I got the impression that he was waiting till his position in the country was consolidated by the election in March. Sirry replied that that was waiting too long; as long as Ali Maher was about (and he knew as a fact that he was still in communication with the Palace) we should continue to have "incidents" and our relations with King Farouk would never get right. In reply to my question he suggested that Ali Maher should be banished to his estate and cordoned off there. If Nahas Pasha would send him abroad so much the better; but if Ali Maher refused to go there was no legal way of compelling him to go. I said that I cherished the hope that Nahas Pasha might eventually ask him, Sirry, to accept the post of the King's Chef de Cabinet. Sirry replied that in no case would he accept until Ali Maher was disposed of.

7893/38/16

4. An hour later I [^{met}? grp. omitted] Nahas Pasha at the Palace luncheon and was able to speak to him on the lines of your telegram No. 791 just in. I had in fact sent him a message only last night renewing my pressure for the immediate removal of Ali Maher. Nahas Pasha said to-day he was in complete agreement as to its necessity, but it was a question of timing. He wished to establish his position more firmly first. I told him I had heard twice from you in the past few days urging speed; and then added what I had heard from Sirry about Ali Maher this morning, of course not betraying the source. Nahas Pasha still pleaded for time - perhaps he could arrange for it after "two more audiences with King Farouk". As we were talking in near proximity to the King,

I/

Jan 27 - 97

Mr. Scriven

You may like to refer to the two reports by the members known to the Embassy — see addition in pencil.

JM17
4/3

62

(I don't know exactly when) so time is rather short.
If we are of the opinion that the "clean-up" should
not wait on the Election (and I am inclined to think
this is right) it is not too early ^{now} to tell Sir M. Langson
that this is our view, so that he can be prepared
and on the look out for a favourable opportunity.

Ab.

March 3. 1942.

I agree

Ab March 3

Pl. 4/3

The elections for the Chamber of Deputies & the
Senate will be held on March 24th & 26th
respectively. By that time, apart from anything
else, Nakas will have been in power for some
7 weeks.

I submit a draft. (Please see red jacket attached)

Worriedness
S.B.

J.P. 1/3/42

14

31568

T992

96
CA

38/16

T992 (333) G
Sir M. Lampson
(bairo)
no: 696
Feb. 28
Mar. 2

Political situation in Egypt
gives account of interviews with Hussein
Kerim Pasha, who emphasized that if we wished
King Farouk to remain we must forthwith
eliminate Ali Maher, who is continuing his
mischievous role. Has spoken on these lines
to Nahas Pasha, who is still pleading for
time, however

Last Paper.

T875

References.

T893 | 38 | 16.
T17 | 2 | 42 (red
paper)

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Feb. bairo no: 819
Mar. 5
Feb. bairo no: 834
Mar. 7

(Minutes.)

I am dealing separately with paragraph
5 of this telegram.
For the rest, my own view is that we ought to
try to get the Palace cleaned out before the
elections. Maher's position does not really require
consideration for this purpose... nor in order to
get Ali Maher "cosigned off." We should
consider the position again, I suggest, next week -
unless Nahas has ~~not~~ started moving in the
interim.

Wrensener

2/3

Agree: time is against us &
the force of the events of Feb 4th are
already beginning to wear off.
? Buy up hand 9th

The elections are some time off, mark.

J. L. M. 16
3/3/42

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

1/10/42

A

Next Paper.

T1040

J. 813/58/16.

[THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR SECRECY AND SHOULD BE RETAINED BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON].

[CYPHER].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

To: EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 752.
February 22nd, 1942.

D. 2.25 a.m. February 23rd, 1942.

YYYYYY

Your telegram No. 611 [of February 18th: Nahas Pasha's policy].

I agree that at this stage Nahas must be left free to tackle King Farouk as he thinks best; but it is desirable to ensure that Pulli and Abdul Wahab go sooner rather than later. I welcome proposed action against Ali Maher and Ikhwan.

2. I also agree as regards channel of communication and as regards Nachat.

[INDIV].

Registry
No. J 812/38/6.

Dep. 23⁴⁴ am 23⁴⁴
JULY

Draft.

Sir M. Lampson
Carib

Tel. No. 152
Feb. 22

cypher.
INDIV/K

War Cabinet Disⁿ

Your telegram No: 611 [of February
18th: Mulla Nahaas Pasha's policy]

I agree that at this stage Nahaas
must be left free to tackle King,
Tarouk as he thinks best; but it
is desirable to ensure that
~~will be necessary~~ ^{rather} Pulli
Pulli and Abdul Wahab to sooner
later. I welcome proposed action

against Ali Maher and Ikhwan.

2. I also agree as regards
channel of communication, or as regards
Nachat.

Ab. J. Feb. 21/42.

AZ Feb 22

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

4.30 pm

43

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 611.

17th February, 1942.

D. 12.25 p.m. 18th February, 1942.

R. 4.25 p.m. 18th February, 1942.

c c c c

VERY CONFIDENTIAL.

Nahas Pasha is now contemplating getting down to work. General lines he has in mind are as follows.

2. He will start by pressing King Farouk to get rid of all Italians from the Palace save Pulli, whose special functions as royal pimp he judges it best for the moment to allow to continue.

3. He will tell Ali Maher to go to his country estate where he will only receive visitors by permission and they will be searched as they go in and out. The telephone to be tapped. I have suggested that much the best solution would be to appoint Ali Maher Minister to Brazil or some distant post.

4. Same retirement to the country for Saleh Harb though destination still to be considered; Assuan might prove dangerous.

5. Ikhwan el Muslimin. Nahas Pasha asks to be supplied with the names of those we regard as most dangerous. These he will either shut up or buy over. I have reminded him of danger of these men and of Sirry Pasha's lapse from virtue in letting them out (see my telegram No. 92) and that prima facie I should regard re-internment as best method. On this I am consulting our military [group undec.] authorities.

6. Abbas Halim will be seriously warned to behave himself or worse will follow.

7. Nahas Pasha prefers to leave Abdul Wahab Talaat at the Palace for the time being so as to avoid appearance of dictation from us, but intends to have him out later.

8. His general plan of campaign is to get the Ali Maher elements out of key positions.

9. Nachat Pasha. Nahas Pasha disapproves of two channels of communications with you and intends to revert to his old system of dealing through me alone. He asks that you may be apprised of this and hopes that you will adopt the same system. I was questioned whether we would prefer to have Nachat (restored?) I replied in the negative. I could not say I trusted Nachat myself but I knew he got on well in London and that you were well aware that he was an intriguer.

INDIV

J

42

J 813

CV

31568

Registry Number } J 813/38/16.

TELEGRAM FROM
Sir Miles Lampson
(Cairo)
No. 611.

Dated 17th Feb. 1942.
Received in Registry } 20th Feb. 1942.

J : Egypt and Sudan.

Policy of Nahas Pasha.

Gives detailed account of the action proposed by Nahas Pasha. Pulla and Abdul Wahab Falaat will be left for present. It has been suggested that Ali Maher be appointed minister to Brazil, and Saleh Harb be retired to the country. Nahas wishes to know names of those regarded as dangerous by His Majesty's Government. Abbas Halim has been warned and Nachat Pasha is regarded with suspicion and in reply to a question His Majesty's Ambassador stated that it was not desired to restore Nachat although he got on well in London and was known as an intriguer.

أنا أوافق على ما ذكره في هذا الموضوع
والله اعلم بالصواب

Last Paper.

J804

References.

(Print.)

With Major Kerwan's comphs.
& Maj. Kerwan (M. 32a)
Feb. 20th

Tel. Cairo 752
Feb 20th

(Copy sent to Major Kerwan. M. L. 243.)

I very much hope that this comparatively cautious approach will develop into something rather more drastic. (Nahas' argument about Pulli is an example of the topsy-turvydom of Egyptian affairs in general). However, if Ali Maher & the Ikhwan (who are tactically reported to have been discussing the old murder tactics) are shackled firmly, it will be all to the good.

I submit that it would be a pity to replace Nachat. Intriguer he may be; but he is, so far as we know, entirely loyal, and he is intelligent (very) and agreeable to deal with. For the rest, I submit that we can agree to the Sir M. Lampson being used as the sole channel. Indeed, so far as I know, Nachat has been very little used (except by King Farouk) as such.

Lattach & Gfr.

Perivener
20/2.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

1/3

1/3

Nachat is sound on the main line.

Ab. Feb. 21. 1942.

Next Paper.

J 815

Registry No. J 705/38/16

✓ 6.35/2
12.2.42

66

Draft.

OUT FILE

Sir M. Lampson

Immediate

Cairo.

Your telegram No 560 [of February

Feb 6.76 ✓
Feb 12th
R

" : suggested press comment on
Egyptian internal situation].

Action is being taken

Political Distribution

accordingly.

J.P.

TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

67

J.705/38/16.

[CODE R].

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION: OUT FILE

TO EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

6

No. 676.
February 12th 1942.

D. 6.55 p.m. February 12th 1942.

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No. 560 [of February 11th: suggested
press comment on Egyptian internal situation].

Action is being taken accordingly.

J

[CYPHER]

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Lampson.
No. 560.

D. 4.30 p.m., 11th February, 1942.

11th February, 1942.

R. 10.30 p.m., 11th February, 1942.

3 5 5

IMMEDIATE.

I am doing all I can to prevent Saadists and Liberals, who are much disgruntled at return to power of the Wafd alone as the result of our intervention, from going out altogether against us.

2. It would be most helpful if The Times and other leading newspapers, and also the British Broadcasting Corporation would, when commenting favourably on the return of the Wafd, include sympathetic references to the loyalty of the Saadists and Liberals to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance in Parliament and in the late Cabinet. Special mention should be made of Ahmed Maher in his capacities of leader of the Saadist Party and President of the late Chamber of Deputies (and also signatory of the Treaty) than whom no-one in Egypt has been more whole-hearted in the cause of Allied victory. Mention might also be made of ~~Mustafa~~ ^{Mustafa} Pasha as Vice-President of the Liberal Party and Minister of Education in the late Cabinet, and of Mokrashi Pasha as right-hand man of Ahmed Maher and a signatory of the Treaty. The signal help which Egypt's Ally has received from Sirry Pasha in the spirit of the Treaty should also not be forgotten, and Hassan Sadek, late Minister of War, might also be mentioned in this connexion. The public might also be reminded of the names of all signatories of the Treaty which was concluded by the most fully representative Government Egypt has ever had.

[Hez]

3. The line should be taken that while for the moment it has not proved possible to form a National Government representative of all parties it is to be hoped that the turn of events will not prevent eminent political leaders, and their followers who have shown loyalty to the alliance and appreciation of the interests of Egypt, from continuing to play a helpful role in the common fight for democracy and in the political life of this country, and that it would be wise statesmanship on the part of Mahas Pasha and the Wafdist leader to work for this end.

4. There should, of course, be no mention of Ali Maher, nor of Mahmoud Bey Khalil, nor of Sidki Pasha.

5. I regard publicity on the above lines as really important at the earliest possible moment. Another leading article in The Times would be specially helpful.

(INDIV)

74

J

55

31568

1942

EGYPT and SUDAN

J 835

2. 1942

17

Registry Number } 835/38/16

FROM Sir M. Lampson,
(Cairo).

No. 135 (688/1/42).

Dated 6th Feb. 1942.

Received in Registry } 21st Feb. 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Protest of Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha at action of His Majesty's Government.

Refers to Cairo telegram 502 (J 621/38/16). Transmits copy of translation of letter from Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha protesting against action of His Majesty's Government in regard to Nahas Pasha's appointment as Prime Minister. The letter has not been acknowledged as it was distributed to the public.

البرقية رقم 502 في 6 شباط 1942

Last Paper.

J834

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8) Maj Kirwan (W/G) 4/22
Feb 25th

(Action completed.)

6 m 25/2

(Index.)

Jan 13/5

Next Paper.

J856

(Minutes.)

Copy Major Kirwan - W.D.

J.S. Lasky
24/2

J
24/2

No. 64.
(J 608/333/G)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

27

11th February, 1942.

SECRET.

Sir,

I have received and read with interest Your Excellency's telegram No. 491 of the 5th February recording the circumstances of your interview with King Farouk on the evening of that day, accompanied by the General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt.

2. I fully approve Your Excellency's decision to accept King Farouk's unconditional surrender and His Majesty's proposal to summon ~~Nahas~~ Pasha to form a government of his own choosing.

I am, with great truth and respect,
Sir,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)

(Sgd) P. Scriver.

His Excellency
The Right Honourable
Sir Miles Lampson, G.C.M.G., C.B.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Cairo.

D

Registry
No. J608/333/4.

رسالة من السيد كينغ فاروق الى السيد كراي
في 11 شباط 1914

Feb. 11th, 1914.

Secret

92
Draft
Sir St. Lambert
Cairo.


No. 64

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Copy No. 0 refs
Maj. Murray
M.M. 2. a)

J

Sir,
I have received & read with interest
YE's telegram No: 491 of February 5th
recording the circumstances of your interview
with King Farouk on the evening of that
day, accompanied by the G.O.C. British Troops
in Egypt/N.P. I fully ~~also~~ approve YE's
decision to accept King Farouk's unconditional
surrender & his proposal to summon Nahaas
Pasha to form a government of his own
choosing.


(sgd) P. Scrivener

رسالة من السيد كراي الى السيد كينغ فاروق في 11 شباط 1914

1608

25

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From EGYPT.

[Cypher]

From CAIRO to FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 492. D. 1.52 p.m. 5th February, 1942.
5th February, 1942. R. 4.50 p.m. 5th February, 1942.

My telegram No. 491.

The following is the text of the oral statement which I read out to King Farouk:-

"It has for long past been evident that Your Majesty has been influenced by advisers who were not only unfaithful to the Alliance with Great Britain, but were actually working against it, and thereby assisting the enemy. Your attitude, and the associates of Your Majesty have constituted a breach of Article 5 of the Treaty of Alliance but which [sic: ? by which] each high contracting party undertakes not to adopt in relation to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the Alliance.

Your Majesty has, moreover, wantonly and unnecessarily provoked a crisis over a decision taken by the Egyptian Government in response to a request by them and which was entirely justified by Article 5 of the Treaty.

Finally having failed to secure a coalition government Your Majesty has refused to entrust Government to the leading political party which by commanding general support of the country is thus alone in a position to ensure the continued execution of the treaty in the spirit of friendship in which it was conceived.

Such recklessness and irresponsibility on the part of the Sovereign endanger the security of Egypt and of the allied forces. They make it clear that Your Majesty is no longer fit to occupy the throne."

INDIV.

[Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page]

an hour later Nahas arrived at the Embassy after having been received by King Farouk who had acted promptly on his promise. King Farouk had in fact charged Nahas to see me and make his [grp. undec.]. We had a satisfactory interview at which the Minister of State was present and I arranged that I should once more relapse into the background until Nahas had formed his Government when we must have a business talk. He agreed whole-heartedly that the evil elements both in the Palace and outside must be immediately eliminated. I emphasised that my desire was, as ever, to remain as much as possible behind the scenes and let him carry out the necessary measures on his own.

Handwritten notes in Arabic script, including the word "مجلس" (Council) and "الملك" (King).

11. So much for the events of the evening which I confess I could not have more enjoyed. It was sorely tempting to have insisted on King Farouk's abdication which I believe I could have extracted. But the course of wisdom seemed on the balance (very reluctantly I admit) to lie in allowing him to send for Nahas. After all if he had agreed at 6 p.m. we should be glad to have accepted this solution: the fact that his acceptance came three hours later would hardly have justified different sanction of ejection however tempting? Or strengthened our case before the public, both Egyptian and foreign, for more efficient remedy? Furthermore I was mindful (a point made just before I left for the Palace by Minister of State) that it was up to us of the civilian side to avoid any major embarrassment for our military commanders (who, I repeat, have played up most nobly throughout). However regretfully, it seemed that the right course, all things considered, was to accept the abject surrender of King Farouk entailed by his unconditional acceptance of our original demand. The more so in that we had in fact scored a complete victory. It was a difficult decision but I hope that all in all you will think it was right.

May I in conclusion record my warmest appreciation of the wide discretion you have been good enough to give me and my sense of gratitude to the Minister of State for his unfailing support and counsel.

(INDIV)

split, so I at once cut him short saying with rising indignation that matters were extremely serious and I took it as no. I would accordingly proceed with my business and I read him with full emphasis and increasing anger the statement contained in my immediately following telegram. At the end I handed him the text of the letter of abdication saying that he must sign it at once or I should have something else and more unpleasant with which to confront him.

6. King Farouk hesitated for a space and would I believe have signed the letter had not Hassanein intervened in Arabic. After a tense pause King Farouk who was by this time completely cowed looked up and asked almost pathetically and with none of his previous bravado if I would not give him one more chance? I replied that I must know categorically what his proposal was? To which, on my repeated and peremptory question, he answered that it was that he should at once summon Nahas, in my presence if I wished, and tell him to form a Government. Having ascertained explicitly that he meant a Government of Nahas' own choosing, I purposely hesitated a while: and finally said, that moved by the desire to spare possible complications in the country, I was disposed to give him this one more chance. But his action must be immediate. King Farouk with considerable emotion said that for his own honour and for his country's good he would summon Nahas forthwith.

7. I said that I agreed.

8. Thereafter King Farouk was at pains to make himself agreeable and indeed affable. He even thanked me personally for having always tried to help him.

9. We then left him and passed through passages filled with British officers and Court Chamberlains, the latter a crowd of scared hens. The same in the entrance hall below where a vista at the entrance of grim armed British soldiers in their steel helmets with their rifles and tommy guns at the ready did nothing to allay their alarm. As we drove out of the courtyard we passed the dim shapes of tanks and armoured cars, drawn up and ready for action. Deeply impressive and I should like here to record my tribute to the efficiency of the military arrangements which could not have been better or more business-like. They worked without a hitch.

10. Arrived back at the Embassy there was the comic relief of an agitated telephone message from Hassanein whether the troops might be now withdrawn as all ingress to the Palace was cut off including Nahas. I promised to see to it. Half

/an

4c

J608

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 491.
5th February, 1942.

D. 7.00 p.m. 5th February, 1942.
R. 1.40 a.m. 6th February, 1942.

q q q

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 489. J579 | 323 | E

You may care to have a fuller account of this evening's events which are in themselves worthy of record.

2. At 9 p.m. I arrived at the Palace accompanied by General Stone and an impressive array of specially picked stalwart military officers armed to the teeth. On the way, we passed through lines of military transport looming up, through the darkened streets on their way to take up their positions round the Palace. I could see by the startled expression of the Court Chamberlain who received me at the Palace entrance that this imposing arrival registered an immediate preliminary effect. Whilst we waited upstairs I could hear the rumble of tanks and armoured cars, taking up their positions round the Palace; and judging by the coming and going of the Palace aide-de-camps this caused no little stir and added to the growing anticipation of coming events.

3. As a result there was some five minutes delay in summoning me to the King's room and I was just on the point of indicating that I was not prepared to be kept waiting when I was invited in. The Chief Chamberlain attempted to obstruct General Stone accompanying me but I brushed him aside and entered the King's presence without further ado.

4. King Farouk clearly taken aback, proposed to keep Hassanein Pasha in attendance to which I agreed.

5. I went straight to business. I had expected a reply, yes or no by 6 p.m. to my communication of the morning. Instead at 6.15 p.m. Hassanein had brought me a communication which I could only regard as no. I must be told here and now without further prevarication whether it was no? King Farouk sought to

/hair

J608

J608 (333) (e) 38/16
Sir M. Lamson
(bairo)
no: 491
Feb. 5
Feb. 6

King Farouk
Refers to his tel. no: 489 (J579 (333) (e)).
Gives account of his interview with King
Farouk, which ended in the King agreeing
to allow Nahas to form a Govt. of his
own choosing.
bairo tel. no: 492 of Feb. 5

Last Paper.

J579

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Rpt. bairo no: 64
Feb. 11
Liaison Maj. Gordon
(bairo) Feb. 12

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

J. 626/16

(Minutes)
Sp. in Dept.
This was a spirited performance - and I think
Sir M. Lamson, having secured the unconditional
surrender of the King, was right not to press for his
abdication as well.

It ~~was~~ would have been interesting to learn
of the interview with Nahas in rather greater detail
? Inform Sir M. Lamson that we ^{agree} think he was
right to accept the King's proposal.

W. Stevenson
6/2

Yes.

What frightens me a little
is that Sir M. Lamson was prepared
even to depose the King without
any real attempt to commit
Nahas to support us.



Ab. Feb. 7, 1952

AB. Feb 8

1626

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]. WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.
FROM EGYPT.
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 490.
February 5th 1942.

D. 5.20 p.m. February 5th 1942.
R. 5.45 a.m. February 6th 1942.

SECRET.

For purposes of record following is text of letter of abdication put before King Farouk last night. I am indebted to Sir W. Monckton for his assistance to the legal counsellor in its compilation.

[Begins].

We, Farouk, King of Egypt, mindful as ever of the interests of our country, hereby renounce and abandon for ourselves and heirs of our body, the throne of the kingdom of Egypt and all sovereign rights, privileges and powers in and over the said kingdom and subjects thereof as we release our said subjects from their allegiance to our person.

Given at our palace of Abdin this fourth day of February 1942.

[Ends].

(INDIV).

11. P

31568

J402.

62
C.

38/16

J402 | 333/G

Sir M. Lampson
(baird)

no: 550

Dated: Feb. 10

Received: Feb. 11

Political situation in Egypt

Gives account of an interview with Hassanin. It was suggested that King Farouk should make some immediate public gesture of allied solidarity to stop the dangerous anti-British manifestations which are going on. Hassanin was told that the Itahai (pro-Itahai) Palace clique must go.

Last Paper.

J400

References.

J401 | 38/16 - info
J541 | 38/16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

There will certainly be no little chance now of establishing more satisfactory relations with His Majesty so long as the "Palace clique" remain - but it is unlikely that King Farouk will get rid of them on his own initiative. Until they disappear we must expect some unpleasantness such as that hinted at by Sir M. Lampson ... and I doubt whether any amount of firm language to Hassanin will prevent it. For the moment, however, I do not think that there is any action which we can take.

Perkins
12/2

[Handwritten signature]

(Action completed.)

AK.

(Index.)

A

Next Paper.

J. 785/G

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION.

[Cypher].

FROM EGYPT.

701

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.

No. 548.

10th February, 1942.

D. 7.25 p.m. 10th February, 1942.

R. 6.15 a.m. 11th February, 1942.

VVVVVV.

IMPORTANT.

General Stone tells me that [grp.undec.] have caused a good deal of resentment in the Egyptian Army especially amongst [grp.undec: ?eminent] officers who while having no particular feeling of personal affection for King Farouk, considered an insult was offered to the throne by the imposition of force.

2. This found expression in a large meeting at the Military club at which various speakers proposed sending a declaration of [grp.undec. ?loyalty] to the King and a protest to myself. The senior officers present appear to have behaved very judiciously and poured water on these hotheads.

3. While the meeting was in progress, a telephone message was received from the Palace to say that His Majesty greatly appreciated the expression of loyalty on the part of the officers of the Egyptian army but enjoined them to remain calm and peaceful and return to their duties.

4. General Stone's comment is that while a strain has undoubtedly been thrown on the Egyptian army by recent events, he hopes and expects that this will gradually ease off and will not produce any adverse effect on co-operation between British and Egyptian armies.

INDIV.

FEB