

J

64

J 705

31,567

Registry Number J 705/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir M. Lampson, (Cairo) No. 560

Dated 11th Feb. 1942. Received in Registry 12th Feb. 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Suggestions for counteracting Saadist and Liberal antagonism to New Government.

Considers it would be helpful if when commenting on return of Wafd sympathetic references were made to loyalty of Saadists and Liberals. Ahmed Maher, Strakal Pasha, Nokrashy Pasha, Sirry Pasha, Hassan Sadek and all signatories of Treaty should be mentioned in this connexion. It is to be hoped that events will not prevent political leaders and their followers who have shown loyalty to alliance and appreciation of Egypt's interests from continuing to play a helpful role and Nahas Pasha and Wafd should work for this. Mahmoud Bey Khalil and Sidki Pasha should not be mentioned.

Last Paper.

J 702

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel Cairo. 19/6/46 Feb. 12th

(Minutes.)

The Secretary of State has approved this action which is in train. "The Times" will probably publish a leading article on these lines tomorrow. The ABC will then arrange to quote it extensively.

I have sent a telegram to Cairo saying that action is being taken accordingly.

V. Morrison 12/2.

[Signature]

(Action completed.)

12/2

(Index.)

12/2

Next Paper.

J 716 (J913)

Registry No. J 724/38/16

OUT FILE

h/3/42  
Despatched 6.5 A.M.

Draft.  
Sir Hampson  
Cairo

Your telegram No: 27 to  
Khartoum [of February 11<sup>th</sup>]:  
possible internment of Ali Maher  
in the Sudan]

Telegram.  
Tel No. 813.  
3rd March 1942  
V.R.

Have you received a  
reply?

Dept. No 1.

J. 27/3.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

9.15pm

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

J724/38/16

[CODE 'R']

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 813  
3rd March, 1942

D. 6.05 a.m. 4th March, 1942

.....

Your telegram No. 27 to Khartoum [of February 11th:  
possible internment of Ali Maher in the Sudan].

77  
[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO KHARTOUM

Sir M. Lampson,  
No. 27.  
February 11th, 1942.

D. 5.50.p.m. February 11th, 1942.  
R. 5.50.p.m. February 11th, 1942.

Repeated to FOREIGN OFFICE No. 551.

-----oOo-----

Secret.

As you know the root evil of all our recent troubles in Egypt has throughout been Ali Maher. Hitherto we have completely failed to find a solution of that problem.

not  
/

The idea occurs to me that as the Egyptian Government would not admit that the Sudan is Egyptian territory we could dodge the constitutional ban on the deportation of any Egyptian subject by moving the new government to send him to El Fashr or some equally salubrious but distant spot. Should this prove feasible would you be prepared to have him there? I cannot yet foreshadow the precise form to be applied to his case, e.g. internment, protective custody or exile under surveillance.

I have not yet broached this idea direct to Nahas Pasha so cannot predict his reaction. But I do know that he is as anxious to deal with Ali Maher as I. A lot will depend on whether Ali Maher retains his parliamentary immunity.

f 724/38/16 in d/f

\* AMENDED COPY \*

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[Cypher]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET).

FROM CAIRO TO KHARTOUM.

Sir M. Lampson,  
No. 27,  
11th February, 1942.

D: 3. 30 p.m. 11th February, 1942  
R: 5. 50 p.m. 11th February, 1942

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 551.

p p p

Secret.

As you know the root evil of all our recent troubles in Egypt has throughout been Ali Maher. Hitherto we have completely failed to find a solution of that problem.

The idea occurs to me that as the Egyptian Government would not admit that the Sudan is *not* Egyptian territory we could dodge the constitutional ban on the deportation of any Egyptian subject by moving the new government to send him to El Fashr or some equally salubrious but distant spot. Should this prove feasible would you be prepared to have him there? I cannot yet foreshadow the precise form to be applied to his case, e.g. internment, protective custody or exile under surveillance.

I have not yet broached this idea direct to Nahas Pasha so cannot predict his reaction. But I do know that he is as anxious to deal with Ali Maher as I. A lot will depend on whether Ali Maher retains his parliamentary immunity.

the spot assigned to him and did not cause trouble there. Consequently the condition under which he were received in Sudan and the application of Sudan regulations to him would be an important one.

*W. B. Benson*  
16th February, 1942.

I quite agree. But I think that we may await the Governor-General's reaction to this telegram before offering any observations. It is addressed to him.

*Scrivenor*  
4/2

BU of V 22/20  
*J*

*Scrivenor*

J

724

CO

Registry Number } 724/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir M. Lamson, Cairo.

No. 551.

Dated 11th Feb., 1942.

Received in Registry } 13th Feb., 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Suggestion to deport Ali Maher to the Sudan.

Addressed Khartoum 27. States that Ali Maher is cause of recent troubles in Egypt. As Egyptian Government do not admit that Sudan is Egyptian territory constitutional ban on deportation of Egyptian subject could be overcome by sending him to El Fashr, the form of detention to be applied cannot be ascertained at present. Asks whether Sudan would have him. Nahas Pasha has not been approached but a great deal will depend on whether Ali Maher retains his parliamentary immunity.

Last Paper.

J 414

References.

See now amended copy with in

32 line 2.

I think that a "not" has been omitted in words that the Egyptian Government could thus dissociate themselves from the Sudan!

I do not think that by referring to Ali Maher's being confined in the Sudan we give anything away.

but Mr Backet for anyone's

V. J. J. 13/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Del Cairo 813 March 3.

Qualified

Of course the Egyptian Government always maintain that the Sudan is territory under Egyptian sovereignty and are only too anxious as a rule to take any step which emphasises this view. Consequently this suggestion by Sir M. Lamson might be attractive to them. We, on the other hand, say that the Sudan, being under a condominium, is territory which is under joint British and Egyptian sovereignty, and we should not want to suggest or acquiesce in any course or conduct which was inconsistent with our view. Possibly this proposal can be reconciled with our view on the ground that, if the Egyptians choose to construe a provision in their constitution (I suppose it is in the constitution) saying that Egyptian nationals cannot be deported or exiled to places outside Egyptian territory as not applying to territory which is half Egyptian, this does not matter to us. Of course, it would be well to find out what the Governor General thinks of this, not only on this particular point, but also as to whether Ali Maher would be an embarrassment to him in the Sudan, and particularly as regards the Governor General's own powers in relation to his detention and so forth. I should think it would be wrong to let Ali Maher go to the Sudan unless the Governor General had the fullest powers to secure that he remained in the/

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

(51088)

J 425

74  
[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson  
No. 557  
10th February, 1942.

D: 3. 35 p.m. 11th February, 1942.

R: 5. 50 p.m. 11th February, 1942.

P P P P P

Nahas has gone back on his intention of allocating uncontested seats to other parties at forthcoming elections.

2. I put it to him that he was thus likely to have contested elections with much mud slinging, not only against himself, but against us. He maintained that up till his last interview with King Farouk on February 4th he was quite ready to leave certain uncontested seats to other parties. But as party leaders, both at the palace and since outside, had accused him of coming to office under British bayonets and were now violently attacking both us and himself he was determined not to keep alive their representation in Parliament beyond what electors may normally return. The elections would be free and he anticipated about 40 out of 265 seats of the Chamber falling to non-Wafdists.

4.[sic] He would see to it that no disloyal speeches or pamphlets against Egypt's ally, were allowed during election.

INDIV.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson  
No. 557  
10th February, 1942.

D: 3. 35 p.m. 11th February, 1942.  
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4.[sic] He would see to it that no disloyal speeches or pamphlets against Egypt's ally were allowed during election.

INDIV.

Foreign Secretary.

Why should we complain of this?

W.S.C. 13.2.

*Handwritten notes:*  
2. 10/2/42



specific ground of complaint - or uneasiness.

(Sgd.) ANTHONY EDEN.

16th February, 1942.

12  
COPY

P.M./@2/24.

PRIME MINISTER.

Please see attached. (Tel. 557 from Cairo).

116  
115  
114

We have always held the view that a general election in Egypt in war-time is to be avoided if possible, in view of the unrest - not to mention disturbances of the peace - to which elections in that country are prone to lead. When Nahas Pasha took office early this month it became clear that we could not avoid an election, but we hoped that the area of possible turmoil would be circumscribed by resort to the time honoured custom in Egypt of an "allocation of seats" to the other (minority) parties. We did not ask Sir M. Lampson to urge this in so many words; but we did instruct him to impress on Nahas the desirability in time of war of getting over the elections as quietly as possible - an instruction which was duly acted on.

Nahas' refusal to adopt this practice, and his determination to go all out for his political opponents and detractors, will pro tanto increase the area of conflict, and also tend to raise the political temperature before and during the election. This is our specific/

Minutes.  
his election. This is our <sup>specific</sup> only  
ground of complaint - or uneasiness.

Versinger

15/2.

Present to  
16/2 per

? Minutes to P.M. in these terms.

Ab. Feb. 16. 1942.

Phase.

AB Feb 16

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Please see attached.

We have always held the view that a general election in Egypt in war-time is to be avoided if possible, in view of the unrest - not to mention disturbances of the peace - to which elections in that country are prone to lead. When Nahas took office early this month, it became clear that we could not avoid an election, but we hoped that the area of possible turmoil would be circumscribed by resort to the time-honoured custom in Egypt of an "allocation of seats" to the other (minority) parties. We did not ask Sir M. Lampson to write this in so many words; but we did instruct him to impress on Nahas the desirability in time of war of getting over the elections as quietly as possible; (J 1443) - an instruction which was duly acted on.

Nahas' refusal to adopt this practice, and his determination to go all out for his political opponents and detractors, will pro tanto increase the area of conflict, and also tend to raise the political temperature before and during

the

J 717  
←

31567

Registry } J 717/38/16  
Number }  
  
TELEGRAM FROM  
Sir M. Lampson (Cairo)  
  
No. 557  
  
Dated 10th Feb. 1942.  
Received }  
in Registry } 13th Feb.  
1942.  
  
J: Egypt and Sudan.

Nahas Pasha's decision regarding elections.  
Nahas Pasha does not now intend to allocate uncontested seats to other parties, in view of the accusation made against him and His Majesty's Governments. The elections are to be free and it is anticipated that about 40 seats will fall to non-Wafdists. No disloyal speeches on pamphlets will be allowed during the election.

*Final decision was given 13 Feb 1942*

Last Paper.  
5716

References.

(Minutes.)

Submitted with J725.

This is rather a petty decision; it means that the political temperature at the time of the elections, & before it, will be considerably raised. But it is Nahas' responsibility, and all we can do is to wish that he discharges it so as to ensure the minimum of unrest.

*V. Perivener*

13/2

*O. ...*  
13/2/42

*J. B. B. B. B. B.*  
Feb 13

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)  
G.M. 14/2  
G.M. 18/2

(Index.)

*2/12*  
*13/2*

Next Paper.

J 724

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

45

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

(J 644/38/16)  
[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

OUT FILE

TO: EGYPT

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 655

10th February, 1942.

D. 3.55 p.m. 10th February, 1942.

ddddddd

IMPORTANT

Your telegram No. 525 [of 7th February: conversation with Mahas Pasha].

I await with interest your account of Mahas' personal reaction to points in my telegram No. 572: Please convey to His Excellency my thanks for his message which I heartily reciprocate, and add that I greatly welcome his assurances of co-operation on the basis of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. INDIV

NOTHING TO SEE WR

J644/38/16.

✓ 3-55/1000-0000

44

Sir M. Lampson  
Cairo

Tel: No. 655V

cypher Feb 10  
K/INDIV  
War Cabinet Secy

Important OUT FILE

Your telegram No 525 [of February 7<sup>th</sup>: conversation with Mahas Pasha]

I await with interest your account of Mahas' personal reaction to points in my

telegram No: 572. Please convey to HE my which I heartily reciprocate, thanks for his message & add that I warmly

greatly welcome appreciate his assurances of co-operation on the basis of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

AB. Feb 9

AB. Feb. 9/12.

P

2-37

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]. WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson  
No. 525  
7th February, 1942.

D. 8.35 p.m. 7th February, 1942.  
R. 1.20 a.m. 8th February, 1942.

✓  
eeeeeeeeee

IMPORTANT.

I paid my first official call upon Nahas as Prime Minister this morning. I had considerable difficulty in getting in or out of the Presidency building owing to throngs of demonstrating followers around it, all of whom were enthusiastically disposed.

2. Conversation was mainly on generalities, but I touched on the immediate need of eradicating the root-cause of our troubles. He told me that he had already tackled the question of Maraghi and Azhar. He appreciated the need to deal with Ali Maher and such evil elements, including Mahmoud Khalil. Also the Palace; but he would prefer to deal in his own way with the King, also with the general problem of Palace interference. I said that I was ready to agree and to back him if he had difficulty. He expatiated on his determination to stand loyally by the treaty in every respect and to solidify the country behind it; he asked for his warmest greetings to be conveyed to you.

3. I purposely have not so far referred to the points in your telegram No. 572 as opportune moment will come later when he gets settled in. In actual fact he already knows them as I have made them through Amin, as already reported.

4. There have, of course, been the usual threats of violence against Nahas and myself: but that was only to be expected; and the police have been fully warned.

(INDIV)

*1. I think that  
✓ 15 should respond in  
in some way in  
your memoir*  
E. J. 19/2  
H.C.



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

J 644

From: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson  
No. 525  
7th February, 1942.

D. 8.35 p.m. 7th February, 1942.  
R. 1.20 a.m. 8th February, 1942.

eeeeeeeee

IMPORTANT.

I paid my first official call upon Nahas as Prime Minister this morning. I had considerable difficulty in getting in or out of the Presidency building owing to throngs of demonstrating followers around it, all of whom were enthusiastically disposed.

2. Conversation was mainly on generalities, but I touched on the immediate need of eradicating the root-cause of our troubles. He told me that he had already tackled the question of Maraghi and Azhar. He appreciated the need to deal with Ali Maher and such evil elements, including Mahmud Khalil. Also the Palace; but he would prefer to deal in his own way with the King, also with the general problem of Palace interference. I said that I was ready to agree and to back him if he had difficulty. He expatiated on his determination to stand loyally by the treaty in every respect and to solidify the country behind it; he asked for his warmest greetings to be conveyed to you.

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4. There have, of course, been the usual threats of violence against Nahas and myself; but that was only to be expected; and the police have been fully warned.

(INDIV)

51

J

41

31567

Visit of His Majesty's Ambassador to the Presidency.

Nahas Pasha informed His Majesty's Ambassador that he preferred to deal with the evil elements and King Farouk in his own way, and reiterated his determination to stand by the Treaty and solidify the country behind it. The Points raised in Foreign Office telegram 572 (J 515/38/16) have not been referred to but they have already been conveyed to him through Amin. There have been threats against Nahas Pasha and His Majesty's Ambassador and the police have been warned.

Registry Number J 644/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir H. Lampson, (Cairo).

525

Dated 7th Feb. 1942.

Received in Registry 9th Feb. 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Last Paper.

J 643

References.

J 515 / 38 / 16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel Cairo 635 Feb 10<sup>th</sup>

(Action completed.)

10/2

(Index.)

12/5

Next Paper.

T 646

(Minutes.)

The pres states that the unfortunate Ambassador was embraced in public by Nahas; but he says all this both subsidises & we can get down to business the better. I submit a draft reply.

✓

Verrienes 9/2.

It will be roses all the way for us (in the streets though not in the studios) for some time to come.

My only criticism of this Tel: is (para. 3) that it is over-optimistic to assume that Nahas "knows" anything because you have asked someone else to tell him. With Nahas you are lucky if he "knows" after you have told him yourself.

DB. 169-542

J 646

[CYPHER]

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson  
No. 516.  
7th February, 1942.

D. 7.30 p.m. 7th February, 1942.  
R. 1.20 a.m. 8th February, 1942.

JJJJ

My immediately preceding telegram. J 638/38/16

After asking my advice, Amin preferred to decline ministerial office and to receive appointment as Secretary-General to the Cabinet where he should be more influential and far more useful to us as immediate shadow to Nahas Pasha.

INDIV.

*Handwritten notes:*  
J 638/38/16  
Amin  
Secretary-General  
Cabinet  
1942

J

46

31567

55

Registry }  
Number } J 646/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM

Sir M. Lampson  
No. (Cairo).  
516

Dated 7th Feb., 1942.  
Received in Registry } 9th Feb.,  
1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Position of Amin in the new Government.

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 515 (J 638/38/16).  
Amin refused a ministerial office, and has  
received appointment as Secretary-General to  
Cabinet where he should be influential.

*Handwritten note in Arabic script*

Last Paper.

J644

pp. in dept. copy of ref attached <sup>(Minutes)</sup>

J. 9/2

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

*Handwritten initials*

*Handwritten initials*

Next Paper.

J644

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

J633

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson. D. 10.10 p.m. 6th February, 1942.  
No. 513. R. 1.30 a.m. 7th February, 1942.  
6th February, 1942.

c c c c

IMMEDIATE.

I had of course kept in general touch with the United States Minister during the past few days.

2. This morning I gave him detailed account of how the crisis had developed from day to day including final dénouement on night of February 5th (my telegram No. 491). J608/333 (C

3. The United States Minister who had been summoned to see King Farouk just before my audience at 9 p.m. that night recounted what had passed. King Farouk argued that Egypt, a small country was being bullied by Great Britain. Mr. Kirk (who had consulted me by telephone before he went down) refused to be drawn on to that ground and had told His Majesty firmly that the only thing that mattered was that every action individual or public, every decision public or private must have only one object and inspiration, namely that this must be to [?group omitted ?help] Egypt's ally to win the war.

4. Since then there has been an attempt to put out the belief that the United States Minister had been called in to mediate. The Minister has made it clear to all and sundry including American correspondents that his visit was at the request of King Farouk and was "purely informative". Mr. Kirk's comment on the whole affair is that we took the right line, that King Farouk would not in fact have abdicated, that after his surrender over Nahas Pashas we should have had a difficult public case for deposition and that I should [group undec. ?require] Allah's help, and 24 hours a day [group undec. ?vigilance] henceforth to watch both King Farouk and Nahas Pasha. For which he wished me joy.

INDIV

31567

J633

33

51

J633 / 333 / G / 16

Sir M. Lampson  
(basis)

No: 513

Dated: Feb. 6

Received: Feb. 7

Hung Tarent<sup>U.S.</sup>

reports that the O.S. Minister has been given a detailed account of how the crisis had developed from day to day. The O.S. Minister, who was summoned to see Hung Tarent before his own audience with the King, recounted what had passed.

Last Paper.

Feb 6

(Minutes.)

I fear that Mr. Kirk's concluding comment is extremely near the mark.

References.

J608 / 253 / G

Feb 7

Verisener  
7/2

(Print.)

7  
7.2

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

H

Next Paper.

J. 700 / G

friendly counsel. If not adopted I imagine the new Prime Minister would be taking these two points up in the near future.

(INDIV).

1954

J402 63

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]. WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson  
No. 550

D. 1.01 a.m. 11th February, 1942.  
R. 6.35 a.m. 11th February, 1942.

10th February, 1942.

eeeeeee

IMMEDIATE.

I saw Hassanein at 3 p.m. to-day for the first time since the audience on February 4th. He sought to go over recent events but I did not let him do so. I had sent for him for a specific purpose and reminded him that King Farouk had asked for "one more chance" and that "byegones should be byegones". With some misgiving I had agreed, and King Farouk had ended by giving his word of honour that he was in earnest for the future. Furthermore to spare His Majesty's feelings, I had concurred in his request that our proceedings of that night should remain within those four walls an undertaking which had been scrupulously respected on our side; but not so on theirs. For there was now talk among Egyptians of the Wafd having been imposed by British bayonets and all sorts of foolishness arising therefrom. As Pasha was present at the interview, he knew full well that was a distortion of the facts: British bayonets had been present for quite another purpose which we on our side had loyally not disclosed. As a result however of what had been spread in Egyptian circles, there was talk now of a socialist boycott; of the Egyptian members withdrawing from the Gezira club; of a break-up of Anglo-Egyptian union and I know not what other follies. To me it was a matter of personal indifference whether Egyptian members threw in their membership: it would in practice save me the trouble in future of influencing the election committee of Gezira club to facilitate their election. Equally the Egyptian members of Anglo-Egyptian union could for ought I cared show their weakness of character. But I should realise and realise at once that such acts of rancour counter his professed intention to play straight by us. It was up to him to let it be known at once that such stupidity was contrary to his wishes. He had just shown he could so act if he wished, see his action with Egyptian army (my telegram No. 548) which had been very wise.

J401/38/16

2. Hassanein made the usual plea that we were [grp. undec. ? remarkably] hard on [grp. undec. ? them]: he had had a great physical shock from which he had not recovered etc. He tried to belittle the importance of these manifestations. But I would hear none of that and observed that in addition to stopping them as I knew he could, King Farouk would, if he were wise, make some immediate public gesture of allied solidarity: for instance why not ask His Majesty's Ambassador to lunch at the Palace? Or dine at the Embassy? This will automatically give quietus to all these stupid but dangerous manifestations. Hassanein did not relish the idea (nor in fact do I!) but undertook to consider some immediate sign of allied loyalty by King Farouk.

3. Finally I told Hassanein that my instructions (see last paragraph of your telegram No. 602) stood that Italian and pro-Italian Palace clique must go. If King Farouk had any sense, he would get rid of them forthwith en bloc. I was not at the moment making a demand but giving a word of serious and

J541/38/16

Friendly.....



J

J 701  
19

31567

Registry }  
Number } J 701/38/16  
  
TELEGRAM FROM  
Sir M. Lampson (Cairo)  
  
No. 548  
  
Dated 10th Feb. 1942.  
  
Received }  
in Registry } 11th Feb.  
1942.

Attitude of Egyptian Army to recent events in Egypt.  
Is informed by General Stone that resentment is felt in Egyptian Army at use of force. At a meeting at Military club, it was proposed to send a declaration of loyalty to the King and a protest to His Majesty's Ambassador. Senior officers appear to have behaved judiciously. King Farouk expressed his appreciation of their loyalty but enjoined them to remain calm and return to their duties. General Stone considers strain imposed on Egyptian army will ease off and will have no ill effects on co-operation between British and Egyptian armies.

البيان ومصادره في سراي

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Last Paper.

J 700

(Minutes)

See on J 702/6.

References.

J. 4/2

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

5/12/42

802  
12/5

Next Paper.

J 702

Enter

697

The Secretary of State has invited us to consider whether he should send a message to Nahas Pasha on his assumption of office.

I think myself that it would be premature to do so.; indeed in all the circumstances I think that Nahas should send one first of all to the Secretary of State. But apart from this, Nahas must prove himself before he receives any marks of our favour, and apart from the expression of some admirable sentiments through an intermediary - to the words at least from the mouth of Makram Ebid: WE have no idea what he is going to do. Later on, when & if it is apparent that he is really going to work with us, it should not prove difficult to find an opportunity for a friendly lecture.

Verrieres

6/2

I agree. Nahas is quite as high enough as it is: he is at the moment on top of the world and his first move has been to assume, at our expense, the role of the champion of Egypt's independence (cf. his letter to Sir H. Lytton).

Al. Feb 8 1892

Al. Feb. 7. 1892.

J

56

J 697  
1A

31567

Registry Number } 697/38/16

FROM Foreign Office  
Minute Mr. Scrivener

No.

Dated 6th Feb, 1942

Received in Registry 11th Feb, 1942

J: Egypt and Sudan

Suggested message from Secretary of State to Nahas Pasha.

Considers it would be premature for a message to be sent to Nahas Pasha, who should in the circumstances send one first. No indication has been given as to how he will behave. If it is apparent that he will work with His Majesty's Government an opportunity can be found for showing him favour.

Last Paper.

J 686

(Minutes.)

See within.

J. 12/2

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

6/12/42

(Index.)

J. 12/2

Next Paper.

2700

5. Mr. Smart suggested that the King had particularly asked Nahas Pasha to take office after our action. Ahmed Maher asked what we would have done if then Nahas Pasha had refused to take office. Mr. Smart replied that [3 grps. undec.] realized that such an impasse would lead to grave complications.

*What indeed!  
The right  
way was to  
see Nahas in  
advance.*

4. Conversation, during which Ahmed Maher repeated several times that his previous policy regarding the war was in no way changed by these events, was extremely friendly and gave the impression that his venom was directed against Nahas Pasha more than against us.

5. I hope this contact may have done some good in restraining Ahmed Maher from going out altogether against us immediately, though [grp. undec. ? he] and his party have hitherto declared themselves rather violently against our intervention and against Nahas Pasha.

(INDIV)

686

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Lampson.  
No. 535.

D. 1.30 p.m. 9th February, 1942.

R. 5.55 p.m. 9th February, 1942.

9th February, 1942.

- - - - -

? Palace

On my instructions Oriental Secretary called on Ahmed Maher on February 7th and told him that I regretted owing to rush of events I had been unable to talk things over with him during recent crisis. In view of his friendly and statesmanlike attitude in the past, I wished him to understand that our recent action had been imposed on us by circumstances. Ministry after Ministry had found essential task of co-operation with us hampered by manoeuvres of elements whose connexion with the Palace was well-known. Finally a crisis had been wantonly provoked over Vichy question in spite of the fact that it raised a grave Anglo-Egyptian issue. As a result, Government which had suspended relations with Vichy at our request had been driven out of office. (~~Royalists~~) had been organising by [2 grps. undec. ? bogus reports] elements against us, and misguided youths had even been induced to utter cries such as "Long live Rommel". It was clearly intolerable that such a state of things should continue. However, I wished His Excellency to realize how much we continued to appreciate his efforts in cause of Anglo-Egyptian co-operation.

3. Ahmed Maher replied that his policy as regards Egypt in this war remained unchanged. He still held the view that a British victory was essential for Egypt's very life. He would still use his influence to help us in prosecution of the war. He considered we had committed a grave mistake. However, he could understand that in the stress of war and in our anxiety for a stable position in Egypt we might indulge in acts of violence even though they were in his opinion unjustifiable. It would, however, be difficult to make his less philosophical followers see the matter in this light. Whatever excuse might be advanced for us, he considered that there was no excuse whatever for Nahas Pasha. Nahas Pasha had abused the English in public speeches, had at the Palace meeting agreed with other leaders that our demand constituted unjustifiable intervention, and had then accepted office supported by British [grp. undec. ? bayonets]. This would never be forgotten by the country. Exchange of letters between Nahas Pasha and myself (see my telegram No. 502) could not explain away patent facts which would be brought up against Nahas Pasha continually.

....3.

507

J

86

31569

Registry }  
Number } J 686/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM  
Sir M. Lampson (Cairo)

No. 535

Dated 9th Feb. 1942.

Received }  
in Registry } 11th Feb.  
1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Attitude of Ahmed Maher regarding recent events.  
Oriental Secretary saw Ahmed Maher on 7th February and informed him that recent action of His Majesty's Government had been imposed by circumstances but his efforts in cause of Anglo-Egyptian co-operation were appreciated. His Excellency stated that his policy remained unchanged but he considered a grave mistake had been made and facts would be brought up against Nahas Pasha continually. Conversation gave impression that his criticism was directed against Nahas more than His Majesty's Government. It is hoped that contact will restrain Ahmed Maher and his party.

الموقف الذي اتخذه السيد أحمد ماهر تجاه الأحداث الأخيرة

Last Paper.

J 641


References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)  
For tactical reasons the Sanadists (or the Liberals) are competitors who were bitter against Nahas and against our "intervention". He might possibly have got Nahas in without an ultimatum, but there was always the risk that the King might confront us with a Palace Government; & that "acts of violence" which were already being perpetrated at Zagazig, might have assumed serious proportions against us.

Wentworth  
11/2

  
11.2.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

6 MS  
12/2

12/2  
13

Next Paper.

/SR.  
No. 130  
(688/142).

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
835 CAIRO.  
6th February, 1942.

Sir, 2. J-62/38/16

With reference to my telegram No. 502 I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the letter from Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha protesting against our action in regard to the advent of Nahas Pasha to office as Prime Minister.

2. As the Pasha distributed this letter in pamphlet form to the public simultaneously with its despatch to me, I preferred not to acknowledge the letter.

I have the honour to be,  
With the highest respect,  
Sir,

Your most obedient,  
humble Servant.

The Right Honourable  
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.  
etc., etc., etc. *Anthony Eden*

COPY OF TRANSLATION.

Chamber of Deputies,  
Office of the  
President.

Cairo, 5th February, 1942.

H.E. the British Ambassador,

With reference to the notification addressed by Your Excellency to H.M. the King insisting on the charging of a definite person you chose to form the Egyptian Cabinet, namely His Excellency Moustapha El Nahas Pasha, and the direct threat by British armed force which was associated with this notification, I have the honour, in my capacity of President of the Chamber of Deputies, to communicate to Your Excellency, in your capacity of representative of the British Government in Egypt, my strong protest against this flagrant aggression on Egypt's independence which greatly upsets (literally "disturbs") the provisions of the Treaty between the two countries and the exigencies of friendship between the two peoples and exposes their relations to grave danger.

I regret that such aggression and such unjustifiable intervention in our real internal affairs should take place at a time when Britain is defending the cause of democracy and the liberties of nations in a war which in relation to herself is a war of life or death.

In recording this my protest I have the honour to present to your Excellency my highest respects.

President of the Chamber  
of Deputies.

2. 2

38 1/2

31567

5626

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10

J 626 (333)  $\frac{1}{2}$

Sir M. Lampson  
(baird)

no: 490

Dated: Feb. 5

Received: Feb. 6

King Jarouk

Notes for purposes of record text of  
letter of abdication put before King Jarouk  
on Feb. 4.

*[Faint handwritten notes]*

Last Paper.

J 608

(Minutes.)

Mr. Beckett to see  
10203  $\frac{2}{2}$

Revised  
6/2

References.

$\frac{P.}{7.2.}$

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Index.)

A

Paper.

$\frac{1}{6}$



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J 4521  
NOV 1942

Sir M. Lampson  
No. 2501.  
2nd November, 1942.

D. 12.50 p.m. 2nd November, 1942.  
R. 5.05 p.m. 2nd November, 1942.

[ ] [ ] [ ]

Your telegram No. 2537. J 4278 138/16

When I received your telegram No. 2507 my immediate reaction was that action with King Farouk was premature as the matter was then developing in a way which promised a satisfactory solution without direct intervention with His Majesty.

2. Moreover I felt strongly (and still do) that we would be placed in a most awkward position if I sought an audience with King Farouk in order to induce him "by persuasion" to modify his attitude so long as we were not prepared in the last resort to make him do so. It was clear from first paragraph of your telegram No. 2507 that we were not. In my opinion that would have a serious political effect and possibly encourage other and later evasions of our "advice". I considered therefore that if His Majesty had realised (as he would assuredly have done) that we were not in real earnest, persuasion would have been of little use. And an abortive interview would merely have strengthened his hand not merely against us but also against the Government.

3. In particular I felt it would be dangerous to speak to King Farouk in the sense of last sentence of paragraph 2 of your telegram. This would inevitably have led the Palace to think that we were weakening in our support of the Government; and opposition, who would have got to know of it at once, would have made strong play with this card in their attacks on the Government.

4. I am becoming increasingly convinced that for the time being we stand to lose very definitely on the balance if we are inveigled by the present obvious drive against the Government into doing anything that will weaken them.

5. As regards paragraph 3 of your telegram I felt the proposed action with the Prime Minister was also premature. I am anxious, especially at the present time, not to estrange Nahas Pasha's personal regard, and I am not yet by any means convinced that the allegations made against the Wafd Government are not exaggerated - perhaps even grossly exaggerated - by parties who are doing their utmost to detach us from him or at least to provoke personal estrangement between us. These matters are extremely delicate to handle with Nahas Pasha; and I have my own methods of dealing with interference which I prefer to use.

? them

6. ....

NOV 4 1942  
REGISTRY

6. As regards the possibility of Nahas Pasha taking the Defence Ministry himself this would only infuriate King Farouk. Moreover Nahas Pasha has more than he can comfortably manage with the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs.

7. I trust that the foregoing will make clear my reasons for questioning the wisdom of your instructions in this case which has happily now been settled satisfactorily.

O.T.P. /

CONFIDENTIAL PERMISSION

I agree, but the personal relations between the Palace and the Embassy have long been strained. It is indeed a pity that in a country like Egypt our Ambassador should be on ~~such~~ extremely formal terms with the contemptible sovereign. It certainly makes everything much more difficult and brings us under fire all round.

Cecil Harcourt  
4.11.42

Quite apart from the omission on Sir M. Lampson's part to tell us what has become of King Farouk's "change of heart", this telegram gives a clear exposition of what I regard as the "Lampsonian Fallacy". I refer to the doctrine that you cannot allow yourself to raise a contentious issue in a potentially hostile quarter in Egypt unless you have tanks at your beck and call to see the thing through.

In actual fact, as the result of this rather ridiculous Army crisis in Egypt shows, Sir M. Lampson could have got his way without tanks. But that is not the whole point. Our action in Egypt is very seriously and dangerously circumscribed if we are never to be able to approach the Palace in future without tanks merely because we brought tanks to bear in February last. There is also a lack of subtlety, or mental elasticity, about the Lampsonian doctrine which must occasion concern. A rebuff by the King in a matter which is peculiarly within H.M.'s province is one of the risks of the game in Egypt and, if received, can always be countered, and even turned to advantage, in other directions. To say that you never intend to risk a rebuff is to tie your hands in advance.



4th November, 1942.

The tendency of the first 2 minutes is rather to imply that the failure to get on common ground with the King is rather the fault of the Embassy. But M.M. has surely made it pretty impossible.