

EGYPTIAN

J 576

J 576 / 333 / 6
38/16

Telegram.
Sir H. Dampson
Cairo.
no 482.

Dated Feb 4
Recd. Feb 5.

King Farouk:

The King started to pack with a view to leaving the country.
Gives the proposed reply that Nahas Pasha is to give at an interview to be held with the King.

Last Paper.

J. 543

(Minutes.)

See on J 576

References.

J 5/2.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

مذكرة اصاحيد (مكررة)
ومرفقا 11 وثيقة بتاريخ 2 و 3 فبراير 1945
ارسلت الى سدام فزال المحامون لغرض منه منق
الاصحاح " بمناسبة العيد الوطني "

وقد سبقت المذكرة المذكورة (المرفقة بالاصحاح)
في اصحاح " يوم اول يونيو 1944 " منذ آخر
مذكرة " بلغة اسبغ الطامد لارا 2 فبراير "

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

A

Next Paper.

J. 577

J

J. 281
10 JAN 1942

31566

Registry Number } 281/38/16.

TELEGRAM FROM
SIR M. LAMPSON, Cairo.

No. 240.

Dated 18th Jan. 1942.

Received in Registry 20th Jan. 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Weekly Political Summary.

Refers to Cairo telegram 197 (J 252/38/16). Failure of Prime Minister to shuffle his Cabinet and handling of supplies is causing anxiety. Saadist Party are pressing their views regarding allocation of important ministries. It is reported that Palace and Mahas are exploring means of strengthening Egypt against encroachment of victorious Britain. Russian and Libya successes have inspired confidence. Decision to postpone elections is taken to foreshadow similar action regarding Parliamentary elections. Further limitation of cotton acreage is still before Parliament.

(Faint handwritten notes in Arabic script)

Last Paper.

J 253

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Mr Cook (Lucas)
Sir E. Benthall (M. & W.)
Jan. 22

(Minutes.)

This telegram affords further evidence of Siriy's weakness in ability to make the best of what is admittedly a weak situation vis-à-vis Parliament. But the proposal further to limit cotton acreage is interesting and important. The Egyptian Government seem at last to have learnt their lesson.

Paragraph 3 This alleged rapprochement (there *previous ones* have been others) will no doubt be carefully watched.

Verisimus.
20/1.

(Handwritten signature)

Copies to Mr Cook Tsy
Sir E. Benthall, M. & W.

(Handwritten initials)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

(Handwritten marks)

Next Paper.

J 253

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. *557/35/16*
M.P.

Draft.
Sir M. Lampson,
Cairo. ✓

Telegram.
No. *609...*
Feb. 4th
INDV/K35
W.C.D.

1.10

FILE
most
Immediate

✓ *1. 4/16/42* 133
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

February 1942.
Despatched M.

Your telegrams Nos. 469. *to file.*

(1) While the end is not in sight, ^{*position*} I feel ~~seems to be developing satisfactorily & I somewhat reassured and~~ approve the line you are following.

The ~~position seems to have improved notably in two respects:~~

(2) ~~you are~~ ^{*It is good that you are now*} in ~~constant~~ communication with Nahas, ~~and~~

(3) ~~the~~ the mere fact that the crisis is being drawn out prevents what I have most feared, viz. a snap decision by the Palace (Daily Telegraph February 3rd reported that Mohamed ^{*Mahmoud*} ~~Ali~~ Khalil had been called upon to form a Government) which would ~~not only~~ have been unacceptable to us ~~and~~ ^{*and left*} would have all Egypt under the impression that we had been ignored.

(4) Wafd had never favoured coalitions, and there seems no reason to force them into one.

ab. Feb. 4/42. RB Feb 4

6J

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM: EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J 557
4 FEB 1942

Sir H. Lampson
No. 469.
3rd February, 1942.

D. 12.10 a.m. 4th February, 1942.
R. 12.35 a.m. 4th February, 1942.

[H] []

MOST IMMEDIATE

I have since informed Nahas through Amin of what I said to Hassanein tonight.

copy
to
me
1/2

INDIV.

J 557
FEB 1942

131

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson,
No. 468

D. 12.12 a.m..4th February 1942

5rd February 1942

R. 12.35 a.m. 4th February 1942

MOST IMMEDIATE

My telegram No. 463. 5556/22/6

It being now quite clear from Nahas Pasha's own record of his interview with the King, that he would only accept office as Prime Minister of his own Government, I summoned Hassanein at 7 p.m. to-night and told him I know what had passed with the King, and that, in the circumstances, I must ask that King Farouk forthwith summon Nahas Pasha and ask him to form a Government. In the meantime there must be no surprises. I should be meeting my colleagues of the War Council at 10 a.m. to-morrow, Wednesday.

(2) Hassanein having repeated his conciliatory assurance of no surprises sought to argue that given time the Palace would bring Nahas Pasha into a coalition. If the King acted as I now asked, it meant free election and the hostility of the other parties. He begged me to allow normal bargaining to proceed.

(3) I refused to budge. In wartime we could not afford political instability in Egypt and this was not the time for delay. Moreover Nahas might well agree (though I guaranteed nothing) to allocate seats to other parties and to bring in party leaders in some form of consultative body. But all that was subsequent detail, and would be the business of the new Prime Minister.

(4) Hassanein sought to challenge the authenticity of my information of Nahas Pasha's attitude; but there was little difficulty in refuting that. I added that I was assured that Nahas Pasha was prepared to accept office if given a free hand.

(5) Nahas Pasha [sic ? Hassanein] in considerable distress undertook at once to tell King Farouk what I had said which I repeated "Send for Nahas Pasha ask him to form a Government".

(6) I shall discuss the question of a time limit with the War Council to-morrow morning.

[INDIV.]

702
FEB 1942

J. 557

Registry Number } 557/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir M. Lampson, Cairo.

No. 468 and 469.

Dated 3rd Feb., 1942.

Received in Registry } 4th Feb., 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Internal Situation in Egypt.

Refers to Cairo telegram 466 (J 556/38/16). As it appears that Nahas will only accept office as Prime Minister of his own Government, Hassanein was told to ask King Farouk to summon Nahas and ask him to form a Government. Matter would be discussed with War Council on Wednesday. Hassanein said that this would mean election and hostility of other parties. His Majesty's Government could not afford political instability in Egypt. Hassanein undertook to inform King Farouk. Matter of time limit will be discussed with War Council. Nahas has been informed of what was said to Hassanein.

Last Paper.

J 556

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

See Cairo 609 Feb 4th

verigrams

(Action completed.)

6/2

(Index.)

10/13

Next Paper.

J 513

Four papers (Minutes.)

See telegram to Sir M. Lampson drafted

this morning

For the question of a time limit, please see the attached which has now come in. The Ambassador's ultimatum may indeed frighten King Farouk into accepting Nahas - but we are not informed what the "consequences" are going to be if he delays.

Cairo Tel. 481

Verigrams 4/2

Sir M. Lampson, having got off rather slowly, is now travelling at a vertiginous speed. But it is all in line with the S.O.S. expressed with K. deal with the King now rather than later.

The "deposition" of Lam is now being handled by the Ad. Sec. and will be submitted by staff.

4.2.42

men as they have discarded me. They would be consulted on big issues where necessary, for example on treaty matters and on questions of supplies.

Here the King insisted again on a coalition government and Mahas again declined for the above reasons and added that the position is very difficult and that any other person in his place would have declined responsibility of power in these circumstances. Mahas added that he was ready to assume responsibility and the whole of it in spite of the sacrifice it meant to him. "Considering the country had been drawn into the abyss" Mahas said, "I must be in a position to work successfully and am not afraid of the responsibility of power provided that it is for the good of my country".

[INDIV.]

J 556
FEB 1942

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM: EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir M. Lampson
No. 466 (?)
3rd February, 1942.

D. 10.22 p.m. 3rd February, 1942.
R. 10.30 p.m. 3rd February, 1942.

0:0:0:0:0

MOST IMMEDIATE

Following is record dictated by Nahas himself of conversation with King Farouk on the afternoon of February 3rd at 3 p.m.

King: You know the seriousness of the position.

Nahas: Yes and I have had time to form an opinion about it.

King: I too have an opinion on the case and would like your opinion and that of other leaders primarily in respect of coalition Cabinet under your Premiership and that you should all work together as happily [group omitted ? as] in my father's time provisionally of course for the period of the war.

Nahas: This solution would not be in accordance with the public good. Position in the country is very grave indeed. The people put the blame for the present situation on successive Cabinets of the present régime. Position is terribly serious not only politically but in every other sense: the people are starving, the people are naked, the people feel they are not well-governed and they blame the régime. I must not therefore associate any of these men with myself in my Government for two reasons.

(1) They put the blame for the present situation on the régime and all their grievances are put to that régime and if I accept to associate them with me I should lose the public confidence and would not be able to govern profitably.

(2) Intrigues which will be bound to follow inside cabinet constructed on these lines.

For these two reasons my position would be untenable and also unprofitable.

I thank Your Majesty for offering me the Premiership and wish to say how much I appreciate Your Majesty's confidence. In order to work successfully I must have homogeneity. This does not mean that I would discard those

nan/

J

J 556

EGYPT

Registry Number J 556/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir M. Lampson (Cairo)

No. 466

Dated 3rd Feb. 1942

Received in Registry 4th Feb. 1942

J: Egypt and Sudan

Conversation between King Farouk and Nahas Pasha. Transmits record of conversation between His Majesty and Nahas Pasha as dictated by Nahas himself. Nahas informed His Majesty that the condition of the country was serious and stated that he could not associate himself with any members of the present regime without losing the confidence of the public and the intrigues which would follow a cabinet on these lines would make his position untenable. His Majesty insisted on a coalition government but Nahas refused for these reasons.

Last Paper.

J 555

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Sec. J 557

J. 4/2

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

1/2

pa 25

Next Paper.

J 557

6. Amin asked whether I wished to insist on coalition? Or, as alternative, on consultative body containing elements of the other parties. I replied that it must primarily be a matter for Nahas Pasha to judge. For myself, I should have thought that a serious attempt to form a coalition would have strengthened Nahas Pasha's hand with the country. But he must decide. Amin said that Nahas Pasha left to his own judgment, would not agree to coalition.

Handwritten notes:
 B
 C
 D

7. Finally, I agreed that the following should be put to Nahas Pasha as the best line to take with King Farouk. Nahas Pasha to tell His Majesty that the position is so bad and he has so very little faith in the loyal co-operation of the other parties, and such fear of possible intrigues, that he would suggest, as the only remedy, a purely Wafdist Government when he will assume all responsibility and feel that he can do so. That he is ready (1) to allocate certain seats in the [group undec.] to other parties and (2) that he is ready to consider also later on the advisability as a symbol of coalition, of forming a consultative body selected from other parties.

8. In reply to a query from Amin, I repeated that I would back Nahas Pasha over this: and see him through.

9. Hardly had I drafted the above when I had a telephone call that Nahas Pasha (who has no sense of time) had been so late that he had missed him and that he had presumably gone straight down to the Palace. I send it none the less as each move may later have its importance.

INDIV.

J 555
FEB 1942

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number } 555/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir M. Lampson, Cairo.

No. 462.

Dated 3rd Feb., 1942.

Received in Registry } 4th Feb., 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Internal Situation in Egypt.
Refers to Cairo telegram 453 (J 553/38/16). Amin stated that Nahas Pasha will refuse coalition. His reason being that even under Hussein Sirri intrigue was rife. He always worked with His Majesty's Government and he wants a free hand regarding the Palace whose opposition he would arouse. Nahas is willing to have coalition elements in consultative body but he alone must govern. It was suggested that Nahas should suggest to King Farouk Wardish Government when he would assume responsibility and was prepared to allocate certain seats to other parties and would consider later forming a consumative body. His Majesty's Ambassador gives his support.

Last Paper.

J554

(Minutes.)
See on J557.

JH

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

12/5

Next Paper.

555

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From EGYPT.

J 554

[Cypher]

From CAIRO to FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir H. Lampson.

No. 461.

3rd February, 1942.

D. 5.35 p.m.

R. 10.35 p.m.

3rd February, 1942.

3rd February, 1942.

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No. 572 and my telegram No. 453. J 553/30/16

Very opportunely Amin Osman Pasha asked to see me this morning. I have purposely avoided seeing him during the past 3 months to prevent any foundation for rumours of intrigue with the Embassy. Position is now entirely changed and he is once more particularly valuable as the Homme de Confiance of Nahas.

2. I defined my attitude clearly and took the opportunity of making the points in your telegram No. 572. If and when Nahas took office I should be making them direct with him. Amin fully agreed that they were very necessary points and did not anticipate that there should be any real difficulty over any of them. He concurred that it would have been a mistake to see Nahas before he was seeing King Farouk.

5. I sent message through him to Nahas that he should turn down the proposal for transition Government but that he should offer to do his best to form coalition Government. That would greatly strengthen his position both with the Egyptian public and with us. Coalition under Nahas was ideal. In reply to question from Amin I advised Nahas strongly against making a condition of fresh election - that would necessarily follow if he took office, seeing that he has only some dozen seats in the Chamber. Actually fresh elections just now were most undesirable and when it came to the point Nahas should revive his idea of allocating seats to other parties which could no doubt be duly legalised. He could tell Nahas that provided he played his hand reasonably well I was behind him. But I was sure that Nahas would agree I should for the time being keep in the background. It would be time to emerge when my support was needed.

4. Amin told me that Nahas was fully determined if he came in to clean up the Palace and have no further nonsense from King Farouk.

5. I expect to be informed this evening of what passes with Nahas at the Palace this afternoon.

6. To complete the record Sirri Pasha rang me up this morning. He is definitely against transition government; which is Palace trick to gain time for further intrigue against us. He believes that the chances of coalition are nil, but from internal political angle it should be played for as ideal. He remains convinced that reform of Government will be the final solution.

INDIV.

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From EGYPT.

[Cypher] From CAIRO to FOREIGN OFFICE. ✓

Sir M. Lampson,

No. 461.

3rd February, 1942.

D. 5.35 p.m.

R. 10.35 p.m.

3rd February, 1942.

3rd February, 1942.

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INDIV.

J

J 554
121
12

31566

Internal situation in Egypt.

Refers to Foreign Office telegram 572. (J 515/58/16
Amin Gesman Pasha was informed of points in this
telegram and agreed it would be unwise to see Nahas
before he saw King Farouk. Message was sent through
him to Nahas to refuse proposal for transition
Government but should offer to form coalition Govern-
ment. Nahas was advised against seeking elections. Sir
Pasha is against transition Government but chances of
coalition are nil and considers reform of government
will be final solution.

Registry } J 554/38/16
Number }

TELEGRAM FROM Sir M.
Lampson, Cairo.

No. 461.

Dated 3rd Feb., 1942.

Received 4th Feb., 1942.
in Registry }

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Last Paper.

J 553

(Minutes.)

شروط في الوقت / ...

See on J 557.

J 1/2.

References.

J 553/38/16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

37/1
6.2.

10/1
13/5

Next Paper.

J 555

Registry 407
No. J 364/38/16

M.D.P.

Draft.

Sir M. Lampson,
CAIRO.

Telegram.

No. 467

Cypher. Jan 27/42
INDIV/K

War Cabinet dist.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUT FILE

Despatched

M.

January, 1942.

MOST IMMEDIATE

Your telegrams Nos. 361 and 362 [of 26th January: threatened resignation of the Egyptian Government].

It is clear that since we must
~~It is clear that since we have decided~~

~~to~~ support the Prime Minister in his present dispute with the King. *(Kings)* We cannot allow former to be forced to resign over that dispute.

2. Provided this principle is maintained, you have full discretion to act as you think best.

3. Present Minister for Foreign Affairs is not of any very great value. But if his resignation would entail either (a) resignation of the Prime Minister, or (b) appearance of a victory for the King, it cannot be allowed. If, as appears from your telegrams, it would produce both these effects it is doubly ruled out.

AG.
Jan 27/42

AG. Jan 27th

11 sent.

1942 56
27/1/42

J 407 / 38 / 16

[CIPHER].

F I L M S

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 565.
January 26th, 1942.

D. 8.45 p.m. January 26th, 1942.
R. 8.10 p.m. January 26th, 1942.

YYYYYY

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Please repeat to Bagdad "MOST IMMEDIATE" for Minister of State.

J 334/35/16 J 314/35/16 J 361/16

Your telegrams Nos. 402 and 451 and my telegrams Nos. 311, 361 and 362 about Egyptian internal crisis.

J 407/35/16

[Action taken accordingly by Communications Department].

[INDIV].

27 JAN 1942
RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT
BAGDAD
J. 2/11

5. However slighted he may feel it seems to me that the King's action is intolerable: and I hope you will authorise me most urgently to include it in my desiderata to His Majesty on Wednesday morning.

6. The Prime Minister asked me whether, if we took up a strong line, we were prepared to see it through. I replied I had no doubt on that score: but I could not myself believe that, faced squarely with the gravity of the issue, King Farouk would be so misguided as to hold out. But naturally our service authorities had been fully cognisant of the recent case and all its developments from the outset. I enquired how, he estimated, strong action (if we were put to it, which we all sincerely hoped we should not) would affect the country? He replied, badly, for unfortunately the news from the Western Desert was not good and only to-day the German radio claimed the capture of 146 of our tanks which, however untrue, had a bad effect on the gullible Egyptian public.

7. May I have most urgent instructions? Unless I receive them I shall act as above on Wednesday morning.

[INDIV]

[Repeated under F.O. No. 103 to Bagdad for Minister of State as requested in Cairo telegram No. 365 (not distributed). Copies sent to Colonel Jacob and Mr. Armstrong].

in the invidious position of acquiescing in the sacrifice of one of our friends.

6. I understood from Hassanein that no announcement will be made until Wednesday; and I have warned him solemnly against facing us with a fait accompli.

[Repeated to Bagdad under Foreign Office No. 101 for Minister of State; as requested in Cairo telegram No. 365 (not distributed).]

Copies sent to Mr. Armstrong and Colonel Jacob].

INDIV.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.

D. 5.50 p.m. 26th January, 1942.

No. 361.

26th January, 1942.

R. 6.15 p.m. 26th January, 1942.

////

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram 451. } 360 - 38 / 16

There have been further developments.

2. Report reached me this morning that King Farouk was insisting on the resignation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3. I sent for Hassanein who confirmed it. The King's prestige had been affected by the failure to consult him; obviously the Prime Minister could not go, as that would involve us, so the only way to avoid that and at the same time to save the King's face was the compromise of the Minister for Foreign Affairs going and the Prime Minister staying. On the King's instructions Hassanein was seeing the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon to persuade him to tender his resignation to the Prime Minister. Hassanein pleaded strongly that when I saw the Prime Minister (I am doing so this afternoon) I would persuade him in the general interest to let the Minister for Foreign Affairs go. He dilated on the unpopularity of Hussein Sirri who was perpetually attacked in Parliament and he urged very earnestly that we should not get drawn into supporting him over a matter where the whole country (so he alleged) were solidly behind the King.

4. I replied that was all very well, but it amounted to the sacrifice of the Minister for Foreign Affairs for something he had done in the execution of a decision of his Prime Minister and colleagues and at our request. At our last interview Hassanein had assured me that Hussein Sirri and the Minister for Foreign Affairs would remain. King Farouk's prestige might be involved but what about ours? In these circumstances I could not see how I could possibly be expected to press the Prime Minister to act as suggested. Hassanein continued to argue that our position was not involved. Sirri had blundered vis-à-vis the King and the Minister for Foreign Affairs must pay for it. If the King did not get satisfaction, his (Hassanein's) position at the palace would be impossible. This he repeated more than once.

5. If, when I see the Prime Minister, he says he will not sacrifice the Minister for Foreign Affairs, then our course seems clear - we support him. If, on the other hand, he says he is allowing the Minister for Foreign Affairs to go, I am not quite so clear. It might, for a time, ease the situation, but not for long as the Prime Minister's position would inevitably be still further weakened. And we should be

/in.....

J

50

31566

Registry Number } J 407/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir H. Lampson,

No. (Cairo) 367 and 362

Dated 26th Jan. 1942.

Received in Registry } 27th Jan. 1942.

J : Egypt and Sudan

Internal situation in Egypt. Refers to Foreign Office telegram 451 (J 304/38/10). King is insisting on resignation of Foreign Minister Hassanein confirms the report. If Prime Minister refuses to remove Foreign Minister His Majesty's Ambassador will support him but if he allows him to go position is not clear. Hassanein stated that no announcement will be made until Wednesday and he was warned not to confront His Majesty's Government with a fait accompli. Unless Foreign Minister is reinstated Prime Minister will resign at noon on Wednesday. Requests instructions to add "continuance of Government in office" to his requests from King Farouk. Prime Minister stated that strong action of H.M. Government would have a bad effect.

Last Paper.

J 369

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

sent to Bagdad. 101 Jan 26
" " " 103 " 27
Tel Cairo 467 Jan 27
Reperated to Bagdad 110
" " Tehran 144
Jan 27

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Box 12/16

Next Paper.

J 414

(Minutes.)
Off telegram in reply has been submitted.

J-27/1

See within. Cairo tel no. 365 of Jan 26th and initial thereon.

OUT FILE

49

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

J. 364/38/16

[Cypher] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

To: EGYPT

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 451

January 25th, 1942.

D. 5.15. p.m. 25th January, 1942.

b b b b b

IMMEDIATE

your 19 My telegram No. 311.

I confirm authority conferred in my telegram No. 402.

2. I feel, however, that it would be best if you were to base your representations to His Majesty primarily on the utter incongruity of the retention of Italian officials in the Royal Household at a time when the full efforts of ourselves as Egypt's Ally are being devoted to the frustration of Italian designs upon Egyptian territory. You will no doubt add that in our view responsibility for this situation must rest at least in part with Abdul Wahab on whose elimination we are likewise forced to insist.

3. The incident between the King and his Ministers over the rupture of diplomatic relations with Vichy will then assume its natural place in your representations as an illustration of the dangers which may be expected to arise from the present organisation of the Palace entourage. The case is one in which a relatively minor issue has been allowed by influences surrounding the King, which we must assume to be directly hostile to the British Alliance, to assume an importance out of all proportion to its real significance.

4. For your own information and whatever bearing the Egyptian constitution may be found to have on the point at issue, it was obviously wrong for the Prime Minister not to have informed His Majesty of the Government's decision. But you may very well feel it undesirable to give any indication whatever, either to the King or to the Prime Minister, that this is our view: and if the King's indignation is more concerned with the breach with Vichy than with the mere failure to inform him in advance he is proportionately less entitled to any sympathy at all.

INDIV

4. For your own information and whatever bearing the Egyptian constitution may be found to have on the point at issue, it was obviously wrong for the Prime Minister not to have informed His Majesty of the Government's decision. But you may very well feel it undesirable to give any indication whatever, either to the King or to the Prime Minister, that this is our view: [and if the King's indignation is more concerned with the breach with Vichy than with the mere failure to inform him in advance he is proportionately less entitled to any sympathy at all.]

(Intd) M.P.

(Intd) A.C.

Jan. 24/42

approved by S/S

Extract in a memo dated 15

SEM

25/1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No: J 364/38/16.

Copy of draft sent for the Secretary of State's approval.

OUT FILE

25.1.42

M.D.P.

Despatched 5.15 P M.

Draft.

IMMEDIATE.

Sir M. Lampson,
CAIRO.

~~My~~ telegram No. 311.

Telegram.

I confirm authority conferred in my telegram No. 402.

No. 451

2. I feel, however, that it would be best if you were to base your representations to His Majesty primarily on the utter incongruity of the retention of Italian officials in the Royal Household at a time when the full efforts of ourselves as Egypt's Ally are being devoted to the frustration of Italian designs upon Egyptian territory. You will no doubt add that in our view responsibility for this situation must rest at least in part with Abdul Wahab on whose elimination we are likewise forced to insist.

Cypher.

Jan. 25

INDIV/K

War Cabinet dist.

3. The incident between the King and his Ministers over the rupture of diplomatic relations with Vichy will then assume its natural place in your representations as an illustration of the dangers which may be expected to arise from the present organisation of the Palace entourage. The case is one in which a relatively minor issue has been allowed by influences surrounding the King, which we must assume to be directly hostile to the British Alliance, to assume an importance out of all proportion to its real significance.

4.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

APN

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

364
24 JAN 1942

Sir M. Lampson

No. 311

23rd January, 1942

D. 10.54 p.m. 23rd January, 1942

R. 1.00 a.m. 24th January, 1942

a.a.a.a.a.a

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No. 402. ^{N.P.} _{J334}

My telegram No. 304, ^{J363 which crossed it, will have shown that I maintained my recommendation.}

2. But in case Hassanein's statement on the constitutional issue (my telegram No. 290) ^{J340} and Prime Minister's reactions (my telegram No. 292) ^{J341} should affect your decision, I shall suspend action until I hear from you again.

(INDIV)


24 JAN 1942
O. HASSANEIN

later gains the great initial advantage that the Egyptians are themselves persuaded that he both knows the mind, and enjoys the confidence, of his own Government without any need for consultation.

But we must, of course, deal with Sir M. Lampson's telegrams as we have them. And here, and after talking with Mr. Scrivener, I feel that the most important thing is to get the Ambassador off the foot of the diplomatic break with Vichy and on to the foot of the undesirability of harbouring Italians in the Palace, or of retaining an Egyptian functionary who may be presumed to have acquiesced in, or assisted in, the employment of Italians, with the Vichy business used merely as an illustration to show how this state of affairs may be relied on to produce a serious and intolerable crisis out of a relatively trivial happening.

In actual fact and whatever the Egyptian constitution may say - I doubt whether it has any direct bearing - it seems clear that the Prime Minister was wrong in not telling the King of the Government's decision to break off relations with Vichy. But Sir M. Lampson may quite probably feel that it would not be expedient for us to give either the King or the Prime Minister an inkling of our view on this point.

Submit a draft tel:



24th January, 1942.

I agree with the draft tel. It seems to me that the time has come to clear the Palace of these undesirable. But apart from that - or in addition to it - Sir M. Lampson has committed himself so far in speaking to Hassanain - see his tel. no. 290 - that it will be unwise not to go ahead with it now.

Ab. Jan. 26, 1942

1 agree

AB 7 Jan 24

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Whatever the strict letter of the constitution, the Ministers treated HM with a certain lack of politeness, or they have presented him with a grievance which - if we go for him too - he will exploit by posing as a martyr. But the overriding consideration must, I think, be whether action is essential to safeguard the future & prevent the situation sliding in the present. If it is, we must risk misrepresentation. Moreover Sir M. Lampson - see his telegram No. 290, has practically committed himself to us in advance.

~~Indiscreetly~~

Revised.

24/11.

Discussed with Sir M. Peterson.

Sp submitted.

J. M.

Italian influence and undesirable favourites are both old stories in Egyptian Palace history. In 1926 we had to oust Naha Pasha himself and in 1934-5 we took similar action against Ibrashi.

In this present case my personal view is that Sir Miles Lampson's methods are wrong. The practice of following each interview up with a telegram to London, which the Egyptians literally follow to the cable office and which, as they well know, gives them some days for further mischief is not the right one: and in Egypt of all countries a man on the spot who acts first and telegraphs

later/

wrong for the Prime Minister not to have informed His Majesty of the Government's decision. But you may very well feel it undesirable to give any indication whatever, either to the King or to the Prime Minister, that this is our view: and if the King's indignation is more concerned with the ~~breach~~ breach with Vichy than with the mere failure to inform him in advance he is proportionately less entitled to any sympathy at all.

[Handwritten mark]

ab. Jan 24/42.

AB Jan 25

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. J 364/38/16

M.D.P.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

Despatched

M.

Draft.

IMMEDIATE

January, 1942.

Sir M. Lampson,
CAIRO.

My telegram No. 311.

Telegram.

I confirm authority conferred in my telegram
No. 402.

No.....

2. I feel, however, that it would be best

Cypher.

if you were to base your representations to
His Majesty primarily on the utter incongruity
of the retention of Italian officials in the
Royal Household at a time when the full efforts
of ourselves as Egypt's Ally are being devoted
to the frustration of Italian designs upon
Egyptian territory. You will no doubt add that
in our view responsibility for this situation
must rest at least in part with Abdul Wahab on
whose elimination we are likewise forced to
insist.

War Cabinet dist.

3. The incident between the King and
his Ministers over the rupture of diplomatic
relations with Vichy will then assume its
natural place in your representations as an
illustration of the dangers which may be
expected to arise from the present organisation
of ^{the Palace} Italian entourage. The case is one in which
a relatively minor issue has been allowed by
influences surrounding the King, which we
^{must assume} believe to be directly hostile to the British
Alliance, to assume an importance out of all
proportion to its real significance.

4. For your own information and whatever
bearing the Egyptian constitution may be found
to have on the point at issue, it was obviously
wrong/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

S. S.

I am keeping a
 copy of this ^{letter} ^{draft} ⁱⁿ
 case you wish to authorize
 its ^{trans.} ^{by} ^{telegraph.}

A.B.

Jan. 21st/12.

This telegram
 has been ^{dispatched}
 by Sir M. Petersen,
 Lt. S/S. having
 telephoned his
 authority.

E. Millard.

25/12.

J

J 363
24 JAN 1942

42

K

31566

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry }
Number J 364/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Sir H. Lampson
(Cairo)

No. 311

Dated 23rd Jan, 1942
Received in Registry 24th Jan, 1942

J: Egypt and Sudan

Internal Situation in Egypt.

Refers to Foreign Office telegram 402 (J 334/38/16). In view of Hassanein's statement on constitutional issue and Prime Minister's reactions, action will be suspended under further instruction received from Foreign Office.

*all in a letter dated 23/1/42
referring to the above*

Last Paper.

J 363

References.

- J 363 / 38 / 16
- J 340 / 38 / 16
- J 341 / 38 / 16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Repealed to Bagdad, 102 Jan 25th
Tel. Cairo no 451 Jan 25th
Repealed to Bagdad, 100 Jan 25th

(Minutes.)

*Minute written.
Dft submitted.*

*W. Harrison
24/1*

Alil 12/1/42

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

12/1/42

Next Paper.

J 369

OUT FILE OUTWARD TELEGRAM

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER].

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

TO EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No: 402
January 22nd, 1942.

D. 9. 50 p.m. January 22nd, 1942.

111111

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegrams Nos. 272, 283 and 284.

Unless your interview with Hassenein leads you to revise your estimate, I agree that you should act as suggested in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 284.

[INDIV].

Registry
No.

OUT FILE

Jan 15/42.

Draft.

Immediate. 9553/E

Jim Langston.
Cairo

You ltr. nos. 272, 283 and 284.

Tr. no. 402

~~If after your interview with Hassanin,~~
Unless your interview with Hassanin
leads you to revise your estimate, I
agree that you shd. act as suggested in
§4 of your ltr. no. 284.

Jan 22
(Cyprus).

INDIV | K

Al.

Jan 24/42.

War Cabinet
Distribution.

ABE Jan 22

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

[THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR SECURITY AND SHOULD BE RETAINED BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON].

[CYPLER].

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET).

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 284.
January 21st, 1942.

D. 12.25 a.m. January 22nd, 1942.
R. 2.40 a.m. January 22nd, 1942.

yyyy

IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram. *g*

SECRET.

Matter seems even more serious than I had supposed. Secret report from our usual diplomatic source (as a rule reliable) has just reached me this evening to the effect that Ali Maher is behind this intrigue and that it is he who is inspiring King Farouk not only to sack Minister for Foreign Affairs but to dismiss Sirri Government as sacrificing rights of the country to Great Britain. Action of the Government in breaking with Vichy at our behest is quoted as a consequence of this weakness. According to the same report, great pressure is being exercised upon King Farouk to replace the present Government, but a Government controlled by Ali Maher behind the scenes and whose motto would be "strict execution of the Treaty but not complaisance towards the British". Names of Ibrashi and Mahmoud Khalil are spoken of.

2. I have summoned Hassenein to see me late to-night when I shall warn him most solemnly that King Farouk is playing with fire: and shall remind him of the first paragraph of your telegram No. 3417 of last year.

3. This development, if correct, as I have no reason to doubt it is, renders the need for speed all the greater, to prevent situation sliding. I trust, therefore, that I may receive authority requested in my immediately preceding telegram urgently.

4. I may know more after seeing Hassenein, but it looks to me as though the moment for the final trial of strength with the Palace may be imminent. In addition therefore to the expulsion of Abdul Wahab Talaat (Ali Maher's tool) I am minded to insist (within a time limit) on total elimination of all Italians of whom many still remain in Palace employment and one of whom (though now technically Egyptian) notorious, Primi [sic] is particularly dangerous and obnoxious. *Pulli*

[Copies sent to Captain Clifford and Mr. Armstrong].

[INDIV].

W. L. C.

[THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR SECRECY AND SHOULD BE
RETAINED BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON]

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

331

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 283.

D. 12.25 a.m. 22nd January, 1942.
R. 2.50 a.m. 22nd January, 1942.

21st January, 1942.

ZZZZZ

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram 272, last paragraph.

J³³³ green

I brought the matter up before the War Council this morning. There was unanimity that salutary action was highly desirable and that subject to your concurrence, it should take form immediate insistence with King Farouk that he gets rid of Abdul Wahab Talatt from the Palace.

2. The Commander-in-Chief Middle East, in agreeing emphasised the desirability of avoiding any commitments involving the use of force at this time when, owing to essential calls elsewhere available forces in Egypt are already fully occupied. It was agreed that, whilst no guarantee could be given that there might not be trouble, the risk was not great and should be taken. I expressed the view that to the best of my belief King Farouk would yield if he saw we were in earnest.

3. I submit that speed is essential if the maximum effect is to be achieved: and request authority to act as proposed forthwith. I am convinced that it is high time King Farouk had a lesson: and that if we do not pull him up sharply over this glaring case, we shall only be storing up worse trouble in the future.

4. Seen and approved by Minister of State.

[Copies sent to Captain Clifford and Mr. Armstrong].

INDIV.

SEARCHED

J 334/38/16

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM: EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir M. Lampson

No. 284

21st January, 1942.

D. 12.25 a.m. 22nd January, 1942.

R. 2.40 a.m. 22nd January, 1942.

0:0:0:0:0

IMMEDIATE

My immediately preceding telegram.

SECRET

Matter seems even more serious than I had supposed. Secret report from our usual diplomatic source (as a rule reliable) has just reached me this evening to the effect that Ali Maher is behind this intrigue and that it is he who is inspiring King Farouk not only to sack Minister for Foreign Affairs but to dismiss Sirri Government as sacrificing rights of the country to Great Britain. Action of the Government in breaking with Vichy at our behest is quoted as a consequence of this weakness. According to the same report, great pressure is being exercised upon King Farouk to replace the present Government, but a Government controlled by Ali Maher behind the scenes and whose motto would be "strict execution of the Treaty but not complaisance towards the British". Names of Ibrashi and Mahmoud Khalil are spoken of.

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4. I may know more after seeing Hassenein, but it looks to me as though the moment for the final trial of strength with the Palace may be imminent. In addition therefore to the expulsion of Abdul Wahab Talaat (Ali Maher's tool) I am minded to insist (within a time limit) on total elimination of all Italians of whom many still remain in Palace employment and one of whom (though now technically Egyptian) notorious, Primli [sic] is particularly dangerous and obnoxious.

[Copies sent to Captain Clifford and Mr. Armstrong].

[INDIV.]

REC. 22/1/42

J 334/38/6 in dept.

16

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM: EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir H. Lampson
No. 283

21st January, 1942.

D. 12.23 a.m. 22nd January, 1942.

R. 2.30 a.m. 22nd January, 1942.

0:0:0:0:0

IMMEDIATE

My telegram 272, last paragraph.

I brought the matter up before the War Council this morning. There was unanimity that salutary action was highly desirable and that subject to your concurrence, it should take form immediate insistence with King Farouk that he gets rid of Abdul Wahab Talatt from the Palace.

2. The Commander-in-Chief Middle East, in agreeing emphasised the desirability of avoiding any commitments involving the use of force at this time when, owing to essential calls elsewhere available forces in Egypt are already fully occupied. It was agreed that, whilst no guarantee could be given that there might not be trouble, the risk was not great and should be taken. I expressed the view that to the best of my belief King Farouk would yield if he saw we were in earnest.

3. I submit that speed is essential if the maximum effect is to be achieved: and request authority to act as proposed forthwith. I am convinced that it is high time King Farouk had a lesson: and that if we do not pull him up sharply over this glaring case, we shall only be storing up worse trouble in the future.

4. Seen and approved by Minister of State.

[Copies sent to Captain Clifford and Mr. Armstrong].

[INDIV.]

[THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR SECRECY AND SHOULD BE
RETAINED BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON].

[CYPHER]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET).

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 283.

21st January, 1942.

D. 12.23 a.m. 22nd January, 1942.

R. 2.30 a.m. 22nd January, 1942.

ZZZZZ

IMMEDIATE.

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4. Seen and approved by Minister of State.

[Copies sent to Captain Clifford and Mr. Armstrong].

INDIV.

21/1/42
21/1/42

[THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR SECRECY AND SHOULD BE RETAINED BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON].

[CYPHER].

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET).

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 284.
January 21st, 1942.

D. 12.25 a.m. January 22nd, 1942.
R. 2.40 a.m. January 22nd, 1942.

YVYY

IMMEDIATE.

My immediately preceding telegram.

SECRET.

Matter seems even more serious than I had supposed. Secret report from our usual diplomatic source (as a rule reliable) has just reached me this evening to the effect that Ali Maher is behind this intrigue and that it is he who is inspiring King Farouk not only to sack Minister for Foreign Affairs but to dismiss Sirri Government as sacrificing rights of the country to Great Britain. Action of the Government in breaking with Vichy at our behest is quoted as a consequence of this weakness. According to the same report, great pressure is being exercised upon King Farouk to replace the present Government, but a Government controlled by Ali Maher behind the scenes and whose motto would be "strict execution of the Treaty but not complaisance towards the British". Names of Ibrashi and Mahmoud Khalil are spoken of.

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3. This development, if correct, as I have no reason to doubt it is, renders the need for speed all the greater, to prevent situation sliding. I trust, therefore, that I may receive authority requested in my immediately preceding telegram urgently.

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[Copies sent to Captain Clifford and Mr. Armstrong].

[INDIV].

prohibitions - (a) Insisting on clearing out Abdul Wahab Talast and the Italians and (b) having a real show down with the King - i.e. "Kicking Farouk out."

Although Sir M. Langford, in S. 4 of his tel. 25th talks of (a) as "the final trial of strength", I don't think it is: it is a preventive measure to prevent worse happening - the sacking of the M.F.A. or - worse still - the sacking of the Govt. That would probably involve (b). But I don't think we're there yet, and may even avert it.

Mr. Lister agrees & we have agreed. annexed tel.

(N.B. on this occasion H.M. Amb., the Min. of State and the C.-in-C. are all agreed)

ALC.

Jan. 22. 1942.

I agree with
Sir A. Cadogan's
excellent summary

ALC

Yes -
That is
the point
ALC

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

that he can play fast & loose with us.

to criticism in connexion with the break with Vichy

As regards the M.F.A. incident, Serrailly has exposed his Government to some extent by his incurable habit of hedging behind ~~it~~ when he has a difficult decision to make. And he himself does not appear to want action (though he is always inclined to refer to the Palace ~~on smaller matters~~ except on vital matters)

~~In fact~~ ~~the warning~~
The warning which is being given to Hassanini is a serious one (the 3417 attached) and contains a reference to British martial law. If the M.F.A. incident stood alone, I should be inclined to regard it as sufficient.

If Sir M. Lampton takes action, he may just as well clean out the Palace properly, & send the Italians sacked.

Perivener

21/1.

I have spoken to Mr. Scrimgeour about this.

It seems to me that there are two

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

to be given to Sir M.L. should be
~~contingent on the situation~~
~~to Sir M.L.'s expression.~~

~~Presiveness.~~

contingent on his being ~~satisfied~~ after his
talk with Hassanain (which may be
very important or of which we have
not yet received the report) that
the situation is in fact likely to
shirk if no action be taken, or
that failure to take action could
be taken by King F as an indication
that

ITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

of course

I am not convinced that the situation
 which has so far arisen (KEMFA has
not (one) warrants our pressing a button which
may release a crisis. The criterion is the
 safety of our base in Egypt: it has not
 yet been endangered by the King's action,
 if the secret report forecasts accurately,
 and the King tries to replace Sa'ad by
 a creature of Ali Maher (the Italians)
 we must of course intervene, although
 with it - kicking Farouk out of
~~the way~~ ~~is not quite clear~~
 necessary. I think therefore that the
 authority

of course

*consideration of the
 security of the base
 in Egypt is the
 main factor*

*the King's action
 is not yet
 a crisis*

WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

J

J 334
22 JAN 1942

31566

International Situation in Egypt.

Refers to Cairo telegram 272 (J 333 G). There was unanimity in the War Council that salutary action should be taken. King Farouk should be forced to remove Abdul Wahab Talatt from the Palace. If maximum effect is to be achieved speed is essential and authority to act as proposed is sought. Matter is serious and Ali Maher is behind the intrigue. Hassenein will be warned that threat contained in Foreign Office telegram 3417 (J 3109/18/16) will be implemented. Wishes to insist on removal of all Italians from Palace. Copies sent Captain Clifford and Mr. Armstrong.

Registry Number J 334/38/16.

TELEGRAM FROM Sir F. Lawson, Cairo

No. 233 and 234.

Dated 21st Jan. 1942.

Received in Registry 2nd Jan. 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Last Paper.

J333

References.

J 3109/18/16 1941
J 333/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Rel Cairo 402 Jan 22 Repeated to Baghdad.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Handwritten initials

Next Paper.

J 340

(Minutes.)

See tel: No 402 to Cairo: + tets Nos

290 + 292 from Cairo.

J. 23/1.

was only informing me of his plans informally. He did not wish to speak to me direct about them so as to avoid any suspicion of [gp. undec.]. It was for this reason that he had charged Amin Osman to tell me of his intention. He wished to place his troubles with the King on an Egyptian and not on a British ground.

(11) Amin Osman intimated that Nahas Pasha's intention was to deal with the Moslem brethren about whose dangerous activities many reports were coming in and other problems of hostile influences after meeting Parliament.

(12) Amin Osman also said that Nahas Pasha also had it in mind to suggest to King Farouk that he should make a friendly gesture to the King of Greece by offering on behalf of the Egyptian Government, the hospitality of Egypt to any number of Greek children.

[Note by Communications Department: paragraphing incorrect].

[INDIV]

5-1319

[CYPHER] 22 MAR 1942 DEPARTMENTAL NO.2.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson. No. 872. 21st March, 1942. D. 7.55 p.m. 21st March, 1942. R. 10.10 p.m. 21st March, 1942.

SSSSS

IMPORTANT.

Amin Osman Pasha brought me a message from Nahas Pasha this morning to the following effect.

? suggested to annoy

(2) Nahas Pasha was having trouble with King Farouk who was making difficulties about receiving him and had wanted him to transact some business through Hassanein. His Majesty through Hassanein had objected to Nahas Pasha's attitude in insisting on a proper reception of the King of Greece. Hassanein had agreed with the Prime Minister that such a reception would [? a group omitted] Germans who would no longer regard Egypt as neutral. Nahas Pasha had replied that allies of Egypt's ally must be Egypt's friends and Egypt had not to consider German susceptibilities but the rights and duties of Egypt. He would stand up against the British if they asked for anything unreasonable and if they asked for anything reasonable he would grant it.

? 3

(4) The King was also angered about Nahas Pasha's action towards Ali Maher [go. undec.] according to proof in Nahas Pasha's possession, had had contact with the King since Ali Maher's interview with the Prime Minister.

51252/32/16

(5) Nahas Pasha was also displeased with Makram's attitude about the King (see my telegram No. 832) and the fact that Makram was having direct contacts with Palace officials.

(6) The Prime Minister was seeing the King today and tomorrow to give him a clear warning. The Prime Minister would insist on the right of direct access to the King would stress the necessity for the King's conforming to the policy adopted regarding the King of Greece. Nahas Pasha would also insist that there should be no further contacts between the King and Ali Maher: in the event of further contacts Ali Maher would be deported.

(7) Nahas Pasha would intimate to the King that if His Majesty did not give him satisfaction over these points, he (Nahas Pasha) would have to insist on a total change of Palace personnel which must be responsible for giving bad advice to the King. Nahas Pasha would also say that he did not approve of Makram's declaration to the press about the King (see my telegram No. 832) 51252.

(8) Generally Nahas Pasha would take the line with the King that Egyptians must act up to the Treaty and that there must be no stabbing Egypt's ally in the back.

(9) If the King proved obstreperous Nahas Pasha would, after meeting the Chamber, bring up before the two Chambers in Congress proposals for modification of Royal powers.

(10) Nahas Pasha wished it to be clearly understood that he

/was

125

J

92

J 1319

EGYPT and SU...
1942

Registry }
Number J 1319/38/16.

TELEGRAM FROM
SIR M. LAMPSON, Cairo

No. 872.

Dated 21st Mar. 1942.

Received
in Registry } Mar. 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Internal Situation. Trouble regarding reception of King of Greece.

A message was sent by Nahas Pasha through Amin Osman regarding the difficulty he was having with King Farouk over the reception of King of Greece. The King objected to the action Nahas had taken over various matters and Nahas was to see him and warn him that if there was any more contact with Ali Maher the latter would be deported and the Palace personnel completely changed. Nahas intentions were explained in full. It is to be suggested that King Farouk should offer hospitality in Egypt to Greek children.

Last Paper.

J 1269

References.

J 1252/38/16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8) Maj. Kirwan (N.O.)
M.I.A. March 25th

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

872
21/3

File
13/3

Next Paper.

(Minutes.)

PP in Dept - Copy of report attached.
This seems to be going quite well. Paragraph 9 is interesting.

Sent Dept PD 27/3 ✓
General Report Dept (p. 1) 23/3 ✓

Pl. see J13306.

23.3.

Ab.

March 23. 1942.

J 1254
18 MAR 1942

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson,
No. 842.
17th March, 1942.

D. 10.30 p.m. 17th March, 1942.
R. 1.50 a.m. 18th March, 1942.

g g g g g

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No. 832 third paragraph. *J1252/38/16*

Nahas Pasha duly saw Ali Maher and gave him the alternatives. If he refused both of them he would be interned at Tor. Ali Maher asked whether if he went to his estate he would be allowed to come to Cairo two days a week. Nahas refused absolutely that he should leave his estate at all.

2. The interview lasted 1½ hours and it was left that Ali Maher must make his choice within one week. Meantime he is being watched.

3. Ali Maher asked if he could go to England? And if so would Nahas provide for him financially? Nahas narrowed the choice down to South America or the Sudan. He would pay the outward but not the return journey and the Egyptian Government would care for his estate during his absence. Ali Maher pressed for an allowance if he went abroad and Nahas indicated readiness to consider it. (Amin tells me Nahas has in mind £1,000 a year but might rise to £3,000).

4. Ali Maher accused Nahas of acting at our behest. Nahas replied that he was acting at no one's behest but on his own conviction on what was best for the King and country. Ali Maher suggested he should call and see me when he could explain away everything. Nahas said he could ask to see me if he wished, but he strongly advised him not to. All the world knew how he had behaved towards us just as they did how he had behaved towards him (Nahas) and also how he had betrayed the interests of his own country.

INDIV.

MAR 1942
F.O. REGISTRY

1942

EGYPT and SUDAN

J. 1254

18 MAR 1942

Nahas Pasha's interview with Ali Maher.

Registry Number } 1254/38/16.

TELEGRAM FROM Sir M. Lampson, Cairo.

No. 842.

Dated 17th Mar. 1942.

Received in Registry 18th Mar. 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Refers to Cairo telegram 832 (J 1252/38/16). Ali Maher was informed that if he refused alternatives offered he would be interned at Tor. He is given a week in which to reply. Nahas informed Ali Maher that he could go either to South America or Sudan and Egyptian Government would pay outward journey and would care for his estate during his absence. An allowance of £1,000 with possible rise to £3,000 is being considered if he goes abroad.

Last Paper.

J1252 (J1191)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

(J1595)

J. 1269.

(Minutes.)

I wonder what Ali Maher envisages he could achieve here. I should have thought that from his point of view it would almost be preferable to go to Tor (which is a fairly quiet prospect). It will be interesting to see whether A. M. makes an attempt to see Sir M. Lampson.

Verisimus

18/3.

Not a very convincing conversation

from any angle as detailed

by Amin Osman.

But I remain of the opinion that it would be highly dangerous for us to commit ourselves to any form of ultimatum to Nahas about Ali Maher.

19. 3.

AB

March 19, 1942.

March 19 1942

[THIS TELEGRAM IS OF PARTICULAR SECRECY AND SHOULD BE
 RETAINED BY THE AUTHORISED RECIPIENT AND NOT PASSED ON].

T. 1149/333/G.

[CYFHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

TO EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 871.

13th March, 1942.

D. 9.05 p.m. 13th March, 1942.

XXXX

IMPORTANT.

Your telegram No. 760.

I am content for the moment with action against the Palace indicated by your telegrams Nos. 719 and 720, coupled with warning contained in your telegram under reference, it being clearly understood that Pulli and Talaat will have to go and (my telegram No. 752) sooner rather than later. But I fail to understand delay in dealing with Ali Maher. As long ago as February 12th Makram assured you (your telegram No. 570) that the Government wished to act promptly and that their followers were "clamouring for drastic measures". Nahas (your telegram No. 841) stated on February 21st that, whilst he wished to choose his own time, he realised that action must be taken without delay. On March 5th he apparently undertook (your telegram No. 720) to deal with Ali Maher on March 7th. On March 10th Amin hedged and said that Nahas was seeing Ali Maher on March 10th. In fact since Nahas came into office we have been treated to a great number of fair words and a minimum of remedial action, and I hope that you will be able to ensure that such action is at any rate largely completed before the elections become a further and uncertain factor in the situation. (My telegram No. 836 paragraph 2).

INDIV.

Registry
No. *L 1149/333/9.*

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

P.S.

Despatched 9:5 P M.

Draft.

13th March, 1942.

Sir M. Lampson,
CAIRO.

IMPORTANT.

Telegram.

Your telegram No. 760.

I am content for the moment with action against the Palace indicated by your telegrams Nos. 719 and 720, ^{copies attached} coupled with warning contained in your telegram under reference, it being clearly understood that Pulli and Talaat will have to go and (my telegram No. 752) ^C sooner rather than later. But I fail to understand delay in dealing with Ali Maher. As long ago as February 12th Makram assured you (your telegram No. 570) ^D that the Government wished to act promptly and that their followers were "clamouring for drastic measures." Nahas (your telegram No. 641) ^E stated on February 21st that, whilst he wished to choose his own time, he realised that action must be taken without delay. On March 5th he apparently undertook (your telegram No. 720) to deal with Ali Maher on March 7th. On March 10th Amin hedged and said that Nahas was seeing Ali Maher on March 10th. In fact since Nahas came into office we have been treated to a great number of fair words and a minimum of remedial action, and I hope that you will be able to ensure that such action is at any rate largely completed before the elections become a further and uncertain factor in the situation.

(my tele. no 626 paragraph 2) Ahmed...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

No... *8.71*
March 13th
cypher
K/INDIV

I think this or No 760 should be given amended War Cabinet Distribution

[Handwritten initials]

452

J1149/G
11 MAR 1942

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER].

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson D. 11. 35 a.m. March 10th, 1942.
No: 760 R. 6. 40 p.m. March 10th, 1942.
March 9th, 1942.

11111

IMPORTANT

Jaad/C *copy at back*

Your telegrams No. 836 and No. 837. *9190/5*

Nahas Pasha is at present indisposed. I have therefore seen Amin Osman to-night at Nahas Pasha's request and told him you were increasingly impatient at the delay in clearing up the Palace (see your telegram No. 835). — *Husein*

2. I asked Amin to urge Nahas Pasha to take more drastic action against Ali Maher who was the core of the trouble. Either he should be sent to Sudan or abroad. As long as he stayed in Egypt we should have no peace. Amin promised to press Nahas Pasha at once but is doubtful if he will succeed. Nahas Pasha is seeing Ali Maher to-morrow (Tuesday).

9190/5

3. How far do you wish me to make an issue with Nahas Pasha for elimination at once of Pulli and Abdul Wahab Talaat from the Palace? I am not clear from your telegram No. 837 whether you regard what Nahas Pasha has already set in motion (see my telegram No. 720) as sufficient for the moment. Please enlighten me. I am quite ready to take up the above point vigorously but it may mean a struggle, this time with Nahas Pasha and not direct with the Palace.

copy at back

4. Amin's advice, for what it is worth, is that we should let Nahas Pasha deal with these matters in his own way and that we are progressing not too badly. Suleh Harb has to-day been confined to his house in Cairo: and Ikhwan el Muslimin and Moslem Association are being dealt with actively.

5. Very confidential. Amin also told me that instructions have been telegraphed to Nachat Pasha to return at once "for consultation" probable intention being to transfer him to Tehran which is vacant and is important owing to family connexion. Nahas Pasha believes Nachat was one of those intriguing with Ali Maher to succeed Hussein Sirry.

[INDIV].

Very possibly he was probably using Ali Maher than vice versa.

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

From: EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir M. Lampson D. 11.35 a.m. March 10th, 1942
No. 760
March 9th, 1942 R. 6.40 p.m. March 10th, 1942

2 m/s

.....

IMPORTANT

Your telegrams No. 836 and No. 837.

Nahas Pasha is at present indisposed. I have therefore seen Amin Osman to-night at Nahas Pasha's request and told him you were increasingly impatient at the delay in clearing up the Palace (see your telegram No. 835).

2. I asked Amin to urge Nahas Pasha to take more drastic action against Ali Maher who was the core of the trouble. Either he should be sent to Sudan or abroad. As long as he stayed in Egypt we should have no peace. Amin promised to press Nahas Pasha at once but is doubtful if he will succeed. Nahas Pasha is seeing Ali Maher to-morrow (Tuesday).

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[INDIV.]

31566

J 543

94
12

J 543/333/9. 38/16

Sir M. Lampson
Cairo

No. 451

Dated: 2/2

Received: 3/2

Last Paper.

333

References.

J 2131/940

J 541/38/16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Mr. Hunter
D.O. 1/2/5
Cairo
Tel. Cairo no. 577
Tel. Cairo no. 573
Mr. Hunter D.O.
1/2/5

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

P.O.
N

Next Paper.

J. 576/2

King Farouk
الملك فاروق / 2/2/50

Suggests procedure for dealing with King Farouk in case of sudden emergency.

- 1) F.O. minute (Sir B. Hewton) of Mar. 12
- 2) D.O. letter of Mar. 10
- 3) F.O. minute (Sir B. Hewton) of Mar. 10

Please see J 1671/6/1955 which deals with the replacement (which then appeared an imminent necessity) of King Farouk by a Regency. In that case, too, it was not possible in the circumstances to suggest a constitutional course.

I submit that Sir M. Lampson's suggestions may be approved. He asks us, however, where King Farouk should be sent; & we could not give a definite reply to this question without consulting the C.O. Possibilities seem to be Kenya, Mauritius & the Seychelles (Zaghlul's place of internment in Tunisia). In replying to Sir M. Lampson I think that we should re-emphasise § 2(a) of Lord Halifax's telegram No 1249 of 1940 (J 2120/6) viz that abdication - or ~~abdication~~ ^{abdication} ~~abdication~~ ^{abdication} - should take place in such circumstances that we can maintain that his conduct has been incompatible with the Treaty... in fact before we "brandish Article 5 of the Treaty" we want to be certain that it applies. *W. Beveridge*
3/2

J 553

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson. D. 10.30 a.m., 3rd February, 1942.
No. 453.
2nd February, 1942. R. 11.50 a.m., 3rd February, 1942.

3 3 3

URGENT.

35/2/46

Unfortunately your telegram No. 572 and the immediately preceding telegram reached me too late: the latter only after midnight. As already reported events had led the Prime Minister to throw in his hand this morning instead of to-morrow, hence my insistence on an audience with King Farouk at 1 p.m. to-day (my telegram No. 449). *J 54/3/46*
It is thus no longer possible to act on that part of your instructions.

2. The only subsequent development up to to-night is that, late this evening, I got a message to Hassanein by Mr. Shone that I trusted that neither King Farouk nor he were under any misapprehension as to the serious importance of summoning Mahas Pasha before noon to-morrow, as stipulated by me this morning. This drew from Hassanein a statement late to-night that King Farouk was seeing Mahas Pasha at 3 p.m. to-morrow, the press and other party leaders thereafter the same afternoon.

3. As events have developed and as I see things to-night I gravely doubt the wisdom of my getting in direct touch with Mahas Pasha in advance of his audience: nor do I fancy he would be willing to see me at the moment as it might embarrass him. It might even deter him from going to see the King, if he knew that we were pressing him in advance to make terms with us. My inclination therefore is to allow things to take their course to-morrow (they hardly ever work out as one anticipates) and reserve action on the lines you suggest (which I welcome and regard as admirable) until the situation clears and I know better than I do to-night what I am up against.

4. Meantime, may I record my grateful thanks for the wide discretion you give me? You can rely on me to deliver the goods to the best of my ability in a situation liable to change almost hourly.

(INDIV)

J541/38/16

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

TO: EGYPT

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 602

3rd February, 1942. D. 6.5 p.m. 3rd February, 1942.

0:0:0:0:0

MOST IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 449 [of February 2nd: Egyptian Cabinet crisis].

In view of manner in which situation has been altered by Sirry's precipitate resignation and consequent impossibility of following suggestions in my telegram No. 572, I must revise opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of that telegram that a Palace nominee without popular support might be acceptable if Nahas proved unco-operative. Such an appointment would suggest a victory by King Farouk (see my telegram No. 597) and I am not prepared to contemplate such a situation in existing circumstances. I should prefer a trial of strength with the King now on the present issue rather than later when, as would inevitably happen, we should be forced to deal with the King's Prime Minister.

2. Whatever happens Italian and pro-Italian Palace clique must go.

[INDIV.]

6.5 p 3 2 42

117

Registry
No. 5541/38/16

CUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

P.S.S.

Despatched M.

Draft.

February, 1942.

Sir M. Lampson,
CAIRO.

Telegram.

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegram No. 449 [of February 2nd: Egyptian Cabinet crisis].

No..... 602 ✓

File 3

Cypher.

INDIV | K

War Cabinet
Distribution.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

In view of manner in which situation has been altered by Sirry's precipitate resignation/ and consequent impossibility of following suggestions in my telegram No. 572, I must revise opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of that telegram that a Palace nominee without popular support might be acceptable if Nahas proved unco-operative. Such an appointment would suggest a victory by King Farouk (see my telegram No. 597.) and I should regard it as difficult and almost impossible to accept. In fact I should prefer a trial of strength with the King now on the issue of ^{present} ~~Nahas' Resignation~~ rather than later when, as would inevitably happen, we should be forced to deal with the King's Prime Minister.

2. Whatever happens Italian and pro-Italian Palace clique must go.

X
Not to be written in this margin

Approved by Sir
M. Reesor

J

ab. J. [unclear]

AB 2/3

5. Before leaving the Palace, I saw Hassanein and told him what had passed. He must see to it that His Majesty did summon Nahas by noon tomorrow. Hassanein argued strongly against this: he disclosed that the Palace plan was to form an interim Government to arrange for the ultimate formation of a coalition Government under Nahas: but he was less explicit that Nahas would be called in forthwith [grp. omitted ? than] over the interim Government. He pleaded that if Nahas was summoned at once, as I was insisting, he would as a result sweep the ends of the country and we should lose any chance of a properly organised opposition (Saadists) to act as a brake when the Government was eventually formed. Meantime he could guarantee that Ali Maherite elements would be excluded from the proposed interim Government. I remarked that judging by the attitude of the Wafd up to date, I could hardly see Nahas or the Wafd agreeing to such an interim Government - or indeed coalition Government later. My point therefore remained that I most earnestly hoped to hear by noon tomorrow that Nahas had been summoned for consultation. It was essential that he, representing the bulk of the country, should fully approve of whatever was done, whether interim or coalition. I left it there.

INDIV.

J 541

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson,
No. 449. D. 9.26 p.m. 2nd February, 1942.
2nd February, 1942. R. 12.50 a.m. 3rd February, 1942.

g g g g g

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 448. J 540/32/16

At 1 p.m. I was duly received by King Farouk who was even more cordial than usual.

2. I explained why I had come down at such short notice. Sirri Pasha [grp. omitted ? had] just resigned and as the Allied representative in Egypt, it was essential that I should know that no successor would be appointed who had not the requisite qualifications for proper fulfilment of treaty obligations.

3. I then gave him the first four points recorded in my telegram No. 443 and read him Article 5 of the treaty to make my status in speaking thus beyond doubt.

4. His Majesty agreed without hesitation that points 1) and 2) were essential and proper. As regards point 3) he had already decided to see Nahas. He indicated that what he was working for was a National Government. He admitted that he knew of no-one but Nahas who could lead such a Government and his relations with Nahas were happily much better at the moment. Ahmed Maher had had the wisdom to realise that this "was not his hour" (he has had a mild stroke). His Majesty was however less explicit that he would summon Nahas for consultation before noon, though he was careful not to say he would not so receive him. I made it quite clear once more I should expect to be informed by that hour that Nahas had been summoned. I used no threats but was firm. I then made the further point that meantime there must be no disorder or trouble. I assumed that all precautionary measures would be taken and emphasised the grave responsibility resulting from any failure to do so. His Majesty answered that there would be no disorder. He had this morning sent out word to students who had come down to the Palace that they must return to their study and keep quiet.

5. Before/

FEB 1942
RECEIVED
MINISTRY OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CAIRO

32.

J

J 541
115

31566

Registry Number J 541/38/16.

TELEGRAM FROM Sir Miles Lampson

(Cairo) No. 449.

Dated 2nd Feb. 1942.

Received in Registry 3rd Feb. 1942.

J : Egypt and Sudan.

His Majesty Ambassador's audience with King Farouk.

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 448 (J 540/38/16). His Majesty was informed that it was essential that no successor would be appointed who had not the qualifications for fulfilment of treaty. Gives an account of his interview with His Majesty who agrees that Nahas was only one to lead a National Government. Massenein admitted that Palace plan was to form an interim government. His Majesty's Ambassador hoped to hear by noon that Nahas had been summoned for an interview.

مجلس الوزراء / 1/2/42

Last Paper.

J 540

References.

J 540
J 515

(Print.)

J 540

81 Mr (K... ..) Feb 3rd
Tel Cairo 602 Feb 3rd.

(Minutes.)

See further telegram drafted by the Secretary of State this morning, and attached draft.

J 3/2.

3.2.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

J 543

loss of face, but between action now with acceptance of risk and the certainty of continuing trouble in the future if we failed to take action.

7. It was agreed that I should see King Farouk at 1 p.m. and tell him

(1) We must have a government that is loyal to the treaty and able to implement both its spirit and letter, calling particular attention to Article 5.

(2) A strong government able to govern and commanding adequate popular support.

(3) That this meant sending for Mahas Pasha as leader of majority party in the country and consulting him with a view to his forming a government.

(4) That I must ask that this be done by noon tomorrow.

(5) That His Majesty would be held personally responsible for any disorders that might occur in the meantime.

8. See my immediately following telegram.

(INDIV)

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

J 540

Sir M. Lampson
No. 448
2nd February, 1942

D. 4.30 p.m. 2nd February, 1942
R. 4.10 p.m. 2nd February, 1942

a. a. a. a. a. a

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 445. J 515/38/16

There was general strike in the University this morning and the students have been parading the streets.

2. The Prime Minister having intimated that things were moving so fast that he must hand his resignation to King Farouk at 12.50 today, I requested Hassanein to arrange audience for me with His Majesty at one p.m.

3. Hassanein made difficulties urging that audience would be resented by public opinion as British interference in Egypt's internal affairs. He said that attempts were being made to form a national government. As there was clearly danger that we might be faced with a government under a nominee of Ali Maher (liberals had already been consulted by Shorbagy as to their willingness to serve in such a government), I insisted on audience.

4. Situation was fully discussed this morning at meeting presided over by the Minister of State at which Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and I were present.

5. It was made clear that present crisis had been timed and worked up by anti-British elements to take advantage of our present difficulties in the Far East and in Libya; and that if we failed to show firmness now the country would remain under the influence of these elements. If we insisted on King Farouk sending for Mahas Pasha it would be difficult for His Majesty to refuse and [grp. undec.] [?thus] imposing another minority government on the country against [grp. undec.] and the popular party. While there was no positive certainty that the Wafd would play, chances of their doing so were very great and unluckily the situation was so threatening that immediate and firm action was essential if we were to avoid being confronted with a government amenable to the Palace and Ali Maher.

6. Commander-in-Chief Middle East made it plain that he was anxious particularly at this moment to avoid a situation developing in which there might be disturbances in the country generally and Egyptian army in particular might not remain passive. Minister of State pointed out that the choice did not lie between action now at the risk of some trouble and inaction with the possibility of tranquility later at some

loss.....

J

113

J 540
3

31566

Registry Number } J 540/38/16.

TELEGRAM FROM
Sir Miles Lamson
(Cairo)
No. 448.

Dated 2nd Feb. 1942.
Received in Registry 3rd Feb. 1942.

J : Egypt and Sudan.

Cabinet Crisis in Egypt. Resignation of Prime Minister.

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 448 (J 515/38/16).
There was a strike of students who paraded the streets. As Prime Minister was resigning at 12.30 Hasserein was asked to arrange an audience with King Farouk at 1. p.m. The situation was discussed at a meeting presided over by Minister of State. Commander-in-Chief, Middle East is anxious to avoid disturbances. Gives particulars agreed upon at the meeting as to procedure to be adopted by His Majesty's Ambassador at an ~~interview~~ interview with King Farouk.
AUDIENCE

Last Paper.

J 539

References.

J 515

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

W. G. G. (W. G. G.)
Sent on J 541 Feb. 5/42

(Minutes.)

minutes of the meeting held on 1/5/42

Second J 541

J 542

(Action completed.)

6 M
5/2

(Index.)

17/5

Next Paper.

J 541

Call it a success be

4.5. But should Nahas, ~~prove unsatisfactory~~
uncooperative
and before we acquiesce in the return to power

of ~~the war in time of war~~, I feel that you should make a final attempt to persuade the King to make peace with his present Prime Minister on the only basis on which this can now be done, viz. by some full personal explanation and recantation on His Majesty's part combined with the bestowal of some high honour, *Prime Minister*, and that if this fails and His Majesty shows any tendency to nominate his own Prime Minister, ~~any other, or another~~, you should acquiesce in his doing so, while at the same time warning him that we consider the crisis and the change unnecessary and wantonly provoked: that we are well acquainted with what has come to be the invariable cycle of governmental changes in Egypt: that this cycle is based on the continued existence of the three governing factors, viz. the British Alliance, the Crown and public opinion: and His Majesty must not be surprised if we in London are wondering ~~if~~ *whether* the only way to get rid of a cycle of which we are heartily tired would not be by reducing the governing factors from three to two.

4.6. Should Nahas already have been summoned by the King before you can give such effect to this line of action, as the discretion which I am most anxious to leave you may incline you to do, you ought, I think, to take the first possible opportunity of speaking to him on the lines suggested above and of reporting his reaction.

11/16/48 N.W. 6

I should have thought Ali Maher's Italian assassinations must have been out

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Nahas that we do not intend to allow any question of Treaty revision to be raised so long as the war lasts.

(b) Whatever view Nahas Pasha may entertain of the present Government, he is unlikely to deny that many of its present difficulties are due to insidious influences in the Palace which it is as much to Egyptian interest as to our own to eliminate. Can you therefore count on Nahas adopting the same attitude towards the Palace favourites and Italians as the present Prime Minister is prepared to do? Should he show signs of welcoming our support, you will, of course promise it and if he is disposed to include ^{Abd. Halim} ~~Mahad~~ amongst those whom he wishes to ~~remove~~ ^{remove} we should be the last to cavil at his decision.

(c) It is most important that the outgoing Prime Minister should receive some signal, mark of the King's favour. Will Nahas Pasha support this view or at least stand aside and let you press it on the King?

~~4.~~ Although you will not, of course, tell Nahas this, something of the kind seems very necessary at what may be the beginning of a troubled period if only to "encourage the others"

4. Should Nahas offer satisfactory assurances on at least the first two of these points, (and I should value such assurances not because I necessarily expect him to keep them, but ^{because} if he does not they will afford us strong grounds for turning him out) you will feel at liberty to encourage the King to follow Hussein Sirry's advice and form a Wafdist government.

A new political crisis has been wantonly provoked and in time of war and ^{and} between Allies there is no reason for H.M.G. to disguise their expectation of being consulted in its solution. ~~If~~ Before this happens you find it essential to have some indication of Nahas's point of view on the following three questions, which are bound to assume great importance in determining your own relations with the new government, ~~for~~ if a change should actually occur. These points are:

(a) ~~While~~ H.M.G. continue to share with Nahas the legitimate pride and satisfaction which they experienced in the signature of the Treaty Settlement six years ago, ~~and while~~ they have no ~~serious~~ ^{but} intention of departing from that Settlement, they would welcome some sign of understanding on Nahas's part ^{that} as, in time of war and in the interests of the Ally who is doing the fighting, ~~it must always~~ ~~be borne in mind that~~ every point which may arise cannot be measured by the yardstick of a treaty and that in such circumstances the Egyptian Government may reasonably be expected to adopt an attitude favourable to the prosecution of the war effort and to military exigencies.

You should not hesitate, if it seems necessary, to tell Nahas with perfect frankness that neutrality in this war would have been impossible for Egypt. ~~and~~ ^{had} it not been for us ~~the~~ ~~barrier~~ ~~which~~ would have stood between her and the harrow of Italian colonisation. ~~would have been the possible reluctance of~~ ~~Germany~~ ~~to~~ ~~abandon~~ ~~so~~ ~~her~~ ~~pride.~~

Some line of approach as the above seems incidentally the best way to make it plain to

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. 5575/38/16
M.D.P.

Draft.
Sir M. Lampson,
CAIRO.

Telegram No. 512
Feb 2nd
Office India
Mr. Cabinet
Distribution

4.10 pm 2 2 42 40

OUT FILE

February
January, 1942.

Despatched M.

MOST IMMEDIATE

Your telegrams Nos. 441-443 [of 1st February: threatened resignation of Egyptian Prime Minister].

I share indignation which is evidently felt both by Prime Minister and yourself at this new crisis which has been provoked with a degree of wantonness that can hardly be ~~met~~ ^{matched} even in Egyptian political history.

2. While the immediate reasons given by the Prime Minister for his intention to resign are not in themselves very convincing. I assume the true position is that he has simply become tired of a situation in which he is exposed to continual pin pricks of such a nature that it is impossible either for H.M.G. or for yourself to protect him against them. If this is so, he has my fullest sympathy.

3. ~~I wish to leave you~~ ^{you have} the fullest discretion in dealing with a situation which I realise may move too fast to permit of a telegraphic interchange of views. Subject ~~to this consideration~~ ^{for exercise of discretion} which I must re-emphasise the course which I should be inclined to recommend in the circumstances described in your telegrams would ~~be~~ ^{be} as follows:

(1) You should establish direct communication with Nahas, if possible before Prime Minister's resignation is announced. You should not ~~boyle~~ ^{bring to the} at putting the position squarely before him on the following lines.

12.11.52

J 515
2 FEB 1942

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson,
No. 443. D. 12.46 a.m. 2nd February, 1942.
1st February, 1942. R. 1.45 a.m. 2nd February, 1942.

g g g g g

MOST IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 442.

I have seen the Prime Minister who confirmed all he had said to Mr. Shone. He made it clear that he was determined to resign. According to what he told me, he has every reason to do so on account of the proved duplicity of King Farouk, since I last saw him (Sirri), and the intrigues of the Ali Maher crowd which the King has refused to restrain.

2. After expressing due regret I asked his ideas about his successor and brushed aside names already mentioned to Shone (Barakac, Ahmed Maher and Heikal) as unsuitable for one reason or another. What did he really think? He at once replied "force King Farouk to send for Wafd". I informed His Excellency that that was precisely my own conclusion.

3. We accordingly arranged that half an hour after he tends his resignation, I shall insist on seeing King Farouk and tell him to send for Nahas at once. I informed His Excellency that if King Farouk refused the gravest consequences would certainly ensue. He said he knew that, but this was the only way to save the situation, and at the same time the only hope of King Farouk keeping his throne.

4. At my request he will not hand in his resignation till noon on Tuesday.

5. Minister of State has seen and fully concurs.

INDIV.

FEB 1942
RECEIVED
FEB 19 1942

THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS

Sir M. Lampson's telegrams Nos. 441, 442, 443.


✓

We have reached stage 1 in my cycle at which the joint Prime Minister of ourselves and the Palace is at long last knifed in the back by the King. The point immediately raised in these Cairo telegrams is that the Ambassador and Egyptian Prime Minister wish to skip stage 2 (appointment of a purely Palace Government because we feel inclined to let the King get himself out of his own mess) and pass straight to stage 3, the calling in of a full-blown Wafdist administration.

I think that both Husan Sir^g and possibly Sir Miles Lampson are to some extent actuated by their personal - and very well-founded - mistrust and dislike of Ali Maher, who seems to be the King's most likely choice should His Majesty be left to himself. In the Ambassador's case, these feelings are no doubt all the more marked because only a few years ago Ali Maher was not far from being the light of his eyes.

The advent of a Wafdist Government to power in the middle of a war is not an event which we can view without real apprehension. I don't think Sir Miles Lampson has ever had to deal with a purely Wafdist Government, and I need hardly emphasise that the behaviour of Nahas Pasha, at the time when at the head of United Egypt he signed the Treaty, affords absolutely no criterion of what his conduct is likely to be as a party Prime Minister in post-Treaty Egypt. On this I feel great uneasiness. We can no doubt handle the situation should it develop straightforwardly and immediately on the lines sketched in these Cairo telegrams - the really serious thing is the evident feeling in Cairo that the King's propaganda has already gained such strength that only a counter-wave of the Wafd can stand up to it - but if time, opportunity and the discretion which we must leave the Ambassador permit, I should myself like to see the situation rather differently handled.

Hence the draft telegram which I attach.


2nd February, 1942.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

5.

5. But should Nahas' attitude be unco-operative I feel that you should make a final attempt to persuade the King to make peace with his present Prime Minister on the only basis on which this can now be done, viz. by some full personal explanation and recantation on His Majesty's part combined with the bestowal of some high honour on Prime Minister. If this fails and His Majesty shows any tendency to nominate his own Prime Minister (I should have thought Ali Maher's Italian connexions must rule him out) you should acquiesce in his doing so, while at the same time warning him that we consider the crisis and the change unnecessary and wantonly provoked: that we are well acquainted with what has come to be the invariable cycle of governmental changes in Egypt: that this cycle is based on the continued existence of the three governing factors, viz. the British Alliance, the Crown and public opinion: and His Majesty must not be surprised if we in London are wondering whether the only way to get rid of a cycle of which we are heartily tired would not be by reducing the governing factors from three to two.

6. Should Nahas already have been summoned by the King before you can give such effect to this line of action, as the discretion which I am most anxious to leave you may incline you to do, you ought, I think, to take the first possible opportunity of speaking to him on the lines suggested above and of reporting his reaction.

7. Should the King, if and after you have spoken to him on the lines of paragraph 5 above indicate that in such circumstances he prefers to summon the Wafd you should make it an absolute condition of your assent that you be allowed opportunity to see Nahas before His Majesty summons him.

[INDIV].

2.

Nahas

Hasas the legitimate pride and satisfaction which they experienced in the signature of the Treaty Settlement six years ago. They have no intention of departing from that Settlement, but they would welcome some sign of understanding on Nahas's part that, in time of war and in the interests of the Ally who is doing the fighting, every point which may arise cannot be measured by the yardstick of a treaty and that in such circumstances the Egyptian Government may reasonably be expected to adopt an attitude favourable to the prosecution of the war effort and to military exigencies.

You should not hesitate, if it seems necessary, to tell Nahas with perfect frankness that neutrality in this war would have been impossible for Egypt. Had it not been for us nothing would have stood between her and the harrow of Italian colonisation.

Some such line of approach as the above seems incidentally the best way to make it plain to Nahas that we do not intend to allow any question of Treaty revision to be raised so long as the war lasts.

(b) Whatever view Nahas Pasha may entertain of the present Government, he is unlikely to deny that many of its present difficulties are due to insidious influences in the Palace which it is as much to Egyptian interest as to our own to eliminate. Can you therefore count on Nahas adopting the same attitude towards the Palace favourites and Italians as the present Prime Minister is prepared to do? Should he show signs of welcoming our support, you will, of course promise it and if he is disposed to include Ali Maher amongst those whom he wishes to eliminate we should be the last to cavil at his decision.

(c) It is most important that the outgoing Prime Minister should receive some signal mark of the King's favour. Will Nahas Pasha support this view or at least stand aside and let you press it on the King? Although you will not, of course, tell Nahas this, something of the kind seems very necessary at what may be the beginning of a troubled period if only to "encourage the others".

4. Should Nahas offer satisfactory assurances on at least the first two of these points, (and I should value such assurances not because I necessarily expect him to keep them, but because if he does not they will afford us strong grounds for turning him out) you will feel at liberty to encourage the King to follow Hussein Sirry's advice and form a Wafdist government.

5./

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Handwritten notes in the left margin, including a small sketch of a map and some illegible text.

Handwritten notes in the left margin, including a small sketch of a map and some illegible text.

OUT FILE

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPRER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

JSIS/38/16

TO: EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 572.

D. 4.10 p.m. 2nd February, 1942.

2nd February, 1942.

& & &

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Your telegrams Nos. 441-443 [of 1st February: threatened resignation of Egyptian Prime Minister].

I share indignation which is evidently felt both by Prime Minister and yourself at this new crisis which has been provoked with a degree of wantonness that can hardly be matched even in Egyptian political history.

2. While the immediate reasons given by the Prime Minister for his intention to resign are not in themselves very convincing, I assume the true position is that he has simply become tired of a situation in which he is exposed to continual pin pricks of such a nature that it is impossible either for His Majesty's Government or for yourself to protect him against them. If this is so, he has my fullest sympathy.

3. You have the fullest discretion in dealing with a situation which I realise may move too fast to permit of a telegraphic interchange of views. Subject to your exercise of discretion which I must re-emphasise, the course which I should be inclined to recommend in the circumstances described in your telegrams would be as follows:

(1) You should establish direct communication with Nahas, if possible before Prime Minister's resignation is announced. You should not hesitate to put the position squarely before him on the following lines. A new political crisis has been wantonly provoked, and in time of war and as between Allies there is no reason for His Majesty's Government to disguise their expectation of being consulted in its solution. Before this happens you find it essential to have some indication of Nahas's point of view on the following three questions, which are bound to assume great importance in determining your own relations with the new government, if a change should actually occur. These points are:

(a) His Majesty's Government continue to share with

Nahas/

Handwritten notes and stamps in the bottom left corner.

Rosty No.

F.O.

, 193 .

Draft.

Despatched

M.

Telegram.

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Should be a separate copy
of the original

7. Should the King,
if and after you have spoken to
him on the lines of para. 5
above indicate that in such
circumstances he prefers to
summon the Wafd you should
make it an absolute condition
of your assent that you
be allowed opportunity to
see Nabus before His Majesty
summons him.

AB.

J

J 515
2 Feb 1942

85

19

31566

Cabinet Crisis in Egypt.
 Refers to Cairo telegram 442 (J 514/38/16).
 Prime Minister is determined to resign, the duplicity of King Farouk had been proved and he had not restrained Ali Msher and his associates in any way. As regards his successor Prime Minister said "force King Farouk to send for Wafd" this was His Majesty's Ambassador's own conclusion. It was arranged that His Majesty's Ambassador should see King Farouk half an hour after Prime Minister tenders his resignation. If he refused grave consequences would ensue but this was only way to save ^{situation} it. Prime Minister will hand in his resignation at noon. Minister of State concurs.

Registry Number J 515/38/16.
TELEGRAM FROM
Sir I. Lampson, Cairo.
 No. 443.
 Dated 1st Feb. 1942.
 Received in Registry 2nd Feb. 1942.
 J: Egypt and Sudan.

Last Paper.
 J 514

References.

(Minutes.)

See within.

Handwritten notes in Arabic script, including a signature and the number '2/2'.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Del Cairo 542 Feb 2

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

7/2

Handwritten initials or signature.

Next Paper.

J 539

COPY FILE

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

5514/38/16

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

TO EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 574

2nd February, 1942

D. 1.45 p.m. 2nd February, 1942

a.a.a.a.a.a

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Your telegrams Nos. 442 and 443 [of February 1st: political situation in Egypt].

While I am anxious to leave you fullest discretion my comments and observations which may prove helpful are now being cyphered.

2. There would therefore be advantage if you could persuade Prime Minister to defer his resignation until you have had time to consider them.

(INDIV)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

5514/38/16

D.S.L.

Draft.

Sir M. Lampson,
Cairo.

Telegram.

No. ... 574 ✓

Feb 2

Cypher. INDIV ✓
K.

War cabinet
distribution.

✓ 1.45 p 2.2 42

83

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

OUT FILE

Despatched

M.

February, 1942.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Your telegrams Nos. 442 and 443
[of February 1st: political situation in
Egypt.]

While I am anxious to leave you
fullest discretion my comments and
observations which may prove helpful are
now being cyphered.

2. There would therefore be
advantage if you could persuade Prime
Minister to defer his resignation until
you have had time to consider them.

J.L.L.
2/2.

1-20p

2.

so on February 2nd or 3rd at the latest. He wished to be informed of his decision, which he repeated was irrevocable, as soon as possible.

4. In conclusion the Prime Minister said he had always worked to uphold the Treaty of Alliance not for England's but for Egypt's sake. He had made mistakes, but he had always done what his conscience told him was right. He himself would always be faithful to the alliance whether in or out of office. He had done all he could to give his King good advice, but it was clear that he had failed. He was sorry for His Majesty who was young and misguided.

5. On receipt of this message, I returned to Cairo at once this evening and am grappling with the situation.

[INDIV.]

J 514

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM: EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir M. Lampson

No. 442

1st February, 1942.

D. 11.0 p.m. 1st February, 1942.

R. 12.0 a.m. 2nd February, 1942.

0:0:0:0:0

MOST IMMEDIATE

The Prime Minister sent for Minister this afternoon (while I was out of Cairo) and said he had decided to resign. He had believed that the issue between King Farouk and his cabinet had been satisfactorily settled on lines agreed - that Salib Samy should stay on as Minister for Foreign Affairs and that our other desiderata should be taken up through himself as Prime Minister. He had done all he could to prevent the issue becoming one between us and King Farouk direct, and at his last interview with His Majesty, when he had spoken to him most frankly as his uncle and not as Prime Minister, His Majesty had embraced him and thanked him for getting him out of the mess.

2. Unfortunately the Prime Minister continued, Ali Maher and the palace clique had intensified their efforts against his Government. They were stirring up university students to make trouble. In addition to Ali Maher, the Prime Minister named Shorbagy Bey, Sheik el Maraghi, and especially the Young Egyptian Party and son of Abdul Wahab Talaat [group undec.]. He said he had so far been able to prevent students from demonstrating in the streets, but he did not know how long they could be held in check. He did not accuse King Farouk of instigating this, but His Majesty had done nothing to stop it. It was not possible for him to continue in office when it was clear that he no longer had the King's confidence. Moreover he could no more count on the support of Liberal and Saadist deputies in Parliament where the Government was sure to be hotly attacked on February 3rd. For his part he was prepared to face attacks in Parliament and the country so long as he felt he was doing his duty, but he could not drag his cabinet through the mud. In any case his resignation was only a question of a few days and he had decided to resign before Parliament met.

3. Mr. Shone emphasized the gravity of the Prime Minister's decision and urged him to see me before taking any final step but the Prime Minister was not to be moved. He said that he had already told Hassanein, Ahmed Maher and Heikal (Liberal leader) that he would resign, and that his intention was to do

FEB 1942
so/
[Circular stamp with illegible text]

J 574
2 FEB 1942

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

From: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson,
No. 441.

1st February, 1942.

D. 9.42 p.m. 1st February, 1942.

R. 10.05 p.m. 1st February, 1942.

g g g g g

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Cabinet crisis has boiled up again in acute form. Prime Minister declares his intention of immediate resignation. See my immediately following telegram.

INDIV.

FEB 1 1942
RECEIVED
P.O. BUREAU

J 514
FEB 1942

31566

EGYPT

Cabinet Crisis in Egypt.

Prime Minister declares his intention of immediate resignation and stated that he had believed issue between King Farouk and the Cabinet had been satisfactorily settled. Ali Maher and his associates had intensified their efforts against Government. Up to present demonstrations of students in street have been prevented. He could not continue in office without the King's confidence and support of Liberal and Saadist deputies. Prime Minister stated that he had endeavoured to uphold the Treaty and his decision was irrevocable and he would resign on 2nd or 3rd February. He wished His Majesty's Ambassador to be informed.

Registry Number } 514/38/16.

TELEGRAM FROM Sir H. Lampson, Cairo.

No. 441 and 442.

Dated 1st Feb. 1942.

Received in Registry } Feb. 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Last Paper.

J 503

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

See Cairo 574 Feb 2.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

J 515

(Minutes)
See on J 515
J 2/2

This brings us back to No. 1.

So long as the three factors remain constant the only thing which we ~~cannot~~ do - but it is a very important thing - is to secure the timing of the changes to coincide with our own interests.

Incidentally, it may be amusing to add that a British representative in Egypt who presides over change No. 2 acquires a certain, and no doubt cheap, local popularity. This is what happened to me in 1934 when I was instrumental in turning out the rump of Sidky's Palace régime and substituting the relatively acquired popular administration of Tewfik Nessim. That popularity, in such circumstances may be embarrassing was brought home to me six years later when, at my own table, and in full hearing of several distinguished Spaniards to whom the term "liberal" was anathema, an enthusiastic Egyptian diplomatist insisted on acclaiming me as "one whom all those who in Egypt have liberal interests at heart will never forget".

27th January, 1942.

Interesting.

And I suppose it is true, as has been said, that we must try to ensure that both Salva and people are never united against us.

Ab. J. Jan. 27. 1942.

Ab. Jan 28

Ab 28/1

... But if ...
... (5) ...
(...)

J. 495
CAN 10.12

Note on the habitual sequence of political changes in the Government of Egypt

So long as the three influences which determine the course of events in Egypt remain, in order of importance, ourselves, the King, and Egyptian public opinion, the changes in Egyptian internal politics move in a perfectly regular cycle. I do not think that the Treaty has affected this in any way, or that anything will affect it unless it be the disappearance of one or other of the three primary factors enumerated above.

There are three stock movements. To say which came first is like attempting to lay down whether the hen preceded the egg. But the sequence is invariable. These movements yield:

1. A Prime Minister who is acceptable both to the King and to ourselves. Our support tends as time goes on to lose him the support of the Palace, partly because the King becomes jealous and partly because the Prime Minister tends in the long run to rely on us and to treat the Palace cavalierly.

Result: the King knifes his Prime Minister over some issue in which we feel unable to interfere or in which perhaps we feel that the King is in the right.

We become rather sulky and take the line that as the King has brought down ~~the~~ man, who had our confidence, His Majesty must get himself out of the ensuing mess as best he can. There follows the invariable change yielding:

2. A Prime Minister who is purely and solely a Palace man.

Result: the Palace interferes at every stage in the administration of the country, graft abounds and popular discontent rises. It is plain that there would be a revolution were it not for the presence of our forces. We therefore move slowly and reluctantly to the second change which leaves the King in his turn sulky and aloof. The change yields:

3. A popular government, either Wafdist, or at least on friendly terms with the Wafd.

Result: British influences and interests are threatened at every turn: we become alarmed, drop all pretence of non-interference, fall back on the Treaty and even strain it, and insist on a change of government for which we are obliged to seek the co-operation of the King and in a measure to defer to his wishes.

This/

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10. ...

J

J 496

v

31566

JAN 1942

Registry Number } 496/33/16

FROM Foreign Office
Via Sir M. Peterson

No.

Dated 27th Jan, 1942

Received in Registry } 31st Jan, 1942

S: Egypt and Sudan

Habitual sequence of political changes in the Government of Egypt.

States that so long as the three factors determining the course of events in Egypt remain in order of importance His Majesty's Government, the King and Egyptian Public opinion the changes in internal politics move in a regular cycle and only the disappearance of one of these would effect this. Sets out the three alternatives as (a) a Prime Minister acceptable to both King and His Majesty's Government (b) a Prime Minister solely a Palace man and (c) a Popular Government and gives the results of each. His Majesty's Government must secure timing of changes to suit their interests.

Last Paper.

J 448

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes) ...

The cycle is now in operation - though we intend that stage 2 shall be eliminated.

W MacKenzie

J. 37

I suggest that the genetic cycle began with the Khedivial egg and is now inherent in the artificial semination of a Royal House in Egypt. In other words the King is bastard with a foreign father.

*Cur. 3.ii
J. 37*

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

↓
2

12/15

Next Paper.

J 503

OUT FILE

J. OUTWARD TELEGRAM.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[CYPHER]. WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

TO EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No.491.
January 28th 1942.

D. 9.0 p.m. January 28th 1942.

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegrams Nos. 380, 388 and 389 [of January 27th: relations between King Farouk and his government].

I agree in the circumstances that you should give Prime Minister the chance of securing our desiderata regarding Abdul Wahab and the Italians as an internal matter. But, in so informing His Excellency, you should leave him in no doubt that His Majesty's Government are resolved that these men must go, and that if within a reasonable period nothing is done His Majesty's Government will be forced to revert to the subject. In the meantime I rely on you to maintain requisite pressure on Prime Minister.

(INDIV).

Registry
No.

J. 448/38/16

✓
20/1/47

OUT FILE

Draft

Sir M. Sampson
Cairo.

Immediata.

Your telegrams Nos 380, 388 and 389 [9

Tel No. 491 ✓
Cypher Jan 28

January 27th : relations between King Farouk and his Government]

Was Cabinet Dis?

K
INDIA

I agree in the circumstances that you should give Prime Minister the chance of securing our desiderata as regards ^{of} Abdul Wahab and the Italians as an internal matter. But, in so informing ^{of} HE, you should leave him in no doubt that HMG are resolved that these men must go, and that if within say ^{a reasonable period} two or three weeks nothing is ^{revert to the} ~~consider~~ their gone HMG will be forced to ^{nothing is} ~~revert to the~~ ^{revert to the} ~~consider~~ their subject. In the meantime I rely on you to maintain requisite pressure on Prime Minister.

R

ALJ
Jan 28
Jan 28/16

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

2.

4. The Prime Minister continued that he was between two fires: but had come to the conclusion that both we and he should give King Farouk another chance; and that our two desiderata should not be involved at this very moment. But that he, the Prime Minister, would as an internal matter "see that they are carried out without our intervention". He felt sure that we were just as anxious as he that these desiderata should be obtained smoothly rather than by our direct intervention. "Give me the chance" were his last words.

5. I said that what he had told me clearly eased the immediate situation materially. But as I had told Hassanein this morning, my instructions stood. In the light of what he had said, I would, of course, at once report to you. It would help me in doing so to know how long he estimated it would take to implement his undertaking to me to get our desiderata through? The Prime Minister feared he could not say: it might take a little time and meantime he hoped I would "prick him" from time to time.

6. In reply to His Excellency's enquiry I said that I should not now be pressing for an audience with King Farouk tomorrow morning. But meantime why could not His Majesty do something decent to show loyalty to us, his Allies? I could remember no single act (with the exception of a small gift of money) on His Majesty's part since the war started. I had said to Hassanein this morning that I and many others were disgusted at this. It was so easy for His Majesty to have made some gesture. Why for instance did he not offer the unused Palace of Koubbeh for a British military hospital? Probably we should not want it but it would be a gesture.

7. My comment on above is that we should be now well advised to take Prime Minister at his word, keep him up to it and see what success he has in getting our wishes about the Palace Italians (including Pulli) and Abdul Wahab Talaat [? group omitted] out. Do you agree to my so informing him?

8. The Prime Minister was most grateful for our support.

[Copies sent to Colonel Jacob and Mr. Armstrong].

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM: EGYPT

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

69
J 448
28 JAN 1942

Sir M. Lampson
No. 589.
27th January, 1942.

D. 1.20 a.m. 28th January, 1942.
R. 4.30 a.m. 28th January, 1942.

Repeated to Bagdad
Tehran (for Minister of State).

[] [] []

URGENT

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is the Prime Minister's account in his own words of his talk with King Farouk at 4 p.m. this afternoon.

2. King Farouk informed the Prime Minister of the substance of my talk with Hassanain (my telegram No. 380) and "started by saying that he was prepared to give the Prime Minister satisfaction and that the Minister for Foreign Affairs would remain in office. But His Majesty requested that for his amour propre it would be just as well that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is now at Mena House, should remain there but continue to do his full work as a Minister. The Prime Minister did not reply immediately, and His Majesty asked for His Excellency's assistance over the question of his dignity and begged him to save the situation. The Prime Minister seized the occasion to tell His Majesty that he was his only Counsellor and should be his only Counsellor; and said that for [group undec.] time people around His Majesty and who pretended to give him advice for his interest were thinking first of all for themselves and had no loyalty whatever to him. Prime Minister mentioned by name Ali Maher, Mahmoud Khalil and Abdul Wahab Talaat and [group omitted ? said] that while he did not share His Majesty's idea of the Minister for Foreign Affairs shamming sickness for a week, yet in order not to complicate the matter the Prime Minister would see that it was done but that all normal prerogatives and ministerial functions of the Minister for Foreign Affairs would remain with him. To this His Majesty agreed.

5. "Then came second point - that of our desiderata. And His Majesty dwelt a long time on the Prime Minister's loyalty to him and again invoked it to save the situation. The Prime Minister replied that he was ready to do this and to try to alleviate the matter with us on condition that there was no more fooling in future and that His Majesty must realise that a sovereign has no right to play with fire (1) for his own sake (2) for that of his dynasty. His Majesty invoked Tewfik Rushdi's help". (I interjected he would need it!) "to get him out of a situation the full gravity of which he realised."

4./

J

J 448
28 JAN 1942

68

7

1942

EGYPT and SUDAN

31566

Registry Number } J 448/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM

Sir M. Lampson
No. (Cairo).
389.

Dated 27th Jan., 1942.
Received in Registry } 28th Jan.,
1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Internal situation in Egypt.

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 388 (J 431/38/16). Sets out the Prime Minister's account of his talk with King Farouk. It was decided that the desirata should not be involved, but Prime Minister would remove the bad influences as an internal matter. An audience would not be pressed for, and it was suggested that His Majesty might make some gesture to show his loyalty. Considers His Majesty's Government should keep Prime Minister to his word. Prime Minister was grateful for support of His Majesty's Government.

Copies sent Colonel Jacob and Mr. Armstrong.

Last Paper.

J 432

References.

J 430/38/16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

to Cairo H 91 Jan 28

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

J 476

pp. in file.

(Minutes.)

See minutes on J 431 + telegram

to Cairo.

Handwritten notes in Arabic script, including a signature and date 29/1.

J 430 / 38 / 16
28 JAN 1942

[Cypher]

FILES.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 383.
27th January, 1942.

D. 7.15 p.m. 27th January, 1942.
R. 6.55 p.m. 27th January, 1942.

c c c c

MOST IMMEDIATE.

If you have not already done so please repeat to Bagdad and Tehran "most immediate" for Minister of State my telegrams Nos. 375 and 380, and your telegram No. 467. J 364 / 38 / 16

J 430 / 38 / 16
3470 / 38 / 16

[Note by Communications Department: Foreign Office telegram to Cairo No. 467 and Cairo telegram No. 375 are being repeated as requested. Cairo telegram No. 380 has not yet arrived, but will be repeated on receipt].

INDIV

x J 28/

JAN 28 1942
F.O. RESIDENCY

42

J 430

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained
by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson
No. 380.
27th January, 1942.

D. 10.45 p.m. 27th January, 1942.
R. 2.30 a.m. 28th January, 1942.

JJJJ

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 375. *J 229/32/3*

Hassanein, who is genuinely alarmed and argues that we are chaining ourselves to a corpse and that the whole country will be against us over the issue of the King's treatment, has agreed to press King Farouk to send for the Prime Minister this afternoon and endeavour to give him satisfaction over the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He urged that if that were achieved I should then agree to allow the Prime Minister to act as intermediary in regard to our desiderata in respect of the Palace Italians and Abdul Wahab Talaat.

2. I replied that my position was that I had your instructions and was of course bound by them. But it seemed perfectly normal that if the Prime Minister remained in office (which means that the Minister for Foreign Affairs did likewise), His Excellency should make representations as he thought fit on any subject; naturally if they had a bearing on my present instructions I should consider them and if necessary refer them to you.

3. I informed the Prime Minister at once of above, adding that I had made it clear to Hassanein that Prime Minister's loyalty to his colleague had my full support. The Prime Minister agreed that it was the right line to take. He added that assuming he did get satisfaction in regard to Minister for Foreign Affairs he presumed I should no longer insist upon an immediate audience with King Farouk tomorrow (Wednesday) morning. I replied in the affirmative.

4. It is obvious that Minister for Foreign Affairs has now become the major issue. The public know this. If we win on that, I submit we can afford to await such observations as the Prime Minister may make in regard to our other desiderata.

[Repeated to Bagdad and Tehran Nos. 114 and 146 "for
Minister of State".]

INDIV.

Egyptian ^{bl}

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[CYPHER]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson
No. 380.

D. 10.45 p.m. 27th January, 1942.
R. 2.30 a.m. 28th January, 1942.

27th January, 1942.

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yes
Dr

[Repeated to Bagdad and Tehran Nos. 114 and 146 "for Minister of State".]

INDIV.

J

J 430
28 JAN 1942

60

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number } J 450/30/16

TELEGRAM FROM

Sir M. Lamson

No. (Ca Po)
350

Dated 27th Jan., 1942.
Received in Registry } 28th Jan., 1942.

Internal situation in Egypt.

Hassanein stated whole country would be against His Majesty's Government over issue of King's treatment. He agreed to press King to send for Prime Minister and to endeavour to give him satisfaction over Foreign Minister. If this was achieved His Majesty's Ambassador agreed to allow Prime Minister to act as intermediary over the Palace Italians. Prime Minister was informed. It appears that Foreign Minister has now become major issue and the public know this.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Last Paper.

J 429

References.

(Minutes)
See within Cairo tel 383 of 27th Jan
See of the Secretary of States note
within; & draft on J 431
J. 28/1

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Repeated to Bagdad 114 Jan 28
" " Tehran 146 Jan 28

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

J 431

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM: EGYPT.

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

J 429
28 JAN 1942

Sir M. Lampson.
No. 375.

D. 2.00 p.m. 27th January, 1942.
R. 3.00 p.m. 27th January, 1942.

27th January, 1942.

uuuu

IMMEDIATE.

My telegram No. 362. J 467/38/16

Prime Minister has just told me that he saw King F. at 11 p.m. last night and told him of my visit yesterday. He informed His Majesty that matters were "very dangerous" and insisted His Majesty should accept what the Prime Minister had put to him i.e. that Salib Sami must stay; in which case he, the Prime Minister would beg me to hold my hand and "everything would be kept quiet". He had asked His Majesty for an answer by 11 p.m. to-night.

2. Prime Minister said to me that our intervention would be much resented by the public. He ended with statement in this matter [sic ? manner] "he and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were one:" both stayed or both went.

3. I have warned Hasanein that I expect to apply for an urgent audience at 10 a.m. tomorrow Wednesday. As a result Hasanein has asked to see me this morning.

(INDIV)

JAN 28 1942
RECEIVED
SECRETARY

J

J 429
28 JAN 1947

58

31566

EGYPT AND SUDAN

Internal situation in Egypt.

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 362 (J 407/38/18).
Prime Minister informed King Farouk that Salib Sami must stay, in which case Prime Minister would request His Majesty's Ambassador to take no action. His Majesty has been asked for reply by 11 p.m. Prime Minister stated that intervention by His Majesty's Government would be resented by public and either he and Foreign Minister stayed or both went. Hassenein has been warned that His Majesty's Ambassador expects to ask for urgent audience at 10. a.m. and has asked to see him this morning.

Registry Number } J 429/38/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Sir M. Lampson
(Cairo).

No. 375

Dated 27th Jan., 1942.
Received in Registry } 28th Jan., 1942.

J: Egypt and Sudan.

Last Paper.

J 4/4

References.

(Minutes.)

See on J 341.

J 289

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Repeated to Bagdad 1/1
" " Tehran 1/4
Jan 27^e

(Action completed.)

6/2
5/2

(Index.)

Pat
12
3

Next Paper.

T/30

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

⁴⁰⁷
J 364/38/16

[Cypher] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

TO EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 467

27th January, 1942

D. 12.20 p.m. 27th January, 1942

a.a.a.a.a.a

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Your telegrams Nos. 361 and 362 [of 26th January: threatened resignation of the Egyptian Government].

I agree that we must support the Prime Minister in his present dispute with the King. We cannot therefore allow former to be forced to resign over that dispute.

2. Provided this principle is maintained, you have full discretion to act as you think best.

3. Present Minister for Foreign Affairs is not of any very great value. But if his resignation would entail either

(a) resignation of the Prime Minister, or

(b) appearance of a victory for the King,

it cannot be allowed. If, as appears from your telegrams, it would produce both these effects it is doubly ruled out.

(INDIV)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J

In clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevenson
No. 1829
10th December, 1952.

D. 1.37 p.m. 10th December, 1952.
R. 2.58 p.m. 10th December, 1952.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1829 of 10th December
Repeated for information Saving to: - Ankara

INDEXED
Washington
Paris
Momin Fayid
Beirut (for Merdiv)
E 1078/454

Press reports broadcast by General Neguib at 3 a.m. December 10th announcing the abrogation of the 1923 constitution. A special committee will be set up to draft a new constitution which will enable the people to be the source of all authority and to realize their hopes for clean and sound Parliamentary rule. In the interim period the executive power would be assumed by a Government which had pledged itself before God and the country to protect the interests of all citizens without discrimination, having regard to general constitutional principals.

2. Questioned, the General made it clear that the Government would appoint the drafting committee, and that the committee would decide the time table for the preparation of the new constitution.

3. Text by bag to Foreign Office.

Foreign Office please pass Washington and Paris as my telegrams Saving 172 and 312.

[Repeated Saving to Washington and Paris].

11 DEC 1952
RECEIVED
FOREIGN OFFICE

it might depend on the circumstances of King Farouk's departure from Egypt. His treatment would obviously be different if he had to be forcibly deposed or if, nominally at any rate, he abdicated and thus appeared to leave of his own free will.

There was little subsequent discussion. Some doubt was expressed whether, in present conditions, an island in the West Indies would be altogether safe. Mr. Vincent Massey made no demur to Canada being chosen and promised to consult the Canadian Government on the subject. The Foreign Office wish to concentrate on Canada which would in their opinion be the best solution.

February 27th, 1942.

After the meeting this afternoon I reminded Mr. Massey of this matter and he promised to expedite the reply.

(Signed). B. NEWTON.

(Dated). 9th March, 1942.

Sir Alexander Cadogan.

Mr. Scrivener.

Please return to Sir Basil Newton.

1543

17 Nov 1949

3

KING FAROUK.

At the meeting with the Dominion High Commissioners on Thursday, February 26th, I said that the Foreign Office wanted to be prepared in case a place of retirement were required at short notice for the present King of Egypt.

As the High Commissioners already knew, young King Farouk's behaviour precipitated a first class crisis early this month when he had to be called upon either to abdicate or to appoint the present Prime Minister. He then accepted the latter course but, at his very next public meeting with our Ambassador, his behaviour amounted to a public affront for which Sir Miles Lampson had to demand an apology. This minor incident was being patched up but, so long as any representative of the Italian clique remained at the Palace (and the efforts to dislodge them might itself precipitate a crisis), the risk remained serious of a further, and this time final, crisis involving the departure from Egypt of the young Farouk. We, of course, hope very much to be able to prevent or solve further crisis but, in case of failure, the Foreign Office thought it prudent to ascertain in advance some place of residence where Farouk could be kept from becoming a source of mischief or a martyr.

There might be considerable objections to the United Kingdom as an asylum (e.g. the United Kingdom Government would have been directly instrumental in King Farouk's removal, it might be difficult to prevent intrigues and mischief making, the climate might not suit him, and his presence might moreover be unwelcome to our own King), so the Foreign Office would like to know whether the ex-King, should he become that, could be received in one of the Dominions. The Canadian Government already said they were prepared to accommodate the ex-Shah of Persia and the Foreign Office hope they might be prepared to grant a further favour of offering a domicile to King Farouk, should that be necessary. If the Canadians were agreeable, the Foreign Office thought that his residence in Canada might present many advantages e.g. the Canadian Government would not have been directly involved, his presence in Canada would be difficult and less likely to be innocuous at that distance, the climate was very varied and offered something which happened to appeal very much to young Farouk, namely, the opportunity of skiing. It would also be entirely safe.

I mentioned that another possibility which might perhaps be considered, was an island in the West Indies. In deciding the most suitable place

*Green Div
Please keep with
suitable papers
W. J. H.*

OUTWARD TELEGRAM.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

J.545/353/G.

[CYPHER].

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET).

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 985.
March 26th 1942.

D. 11.50 p.m. March 26th 1942.

MOST SECRET.

My telegram No. 618 [of February 4th: possible deposition of King Farouk] paragraph 4. Canadian Government have expressed willingness to receive King Farouk should his abdication on deposition prove necessary at any time.

(INDIV).

C O P Y.

J.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, 108

Egyptian Dept. CANADA HOUSE, LONDON, S.W.1.
to keep with relevant P.P. 12th March, 1942.

3 N 19/3/1543

MOST SECRET.

My dear Attlee, 25 MAR 1942

I have just received a cablegram from my Government letting me know that I may inform you that, in the event of King Farouk's abdication, the Canadian Government would be willing to allow him to stay in Canada.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) VINCENT MASSEY.

With the Compliments of the Under-Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
D. O. Reference No. W.F. 26/9
The Rt. Hon. C.R. Attlee, M.P.,
Dominions Office,
S.W.1.

Registry
No. J. 542/333/4.

✓ 11.50 P- 109
26/3

Draft.
H. M. Ambassador
Cairo

DEIP
Most Secret.

Tel. No. 985 ✓
handlab

My telegram No: 618 [of February
4th: possible deposition of King
Farouk] paragraph 4.

Cypher
KINDON

Departmental Secret.

Canadian Govt have expressed
willingness to receive King Farouk
should his abdication or deposition
occur ~~to the~~ to the ~~place~~ place ~~there~~
necessary at any time.

Copy M. Kimber
D.O. ref.

Sir B. Newton to see

R.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

7pm.

Secret

Minutes.

157

Green Hill

Keep with
Hague

Egyptian Dept.

2543

25 MAR 1942

G

At the daily meetings with
High Commissioners on the 11th
March Mr Massey said
that the Canadian Govt.
would afford a place of
residence for King Farouk,
if need were. I understand
written confirmation will
follow.

J.P.

B N

12/3/

See now letter to Mr. Atlee from Mr. Massey

of 12/3

Dft Jcl:

Warriner

26/3

J sent

J 26/3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(J 543/333/G)

15th February, 1942.

PERSONAL AND SECRET.*Dear Kimber.*

You asked me by telephone to consider whether the action suggested in my Personal and Secret letter of 5th February - viz. a discreet approach to the Dominions regarding the possible necessity of finding accommodation there for King Parouk - could be suspended in view of:-

(a) the fact that Canada was already being asked to house one ex-sovereign, and might not welcome the prospect of another;

(b) the desirability of not drawing too heavily on Dominion good-will;

(c) the fact that the crisis seemed happily solved and

(d) the possibility of making arrangements after the King's abdication.

After thinking the matter over, I am quite satisfied in my own mind that the suggested action should be pursued. My main reason is that the Palace Italian and pro-Italian clique - the bons et origo of the recent crisis - has not yet been removed; that it is the definite intention of His Majesty's Government that it shall be removed; and that its removal (which Kahané is to undertake) may lead to a fresh crisis with the King at any moment. For the rest, we are contemplating an approach to Australia and New Zealand as well as Canada and, as regards (d) we should be so occupied with/

G. Kimber Esq.,
Dominions Office.

with many other matters that it would be seriously inconvenient to have to find accommodation for the King as well. In fact I think that we should lay ourselves open to considerable criticism if we did not explore all possibilities now.

Yours ever,

(sgd) P. Scovener.

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been removed; that it is ^{the} definite
intention of HMG that it shall be
removed; & that its removal (which
Nahas is to undertake) may lead to
a fresh crisis with the King at any
moment. For the rest, we are contemplating
an approach to Australia & New Zealand
as well as Canada and, as regards
(d) we should be so occupied with
many other things that it would be seriously
inconvenient to have to ^{accommodate} ~~fac~~ ^{practices}
for the King as well. In fact I
think that we should lay ourselves
open to considerable criticism ~~on the~~
~~grounds of lack of foresight~~ if we did
not explore all possibilities now.

Yours ever

J. (sqd) P. Berwenen.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. JS 43/333/G

104

J.O.
15 Feb 1942.

Personal Secret

Dear Kimber,

⁷⁸¹⁶
Draft. M. Kimber
D.O.

from Mr. Scrivener

You asked me by telephone to consider whether the action suggested in my Personal Secret letter of February 5th - viz a discreet approach to the Dominion regarding the possible necessity of finding accommodation there for King Farouk - could be superseded in view of:-

- (a) the fact that Canada was already being asked to house one ex-Sovereign & it might not welcome the prospect of another;
- (b) the desirability of not weighing too heavily on Dominion good-will;
- (c) the fact that ~~at present~~ the crisis seemed happily solved and
- (d) the possibility of making arrangements after the King's abdication.

After thinking the matter over, I am quite satisfied in my own mind that the suggested action should be pursued. My main reason is that the Palace Italian & pro-Italian clique - the four

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Please return to me after typing, with jacket.

Shah would in practice be a
matter of serious consequence.
We hope therefore that the
Canadian Government will be
ready to consider the matter
favourably.

Yours ever

(sgd) P. S. Lawrence

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

(J 543/333/G). 5th February,
1942.

Personal & Secret.

Dear Kimber,

With reference to our conversation this morning, I confirm that we should be grateful if the question of accommodating King Ferouk of Egypt in Canada, Australia or New Zealand in the hypothetical event - which was however imminent last night - of his abdication or deposition could be taken up with due discretion with the Governments of those Dominions. We remain of opinion that Canada would be by far the most suitable choice, and do not consider that the possible proximity of the ex-Shah/

G. Kimber, Esq.,
Dominions Office.

Registry
No. J543/333/G.

Feb 5th

102

Personal Secret.

Dr. J. M. Kimber

D.O.

from Indriwener

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Dear Kimber,

with refer^{ce} to our conversation this morning, I confirm that we should be grateful if the question of accommodating King Farouk of Egypt in Canada, Australia or New Zealand in the ^{hypothetical} event - which was however imminent last night - of his abdication or deposition could be taken up ^{with due discretion} with the Dominions Govts ^{of those concerned.} We remain of opinion that Canada would be by far the most suitable choice, and do not consider that the possible proximity of the ex-Shah would ^{in practice} be a matter of serious consequence. We hope therefore that the Canadian Govt will be ready to consider the matter favourably.

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten mark]

[Handwritten signature]

yours ever,

(241) P.S. Suriver

J.543/333/G.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

[Cypher]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No.618. D. 10.40 p.m. 4th February, 1942.
4th February, 1942.

[[]]

IMMEDIATE.

MOST SECRET.

Your telegram No.451 [of 2nd February: procedure for deposing King of Egypt should necessity arise].

I am in general agreement with procedure which you suggest.

2. But would it not be better if King has to go, to replace him by a Regency Council headed by Prince Mohamed Ali, as was contemplated in 1935 when setting aside of King Fuad on grounds of his continued ill-health was under consideration. Mohamed Ali is old and childless and to make him King would foreshadow another succession crisis at no distant date. At the same time it would appear safer to allow an interval for Egyptian opinion to declare itself on the point of whether monarchy is to be retained at all.

3. I assume also that before proceeding to remove the King you should consult Nahas as the majority leader and whether or not he was actually Prime Minister at the time. It would be most desirable that he should be associated with us in our action against Farouk on the ground that the latter refuses to reign constitutionally and democratically. Nahas' co-operation might avert any necessity for martial law and prevent e.g. any such development as a strike of officials.

4. Place to which King should be sent, if it is necessary to depose him, is under urgent consideration here and I will telegraph again as soon as possible.

5. In the meantime and with reference to your telegram No.482 Farouk must not be allowed to leave the country should he attempt to do so by aeroplane or otherwise.

INDIV.

Handwritten notes:
2/4/42
10.40 p.m.
2/4/42
10.40 p.m.
2/4/42
10.40 p.m.

4. Place to which King should be sent, if it is necessary to depose him, is under urgent consideration here and I will telegraph again as soon as possible.

5. In the meantime and with reference to your telegram No.482, Farouk must not be allowed to leave the country should he attempt to do so by aeroplane or otherwise.

Al. J. 14/1/52

R. 24 4

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. J 543/333/G.

A.P.

4 February 1942.

Despatched 10-40 P.M.

Draft.

Sir M. Lampson,
Cairo. ✓

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET.

Telegram.

No: 618 /
Feb 4
Cypher.
INDIV

DEPARTMENTAL
SECRET.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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necessity arise].

I am in general agreement with procedure
which you suggest.

2. But ~~I should prefer~~ ^{would it not be better} if King has to go,
to replace him by a Regency Council headed by
Prince ~~Mahmoud~~ ^{Mohamed} Ali, ^{was} as contemplated in 1935
when setting aside of King Fuad on grounds of
his continued ill-health was under consideration.
~~Mahmoud~~ ^{Mohamed} Ali is old and childless and to make
him King would foreshadow another succession
crisis at no distant date. At the same time
it would appear safer to allow an interval for
Egyptian opinion to declare itself on the point
of whether monarchy is to be retained at all.

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to remove the King you would consult Nahas
as the majority leader and whether or not he
was actually Prime Minister at the time. It
would be most desirable that he should be
associated with us in our action against Farouk
on the ground that the latter refuses to reign
constitutionally and democratically. Nahas'
co-operation might avert any necessity for
martial law and prevent e.g. any such develop-
ment as a strike of officials.

9 pm

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[Cypher]

WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

TO EGYPT.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 597

3rd February, 1942.

D: 11. 40 a.m. 3rd February, 1942.

P P P P

MOST IMMEDIATE.

1. I fully approve course you took with King in your telegram 449. *501/38/16*

2. In or out of office I hope that you will see Nahas as suggested.

3. You have my full support in any steps you think it necessary to take.

4. Anything further I may send you will only be in the nature of suggestions which I hope may help you. You must judge, but to my mind it is essential at this juncture to prevent a palace victory.

INDIV.

Registry
No.

543/333/C

Desp. 11. 40

3. 2. 42

Draft. S. M. Lampson
Caus.

Tel. no. 594
Feb. 3rd

cyphar

K/ INDIV

Was Cabinet Dis?

Most Immediate

11/01

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

- (1) I fully approve course you took with King in your telegram 449.
- (2) In or out of office I hope that you will see ^{NAHAS} Nahas as suggested as suggested.
- (3) You have my full support in any steps you think it necessary to take.

(4) Anything further I may send you will only be in the nature of suggestions which I hope may help you. You must judge but to my mind ^{it is} essential at this juncture to present a ^{firm} victory.

11.20am

AK

2.

act, and no legal niceties could make it otherwise. Any attempt to appear at one and the same time as a protector of the constitution's [?Grp. omitted] whilst violating them by force would lead us into trouble. Our action should therefore be merely to put someone else on the throne, brandish Article 5 of the Treaty and insist (also by force if necessary) that proper constitutional incantations should be pronounced over the new monarch.

5. It is clear that whether he abdicated or was deposed, the King would have to be placed under restraint and removed from Egypt to some British territory as soon as possible (see the fourth consideration in 2nd paragraph of your predecessor's telegram No. 1249 of 1940). Where could he best be sent?
J2131 | E

6. It might well prove necessary at some stage in the proceedings to proclaim British martial law (though this might be avoidable if the King abdicated). If so, it would be removed as soon as the position had been regularised.

7. The purpose of this telegram is to prepare for emergency which may not arise. If the King now agrees to consult Mahas Pasha (see my telegram No. 449), we may be out of the wood for the time being. But if things go wrong, we may have to act quickly. And in any case I remain convinced (as was the late Mahommed Mahmoud - see his dying advice recorded by telegram at the time) that we shall have no real peace here as long as King Farouk is on the throne as [sic. ? and] that problem is one which we may have to tackle at any time. 54/38/116

8. Minister of State concurs.

INDIV.

J 5743

3 FEB 1942

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

[Cypher]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET).

From CAIRO to FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir M. Lampson.

No. 451.
2nd February, 1942.

D. 9.50 p.m. 2nd February, 1942.
R. 12.50 a.m. 3rd February, 1942.

IMMEDIATE.
MOST SECRET.

Handwritten notes:
- r/w
- ...
- ...
- ...

In view of current developments it seems essential to have a cut and dried plan ready for dealing with King Farouk in case of sudden emergency. I know that there is the belief in certain Egyptian quarters that we have such a plan and I have done nothing to disabuse them. I have accordingly discussed the whole question with the Minister of State and General Officer Commanding-in-Chief British Troops Egypt who is [Grp. undec.] military aspect (e.g. arrangements for surrounding the Palace and intimidating the Royal Bodyguard) in case a show of force is necessary.

2. Should things be brought to a head e.g. by the King refusing some legitimate demand of prime necessity to us or by behaving in a manner contrary to Article 5 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty the following procedure would seem to be simplest.

1) To inform His Majesty that we can no longer regard his general attitude as that of an Ally and to invite him to abdicate.

2) If he agrees, to invite Prince Mohamed Ali to assume the crown.

3) If His Majesty refuses to abdicate to inform him that he has been deposed and approach Mohamed Ali as above.

4) If Prince Mohamed Ali declines (which I do not anticipate) Egypt might have to be governed under martial law until the situation was regularised by another Prince accepting the crown or by the establishment of some other régime.

3. I should ask General Officer Commanding-in-Chief British Troops Egypt to accompany me to the Palace for final interview at which the King would be told that he must decide whether to abdicate or suffer deposition then and there. The necessary military measures might according to circumstances of the moment have to be taken before the audience.

4. There is no provision in the Constitution for deposing the King. If his Majesty refused to abdicate, his deposition by us would be an illegal (though necessary)

act /

I took up with Mr Kimber this morning the question of sending King Farouk, if necessary, to Canada.

He agreed that Canada was in many ways ideal, but pointed out that the ex-Shah would shortly be there: that it would be difficult to prevent the two hatching schemes together: & that the Canadian Govt might not welcome the presence of two ex-monarchs. Would we consider Australia or New Zealand as well? The housing problem was difficult in the latter; but there were winter sports (to which King is so partial).

As regards approach, the Secy for the ^{Dominions} ~~Commonwealth~~ could raise the matter at the almost daily conference of High Commissioners - or he could treat with the Governments direct. He. Mr. Kimber. did not consider action through ~~or~~ the High Commissioners as the best - since they did not in fact cut much ice with their Governments. (This applies both to the HC's meetings.

to an approach via Mr. Massey alone). So? ask Do. to consult all three Dominion Governments. (You could reinforce the Canadian approach via Mr. Massey)

Forisover
5/2

Yes. I will let Canada be the best, for reasons which are sufficiently obvious. Nor would the Shah's proximity do much harm.


5.2

of course
don't say it
- Ch. it will be
do system if it
leaked out!

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

officials might go on strike. It seems to me that it is desirable that reference to this point should be made in any instructions sent to Sir M. Lampson. Nahas Pasha fills the bill, i.e. as a man who could govern Egypt and command the loyalty of the Civil Service and the support of Parliament and of the masses. There is not anybody else I imagine who can do so. Nahas is either about to become the Prime Minister of Egypt, or if he does not, it is because the King, acting more or less unconstitutionally, refuses to accept him. We want to avoid having to govern Egypt under British martial law; therefore if the removal of King Farouk is brought about, I suggest that Nahas must be put at the head of the Government. Further, I suggest that it is most desirable if possible that the demand for Farouk's departure should not only come from us on the ground that he has been disloyal to the alliance (Article 5), but also from Nahas, the biggest popular leader in Egypt, on the ground that King Farouk refuses to reign constitutionally and democratically. The more this latter aspect could be put in the foreground, and the more our part in it could be put in the background the more advantageous the position. Would it be well to put something on these lines to Sir M. Lampson, and indicate that we think it desirable that, if the removal of the King has to be brought about, he should arrange things with Nahas accordingly?

W.P. Bennett
 4th February, 1942.

I agree with the above. We should have to involve Nahas so far as possible as whether or not he was C.M. at the time.

[Signature]
 4.2

See diff. letter.

(Question of destination is being taken up with D.O. W.O.)

[Signature]
 Feb. 11. 1942.

Tot. despatched
 Jan 4 1942

4

The Secretary of State wishes this question to be examined immediately as being of potential imminence.

The 1935 papers, when a similar ^{but not identical} course of action in regard to King Fuad was under discussion, are attached.


I agree in the main with Sir M. Lampson's plan, and we shall have to rely on article 5 of the Treaty by which ~~Egypt~~ undertakes "not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance" - an undertaking which has been violated by the King's persistence in retaining relations with Italy, more particularly by the retention of the Italian nationals in the Palace entourage.

Reinsurance is sometimes a dangerous policy and the deposition of Nicholas of Montenegro in the last war was largely due to his persistence in keeping a son at the Court of Vienna even while ostensibly fighting the Austrians.

The only point on which I am inclined not to agree with Sir M. Lampson is his suggestion that we should immediately substitute Prince Mohamed Ali for King Farouk. Mohamed Ali would ~~take~~ the job and would be content to be a figure head, albeit a long-winded and highly indiscreet one. But he is very old, not in good health and has no children. To put him in would therefore really be to leave the question of succession in suspense and foreshadow another crisis in not some very distant future.

I should prefer to revert to the 1935 plan and have a Council of Regency, headed by Prince Mohamed Ali. This would give time for Egyptian feeling to declare itself and we might find that there would be a good deal of support for abolishing the monarchy altogether.

As regards the destination to which the deposed King Farouk should be sent, I think we must consult ~~the Dominions~~, the D.O. and the C.O., and, in order not to hold up our reply to Sir M. Lampson, we must promise an opinion on this point to follow. I certainly should not favour sending Farouk to the Seychelles, which might win him Wafdist sentiments in a way which would not be welcome. And on the whole I should greatly prefer Canada, if we could only get Mr. Mackenzie King to agree and not without reflecting that the only healthy interest which the King, his sisters and his royal mother have shown of recent years has been their fondness for winter sports.


4th February, 1942.

Mr. Beckett.

In the past papers the point is several times made that, if an occasion arose when the King of Egypt had to be deposed or induced to abdicate, it was in the highest degree desirable that there should be at the head of the Government in Egypt a personality who could govern because he would command the loyalty of the Egyptian Civil Service, etc. (One might also, that it would be better still if he could command parliamentary support and a large support in popular opinion.) It was pointed out that if this was not so, the abdication or deposition might involve the necessity of Egypt being governed under British martial law, and that under the most favourable conditions, when all the officials/

6
Tel. Cairo
no: 985 par. 24
copy to Kimber
Mar. 29

*Amended copy
p.w. 20:*

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

[Cypher]

DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir E. Lamson

No. 272.
20th January, 1942.

D. 10.40 a.m. 21st January, 1942
R. 6.10 p.m. 21st January, 1942.

addddd

IMPORTANT

Report reached me from source over the week-end that owing to a severe reprimand by King Farouk (who had been got at) to the Minister for Foreign Affairs for breach with Vichy the Minister for Foreign Affairs had tendered his resignation which, despite the opposition of his Cabinet colleagues, was likely to be accepted.

2. I sought an urgent interview with the Prime Minister this afternoon, told him of the report and emphasised its seriousness if true. I hoped I might report that it was ill-founded.

3. The Prime Minister sought to draw from me what the result would be if the report were true. I refused to be drawn beyond the statement that it would amount to the ~~law~~ ^A ~~undec-~~sackling of an Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs by his sovereign for loyally complying with a request by His Majesty's Ally formulated for perfectly legitimate war reasons. His Excellency could draw his own conclusion as to the results which such an intolerable intervention by the sovereign might, and in my view should, bring in its train. I reminded His Excellency this was not the first time I had had to speak seriously about the King.

4. The Prime Minister said that in the circumstances he was glad to give the following answer to my questions. The Egyptian Government had decided to sever relations with Vichy: that decision stood. As to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he would be attending the Foreign Affairs Commission of Parliament this very afternoon to explain and maintain the Government decision. This (this to my direct question) was equivalent to saying that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had not and was not resigning.

5. I expressed suitable relief which I felt sure you would share.