

FO 371/90149

24

Sir to Sir
Africa Dept 27/11
PUS Dept

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MINUTE

SAS of return (29/11)
F. 27/11
SERIAL No. 17.101/61.

copy by ✓
SF

PW

~~GENERAL MALLAN FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE~~
~~FOREIGN OFFICE TO SEE~~

PW

16/05/47

(8)

Egyptian
Service
Trains

I hope we shall have reached a conclusion one way or the other in Egypt at least by April Fool's Day. What is needed now is not a long term separation of our slowly established contacts and connections with Egypt, but an abrupt suspension of new arrivals. Pray consider whether the Egyptian Government should not be informed that this will begin forthwith.

2. At the same time let us know what other things we are doing for them, e.g., giving or selling them ships, weapons, or munitions of any kind. What is being done about money payments, or payments in goods on account of sterling balances?

3. Let us have a full programme of immediate suspension rather than of deferred cessation which I can discuss with the Foreign Secretary when he returns on Thursday. Make it the best programme you can, i.e., what they would like least.

W.C.C.

26.11.51

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO

C.O.S.(51)192nd MEETING HELD
ON WEDNESDAY, 28TH NOVEMBER, 1951

5. MEASURES TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION IN EGYPT

(Previous reference: C.O.S.(51)191st Meeting, Minute 7)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a Secretary's minute⁺ covering a personal minute from the Prime Minister with regard to various measures for the greater discomfiture of the Egyptians.

In discussion the following points were made:-

(a) General

The full programme of immediate suspension of our established contacts and connections in Egypt asked for by the Prime Minister could not conveniently be prepared until the joint recommendations of the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, and H.M. Ambassador in Cairo for future action against the Egyptians were received and examined. The Prime Minister was aware of the situation;

(b) Sale or Gift of military equipment to Egypt

MR. WHEELER informed the Committee that the sale or gift of all military equipment and spare parts to Egypt had been suspended almost immediately after the Egyptian Prime Minister's speech on 8th October in which he had announced the abrogation of the treaty. The suspension had been strictly interpreted and also covered numerous items which were applicable either to military or civilian purposes;

+ PPM.8

o C.O.S.(ME)598 and F.O. telegram to Cairo No. 1490 refer

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(c) Money payments or payments in goods on account of Sterling balances

MR. SERPELL informed the Committee that the next release from the blocked balances under the Sterling Releases Agreement was not due before 1st January, 1952;

(d) Egyptian Trainees

(Previous reference:- C.O.S.(51)190th Meeting, Minute 3)

In favour of the immediate cessation of accepting Egyptian trainees, it was pointed out that:-

- (i) the very presence of Egyptians whose fellow countrymen were butchering the brother officers of the British students and staff, was embarrassing for the schools and establishments to which they were attached.
- (ii) if, as seemed likely, the Egyptians ceased to send trainees, it would really be more dignified if we were to have taken the initiative and declined to accept them

In favour of adhering to the previous views of the Committee, it was pointed out:-

- (iii) that refusal to accept further trainees would not greatly annoy the Egyptian Government;
- (iv) that the Americans had reached certain decisions in this matter in consultation with us; though they might be persuaded to change their minds, it was undesirable to have to ask them to do so;
- (v) it was most desirable not to antagonise the Egyptian armed forces but rather to keep on good terms with them and to foster any breach which might be made between the Egyptian forces and their Government. Moreover, should the Egyptian forces become hostile to us there were certain obvious advantages in having 40-50 of their best trained officers in our hands.

It was agreed that on balance the views previously expressed by the Committee should be adhered to. If it were necessary to make any public statement on the subject, a reasonable line would seem to be that the Egyptian Armed forces had consistently behaved in a correct and friendly fashion; our quarrel was not with them but with their Government. If, however, the Prime Minister insisted that no further Egyptian trainees be accepted, then this should

✓ C.O.S.(51)692

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TOP SECRET

be put over through Service channels on the lines that we greatly regretted having to take this step but were forced to do so because of the abominable behaviour of the Egyptian Government.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Invited Sir Kenneth McLean to forward an interim reply to the Prime Minister's Personal Minute⁺ in the light of their discussion.

(B)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.,

28th NOVEMBER, 1951.

+ PPM. 8.

- 3 -

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E. W. G. Brown

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JE 1051

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C.O.S. (51)708

[P.P.M.8]

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

SANCTIONS AGAINST EGYPT

Note by the Secretary

At their meeting⁺ on 28th November, the Chiefs of Staff approved the attached Report^o which was forwarded to the Prime Minister. This Report was prepared in reply to the Prime Minister's Personal minute^f commenting on the Report^o by the Chiefs of Staff on Egyptian Service Trainees.

(Signed) R.W.EWBANK

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

30TH NOVEMBER, 1951.

JE 1051 / 469 C

- + COS(51)192nd Meeting Minute 5.
- o Annex I
- f Annex II
- f COS(51)692.

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ANNEX I

Forwarded as KGM/372

MINISTER OF DEFENCE

In your minute M.101(c)/51 you raised the question of the suspension of our established contacts and connections with Egypt. To take your points in turn -

Egyptian Trainees in British Service Establishments

The Chiefs of Staff originally put forwarded their views to you under my minute KGM 345, namely that we should accept no further Egyptian trainees on courses starting after 31st March 1952.

The Chiefs of Staff have again considered this matter and they adhere to the views expressed in that minute. They feel that it is essential to retain our present cordial relations with the Egyptian services, to take every opportunity to emphasise that the present situation is the outcome of the Egyptian Government alone, and to encourage any potential split between the Egyptian armed forces and their Government. They believe that the immediate suspension of training facilities would only have an adverse effect on Service relations and would in no way embarrass the Egyptian Government. Further, they consider that should a clash arise between the Egyptian armed forces and ourselves, there is a certain advantage in having some fifty of their brighter officers taking courses in this country.

Should it be necessary to make any public statement about our policy regarding Egyptian trainees, the Chiefs of Staff feel that the line might be taken that our quarrel is with the Egyptian Government and not with the armed forces, whose behaviour, in contrast to their Government, has been invariably correct and indeed friendly.

The Chiefs of Staff therefore hope that you will endorse the policy of continuing to accept Egyptian trainees on courses beginning on 31st March 1952, and after that to discontinue these facilities, thus conforming with the American policy.

Should, however, you decide against the acceptance of any further trainees, the Chiefs of Staff urge that this policy should be communicated to the Egyptian armed forces through Service channels in Cairo as, if done through Embassy channels, the Egyptian Government might well distort our policy when conveying it to the Egyptian armed forces.

Supply of Munitions, etc.

You asked whether we are giving or selling ships, munitions, weapons, etc. to the Egyptians. The sale or gift of all forms of military equipment and spare parts to Egypt was suspended immediately after the Egyptian Prime Minister announced the abrogation of the Treaty on 8th October.

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		1		2		
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Political, Economic and Financial Action against Egypt

A report was recently prepared by a Working Party in Whitehall under the aegis of the Foreign Office, giving the pros and cons of various types of economic and financial action against Egypt. This report was sent to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, and to our Ambassador, for comment. Comments and recommendations on the action we should take have just been received this morning (Commanders-in-Chief to Chiefs of Staff telegram 572/CCL refers). The Chiefs of Staff and interested Departments in Whitehall have not yet had an opportunity to consider these recommendations.

These recommendations require careful consideration by the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office in conjunction with other Departments concerned. It is expected that definite proposals will be put to you early next week.

In the meantime I am informed that the next release from the blocked balances under the Sterling Releases Agreement is not due before 1st January, 1952.

(Signed) K.G. McLEAN

29TH NOVEMBER, 1951.

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TOP SECRETANNEX IIISSUED AS ANNEX TO P.P.M. 6PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL
MINUTE.
SERIAL NO. M. 101 c/51GENERAL McLEAN FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.FOREIGN OFFICE TO SEE.

I hope we shall have reached a conclusion one way or the other in Egypt at least by April Fool's Day. What is needed now is not a long term separation of our slowly established contacts and connections with Egypt, but an abrupt suspension of new arrivals. Pray consider whether the Egyptian Government should not be informed that this will begin forthwith.

2. At the same time let me know what other things we are doing for them, e.g. giving or selling them ships, weapons, or munitions of any kind. What is being done about money payments, or payments in goods on account of sterling balances?

3. Let me have a full programme of immediate suspension rather than of deferred cessation which I can discuss with the Foreign Secretary when he returns on Thursday. Make it the best programme you can, i.e., what they would like least.

(Signed) W.S.C.

26th November, 1951.

SECRET

Mr. Allen.

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MINUTE P.P.M. 8

C.I.G.S.
FIRST SEA LORD
C.A.S.
SIR HAROLD PARKER

} 5 copies to
each addressee.

J61051/472

(A)

Copy to: General McLean
Mr. R. Allen, Foreign Office.

SANCTIONS AGAINST EGYPT

R2

I attach a Personal Minute from the Prime Minister concerning Egypt, only part of which directly concerns the Chiefs of Staff.

2. I suggest that this minute should be handled as follows:-

- (a) Para. 1. This concerns Egyptian trainees, a subject discussed by the Vice Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on 23rd November: as a result the Minister of Defence was asked to agree that Egyptian Service trainees should cease to attend courses in the United Kingdom after 31st March, 1952.

The Chiefs of Staff are requested to be prepared to discuss this paragraph at their meeting on 28th November.

- (b) Para. 2. First sentence only. Sir Harold Parker is requested to arrange for the attendance of a representative of the Ministry of Defence on 28th November, furnished with a draft reply. This reply should cover also spare parts and maintenance stores generally.
- (c) Para. 2. Last sentence only and Para. 3. The Foreign Office have been fathering the examination by an inter-departmental working party of possible economic sanctions against Egypt. H.M. Ambassador in Cairo and the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, are sending in their comments on the working party report on 28th November; but too late for your meeting.

However, I propose to invite Mr. R. Allen of the Foreign Office to your meeting to agree an interim reply to these questions.

3. To sum up, unless you notify me to the contrary, I propose to place this minute on the agenda for your meeting on Wednesday next, 28th November, with the object of :-

+ No. M.101 c/51.
COS(51)190th Mtg. Minute 3. // (a).....
p COS (51) 692. & COS.2248/22/11/51. © 569/OCL

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AND PERSONAL

- (a) obtaining your answer to para. 1;
- (b) obtaining the Ministry of Defence answer to para. 2 (1st sentence);
- (c) obtaining an agreed Foreign Office/C.O.S. interim reply to para. 2 (2nd sentence) and Para. 3.

(Sgd) R. W. Ewbank

Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

27th November, 1951.

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AND PERSONAL

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SECRET
AND PERSONALPRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL
MINUTE.
SERIAL NO. M. 101 c/51GENERAL McLEAN FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.FOREIGN OFFICE TO SEE.

I hope we shall have reached a conclusion one way or the other in Egypt at least by April Fool's Day. What is needed now is not a long term separation of our slowly established contacts and connections with Egypt, but an abrupt suspension of new arrivals. Pray consider whether the Egyptian Government should not be informed that this will begin forthwith.

2. At the same time let me know what other things we are doing for them, e.g. giving or selling them ships, weapons, or munitions of any kind. What is being done about money payments, or payments in goods on account of sterling balances?

3. Let me have a full programme of immediate suspension rather than of deferred cessation which I can discuss with the Foreign Secretary when he returns on Thursday. Make it the best programme you can, i.e. what they would like least.

(Signed) W.S.C.

26th November, 1951.SECRET
AND PERSONAL

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AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY, CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

C.O.S.(51)692

26TH NOVEMBER, 1951

COPY NO 32

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

EGYPTIAN SERVICE TRAINEES

Report by the Chiefs of Staff

All three Services are at present accepting Egyptian Service trainees on courses of instruction in this country.

2. We recently considered this matter with the Foreign Office and came to the conclusion that, although we wished to remain on friendly terms with the Egyptian armed forces, public opinion would not tolerate the training of Egyptians in this country while our own men were being butchered in the Canal Zone. However, we realised that the first essential was to co-ordinate our policy with the Americans.

The State Department have readily agreed with the necessity for a common policy and have said that they wish to continue accepting Egyptian trainees up to the end of the fiscal year 1951/52; but to inform the Egyptians, through American Service channels, that after 30th June, 1952, the acceptance in the United States of further trainees will be dependant on the political situation then prevailing.

3. We recommend the adoption of a similar policy: but, we suggest that in order to fit in with our own financial year no Egyptian trainees should be accepted on courses which start after 31st March, 1952. Details of Egyptian officers attending courses at the moment and due to attend courses starting before 1st April, 1952, are attached*.

RECOMMENDATION

4. We recommend that you should approve our policy of informing the Egyptians through Service channels in Cairo that, regretfully, we are not prepared to accept any further Egyptian trainees in this country after 31st March, 1952, as long as the present tension prevails.

(Signed) W. J. SLIM
FRASER
A. P. M. SANDERS
(for Chief of the Air
Staff)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.,

26TH NOVEMBER, 1951.

* Annex

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CONFIDENTIALANNEXEGYPTIAN OFFICERS AT PRESENT ATTENDING COURSES OF
INSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OR DUE TO ATTEND
COURSES STARTING BEFORE 1ST APRIL, 1952

	<u>At present on courses</u>	<u>Due to attend before 1st April, 1952</u>
Navy	11	32
Army	14	19
Air Force ...	14	13
Total ...	<u>39</u>	<u>64</u>

GRAND TOTAL: 103

JR1051

SECRETARY OF STATE

EGYPT

RESTRICTIONS ON OIL

I attach a copy of a minute which the Chiefs of Staff are sending to the Prime Minister as a result of a telegram received from the Commanders-in-Chief Middle East recommending the re-imposition of partial restrictions on oil from the Canal Zone to Suez.

[562/CCL
attached]

2. I also attach a copy of Cairo telegram No. 1037, from which you will see that Stevenson is not in favour of re-imposing these restrictions at present.

3. You will remember that on the 20th November you sent a minute to the Prime Minister in which you said that it might be well to wait awhile before coming to a decision to use further means of pressure on the Egyptians. You also suggested that the paper on economic sanctions, including oil restrictions, which had been prepared by the Departments concerned, should be sent out to Cairo and Fayid, and the Ambassador and Commanders-in-Chief asked to take this into account and to prepare joint recommendations. These recommendations would include political, military and economic measures which we might take, and the order in which we might take them, in the event of a decision to embark on further action against Egypt. This action might be within or beyond the lines of policy already laid down in your telegram to Cairo No. 1249 (of which a copy is also attached). This paper has now been sent out to Egypt and we are instructing the Ambassador to prepare recommendations in consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief.

FO 371/90149

60647

4. As regards oil restrictions, you will remember that several Departments, such as the Treasury, Ministry of Fuel and Power, and Ministry of Civil Aviation, are interested in different aspects of the question. It would seem therefore that the matter of oil restrictions should be considered in relation to the broad question of our policy towards Egypt and that it would be preferable not to take a decision upon it in advance of the decisions on policy which will be required in the near future when we receive the joint recommendations from Stevenson and the Commanders-in-Chief. I would therefore suggest that it might be preferable to leave a decision on the re-imposition of oil sanctions in abeyance until Ministers are able to consider these recommendations.

5. If you agree, I will inform the Prime Minister accordingly, stating that I have ascertained that these are your views.

W. Steang

22nd November, 1951.

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

MINISTER OF DEFENCE

EGYPT

On 2nd November, on the advice of the Foreign Secretary, you gave instructions that the restrictions placed by the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, on the movement of oil from Suez to the Delta should for the time being be completely removed.

2. This decision was based on reports that the restriction on the movement of oil was seriously affecting its distribution to the Delta population and that large scale riots would result. No serious riot occurred as a result of oil restrictions and recent events in Cairo and Alexandria have shown that the Egyptian Government can prevent rioting if they so desire.

3. The Chiefs of Staff are disturbed at the way the situation is developing in Egypt. It seems to them that little is being done seriously to incommode the Egyptian Government. We have lost the initiative. This reminds them unpleasantly of the course of events which led up to our withdrawal from Persia and the similarity, which must be equally obvious to the Egyptians, is further emphasised by the fact that we have now been forced to evacuate large numbers of Service Families from Egypt.

The Chiefs of Staff consider that unless we are to drift into a stalemate in Egypt, our initiative should be regained. A step towards this would be to resume intermittent interruption of oil supplies as recommended by the Commanders-in-Chief.

4. A Draft Report by a Working Party on the implications of economic sanctions against Egypt points out that there are counter measures which the Egyptians could take. It is unlikely that these measures would follow the limited interruption of oil movement now proposed.

5. The Chiefs of Staff are convinced that the intermittent interruption of oil need not give rise to widespread disturbances in the Delta. If the Egyptian Government were informed that widespread disturbances in the Delta endangering British lives must inevitably lead to action by our own troops to restore the situation, such disturbances would not in fact occur.

7 Foreign Office to Cairo No. 1255 refers.

Reference:-

FO 371/90149

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6. They suggest that the Egyptians should be told that for reasons of security and administration we are unable to avoid interrupting the movement of oil; that this has been caused by their own actions by intimidating labour and in terrorist attacks and that continued ill-behaviour on their part must inevitably lead to longer and more serious interruptions.

7. The Chiefs of Staff strongly endorse the recommendations made by the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, in their telegram 562/OCL and have instructed me to seek your approval to the intermittent interruption of oil supplies to the Delta.

[attached]

22nd November, 1951.

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TOP SECRET TELEGRAM

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IZ 8151
TOO 201532
TOR 210140Z

FROM : G.H.Q., MIDDLE EAST LAND FORCES

TO : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON

INFO : C-IN-C MEDITERRANEAN
EMBASSY, CAIRO
B.M.E.O., CAIRO

JK 103

582/OCL

JK 1051/474 G

20th November, 1951.

From B.D.C.C. (M.E.) for Chiefs of Staff.

1. In accordance with COS(ME)584 all restrictions on transport of oils from the Canal Zone to the Delta have been removed since 8th November except that the road is closed to all traffic at night.

2. The fear expressed in F.O. telegram No. 1290 of 5th November to Cairo that widespread disturbances might occur as a result of the restrictions already imposed has not materialised. There have been no disturbances due to oil shortages other than some very minor disorders in the provinces where local shortages had occurred. There have been no cuts in railway services, electric power, lighting, road transport or any other essential services.

3. According to Shell representatives the stocks situation is still low and severe restrictions would dislocate supply rapidly.

4. We believe that it is very important to keep the Egyptian Government in anxiety over this question although we must avoid creating a serious crisis, i.e., in other words we wish to pursue the object as stated in para 4 (a) and (b) of COS(ME) 580.

5. Moreover we hold it to be essential on security grounds. The present system of unrestricted traffic involves a most serious burden on our troops who are responsible for checking the traffic. It is most important also on security grounds that our control of rail and road traffic should be continuously demonstrated.

6. We therefore propose that intermittent interruptions of oil supply should start again. To start with these will take the form of

(a) Stopping rail traffic for one day in seven or equivalent.

(b) Stopping road transport for six hours in one day in seven. Thereafter adjustments will be made in consultation with H.M. Ambassador.

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7. We have discussed this with H.M. Ambassador who is commenting separately.

CIRCULATION

100 201532

No. 10 Downing Street.
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
 War Registry, Admiralty.
 Message Control, War Office.
 Registry Telegrams, Air Ministry.
 Chief of Amphibious Warfare.
 Sir W. Strang, Foreign Office.
 Sir P. Dixon, Foreign Office.
 Mr. R. T. Bowker, Foreign Office.
 Mr. D. P. Reilly, Foreign Office.
 Lord Hood, Foreign Office.
 Mr. R. Allen, Foreign Office.
 Mr. A. D. M. Ross, Foreign Office.
 Sir F. Hoyer Millar.
 Mr. Armitage Smith, Colonial Office.
 Mr. N. Pritchard, C.R.O.
 Sir P. Liesching, C.R.O.
 Mr. E. L. Sykes, C.R.O.
 Mr. Goodison, Ministry of Transport.
 D.C.O.R. "B"

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Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Stevenson

No. 1037

21st November, 1951

D. 11.35 a.m. 21st November, 1951

R. 1. 50 p.m. 21st November, 1951

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1037 of
21st November

Repeated for information to Memin Fayid.

Oil sanction.

I discussed 562/C.C.L. with B.D.C.C. on November 20th. My view is that while it might be salutary to disabuse the Egyptian Government of any idea they may have that they have succeeded in talking us out of using the oil sanction its re-imposition would not (repeat not) have the effect of hastening the fall or modification of the present Government. It might possibly please the opposition. It would be regarded with equanimity by the Egyptian Foreign Minister whose object is to intensify the present crisis as much as possible and it might also please the extremists for the same reason. It would certainly please the local authorities and influential persons in upper Egypt who are still making a very good thing out of the black market persisting from the previous stoppage of oil. In all the circumstances I would prefer, by frequent reference to the possibility of re-imposition in my contacts with the Egyptian authorities, to keep alive their anxiety on this score.

2. As re-imposition could be plausibly based on security grounds (Para 5 of telegram under reference) it would be perhaps less likely to cause a rift in the otherwise completely solid Anglo-American front in Cairo. I impressed on the committee the staunchness of the support which I had received from my United States colleague who in answer to bitter complaints and appeals for intervention against measures we had taken in the Canal Zone had

/invariably said that

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SECRETCairo telegram No. 1037 to Foreign Office


invariably said that he was in no way interested as the United States Government was 100 per cent behind His Majesty's Government in maintaining the security of our base in the zone.

3. My United States colleague's view of this sanction has always been that it would not (repeat not) attain the object desired.

Foreign Office please pass Memin Fayid as my telegram No. 85.

[Repeated Memin Fayid]

66666



1-90

? brief for S/S before
speaking about
Egypt & Mr. Arden



Gates
✓
Africa

Egypt.

JE 1051/477

The Commander in Chief, Middle East Land Forces, has pointed out that all restrictions on the transport of oils from the Canal Zone to the Delta were removed on the 6th November, except that the road is closed to all traffic at night. There have been no disturbances of any consequence as a result of previous interference with supplies, and there have been no cuts in essential services.

The Commander in Chief has two reasons for the action he now proposes:

1. The present system of unrestricted traffic imposes a very heavy burden on our troops.
2. The Egyptians must be reminded from time to time that we can inconvenience them, though we have no intention of creating a serious crisis.

General Robertson's proposal, which has now been accepted in London, is that there should be intermittent interruptions of the oil supply as follows:-

- i. stopping rail traffic for one day in seven or equivalent;
- ii. stopping road transport for six hours in one day in seven.

Sir R. Stevenson was instructed to tell his American colleague that we had been obliged to re-impose these restrictions for administrative reasons and in particular in view of the necessity of allowing our troops some relief.

Mr. Caffery apparently took this very badly. He said he was very much disturbed and thought that the United States

/Government

FO 371/90149

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Government would be equally so, and that they could not "go along with us on this". He forecast that the reaction of the Egyptian Government and of the King would be so bad that all hope might as well be given up of coming to an agreement. Sir R. Stevenson said that he did not think the result would be tragic as Mr. Caffery expected, and he said that he did not want the Egyptians to think that they could make a rift between us and the Americans on larger issues.

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EXTRACT FROM C.O.S.(51) 1911th MEETING HELD 30/4.8. MEASURES TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION IN EGYPT - SECRET

(Previous reference: C.O.S.(51)192nd Meeting, Minute 5)

A. 573/CCL

THE COMMITTEE considered a telegram from the British Defence Co-ordination Committee (Middle East) about the implications of establishing military Government in Egypt. It was agreed that only paragraph 4 of this telegram should be considered for the present, the remainder would be taken into account with 572/CCL.

In discussion the following points were made:-

- (a) the personnel referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 4 of 573/CCL were already being provided;
- (b) the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle East, were now asking for the personnel detailed in paragraph 33 (a) of COS(51)681, and with these would presumably proceed to work out the requirement referred to in paragraph 33 (b) of COS(51)681. There was general agreement that the demands of the B.D.C.C.(M.E.) should be met as quickly as possible.

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SECRET

Sec 51/475

(4)

SECRET

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (1) Invited the War Office to take the necessary executive action to provide the personnel requested by the B.D.C.C. M.E., in the last sentence of paragraph 4 of the telegram under discussion;
- (2) Instructed the Secretary to inform^o the B.D.C.C. (M.E.) of their decision.

B. 574/CCL

THE COMMITTEE then proceeded to consider a further telegram from the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle East, about the provision of Field Security sections and of Military Police and about the secondment of Sudan and/or Colonial Police for employment in the Canal Zone.

In discussion the following points were made:-

(c) Field Security Sections

MAJOR GENERAL McLEOD said that one Field Security Section had already been sent to the Middle East with 3rd Infantry Division; a further 3 officers and 27 other ranks would be sent in January. If more were to be provided this would have to be done by withdrawing from British Army of the Rhine; the War Office were investigating this possibility.

(d) Military Police

MAJOR GENERAL McLEOD said that the demands made by the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle East, could not be met till February except at the expense of 6th Armoured Division;

SIR ARTHUR SANDERS suggested that the War Office should approach the Air Ministry to see whether they could assist by providing some R.A.F. Police.

There was general agreement that every effort should be made to meet the requirement of the B.D.C.C., M.E. as quickly as possible.

(e) Secondment of Sudan and/or Colonial Police

MR. BENDALL said that the provision of Sudanese Police for this task would be very difficult owing to the nominal constitutional status of the Sudan vis-a-vis Egypt; moreover there had recently been a Police strike which made it undesirable to reduce the officer strength in the Sudan. This source of supply should be ruled out except in the very last resort. He would however investigate the possibility of providing personnel from Eritrea and Libya.

^o Telegram sent as C.O.S.(ME)600

SECRET

MR. TRAFFORD SMITH said that the Colonial Office might be able to assist by providing personnel from East and Central Africa and perhaps Aden where there were a number of ex-Palestine Police (whose knowledge of Arabic would probably be a bit rusty). Before committing themselves they would however have to consult the Colonial Territories concerned. Whether volunteers for this task would be forthcoming or not might depend largely on the status which would be accorded to officers seconded and on the financial inducement offered.

X' In discussion it was agreed that the War Office should take all necessary action in this matter in consultation with the Foreign Office and Colonial Office. It was obviously necessary to clear up the question of terms of service as quickly as possible but meanwhile it was desirable that the Foreign Office and Colonial Office should make confidential exploratory enquiries from the authorities concerned. It was pointed out that for the time being only four officers were being asked for and their provision was obviously a matter of urgency; clearly, should the situation in the Canal Zone deteriorate, there would at a later stage be further and much heavier demands and all possible sources of supply should be investigated now - for instance there might be available in the United Kingdom retired Colonial Policemen or retired British members of the Egyptian Police Force.

(f) Other Administrative Assistance which might be required from the Colonial Office

MR. TRAFFORD SMITH enquired whether there was any likelihood of demands being made on the Colonial Office for assistance in administrative personnel should it become necessary to institute military Government in the Canal Zone. If this were likely to occur the Colonial Office would like to start considering the problem now and making such confidential enquiries as might be necessary.

It was agreed that should it become necessary to institute Military Government in the Canal Zone requests would certainly be made to the Colonial Office for the provision of administrative personnel. It was most desirable that the Colonial Office should start considering the problem now and there was no objection to the making of such confidential enquiries as might be necessary.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (3) Invited the War Office
- (a) to investigate the possibility of providing extra Field Security sections from British Army of the Rhine;
 - (b) to make every effort to meet the requirement for Military Police and to approach the Air Ministry to see whether they could help by providing R.A.F. police;

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SECRET

- (c) in consultation with the Foreign Office and Colonial Office to take all necessary action in the matter of providing the Colonial Police requested by the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle East, and to deal direct with General Headquarters Middle East Land Forces on this subject.
- (4) Invited the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office to co-operate with the War Office in the matter of providing Colonial Police for the Canal Zone;
- (5) Invited the Colonial Office to take such action as was necessary in the light of the views expressed at 'X' and 'Y' above.
- (6) Instructed the Secretary to inform^z the British Defence Co-ordination Committee Middle East of their decisions.
- (c) Movement of reinforcements to the Middle East

MAJOR GENERAL McLEOD said that the War Office now found it necessary to ask that H.M.S. "ILLUSTRIOUS" should, immediately on her return to this country, undertake one more trooping trip to the Middle East. They would shortly be approaching the Admiralty with an official request.

VICE ADMIRAL GRANTHAM agreed to look into this question.

THE COMMITTEE:

- (7) Took note that the War Office would be approaching the Admiralty officially in this matter.

(B)

z telegram sent as C.O.S.(ME)606

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22/11

Registry No. *3605/4756*

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Open

+2 FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
22 December, 1961.

Dear Sir,

Dr's letter to
W/O. Everitt,
C.O.S. Secretariat
S.S.O. S.F.C.

RECEIVED THE
DIVISION.
21 DEC 1961

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

From Mr. Bendall

Copy to -
Col. Collins
M.O. 4, War Office
Mr. Barrow, FOAT

Mr. Barrow,
FOAT first
Handwritten notes
but see minutes below.

80750 WA 2831-314 1250 11/28 O.A.S.

Will you please refer to your letter 8526/1/12/61 of the 1st December about the recruiting of police and administrative personnel for the Canal Zone?

As regards police I am afraid that our investigations have not been very fruitful so far. Eritrea is hard-pressed and is unlikely to be able to spare any before we hand over our responsibilities next September. We had greater hopes from Libya, but these too have been disappointed since the majority of the British police officers serving under the present administration have decided to stay on with the new Libyan State. The remainder could not be recommended, ~~but we have been given the names of~~ two ex-members of the Tripolitanian Police who might be suitable if they are available. We have also been given the name of a certain Gilles Bay who has served in Egypt, has held high positions in the Palestine police and who is in touch with various ex-colleagues from the Egyptian and Palestine Police Force. This information has been passed on to the War Office.

We have also asked the Foreign Office Administration of African Territories if they could help over the earmarking of suitable administrative personnel, if such should ever be required for military government in the Canal Zone. The prospects here seem a little brighter, particularly as there may be some redundancy in Eritrea before long. The difficulty is of course that, being on temporary engagement, once
/these

FO 371/90149

60047

these people cease to be employed by the
 administrations concerned, they disappear to
 other employment ^{and out of our ken.} While some of them may be
 willing to come to the Canal Zone, it is not
 much good approaching them until there is
 something definite to offer them.

I am sending a copy of this letter to
 Collins at the War Office (M.O.4), and Barrow
 (F.O.A.A.T.).

Ra

2/12

Yours sincerely

(Sd.) D. V. Randall

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

167

FROM W/Adm. Smith
(Ministry of
Defense) to
Mr. Kendall
No. COS. 2326/1/12/51
Dated 1. 12. 51
Received in
Registry—4. 12. 51
TOP SECRET

Chiefs of Staff consideration
of further measures to maintain
D.C. position in Egypt.

References

SECRET/ISIG

MINUTES

1) COS(S) 1944 ltr: Stand of Gen. Rod.

FOATI has telegraphed Tripoli about
patrol officers, but have received an entirely
negative reply. I understand that
criticism must in any case be discontinued
as a source of supply. We have often
known this.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

1) W/Adm.
Smith (1/2)
from Mr. Kendall

2. FOATI have also interview getting
into touch with GIKES Bay on

2) W.A. (Col. Collyer - Palestine) Patrol strict with money
contacts. I have passed this name
on to the W.O. who have contacted
MELB (GIKES himself money to 100 Sudan)

Copy sent
(Mr. Gordon)
Dec 28

3. X in Smith's letter asks us to
help with the re-arranging of administrative
personnel in case mil. gov. in the

(Action completed)

(Index)

28/12

lyk

(Cones)

Canal Zone has to be set up. It seems to me that Libya might be a possible source of supply here too, and in any case, Libya may have other suitable personnel (cf. ex-Somalia) on their books.

Libya (Mr Barrow)

J. Barrow

11/12

Para. 1 of your minute is confirmed. I have, however, today telegraphed Tripoli asking whether they would recommend two police officers (R.N. Armstrong and G.H. Steet) who returned to this country from Tripolitania during September 1951. These are the only two policemen among those who have left our territories in recent months who appear to be worth considering.

2. As regards your para.3, I doubt whether any of the administrative officers ex-Somalia would now be available, neither do I think we shall get anyone from Libya. It may well be, however, that before very long the Chief Administrator, Eritrea, will be in a position to release some of his administrative staff. No useful purpose would, however, be served in pursuing this possibility until it is fairly certain that the step referred to at X of Everitt's letter is to be taken. At the appropriate time, we will also let you have the names of any other possible 'starters' who may be on our books.

R.W. Barrow

(R.W. Barrow)

13th December, 1951.

F.O.A.A.T.

Mr. D.V. Handall,
African Department.

J.M. ...
Secretary

J.S.

16/12

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62247

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Minutes.

Grade III

Further to Mr. Barrow's minute of 13th December, information has now been received from Tripoli to the effect that they can recommend the two police officers in question.

Tripoli reports that Armstrong is the better of the two and more experienced but is not Arabic-speaking. Steet speaks good Arabic and can be recommended by the Commissioner of Police in Tripolitania as suitable.

The private addresses are as follows:

R.N. Armstrong, M.M.
66 Greenside Street,
Millerston,
Glasgow, E.1.

G.H. Steet,
191, Queens Gate, London S.W.7.

T.W. Deeves

(T.W. Deeves)

18th December 1951.

Mr. D.V. Bendall,
African Department

Thank you.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin

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R.

TOP SECRET

Handwritten: 371/90149
 475
 9

(Secy) ~~G. H. EVERETT~~
 Ministry of Defence,
 Storey's Gate,
 LONDON, S.W.1.

2326/1/12/51

1st December, 1951.

Dear Bendall,

I enclose a copy of the relevant minute* of the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff when they considered telegram 574/GCI from the British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Middle East.

You will note that the Chiefs of Staff invited the War Office to co-ordinate all action in the matter referred to in paragraphs 4-7 of the telegram and you will no doubt therefore keep in close touch with them.

You will also remember that, while accepting the unsuitability of the Sudan as a source of supply except in the last resort, the Chiefs of Staff invited you to explore the possibilities of Eritrea and Libya.

While this question was not directly raised at the meeting in relation to territories administered by the Foreign Office, you will remember that the Colonial Office asked whether demands for administrative personnel would be made should we be forced to institute military Government in the Canal Zone. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that such demands would be certain to arise and invited the Colonial Office to start considering the problem. It has occurred to me that similar demands might be made to you and that you might be in a position to help. You may therefore feel that it would be worthwhile thinking about this even though the Chiefs of Staff did not specifically suggest you should do so.

Handwritten signature:
 for Secretary,
 Chiefs of Staff Committee

V. Bendall, Esq.,
 Foreign Office.

* COS(51)194th Mtg., Minute 9.

EGYPT AND SUDAN

Regarding proposal that H.M.G. should go forward for settlement of the defence problem with Egypt, acknowledge the legality of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan.

195

3/12/51

ed in
y- 14/12/51

REFERENCES

1051/4507

E10110/141

1051/483

1051/3-1952

(Print)

how disposed of)

(Index)

16.2.54
W

See within

A F.O. Minute L. P. Beckett (MINUTES) Dec. 4

The Governor General's telegram (FLAG A) is in my view an undisguised piece of special pleading. The whole point of Sir R. Stevenson's plan (FLAG B) is that the Egyptians should formally acknowledge the right of the Sudanese to secede and thus ensure that the recognition of Egyptian sovereignty by H.M. Government did not either interfere with the present system of administration in the Sudan or prejudice the right of the Sudanese to self-determination. This is very different from the earlier "formula" proposals and is designed to deal with the argument that the "symbolic act" is liable to misinterpretation. If the Governor General advises us that notwithstanding the safeguards mentioned the Sudan will rise against even a symbolic acknowledgement of Egyptian sovereignty, then we must accept his view. His anxiety however to introduce other arguments in support of his view, many of which are founded on debatable premises, throws some doubt on his impartiality in this affair, or at least some doubt on his part in our honesty of purpose.

2. To turn to Sir R. Stevenson's proposal (FLAG B). To start with it would I think be politically impossible for H.M. Government to acknowledge Egyptian sovereignty in the Sudan "out of the blue" and the only acceptable procedure would be along the lines proposed in 2 (4) and (5).

3. The main point however is whether it is practicable for Egypt in one breath to ask the Hague Court for a ruling on sovereignty and with the next to say that she is prepared to accept the Sudanese right to secession. What, moreover, would happen if the Egyptian Government having obtained an acknowledgement by the International Court and H.M. Government of her sovereignty over the Sudan, then proceeded to go back on her undertakings to allow the Sudanese to determine their own future and attempted to exercise her sovereign power in reality? Perhaps we might invite the views of the Legal Adviser on this.

/4. Sir

4. Sir R. Stevenson's solution is ingenious and if it is legally viable does seem to ensure beyond all reasonable doubt that the sop to Egyptian pride would not in any way damage either Sudanese or H.M. Government's interests. In fact all it is likely to damage is Sudanese sentiment and I am not convinced that if the Sudan Government really set out to promote the scheme (rather than concentrate on raising objections) they could not persuade Sudanese public opinion that it was a means of killing off ~~for good~~ rather than reviving the menace of Egyptian political domination. The greatest doubt in my mind is whether the Egyptians themselves would ever be prepared to guarantee the right of the Sudanese to secede, well knowing that this is what would probably happen when they came to exercise their

choice

R. Allen
(R. Allen)
5th December, 1951.

now see Sir E. Beckett's remarks in
the problem of 'sovereignty' raised by Sir E.
(Para. C).

It seems to me that it would be helpful to have the views of the Legal Adviser on the following points:-

- (i) Could we ask for a ruling of the International Court on the question of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan either -
 - (a) without the consent
 - (b) in opposition to the wishes of the Egyptian Government?
- (ii) Would it be open to the Egyptian Government, assuming that they were willing, to declare in advance that they would be prepared to ignore a decision of the Hague Court in their favour to the extent of allowing the Sudanese people a free choice as to whether they should be united with Egypt or not?
- (iii) Assuming that the finding of the Hague Court was in favour of Egypt, would it be open to the Sudanese people, despite that finding, to choose their own future status "in complete freedom and in the full consciousness of their responsibilities"?

2. There seem to me at first sight to be political objections to Sir R. Stevenson's proposals, but we can perhaps go into these in the light of legal advice on the above points.

R. Allen

(R. Allen)
5th December, 1951.

Sir E. Beckett

The

The reference in (f) of Sir Ralph Stevenson's letter below is in fact to an opinion by Lord Jowitt when Lord Chancellor given in 1946 at the time of the Bevin-Sidky negotiations. Referring to my minute of the 4th December which is attached below, Lord Jowitt's opinion was on the lines of the passage which I have marked XY there, though he expressed it in his own words. The reason why Mr. Bevin asked the Lord Chancellor for his opinion was that he was wanting to put in the Treaty with Egypt some acknowledgement of the rights of the Crown of Egypt over the Sudan, and at the same time was bound by an undertaking not to change the position of the Sudanese without consulting them, ~~since~~ ^{on} the basis of Lord Jowitt's opinion he felt he could put this position in the Bevin-Sidky draft Treaty because the provision in the Treaty was stating nothing new. From this it really follows, as I have pointed out frequently in minutes of 1946 and 1947 (unpopular, of course, as the conclusion is) that although the Bevin-Sidky draft Treaty never came to anything, there is an admission there about the rights of the King of Egypt over the Sudan which is valid as an admission, treaty or no treaty.

I do not think that the suggestion of a reference to the Hague Court on this question is of any practical value. The case could not be brought before the Hague Court for decision except by agreement with Egypt, though of course as a political move H.M.G. could indicate that if Egypt chose to institute proceedings against the United Kingdom in the Hague Court in which she asked for a judgment that the King of Egypt was King of the Sudan, or whatever Egypt wanted to say, the United Kingdom would defend the proceedings in the Court and accept the Court's jurisdiction. I do not think Egypt would go to the Court at all, and if the offer was made and Egypt does not take it up, it is, of course, helpful in one sense but I think the Governor-General would have a great deal to say about the effect in the Sudan of such a move. Further, there is in fact what I have described above as the admission in the Bevin-Sidky draft Treaty, and if the Egyptians on this point really put their case well, H.M.G. would in fact be in a cleft stick in the proceedings. I do not think question (ii) in Mr. Allen's minute above is quite well framed, but of course it would be theoretically possible for Egypt to take up the position that it did desire the decision of the Hague Court in favour of its claim to sovereignty over the Sudan, and at the same time say that whatever the Court decided, Egypt was prepared to accept the wishes of the Sudanese expressed in proper form, if the wishes of the Sudanese were in favour of complete secession. For Egypt to do this would not be ignoring the decision of the

Hague/

*This is
Cairns' proposal*

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Minutes.

Hague Court. It would merely mean that, having obtained a judgment in its favour on a certain point, it was then as an act of grace willing to surrender its right in a certain event, but I should have thought that it is almost a useless complication to think of this because, if Egypt really is prepared to accept a decision of the Sudanese in favour of secession and the United Kingdom is prepared to accept the decision of the Sudanese in favour of union with Egypt, there is not really much point in getting the Hague Court to decide what is the position as regards sovereignty, seeing that a decision of the Sudanese in two or three years' time is going to render the existing position academic.

Again turning to question (111) in Mr. Allen's minute, I find the framing of the question rather difficult. The answer is of course "Yes", both legally and actually - if Egypt agrees to accept the Sudanese choice. If Egypt has not agreed this, then surely we are back on something like the present position under the last declaration which H.M.G. have made, that H.M.G. will hold the existing position until the Sudanese are in a position to make their choice, and if the Sudanese then choose complete separation from Egypt, H.M.G. may step out leaving Egypt to enforce what she conceives to be her legal rights by armed operations if she can.

I could conceive an arrangement with Egypt on the basis of

- (a) admission of Egyptian sovereignty on the lines of the Bevin-Sidky Treaty;
- (b) an undertaking by Egypt to respect the completely free choice of the Sudanese people, such choice to be exercised in a certain way at a certain time; coupled with
- (c) something that we were prepared to accept as regards the continuation of the present administration of the Sudan in the interval.

Now, as (a) and (b) are in fact what the Egyptians rejected in the Bevin-Sidky negotiations, I should not imagine an arrangement on these lines has much chance of success unless we can introduce something pretty interesting under (c). However, perhaps I can leave the matter at the moment with these observations as it may lend itself more to oral discussion in the first place and there will then be no chance that I am at cross purposes because I have not entirely understood what was meant by the question put to me.

W. A. R. ...
6th December 1951.

now in separate minute on this page 1051/483.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes

African Department.

Telegrams are flying about again now relating to questions of sovereignty over the Sudan. Perhaps the following brief observations may be of some assistance to you.

One of the troubles is that sovereignty is a word which is used in so many different meanings. For the present purposes I will indicate three of the various meanings attributed to sovereignty:-

- (1) Quotation: "In the United Kingdom the electorate (or the House of Commons) is sovereign."

Here the word "sovereign" is used to describe where in a State the actual power lies. In this sense the recent declaration about the Sudan can be said to mean that we recognise that the people of the Sudan have the sovereign power of determining the future of the Sudan.

- (2) Quotation: "His Majesty King George is the sovereign of the United Kingdom."

This is quite a different meaning of the word "sovereign" and refers to a monarch whose actual power may be very slight.

- (3) Quotation: "Egypt is the sovereign of the Sudan" or "Egypt and the United Kingdom are joint sovereigns of the Sudan."

Here the word "sovereign" is used in the relation between one country and another and implies that one country is not independent and is subordinate to another. The Sudan is undoubtedly not itself sovereign at the present time and the question whether, in the sense that the word is used here, the first or the second statement which I have given above is the correct one, again depends on another refinement of the conception of sovereignty. According to one conception (not, I think, the commonest one), sovereignty cannot be divorced from the power and the sovereign of a territory is vested in the country which has the power over it. On this conception undoubtedly the United Kingdom and Egypt are joint sovereigns because of the administration and power which is exercised through the Governor-General, and his appointment is a joint affair. According to another conception, sovereignty over a territory may be divorced from actual power and administration and therefore you may have a situation where the administration of a certain territory is vested in A for a period of time but the ultimate right is vested in B. To take

another

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and that is sometimes true for the application of the conception because

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Minutes.

another example, Chinese territory may be leased to the United Kingdom for 99 years. According to one conception, the sovereignty over the leased territory is to-day vested in the United Kingdom and according to the other conception it is vested in China. If sovereignty over a territory can be divorced from administration, then it is probable that Egypt is the sovereign of the Sudan and the Condominium Agreement must be regarded as an Agreement relating to administration only.

I mention the above meanings of the word "sovereignty" because the last telegram which I have read from the Sudan uses the word "sovereignty" in all the above senses in the same telegram without any apparent awareness that the expression is being used in a different sense each time. Moreover, the plain man and in particular the Sudanese in the street never will, I think, be brought to understand that sovereignty has all these different meanings. *and that is one of the reasons - when one feels a sort of despair*

W. R. Beckett
4th December, 1951.

I think it will be useful if we can bear these distinctions in mind. In practice the best plan may be to avoid so far as possible using the word "sovereignty" in drafts, and saying what we mean each time we are tempted to use the word.

RA. 5/12.

XY

W.S. Graham W. Stirling
to Bowker
Admission Dept

FROM KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET (AND)
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Cypher/OTP.

Governor-General.
No: 195.
3rd December, 1951.

D: 4.47 p.m. 3rd December, 1951.
R: 5.06 p.m. 3rd December, 1951.

IMMEDIATE.
TOP SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No: 195 of
3rd December

Repeated for information to: Cairo.
Washington. ✓

Personal for Secretary of State from Governor-General.

Cairo telegram No: 1084 to you and Sir R. Stevenson's letter to Bowker dated 24th November.

Proposal is that His Majesty's Government should, as price for settlement of the defence problem with Egypt, acknowledge the legality of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan. This acknowledgment would be made either out of the blue or as the result of a reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice which, it can be assumed, would find in Egypt's favour.

I have not
intended
it
doing
Should
not be
K.S. 80
R.2

2. Whether or not the acknowledgment was given out of the blue or follow a Permanent Court of International Justice judgment in Egypt's favour, it would be seen in the Sudan to be, as it in fact would be, a bargain between Egypt and the United Kingdom at the expense of the Sudanese. The result of this would be firstly a serious upheaval in the Sudan and secondly a change in the status of the Sudan.

3. As regards the upheaval I am certain that acceptance by His Majesty's Government of any form of Egyptian sovereignty, however remote or symbolic, would simply result in a general rising which British troops and officials would be asked to put down. And I could not guarantee the loyalty of my political officers in action of this kind and neither should I expect it. I would be asking them to do something against the interests of the Sudanese and they would feel His Majesty's

Government had.....

TOP SECRET.

Khartoum telegram No: 195 to Foreign Office.

- 2 -

Government had gone back on their oft-repeated pledge not to sell the Sudan for defence reasons and not to change the status of the Sudan without consulting the Sudanese.

4. It is argued that the status of the Sudan would not have been changed and that we should only be admitting the existence of a situation which has always subsisted. Ever since 1898, however, even if Egyptian sovereignty had existed the King of Egypt has not in fact exercised it effectively because we have not allowed him to do so. Were we now to admit the existence of Egyptian sovereignty the King of Egypt could and would exercise it because we should not be able to stop him except by force. All our pledges to the Sudan might therefore fall to the ground.

5. His Majesty's Government, by promising the Sudan that immediate steps would be taken towards self-determination in 1952, have implicitly if not explicitly admitted that sovereignty lies in the hands of the Sudanese and no longer lies, if it ever did, in the King of Egypt.

6. I fully appreciate the need for an operative base in Egypt with all its implications on Imperial communications and National interests. But His Majesty's Government is pledged and rightly so to the Sudanese. Egypt too was so pledged. It is she who has broken the pledge; who has arbitrarily conceived dominating legislation for the Sudan against the wish of the Sudanese and who has thrown down the gauntlet in a gross breach of an international treaty. It is she who must make the first move and in the meantime surely must suffer the consequences of her action.

7. My telegram No: 94 (not to Washington) is more than ever true today following the events of the past two months.

8. Reference preceding paragraph, will Foreign Office please pass my telegram No: 94 to Washington.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo and Washington as my telegrams Nos: 104 and 72 miscellaneous respectively.

Foreign Office please pass copy to Sudan Agent.

[No action taken on paragraph 8 by Telegraph Dept.].

[Repeated to Cairo and Washington].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Sir W. Strang.

Mr. Bowker.

Private Secretary.

Head of African Department.

JJJJJ

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~~J~~

p. 9

from
Reference the attached telegram/President of the
Egyptian Chamber of Deputies to the Speaker.

2. This telegram is characteristic of the irresponsible and mendacious propaganda at present being put out by Egyptian official sources.

3. Since there is presumably no means of "refusing to accept" the telegram, it is suggested that it would be preferable to ignore this telegram.

4. If, however, it is felt that some reply must be sent, something along the lines of the attached draft might be suitable.

Regu Allen

30th November, 1951.

I am in favour of ignoring.

Kurt Hilfer
1/12.

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- Restricted.
- Open.

Draft reply from the Speaker to telegram from the President of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies.

In reply to your telegram of 25th November I have to state that I cannot accept such a travesty of the facts in the Suez Canal Zone where British soldiers are being murdered by Egyptian terrorists. The British forces in the Canal Zone are there by right of a treaty freely negotiated and illegally denounced by the Egyptian Government. I look forward with hope to the day when we can reach an agreement with an Egyptian Government which takes proper account both of Egyptian interests and of the vital interest of the whole free world including Egypt herself in the defence of the Middle East.

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ente

3rd December, 1951.

SE 1061/480

CUTTING

draft

You sent us a telegram received by the Speaker from the President of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies.

This telegram is an offensive one, and is characteristic of the irresponsible and mendacious propaganda at present being put out by Egyptian official sources.

Unless you hold strongly that the Speaker should send a reply, we would prefer to ignore it. If the Speaker did reply, he would only have to say unpleasant things which would serve no useful purpose.

((SD.) K. M. WILFORD.

Lt.-Colonel Sir Ralph Verney, Bt., C.B., C.I.E., C.V.O.,
House of Commons.

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Egypt No. 2 (1951)

Anglo-Egyptian Conversations on the Defence of the Suez Canal and on the Sudan

December 1950–November 1951

*Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament
by Command of His Majesty
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ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONVERSATIONS ON THE
DEFENCE OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND ON THE SUDAN,
DECEMBER 1950—NOVEMBER 1951
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936⁽¹⁾ on which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom base their right to keep British troops in Egypt, was to run for a minimum of twenty years, and was thereafter only subject to such revision as might be agreed between both parties. If the parties failed to reach agreement, their differences were to be referred to arbitration.⁽²⁾ When this Treaty was signed, it was warmly welcomed by prominent Egyptians of all shades of political opinion including the present Egyptian Prime Minister.⁽³⁾ Nevertheless, the Egyptian Government felt, after the war, that the Treaty no longer took account of present-day realities. Although the rights of His Majesty's Government under the 1936 Treaty are unassailable, they agreed, in response to an Egyptian request in December 1945, to open negotiations for revision of the Treaty, and a mission under Lord Stanagate went to Egypt in April 1946. By the autumn of that year, by which time the venue of the talks had been changed to London, agreement had been reached on all points (including the Sudan, which was also dealt with in the discussions). The main proposals were that all British troops should be evacuated within a period of under three years, and that a joint Anglo-Egyptian Defence Board should be set up to study the defence of Egypt. These proposals represented very substantial concessions on the part of His Majesty's Government. Nevertheless, the "Bevin-Sidky" agreement⁽⁴⁾ was rejected by the Egyptian Parliament, mainly because of a difference of opinion between His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government which arose after Sidky Pasha's return to Egypt, about the interpretation of a key clause in the protocol relating to the Sudan.

2. The Egyptian Government then referred the matter to the Security Council. In the event no resolution received the necessary seven votes. Nothing further was done until, as a result of an Egyptian approach in 1949, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff went to Egypt in an attempt to secure agreement with the Egyptians on the military arrangements that must be made for the defence of Egypt. The talks were suspended towards the end of 1949 because the Egyptian Government lacked sufficient support to commit themselves. A General Election then took place in Egypt, as a result of which the Wafd Party came to power in January 1950.

3. Meanwhile, the world situation had changed. Soviet use of the veto in the Security Council had made it clear that the free nations of the world could no longer rely on the United Nations alone for their security, and first Western Union⁽⁵⁾ and subsequently the Atlantic Pact⁽⁶⁾ were set up to meet the need.

⁽¹⁾ "Treaty Series No. 6 (1937)," Cmd. 5360.
⁽²⁾ Articles 8 and 16 of the Treaty provide that if the High Contracting Parties do not agree, "the difference will be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for decision in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of signature of the present treaty, or to such other person or body of persons for decision in accordance with such other procedure as the high contracting parties may agree." Clearly only arbitration of the second kind is applicable now.
⁽³⁾ See Appendix A.
⁽⁴⁾ "Egypt No. 2" (Cmd. 7179).
⁽⁵⁾ "Miscellaneous No. 1 (1950)," Cmd. 7869.
⁽⁶⁾ "Treaty Series No. 56 (1951)," Cmd. 7789.

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their needs. At the same time Britain, upon whom rested responsibility for the defence of the Middle East, could not contemplate any solution of the Egyptian question which laid that area open to aggression.

4. Further talks were accordingly held in Cairo and subsequently between the Egyptian Foreign Minister and Mr. Bevin in London. The latter talks were in the nature of preliminary conversations involving expressions of personal views (Appendices B, C, D and E). In the course of them, Mr. Bevin gave the Egyptian Foreign Minister an outline of his personal ideas on a possible solution of the defence problem, and undertook to have them studied by military experts and to make proposals to the Egyptian Government in due course. This study resulted in proposals which were eventually put forward to the Egyptian Government on 11th April, 1951 (Appendix F), and formally rejected by them in their Note of 24th April (Appendix G).

5. The new proposals offered a complete withdrawal of all fighting troops within five years (in view of the changed world situation these troops must now be accommodated elsewhere in the Middle East, and five years is the period required to provide for this if the expenditure is to be kept within manageable bounds), civilisation of the base and a joint Anglo-Egyptian Air Defence scheme. These proposals still represented very considerable concessions on the part of His Majesty's Government, who were fully entitled to stand on their rights under the 1936 Treaty. It was reasonable to hope that the Egyptian Government would make some response to an offer which went a long way to meet their demands. Nevertheless, the Egyptians made no attempt even to discuss the new proposals, but replied on 24th April rejecting them out of hand, and reasserting their original demands, namely, for evacuation of all British troops from Egyptian territory within one year.

6. In addition the Egyptian Government insisted that any solution must include a settlement of the Sudan question, asserted the unity of the Sudan and Egypt under the Egyptian Crown, and demanded the evacuation of all British officials and forces from the country within two years. His Majesty's Government's attitude on the Sudan question had always been that no change in the country's status should be made without consulting the Sudanese, and that the Sudanese should in due course freely determine their own future. In response to the Egyptian demands they proposed, in a Note to the Egyptian Government of 8th June (Appendix H), that an Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese Commission should be set up to help forward a settlement on that basis. Again the Egyptian Government made no attempt to give serious consideration to His Majesty's Government's proposal, but, when they replied on 6th July (Appendix I), insisted as a prerequisite to negotiations, on the full satisfaction of their main demands concerning the unity of the Sudan with Egypt under the Egyptian Crown. The Egyptian Foreign Minister made it clear, in conversations with His Majesty's Ambassador (Appendices J, K and L), that this "unity" meant in practice Egyptian control of the key Sudanese departments of defence, finance and foreign affairs. This would in effect mean handing over the Sudanese people, who are already far advanced on the road to self-government, to the ultimate control of the Egyptian Government, without any attempt to consult their wishes. His Majesty's Government, while recognising that the dependence of both countries on the waters of the Nile made it essential that the friendliest relations should link the two peoples, could not contemplate such a solution.

7. The Egyptian Government having thus adopted an attitude which made certain the failure of the conversations, the Egyptian Foreign Minister himself administered the *coup de grace* by announcing in a speech to the

Egyptian Chamber of Deputies on 6th August that they must be regarded as closed, and attempted to fasten the blame for the breakdown on the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs's speech in the House of Commons on 30th July. In fact, Mr. Morrison, far from declaring, or even implying, that the "door was closed on negotiations," said:—

"I believe that one of the cornerstones on which stability and security in the Middle East must rest is friendship and co-operation between us and Egypt in the various fields in which we have common interests. We are well aware of the difficulties which face the Egyptian Government, and we have tried to approach our common problems with patience and understanding of these difficulties. We know that the stand taken by Egypt has its roots deep in the past, and we have tried to take account of that fact."

It is, on the contrary, clear that the responsibility for the breakdown rests with the Egyptian Government, who, having all along refused to consider proposals put to them, and having simply insisted that His Majesty's Government should capitulate to their demands, finally announced that the conversations must be considered closed. They took this action in spite of the fact that His Majesty's Government were known to be working on a completely new approach to the defence question which went far to reconcile the needs of the free world with Egypt's own requirements, and had so informed the Egyptian Government.

8. In spite of this set-back His Majesty's Government continued to work on their new proposals, the effect of which would be to replace the British command in Egypt by an allied command in which Egypt herself should be an equal partner. Since these proposals involved consultation with other Powers it was not possible to place them before the Egyptian Government until after the Washington and Ottawa meetings in September. The Egyptian Government were left in no doubt that these proposals were in course of preparation, and on 6th October the Egyptian Prime Minister was informed in a message from Mr. Morrison that His Majesty's Government confidently hoped to be able to make a communication to the Egyptian Government by 10th October. The Egyptian Government thereupon selected 8th October as the day on which to announce their intention to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 and the Condominium Agreements of 1889.⁽⁷⁾ The proposals were, in fact, delivered by His Majesty's Ambassador, on the instructions of Mr. Morrison, and the representatives of the United States, France and Turkey on 13th October (Appendix M), together with new proposals, presented by His Majesty's Ambassador alone, for a settlement in the Sudan (Appendix N). The Egyptian Foreign Minister informed His Majesty's Ambassador on 15th October that the Egyptian Government rejected them on the ground that they represented no advance on His Majesty's Government's proposals of 11th April. Even the most cursory study of the two sets of proposals shows that this statement is inaccurate. The four-Power offer, which provided for Egyptian participation as a founder member in a new Middle East Command on a basis of partnership with the other Powers concerned, offered a solution designed to give full satisfaction both to Egypt's national dignity and the strategic needs of the area. But the proposals were rejected in such haste that His Majesty's Government are regretfully forced to conclude that it was never the Egyptian Government's intention, even before they had been submitted, to give them any serious consideration at all. Their action in so rejecting them demon-

⁽⁷⁾ State Papers, Volume 91, pages 19 and 21.

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states a lack of responsibility towards grave issues which are the concern not only of the Egyptian and British peoples, but of the whole free world.

9. On 15th October the Egyptian Parliament passed decrees purporting to abrogate the treaty of 1936 and the Condominium Agreements of 1899, and on 27th October a note was handed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo (Appendix O) informing His Majesty's Government of this fact and formally demanding the withdrawal of British forces from Egyptian and Sudanese territory. His Majesty's Government's reply, handed to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry on 6th November (Appendix P), makes it clear that the action of the Egyptian Government in repudiating those instruments is without validity. It declares that His Majesty's Government intend to maintain their rights under them, and places the responsibility for any loss, damage or breach of the peace that may occur as a result of the Egyptian action upon the shoulders of the Egyptian Government.

APPENDIX A

Extract from Speech by Nahas Pasha in the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies on 14th November, 1936

When the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance and Friendship was signed in 1936 leading Egyptian statesmen were warm in its praises. The present Egyptian Prime Minister, Nahas Pasha, who was also Prime Minister at that time, said during the debate on the Treaty in the Chamber of Deputies:—

"Indeed, gentlemen, the treaty realises the independence of Egypt. To enjoy this independence we must assume several obligations, of which the main one is to complete our preparations in order that our ally should not contemplate keeping her troops on our territory on the pretext of helping us to safeguard liberty of navigation and the security of the Suez Canal."

"That is an obligation which is in our own interest. We must carry it out in order to realise our own independence. No one thinks that it implies serious restrictions on our independence. I consider for my part that it is a question of necessity imposed on us by the state of our military forces, for we have not at the moment sufficient forces to assume sole responsibility for the protection of liberty of navigation and security of the Suez Canal. Yes, we are not capable by ourselves of assuring that protection. That is why we must accept the assistance of an ally. But this situation is only provisional, and we have the possibility of arming ourselves and arriving at a state which will allow us to undertake the protection of the canal with our own resources. . . . Our territory will therefore be evacuated either by an agreement between us . . . or by arbitration.⁽¹⁾ . . . We have of our full will and free-will authorised the English to maintain a garrison on the canal. [Applause.]"

APPENDIX B

Record of a Conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs on 4th December, 1936

PROPOSED REVISION OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY OF 1936

Mr. Bevin, after the usual courtesies, said that he had been studying the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and thought that it looked as though Article 8, providing for the presence of British troops in the Canal Zone, was the source of the difficulty between His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government. He asked, however, whether there were any other aspects of the 1936 Treaty which the Egyptian Foreign Minister would like to discuss.

Salah ed Din Bey said that there was no doubt that Article 8, dealing with the occupation, was the article to which Egypt objected more than any other

⁽¹⁾ This refers to the provisions in Articles 8 and 16 of the Treaty of 1936 concerning revision of the Treaty of which the substance is contained in the first paragraph of the explanatory memorandum and its accompanying footnotes. The remark is valid only for a period beginning 20 years after the coming into force of the Treaty, *ie.*, 1956.

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enter J

ABROGATION OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY OF 1936

WHITE PAPER

The Egyptian Government have published records of
Flags A & B two out of the four conversations which Mr. Bevin had with the
Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs last autumn. These
conversations deal mainly with the Sudan, while the remaining
Flags C & D two, which they have not published, are mainly concerned with
the defence question. In addition, the Egyptians have
Flags E, F & G published the records of three conversations which H.M. Ambassador
in Cairo had with the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs this
summer about the Sudan, together with the Egyptian Government's
Flag H reply of 6th July to our proposals of 6th June about the Sudan.
They have not published our proposals. According to information
which we have received, the Egyptian Government are going to
publish in the near future a "Green book" giving a full account
of Anglo/Egyptian conversations over the past year.

[attached] 2. A draft white paper has now been prepared giving a
connected account of the Anglo-Egyptian discussions on defence
and the Sudan from 1945 to the abrogation of the Treaty in
October of this year by the Egyptian Government, and containing
as appendices the documents published by the Egyptian Government,
with the additions set forth at the end of this submission. From
the propaganda point of view it will help our case if this paper
can be published before the Egyptians' Green Book.

3. It is considered desirable that our defence proposals
of April 11th (which the Egyptians have not published, but which
have been included in the draft White Paper) should be included
in the White Paper for two reasons. First, because their
publication is necessary if a connected account is to be given
of the course of the discussions over the period; and second,
because the Egyptian Government gave as their reason for

/rejecting

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rejecting the four-Power proposals of October 10th that they represented no advance on our proposals of April 11th. It is necessary to disprove this, especially to the French and the Turks, both of whom have already asked for copies of our proposals of April 11th. Moreover, the Egyptians will probably publish them in their "Green Book".

4. The only other two documents which might be worth publishing are the records of ^{the} two further conversations which Mr. Bevin had with the Egyptian Foreign Minister in December, 1950. These conversations relate mainly to defence, while the two already published by the Egyptian Government chiefly concern the Sudan. There is much valuable material in both records from the point of view of propoganda.

Nevertheless there are certain passages in them which might make their publication appear undesirable. In the record of the conversation of 7th December, Mr. Bevin states that he and Sidky Pasha had estimated that complete Sudanisation of the Sudan would take about twenty years. This would not go down well in the Sudan: but the adverse effect might be lessened by the statement which the Secretary of State proposes to make on the Sudan. In the conversation of

Flag D

4th December Mr. Bevin informally suggested an Anglo-Egyptian agreement which might include other Middle Eastern countries, such as Israel and Iraq. The Egyptian Foreign Minister replied that no Arab state could participate in a collective defence system with Israel. The publication of this passage might have a somewhat unfortunate effect on our efforts to get Arab states to come into the new allied Command at the present time. Clearly, however, if these records are to be published at all, they must be

Flag C

/published

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published in toto, since if the Egyptians can show that we have suppressed some unpalatable passages, there will be good ground for suspicion that we have suppressed many more, and are reluctant to tell the whole story. On balance, therefore, it seems preferable that we should publish these records now, with the explanation that they were only preliminary conversations and expressions of personal views.

5. It is therefore recommended that the draft White Paper should now be approved and laid before Parliament. H.M.G. may perhaps consider it necessary to consult the Opposition before publication.

6. It is proposed to publish the following documents in addition to those already published by the Egyptian Government:-

- Flag I (a) An extract from a speech by Nahas Pasha in 1936, welcoming the treaty.
- Flag C (b) Record of Mr. Bevin's meeting with the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and others on 4th December 1950.
- Flag D (c) Record of Mr. Bevin's meeting with the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and others on 7th December, 1950.
- Flag J (d) Our proposals on defence of 11th April, 1951.
- Flag K (e) The Egyptian Government's reply of 24th April, 1950.
- Flag L (f) Our proposals of 8th June concerning the Sudan.
- Flag M (g) The four-Power proposals of 10th October for Egyptian participation in a Middle East Command (already published).
- Flag N (h) Our proposals, also of 10th October, concerning the Sudan (also published).
- Flag O (i) The Egyptian Government's Note of 27th October, informing H.M.G. that the Treaty of 1936 and the two Condominium Agreements of 1899 relating to the Sudan had been abrogated (already published).

/(j) H.M.G.'s

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(j). H.M.G.'s reply to that note of 7th November

Flag P

(already published).

These papers have been seen by
Sir E. Bushell and
Lester Dyer.

Roger Allen

13th November, 1951.

I agree that the moment has
come to publish these documents.

Lester Dyer

R. G. Bowler
17/11

Mr. Nutting

I should be grateful for your
advice on this.

W. P. King
17/11

We should certainly do this, and get in
before the Egyptian Green Book. I hope
we shall be able to get this ^{case} across in
our propaganda to Middle Eastern states.
I think we might let Mr. Morrison know
before publication.

Nov. 21.

Discussed with Mr. Nutting.

Let us first have a brief, to show to the
S.G.S. and Mr. Morrison.

W.P.K.

and I think
cc: R.S.