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FROM MARIAN OFFICE TO VASHINGTON.

10. 10701

12th November 1949 D. 7.10 p.m. 19th November 1949.

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
And Saving to: Paris No. 2702

FROM

19th Revised to Vanhaugtan telegram No. 10701 of 19th Revised For Laronauturen to U.L. Dat. New Fork, I.H. L.G. (Calmo) / Telro, Tol Mriv. Bairut, Damascus, Annan, Bagtad, Augora, Jacks, Tehran and Saving to Paris.

My invadiately preceding telegree (not repeated to all posts).

I told Mr. Astronom That I was nervous about the superal situation in the Maddie Last. I the had a Luconston on the autowort with M. Astronom and the reach were still wadded to the pellow of the maintenance of the status gao. I and told H. Schusen that I the statics mo Charling has a second of the s a a Pacesa that I throught there at riet hin ve tries to Clock any new developments. REPEALE TOULS TAKE the local in a mo more the level and by which 10 and have a spe 028. The st tustion Tes a ot terr accure. 74 79 68 5 T II 1 THE CONTRACTOR DESIGNATION ADDRESS ALL COME ALL DESIGNATION ADDRESS ADDRES ADDRESS ADD there vore DACKEY of apportunity energy the poet S / 10 T der d'erningt verze ef a lang time far Son t and te afrect the Liv aus it test as to saterialise



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.O. telegran Ne. 10701 te Tesidingten

wish to thy to impose any new solution of the Middle Eastern States, but I throught it was important that the United States Government should examine this problem very earsfully and perhaps belp us to neve the French from their present very rigid position. I was glad that Mr. Wright was going to have an superfunity to discuss this shale problem with the State Department.

S. Mr. Acheson said that the State Department were devoting a let of thought to this area and were trying to evalve constructive proposals for mosting the situation. Is I had said there were a number of devalopment plans on fost, but it wents be seen time before any of them yielded congrete results. He undertook to keep in close touch with me on this whole problem.

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
Eastern

13842 **Parliamentary Question** etary of State Ian Filling State Fushin ORA The News Department informed the press **ÅNSWERED** 14 NOV 1949 informally on November 8th that Mr. Wright and Mr. Trefor Evans (Head of the Middle East **REPLY ATTACHED.** Secretariat), would be paying a routine visit to Washington for an informal exchange of views with their United States opposite numbers. It has been suggested in the "Times" that the discuss-ions will include the Arab refugee problem, the position of the oil refineries at Haifa and the coming elections in Syria. A statement that the discussions would also include the question of the Persian elections has since been withdrawn A draft reply is submitted. E Water low: 11th November, 1949: 11.11

> It is possible that Mr. Platts-Mills, who asked on November 7th whether H.M.G. proposed to evacuate the Canal Zone, may ask whether Middle East defence is to be included in the scope of Mr. Wright's talks. The answer is "No". Neither the State Department (see Washington telegram No. 5011) nor the British Chiefs of Staff wish the subject to be discussed.


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


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MIDDLE EAST (ANGLO-AMERICAN DISCUSSIONS)

DISCUSSIONS) Mr. Platts-Mills asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what is the nature of the discussions on Middle East affairs which are being held in Washing-ton between representatives of the Foreign Office and the State Department. Mr. Mayhew: Representatives of the Foreign Office are visiting Washington for an informal exchange of views with the State Department on various matters of common interest in the Middle East.

14 NOV 1949

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
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rt Brief for wright's visit 10 Washington.



fativ shi General Priof 4 Objects of the discussion sto-

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almost all Middle East questions since saled and use this griansing spinger as sigishing shit

the views exchanged at that time should now be weediling s fait bein of sorid by fain fi

reviewed two years later in order to see to na to space at task stoots and mout iswardhair

what extent they remain valid and to what obvious decision not to defend it in war, would

extent they have to be brought up to deter

Most of the Middle East estivity sluce deserg ont of neve spreafiel destroke one

the earlier talks has been connected directly

or indirectly with Palestine. Palestine was at soldier you of tegous doals and

hardly brought in to the 1947 talks by mutual

agreement, but it was thanks to the general eviloatie of gribbal notisergernials lace and

understanding created by the 1947 tapks that esd reacto sin's such and one fallowares

the sometimes coute differences between British appage of colfactavill galigande a pavisosi

and American pelloy over Palestine could be Dernicq eros IILis about at bus antio of erosys

overcome without lasting danger to Anglo-ic assosant out no siditas abvert instant a . The 1947 talks provided a security of the se American relations.

The presence of framework within which the Palestine difficulties reds or thousands or ana refused is another

could be seen in perspective. Buth regats basestont ful points rotosi fuirever At the same time it must be recognized that

the Palestine question has prevented or at least secretoring door for sale bossible so sale if

seriously delayed the realisation of many of na abrawot gaizator of Vaki sonie star dust ្រុះព័

the objectives in Middle East policy discussed anois been alsoned ben island to interver

in 1947.

Palestine question is, so hope, over and that THO .SC. JET SOLEID LEGISINI TO TOWNED S in any case there are practically no remaining plat for about an one decis to Juemseeses in a one

differences over it between British and

vous are given in the paper on contait development morican policy, it is time to see what is lers on long-serm development needed to resume the programme mapped out in 1947, how that programme needs to be modified yanage state and to negat ad blocks a statyon and how the further development of Palestine and so the further development of Palestine and of the off Inseqs (Baciloss and Sitelidia questions can best be fitted into it. These are the three main objectives of the present discussions, and alkolis blove which and anothe /948s general 🔥 🗄 🖓 🖓 👘

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The basic consideration remains the vital

- Inportance of the USADE Shet Co to the Will

Gevernment and the U.S. Government in both al withins intersome need and wish's peace and war. The military implications of oonle anolisace Jean alberts file leader this principle as regards planning for war are being ind succonditions of the success ind succonditions of the success ind successful factors at the tradeworld discussed separately.

It must be borne in mind that a military ithdrawal from the Middle East in peace or an obvious decision not to defend it in war, would result in the loss of the whole area to British and American influence even in the present period of peace or cold war.

The other danger to our position in aim' peace 18, as was recognized in 1947, that of internal disintegration leading to effective communist perstration, This danger has received a startling illustration in recent events in Ching and is made still more pointed by a recent Praves article on the weakness of . anoissis real and Middle East internal regimes. The presence of Australs of thousands of Arab refugees is another could be seen in perfyersive powerful factor making for increased danger from At the name time it must be recommined this source.

incel to no octoward and molicoup entiteels? and It must be soultted that not much progress has been made since 1947 in working towards an the objectives in Miccle and Social and Soci .74KI 01 in the middle East, which is the best answer to the danger of internal disintegration. Our present assessment of alme and methods for this work are given in the paper on concait development ACCEPTOR TOTICE and in the briefs on long-term development machinery and the Polestine refugers. Full 1947, how that programme needs to be modified publicity and emotional appeal brought to this aubject by the plight of the refugers. But we scadern and in spyltoside niss eards and ers 1912 B Tue

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have started being hann over by the Saith Nation, or any other international space, which would allow the ontop of underirable influences. Second Samelagement has just stark beth bookups of a friend to internet the Arab Governments in the pression is store the filming araba inder to bring it about a some bilaking araba are conscious of the Service social filming araba of affairs is their scatters of social

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The Middle Gamb countries badd and demand technical and fatureis), help from putskies of the have on the other hand in the meet considerable though by no matter infinite recovery of technical skill, material products and financial powerste There is general) spreases between us solf of 1710 America that the instemate between us solf of 1710 the feature is spitestick. To down in to the the best method by application, To down in the

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We bollowe one position is the Middle's to East is valuable both to be we we the implies. It is constined this position to at we must confident surrender this position to another bookers that a American flowed a construction of 12 ber an man greater the contributions are accoused by accoust in which contributions are accoused by accoust with the mational the contributions of another with the mational the contribution of another with the mational the contribution of another with the contributions are accoused by accoust with the mational the contribution of another with the mational the contribution of another with the contributions are accoust by accoust with the mational the contribution of another with the second of the contribution of another with the contribution of the contribution with the contribution of the contribution with the contribution of the contribution with the second of the contribution of the contribusecond density the contribution of the time of another bank loans the formation defines and the contribube contribution with the the time the contribution be accoust of for light and the the time the way of all on the contribution we divert the formation there are the contribution of the the time the the the second states (e.go \$15 million we divert the box the visite the solution of the the time the the time the second of the visite the solution of the the time the the the visite.

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Which will address to interpret to the set of the set o

(b) <u>Political</u> Any remaining differences over Syriab-Iraqi plans should be ironed out. It should be **XXIX reaffirmed** that both sides should work against the conception of an **Herri-**Saudi bloe supported by the United States and an Iraqi-Jordan bloe supported by the U.L. A

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
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the state of the state in a lite the lite is a state of the state of t will be stand and the stands of the stands of the line should sprant of a statute sof the graph to safe the 3 discussions as inveryosable diamination in the to the ball of the second second in the second of the ball of the semilited for approvel to higher without the tack the sale of the sector of the sector of the sector reconside story of the late of the selface of the ci susifies jess as an action to interventions to play a vital part both in continuing to make systlable such technical and other sadistance as may be possible and in using our treditional ties with the Middle Sast to Interpret to the countries the restern way of life. Any remaining differences (b) Political

over Syrian-Iragi plane should be ironed out. It should be xain reaffirmed that both sides should work systaat the conception of as set and bloe supported by the United States. A in Iragi-Jordan bloe supported by the Uit.

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Dear Department.

We refer to your telegram No. 1702 addressed to British Whidle Bast Office on 8th November, 1949. about the publicity treatment to be accorded to Mr. M.Wright's visit to Washington.

The Tipet 4. N.A. measage on the subject publiched here contained some surprising statements steb ant

- (a) Reserve Wright and Evens tid not agree with or represent the new Middle Best Bolloy introduced by Sir William Strang, **a 10** 1
- ()) that one of the subjects discussed would 包裹的外的人 be Greater Syria 4

Another A. W.A. message, the following day played the visit form on the lines of your message under refere ase

Yours over.

AURIAN CHARGETY.

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Eastern Department, Foreign Strice, Londen, S.W. 1.

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Repeated to New York (United Kingdom Delegation) Saving.

demand to Foreign Office telegrou No. 5421 of Revealer 18th repeated for information Series to New York (Baited Mingdon Dolegation).

Following from Wright,

Pollowing is general course of talks with State Department on Middle East and African questions so far.

Seneral attitude of all economical on the American side has been extremely relandly and belockil. Buch difficulties as we have had respectly with the Americans over the Italian Colonies or ether at these we are disconsing appear to have been due to confusion and lack of coordination on the American side, particularly between Washington and New York and also, of convex, to the fact that the State Department are always happendent peckuse congressions! approval of pelloy is so largely dependent open everything being dues under the morells of the inited Eatlong. There is no treas whatever of any deality to use us for purpose of implementing American policy, but mather an impression of lack of policy and of grossed wires.

Basic appreach of the solutils tration is an appropriation, openly expressed, of the extent to which world stability and the efforts of the free world to remist Communica depend upon a strong Britain and a desire to help us to retain and increase our strong St.

a the Middle Bast the following particular points have ensured to

(a) The State Department have readilized their general Martity of approach to the problems of the area

(b) They agree is principle with the secondaic suggested in our paper 1. P.O. (19) 99.

They agree in principle with the parellel (•)

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The Tablactor televis 10, 5421 to Foreign Grind

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inportance of internal reform.

(d) They wish to assist us in maintaining our present blisteral treaties in the Kiddle East. If we wish to conclude further blisteral agreements they would welcome this as a stabilizing fuertor. They are unwilling to enter into a Middle East past, but reaffirm their attitude towards dreece. Turkey and Persia, when they wish to continue to help.

(e) They agree with our sittinds towards closer union between Anab States and cannot (repeat not) scampt French thesis of maintenance of the status quo at all cents.

(g) The State Department discount reports that United States Covernment is contemplating vitidiraval from Dahran, but are looking into the matter with service departments.

(b) They agree with our attitude over Haifa. See my telegree No. SLOL E 13909 /1531/3/

5. State Department explained that if point four programme is adopted by Congress, they will have between 1 and 10 million dollars to spand in the Middle Mant directly (i.e. spart from semistance to United Nations agencies) sainly or estimate of experts. We are examining how this help and or coordinated with our own againstance to the Middle East so as to avoid Suplication or everlap.

6. State Department intend to discuss most of these questions at the meeting of their representatives

in the Middle Next, which is to start next most at Istanbul. They will give us their views after the meeting. Meanwhile, I have given thes a multable mannary of the meeting of our own meeting of Middle next representatives. They agree in principle with the general pobley there outlined and may

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The Washington telegram No. 5191 to Poreion Office

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take it as a guide for their own discussions.

7. They tell on that internal pressures over Israel are subsiding and that they have greater freedom to adapt an objective policy. They are now considering the pessibility of a name pesitive approach to the kiddle the pessibility of a name pesitive approach to the kiddle the pessibility of a name pesitive approach to the kiddle the pessibility of a name pesitive approach to the kiddle the pessibility of a name pesitive approach to the kiddle the pessibility of a name pesitive approach to the kiddle the pessibility of a name pesitive approach to the kiddle with us and in accordance with a dustion set of principles with us and in accordance with a dustion set of principles and have no wish to supplace us. On the contrary, they are going avain to brief their representatives at their kiddle East conference on the importance of surking in close comparation with our own representatives in the kiddle East at all levels and of exchaning all rivalry.

6. As regards Italian Colonies, the State Department have reaffirmed their support in principle of our desire to proceed with early independence and a treaty in dyrenales. We are still examining together the alternadyrenales. We are still examining together the alternative methods by which this might be done. They agree with our intention of proceeding with early stope towards with our intention of proceeding with early stope towards with our intention of proceeding with early stope towards with our intention of proceeding with early stope towards with our intention of proceeding with early stope towards with early intention of proceeding with early stope towards with early states Government will probably with the retain that hed States Government will probably with the retain probably necessitate an agreement with the future Government of Libys in due course. They are chousing their requirements with their service departments and will let us ment further.

9. Talks will not be concluded before middle of next week.

[Copy sent to Middle Dast Scoretariat]

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(SUMMARY)

MIDDLE ELST POLICX GENERAL PRINCIPIES AND PROBLEMS

IN PORTANCE OF THE MUDDLE EAST

1. In peace and war the Middle East is an area of cardinal importance to the United Mingdom, second only to the United Mingdom itself. Strategically the Middle East is a focal point of communications, a source of oil, a shield to Africa and the Indian Ocean, and an irreplaceable offensive base. Economically it is, owing to oil and cotton, essential to United Mingdom recovery. DRITISH POSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2. In addition to these vital strategic and economic interests, His Hajosty's Government have weighty responsibilities towards the peoples of the Hiddle East by history, tradition and in some cases by treaty. Our influence is greater than that of any other foreign Power. It is essential that we should maintain our special position and carry out our special responsibilities.

D_NGERS

3. The main threats to the Middle East and to our position there arise from:-

- (a) the canger of disintegration due to the backwardness of
 - many Middle Bast countries and the instability of their relations with each other;
- (b) the tension between Israel and the trab States;
- (c) the opportunities which (a) and (b) provide for Commist penetration;
- (d) the possibility of Russian armed aggression.

ODJECHIVES

4. Our general task must be to help Middle East Covernments and peoples to develop in such a way as to avoid the above dangers, and

to maintain and increase our influence. Our help must be directed to strengthening defence and to social and economic development. It should consist of guidance, example, technical expertise, co-operation for defence and, subject to the limits of our resources, material assistance. To obtain success we must retain the initiative and, once our policy is flocided, carry it out confidently and vigorously in spite of possible criticism from individual States or interests. 28/Wew/May

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to be of intrinsic merit, and which in certain cases offer good prospects of an early return. (ii) projects which will provide for the resettlement

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of the Arab rofugees; and

(111) projects which are of doubtful economic value, but on which work has already progressed so far that it would be wasteful to stop at this stage. It is recommanded that where practicable these projects shall be revised.

(b) His Majosty's Government should encourage the Governments concerned to undertake without delay the detailed examination, necessary before a decision regarding their execution can be taken, of the schemes listed in AnnexA(II) which proliminary surveys have indicated are likely to be

economically sound.

It should be accepted that this programme will involve the 2. contribution by H.M.G. of cortain limited technical, financial and material resources, but that the amount of this contribution cannot be accurately determined until it is known what contributions are available from the United States, the International Bank and other sources and until international policy with regard to the settlement of Arab refugees has been worked out in detail. Early discussion on the basis of this programme should be 3.held with the U.S. Government and the International Bank. The programme should also be used as a brief for discussion 4. with the Middle East governments concerned and in particular with Middle East Development Boards as soon as these are set up in the hope that they will also adopt this programme or something as like it as possible and will make the maximum contributions towards

its implementation.

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OUTER FRINGE

5. While the central problems lie in the Semitic world, we must by no means leave out of account the great importance of the outer fringe of Greece, Persia and particularly Turkey. CO-OPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES

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6. Co-operation with the United States at all levels and in all fields is of the highest importance.

FRANCE AND OTHER DESTERN POWERS

7. There is a tradition of rivalry between the United Mingdom and France in the Middle East. It must be our aim to allay this without sacrificing any essential British interest. There ought not to be any conflict of interest in the Middle East between us and any Western Power except to some extent with Italy and France over the disposal of the former Italian Colonies. We should do our best to convince the Western Union Powers of the necessity of holding the Middle East as well as Western Europe.

ISR EL

8. Our aim must be that the whole of the Middle East, including both the Arab countries and Israel, should have close and friendly relations with the West, but if we were to gain the friendship of Israel at the expense of losing our position and influence in the Arab countries, we should lose more than we should gain. We must therefore hold the two if we can.

SPECIFIC TASKS AND LETHODS

9. The following points are applicable to all or most of the area, subject to stated exceptions. Notes on some of the nore important tasks and problems in individual countries are given in the Annex.

SOCIAL AND ADVINISTRATIVE REFORM

10. The standards of administration are lamentably low by Western

standards and in many cases declining. Except to some extent in Israel, Turkey, and to a lesser degree in the Lebanon and Jordan, social conditions are most inequitable and provide an obvious field for Communist propaganda. Although the present regimes are in most cases unsatisfactory, we are obliged to deal with them in current affairs and there is usually no possible alternative regime which would not be under Communist or cuasi-Fascist influence. We are often

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accused of deliberately supporting reactionary and corrupt regimes. One of our principal tasks must be to use every possible means to encourage the emergence of progressive and honest governments and efficient administrations. Our means of carrying out this task are -

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- (a) Constant advice to Governments,
- (b) The supply of social and labour experts.
- (c) The supply of information about social developments in the United Kingdom.
- (d) Whenever we are able to give material or other assistance, we should seek to make use of it to secure an improvement in the local administrative and social conditions.
- (e) While being scrupulously careful not to join in any intrigues against existing regimes, we should lose no opportunity of maintaining informal contact with progressive individuals or groups who seen to be genuinely working for administrative and social reform.

11. Where drastic constitutional changes occur, as recently in Syria, we should be ready to establish our influence with the new regime in order to make the most of its plans for reform. But there can be no certainty that such changes will always be for the better, and in special cases, e.g., Iraq, there may well be special dangers.

12. We should be particularly careful to ensure that social reform keeps pace with economic development, e.g., that the reform of land tenure does not lag behind the increase of irrigated land. EDUCATION

13. In the long run progress towards more progressive and hones: government will depend largely on education. Outside pressure on Governments towards reform can never achieve the same results as pressure from an educated nucleus within. One of our most important

general tasks must therefore be the encouragement of education on the right lines. Such encouragement can best be given in practical form by British Council advice to local educational authorities, by the maintenance and expansion of British schools and by the offer of scholarships in the United Kingdon. We should be prepared to devote increasing attention and resources to the creation and development of this nucleus in each country, even perhaps at the expense of some other forms of expenditure.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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The countries of the Middle East vary greatly in their 14. resources. The populations are by no means commensurate with these resources (over-population in Egypt; under-population in Syria and Iraq; the greatest proved oil resources in the world in Kuwait with 150,000 inhabitants). The standard of living is, however, almost universally for too low except for a few people at the top, whose standard is far too high. In most cases a redistribution of existing wealth would not be enough to remedy the dangerously low standards of the masses. The development of potential resources proportionately to the financial possibilities of each country must go hand in hand with social reform. Various schemes have been surveyed, e.g., the control of the Nile waters, irrigation and flood control in Iraq, extensive agricultural development in North-Eastern Syria, and the comprehensive Seven-Year Plan in Persia. (A paper by the Middle East Official Committee containing a selective list of projects is being considered by the Official Committee on Economic Development in relation to other calls on available resources from the Colonies, the Commonwealth, etc.)

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EXTERNAL FINANCE

15. Plans for economic development pose two extremely difficult financial problems - the provision of internal and external finance, It has been estimated very roughly that the projects whose early realisation the Middle East (Official) Committee believe to be desirable would call for an internal expenditure of about 170 millions over the next 10 or 15 years and external expenditure in foreign currencies of about 190 millions over the same period. To the extent that Middle East Governments cannot meet external finance requirements from their own earnings, the primary source for such finance is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Dovelopment. in which the United States Government and His Majesty's Government

are major participants. There may be calls on the United States Government and on His Majosty's Government in addition. The attitude to be adopted by His Majesty's Government in dealing with these requirements is duscussed in paragraph 29 below.

INTERNAL FINANCE

16. Difficult as the provision of external finance may be, the provision by Middle East Governments of adequate internal finance is likely to be, if anything, a more intractable problem. It cannot be found/

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found without improved collection of revenue and higher taxes. Those demand major administrative and political reforms, of which no Middle East regime has yet shown itself capable, but which are absolutely essential if the objectives of our policy are to be achieved. Even in advance of decisions about external finance, much can be done by His Majesty's Representatives to bring home to Middle East Governments the gravity of the decisions with which they are faced in this internal field. We must continually press them not only to bring development plans to nore advance stages by expediting technical study and preparation, but, more important still, to face immediately the administrative, political and social problems involved in the provision of the necessary internal finance and in the creation of social conditions in which the maximum benefit may be derived from the economic plans.

BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE (B.N.E.O.)

17. One of our most effective agencies for bringing about improved social and economic conditions and for co-ordinating Eritish political, strategic and economic interests is the British Middle East Office, which was set up in 1945. Its tasks are to give expert guidance to the Middle East countries in economic and social matters, to make recommendations on political cuestions affecting the Hiddle East as a whole and to give political advice to the Hiddle East Defence Co-ordination Committee. The B.M.E.O. should receive every encouragement and possibly increases in staff.

COLDUNIST ACTIVITIES

18. The above paragraphs deal largely with the creation of conditions in which Communist penetration will fail. Hiddle East Governments are slow to take the necessary action in this field, but are usually readier to deal with the manifestations of Communist activities which come to their notice. We can and should give valuable assistance in this matter also both as regards publicity and security measures. We should at the same time be careful to watch for signs that reactionary Governments use anti-Communist measures to repress genuinely progressive opposition.

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EXTERNAL RELATIONS

19. Arab Unity. - We desire that Middle East countries should become increasingly strong and prosperous and should compose the cuarrels and differences which have in the past so weakened them. We do not wish to express an opinion about the form which Arab unity should take as between, e.g., the existing arab League, the proposal: for the unity of the Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan) or the Greater S ria plan (the unity of Spria and Jordan). We are strongly opposed to the use of force by one Arab country against another to bring about changes of their relative status. But if closer relations between any or all of the Arab countries, leading even to some kind of union, grew up organically and constitutionally, by the free consent of the peoples concerned, and without hostile intentions against other Arab States, we should see no reason to oppose this and, indeed, such a development might have advantages, - though we should have to consider carefully how it affected our treaty relationships. The arab League has not been as beneficial as was hoped. Its main function has been as a forum for nationalist propaganda, though it may well have had some value as a safety-valve. His Majesty's Government cannot take any steps to bring it to an end but we should not regret its demise. If it continues in being we should hope it would concentrate more on social and economic problems

20. <u>Israel</u>. - The developments in Palestine since the end of the Handate, resulting in the energence of the State of Israel, have been one of the most disturbing elements in Middle East policy. It is largely owing to them that the present review of our Hiddle East policy is being held. We must never under-rate the political and psychological preoccupation of all Arab Governments and peoples with the Palestine cuestion. They will, for instance, refuse to respond

to our guidance on social and economic matters if they find us differ ing too widely from them over Palestine. His Hajesty's Government accept Israel as an established fact and intend to grant her <u>de jure</u> recognition at the earliest suitable moment. They regard it as a matter of high importance that she should be orientated towards the West and play her part in the defence of the Hiddle East against

Communist/

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Communist penetration and Soviet aggression. For this purpose they will use their best endeavours to have friendly and mutually profitable relations with her. At the same time they are bound to have regard to their existing friendships and alliances with the Arab States, particularly as the latter are at present more willing than Israel to commit themselves to the anti-Communist camp. It would be too high a price to pay for the friendship of Israel to jeopardise, by estranging the arabs, either the base in Egypt or Middle Eastern oil. Subject always to these interests being safeguarded, His Majesty's Government are anxious to promote not merely peace but friendly relations between Israel and the Arab States. They would see no objection to the development of normal trading relations botween Israel and her Arab neighbours on a basis of complete independence. But His Majesty's Government would not regard it as in their interest that Israel should acquire more Arab territory without a cuid pro quo or that she should carry her economic exchanges with the Arab States to the point of dominating them economically and so politically, and thus perhaps imposing hor own ideas of neutrality on . the Arab world. They would not lend their assistance to the furtherance of any such ambitions and would indeed support the arab States in resisting them.

21. This being our general policy, we should judge on their merits all questions arising in our relations with Israel and we should be ready to take such opportunities as occur of improving these relation. in such ways as do not endanger our position in the rest of the Hidd. East and the Moslem world. We do not at present dispose of such influence with the Arabs, however, that we can safely press them to make friendly overtures to Israel.

22. We should continue to co-operate as closely as possible with the United States Government and the Palestine Conciliation Commission

of the United Nations to bring about a final settlement of all

Palestine questions, including particularly the Arab refugees, the

territorial settlement, Jerusalem and Haifa.

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DEFENCE

23. If progress is made in the tasks described above we can have some assurance that Russia will not gain marked success in the cold war in the Middle East. It is necessary also to consider how we may bost prevent Russian success in a shooting war in that area. There is no doubt whatever that the Middle East must be defended, on account of its value as an offensive base, as a source of oil and as a focal point of communications. The forces of Hiddle East Governments will never be adocuate to make any appreciable contribution to this task, though the Turkish forces and the Arab Legion will be able to play a useful role in the carly stages. In order to enable our forces to undertake successful offensive and defensive operations in the Middle East, it is necessary to have our main base in Egypt, the assurance that Turkey is both able and determined either to safeguard her neutrality or to impose effective delay on Russian forces, adequate subsidiary strategic facilities in Jordan, Iraq and Cyronaica and preferably some additional facilities in Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Lebanon. It will also be essential in time of war for our forces to be able to operate in and through Israel. We do not at present desire strategic facilities in Israel in peace-time, largely because of the . political pressure to which this night expose us, But the method of obtaining access to ports, airfields and communications in Israel must be constantly reviewed. It is possible that it may be easier for the United States than for the United Hingdom to obtain the necessary agroement from Israel.

24. <u>Hiddle East Pact</u>. - In order to be assured of the above facilities, our ultimate object must be to see the whole Hiddle East area covered by a system of defence agreements. Thought is being given to the desirability of a general Hiddle East Pact complementary

to the Atlantic Pact. But the prospect of the Arab countries and Israel joining together in such a pact is remote. Finally, a Middle East pact on the lines of the Atlantic Pact would not assure us of the strategic facilities which we possess or require. We should, therefore, still wish to rotain and reinforce our bilateral agreements. If the Arab States wished, however, we should not object to some kind of general Arab League endorsement of bilateral agreements.

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25.- Supply of Arms - In attempting to consolidate our strategic position and to build up a defence system throughout the Hiddle East, we shall constantly be faced with pressing recuests from Hiddle East Governments for extensive supplies of war material. In some cases we have treaty obligations to make these supplies. Some of these requirements may be unrealistic and it may sometimes be better for the Governments concerned to spend more on economic development and less on arms. But the building up of independent armed forces is a matter to which Hiddle East States attach such prime importance that we must be careful to recognise it in all our dealings with then. If they cannot get what they want from us, they will certainly turn to other sources of supply, e.g., particularly Czechoslovakia. Our task must be to obtain the fullest and most definite statements of requirements of Hiddle East countries and at the same time to examine ways and means of meeting these requirements in the United Kingdom, including examination of the possibility of new production.

26. <u>United States Strategic Facilities.</u> - The United States has airfields at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia and at Hellaha in Tripolitania. She also wishes to obtain a fighter base. The strategic presence of the United States in the Middle Bast is to the common advantage. In time of war action should be on an inglo-American basis.

TURICY

27. Turkey sits astride the entrance to the road along which Soviet forces would have to advance in order to reach the Canal, and it is therefore very important that the Turks should be in a situation to delay such an advance as long as possible. The Americans have taken over from us the main burden of arming and training the Turks, though we still supply instructors, and given time the Turkish army might be made capable of major defensive operations. But it is

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never likely to be so strong as to make it worth our while that Turkey should come into a war on our side if she had not been attacked. Our treaty of alliance with the Turks, which requires us to come to their aid if they are attacked but does not require them to come to our aid if we are independently involved in war with Russia, is therefore not at all disadvantageous to us though <u>prima facie</u> onesided. The Turks set great store by this treaty, whose validity we /have

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have recently reaffirmed, and it helps to keep up their morale in face of Russian threats. We should continue to contribute what help we can to the modernisation of the Turkish arged forces and we should continue to bolster Turkish resistance to Russian encroachments by moral and political support.

ANGLO-ADERICAN CO-OPERATION

28. Co-operation between London and Tashington in regard to the Middle East is extremely close. Divergence of policy over Palestine has now been very largely narrowed. In other natters there is virtual agroement, which is perhaps closer than in regard to any other area. We should like to work with the Americans in a common constructive Middle East policy in the fields of defence, resistance to Communist penetration, economic development and social reform, and by constant co-operation in London, Mashington and in the field to give practical effect to this programme by joint or concerted action. CALLS ON HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNEENT

29. The need of Hiddle East countries for the provision of external finance from outside sources in order to carry out their development projects has been referred to in paragraph 15 above. Their need for guidance and technical advice from outside is no less great. If these are not provided by the West, they may sooner or lator bo provided by Russia. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government's first task is to decide, in the light of the Hiddle East projects under examination and of various other competing claims, what are the general lines of economic development in the Hiddle East which they can support and encourage and, secondly, what is the nature and extent of possible United Kingdom assistance. Our contribution may be one or all of the following: -

(1) allocation of United Kingdom production;

(2) support for loan applications by Middle East Governments to the International Bank; (3) larger sterling releases; (4) direct cash loans; (5) technical assistance. /Current

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CURNENT LIABILITIES OF HIS HAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

30. Apart from the cuestion of participation in general economic development in the Middle East, there are a number of current liabilities which His Majesty's Government have undertaken in the course of day to day dealings with the Middle East or which it is being recommended that they should undertake. The most important of these, so far as can at present be foreseen, are: -

- (a) <u>Jordan</u>. Our present annual contribution to Jordan in the form of a subvention to the grab Legion is ±3³/₂ millions. This is based on a force of 7,000 men. The Chiefs of Staff consider that the size of force required to defend Jordan is 25,000. This would probably involve an increase in our annual subvention to ±5³/₂ millions.
- (b) <u>Cyronaica</u>. Cyronaica at present receives a grant in aid of some £3/4-£1‡ millions per annum. The future grant in aid required by the territory is hard to estimate because the territory's economy will receive considerable help from the sums to be expended on military installations, which, of course, are a charge on His Hajesty's Covernment, and by means of which some employment might be found for arab refugees.
- (c) <u>Arab Rofugeos</u>. In 1948-49 His Hajesty's Government contributed £1,100,000 to the relief of Arab refugees. The Foreign Office have recommended that in 1949-50 His Hajesty's Government should be willing to make a further contribution for temporary relief which might be in the neighbourhood of £1,000,000. We are also making an interest-free loan of £1,000,000 to Jordan to assist in the permanent settlement of Arab refugees.

(d) <u>Military Jission and Civil Air Training Mission in Saudi</u>

Arabia - The present cost of these Missions is about £90,000 a year.

(e) Lovy force in the Persian Gulf - A recommondation will shortly be made for the establishment of a small local force under British command in the Trucial Coast area of the Persian Gulf with the primary object of stopping the trade in slaves, which has recently increased. A very rough estimate /of

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of the cost is £40,000 a year.

(f) <u>Provision of Experts</u>. - Foreign experts of the necessary cali bre can only be obtained if salaries and conditions of service are such as to altreact first-class pen. Hiddle East Governments cannot always afford to pay adequate salaries, in which case it may be impossible to appoint the right men unless some means can be found to make up the difference. Arrangements are also required to ensure that British experts and others who take service in a Hiddle East country do not suffer for having done so on their return to the United Mingdon, and it is essential to have an efficient organisation in the United Kingdom for the recruitment of experts.

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(g) <u>Training</u>. - His Hajesty's Government could usefully extend facilities free or at reduced rates for technical training wither in the Hiddle East or in the United Kingdom.

Foreign Office, London, S.T.L.

30th July, 1949.

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Saudi Arabia

Settlement of castern and southern frontiers.

Continuance of efforts to improve relations with Jordan and is Iraq.

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Continued ovidence of British interest through, e.g., Military Mission Civil Air Training Mission, Reconnaissance Mission and the supply of arms.

Financial guidance should be given where possible but there is not much hope of early social progress. Commercial opportunities should be developed.

Jordan

Maintain the viability of Jordan, with particular reference to refugees.

Extension of Arab Legion to fulfil the tasks laid down for it by the Chiefs of Staff.

Early absorption of Arab Pelestine with extension of Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.

Maintenance of existing relatively satisfactory social conditions.

<u>Lobanon</u>

Intensification of anti-Communist measures with the help of British security expert.

Expedite establishment of social insurance scheme and other social measures.

Lebanese overtures with regard to a defence treaty should be kept in play without definite commitments for the time being.

Possible action by Lebanose Government to mediate between rival groups of Arab States.

Syria

The new regime should be given such guidance and technical

assistance as is possible.

War material should be supplied.

Overtures with regard to a Treaty should be met in the

first instance by the dispatch of the proposed British Reconneissance Mission to study sites for airfields.

/Economic

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Economic development of the Gezira, with particular reference to refugee resettlement. Improvement of relations with Jordan and Iraq, possibly assisted by assurances of His Majesty's Government's friendly intentions.

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Persian Gulf

Financial guidance, particularly to Kuwait about the best use of oil revenues.

Similar guidance to other states as their oil revenues increase.

Local administration should be continually reminded, as may be appropriate, of the need for social progress and equitable distribution of wealth.

Emphasis to be laid on education.

The slave trade must be stopped.

A Levy Force should be created for this purpose in the Trucial Coast.

<u>Israel</u>


Establishment of normal friendly relations with the United Kingdom.

Efforts to consolidate Israel's western orientation,

Great care to be exercised about the role of Israel in the Middle East.

Early settlement of outstanding Palestine questions, including particularly maximum Israeli contribution to refugees.

Reopening of Haifa refinery.



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ANNEX Some of the Specific Tasks of British Policy in Individual Middle East Countries 83

Egypt

Iraq

(1) The establishment of a stable Government which, while friendly to this country, is more representative of Egyptian opinion than any of the previous Palace Cabinets. Only such a Government will be in a position to tackle the vast social and economic problems facing Egypt and to reach a settlement on outstanding political issues with His Majesty's Government.

(2) Progressive social reform and economic development. The principal economic project is the development of the Nile Waters, without which Egypt will be unable to support her growing population. Without her co-operation moreover, economic and social development would be retarded in the Sudan and Uganda.

(3) The settlement of the Treaty issue and the question of the status of the Sudan. The first problem is much the most important and it is possible that the question of the Sudan can be left dormant for the time being.

Some progress towards the achievement of all these three aims has been made. A Government of national union, at any rate for the duration of the elections, has been created. The Egyptian Government have in principle agreed to co-operate in both the Equatorial and the Blue Nile schemes. Technical military talks have progressed extremely well so far and offer at, any rate a chance of a more permanent <u>modus vivendi</u> giving us the facilities we need to meet the threat of war in the Middle East.

Establishment of financial stability. Reform of the Administration.

Broader political basis for the regime.

Active progress with economic development through an Economic development Board, accompanied by the necessary social reform under the guidence of a British labour expert.

Resumption of full supply of war material.

When some progress has been made with the above, the question

of a new Defence Agreement can be reviewed.

Discouragement of provocative measures against other Arab States. Re-opening of Haifa pipeline.

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Record of discussion between Mr. Michael Wright and members of the State Department. (Communicated by the State Department).

Novembor 14, 1949.

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INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS

In his introductory remarks, Mr. George McGhee said that such intimate discussions had now become a normal aspect of Anglo-American relations. It was clearly understood by both parties that the conclusions from the talks constituted no binding agreements on the parties concerned and that the purpose of the exchanges ov view was to find areas of agreement. In the case of the United States Group the opinions expressed and conclusions reached were tentative until the conclusion of the conference of American representatives in the Near East which was opening in Istanbul on November 26th. (Following the conclusions and obtain higher approval for more precise dofinition of policies.)

> Mr. Wright confirmed Mr. McGhee's view of the status of the talks and pointed out that conclusions reached on the British side would also be for approval by higher authority. He hoped that the talks would lead to agreement on the same set of principles for tackling problems in the Middle East.

Mr. McGheo said he had considered carefully Anglo-American relations in the Neur East and had come to the conclusion that the objectives of the two countries in the area were identical, although there might be a difference of method in seeking to attain them. Both countries attached high importance to the area from a security point of view. American interests were parallel and not competitive and both countries shared a common desire for the stability of the area and its orientation towards the West. The difference in methods might arise from the fact that the influence and material interests of the United Kingdom and the United States were not the same in each country. Points of asymmetry, therefore, were only superimposed on an area of broad agreement. He emphasized that the United States Government had no desire to compete with or to hinder the United Kingdom in carrying out its policy in the Middle East. The United States policy was, however, governed by the limitations imposed by the nature of the United States Government, its policy of non-interference, and the difficulty of securing ad hoc treatment.

Mr. Wright agreed in general with the above analysis. He said that in the United Kingdom view the Middle East was a key to the struggle with the Soviet Union. If Western influence was removed from the Middle East, either voluntarily or by force, Communism would cortainly fill the vacuum left. The Middle East under Communist control would bring alarming results. It would affect the whole United Kingdom relationship with Asia. It would projudice the future of Europe and would pave the way for Communist domination in Africa. The triumph of Soviet ideology in the Middle East and Africa would secure a tremendous strategic prize for the U.S.S.R., the possession of which would

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in other circumstances cost her a great expenditure of blood and treasure. With this prize, the U.S.S.R., might be emboldened to take further aggressive action. The loss of the Middle East to Communism would have a devastating economic the Middle East to Communism would have a devastating economic effect on the United Kingdom. Post-war recovery would be prejudiced and, deprived of Middle East oil and to a lesser prejudiced and, deprived of Middle East oil and to a lesser irretrievably damaged. It was to our common advantage that irretrievably damaged. It was to our common advantage that the United States Government should increasingly consern the United States Government should increasingly consern itself with the Middle East. The United States Government in this had no desire to persuade the United States Government in this matter. It was entirely a decision for the United States Government but he wished to make it clear that the presence of the United States in the Middle East was considered by the United Kingdom to be to the common advantage.

Mr. McGheo replied that the importance of the Middle East to the United States Government was determined to a considerable extent by its importance to the United Kingdom The Americans had no comparable position in Africa and Asia to protect and, in the matter of oil, was not so dependent as the United Kingdom on Middle East supplies. Novortheloss, American oil interests were largo and the area was important from the point of view of strategic position and For the United States to take an increased interest in the Middle East was the assumption of In these discussions the pervading problem from the American side was how far to go in accepting new responsibilities and in taking a more positive role in the area. It was not sufficient just to ward off Communism in the Middle East, it was essential to assist the peoples of the Middle Bast to improve their living standards and social and political institutions and to acquire self respect and their The United States proper place among the nations of the world. Government had found it advantageous to back nationalism against communism. But nationalism was not necessarily friendly to British and American interests. We should aim at putting the Middle East countries on their own feet and persunding them voluntarily to turn toward the West. United States was in the process of deciding how far it should and could go in a positive approach to the area to achieve the foregoing objectives.

Mr. Wright agreed that support of nationalism could be used effectively against the spread of communism. But nationalism and communism could not be fought together. It should be our objective to convert the nationalism of the Middle East countries into a freindly force. France, Belgium and Holland did not yet wholly share this view. The preoccupation of the youthful countries of the Middle East with political problems made it very difficult for economic progress to be made. It was, however, the view of the United Kingdom that the effect of the Palestine problem was fading and the moment for more constructive action by the United Kingdom and the United States was approaching.

The conclusions drawn from the above discussion are

as follows:-(a) The general objectives of the United States and United Kingdom Governments in the Middle East are basically the same. (b)

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(b) The maintenance and extension of a friendly attitude on the part of the Middle Eastern countries to the United Kingdom and United States influence is a vital factor in the security of the Western Powers. The denial of the area to Communist influence, in peace no less than in war, is essential.

(c) The United States has no desire to compete with or hinder the United Kingdom Government in its activities in the Middle East area but on the contrary both have a desire to reinforce the general position of the other.

(d) Should the United States Government choose to assume a greater responsibility in the area, such a decision would be welcomed by the United Kingdom as being to the common advantage.

(e) It must be our common aim to slign the forces of nationalism in the Middle East against communism and to guide them into channels friendly to the Western Powers.

(f) With the bittorness of the Palestine problem receding the moment for United States and United Kingdom to take more constructive action to achieve common objectives is at hand. The United States Government is at present considering how far it can go in making a more positive approach to the area.

Approved by Mr. McGhee and Mr. Wright November 20, 1949.

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Record of discussion between Mr. Michael Wright and members of the State Department. (Communicated by the State Department)

DISCUSSION ON ARAB UNITY

November 15, 1949

Mr. Wright said that in the British view one of the reasons for Arab bitterness against Western countries was the territorial settlement after World War I, This settlement, in the Arab view, created artificial territorial divisions which have been continuously resented. There existed amongst the Arabs a deep-seated desire for some sort of union and this desire was a potent-factor in their political thinking. It had so far found expression only in the Arab League, whose record was on the whole unsuccessful, The policy of the Arab League had been one of extreme nationalism orientated against the western powers. This policy had to a large, extent now been discredited. He felt that if every move towards closer union between Arab countries was blocked by Western Countries the Arabs would fall back again on the extremism which had characterised the first stage of Arab League development. There was in the Middle East countries a strong desire for some change and in Arab. minds social, economic, and political reform or change were linked. However illogical it might appear to the U.K. and the U.S., any attempt to block political change in the Middle East was automatically interpreted as an attempt to block economic and social change. The U.K. attitude towards any movement for closer union in the Middle East, was based on the foregoing analysis. The U.K. was opposed to change by force but had decided that it could not oppose change brought about in a peaceful and constitutional manner. The U.K. could not share the French desire for retaining the status <u>quo</u> at all costs.

Mr. McGhee replied that the U.S. Government was in general a greement with this analysis. There could be no doubt that the instability of the area was increased by the existence of several small states which were not viable either politically or economically. He believed a more stable situation would exist if the states could get together in some way. The U.S. Government did not seek to maintain the <u>status</u> <u>que</u> but in the case of the proposed Iraq-Syrian Union had not considered that the moment was ripe nor the auspices correct. It had therefore counselled caution and careful consideration. He thought that the attitudes of the U.S. Government and the U.K. were close on this point.

Mr. Wright said that the proposed union in its extreme and immediate form would undoubtedly cause serious difficulties with neighbouring Arab states. The U.K. had felt, however, that it could not come out against it. It was possible that the idea would in fact now come to nothing. He noted with interest that the states had been considering steps short of complete union.

It was agreed that much of the instability in the area arose from a feeling of insecurity in the countries concerned. There was a general discussion on how far this insecurity could be removed from which the following points emerged:-

1. The Egyptian proposal for a general Arab collective security pact was in too elementary a stage for judgment to be passed upon it. The U.K.-U.S. attitude should for the time being be non-committal.

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2. A Middle East pact on the Atlantic model was excluded by the present policy of the U.S. Government and, in any case, such a pact did not by itself meet U.K. strategic requirements. Bilateral treaties between the U.K. and Arab countries were necessary and their stabilising effect was recognized.

3. As a result of the existing Palestine situation it was necessary for U.S. Government to seek to maintain a balance of its favours between Arab States and Israel.

4. U.S. Military Assistance Programme could not be extended to Near East countries other than to Greece, Iran and Turkey with the possible later exception of S.A.

5. The approval of the U.S. and its influence on the side of the maintenance of existing U.K. Arab treaties would be of great assistance to the U.K. Government and would increase the stability of the area.

6. The United States would examine its attitude toward the extension of U.K. treaty obligations to additional Arab countries, although such an extension did not at first glance seem attractive to Foreign Office representatives. The maintenance of the U.S. air base at Dhahran was a stabilising influence.

7. A revision of Arab League activities leading to more concern with economic development should be encouraged.

8. Both U.S. and U.K. Governments are opposed to political change by force but would not obstruct change brought about in a peaceful and constitutional manner.

Approved by Mr. McGhee and Mr. Wright. November 20, 1949

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Record of discussion between Mr. Michael <u>Wright and members of the State Department</u> (Communicated by the State Department).

November 14, 1949

PALESTINE SETTLEMENT DISCUSSION ON A

Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the State Department drew attention to four points outstanding in the Palestine settlement arising directly from the Resolution of December 11, 1948. These points were:

- (1) What was to be the future of the Palestine Conciliation Commission?
- 1.1 (2) Gould the scope of present discussions be ex-tended to lead towards a solution of the boundary question?
- (3) What was to be the future of the Jerusalem area?
- (4) What was to be the decision on the right of the refugee to return--repatriation and settlement?

Mr. McGhee said that it was the United States policy to keep the solution of the Palestine question in a United Nations framework and not to intervene on a national basis. The United States Government had decided that it was neither desirable nor possible for the United States itself to propose any overall solution. It was not considered that the United States had sufficient influence on the countries concerned to persuade them to accept such a . solution, and the result would only be to create bad relations and impair the position of the United States in assisting the United Nations or the states concerned in arriving at/an agreement.

It, therefore, supported the continuation of the work of the United Mations through the Palestine Conciliation Commission ... In Mr. McGhee's view there was no quick solution and the Conciliation Commission had a long pull before it. Its affairs appeared at the moment to be in a critical state as a result of the Israelis! refusal to utilize it for indirect talks, and the Arabs' unwillingness to talk direct to the Jews. The United States delegate to the P.O.C. would, however, urge the Commission to seek a solution in every way possible, including encouragement of direct talks. If acceptable to both parties, the Commission would mediate between the disputants.

Mr. McGhee wished to keep the Commission entirely divorced from the relief and development program. In his view coordination between the two could be achieved outside the area by the governments represented in them. In the United States view, the Commission should continue with its existing terms of reference as it appeared desirable not to risk raising the question of modified Verms of reference in the General Assembly and thus precipitate general discussion of the Palastine problem.

Mr. Wright of the Foreign Office generally shared these views and was anxious to avoid a debate in the Assembly, and he considered it inadvisable to tamper with the present terms of reference of the Commission. and the second states

/Mr. McGhee

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Mr. Mothes pointed out that the Jerusalem settlement and the report of the Regnomic Survey Mission must becessarily be fully debated. If the United States is to take a positive role in the economic development of the Near East, it is necessary that this development be associated with the solution of the Pelestine problem. No other policy or legislative basis for United States participation in the development of the Middle East exists at present, except for the Point Four program, which is limited to technical assistance. The United States desired the United Nations to continue to assume responsibility and to provide the machinery through which the parties could solve the Palestine problem, themselves. The United States wished to avoid further general statements which might serve to postpone the parties coming to grips with the problem, rather than assist them.

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Mr. Wright drew a distinction between private and public advice on a settlement and cited cases in which the U.K. Government considered that informal action could facilitate settlement.

Mr. McGhee agreed, but emphasized that the parties must themselves come to grips with the problem.

On the question of Jerusalem Mr. Modhee said that the United States supported the P.C.C.'s proposal. The United States would not wish to take the initiative to amend the proposal in the General Assembly, but would be prepared to consider the amendments of others on their merits and if they appear to contribute to obtaining agreement. The plan was in their view a good compromise proposal. It was the general view of the meeting that it might be desirable to get a Sub-Committee appointed after the discussion of Jerusalem in the ad hoc Political Committee. This Sub-Committee could, under the supervision of the P.C.C. try to work out a plan based on the amendments presented. It was agreed to consider the Jerusalem problem further on the arrival of Mr. Sheringham from the Foreign Office.

Mr. Wright then raised the question of the incorporation of Arab Palestine in Jordan. The Foreign Office considered the present state of uncertainty was bound to introduce an unnecessary element of instability into the area. The incorporation of Arab Palestine into Jordan, besides removing a cause of instability, would be a material factor in solving the refugee problem. The Arab League appeared to be reconciled to the step and it seemed unlikely that the Israelis would object.

Mr. McGhee replied that when the Secretary of State, Mr. Bevin, had raised this question with Mr. Acheson, the U.S. considered that the moment was not ripe for incorporation. It was pointed out at that time that this might lead to similar declaration by Israel with respect to her occupied territory, and might be resisted by the other Arab states. New factors had now been introduced. Israel had asserted title to the territory already occupied by them and had stated there would be no cession of it.

The United States Government accepted the principle of incorporation of Arab Palestine in Jordan and was concerned only with the question of timing.

Mr. Wright suggested that some time after the General Assembly Jordan should, by proclamation, incorporate the area. The U.K. would raise no objection and he hoped that the United States would follow suit. The Anglo-Jordanian Treaty would automatically be

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extended to the enlarged area. He agreed with Mr. Hare that the move would in practice mean the liquidation of the greater part of the outstanding territorial settlement and would be a marked step forward.

Mr. McGhee agreed to discuss the point with the United States representatives at the coming meeting at Istanbul and reaffirmed the United States Government's agreement to the step in principle. He said that the U.S. would consider the matter further after the General Assembly.

(Approved by Mr. McGhee and Mr. Michael Wright, November 20, 1949).

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Record of discussion between Mr. Michael Wright and members of the State Department. (Communicated by the State Department.)

RECORD OF DISCUSSION ON ISRAEL AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON 22ND NOVEMBER.

Mr. Wright said that the Foreign Office were particularly interested in

- (a) the extent of Israel disarmament and
- (b) the State Department's opinion on the economic viability of the State of Israel.

2. On the first point, State Department representatives said that their information tallied with our own, that the force was down to about 10,000 men backed by a readily mobilized reserve. According to their information defence was being strongly organised in the frontier settlements and through the new frontier force. On the second point, State Department was concerned at the economic position of Israel. They had received disturbing accounts from Mr. Clapp who had a low opinion of the country's economic future. Great offorts were being made in the United States to raise money from the Jewish community but the total raised this year was nearly \$100 million short of the target figure of \$250 million. In the State Department's opinion, the Israel Government had very considerable difficulties ahead but they felt confident that, in an extreme crisis, American Jewry would not permit Israel to go down.

3. Mr. Wright referred to Israel's continued attitude of neutralty in the Cold War. He said that in the opinion of the Foreign Office this neutrality was more assumed than real and that in a crisis Israel would support the West. The State Department shared this view.

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ort of our ortiled pollog (Sant. This ponetion was dealt with in Foreign Office despetch Mc. 5) of the 64h April 1945. You will remarker that it was plan discussed at the Middle Rest Genterence in London this summer.

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POREIGE OFFICE, 8.W.1.

14th December, 1949.

When Wright was in Machington two wooks ago, the State Repartment gave him an assertance that close co-operation with us in the field os well as in Machington estimate to be an integral part of intrices policy in the fidile last. They added that they would again byint help representatives in this sense of the conference pout to be held in Istanbal. The State Bepartment and on to any that shares in the part that? Spencentation at Assas had been, as we know, at a perior level, they ware now epochating a second representative who perior probably errive in January. To was being given special instructions to work closely and intimately with you.

We shall be glad if you will make it a point to melosme and help your new American collengue, and to lead him to feel that you offer him your confidence and friendship. If you find any recorve on his side you should not heattate to let us know.

Sad SE W. Strang

Sir Ales Kirkbrids, K.C.H.G., O.B.R.,



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MIDDLE EAST TALKS

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Mr. Wright and Mr. Evans (of the Middle East Secretariat) had talks with the State Department (Mr. George McGhee and others) from November 14th - 19th, and with the International Bank (Mr. Garner and others) from November 21 - 23rd. The area covered was the Arab countries of the Middle East, the Ex-Italian Colonies and Ethiopan.

2. The purpose of the talks with the State Department was:-

- (a) To make a general review of the situation in the Middle East. This was particularly timely as a conference of U.S. representatives in the area was due to take place in Istanbul under McGhee's chairmanship on November 26th.
- (b) To deal with specific questions on the Italian
 Colonies resolution then before the General
 Assembly.
- (c) To discuss the Palestine question which was due to come up before the United Nations on November 25th.
- (d) To consider the Interim report of the Economic Survey Mission headed by Gordon Clapp.
- (e) To interest the State Department in the conclusions of the official committee on Economic Development (overseas) and the Interim Report on Middle East Development by the Middle East

official committee and to discuss with them long term development plans including the priorities to be assigned to individual projects. (See attached

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(a) The tour d'horizon of the Middle East with McGhee revealed general agreement on methods and objectives. The State Department are at present examining how far the U.S. can take a more forward policy in the Middle East area and these talks should ensure that this policy, if undertaken, will be in collaboration, and not in competition, with the United Kingdom.

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- (b) Discussions on the Italian Colonies centred on how to make the best of the bad resolution of the Assembly. As a result U.S. support was promised for our intended action after the Assembly (details have been given in current telegrams). This support should be highly important to us in obtaining our strategic requirements in Cyrenaica.
- (c) On Palestine there was satisfactory agreement. H.M.G. are supporting the Palestine Conciliation Commission proposals for Jerusalem with the U.S. until something better turns up. The State Department agree in principle to the incorporation of Arab-Palestine into Jordan and will consult together with H.M.G. on how best to bring this about after the United Nations Assembly disperses.
- (d) Clapp's Interim Report was examined with the
 State Department and general agreement was reached on the proposals for setting up a new organisation

for relief and relief works in the refugee areas of the Middle East. It is clear that the main difficulty as far as the U.K. is concerned is not the organisation but the extent of the U.K. contribution.

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(e) As far as long term development in the Middle East is concerned it was not difficult to get State Department's agreement on our objectives. They are examining the mass of detailed information which has been passed to them on the various projects now under consideration. At the present time State Department do not consider they can obtain money from Congress for development in the Middle East unless this development is directly linked to the liquidation of the Arab refugee problem. They will, however, use their influence with the International Bank. These matters will have to be examined again when Clapp's long term report is received at the end of December.

McGhee has taken the conclusions of the present talks to the conference at Istanbul and will let us know further comments after his discussions have been concluded.

4. The purpose of the talks with the International Bank was primarily to exchange information and to enlist the Bank's support for the various projects for development in the Middle East countries which have been examined and approved in London. The members of the Bank were extremely friendlily disposed and they are now examining the data which has been passed to them and appear to be thinking on very much the same lines as H.M.G.

Sir Derick Hoyer Millar

D.A. Greenhill, 28th November, 1949.

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
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As receives the Incommitteel Bank, Mr. Engert said that while Middle Eastern governments had never openly rated objections to the conditions which the Bank attaches to its loaps, he felt that they were in fact unhappy about -


(5) Its terms of interest (31%), as they could not understand that it was a banking and not a charitable organisation;


(b) the extent to which it is obliged to watch the uses to which its loans are put and to control that these leans are used in an arrowsive manner and for the purposes for which they were intended.


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The State Department invited me in November to visit Washington for an exchange of views on the Middle East before the meeting of American Middle East representatives which took

2. <u>Rivalry and Suspicion before the War</u>.

place in Istanbul in the first week of December.

Before the war the United States Government took no positive line in the Middle East, but the American attitude towards Britain in that area was not unmixed with rivalry and suspicion. It has been our constant endeavour to turn this attitude into one of friendly cooperation. This was the more desirable since issues such as Palestine and Middle East oil were capable of leading to such a degree of friction and tension with the United States as to endanger the general policy embodied in the Atlantic Pact and the European Recovery Programme. Moreover our own interests in the Middle East would gravely suffer if we and the United States, were working at cross purposes.

3. <u>1947 Talks</u>.

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A step forward was taken in the Washington talks of 1947, in which both the State Department and the American Chiefs of Staff participated. The major conclusions then reached were approved by the National Security Council and the President. 4. At that time the Americans reached the conclusion that the Middle East was an area of importance to the security of the

United States; that the United States Government wished to cooperate closely with His Majesty's Government in the area; that they wished the United Kingdom'to maintain and strengthen her position in the area; that, the United States Government would do their best to assist the United Kingdom to this end without any sense of rivalry or any desire to supplant her; and that

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they wished to work with the United Kingdom in trying to secure social and economic reform and progress in the area. 5. At the same time it was recognised that in spiteof this general similarity of approach there were divergences of view between us over Palestine, and that it might not be possible to make much progress until the Palestine question was nearer settlement.

6. 1949 Talks.

The Americans began by saying that now that Israel had become an independent state the extreme Zionist pressure in the United States was diminishing, and barring a renewal of hostilities was unlikely to revive even in an election year.

7. The State Department, therefore, now felt more free to adopt an "objective" attitude in the Middle East. They wished, if possible, to formulate a more positive policy.

8. In the formulation of this policy, the State Department assured us that they would continue to be guided by the attitude towards H.M. Government formulated in 1947. A copy of the statement formulated at that time is attached.

Auner A

9. I was particularly concerned to probe American intentions in the course of the telks, and particularly to discover whether there were any signs, either

- (a) that the United States Government were tending to disinterest themselves from the Middle East, or
- (b) whether they had any thought or design of using

Britain in the Middle East for their own purposes. 10. I could not discover any indication of either tendency. Those on our side who took part in the talks with me agreed on this.

11. Limitations.

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It must, of course, be recognised that in the Middle East, as in other fields of policy, the State Department is neither all-powerful nor always consistent.

12./

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12. Moreover, American policy in the Middle East is subject at present, and is likely to remain so in the near future at any rate, to certain limitations.

13. Middle East Pact.

For example, there is no prospect that Congress would be willing to approve United States participation in a Middle East pact, or in bilateral treaties, or multilateral treaties (such as the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty). The Atlantic Pact is a big step forward in American policy, and a breach with the traditions of one hundred and fifty years. There must be time for digestion and consolidation before membership of further pacts is likely (if ever).

Positive American Action in the Middle East.

14. But within these limitations the intentions of the State Department appeared to be clear and sincere.

15. It must be remembered that when Americans speak of the Near East they include Greece, Turkey and Persia.

16. The United States Government regard their Military Aid Programme to Greece, Turkey and Persia, which amounted to about three hundred million dollars in 1949, as a material contribution to the stability and security of the area and a deliberate demonstration of the importance which they attach to it. They regard President Truman's statement about Greece, Turkey and Persia at the time of the signature of the Atlantic Pact, their invitation to the Shah of Persia to visit Washington, and the presence of an American fleet in the Mediterranean as further deliberate demonstrations of this policy. They also regard the maintenance of their military air fields at Dhahran in the Persian Gulf and at Mellaha in Tripolitania, both of which they wish to retain, as part of the same process. Still further examples are their assistance to the Seven Year Development Plan in Persia, their contribution of 50 per cent of the aid to Arab

refugees/

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refugees, their assistance to Saudi Arabia, and their intention to devote special sums to the Middle East under President Truman's Fourth Point Programme.

17. Particular Points of Agreement reached in the 1949 Talks. Economic.

The State Department gave careful consideration to our paper E.P.C. about Social and Economic Development in the Middle East. They stated that they were in full general agreement with it.

18. The substance of the paper was also discussed with the International Bank. They also expressed their general agreement and their willingness in principle to consider assistance for all the projects listed therein.

19. The State Department stated they were willing to ask Congress for 50 per cent on a matching basis of the total sum required to implement the recommendations of the Report of the Economic Survey Commission about Arab refugees (this would amount to \$26 million over eighteen months).

20. The State Department stated they intended to ask Congress for about \$5 million under President Truman's Fourth Point Programme in 1950, for direct assistance in the provision of experts for the Middle East over and above their contribution through United Nations agencies.

21. Political.

The State Department stated after consideration that they agreed with our viewof the importance of our both pressing Middle East Governments to adopt social reform.

22. The State Department stated that they agreed with our view that we should not support the maintenance of the political status quo in the Middle East at all costs. They did not gree with the contrary thesis of the French. They were willing to take part in tripartite talks about this in the New Year.

23./

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23. The State Department repeated that they would be glad to see H.M. Government retain their present treaties in the Middle East or to conclude further and similar treaties if we wished to do so. They regarded this as a stabilizing factor in the area. 24. The State Department informed us that they agree in principle to the incorporation of Arab Palestine into Jordan in the reasonably near future.

25. The State Department informed us they would send instructions to their representatives throughout the Middle East to cooperate closely with us.

26. We worked out together the resolution establishing the Near East Relief Works Agency for the Palestine refugees, which was adopted almost unanimously by the Assembly.

27. Detailed Records of the Talks.

Detailed records of the talks are being considered by Departments concerned and by the Middle East Official Committee. 28. The above is intended as a general summary for the information of the Secretary of State.

29. Talks with the International Bank.


An agreed summary of the talks with the International Bank is attached.

Mitsnight

19th December 1949.

Sin 10 Sthang During his visit K. Wright dicited some useful indications of U.S. policy, which is generally in line with our own. W.Strang 19/12 600 ME Furlonge

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GENERAL STATEMENT

On the instructions of their respective Governments, United States and United Kingdom representatives, including Service advisers, have reviewed the strategic, political, and economic problems in the Middle East, as well as certain strategic and political problems in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The conversations opened on October 16th and closed on November 7th, 1947. The following persons took part at

various times:

British Group

H.M. Minister, British Embassy, Washington Mr. John Balfour Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Mr. M.R. Wright Foreign Office Admiral Sir Henry Moore Air Chief Marshal Sir Guy Garrod) Members of the British) Joint Staff Mission General Sir William Morgan Mieut. General Sir Leslie Hollis Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence Air Vice Marshal R.M. Foster Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Policy) Counsellor, British Embassy, Washington First Secretary, British Embassy, Washington. Mr. W.D. Allen Mr. T.E. Bromley American Group Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs Mr. John D. Hickerson, Director, Office of European Affairs Mr. George F. Kennan, Director, Policy Planning Staff Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Lieut.General Lauris Norstad, Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, U.S. Army Major General A.M.Gruenther, U.S. Army Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Chief, Division of South Asian Affairs Mr. Edward T. Wailes, Chief, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs The two groups were headed by Lord Inverchapel, H.M.

Ambaseador in Washington, and by the Hon. Robert A. Lovett Under Secretary of State, who were present at the opening

and closing meetings.

As a result of these conversations, the United States

representatives have decided to recommend the adoption of a policy towards the area based on the general principles set

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forth below. The United Kingdom representatives have likewise indicated their intention to recommend to their Government a policy based on the same principles. 125

1. The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States and of the United Kingdom and to world peace.

2. This policy can be implemented only if the British maintain their strong strategic, political and economic position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, including the sea approaches to the area through the Straits of Gibraltar and the Red Sea, and if the British and American Governments pursue parallel policies in that area.

3. It follows from the above that both Governments should endeavour to prevent either foreign countries, commercial interests, British or American or other, or any other influences from making capital for themselves by playing off one of the two countries against the other in the It should be Eastern Meditorranean and the Middle East. the Parallel and respective policies of the two Governments to adopt the general principle that they will endeavour to strengthen each other's position in the area on the basis of It should be contrary to the mutual respect and cooperation. policy of either Government to make efforts to increase its country's influence at the expense of the other. Likewise, the policy of the two countries should be to strengthen and improve each other's position by lending each other all This support should also apply possible and proper support. to the retention or development of strategic facilities,

including civil air development.

There shall be full and constant exchanges of information

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and views and consultation between the two Governments about

the problems of the area.

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In cooperation with one another, they should of course take care not to embark on policies which would tend to deprive discussion the countries of the Middle East of the opportunity to engage in normal friendly economic or other intercourse with each other or with other nations. At the same time, every effort should be made by both Governments in close consultation with one onother to assist in the economic and social development of the countries of the area. Such a policy would not only be in accord with general Anglo-American encouragement of the progress of the peoples of backward areas, but it would also have the specific advantage of reducing the field for subversive activity and of contributing to the stability of the area.

In the spirit of the foregoing, there are attached hereto a number of statements covering individual countries and topics which, taken as a whole and to the extent that approval is indicated in each statement, will provide guidance for action on the subjects in question.

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