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Cypher/OTP

PLEETICAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM ALEXANDRIA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

6022

Mr. Chapman Andrews.

No. 50

D. 8.19 p.m. 25th July, 1949

25th July, 1949

R. 9.35 p.m. 25th July, 1949

Repeated to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jerusalem, Jedda, Bagdad, Cairo and C.S in C. M.E.L.F.

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 50 of 25th July, repeated for information to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jerusalem, Jedda, Bagdad, Cairo, and C.S in C. [? grp. omd.].

My telegram No. 48.

Abboud Pasha took lunch with me today. He said that he had been with Sirry Pasha at Aix Les Bains when the summons to return to Egypt arrived. Sirry guessed the reason for the summons and expressed to Abboud disinclination to accept to form a Government. It would involve financial sacrifices for him without prospect of holding office for more than a few weeks. Abboud however, rallied him and persuaded him to meet his destiny. They journeyed together by air to Egypt arriving at Alexandria yesterday July 24th. Sirry Pasha had an immediate audience with King Farouk and was given leave to consider the situation until this morning. During the night consultations were held with Nahas Pasha and leaders of the Wafd. The King's wish was that Sirry should form his Government without including any of the leaders of the three main political parties (Wafd, Saadist and Liberal) which however, would each be represented by three (repeat three) members. There should in addition be one [grps. undec.] and three independents without counting the Prime Minister himself making a total of 14. Nahas Pasha had at first proved obdurate and in particular wanted explicit assurances concerning freedom of the forthcoming general election, but in the end was prevailed upon to collaborate on the above lines leaving it to Hussein Sirry Pasha to see fair play later.

2. In the small hours of this morning, Sirry Pasha's willingness to form a Government was communicated to King Farouk, and Abdul Hadi Pasha was acquainted at 8 a.m. this morning with King's wish that he should relinquish the office.

3. Throughout all this, Abboud was in closest touch with Hussein Sirry, the Wafdist leaders, the acting chief of the Royalist cabinet and Kerim Bey Tabet (Royalist Press Councillor and King Farouk's constant companion and most influential /courtier) and



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SECRET

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Alexandria telegram No. 50 to Foreign Office.

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courtier) and it was through the final intermediation with the King of the last named that His Majesty, according to Abboud at last agreed that the general election should be really free i.e. that there should be no previous agreement between the various parties about division of seats.

4. This evening's papers carry banner headline announcing Abdul Hadi's resignation and envisaging strongly the probability of Sirry Pasha being called upon to form a Government of National Union.

Cairo please pass Immediate to C's. in C. M.E.L.F.

O:O

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J6025

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Cypher/OTP

POLITICAL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM ALEXANDRIA TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Chapman Andrews  
No. 51

D. 8.38 p.m. 25th July 1949  
R. 9.47 p.m. 25th July 1949

25th July 1949

Repeated to Cairo  
Commanders-in-Chief.

IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 51 of July 25th repeated for information to Cairo and Commanders-in-Chief.

My telegram No. 50. J6022

Abboud Pasha told me that King Farouk had informed Sirry Pasha that as soon as the new Government was formed, His Majesty intended to take six weeks' holiday cruising in his yacht in the Mediterranean. Sirry Pasha had at once said that he must ask His Majesty to delay a little before leaving Egypt. The King had replied "Now that you have the Wafd and the rest behind you, what is there to worry about?"

Sirry had then said he must ask His Majesty to be good enough to give him at least ten days after the formation of the new Government before starting on his holiday. The King had thereupon agreed and had added that he would make his plans to sail on August 5th.

2. I will try and find out and report nearer to the date what the King's final plans are in order that the British authorities in the Eastern Mediterranean may be warned; but in the meanwhile I think it would be safer to maintain strict secrecy.

Cairo please pass to Commanders-in-Chief MELF.

V V V

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6035 10

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Cypher/OTP

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM ALEXANDRIA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Chapman Andrews D. 7.02 p.m. 26th July 1949  
No. 57 R. 8.25 p.m. 26th July 1949

26th July 1949

Repeated to Beirut

Bagdad

Damascus

Amman

Jedda

Jerusalem

Cairo (Saving)

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 57 of 26th July repeated for information (priority) to Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, Jerusalem and saving to Cairo.

My telegram No. 52. 56008

Sirry Pasha has not yet succeeded in forming a government but is expecting to do so this evening. Difficulties were raised by the Liberals whose leader Hoykal Pasha (President of the Senate) has been standing out for an agreed allocation of seats before (repeat before) the elections. The Wafd have refused to agree to this and Sirry Pasha sides with the Wafd.

2. It seems that the three main parties are now going to have four (repeat four) seats each in the Cabinet instead of three (repeat three). Makram Pasha was also approached by Sirry Pasha but stipulated the impossible conditions, including equality of representation for his Kotla party in the Cabinet.

3. The above was mainly from information supplied by Abboud Pasha who is still in the thick of things; but Keres Bey Tabet called upon me this morning at his own request with the King's knowledge (he said) to keep me informed. On the subject of the freedom of the coming elections he said that the King had quite made up his mind not to stand in the way but would not actually make a clear declaration or, on his own initiative authorise Hussein Sirry to do so. The Royal rescript calling upon Hussein Sirry to form a government, would, he said, express the King's desire to promote unity in the country "especially in view of the forthcoming elections". This somewhat / ambiguous way.....

KERIM



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SECRET

Alexandria telegram No. 57 to Foreign Office

-2-

KERIM

ambiguous way of putting matters was intended, said ~~Keres~~, to indicate the King's wish that the forthcoming elections, though freely conducted might produce a coalition government.

4. Although there have been no demonstrations of joy throughout the country at the news of the past 24 hours there is no doubt that the news has produced a feeling of widespread relief and pleasure. On the eve of the great Moslem festival of Bairam following a month of Ramadan fasting, which has been really trying in the hot weather, the political news has provided good material for holiday reading and speculative discussion.

ccc

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**J**

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1949 **EGYPT and SUDAN**

J. 6064

<p>Registry Number } J6064/1015/16</p> <p>TELEGRAM FROM Mr. Chapman Andrews, ALEXANDRIA. No. 59. Confidential.</p> <p>Dated 26.7.49.</p> <p>Received in Registry 27.7.49.</p>	<p>Records reasons for the delay in formation of the new Egyptian Government as described by ABOUD PASHA.</p> <p>Repeated to Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Amman, Kadda, Jerusalem, Cairo(S).</p> <p>Refers to Alexandria telegram No. 58 of 26 July (J6063/1015/16).</p>
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**Last Paper.**

J6063

(Minutes.)

**References.**

With J6022, J6025/G, J6008, J6035 and J6063/1015/16.

(Print.)

There is no clear indication in these telegrams that the King intends the elections to be entirely free, nor (in the event of their not being free) what form of government he would like to see in power after the elections.

(How disposed of.)

The new Cabinet is not a distinguished one; it is interesting however that it contains two members (Hussein Serry and Usman Aluharram) of the Committee of Three which has been examining the Nile Waters Projects. We may therefore be able to make more rapid progress on the Nile Waters subject in the next three months.

(Action completed.)

*[Signature]* 9/8

(Index)

*[Signature]* 16/8/49

**Next Paper.**

J6133G.

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In the light of the ability of the new Cabinet to operate successfully or otherwise in practice, we shall be able to judge whether it would be practicable to negotiate on major issues with a Coalition Government after the elections. King Farouk may also have this consideration in mind.

*W Stuart Hand*  
27.7

Research Dept to see file  
G.H.S.  
5/8.

*W Stuart Hand*  
28/7

*S. L. Chilton*  
- 28/7

*Mills*  
31.7

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6064

Cypher/OTF

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM ALEXANDRIA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Chapman Andrews,  
No. 59  
26th July, 1949.

D. 12.45 a.m. 27th July, 1949.

R. 5.40 a.m. 27th July, 1949.

Repeated to Beirut,  
Bagdad,  
Damascus,  
Amman,  
Jedda,  
Jerusalem,  
Cairo Saving.

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 59 of 26th July.  
repeated for information to Beirut, Bagdad, Damascus, Amman,  
Jedda, Jerusalem and Saving to Cairo.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Abboud Pasha has just brought me from Hussein Sirry Pasha, details given in my immediately preceding telegram of the new government which has been approved by King Farouk.

2. There is a total of 18 members of the Cabinet in addition to the Prime Minister.

3. Abboud Pasha tells me that the delay in forming the new government was occasioned by Saadist and Liberal demands for an allocation of seats in the Chamber of Deputies after (repeat after) the forthcoming election. The Wafd [gp. undec.] reserving as did Hussein Sirry Pasha. The palace in the person of Hassan Youssef Bey supported the Prime Minister. The issue seems therefore so far at any rate, to have gone in favour of the free electorate rather than of a previously agreed allocation of seats; but it is early days yet. The Cabinet strikes me at first sight as unwieldy and might take some time to settle down (if it ever does).

QQQQQ

JUL 27 1949  
X  
M  
A  
M



<p>13</p>	<p>FO 371 73485</p>	<p>J6133 / G 17</p>
<p>J 6133 / 1015 / 16G M<sup>r</sup> Chapman Andrews (Alexandria) 64 28 - 7 - 49 29 - 7 - 49.</p>	<p>Record of talks with new Prime Minister, Fuad Seraj Eddin Pasha and Abboud Pasha about the technical talks and the Egyptian elections.</p>	
<p>Last Paper. J 6025</p>	<p>(Minutes.)</p>	
<p>References.</p>	<p>Para 3. It will also be prudent for us to avoid raising long-term issues for the time being; and for the same reason that it will not serve us to allow these issues to become the subject of election campaigns.</p>	
<p>(Print.)</p>	<p>It is not yet clear how this will affect the defence talks which we should like to see pursued quickly and secretly. It may be too much to expect the various components of the coalition to undertake now to refrain from comment on the evacuation question in their election campaigns. I suggest that/</p>	
<p>(How disposed of.)</p>	<p>(Action completed.) Gm 4/8</p>	<p>(Index.) W/M.</p>
<p>Next Paper.</p>		

that we should give the new cabinet a week or two at least to settle down.

after lunch

30.7

It looks as though we shall not be able to make much progress with the talks until after the elections and I think to see Siry Park on film now might easily ~~be~~ <sup>have</sup> to have unfortunate consequences.

W. Sturges  
S/S

MSL

3.8

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J 6133

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POLITICAL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION.

FROM ALEXANDRIA TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Chapman Andrews.

No. 64.  
28th July, 1949.

D. 8.20 p.m. 28th July, 1949.

R. 9.49 p.m. 28th July, 1949.

Repeated to Cairo  
B.M.E.O. (Cairo).

IMMEDIATE.  
TOP SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 64 of 28th July  
repeated for information to Cairo and B.M.E.O. (Cairo).  
B.M.E.O. please copy to Commanders-in-Chief.

I had long and most friendly talks during and after lunch today with the new Prime Minister and with Rüd Seraj Eddin Pasha. All three of us were guests (the only ones) of Abboud Pasha. I spoke to the Prime Minister alone and on top secret basis without going into details, of present situation in regard to military talks and at his request am seeing him again tomorrow afternoon in his office, when he will be fully briefed. Military Attaché and Air Vice Marshal Coombe are coming down here tomorrow to brief me thoroughly beforehand.

2. The Prime Minister said he was very glad to have received through the Egyptian Ambassador in London a friendly message from you Sir. He declared himself very [grps. omitted] to work with us but asked me to bear in mind that he would have to consult his colleagues and carry them with him in important matters-no easy task.

3. Fuad Pasha, talking to me apart said that the Wafd had "made many sacrifices" in order to reach an agreed basis of collaboration under the present Prime Minister with a view to complete freedom of elections as soon as possible. He hopes that these may now take place during the first half of September. The others are similarly urging early general elections upon the Prime Minister who, however, told me that he expected they would be held in October. So clearly nothing has been finally decided yet. Fuad Pasha said he was sure it would be better for His Majesty's Government to try and avoid so far as possible, raising long-term issues with the present government. It would be far better to await result of the coming elections. Only really urgent matters that could not (repeat not) wait should be raised under the existing conditions, if we were to be quite sure of avoiding danger of providing Saadists and Liberals in the Cabinet with a pretext for a "patriotic" demonstration and possible walk-out and with material for electioneering.

4. So, while being

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TOP SECRET.

Alexandria telegram No. 64 to Foreign Office.

- 2 -

4. So, while being frank with the Prime Minister tomorrow and while speaking with the object of persuading him to endorse the progress of the note so far and to agree to further planning after formal acceptance by him of agreed basis, I shall ride with a fairly light rein with a view to coming again another day, if he shows signs of fright.

666666

14 1949	AFRICAN EGYPT AND SUDAN	J 6134 <sup>21</sup> / G
J 6134 / 1015 / 169 Mr A. Chapman Andrews (Alexandria) Mr Knight 25 - 7 - 49 29 - 7 - 49	Record of talk with Abboud Pasha about the change of Government in Egypt.	
Last Paper J 6133	(Minutes)	
References	As regards the second last paragraph, Monsieur Yousef of the Egyptian Embassy expressed misgivings about Amir Pasha's future in conversation three days ago.	
(Print)	He suggested that if Amir were transferred from London (which he considered possible) in the event of the Wafd being returned to power, the only suitable appointment open to Amir would be Chief of the Royal Cabinet. While he thought that this would have certain advantages he would much prefer (in Egypt's interests) to see Amir remain in London. Hassan	
(How disposed of)	Yousef was admittedly a light-weight who could never say "no" to the King but the disadvantages lay in the fact that Amir might	
(Action completed) J 6/8	(Index) 	be
Next Paper	37021	

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be replaced in London by a highly unsuitable representative.

By inform Mr. Chapman-Andrews.

*John Hand*

30.7  
*J. Hand* 30.7

I doubt whether there is work relating to Cairo.

Sir W. Gray has still to see this letter.

*W. Howard*  
 3/8.

Now see further letter from Mr Chapman-Andrews dated July 29th.  
 No further action required

*M. Wright*

3.8.

*W.S.*  
 3/8

*Enter given 23*

British Embassy,  
ALEXANDRIA.

*J 6134*

25th July, 1949.

*interesting*

*Re 20/7 M. R. Wright  
Sir to Campbell 20.7  
Mrs. Clutton  
Sir to [unclear]*

**SECRET**

*Mr. dear Michael,*

Today has been quite a day as you will have gathered from the various telegrams I have sent off about the change of Government. It was a pure fluke but a very lucky one that I was seeing Abdel Hadi at half past ten this morning in any case and that Abboud was coming to lunch. There were other guests at lunch but when they had gone Abboud took his hair down and we sat together until nearly half past five. He gave me the whole story which I reported in the telegrams but in addition he gave me many assurances that we British should find Hussein Sirry a much more satisfactory Prime Minister than Egypt had had for a long time. I took the opportunity to say that there were several extremely important matters pending and I greatly hoped that Hussein would lose no time in getting down to them with me. I mentioned the military talks without going into details and said that we must have from Hussein what Ibrahim Abdel Hadi had seemed reluctant to give, namely, a written assurance that the basis for future planning, already agreed on the military side, was accepted by the Egyptian Government. Abdel Hadi had accepted verbally but, in a serious matter of this sort, that was not enough. The document was not for publication but to strengthen confidence. Abboud said he felt sure that we should find a ready means to overcome all such difficulties and he asked me whether I would meet Hussein Sirry Pasha and Fuad Serag ed Din at luncheon, in secret, within the course of the next day or two. I agreed. We are

to/

M.R. Wright, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office.

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meet on Abboud's houseboat to which we can make our way separately by different routes and at different times, safely leaving our police escorts or attendant spies on the sad seashore.

Abboud also asked me on behalf of Hussein Sirry whether I had any comments on the proposed list of the new Government and in particular any recommendations to make. This seemed quite like old times; but I thought it wise to say straight away that I could take no responsibility whatever for recommending or approving any nominations. Abboud said, "Yes, I know all about that. But do you want anything?". I said that speaking personally the nominations seemed all right to me. Again speaking quite personally I should have preferred to see someone like Abdel Ghaffar among the Liberals in the team rather than, say, Dessouki Abaza who had shown a tendency to talk too much, especially to the press. Abboud replied that that was a difficult one because Dessouki was Secretary of the Liberal Party and therefore the natural person to head the list in the absence of the President, Heikal Pasha; but he would see what could be done about including Abdel Ghaffar. My reason for mentioning Ghaffar was that he is pro-British and not afraid to say so publicly.

One final, but by no means insignificant point. Abboud asked my opinion on the relative merits of absolutely free elections or an agreed split beforehand. Here again I said that if he was asking me officially my answer must be that I could give no advice but when he persisted and asked me as a friend, for the personal ear of Hussein Sirry Pasha only, I said that not only I but every self-respecting

Englishment/



25

Englishman must come down in favour of free rather than rigged elections and it seemed to me that never was there a time when free elections could be held in Egypt with greater benefit to the country and to all concerned. No-one knew the real state of the country and here was the opportunity to find out. If King Farouk himself could come out with a declaration, or authorise a declaration, in favour of free elections, I was sure His Majesty's position in the country, and for that matter outside it, would be greatly strengthened. However, though I may be over cautious I should be inclined not to put too much money yet on the chances of there being really free elections. It is only to be expected that the Liberals and Saadists will strive to put the coming weeks to good use and drive a bargain to secure their future position as far as they can.

One final word, I deemed it a suitable moment to tell Abboud, for the information of Hussein that in my opinion, and in yours, it would be a mistake for the present Egyptian Ambassador in London to be changed as a result of any change of Government even though the Wafd itself might come in full flood. Abboud replied that he would personally guarantee that no recommendation to change Amr Pasha should be made to King Farouk.

I am really very sorry indeed to have had to miss you before leaving London but I could not risk overtaxing myself at that time and had to cut out many things I had been hoping to do. It was too soon after leaving hospital. But Now I am fine.

*Yours as ever,*  
*Abdul Chayem Arslan*

87  
 J  
 AFRICAN DEPARTMENT  
 EGYPT AND SU...  
 1949  
 J 6411  
 35

Registry Number | J6411/1015/16  
 FROM Mr. Chapman Andrews,  
 ALEXANDRIA.  
 No. 426. (38/106/49)  
 Confidential.  
 Dated 4.8.49.  
 Received in Registry 9.8.49.

The New Egyptian Government.  
 Refers to Cairo telegram No. 912 of 2 August (J6206/1015/16).  
 Encloses copies of the "Journal Officiel" of 26 July giving texts of ABDEL HADI PASHA's letter of resignation, Royal Rescript No. 20 accepting that resignation, Royal Rescript No. 21 summoning SIRRY PASHA to premiership and the latter's letter submitting names of his Ministers. Also encloses extract from the "Journal Officiel d'Egypte" of 27 July reporting the King's declaration to the new Ministers. Comments on the structure of the new Cabinet and the chances of its continuing in office. (Copied to Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jeddah, Jerusalem, Karachi, C-in-Cs Middle East and B.M.E.O.).

Last Paper  
 J6330

References  
 JS884 | 1015 | 16 G  
 JS696 | 1015 | 16  
 J6044 | 1023 | 16  
 J6035 | 1015 | 16  
 J6133 | 1015 | 16 G  
 J6310 | 1015 | 16

(Printed) 6  
 Egypt Volume

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) [Signature]  
 (Index) [Signature]

Next Paper  
 J 6539 G

(Minutes)  
 Although long, this despatch is worth reading in full as it puts into their proper places the miscellaneous items of information which we have received about the new Government.

The significant points are these:  
 (a) the chief disagreement within the coalition is over the question of allocating constituencies to the parties in the Government before the elections. The Saadists, Liberals and Watanists want such a prior allocation; the Wafdists, probably supported by Hussein Sirry, want free elections. The Wafd hope that free elections will result in an absolute majority for them; Hussein Sirry hopes that, even so, another National Government under himself would be

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- be formed after the elections;
- (b) The Wafdists want the elections to take place as soon as possible i.e. in the first half of September;
- (c) Hassan Yousef Pasha and Hussein Sirry are old friends. This may lead to embarrassment for Hassan Yousef if he has to communicate unpleasant instructions from the King to the Prime Minister;
- (d) Inter-party rivalries, such as that in (a) above, are bound to occur in the coalition; and
- (e) in view of all this, it is desirable that the elections should take place as soon as possible;
- (f) Hussein Sirry intends to relax martial law.

Qy. print for the volume.

W. Stewart and  
 Ataway Comp. Ltd. No. 11-8  
 Printers, Mans. Unit.  
 17/8.

See within:

1) Cairo communicated No. 426 (38/110/49)

*[Signature]*  
 23.8

Copy detached. This folder only reached Research Dept. on 5<sup>th</sup> September.  
 B.H.S.  
 6/9/49.

No. 426  
 (38/106/4)  
 CONFIDENT

J 560

/SR  
No. 426  
(38/106/49)  
CONFIDENTIAL



37  
BRITISH EMBASSY,  
ALEXANDRIA.  
4th August, 1949.

6411

Sir,

J6206

With reference to my telegram No. 912 from Cairo of August 2nd and previous telegrams dealing with the resignation of Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha's government and Hussein Sirry Pasha's return to the premiership, I have the honour to transmit copies of the "Journal Officiel" of 26th July giving the texts of Abdel Hadi Pasha's letter of resignation addressed to King Farouk, Royal Rescript No. 20 accepting that resignation, Royal Rescript No. 21 summoning Hussein Sirry Pasha to the premiership, and His Excellency's letter submitting the names of his Ministers. I also enclose an extract from the "Journal d'Egypte" of 27th July reporting a declaration by King Farouk to the new Ministers on the occasion of their taking the oath of office.

J58804/5/15/49

J5696

2. As you are aware from Sir Ronald Campbell's letter No. 38/31/49G of 13th July to Sir William Strang and earlier correspondence with Mr. Michael Wright, the Palace had for some time previously been cogitating upon possible ways and means of effecting a change of government without causing too violent a disturbance of the political atmosphere, a fundamental object being to create conditions in which the danger of acute domestic strife during the forthcoming general elections might be minimised as far as possible. A series of informal talks between the Palace and Ibrahim Abdel Hadi Pasha on the one hand, and Wafdist spokesmen on the other, with a view to the inclusion of the Wafd in a coalition cabinet under Abdel Hadi Pasha had failed to produce agreement between the two sides, since the Wafd refused to contemplate the possibility of general elections being held under the auspices of a government headed by any other than a neutral Premier. A review of the position as it appeared three weeks ago before the change of government took place was contained in Sir Ronald Campbell's despatch No. 384 of 7th July, in paragraph 7 of which the opinion was expressed that King Farouk held the key to the situation. This, in fact, has proved to be the case. It will have been seen from my telegrams about the change of government that everybody (including Abdel Hadi Pasha himself) was taken by surprise. The general feeling throughout the country however was one of relief that a change had at last been effected; the public's impatience with rigorous security measures, which to many savoured of the Gestapo, had been growing steadily for many months and the initial skirmishes in the electoral campaign were intensifying the state of nervous tension owing to the fear of polling being marked by violence and bloodshed and perhaps even a wholesale disruption of public order throughout the country. At the same time, many people (and among them pro-Wafdists), while welcoming the change, do not feel altogether happy about the manner in which it was effected;

the pleasure/...

The Right Honourable  
Clement Attlee, M.P.,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S. W. 1.

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the pleasure of the surprise being mitigated by the thought that the virtual dismissal of Abdel Hadi Pasha and his government just before the Ramadan Bairam was ungracious as well as brusque and that Abdel Hadi Pasha, who after all had been a loyal and faithful servant to King Farouk and had accepted grave risks to his person in pursuing the campaign against the Moslem Brethren, had deserved more kindly consideration. Incidentally, King Farouk himself evidently experienced a twinge of conscience about this because Kerim Tabet Pasha told me that he had been sent to tell Abdel Hadi Pasha that he must not think that he had sacrificed in any way the King's regard but that he was held in high esteem and even affection; by his conduct in supporting the King's policy and not opposing the new government he would retain His Majesty's confidence and should regard himself as held in reserve for future service. In a speech to his party followers at the Saadist Party's Club on August 1st, Abdel Hadi Pasha evinced a correct and dignified attitude, declaring that his government had conformed to His Majesty's will in supporting Hussein Sirry Pasha in forming his cabinet. He expressed the hope that national unity would be realised and that the country would reap the fruits thereof. King Farouk, for his part, has represented the change of government as his Bairam gift to the nation, but it is a matter of conjecture whether the thought of regaining a measure of popularity was uppermost in his mind when he decided to make a change at that particular moment or whether he was mainly influenced by other considerations of deeper significance. There is a widespread belief that articles published by Mahmoud Abul Fath in his newspaper "Misri" and a memorandum stated to have been submitted by him to the Palace may also have exerted a potent influence on King Farouk. A translation of the principal article was submitted under cover of my despatch No. 411 of July 23rd. It underlined the coincidence of the Middle East Conference at the Foreign Office with the presence in London of various notabilities of other Arab States and went on to deplore Egypt's simultaneous absorption in domestic squabbles to the exclusion of any active interest in important international developments. One of the Royal Princes who, like most members of the Royal Family, is under no illusions about King Farouk, has voiced to me his strong belief that King Farouk's action must have been dictated by fear though there might be room for speculation concerning who or what had frightened him. The Prince thought it might be the international situation and His Majesty's sudden realisation of Egypt's defencelessness. This in my opinion is a possibility not to be ruled out, for in the event of war (which the King may regard as imminent) His Majesty (mindful of the lengths to which military necessity have driven him in the past) may prefer to find himself at the head of a popular and united government rather than of an unpopular one.

J606/523

3. Having/...



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3. Having accepted the charge of office with a decent show of reluctance, Hussein Sirry Pasha had a feverish round of discussions with the various party leaders and finally, with comparatively little delay, succeeded in forming a coalition of all parties (except Makram Pasha's Kotla) and some Independents. Party leaders were not invited to join the Cabinet. I have already expressed the opinion that it was a considerable achievement to gain the Wafd's adherence on an equal footing with the Saadists and Constitutional-Liberals but that, at first sight, the Cabinet is an unwieldy combination. Of the eighteen Ministers, fourteen have held cabinet rank before. The four who have reached ministerial rank for the first time comprise: one Wafdist (Mohamed El Wakil Bey - no relation of Madame Nahas - who is a man of good standing having been hitherto Vice-President of the Senate), one Liberal (Ahmed Alluba Bey, a prominent Counsellor in the Court of Appeal who is reported to be level-headed and pro-British), one Watanist (Abdel Rahman Rafei Bey, an extremist with a reputation for Anglophobia and Moslem fanaticism) and one Independent (Doctor Mohamed Hashem, an intelligent young lawyer who is the son-in-law of Hussein Sirry Pasha). The others already figure in the Egyptian personalities list.

4. It is not to be wondered at that in all circumstances the composition of the Cabinet should bear some marks of improvisation and it cannot be expected that the machine will run, at least in the early stages, without a certain amount of friction and clatter. The Saadist and Liberal Parties and probably the Watanists too, maintain their preference for an agreed allocation of constituencies in the general elections whereas the Wafd remain adamant in their insistence on free elections; the present indications are that Hussein Sirry Pasha's preference is for the latter and that, in his view, any question of a pre-arranged division of constituencies between the various parties is a matter for discussion by the parties themselves and does not concern himself and the Executive. At the same time there are strong indications that Sirry Pasha is being tempted by the ambition, which may be fed by the Palace, to remain in office as the head of a national coalition government even after the elections. Such an objective would not necessarily be in conflict with that of free elections, especially if the Wafd were prepared to play. But this, from everything that Fuad Serag Eddin Pasha himself has said to me, the Wafd are not prepared to do. They stand for free elections and for normal constitutional practice by which the party, whichever it may be, that gets a majority over every other single party in the elections, should be called upon to form a government. It would be for the leader of that majority party to decide whether, and if so to what extent and on what conditions, to invite the other parties to collaborate with him in the government. On this fundamental point there seems to me to be no hope

of the/ . . .

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of the Wafd giving way and it may be in the Wafd's rigid refusal to compromise on this point before the elections that the fundamental weakness of the present coalition may finally reveal itself. The party leaders, who have no ministerial responsibility, remain behind the scenes where the temptation to pull strings in partisan interests will doubtless only be restrained by their fear of, or loyalty to, King Farouk who obviously desires to keep this new Government in being at least until the elections are over and who, it seems evident, is anxious that a coalition cabinet of somewhat similar composition should emerge from the elections. Reading between the lines of Royal Rescript No. 21 and King Farouk's declaration to the new Ministers on taking the oath, it is possible to discern a gentle hint of His Majesty's desire to see a fairly representative coalition government in power after the elections. (See in this connection the last sentence of paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 57.) Moreover Hassan Youssef Pasha has told me of his hopes and even expectation that Hussein Sirry Pasha (whom incidentally he had always greatly admired since the days when he served him as private secretary) will remain as the head of a national government "for a very long time". On the other hand, Kerim Tabet Pasha, the Royal Press Counsellor and constant companion of the King and undoubtedly the cleverest man at Court today, cannot be expected to view with detachment the possibility of the combination between Hussein Sirry Pasha as Prime Minister and Hassan Youssef Pasha as Acting Chief of the Royal Cabinet becoming deep-rooted and of long duration; for this would naturally mean that he himself would tend to be short-circuited and perhaps ultimately eliminated altogether in the contacts, formal and informal, between His Majesty and the Egyptian Government. One final consideration arising from the special relationship between Hussein Sirry Pasha and Hassan Youssef Pasha is that the latter, except when acting under direct orders from the King, will be very unlikely to try, or be persuaded, to intervene in the affairs of government. He will, I think, tend to withdraw somewhat into the background, keeping the Prime Minister abreast of such information as comes his way but anxious to encourage rather than otherwise direct contact between the King and the Prime Minister. He will hate having to give Hussein Sirry Pasha orders or convey possibly unwelcome instructions. Indeed, his natural tendency will be rather to take orders from his old chief, and it seems likely to me that Hassan Youssef Pasha may before long find himself in a somewhat embarrassing and therefore weaker position, though there is no sign of this at present. Another cogent point relating to the prospects of this Cabinet's survival was made to me by Fuad Serag ed Din Pasha as reported in my telegram No. 64 of July 28th, namely, that we should not raise non-urgent contentious matters, which might provide the Saadists and Liberals with a pretext for a "patriotic" demonstration and possible walk-out. This is an indication of the Wafd's expectation, after the elections, of being in a position to exercise a monopoly in the effective display of patriotism. At present they are vulnerable and therefore cannot afford to let anyone challenge them on that ground.

5. The position/...



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5. The position taken up by Makram Ebeid Pasha and his Kotla Party has, if anything, further diminished their dwindling political stature. Hussein Sirry Pasha went through the motions of inviting Makram Pasha to nominate representatives of his party for inclusion in the Cabinet but Makram demanded equality of representation with the other parties and it was obviously impossible for Hussein Sirry Pasha to accept this. At the same time, Makram Pasha characteristically attempted to pose as the champion of public liberties by stipulating the abolition of martial law as a condition of his party's entering the Cabinet. Having thus brought about his exclusion, he is now displaying chagrin at King Farouk's reference, in his declaration to the new Ministers, to the fact that it is the first time that all political parties are taking part in one cabinet. In the Chamber of Deputies on August 1st, when Hussein Sirry Pasha made the statement reported in my telegram No. 912, Makram Pasha objected that the statement omitted reference to the most important questions and he demanded that martial law should be abolished forthwith and internees released. This merely aroused ironical mirth.

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6. It is difficult to forecast at the moment how Hussein Sirry Pasha will fare in his dealings with Parliament. When he made his brief and almost anodyne statement of policy to the Chamber of Deputies on August 1st, it was received (as was reported in my telegram No. 76 of the 4th August) without marked enthusiasm and the applause for his reference to evacuation and the unity of the Nile Valley (which, incidentally, did not include the words "under the crown of Egypt") was rather perfunctory. He repeated that statement to the Senate on the following day and on this occasion press reports would suggest a rather warmer reception. This is not surprising in view of the substantial Wafdist representation in the Senate and its absence in the Chamber of Deputies. Unlike his predecessor, Sirry Pasha is not an outstandingly able parliamentarian. He is something of a martinet and rather brusque and even dictatorial in his manner of handling people. These qualities, and a propensity for taking snap decisions, may at times prove to be defects in a man placed in the peculiar position of having to handle different groups of party politicians both in the Cabinet and in Parliament without having any party affiliations himself. On the other hand, he will probably be disinclined to take orders from the King to the extent that Abdel Hadi Pasha was prepared to do (if only because by so doing he would lose Wafdist support without which he could not carry on at all) and if he stands up to the King in any matter concerned with constitutional practice he could certainly count on the strong support of the Wafdist elements in the Government. On the whole, I should say that the Cabinet will be characterised by inter-party rivalry rather than by unity and that it will become progressively weaker the longer it survives. I cannot conceive of any reshuffle that would include all the elements at present in the Government and it is already being suggested here and there that should one or other of the parties represented in the Cabinet prove recalcitrant Hussein Sirry Pasha would make no bones about resigning and forming a new cabinet consisting entirely of Independents. Such a government would at least have the

advantage/ . . .





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advantage of being unmistakably a purely temporary affair. It therefore seems to me that the sooner the general elections take place the better. The Wafd certainly think so and Fusa Serag ed Din Pasha told me that they would use their influence to bring about elections during the first half of September.

7. As regards the continuance of martial law, Sirry Pasha told me that he would have to feel his way but that his intention was to relax it. The first signs of relaxation have already been manifest and have been heartily welcomed by the Wafd; for instance, instructions have been given for the release of nearly three hundred internees and steps are being taken to review promptly the cases of the others. Meanwhile Exit Visas have been abolished altogether.

8. To sum up, the outward appearance of national unity, which is cried up in Palace circles and by the Prime Minister in Parliament, is deceptive and there is a strong possibility of fundamental differences with the Wafd concerning the nature of the government that is to follow the general elections and therefore the measures that would have to be taken before the elections to produce, or at any rate aim at producing, the desired result. This fundamental difference is identifiable with the constitutional struggle often seen in developing but immature political communities between the head of the state and the representatives of the majority of the people. That is the issue which has now been raised, though as yet only in a tentative fashion; and it is the issue which may become the dominating one after the elections. In the meanwhile, in their day-to-day relations with foreigners and particularly with this Embassy, the present government are showing themselves well disposed and even eager to meet us more than half way. So far as Anglo-Egyptian relations are concerned, however, it seems certain that nothing is to be gained, rather the contrary, by allowing long-term issues to be seriously raised. Indeed, it would be positively harmful to our interests if such issues became the rock on which the coalition foundered. For the time being, therefore, our best course would seem to be to tread delicately, exercising by the way such influence as we can in the direction of free elections and constitutional government. For not only are these objectives (one might almost say ideals) in keeping with British tradition and example, but also, as the experience of recent years has shown, a weak government dependent solely on Palace support and fearful of the strength of popular opposition whether inside or outside Parliament, is incapable of ratifying or implementing agreements reached by their own plenipotentiaries even after exhaustive discussion and, on our part, the limit of concession. Our hope should therefore be that the events of the coming weeks may produce a government which, though having to contend with parliamentary opposition of a healthy nature, may yet be strong enough through its confidence in popular support to deal reasonably with us without fear or favour. Such a possibility undoubtedly exists though it is not yet by any means within easy reach.

9. I am/...

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9. I am sending copies of this despatch, without enclosures, to His Majesty's representatives at Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, Jerusalem and Karachi, to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East and to British Middle East Office.

I have the honour to be,  
With the highest respect,  
Sir,  
Your most obedient, humble Servant,

*E.A. Chapman Andrews*

/SR

38/26/490

PERSO

TOP SECRET



BRITISH EMBASSY, 49  
ALEXANDRIA.

9th August, 1949.

J6539

NRUs

11.8

per Stewart  
per Stirling  
per Clifton  
11/8  
11/8  
11/8

My dear Michael,

Abboud Pashe has told me very privately that Nahas, Fuad Serag Eddin and Kerim Tabet met two days ago in secret and came to an arrangement as a result of which Kerim is going to use all his influence in the direction of persuading the King:

- (a) to ensure really free elections, i.e. to do nothing through the Prime Minister or otherwise to prevent the Wafd from running their own candidates in all the constituencies if they wish to do so;
- (b) to let the normal constitutional procedure take its course after the elections, i.e., the majority party to be called upon to form a government.

This might seem a simple and straightforward matter to be so mysterious about, but it is not. Apart from Hussein Sirry's own ambitions and ideas he is under strong pressure from the Liberals and some pressure from the Saadists and the Independents to try and come to an agreement with the Wafd under which they would not run candidates in certain constituencies thus ensuring the election of an agreed number of non-Wafdists. Pressure upon the Prime Minister is also maintained by the Royal Cabinet, maybe with the half-hearted agreement of the King.

Anyhow if, as I believe to be the case, Abboud's information is correct and if Kerim Tabet proves as good as his word, the result will almost certainly be a sweeping Wafdist victory in the general elections. The question then arises "Will the King summon Nahas" and that question still remains unanswered. It may be that in the course of the next few weeks some agreement will be reached, through Kerim and Fuad, between the King and Nahas under which, for example, Nahas would be summoned to form a government but would ask leave to be excused on the grounds of advancing age or ill health or something of that sort. But I can hardly see Nahas playing such a part and I doubt whether the King would trust him to carry it through. Certainly all my information up to the present is that although the King is well disposed towards the Wafd in general and towards Fuad Serag Eddin in particular he still cannot bring himself to face the prospect of Nahas as Prime Minister again.

Another point of less interest is that Hassan Youssef's plan of pushing the Prime Minister in to see the King and thus building up a habit of direct contact between the two is not working. Kerim, as I hinted in my despatch No. 426, is not unnaturally against it and he seems to have succeeded in persuading the King that from His Majesty's

own point/...

V641/1015/16

M. R. Wright, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S. W. 1.

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own point of view in dealing with important matters of state it is necessary for His Majesty to have time to reflect and consult his friends and personal counsellors and this can only be assured if there is a cushion between the Prime Minister and the King. So the channel of communication between the two remains the Royal Cabinet office and the means of communication written memoranda which, of course, suits Kerim admirably. He is a clever devil: one has to admit that.

*Yours ever,*  
*Andrew Chapman Andrews*

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**J**

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**1949**

**EGYPT and SUDAN**

**J 6562**

Registry Number } J 6562/1015/16.

**TELEGRAM FROM**  
**Mr. Chapman Andrews, ALEXANDRIA.**

No. 103. Secret.

Dated 15th August '49.

Received in Registry } 16th August '49.

Conversation with the Egyptian Prime Minister on 10th August at which complaint was made about U.K. press criticism of the Egyptian Government.

---

Repeated to B.M.E.O.

**Last Paper.**  
 J.6539(G)

**References.**

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)  
 27/8

(Index)  
 15/11/49

**Next Paper.**  
 J6542.

(Minutes.)

Unless Hussein Sirry is even more ambitious than we have been led to believe, I cannot understand his objections to being described as the leader of a caretaker Government. To all intents and purposes that is what he is. His complaint strikes me as being petty and unwarranted; I have seen nothing in the press cuttings, which we receive every day, to which Sirry could reasonably take exception. If we do mention the subject at all to the Egyptian Embassy, we might confine ourselves to expressing surprise that Hussein Sirry does not realise yet that the Press in this country is free.

I agree that it is desirable to avoid reference to Anglo-Egyptian

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Egyptian relations for the time being as far as is possible. But the Press in this country naturally want to know our reaction to such events as Sirry's ill-judged references to evacuation and unity of the Nile Valley and the article in "Atchbar al-Yom" of the 13th August to the effect that Amir Pasha had informed the Foreign Office that Sirry's Government would remain in power for months, if not years.

*W. Stewart*  
16.5

I do not think that this telegram calls for any action.

*W. Stewart*  
W/S

No. It is an absurd complaint. It is just as if H.M.G. were to complain of the New York press because of its comments on the future of the Labour Govt.

*News Dept*

*J. 10/5*

*see Re 16/9*

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J 6562 J

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM ALEXANDRIA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Chapman Andrews D. 5. 31 p.m. 15th August, 1949.  
 No: 103 R. 7. 00 p.m. 15th August, 1949.  
 15th August, 1949.

Repeated to B.M.E.O. (Cairo) Saving.

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 103 of August 12th, repeated for information Saving to B.M.E.O. (Cairo).

When the Prime Minister sent for me on August 10th his main theme was to complain about items in the United Kingdom press implying that his Government was purely temporary caretaker "a bridge" etc. He said he much objected to this and thought it was contrary to British interests to weaken his position. On being pressed for details he mentioned the News Chronicle and Economist but was unable to give chapter and verse. His remarks may have been occasioned by some telephoned or telegraphed report from the Egyptian Embassy in London which was not specific.

2. I said that I myself had not been conscious of any implied criticism of his Government in the United Kingdom press and made the obvious remarks about freedom of the press and pointed out that the two journals he mentioned were often critical of the British Government let alone foreign Governments.

3. I have since seen an account of an article in the "Times" of August 10th which sounds to be sufficiently favourable to Sirry Pasha's Government to comfort him somewhat.

4. If any of the United Kingdom press has in fact been unduly unfavourable to the present Government would you consider telling the Egyptian Embassy privately the Prime Minister's remarks so that they may correct any false impression that they may have given? Generally speaking, as I have advised previously, the less said for the time being in the United Kingdom press or by public statements or on the radio about the present Egyptian Government or about Anglo-Egyptian relations the better.

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POLITICAL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

FROM ALEXANDRIA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Chapman Andrews

No.158

D.7.18 p.m. 5th September, 1949.

5th September, 1949.

R.8.45 p.m. 5th September, 1949.

Repeated to B.M.E.O. (Cairo) Saving

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.158 of 5th September, repeated for information saving to B.M.E.O. (Cairo).

My telegram No.156. J 7019 319

Abbon Pasha told me last night that having heard possibility of early removal or resignation of Egyptian Prime Minister he had tackled Kerim Tabet that morning and had had it out with him. Abbon said it was pretty evident that Prime Minister had indeed been demoralised over certain matters and that this had offended the King. Perhaps more important still Prime Minister's attitude towards Kerim Tabet had deeply offended latter who consequently was losing no opportunity to denigrate him. He had accordingly spoken very strongly to Kerim to the effect that in his opinion and that of the Wafd, Hussein Sirry still remained by far the best choice until the election. He was seeing the Prime Minister immediately after seeing me with a view to persuading him to moderate his attitude towards Kerim and to be more tactful in his handling of the King.

2. This morning I had a long talk with Hassan Youssef Pasha who confirmed that matters were very shaky as between the King and Prime Minister. He was however very hopeful of an early improvement. He too felt that the Prime Minister had been tactless in his handling of the King and he attributed this to [grp undec] of his son-in-law Mohamed Hashem Bey, one of the Ministers of State whose appointment, thought Hassan Youssef, had been a tactical blunder for it was thought throughout the country to be nothing but nepotism. Moreover Hassem though a decent fellow and clever withal, was a young man in a hurry and was a spur to the Prime Minister's already impulsive nature. Hassan also told me in response to promptings on my side that Kerim Tabet's nose had been put out of joint by the Prime Minister asking the King

/for permission to





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TOP SECRET

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Alexandria telegram No.158 to Foreign Office

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for permission to deal with His Majesty either direct or through the Royal Cabinet Office. This had been rightly interpreted both by the King and by Kerim Tabet as an attempt to cut out the latter. The King was amused and had told the Prime Minister that he raised no objection but Kerim was mortally offended. Hassan thought that here too the Prime Minister had been unwise. Kerim still stood as high as ever in the King's [grp undec] Hassan confessed to me with bated breath that he too longed for the day when Kerim should overreach himself and be dropped; but that day was not yet. Meanwhile a sensible man took things as he found them.

3. From the above I formed the conclusion that immediate danger to the Prime Minister's position has abated somewhat.

B B B

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Cypher/OTP

POLITICAL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM ALEXANDRIA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Chapman Andrews

No. 156  
3rd September, 1949

D: 10.40 a.m. 4th September, 1949

R: 12.29 p.m. 4th September, 1949

Repeated to: B.M.E.O. (Cairo) Saving

IMMEDIATE  
TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 156 of September 3rd, repeated for information to British Middle East Office (Cairo) Saving.

My immediately preceding telegram.

My informant was of course Kerim Tabet Pasha who spent an hour and a half with me this morning. He said that relations between the King and the Prime Minister were very shaky and they were not to be surprised if the latter resigned any day now. He personally thought the Prime Minister could not possibly last more than another ten days and that the probability was that he would go early next week.

2. It appears that he has been very inept in his handling of the King whom he has not taken sufficiently into account about various matters. The first of these was the removal of certain senior officials in the Ministry of the Interior and appointment of others; then there was a case where the Prime Minister reduced a court martial sentence of a university professor from seven years to three years imprisonment for propagating Communism and finally this question of the World Health Organisation meeting.

3. Kerim said that if and when Hussein Sirry did go, he would be replaced by another independent, probably [gp. undec. ? Baro] hadin Barakat Pasha and that the King's intention that forthcoming parliamentary elections should be free remained unchanged.

3. [Sic] Much of this manoeuvring is I think attributable to Kerim's own intriguing to defeat the Hussein Sirry, Hassan Youssef combination which might have succeeded in short-circuiting him.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat]

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DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 1581.

21st September, 1949.

D. 8.55 p.m. 21st September, 1949.

PRIORITY.

TOP SECRET.

Following personal for Chapman Andrews from Strang.

We are reviewing with Sir R. Campbell the question whether our relations with Egypt and the interest of Egypt herself are likely to be best promoted by the greatest attainable freedom of elections in Egypt when these are held.

2. It has always been agreed that it would be both undesirable in principle and would defeat our own object in practice if we were to take any public attitude. This, however, does not necessarily debar us from exercising discreet and tactful influence as Sir R. Campbell was authorised to do by the Secretary of State in our telegram No. 29 to Alexandria.

3. There seems to be little doubt that it would be undesirable for the Wafd not repeat not to participate in the elections and in a future government. The practical choice, therefore, lies between virtually free elections (which might result in a large Wafd majority and the formation of a purely Wafd Government) and prior agreement about allocation of seats (which would result in substantial Wafdist representation and probably in a coalition or national government). It is presumably also possible that the Wafd themselves even if returned with a large majority would attempt to form a coalition or national government.

4. Our major interest is that the future government should first be likely to be well disposed towards us in general and in particular over questions of defence, the Sudan and Nile Waters, and secondly should be likely to tackle energetically problems of internal reform and social progress.

5. We assume that if a coalition or national government including the Wafd is formed as a result of the elections, Egyptians will consider that the requisite political conditions exist for negotiations with us possibly for a new Treaty. (The Wafd might also claim this if they formed a government by themselves with a large majority). This cuts both ways. On the one hand negotiations with such a government backed by the King does in fact afford the best basis for negotiations. On the other hand we could not in the present international situation agree to evacuation, and indeed as you know our military requirements go beyond those of the present Treaty. Unless, therefore, such a government were prepared for negotiations, whether on a

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TOP SECRET.

Foreign Office telegram No.1581 to Cairo.

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negotiations, whether on a formal long term basis or on a less formal short term basis, which met our essential strategic requirements we might be faced with a deadlock in which all political forces in Egypt were united against us. It might be particularly unfortunate if we had indicated however discreetly that we wished a coalition or national government and could then find no basis for agreement with it.

6. On the question of internal reform we find it difficult to estimate whether in the event of a coalition or national government being formed the advantage of having no party in opposition would outweigh the inevitable difficulties of carrying all parties on a united programme.

7. Turning to the alternative possibility of largely free elections followed by a purely Wafd Government, past experience has been that the Wafd, however much they may criticise us when out of office, are apt to be more realistic and easier to deal with than other governments when they are in office. Further we presume that if a Wafd Government wished to reach agreement with us and were backed by the King other parties would, in spite of their desire to make political capital out of opposition, be reasonably responsive to Palace pressure. If this proved to be the case negotiations with a purely Wafd Government would not necessarily be out of the question. There is moreover the possibility mentioned in paragraph 3 above that even if returned with a large majority as a result of virtually free elections, the Wafd would still desire a coalition or national Government.

8. We further understand that compromise solutions have at least been discussed such as that say 60 per cent of the seats might be allocated between parties in advance, leaving the remainder for free contests.

9. We shall be glad to receive your early comments on the above analysis, on which you may be able to throw different or fresh light. Since it does not repeat not point to any clear conclusion it may well be that the deciding factor in striking the balance of advantage should be the simple consideration that it is politically healthy and desirable that the country should be given the chance to express its views under the freest possible conditions, even though both the political systems and the immaturity of the electorate make such terms as free elections in Egypt highly misleading. It was thus suggested in the telegram referred to in paragraph 2 above that free elections under some form of neutral government would be the best solution.

10. The purpose of this telegram is only at this stage to seek your views.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

666666

100  1949	J	86
<b>EGYPT and SUDAN</b>		J 7513

<p>Registry Number J7515/1015/16</p> <p><b>TELEGRAM FROM</b> Mr. Chapman Andrews, ALEXANDRIA.</p> <p>No. 197 Secret</p> <p>Dated 21st Sept. 1949.</p> <p>Received in Registry 23rd Sept. 1949.</p>	<p>The Prime Minister's position is very difficult as the Saadists are obstructive and cannot be trusted with State secrets. A big effort was being made to get Abdel Hadi's agreement to the election arrangements and it seems that if this is not obtained only a royal rescript of an arbitrary nature could solve the problem.</p> <hr/> <p>Refers to Alexandria telegram No. 196 (E11462/1531/31)</p>
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**Last Paper**  
J 75086  
~~J 75089~~

**References**

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed) 10/9	(Index) 10/9
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**Next Paper**  
J 7524

(Minutes)

It is not easy to analyse the inter-play of Egyptian party politics at this distance, for what <sup>they</sup> are worth, however, my general impressions are: -

a.) The Wafd, confident that its political machine, however rusty, is superior to that of any other party, foresees a comfortable majority provided that the elections are more or less "free" — in so far as this is possible in Egypt. Their immediate aim must therefore be to keep Sini in power & sit tight themselves, meanwhile being as polite as possible to the Palace.

b.) The Liberals (= Conservatives), whose backing traditionally comes from Upper Egypt, seem fairly happy, presumably because they can rely on persuading enough Upper Egyptian fellahs to vote for them & — perhaps more important

important - because, foreseeing a Wafdist comeback, they have (as we know from other reports) made overtures to their present Wafdist colleagues accordingly.

c.) The Saudis know that the Wafdists defect from as 'deserters', that (as Mr. Chapman Andrews points out in his tel on J 7524) they have little support in the country, & that they can no longer be certain of their hitherto untrifling ally, the King. Quite what they hope to gain by precipitating a cabinet crisis is not clear; perhaps they regard anything as preferable to the present trend of affairs.

In any case the key to the future remains with the King, & until we know for certain what attitude he will adopt towards a Wafdist majority in Parliament (which in turn depends on other uncertain factors, such as Nafis Anwar's willingness to stand down in Serghat bin's favour), it is impossible to make a forecast which is anything but guesswork.

(Now see J 7524)

R. M. Diamonds

J. J. Jones 23/ix

Now see J 7663

Rg. 29/ix

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J 7515

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Cypher/OTP

POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM ALEXANDRIA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Chapman Andrews

No. 197

D. 3.29 p.m. 22nd September, 1949

21st September, 1949

R. 5.30 p.m. 22nd September, 1949

Repeated to B.M.E.O. (Cairo) Saving

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 197 of 21st September repeated Saving to B.M.E.O. (Cairo)

My telegram No. 196.

Prime Minister told me tonight that his position was very difficult and he was tempted to throw his hand in. Main reason was the Saadists.

They were not only persistently obstructive but could not [? gp outd] trusted not to reveal Cabinet secrets to their press, in which indeed, they were now openly attacking the Government. Accurate reports of Cabinet discussions had been published and the Prime Minister [gp undec ? felt] he dared not even acquaint his Government with the information I had given him about arms and equipment available, for fear lest this too should be published in the press "tomorrow". Members of his Government when asked their opinion in the Cabinet ~~was~~ (sic) now passing his written notes in order not to be quoted in the press next day. The situation was becoming quite impossible.

2. I took the opportunity to ask him how long he thought it would last, and when he expected the general election to take place. He said he had undertaken to try and carry on until the election and was therefore anxious not to precipitate a crisis by himself resigning. So far as he was concerned the sooner the election took place the better but this could not be until the question of re-organisation of the constituencies had been settled. This was the first time that such a question had fallen to a neutral Prime Minister to settle, and he had tried to do it first on basis of convenience of electors and not of candidates, and secondly by agreement between the parties. He had set up an all-party Cabinet Committee under the chairmanship of his son-in-law Mohammed Hashem, an Independent

Minister of State, but the



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SECRETALEXANDRIA TELEGRAM NO. 197 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

- 2 -

Minister of State, but the Saadists were contesting every small point. A big effort was being made to secure agreement with Abdel Hadi to the latest suggested arrangements, but he was not very hopeful of the outcome. I asked whether he had thought of setting up a small judicial committee, composed of members of the bench and including no politicians to settle this purely technical question, and he replied that as he had understood it the whole object in appointing him, an Independent, as Prime Minister had been to facilitate non-political settlement of this and other technical questions which were necessary preliminaries to the election. He should be judge, as he could quite well be for he had no political axe to grind [gp undec ? personally] but the trouble was that the Saadists had clearly shown that they did not want agreement. All they wanted was to render his own position untenable or themselves to play the hero and resign on a patriotic issue. Unless he could get agreement on this matter of constituencies they would declare that the elections were after all being rigged.

3. I said that I had read in this morning's press that His Excellency had given orders to all Governor's and Mudirs stress [gp undec] absolute freedom in the elections and stating that electoral cards must be handed personally to the right recipients against receipt in the presence of Omdahs and Sheiks who must vouch for identity of the recipient. The Prime Minister confirmed this and went on to say that the measure had been made necessary because he had discovered that his predecessor had distributed cards through Saadist Party channels with the object of cooking the returns. Exposure of this plot had greatly annoyed Abdel Hadi who was therefore the more disposed [gp undec] that it was said he must agree. The Prime Minister was now issuing new electoral cards of a colour (orange) never previously employed. The Wafd, he said were making no difficulties about the election law because they took the view that it would not substantially affect the result, which rightly or wrongly they expected to be sweeping victory for themselves. The Liberals too were fairly reasonable and were disposed to agree with Hashem's recommendations subject to a few minor changes. The Prime Minister seemed to have no idea how this technical matter would finally be settled.

4. It seems to me, though I did not say so, that if Hashem's attempt to win over Abdel Hadi fails, only a royal rescript of an arbitrary nature could solve the problem and I should expect his idea to be [gp undec] in the King's mind soon.

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J 7524 E 91

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Cypher/OTP POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM ALEXANDRIA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Chapman Andrews D. 5.29 p.m. 22nd September, 1949  
 No. 199  
 22nd September, 1949. R. 7.14 p.m. 22nd September, 1949  
 Repeated to B.M.E.O. (Cairo).

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 199 of 22nd September repeated to B.M.E.O. (Cairo)

My telegram No. 197: Political Situation.

The Oriental Counsellor reported from Cairo yesterday a rumour current there in political circles that Saadists were about to break the coalition, possibly on the issue of constituencies and [gp. undec.] and tankers. I do not think we need worry about this so far as tankers are concerned for rumour doubtless originated from false report mentioned in your telegram No. 186 which has now been cleared up. In any case I personally would be inclined to let them go their own way if the King should not (repeat not) see fit to try and restrain them through their leader who is still obedient. They seem bent on making trouble, though they have certainly very little support in the country, and if they [gp. undec.] do go, the elections will take place without delay.

2. Gallad Pasha, who has just returned from a holiday in Europe, confirmed rumours of the Saadists intentions which he said were timed to be put into effect at Bairam (October 2nd). He told me that the King has asked him to make a [gp. undec. ? concise] survey and report on the internal political situation. He said he is convinced that Hussein Sirry's position has greatly deteriorated during the past three or four weeks, and that it is in the King's interest to bolster it up until the elections, by exercising restraint upon the Saadists through Abdul Hadi. He is advising the King to effect this through the medium of Hosny Pasha, the private secretary, who alone amongst the King's entourage retains Abdul Hadi's confidence. Gallad himself was on good terms with Fuad Serag Eddin, and was to be the main contact between the King and the Wafd who he felt sure would sweep the country at the elections, and between whom and the King there need be no gulf provided Fuad continued to display political sagacity which has now shown he possessed to an astonishing degree.

/Nahas, who was



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SECRET

Alexandria telegram No. 199 to Foreign Office

2.

Nahas, who was still persona non grata to the King, was prepared to stand down at any rate for the time being. This for Galled is quite a change of tune.

3. Fuad's own ideas as communicated to me by Abbeud in the course of a general conversation, are that the elections will probably take place in the latter part of October but ought to be in any case not later than the first week of November. The Wafd take the view that upon even the broadest interpretation, the constitution requires:

(a) new Parliament to be convened not later than January 8th which is exactly five years (i.e. more than five sessions) from the beginning of the Wafd Parliament; and

(b) that elections shall take place not later than sixty days before the end of the five years period. This would put the latest date for the elections at November 7th. The Wafd will insist on this even to the length if necessary of breaking up the coalition.

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AMENDED DISTRIBUTION (27/9/1949) *J. Ente. 101*

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DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM ALEXANDRIA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

*J7600*

Mr. Chapman Andrews  
No. 207

D. 7.59 a.m. 26th September, 1949.  
24th September, 1949. R. 10.00 a.m. 26th September, 1949.

PRIORITY  
TOP SECRET

*J7508/1015/109*

Following personal for Strang from Chapman Andrews.

Your telegram No. 1581 which was addressed to Cairo in error and has only just reached me.

You will by now have received my telegram No. 198 wherein I gave my opinion brief on what our attitude should be towards the elections.

2. I certainly agree that we should adopt no public attitude though reasons for this would be less strong if our public attitude were simply that we are naturally in favour of free elections. Is not that the litmus test of a healthy democratic system of Government? We certainly could not adopt a public attitude (and it would be very unwise to adopt a private one) concerning the sort of Government we hoped to see emerge from the general election. The Secretary of State has recently been reported in the Egyptian press as having stated in an interview at Washington that he was glad to see the present national Coalition Government in Egypt because the present was the time for unifying efforts in both national and world interests. This caused a little flurry in the Wafdist press though by other sections of the press it was welcomed as an indication that Britain would negotiate revision of the Treaty with a coalition Government. That is the danger of saying anything about any particular form of Government here and that is one of the reasons why I would advise against lending our support, however discreetly and informally, to any proposals for a pre division of seats even one that would give the Wafd as much as 60%. Moreover the Wafd will definitely not agree to any such arrangement. Hassan Youssef hinted to me some weeks ago that the Wafd had in fact already agreed to some such arrangement when they joined the coalition but this was categorically denied by Fuad Serag Eddin to me at the time and has since been denied publicly in the press. The explanation probably is that the Wafd said the future Government of the country must be decided at the elections and that provided these

/were free,.....

SEP 27 1949

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TOP SECRET

Alexandria telegram No. 207 to Foreign Office

2.

were free the Wafd would not in certain circumstances exclude the possibility of there being a coalition. Indeed I have heard, and believe it to be very probable, that even if the Wafd sweep the country as they expect to do, they will invite representatives of other parties and some independents to join the Government in numbers roughly proportionate to their various strengths in the Chamber. The Wafd would I think, do this more as a gesture than in expectation that other parties, particularly the Saadists would cooperate; for it is pretty certain that the Saadists would not do so though I believe they might possibly agree if it came to it, to cooperate in a Treaty delegation.

3. There is no (repeat no) prospect now of the Wafd not participating in the elections though I personally am very doubtful whether the Saadists will (and indeed from their narrow party point of view they might be wise to boycott them) because I think it very unlikely that they will get more than half a dozen seats if it is a really free election in which case their bluff would be called. Whereas if they boycott, their weakness will be undiscovered; this would make them more effective as an opposition and they are hopeful that a change of wind in [gp. undec.] quarter might bring Abdel Hadi back to power again. For they know as do we all that King Farouk is a very astute political manoeuvrer (witness the way he got rid of Nahas in 1944 and has for five years, a record run, kept things going despite several very severe crises in both domestic and foreign affairs and in the teeth of a majority party notably represented in the lower chamber). It is even possible that the King may command Abdel Hadi not (repeat not) to boycott the elections in which case Abdel Hadi who is still obedient to the palace whom he has served to the best of his ability and who may himself be hopeful of another change in fortune provided he retains the King's confidence, will do his best to obey, though he will have difficulty with some of his followers [gp. undec.] who are now openly critical.

4. As for the attitude towards us of whatever Government may emerge from the elections my belief is that the greater the Wafdist majority the easier things will be for us because if this majority is a really substantial one the Government will not be afraid of opposition; for it is axiomatic here that the Wafd does not betray the country's interests and they are skilled in justifying for popular consumption the necessity or expediency of measures which may seem inconsistent with previous policy or declarations. Negotiations for a revision of the treaty involving evacuation, are soon

/going to be a

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Alexandria telegram No. 207 to Foreign Office

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J7352/nol/169

going to be a grave problem anyway, but my own belief is that if we cannot reach some sort of agreement that would satisfy both our strategical requirements and Egyptian strategical aspirations with a Wafd Government we certainly should not be able to do it with any other. Whereas again in my opinion, the Wafd in power would be much better disposed towards a sensible modus vivendi under the existing treaty (of which they were the prime architects) than any other Government could afford to be (witness in this connexion Hussein Sirry's helpless reaction to my treaty [gp. undec.] project - see my letter to Mr. Clutton No. [gp. undec.] 28/9/49 G of September 9th) and as for the point that if the Wafd sweep the country and the King lined up with them we should be faced by overwhelming strength against which we should find it extremely difficult to maintain our essential strategic requirements, I personally would not attach much weight to it because a constitutional struggle lies ahead between the King and the Wafd. The Wafd want to come to power by the proper constitutional method of ballot box and it seems that the King himself really wants to know this time the real strength of the parties in the country. But I feel sure that if the Wafd get a substantial majority they will very soon make it clear to King Farouk they stand for constitutional Government and therefore non-interference by the throne in affairs that are properly within the province of responsible Ministers e.g. nominees for appointments and promotion of officials. Unless King Farouk has acquired more wisdom than I credit him with, he will not like this and there will be trouble. In fact this trouble may in the course of time become so deep rooted and critical as to overshadow the treaty issue though our position would not be weakened. In this connexion it should be observed that the Wafd even when out of power retained much popularity; but the King with all power in his hands is very unpopular.

5. To sum up I favour free elections at the earliest possible moment because I believe they will produce a substantial Wafd majority to work for and find a solution to our common problems based on Egypt's real needs, first of which is security; and while I would not advise saying anything publicly or privately about that, I would advise that we here should exercise such influence as we discreetly can privately, in favour of really free elections on general grounds as a sound political principle.

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DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3159

D. 5.00 p.m. 28th September, 1949

28th September, 1949

Repeated to Alexandria No. 208.

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 3159 of 28th September repeated for information to Alexandria.

Following for Secretary of State from Strang.

We have been considering with Sir Ronald Campbell what attitude we should adopt towards the forthcoming elections in Egypt.

14/10/49

2. The date of these elections is still unfixed but at present it looks as though they are likely to take place some time in October or, at the latest, during the first fortnight of November. It is just possible that they may be postponed until the beginning of next year. This, however, seems unlikely since, apart from other considerations, the Egyptian Prime Minister is reported to be having trouble with some members of his Coalition Government and it does not appear that he will be able to hold it together for more than another few weeks.

3. We are agreed that it would be both undesirable in principle and would defeat our own object in practice if we were to take any public attitude even over the question of the freedom of the elections. This does not, however, necessarily debar Sir Ronald Campbell from exercising discreet and tactful influence on the King and on the leaders of the principal Egyptian parties. He is certain to be approached on the side and will be expected to make some response.

4. The choice for the Egyptians who are responsible for arranging the elections lies between virtually free elections and a prior agreement among the parties about the allocation of seats in the new Parliament.

5. It appears....

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TOP SECRETForeign Office telegram No. 315.9 to U.K. Del. New York

(2)

5. It appears probable that free elections would result in a large Wafd majority and the formation of a purely Wafd Government or, at any rate, a Government in which the Wafd would have the predominant influence. Rigged elections would probably mean that the next Egyptian Government would be a National Coalition very similar to the present Government.

6. Our own interest is first that whatever Government emerges as a result of the elections should be well disposed to us in general, and in particular over the questions of defence, the Sudan and the Nile Waters; secondly, that it should be disposed to tackle energetically the problems of internal reform and social progress in Egypt.

7. From the point of view of our own interests, we must assume that, if a National Coalition is formed, the Egyptians will consider that requisite political conditions exist for negotiations with us, possibly for a new Treaty. This would not, however, necessarily be to our advantage since it is improbable that any such Coalition Government would consent to Treaty negotiations without making evacuation an essential condition. Since we could never agree to this, we might easily find ourselves in the position where all political forces in Egypt were united against us.

8. It is true that if a purely Wafd Government were to be formed as a result of free elections, we might equally well be faced with a demand for Treaty negotiations in which the question of evacuation would have to figure. We have, however, found from past experience that although the Wafd criticise us as much as any other party when out of office, they tend to be more realistic and easy to deal with than other Governments when they are in office. We might, therefore, find that we could obtain our strategic requirements either through a new Treaty or, as would appear a more likely line, through the successful conclusion of the present Military talks more readily with a Wafd Government than with a National Coalition.

9. If the Wafd return as a result of free elections it may have a considerable effect on the position of King Farouk. The latter is at present able to make or unmake Governments as he wishes and is the source of such impulse as lies behind the Egyptian representatives in the present military talks. If a Coalition Government emerged as a result of the elections, the King's position would, in all probability, be much the same as it is at present. If, however, the Wafd were returned with a large majority, the dominating influence of the King

in Egyptian....

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Foreign Office telegram No. 3153 to U.K. Del. New York

(3)

in Egyptian politics, might be impaired. Alternatively there might be a conflict between the King and the Government. There is the further question of his personal relations with Nahas Pasha, the leader of the Wafd. Both the King and the Wafd, however, are behaving with discretion and statesmanship at present and it is possible that they would continue to do so, at any rate for some time, even if the Wafd were returned. The King's influence is, of course, of great importance to us from the point of view of our strategic interests.

10. The foregoing, being perforce in the nature of speculation, is rather inconclusive. But we are inclined to think that the best line for us to take in private is to favour free elections as being free from taint of intervention and at the same time perhaps carrying with it the better prospect of helping on our own policies. We must be particularly careful to avoid laying ourselves open to the accusation either through anything we say or through maintaining an apparently acquiescent silence that we prevented free elections. Such an accusation might be damaging to us afterwards.

11. We, therefore, consider that though it is not desirable that Sir Ronald Campbell should be given specific instructions at present to advocate free elections, he should be given discretion to make use of whatever opportunities he has of using his personal influence in favour of free elections.

12. If you agree, we will so guide Sir Ronald Campbell whose intention it is at present to leave the United Kingdom by boat on the 1st October and be back in Egypt 9 or 10 days later.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

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J 7924

1949

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number J7924/1015/16  
TELEGRAM FROM Mr. Chapman Andrews, CAIRO

No. 1028. Top Secret.

Dated 6.10.49.

Received in Registry 8.10.49.

Record of a conversation between Mr. CHAPMAN ANDREWS and FUAD SERAG EDDIN BASHA on 6 October on the misrepresentation in the Egyptian press of remarks made by King FAROUK on the forthcoming elections and on Wafd attitude towards free elections.

Refers to Cairo telegram No. 1022 of 5 October (J 7924/1015/16).

Last Paper

J7867

References

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(Index)

*[Handwritten signature]*

Next Paper

J8205

(Minutes)

Though I have sidelined passages, this telegram is worth reading in full. The palace parties & the Wafd will doubtless never agree on what King Farouk's exact words were. The two ~~one~~ things which are clear are, first, that the King has incensed the Wafd (& apparently — see "Flag" attached — King Fasha as well), & secondly, whatever his motives may have been in intervening at this particular moment, his intervention has not increased his reputation as a constitutional monarch, or his chance of hitting it off successfully with a future Wafdist govt. R. E. Edmunds

See also J. 7866 & 7867. *[Handwritten initials]*  
I suspect that King Farouk has decided that free elections *[Handwritten signature]*

37021

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are too risky; but we may  
know more after Sir P. Campbell  
has seen him to-day.  
M. Anon  
17/10.

MFL  
14.10

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POLITICAL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Chapman Andrews D. 10.26 a.m. 7th October, 1949.  
 No: 1028 R. 12.37 p.m. 7th October, 1949.  
 6th October, 1949.

PRIORITY

TOP SECRET

71022-7807 4/1

My telegram No. 1002 [sic]: Political situation.

I took a chance opportunity this morning of a long and private talk with Fuad Serag Eddin Pasha. He said that he had been sitting very near the King at the Bairam breakfast in the course of which His Majesty made the short address reported or rather misreported in the press. What the King actually said was that he had prayed that the efforts of those not working for the stability of the Government should not be blessed by the Almighty. Then turning towards Hussein Sirry Pasha, His Majesty then said that he knew that the problem of the geographical division of the constituencies was now under consideration. He did not wish to enter into that for it was essentially a matter for the parties and Parliament. Regarding any suggestion that a number of seats in the new Parliament should be reserved for the parties, His Majesty thought it worthy of study that a small number of places should be assured to the leaders of the Parties. The names said His Majesty of the leaders in question would readily present themselves to the minds of all present. He would leave them with this thought to study. He also hoped that the election campaign would be conducted without bitterness or rancour.

2. Commenting on this Fuad said that this address as delivered did not arouse opposition in the breasts of the Wafdists present. They would be quite prepared to make arrangements whereby places should be reserved in Parliament (either Senate or Chamber of Deputies) for "7 or 8" members of the Saadist and Liberal Parties. They would certainly be prepared to study this in consultation with the other Parties. They did not much like the reference to "Parliament" in the address because it seemed to foreshadow possibility of reassembling the present Parliament, and the Wafd were definitely opposed to this. In fact said Fuad the King had said in his speech from the Throne last November that the session of Parliament then beginning was to be the last of the existing Parliament. That Session had now

/definitely ended and

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Cairo telegram No. 1028 to Foreign Office

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definitely ended and Parliament should therefore be dissolved. He added that the Constituencies Committee had made little progress and he thought would never finally agree because the Saadists and the Liberals were still quite definitely out to be obstructive and cause delays. They did not want agreement except in return for some arrangement for a pre-allocation of seats which the Wafd would not accept except within the very narrow limits stated above.

3. He added that Nahas had been furious on reading the Palace-inspired version of the King's Bairam breakfast speech (which he believed had been cooked up by Hassan Youssef and Hussein Hosny, the King's Private Secretary who is known to be a strong supporter of Ibrahim Abdel Hadi) and had with difficulty been restrained from issuing a belligerent manifesto. That crisis however was now past but from now on the Wafd would set very seriously about making it clear in the Cabinet that a time limit must be set and a short one at that, to the deliberations of the Constituencies Committee and that the date for the elections must be fixed. He thought that as a result of all these manoeuvres the date of elections would now inevitably be somewhat retarded. The Wafd had expected them to take place by the 7th November at the latest and according to even the most generous reading of the constitution this was indeed the latest legal date; but the Wafd were still prepared to be conciliatory rather than precipitate a first-class crisis by walking out of the Government; and always provided elections were to be free, they really did not mind if these took place albeit unconstitutionally a little later. The Wafd would still however contend for elections during the month of November. He did not now see how they could possibly occur sooner. He would be seeing the Prime Minister this evening about all this and would let me know the outcome. For this I thanked him.

4. He emphasised that the Wafd were and would remain adamant on the point of free elections and if it should later appear that Hussein Sirry, who had promised free elections (and who had actually authorised the publication of an assurance to that effect in Al Zamane a few days ago) was not playing straight over this the Wafd would exert every influence to have him replaced by someone who could be counted upon to see fair play. Hussein Sirry had been a great disappointment to the Wafd for he had succumbed to the lust for power and they no longer trusted him not to play tricks even at the last moment in order so to contrive matters as to remain after the elections as the

/head of a fairly



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TOP SECRET

Cairo telegram No. 1028 to Foreign Office

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head of a fairly evenly balanced Coalition Government. Such tricks, he constantly repeated, the Wafd would not stand for. He said they were coming round to the view that it might be better if Bahadin Barakat were called upon to form a Government for the sole purpose of conducting the elections. Another name suggested had been that of Haidar Pasha but the Wafd would not favour him because he would be regarded throughout the country as purely a King's man rather than a genuine Independent. Fuad finally said that in order to correct the false impression throughout the country given by the published report of the King's address he thought he would publish the true version in his own paper on Saturday. He was also thinking seriously of asking the King for a private audience.

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TIMES.

17 OCT 1949

Cutting dated

194

J 8205

*K*  
*Sunder*  
*(Gang)*  
*AG*  
*DK*

**Egypt Before the Elections**

Egyptian political life is now over-shadowed by the coming elections. No date for polling has been fixed so far, mainly because the scheme for redistributing Parliamentary constituencies is still under discussion. There is a strong feeling throughout the country that Egypt needs a national Government in which the Waft as well as the Liberals and Saadists are represented; it is also the traditional policy of the Palace to ensure that no single group monopolises power. KING FAROUK was generally believed to be working for a national Government when in July he dismissed ABDEL HADI PASHA, who headed a Saadist-Liberal coalition with a secure majority in Parliament, and invited HUSSEIN SIRRY PASHA, a non-party man with a distinguished record of public and professional service, to head a new coalition (in which the Waft was represented) in order to ensure that the elections would be conducted in a way that would give all the political groups a share of power.

On the administrative side, HUSSEIN SIRRY PASHA's Cabinet has done well. It stepped into the strong position created by the Saadist-Liberal coalition, which had broken the power of the Muslim Brotherhood and curbed both the intrigues of the Communists and the outburst of popular unrest caused by events in Palestine. It has been able to release many detained persons, to relax the censorship, and to remove the guards and barriers round public buildings and the dwellings of important people. The PRIME MINISTER, who made his reputation as an engineer, has tried to direct public attention to the real needs of the country—building, industrialization, development schemes, and social legislation. He has not been entirely successful, and there is evidence that the domestic needs of Egypt rather than her international relations will provide the principal planks in the rival election platforms. The Waft has already published an elaborate programme of reform based upon national unity and social justice which contains specific pledges of action to remove existing abuses.

HUSSEIN SIRRY PASHA is not finding it easy to hold his coalition together; last week KING FAROUK issued a fresh public appeal to all the parties urging them to rally to the Government. Although the official party responses have been favourable, the tug-of-war persists in the Cabinet, as in the country. Saadists and Liberals, still annoyed at the sudden dismissal of ABDEL HADI PASHA, are accusing HUSSEIN SIRRY PASHA of favouring the Waft, which has gained new prestige since its leaders were included in the present coalition after their long sojourn in the wilderness. The PRIME MINISTER has denied, no doubt with truth, that he is supporting the Waft; but its marked revival may complicate the main problem which now confronts both the Palace and the PRIME MINISTER—how to conduct the elections so that a balanced coalition will be returned without unduly interfering with the choice of the electors. Until the elections take place the strength of the Waft in the country is difficult to gauge; but already the old false rumours are circulating that there can be no settlement with Britain unless a Waft Government rules Egypt. One thing at least is certain; Saadists and Liberals have both built up an effective party machine, and the Waft can no longer rely on a walk-over in the new constituencies. Yet, unless there is some preliminary agreement among the three principal parties to arrange the distribution of seats, it is hard to see a representative coalition emerging from the elections.

13 OCT 1949  
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114 **J** 135  
**AFRICAN DEPARTMENT**  
**EGYPT and SUDAN**  
**J 8289**  
**1949**

Registry Number J8289/1015/16  
 FROM Sir R. Campbell, CAIRO.  
 No. 536. (38/43/49G)  
 Secret.  
 Dated 18.10.49.  
 Received in Registry 20.10.49.

Records conversation with the Egyptian Prime Minister on 12 October on the subject of the present Government, the holding of Egyptian Parliamentary elections and the nature of the Government which might emerge therefrom.

Last Paper  
 J8269

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)  
 J 26/10

(Index)  
 21/10/49

Next Paper  
 J 8492

(minutes)  
 Para 7 is interesting, but hard to believe.\*  
 The reference to treaty negotiations throughout this conversation is ominous, if a coalition govt is in fact formed after the elections.  
 R. M. Edmunds.  
 21/10  
 (\* previous evidence suggests that Sirry wd have no objection to becoming ~~second~~ second Adly Pasha).  
 This suggests that if a coalition emerges after the elections, we may well have a request for treaty negotiations springing on us almost at once. It might be well to prepare an answer in advance.  
 Better wait  
 MTL  
 24.10  
 J. Simon  
 21/10  
 G. Stewart  
 28/10  
 J



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8289

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

18th October, 1949.

No. 556  
(38/43/49G)SECRET.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that at my interview with the Egyptian Prime Minister on October 12th we had some conversation on the subject of the present Government, the holding of Egyptian Parliamentary elections and the nature of the Government which might emerge therefrom.

2. Sirry Pasha told me that the office of Prime Minister at the present time was one which he did not like and had not sought. But he had felt it his duty to yield to King Farouk's desire since he might be able to do some small amount of good. It was very difficult, he said, to maintain harmony and to get the parties to work together. They all hated each other cordially. Fortunately he himself at least had the capacity to forget his troubles at night and still managed to sleep the sleep of the just.

3. As regards the elections, he attached importance to their taking place soon, as he hoped they would. He himself was making no attempt to decide the question of whether under the constitution the life of the Parliament was five years or five sessions. Numerous papers on the subject had been prepared all saying different things, and he was leaving events to decide.

4. The question of the new delimitation of the constituencies was still under discussion between the parties, with whom he considered the decision properly lay. He had his own ideas which he had put forward, and they were based on the definite principle, which he would not abandon, that the constituencies should be arranged to suit the electors and not the candidates. There was of course considerable controversy between the parties in the matter, and now it was up to them. He hoped now they would make a quick decision in accordance with his views, in which case there would be early elections. These events were driving him towards holding the elections some time between the period prescribed if the deciding factor was five sessions and what it would be if the deciding factor were five years. When I asked him what would happen if there was no decision by the time the five year period came to an end, he said that he must hold the elections before that point and that if the parties had reached no decision, then he would resign and ask others to come in.

5. Sirry Pasha added that he was quite determined to make the elections free, or at any rate to do everything in his power to ensure that they were free and that there was no hanky panky of any sort.

/s. As

The Right Honourable  
Ernest Bevin, M.P.,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

6. As for the Government which might emerge from the elections, he personally favoured a coalition. He was convinced that this would be best for Egypt with a view to the solution of her difficult problems, both external (such as the Treaty, the Sudan) and internal. He was sure that for any settlement with us a coalition would be the best thing; otherwise we would have a repetition of 1948 when Sidky Pasha had made a great mistake in not bringing in the Wafd (he had only pretended to try to do so and thus deceived Sirry and the others). Nothing this, and if the Wafd should come back with a great majority, then he was equally convinced that for any negotiations, the negotiating body should include members of all the important parties. But a coalition would be preferable, if only because he attached importance to the negotiators all being actually members of the Government in power. In such a case no one of them could be accused of being a traitor unless the whole Government, and therefore the whole nation, were traitors. I asked His Excellency whether he therefore thought that by the fact of the free elections on which he was determined, the parties would feel purged of their passions, and therefore be able to co-operate better in a coalition than they did at present, according to his own account. He shrugged his shoulders and said that that remained to be seen, but repeated his view that a coalition was preferable.
7. Finally Sirry Pasha said that he had no ambition to be Prime Minister of any such coalition after the elections.

I have the honour to be  
with the highest respect,  
Sir,  
Your most obedient, humble servant,

*Bonald Tompsett*

117	<b>J</b>	142
1949	AFRICAN DEPARTMENT	<b>J 8591</b>
	<b>EGYPT and SUDAN</b>	

Registry Number } J 8591/1015/16.  
 FROM Sir R. Campbell, CAIRO.  
 No. 549. (38/168/49).  
 Dated 24th Oct. '49.  
 Received in Registry 31st Oct. '49.

Comments on a speech by Nahas Pasha at a reception given in his honour by Alexandria lawyers on 18th October.

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Refers to Cairo telegram No. 1022, (J 7867/1015/16).  
 Encloses extract from "Le Progres Egyptien" of 19th Oct.  
 Copied to Bagdad, Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Jeddah, Jerusalem, and B.M.E.O.

**Last Paper**  
 J. 8542.

**References**

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)  
 6/2/49

(Index)  
 9/11/49

**Next Paper**  
 J. 8593

(Minutes)

As regards the elections, although Nahas in the course of his speech made his position abundantly clear, he took great care to refer diplomatically to King Farouk's much-disputed Bairam pronouncement. This diplomacy is in marked contrast to the furious reaction which has been reliably reported from other sources.

The explanation of the remarks referred to at the end of the third paragraph of this despatch is of course that the Egyptian Delegation which signed the Montreux Convention was led by Nahas Pasha himself.

*R.H.B. Edwards*  
 2nd November 1949.

Eastern Department H.3.xi.  
 (To see passage referred to in paragraph 4)

*J. J. [unclear]*  
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*[unclear]*  
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/LMB

J 8591

BRITISH EMBASSY, J

CAIRO.

24th October, 1949.

No. 549  
(38/168/49)

Sir,

With reference to Mr. Chapman-Andrews' telegram No. 1022 of 5th October, regarding the Egyptian political situation, I have the honour to transmit herewith an extract from "Le Progrès Egyptien" of 19th October reporting a speech by Nahas Pasha at a reception given in his honour by Alexandria lawyers on October 18th.

2. Nahas Pasha's declaration shows that he has not moved from the position which he and his party have maintained in recent months with regard to the main issues of the Egyptian political situation. He re-affirms his insistence on the strict application of the Constitution particularly in regard to the freedom of the forthcoming general elections, and recalls that it was on that basis that the Wafd entered the present coalition Government. He deplores time lost in interminable discussions about the delimitation and possible allocation of electoral constituencies, a delay which, he says, damages the hope that a new Parliament would meet in November in accordance with the Constitution. He renews the demand of the Wafd for the abolition of martial law and, reverting to the question of an arranged distribution of constituencies, denounces this as absurd and unconstitutional. Nahas Pasha interprets King Farouk's Bairam declaration to the Cabinet Ministers, (see my telegram No. 1021), as meaning that King Farouk would wish to see the coalition maintained.

3. In a reference to the abolition of the Mixed Courts, Nahas Pasha offers foreigners the assurance that Egyptian justice makes no distinction between Egyptians and foreigners. At the same time he deplores the absence of any specific mention of the Egyptian delegation which signed the Montreux Convention in the course of the ceremony which took place in Cairo on October 15th in celebration of the end of the transition period envisaged in that Convention.

4. On the subject of Arab Affairs, Nahas Pasha alludes regretfully to the fissures in the Arab League and the personal differences between its members, adding a sympathetic word for the Palestine Arab refugees. His allusion to the project for a form of union between Syria and Iraq shrewdly avoids a categorical pronouncement either for or against such a project but includes an anodyne warning against entering upon anything which might be a cause of difficulties.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch, without enclosures, to His Majesty's Representatives at Baghdad, Beirut, Amman, Damascus, Jedda and Jerusalem and to British Middle East Office.

I have the honour to be,  
With the highest respect,  
Sir,  
Your most obedient, humble Servant,

The Right Honourable  
Ernest Bevin, M.P.,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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87916

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"Le Progrès Egyptien" - 19th October, 1949.

## Dans un important discours politique S. E. NAHAS PACHA DEMANDE L'ABOLITION DE LA LOI MARTIALE



### La distribution des circonscriptions électorales est incompatible avec l'esprit de la Constitution

S. E. MOUSTAPHA EL NAHAS pacha, président du Wafd, a prononcé hier après-midi, à Alexandrie, un important discours politique à l'occasion d'une réception qui avait été donnée en son honneur par les membres du Barreau de la seconde capitale.

Passant en revue la situation politique générale, l'ancien président du Conseil a souligné le fait que les autorités affrontent de nombreuses difficultés dans leurs efforts en vue de clarifier l'atmosphère actuelle; il a toutefois exprimé l'espoir de voir S. E. Hussein Sirry pacha, Premier ministre, réussir dans la tâche qu'a daigné lui confier Sa Majesté le Roi.

"Notre politique nous demande de ne pas faire montre de faiblesse dans l'application de la Constitution" a souligné ici S. E. Nahas pacha en se référant à la coalition gouvernementale. "La Nation doit être consultée librement et sans condition aucune; c'est à la lumière de cette consultation que les affaires publiques devront être laissées entre les mains de ceux qui auront réussi à obtenir la confiance du pays.

#### Réponse à l'appel royal

"Les circonstances critiques actuelles et les malheurs qui ont frappé le pays ont obligé le Wafd à répondre au désir de Sa Majesté le Roi; le Wafd a donc accepté de se joindre au Cabinet de Coalition nationale dans l'intérêt supérieur du pays.

"Nous avons accepté la coalition sans exprimer un désir quelconque ou dicter des conditions; toutefois, nous avons rappelé les articles de la Constitution. Nous avons accepté de faire de grands sacrifices et de nous plier aux exigences du moment."

(LIRE LA SUITE EN PAGE 6)

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(SUITE DE LA PAGE 1)

**Tout au ralenti**

S.E. Nahas pacha a poursuivi en rappelant que le Wafd a trouvé une solution à chaque problème et une réponse à chaque objection; "...nous avons accepté une coalition saine et n'avons pas créé de crises ou de difficultés quelconques.

"Nous avons consenti tous ces sacrifices avec la certitude que les choses suivraient leur cours normal dans l'esprit de la Constitution, mais nous nous sommes plus tard aperçus que tout allait au ralenti et avec hésitation. Des mois ont passé et le peuple n'a d'autre sujet de conversation que celui de la délimitation ou de la distribution des circonscriptions électorales.

**Du temps perdu**

"Voilà une perte de temps inutile. Nous avions espéré voir prendre des mesures afin que le nouveau Parlement puisse se réunir en temps opportun, c'est-à-dire avant le troisième samedi de novembre conformément à la Constitution, mais rien de tout cela n'a été fait..."

"Nous ne voyons pas le fruit de nos sacrifices et cela a porté certaines personnes à nous accuser d'avoir modifié nos principes!" dit encore le président du Wafd.

**La loi martiale**

Poursuivant son discours, Nahas pacha a rappelé que le Wafd avait été accusé par certains d'avoir demandé l'abolition de la loi martiale alors qu'il

était hors du pouvoir et qu'il avait changé de politique aussitôt après son entrée dans le Cabinet de Coalition.

"Je voudrais que ces gens-là comprennent que le Wafd n'a pas deux politiques: l'une qu'il prône hors du pouvoir et l'autre qu'il applique alors qu'il se trouve dans le gouvernement. Le Wafd n'a qu'une seule politique et elle n'a pas changé.

"Les Wafdistes demandent l'abolition de la loi martiale mais on nous a dit que certaines mesures de sécurité doivent être prises avant la mise en vigueur d'une pareille mesure."

**Les circonscriptions électorales**

Se référant à la coalition, Moustapha el Nahas pacha a dit que cette forme de gouvernement n'a pas fait dévier le Wafd de sa politique tenace d'appui total à la Constitution. "C'est pourquoi la distribution des circonscriptions électorales est une chose absurde; elle n'est pas acceptable dans le parlementarisme et ne jouit point de l'appui de la Constitution.

"Pareille distribution signifie l'imposition des députés aux électeurs; si l'on veut une pareille solution, il n'est donc plus nécessaire de s'embarquer dans des frais ou de prendre des dispositions en vue de la campagne électorale."

**La déclaration royale**

Quant à la déclaration faite par Sa Majesté le Roi à l'occasion de la fête de Baïram, Moustapha el Nahas pacha a souligné qu'elle signifie que l'Auguste Souverain désire voir la Coalition se maintenir.

"Mais la question de la distribution des circonscriptions intéresse seulement les partis; c'est pour cela que le peuple devrait cesser d'en parler."

**Les Tribunaux Mixtes**

Le Président du Wafd s'est ensuite référé à la fin des Juridictions Mixtes et a souligné: "Les étrangers peuvent être assurés que leurs procès seront entre les mains sûres d'un peuple honnête. La Justice égyptienne ne fait aucune distinction entre Egyptiens et Etrangers".

**La Ligue Arabe**

"Quant à la Ligue Arabe, a poursuivi S.E. Nahas pacha, il est pénible de parler des fissures qui se sont produites dans cet édifice et des divergences qui prévalent dans son sein.

"Nous avons lutté pour la création de cette Ligue et il est donc nécessaire que ses membres mettent de côté leurs divergences personnelles. Il nous suffit de dire et de relever l'injustice et l'oppression en ce qui concerne la Palestine et d'ajouter combien ses habitants, maintenant sansabri, ont souffert."

**Le projet syro-irakien**

Le Président du Wafd a ensuite parlé du projet d'union syro-irakien. "Les observateurs politiques croient voir dans ce projet le signe d'une nouvelle que-

relle. Les Arabes doivent comprendre que, maintenant ou jamais, leur solidarité et leur unité sont nécessaires. Ils doivent comprendre qu'ils doivent se tenir à l'écart de tout ce qui peut être une cause de difficultés..."

**La délégation de Montreux**

Avant de terminer, S.E. Nahas pacha a parlé avec émotion des activités des membres de la délégation égyptienne qui a conclu la Convention de Montreux. Il a regretté de voir qu'aucune mention n'avait été faite à leur sujet au cours de la cérémonie officielle au Théâtre Royal de l'Opéra, samedi dernier.

Citant des noms, il a rappelé ceux du regretté Ahmed Maher pacha, de Wagyl Ghalil pacha et de Makram Ebeid pacha.

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/IMB.

No. 554  
(206/50/49)

RESTRICTED.

J 8593

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

25th October, 1949.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to Chancery letter to African Department No. 206/19/49 of the 25th May, about the impending trial of ex-members of the Ikhwan el Muslimeen on combined charges of complicity in the murder of Nokraahi Pasha and of plotting against the safety of the State.

2. The Acte d'Accusation recited the names of twenty-four defendants, the original intention of the Procurator General having been to try all together on either or on both of the charges. As stated, however, in paragraph 5 of Chancery letter under reference further revelations concerning the terrorist plots came to light as the result of the interrogation of Mohamed Yusef Malek and, in view of the delay which would ensue whilst these were being investigated, it was decided by the Parquet to separate the two charges, and first of all to complete proceedings against fifteen of the defendants who were accused of complicity in Nokraahi Pasha's murder.

3. The pleadings before the High Military Tribunal, were concluded on the 26th September, and on the 13th October the President of the Tribunal pronounced judgment.

4. Abdel Meguid Ahmed Hassan, at whose hands Nokraahi Pasha met his death, was sentenced to death by hanging. In sentencing Mohamed Yusef Malek to penal servitude for life, the President of the Tribunal described him as the chief instigator of the assassination plot, and as responsible for making all the preparatory arrangements. Also sentenced to penal servitude for life were Atef Attia Halim, Shafik Ibrahim Anas, and Mahmoud Kamel el Sayed.

5. Seven of the defendants, although acquitted for lack of evidence, are still held in custody pending their trial on the second charge of complicity in plotting against the safety of the State, and the remaining three, also acquitted, have been placed in an internment camp at the request of the Political police.

6. The trial seems to have been conducted in a reasonably straightforward manner without the interposition of extraneous political bombast such as was at times a feature of the trial following the murder of the late Amin Osman Pasha.

7. It is reported from various sources that Hussein Sirri Pasha has received a number of letters threatening him with death in the event of the execution of the death sentence passed on Abdel Meguid Ahmed Hassan.

The Right honourable  
Ernest Bevin, M.P.  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

I have the honour to be,  
With the highest respect,  
Sir,  
Your most obedient, humble Servant.  
*Ronald James Bell*