

f0371/62989

COPY.

112

WE AND THE ENGLISH.

But when we accuse the pusillanimity and defeatism of Nokrashy Pasha, we must not forget that the origin of the trouble lies with the British; the British who are the enemies of Egypt so long as they pursue their policy of occupation and imperialism as well as that aimed to the separation of Egypt from the Sudan.

It is time they should understand that no one in Egypt any longer believes what some of their statesmen declare from time to time, namely, the desire for friendship with Egypt.

How can friendship exist between ourselves and Great Britain side by side with the occupation of any region or town of our country, whether it be large or small, near or remote, (from the capital). How is it possible to hope for an understanding when they insist on the maintenance of the 1936 Treaty, of which Treaty our country is unanimously desirous of being rid?

What benefit can be derived from a Treaty to which one of the contracting parties holds fast whilst the other party holds equally fast to its well founded right to be free from the bonds imposed by the said Treaty? And how can we believe the pretence of friendship while the British still pursue a policy inimical towards Egypt in the Sudan? They are very far wrong if they think we can be duped by friendly and conciliating words, when these are belied by facts and realities.

I have made it abundantly clear in my speech delivered on this same occasion last year that our policy is to conduct our affairs within the framework of the UNO and according to its Charter, on a basis of complete equality in sovereignty between ourselves and all members of the UNO, including G.B. This policy we have decided upon, we believe to be the sole policy that can guarantee for us the enjoyment of our national rights and that can enable us to fulfil our international responsibilities and to take our share in maintaining world peace and security. Egypt, proud of her democracy and resolved to guard it as well as to repel any attack upon her by whomsoever it may be, is unshakeable in its intention to adhere strictly to this wise and honourable policy which is the outcome of the post-war evolution of the world.

EGYPT AND THE ARAB LEAGUE.

The aims exposed above are the same we had in view when contributing to the foundation of the Arab League and laying down the policy defined in the protocol of Alexandria. The policy exposed in the Alexandria Protocol is based on the independence of all Arab States and their close cooperation in a manner which would make the League an effective regional instrument for the preservation of the peace of the world as far as the Middle-East is concerned.

F0 371/62989

59464

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COPY/JMK.

Le Caire, le 19 Novembre, 1947.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Faisant suite aux documents que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser récemment, je me permets de vous adresser aujourd'hui la traduction du discours qu'au nom du Wafd j'ai adressé au peuple égyptien à l'occasion de l'anniversaire du 13 Novembre 1918, date qui marqua notre réveil national.

Votre Excellence pourra ainsi suivre l'évolution logique du point de vue politique du peuple de la Vallée du Nil. Je vous serais reconnaissant de vouloir bien en faire parvenir une copie à votre Gouvernement.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Le Président du Wafd,

(Sgd) M.F. NAHAS.

Bon Excellence  
 Sir Ronald Ian Campbell,  
 G.C.M.G., C.B.,  
 Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique,  
 LE CAIRE.

SECRET.

AA/GEN/16

BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE

10 SHARIA TOLUBAT,

CAIRO.

14th November 1947

Dear Andrew,

Gueffri Boutros Ghali asked to come and see me yesterday morning. As you know he is now, and has been for some time, a Wafdist and appears to be very close to Nahas.

He brought me the attached paper which is a translation made by him of the draft of a portion of the speech which Nahas was to deliver last night at the Saadist Club. The fragment as written is hardly cordial towards us but Gueffri says that as Nahas originally drafted it it was a good deal worse. The points to which the former attached importance and which he persuaded Nahas to accept are the phrase, in the third line "so long as they pursue their policy . . ."; the words "our country" (watan) in the third paragraph instead of "Wadi"; the implication contained in the words "of which Treaty our country is unanimously desirous of being rid" and "well founded right to be free from the bonds imposed by the said treaty", that the treaty is valid and cannot be denounced; the phrase in the last line but one "an effective regional instrument" which is intended to visualise the possibility of dealing with defence problems on a regional basis.

Gueffri told me that Nahas understood these implications. He could not be absolutely sure that Nahas would deliver the speech in this form but was pretty confident that he would.

He asked particularly that it should not be known that he had shown me an advance copy in this way.

Yours ever,

(Sgd.) CLAYTON.

E.A. Chapman-Andrews Esq., O.B.E.,  
British Embassy,  
Cairo.

6. The constitution should not be a mere string of words. It should be the realisation of two inseparable principles, the guarantee of liberties and the sovereignty of the people as the source of all power. Where is the guarantee of the freedoms of the people to-day? Where is the freedom of public meeting, the freedom of the press, the freedom of private life, and where is the authority of the people when the general elections have been falsified and when the Wafd is excluded from political life? The present régime fears nothing more than free elections. It could not live in an atmosphere of freedom and honest consultation. The truth is plain. It is time that the nation knew whether or not there is a constitution. If there is one, the way would be clear to hold free elections. If not, the nation must strive as it always has done to safeguard its authority and protect its sovereignty.

7. After describing the inefficiency of the administration in dealing with internal affairs, crime, social grievances, and economic crisis, Nahas indicts the Government for the alleged inadequacy of the measures taken to fight the recent cholera epidemic, and blames them for failing to prevent the spread of the disease. To improve the present unsatisfactory situation, it is absolutely necessary to hold free elections which will allow the true representatives of the people of whatever party to direct the national policy towards solving all these internal problems. It would not then be necessary even to consider suspending the present constitution as has been mooted in certain quarters.

8. The present régime has done much damage both to the Egyptian cause which demands total evacuation and the unity of the Nile Valley. Nokrashi's policy towards the imperialistic designs of the British has now entered its most disquietening phase. He began in his weakness by preparing badly for the negotiations. When they opened he did not even mention the unity of Egypt and the Sudan, and he even admitted the British theory of the right of consultation for the Sudanese. Later it was clear to him that this consultation was contrary to the realisation of the unity of the two parts of the Valley. He had finally approved the Sidky-Bevin plan conferring on the Sudan the right to choose their future status, even if that status should destroy the unity of the Valley. Nokrashi's final and worse move was when he asked what argument he could use before the Security Council to support the unity of Egypt and the Sudan. Nothing could have shown more clearly his complete lack of faith in the cause of this unity. That is why when pleading the Egyptian case before the Security Council he intentionally omitted to speak openly of this unity, contenting himself with demanding the end of dual administration in the Sudan.

9. Speaking of Anglo-Egyptian relations, Nahas points out that in attacking the weakness of Nokrashi, it must never be forgotten that the root of the evil is the British who are enemies of Egypt as long as they continue their imperialistic policy of military occupation and of separation of the Sudan. It is time that they knew that no one in Egypt would be taken in by the declarations of their statesmen who desire friendship with Egypt. How can friendship exist under military occupation or by adhering to a Treaty of which the whole country wanted to be rid? How can they desire friendship when they continue their encroachment on the Sudan? It has already been explained in an earlier speech that Egyptian external politics will be

- 3 -

within the framework of the United Nations Organisation on the basis of complete equality with all members, including Great Britain. This is the only policy which would guarantee Egypt's rights and allow Egypt to assume her international responsibilities and to help in safeguarding world peace. With this same object in view Egypt founded the Arab League on the principle of the independence of all Arab countries with whose close co-operation in improving their conditions and resisting aggression the League will become an effective regional instrument to preserve peace in the Middle East.

10. After a brief summary of the Wafds' policy for internal reforms and the expansion of the Army, Nahas ends his speech with yet another clarion call to action.

11. In connection with this speech of Nahas Pasha's a copy of a letter from Brigadier Clayton to His Majesty's Minister is also forwarded herewith with a copy of its enclosure. It has been verified from the Arabic text that Nahas did deliver the portion of the speech "We and the English" (page 18 of the French text) as predicted by Gueffri Boutros Ghali except for a slight variation of the third paragraph (paragraph 3 in the French text) where he appears to have said in the Arabic "What is the use of a Treaty to which one party holds fast, while the other party holds fast to a right and insists, with perseverance and determination, on being free from its bonds".

12. I have sent Nahas Pasha a simple acknowledgement of his letter.

I have the honour to be  
With the highest respect,  
Sir,  
Your most obedient humble Servant,

*Ronald Campbell*

J. 9  
BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

27th November 1947

V 5965

RESTRICTED.

/GBA

NO. 952.  
(240/843/47)

Sir,

With reference to Chancery's letter of 15th/1947 October to the Egyptian Department, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a letter dated 19th November from Nahas Pasha to myself, together with a copy of a French translation, enclosed therein, of the speech which he delivered at the Saadist Club on 13th November on the occasion of National Struggle Day.

2. In this speech Nahas begins by asking how far Egypt has got towards reaching the glorious objectives for which she has sacrificed so much - the immediate evacuation of Egypt and the Sudan, the complete independence of Egypt and the Sudan, the realisation of a true constitutional régime, and the prosperity, well-being and progress to which Egypt aspires.

3. The speech goes on to describe the failure of Sidky Pasha and Nokrashi Pasha in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations, and the failure of the Egyptian case before the Security Council, and attacks Nokrashi Pasha's alleged policy of ignoring the British pointing out that to ignore military occupation, the adherence to the 1936 Treaty by the British and the attempts of the British to separate the Sudan from Egypt, is not to ignore the British themselves but to give way to them.

4. The British have deprived Egypt of the post of Grand Kadi in the Sudan, and have taken power into their own hands without paying any attention to the delicate religious considerations which are attached to this important appointment. They have prevented the Egyptian Cultural Mission from entering the Sudan, and worse, they have prevented the departure of the Egyptian Director of Education for the Sudan, and have ordered an Egyptian teacher to leave the Sudan under threat of imprisonment, refusing to reverse their decision even when he had given an undertaking on the instructions of the Minister of Education and with the approval of the Prime Minister, not to engage in politics. They have refused to recognise any organisation working for the unity of the Nile Valley, while giving free rein to their own creatures the Separatists, who were working openly for imperialism. Finally, taking a decisive step, they have announced that they would follow what they called a policy of Sudanisation which would be the final blow to the unity of the Valley.

5. Nokrashi has shown nothing but weakness, and has even associated himself with the policy of Sudanisation, in other words, of separation by proposing to the British Government and the Governor-General of the Sudan the formation of a commission composed of Egyptians, British and Sudanese, to expand the programme of Sudanisation drawn up by the British. Thus he has pleased the British in spite of their recent dissatisfaction with him.

The Right Honourable  
Ernest Bevin, M.P.,  
FOREIGN OFFICE,  
LONDON S.W.1.

P391/62989

EGYPT and SUDAN

DEC 1947

Registry Number } J596E/12/16

FROM Sir R. Campbell  
CAIRO

952  
No. (240/843/47)

Dated Nov 27, 1947

Received in Registry | Dec 5, 1947

Communication by Nahas Pasha, President of Ward.

Refers to Cairo letter of October 11  
(J596E/12/16)

Encloses copy of a letter from Nahas Pasha of November 19 together with a copy of a French translation of the speech which he delivered at the Saadist Club on November 15th on the occasion of National Struggle day.

Last Paper.

J5901G

References.

gypt vol. (cover only)  
(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)  
Nahas has turned his back and  
can not now leave his present position among  
the most rabid anti-British.

*F.D. is aware*  
It is disquieting  
that Nahas should apparently  
regard it as the course likely  
to pay the biggest dividend, to  
devote so much of his speech  
to Anglo-Egyptian relations, &  
so little to "La Constitution" &  
"Le Quotien Interieur" pp 8-10  
? Print cover  
for volume.

*W. Fisher*  
9/11  
*D. S. ...*  
9/12.

otion pleted.) (Index)  
2416/2

Next Paper.

J5981G

More evidence, if any were needed, of the  
fact that our chances of negotiating a treaty  
with

f0371/62989

with the Wafd would be even more remote than our chances of negotiating one with Nokrashi, and that we must look around for other means of solving the problem.

Nahas is of course completely disingenuous in the charges he levels against Nokrashi of trying to please us by agreeing to submission, and of omitting to speak openly of the "unity of the Nile Valley" at Lake Nasser. The first charge is only superficially true — Nahas cannot fail to realize the Egyptian part's tactics. The second is a particularly silly lie.

Mustafa Brothers Ghali's little manoeuvres made no appreciable difference to the result.

A useful document to have on the table when we are next approached by some plausible emissary of the Wafd.

G. Hamilton  
Dec 10/5

It is a mistake to oversimplify this. Egyptian politics being what they are, the party or parties out of power always try and outbid those in power. This is the fundamental objection to negotiating a treaty except with a Government of all parties, and in particular when the largest party, namely the Wafd, is out of power. Once we agreed to negotiate with another party while the Wafd was out of power it was inevitable that the Wafd and Nahas should start making statements of this kind. Hussein Sirry Pasha, who is anti-Wafd, said at the time that if a treaty were signed under these conditions which included the cession to Egypt of the Isle of Wight the Wafd would be obliged to ask for the whole of Hampshire.

The inevitable corollary of the above is that Egyptian parties when they come into power pay as little attention as they can to what they said when out of power. While they must, of course, pay some attention to their past words they have a unique facility for forgetting about them. The Egyptians say about themselves "The Egyptian is afraid. He is never ashamed". Were the Egyptians not possessed of this fortunate facility the conduct of any public business in Egypt would be impossible.

While/



Minutes.

90

While therefore it is regrettable that the Wafd should make statements of this kind, it is a mistake to conclude from them that they would necessarily be more difficult or even as difficult to negotiate with, as other parties, who themselves when out of power have made equally wild declarations.

We must not entirely forget the past performance of the Wafd who held Egypt firm for us during the worst days of the war, against the inclination of the King. I certainly do not believe that Nahas is fundamentally anti-British. On the contrary, he is at heart a much better friend of ours than Nokrashi.

The principle conclusions to be drawn are firstly that the longer the Wafd remain in the wilderness the wilder are their statements likely to become; and secondly that the fundamental principle that a treaty ought to be negotiated with representatives of all parties remains as valid as ever.

MR Wright

I agree

12th December, 1947.

AP  
Dec 16

- Mr Llewellyn
- Mr Scott P. O.S.S.
- Mr Pinder G.L.M.S.
- Mr Howes

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Reference:-

Fo 371/62989

59464

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442 1944	E. & S.	J 6390 / G. 2 DEC 1944 / M
	EGYPTIAN	

J 6390 / 12 / C14

Cairo  
2373

Dated 24  
Rec'd 27 Dec 1944

Egyptian attitude towards  
U.S.

Last Paper.

J 6340

References.

J 6346 / 12 / 16

J 6362 / 2 / 16

in Dept. of State  
(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

The main papers about the withdrawal of the British Military Mission are at present under separate submission.

There seems little doubt but that the last sentence of this telegram represents the truth.

Please see also minutes on J 6386.

J. L. Deane  
Dec. 29 1944

N. American Dept.  
S. L. Dept.

Milchright

30.12.

See 30

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

J/G

[This telegram is of particular Secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTF

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Sir R. Campbell. D. 9.18 p.m. 24th December, 1947.  
No. 2573.

24th December, 1947. R. 9.42 p.m. 24th December, 1947.

Repeated to: Washington.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2575 of 24th December, repeated to Washington.

SECRET  
LIGHT

JG386 / 12 / 16

My telegram No. 178 saying.

6362 / 2 / 6

In conversation on December 17th with member of Embassy staff Hassan Youssef, [sp. undec. reverting] to question I had asked him in connection with departure of Military Mission (see paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 2567) and after satisfying himself on the exact purport of my question gratuitously launched into a description of present Egyptian attitude towards the Americans. Quite apart from "Palestine blunder" which had of course in itself greatly lowered the prestige of America in Egyptian eyes, Egyptians were more and more chary about drawing the Americans into their dealings because they were unreliable and appeared nearly always to be motivated by their worship of the dollar. Realising the necessity as a small nation of attaching themselves to one of the Great Powers, the Egyptians were increasingly feeling "better the Devil you know". Hassan Bey did not therefore wish us to run away with the idea that the Egyptian Government had made up their minds to bring in the Americans in the matter of expert advice for Egyptian army and of a future Treaty. They were very far from that decision and he himself had only been at pains to point to the possibility of their being driven to it by the hardening of Egyptian public opinion against us in the event of our being obstinate over the question of evacuation. (Member of staff could not escape the feeling here that during the last few weeks the Palace had been rather throwing American participation in our face in the hope that dislike of the idea would induce us to moderate our eventual Treaty terms but that now, surprised to find that we were not reacting vigorously and at once against the idea of American participation in the defence of this area, they had felt doubts and were wanting to go back on what they had said).

Foreign Office please pass to Washington as my telegram No. 67.

[Repeated to Washington]

1947

10371/62989

1947

Registry Number J5600/13/10

FROM Sir R. Campbell, CAIRO.

No. 935. (340/349/47)

Dated 17th Dec. 1947.

Received in Registry 24th Dec. 1947

Nuri El-Sayed Pasha's views on Anglo-Egyptian Settlement.

In conversation on 17th December with the Ambassador and Mr. Clayton, Nuri Pasha described the suggestions he had put forward at Lake Success for the settlement of the Egyptian question, stated that he would continue to urge the Egyptians to settle direct with Great Britain, and would press on for an inter-Arab security pact; he also expressed his views on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the evacuation of British troops and the order in which inter-Arab pacts and bilateral treaties between B.M.G. and Arab States should be concluded.

Last Paper.

J 6345

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

9) Bagdad. No. 2 Jan. 5

(Action completed.)

10/24/47

(Index.)

11/3/47

Next Paper.

J 6388

(Minutes.)

Malvernland 24/12/47

Nuri is always full of ideas, but they are not always very practical. It has been explained to him why he must not press the idea of internationalising the Suez Canal Zone (to which any way the Egyp. Gov. not agree). He is over-optimistic about being able to leave the Sudan aside (end of para. 2). And I do not think that the other ideas which he rather lightly throws out are really calculated to help matters much.

Copy Bagdad.

depts. 24/12/47

GL McDermott D.S. Station 24/12

30471 F.O.D. I agree. He is no doubt inspired by

good motives, but in practice he has put two very dangerous ideas to the Egyptians, against one of which he was specially warned here (inter-nationalisation of the Suez Canal and an Anglo-Egyptian treaty on Anglo-Turkish lines).

2. An "inter-Arab security Pact" on "very general lines" would be of no use to us - at any rate so far as Egypt is concerned - if the bilateral agreement with Egypt were, as Nuri suggests, on vague general lines too. He has in fact aligned himself with the Egyptians, who are always telling us that if <sup>only</sup> we will ~~only~~ let go our treaty hold first we shall be able later to get a beautiful treaty with them.

*(The London Dec. 24th)*

Nuri is trying to be helpful.

Some good may yet come of his intervention.

MILSWIGHT

29.12.

*Secy*

165

17th December, 1947

J 6366

No. 985

(240/849/47)

SECRET

Sir,

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me on December 13th that Nuri El-Sayed Pasha was arriving in Cairo that evening, that he believed he had some large plan for the Middle East and that he had seen you and brought with him your views for a comprehensive settlement of British relations with the countries of the Middle East. I said that I knew nothing of this, to which His Excellency replied that it was treated in an ample way in messages to the Arabic newspapers from their London correspondents. He added that he hoped it would prove correct.

2. Having already arranged for Nuri Pasha and Mr. Clayton to call on me this morning, I told His Excellency of Khashaba Pasha's remarks as of possible interest to him. Nuri said that at Lake Success he had, first to Mokrasbi and later to Heykal Pasha, suggested the advantage of a direct settlement between Egypt and Great Britain of their mutual relations. He had found them not averse to this; he thought that their views had been broadened by their visit to New York where they had found that Egypt was part of a larger community and the Egyptian problem part of a larger problem. He had suggested, as a method of dealing with the Egyptian question, either the internationalisation of the Suez Canal Zone, or the conclusion of an inter-Arab Pact for mutual defence into which bilateral treaties between Great Britain and the individual Arab States could be fitted. Both Mokrasbi and Heykal had preferred the second suggestion and he found that this was also Mr. Bevin's preference. One of its advantages in Nuri's view was that it enabled the Sudan question to be treated separately, since it was quite foreign <sup>and</sup> irrelevant for a system of Anglo-Arab mutual defence Treaties.

3. Nuri Pasha went on to say that he would continue to urge the Egyptians to settle directly with us, and I understood him also to say that he intended to press on with his idea of an inter-Arab Security Pact. This, he said, would be of a very general kind, the bilateral treaties between Great Britain and the Arab States being less general. As for the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty he thought (and had so told the Egyptians), that it should be on the lines of the Anglo-France-Turkish Treaty of mutual assistance. I explained why this would not fill the bill in our view, that we must agree with the Egyptians on some provision which would make our assistance immediately effective. Nuri advised against going into too much detail or prolonging any resumed

/negotiations.

The Right Honourable  
Ernest Bevin, M.P.,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

637/62 989

negotiations. He suggested that while we might give the alliance a duration of 20 years, we should agree that any provisions entailing military details should be made subject to review - say every 5 years. Thus some rather general provisions of this kind in the original document could be made more specific and probably be made more extensive for the second 5-year period after past history, present excitement and suspicions had had time to die down. His Excellency also suggested that if we decided to withdraw our troops from Egypt, our rights under the treaty with Transjordan, and that which seemed about to be concluded with Iraq; would probably provide us with the facilities we required.

4. At one moment Nuri Pasha, if I heard him aright, said he wished to get the inter-Arab Pact agreed to before the conclusion of a new Anglo-Iraqi treaty or any other bilateral treaties between Great Britain and Arab States. This, I understand, is not the order in which His Majesty's Government would prefer to proceed.

5. Nuri asked during our conversation whether there had been any thought on our side of a tripartite Anglo-Egyptian-American Treaty. Mr. Clayton and I asked whether he thought this would make a settlement between us and Egypt easier. His Excellency seemed dubious, and it was not clear why he had raised the point.

I have the honour to be,  
With the highest respect,  
Sir,  
Your most obedient, humble servant,

*Ronald Campbell*

E. & S.

60371/62989

616256 / G  
135

6256/12/9/16

Relations with Egypt

F.O. Min

used

received 17 Dec

Last Paper

6194

(Minutes)

See within.

References

SL dept. 29/12  
G.M. Dermott. 18/12.

D.S. 5/12

19/12

Min

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Min 6194/11/19  
15 Dec

45) Gen Hollis  
11 Dec

now by O. Carpan

3rd. Jan

see now 63124/9  
-1948

(Action completed)

(Index)

58/11

Next Paper



371/62989

186

J. ...  
The ...  
London ...

Egypt

Fly B

Fly A

Attached are copies of Sir R. Campbell's telegrams nos. 2247 of December 2nd, 163 Saving of November 20th, and Sir R. Campbell's letter to Sir O. Sargent of November 17th.

2. It is recommended that Sir R. Campbell should be instructed, as he suggests in paragraph 9 of his telegram no. 2247, to keep the ball in play by responding to any further advances from the Egyptian side, for example from the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, by listening to whatever the Egyptians may have to say and showing that he is anxious to learn their mind. He might say that he is to come back to London soon after Christmas to talk matters over, and might make some play with this. But he should not commit himself or H.M.G. at this stage.

3. Unfortunately the new Minister for Foreign Affairs does not have a good record. He was one of the seven deputies who voted against the 1936 treaty, and later came under the influence of Ali Maher. Nonetheless it would be better for Sir R. Campbell to be in touch with a responsible member of the Government than merely with the King behind the back of his Government.

4. Meanwhile I submit for consideration the following reflections and suggestions, which might be put to Sir R. Campbell for his views.

5. On our side there are four main problems for negotiations with Egypt:

- (a) our peacetime requirements for the maintenance of physical installations and the guarding of stores which involve leaving in Egypt about a thousand men, almost all of whom would be in civilian clothes;
- (b) facilities for re-entry in an apprehended emergency;
- (c) the Sudan;
- (d) the desirability of any revised treaty being signed by representatives of all Egyptian parties.

6. Sir R. Campbell considers (see paragraph 4 of his telegram no. 2247) that we are unlikely to get anything better on (b) than Article 3 of the Sicky Protocol and that the Egyptians would prefer something even less. This would not meet our requirements.

Fly D  
The ...  
from ...

6./

(the Sudan)

6. As regards (c) our present view is that we cannot now go as far as we were prepared to do at the time of the Sidky negotiations. We are therefore faced with a dead-lock.

7. As regards (d) Sir R. Campbell, in his letter to Sir O. Sargent of the 17th November, expressed the view that prospects of a government of National Union remain extremely remote.

8. On points (b), (c) and (d) the prospects of agreement are therefore gloomy.

9. Unless, therefore, Sir R. Campbell's further talks show any prospects of advance on these points, it occurs to me to wonder whether there would be advantage to us in considering the following new line of approach.

10. We might at the appropriate moment say to the Egyptians that both we and they desire an agreement which will place our relations on a new footing, but that the obstacles to the conclusion of a new treaty acceptable to both sides appear to be difficult to surmount at the moment. We are therefore prepared to go beyond the reduction of our forces to the Treaty level and to offer to Egypt to withdraw all formed units from Egypt altogether by a date x, provided the Egyptian Government will agree on their side to maintain physical installations in a state of readiness and to guard our stores, allowing us to keep about a thousand men (all, or almost ~~of~~ all of whom, would be in civilian clothes) for these purposes only. In paragraph 1 of his telegram no. 2247 Sir R. Campbell states that the programme of withdrawal and final date are the crucial factors in the eyes of the Egyptians. The Chiefs of Staff in their latest paper agreed that stores should be guarded by the Egyptians provided we leave behind the thousand men. We should therefore have to press them to agree on this basis to earlier evacuation than they have so far been prepared to accept. If we could get the date fixed sufficiently early we should have offered to meet the main Egyptian preoccupation.

11. By making this offer, even if the Egyptians refused to accept it, we should have largely cut from under the feet of our critics, whether at U.N.O. or elsewhere, the main burden of whose accusation, centres round continued British occupation of Egypt. *(the ground)*

12. We might make our offer in the form of an undertaking not to avail ourselves (short of an apprehended international emergency) of the facilities accorded to us under the 1936 Treaty for the maintenance of troops in Egypt. For the rest the Treaty would remain in force until 1956 (in particular Article 7 providing for re-entry). This would mean that the Egyptian Government and H.M.G. would have to agree not to continue negotiations for the revision of the Treaty which we and they decided on in 1946 in virtue of the last sentence of Article 16. This would *further* mean that for the life of the Treaty i.e. at least until 1956 (and perhaps longer in virtue of Article 16), we should retain the right of re-entry which we need.

Flug E

as a Flug

13. At the same time we might make it clear that it is our <sup>intention</sup> ~~hope~~ that our treaty arrangements with <sup>the</sup> Egypt <sup>should eventually</sup> fall into the framework of common defence arrangements for the Middle East as a whole. (which is to be done in due course to be made)

14. If we could reach an agreement with Egypt on the above lines we should keep our present re-entry facilities, and avoid the dilemma about negotiating a new treaty with a Government other than a Government of National Union. The question of the Sudan would remain for separate treatment. We should therefore avoid the greater part of the difficulties now facing us over points (b), (c) + (d) in para 5 above.

MR Wright

6.12.

I have discussed this with Mr Wright and the above represents our joint views.

B. Sargent  
Deeb

The Sof S discussed this on December 9th. He asked for a brief for the Prime Minister, which I attach.

MR Wright

11.12.

B. Sargent  
Deeb

EGYPT.

I. The problem.

We have been considering afresh how best to break the deadlock in our relations with Egypt. A few weeks ago certain very tentative approaches by King Farouk and his entourage to our Ambassador, and by the Egyptian Ambassador to myself, seemed to indicate the possibility of resuming negotiations for a general settlement. The King, whose position is none too secure, would certainly like to see the deadlock broken and negotiations resumed; but from Sir R. Campbell's most recent telegrams it is clear that no adequate basis for resumption exists. The Egyptians are still demanding as much as ever, and this is a great deal more than we could profitably concede. They want, that is, an impossibly early date for the complete evacuation of our troops from Egypt; and they also want us to acknowledge explicitly King Farouk's status as Sovereign of the Sudan and to open the higher grades of the Sudan Administration to Egyptians. These, in Sir R. Campbell's opinion, are likely to be their minimum terms.

2. We therefore must, for the present at any rate, give up hope of reaching a general settlement and try instead to tackle our immediate problems from another angle. Our position so far has been that we stand on the 1936 Treaty, under which we have the right (but not the obligation) to keep troops in the Canal Zone. But in practice it would almost certainly be impossible to keep troops there indefinitely against the Egyptian people's will. There are many ways in which the Egyptian Government could make the position of our forces extremely difficult, e.g. by withholding labour and supplies.

/Moreover

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Moreover, we were under strong pressure from many quarters, during the hearing of the Egyptian Appeal at Lake Success, to withdraw our troops from Egypt as a gesture which would be compatible with our stand on the Treaty.

3. In any negotiations with Egypt for a general settlement there are four main problems:-

- (a) Our peace-time requirements for the maintenance of Egypt in a state of readiness to serve as an essential strategic base for Middle Eastern defence, i.e. the maintenance of the necessary physical installations and the guarding of our stores. This would involve leaving in Egypt about 1,000 men, all, or almost all, of whom, could be in civilian clothes;
- (b) Facilities for re-entry in an apprehended emergency;
- (c) The Sudan;
- (d) The desirability of any revised treaty being signed by representatives of all Egyptian parties.

4. Sir R. Campbell considers that we are unlikely to get anything better on (b) than Article 3 of the Sidky protocol, which provided for an Anglo-Egyptian Joint Defence Board, and that the Egyptians would probably press for something even less specific. This would not meet our requirements.

5. As regards (c) (the Sudan) my personal view is that we cannot now go as far as we were prepared to do at the time of the Sidky negotiations, since the text which we were then prepared to adopt has been exploited and misinterpreted. Moreover, to admit Egyptians to the higher grades of the Administration would certainly retard, and probably wreck, our programme of "Sudanisation" and self government. We are therefore faced with a deadlock.

its reply

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6. As regards (d), Sir R. Campbell considers that the prospects of a government of National Union remain extremely remote.

7. On points (b), (c) and (d) above, therefore, the prospects of agreement are slight; and even as regards (a) the Egyptian insistence on a very early date for the completion of evacuation is likely to prove a complicating factor.

II. Recommendations.

8. I should like therefore to try the following new line of approach. At the appropriate moment we would say to the Egyptians that although we and they desire an agreement which would place our relations on a new footing, the obstacles to the conclusion of a new treaty acceptable to both sides seem difficult to surmount at the moment. We are therefore prepared to go beyond the reduction of our forces to the Treaty level, and to offer the withdrawal of all formed units from Egypt altogether by a date X, provided that the Egyptian Government will agree on their side to cooperate in the maintenance of physical installations in a state of readiness and to guard our stores, allowing us to keep about 1,000 men (all, or almost all, of whom would be in civilian clothes) for these purposes only. As I have indicated above, the tempo of withdrawal and the final date by which it will be completed are the crucial factors in the eyes of the Egyptians. The Chiefs of Staff, in their latest paper, agreed that the stores could be guarded by Egyptians provided we leave behind the 1,000 men. We should therefore have to press the Chiefs of Staff to agree on this basis to earlier evacuation than they have so far been prepared to accept. Their calculations, ever since the Sidky Protocol was /rejected,

rejected, have been based on the need for withdrawing a vast accumulation of stores and for retaining troops to perform this work. If arrangements can be made for leaving the stores in Egypt, it should be possible to evacuate the men much faster, though the difficulty created by the shortage of shipping will remain. If we could get the date fixed sufficiently early, we should have offered to meet the main Egyptian preoccupation.

9. By making this offer, even if the Egyptians refused to accept it, we should have largely cut the ground from under the feet of our critics, whether at U.N.O. or elsewhere, the main burden of whose accusation centres round continued British occupation of Egypt.

10. We might make our offer in the form of an undertaking not to avail ourselves (short of an apprehended international emergency) of the facilities accorded to us under the 1936 Treaty for the maintenance of troops in Egypt. For the rest the Treaty would remain in force until 1956 (in particular Article 7 providing for re-entry). This would mean that the Egyptian Government and H.M.G. would have to agree not to continue negotiations for the revision of the Treaty which we and they decided on in 1946 in virtue of the last sentence of Article 16 (which provides that with the consent of both parties negotiations for revision may be entered into any time after the expiration of a period of ten years from the date on which the Treaty comes into force). This would further mean that for the life of the Treaty, i.e. at least until 1956 (and perhaps longer in virtue of Article 16), we should retain the right of re-entry which we need.

11. At the same time we might make it clear that it is our intention that our treaty arrangements with Egypt should eventually fall into the framework of those common defence

/arrangements

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(44)

arrangements which we hope will in due course be made for the Middle East as a whole.

12. If we could reach an agreement with Egypt on the above lines we should keep our present re-entry facilities, and avoid the dilemma about negotiating a new treaty with a government other than a government of National Union. The question of the Sudan would remain for separate treatment. We should therefore avoid the greater part of the difficulties now facing us over points (b), (c) and (d) in para 3. above.



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1947

Registry Number | J6345/12/16

FROM  
Conversation  
Egyptian Ambassador.  
No.

Dated 22nd Dec. 1947.

Received in Registry | 23rd Dec. 1947

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

Records conversation with the Egyptian Ambassador on the 22nd December. Mr. Bevin stated that he was keeping the question of the treaty in mind, and would discuss it and the financial negotiation held with Iliffe in the New Year. Amar Pasha said that his government was thinking of negotiating on the basis that if British troops were now withdrawn from Egypt, they might later invite H.M.G. to maintain troops there in peace and war. Amar Pasha was disturbed that the C.I.G.S. had not visited Cairo.

Last Paper.

J 6340 G

References.

(Print.)

N.C.D.

(How disposed of.)

Dft. Cairo 866.

Dec. 22

(cc) Cairo. 2300.

Rep. Khartoum. 331.

Dec. 23rd

(Minutes.)

SL / depts.  
E R / 31

see out tel.

*Handwritten signature*  
24/12

OLM'Dermott 24/12.

DSS.  
24/12.

(Action completed.)

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Secretary of State.

MEMO (II)

I understand that you intend to see the Egyptian Ambassador on Monday.

We have, as you know, proposed a new method of breaking the Egyptian deadlock, and the Prime Minister has approved the proposal with certain reservations. (Please see the separate paper attached, "Egypt (I)".) But it has yet to be discussed in detail with the Chiefs of Staff, and Sir R. Campbell. The latter, (to whom we have not yet propounded it), has been asked to keep the Egyptians in play by noncommittally listening to anything that they may have to say and intimating that he hopes to return to London shortly for consultations. It would, therefore, of course, be premature to give Amr Pasha any hint of the nature of the scheme which we have in mind, and you no doubt intend merely to keep him too in play. I suggest that you might emphasise to him the increasing need, in view of recent Palestine developments, for reaching a <sup>general</sup> ~~general~~ understanding with the Arab world on mutual defence problems, and tell him in general terms that you are recalling our Ambassador in Cairo in order to discuss with him the whole complex of Anglo-Egyptian relations in the light of his recent talks with King Farouk and others. It would be useful if you could, in addition, lay stress on the necessity for tackling our problems separately. We may, indeed, find it expedient to embark before long on some form of discussions with the Egyptians about the Sudan Government's scheme of constitutional reform -- this question is being further explored with Sir R. Campbell and Sir R. Howard <sup>and it would be better to say nothing about it yet to Amr.</sup> But, whether we do so or not, we must try to maintain the position that such discussions, being on a subject entirely different from that of evacuation from Egypt, should not be linked in any way

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with the latter.

(You will remember writing a few days ago to Mr Issha to condole with him on the death of his Minister, Said Ben, who was a good friend of this country. He knows that the Ambassador is extremely cut up about this, and I have no doubt that he would greatly appreciate an additional and personal word of sympathy).

*S. G. Baryentz*  
*Dec 20*

*N. D.*

Registry } 6388  
Number } J6388/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM  
Sir R. Campbell  
No. CAIRO.  
173 Saving.

Dated }  
Received } 24.12.47.  
in Registry } 27.12.47.

Hassan Youssef's comments on the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement

Refers to Cairo despatch no 985 (J6388/12/16). Gives gist of a conversation with Hassan Youssef at which he expressed his views on the best way of obtaining an Anglo-Egyptian settlement.

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Last Paper.

J6388

References.

J6220/1/8

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

(Please see Sir O. Sargent's minuted copy within).

Para. 1: Hassan Youssef, who is merely a Palace go-between, has of late been extraordinarily prolific in ideas for breaking the deadlock. These ideas may or may not have King Farouk's approval. In so far as they do, they are of course worth considering carefully. But for the most part they are obvious non-starters from our point of view; and it should by no means be assumed that they would be acceptable to Egyptian official opinion as a whole.

2. As regards this particular idea of a tripartite treaty, there has evidently been a leakage at the Cairo end, for the journalists here have got wind of it and are connecting it with the news of Sir R. Campbell's impending return to London. I have asked the News Dep<sup>t</sup> to say, if questioned, that so far as we are aware no proposal for a tripartite treaty has been mooted. We do not want the Americans to think that we have been discussing it, or are about to discuss it, behind their backs, and nothing in the Washington conversations suggests that they have evolved far enough to be ready to consider a tripartite treaty. Moreover the Secretary of State

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(Action completed.)

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Next Paper.

J6390 G

State has recently re-emphasized, in connexion with a matter of far less importance, his wish to keep the Americans well in the background in order to avoid giving the Soviet authorities any pretext for going back on their official attitude of non-interference with our Egyptian role.

3. In any case it is open to doubt, pace Hassan Yusef, whether in the present state of exacerbation resulting from the U.S. Government's Palestine policy a tripartite treaty would be any more acceptable to the Egyptian public than a bilateral one. In other recent papers Hassan Yusef himself is reported as having animadverted against the Americans, their dollar diplomacy, etc. (cf. J 6390/G).

Para. 2:

4. Hassan Yusef's suggestions regarding the timing of our announcement about evacuation are difficult to follow and seem to me highly suspect. Once we sit down to a table with Egyptian negotiators and start discussing with them the terms of evacuation, it will be quite unnecessary to assure them that we do in fact intend to evacuate provided that the Egyptians will cooperate over alternative arrangements for guarding our stores etc. But we cannot, at that moment, announce the intention publicly unless we couple the proviso with it; nor can we; at that moment, give "genuine signs of execution", even if that were desirable in advance of Egyptian acceptance of the proviso, since we are still far above the level allowed by the treaty for troops in the Canal Zone and are even now reducing the number at the best pace (a slow one, unfortunately) which the physical circumstances allow. There would of course

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course be no objection at all to our "making public our vaccination promise" after a new treaty giving us the facilities which we require had been agreed and signed. But Hassan Yusef can hardly imagine that we would object to that. Consequently it is pretty clear that the idea at the back of his mind is to induce us to furnish, before any new agreement is negotiated, an assurance which, though not intended for publication, would be publicly exploited on the Egyptian side as proof that we had at least given way and agreed to quit unconditionally. It may in the end prove expedient to let the Egyptians get away with a "solution" on these lines in order to save their faces. Meanwhile, however, Hassan Yusef's ostensible compromise is not really a compromise at all. It constitutes no advance on the well-worn Egyptian theme that we must first commit ourselves to unconditional vaccination and only thereafter negotiate the conditions of our going.

5. Hassan Yusef's further suggestion (end of para. 2) regarding the doubling-up of Egyptian and British troops in the Canal Zone has already been dealt with provisionally in other papers. At first sight it appears most unpromising.

6. On the subject of the Sudan, the line

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Minutes.

line taken here by Hassan Youssef is not at all encouraging, except in so far as he seems to think that a final agreement on the Sudan issue could be held over till after the conclusion of an agreement on evacuation from Egypt. He "murmured something about the Common Crown of Egypt"; and he talked of giving the Egyptians "a few more appointments in the Administration". On the first of these two points it has been decided that we cannot play at all; on the second, it is clear that we cannot play to any appreciable extent without letting the Sudanese and ourselves down by spoiling the Administration and retarding Sudanisation. It is but slight consolation that "all these remarks of his distinctly implied the continuation of the Condominium"; for it has all along been obvious that the Egyptians, while disliking the Condominium Agreements, can see no way of putting an end to them in practice after their failure at New York.

7. We asked Sir R. Campbell to keep the Egyptians in play; pending his return to London, by listening non-committally to anything which they might have to say. Consequently he is not, of course, to be blamed for his apparently non-argumentative rôle in

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in this and other recent conversations. It seems obvious, however, that the Egyptians, while continuing to show general willingness to resume negotiations, have not really budged from any of those positions which in the past were regarded as a bar to resumption.

We shall have to discuss all this with Sir R. Campbell on his return.

N. Am. <sup>Dept</sup> 3/12  
S. L. Dept. <sup>1/2</sup>  
News Dept. <sup>1/2</sup>

Langley  
Dec. 29<sup>th</sup>

See 1100/100/16  
Discusses with Sir R. Campbell on arrival. The Egyptians are at least multiplying feelings

Mitchell

30.12

It is all to be good if the Egyptians are more in a hurry for a settlement than we. I have always hoped that if it is played a baiting game to Egyptians' patience & nerve which we did - first at before we did -

See 30

Mitchell

31.12

Mr Langley



FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir. R. Campbell  
 No. 178 Saving  
 24th December, 1947.

H. 26th December, 1947.

SECRET

In a conversation on December 13th Hassan Youssef said that his recent suggestion to Mr. Chapman-Andrews for a tripartite agreement with the Americans (see in this connexion also paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 985) had not been made because he necessarily believed that such was intrinsically desirable. Mr. Chapman-Andrews had himself observed in discussing the possible opening moves of any future armed conflict in the Middle East that the British role would probably be to hold the pass until the Americans arrived; and it was this observation which led Hassan Youssef to the spontaneous thought that if the Americans were in any case to be actively engaged in the defence of this area they might as well be concerned in any defensive preparations. Another advantage of a tripartite treaty including the Americans was that it would be easier for the Egyptian Government to negotiate vis à vis of their public opinion than an agreement with the British alone. Such a treaty might also pave the way to defensive agreements with other Arab States in the building up of a defensive system for the Middle East as a whole. The incorporation of this idea (i.e. a Middle East defence system) in the main treaty of alliance (whether bipartite or tripartite) by a statement that it was intended as a contribution to a Middle East security system and as such was open to accession by other Middle East States would render such a treaty more palatable to the Egyptian public, and still more so if the new treaty were given some new title such as "democratic front" or a Treaty or Entente Cordiale of Democratic Defence, to show a complete break with the past.

2. Hassan Youssef remained as convinced as ever that the crux of the Egyptian Government's difficulties was the psychological factor. In view of past history the Egyptian public were ever suspicious of bilateral commitments with the British which for them meant the perpetuation of subordination to the British yoke. In his view there was a single key to the removal of this complex and that was a spontaneous declaration by the British of an early date by which the evacuation of British troops from the Canal would be completed. If that were once made and followed by genuine signs of execution (it need not be made publicly at the outset but it could take the form of an assurance of intention made to the Egyptian negotiators) Hassan Bey was sure that thereafter the British could win the willing agreement of any Egyptian Government to the peace-time requirements which they seemed to want. The terms of the Treaty (including provisions for our "facilities") having been agreed ("and signed", added Hassan Bey), our evacuation promise would first be made in public and the publication of the treaty stating what was

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 \* being searched for; it up to a communication with Nari.

to take the place of the provisions of the 1936 Treaty - troops, Articles 7 and 8 etc. - would follow after an agreed suitable interval of time. Thus the filling of the vacuum would have been in effect negotiated concurrently with our agreement to evacuate by a certain date; only the announcement of our spontaneous decision to evacuate (on whatever grounds we liked to base it) would precede that of the new treaty (already concluded). In this way Hassan Bey saw no difficulty about agreement of the Egyptian people being secured for the maintenance of installations at the Canal and for their supervision by British experts in civilian clothing. Earlier in the conversation he had suggested the progressive substitution of Egyptian troops for British departing ones so that Egyptian troops could at once begin working and training with and under the British on the sites for which they would eventually be responsible.


3. If the differences which at present lay between us on the defence aspect of the treaty could be worked out along these lines, Hassan Bey considered that special negotiations on the question of the Sudan would be unnecessary. In his view discussions between us on that subject had already begun with the recent exchange of Notes about Sudanese constitutional reform and it might only be necessary to state that discussions on the Sudan were proceeding (see my telegram No. 2328). Hassan Bey murmured here something about a reference to the Common Crown of Egypt. In dealing with the Sudan issue, he believed that the psychological factor again was predominant. All the Egyptian people wanted was the restoration of their rights under the 1899 Agreement. They were sensitive about the continued denial of those rights which made them feel an inferior partner in the administration and wounded their national pride. The British at no cost to themselves could greatly ease the situation by reducing the needless day to day friction over petty incidents. Every time an Egyptian official was sent to the Sudan he was branded as anti-British by the Sudan Government instead of being treated on the basis of equality with British officials. Hassan Bey felt that if we were spontaneously to give the Egyptians a few more appointments in the administration and treat the Egyptians generally on a more equal footing, the atmosphere would greatly improve, and Egyptian amour propre would be satisfied. All these remarks of his distinctly implied the continuation of the condominium.

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E. S.

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33901/12/9/16  
FO Minute  
Mr. M. Wright  
November 20th.  
Reed. Dec. 1st.

Egyptian Treaty.

Last Paper  
20712

(Minutes)  
D.H.H. Richards  
10/xii  
D.H.H.

References

(Print)

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Action completed (Index)  
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The following are the views of the Chiefs of Staff.

I attach copies of Cairo telegrams nos. 159 saving, 2179 and 2191, Foreign Office telegram no. 2093 to Cairo and Washington telegram no. 5965 about Egypt.

2. New Factors

We are now reviewing the whole position in the light of the new factors which have emerged. The most important of these new factors are the prospects of American support coupled with the importance the Americans attach to the right of re-entry in addition to minimum facilities in peacetime, a fresh examination by the Chiefs of Staff of our minimum requirements in peacetime and of the possibility of using Sinai, and the overtures from the King of Egypt over the head of and presumably without the knowledge of his government.

3. Minimum requirements in peacetime and possible use of Sinai.

~~The paper from the Chiefs of Staff has not yet been received but the following are the general conclusions provisionally reached by the Planners.~~ The Services do not require the retention in Egypt in peacetime of any units in uniform, or of any men in uniform except possibly about 150 R. A. F. personnel for a transit airfield. The use in peacetime of any airfields in Egypt is not essential (although desirable) with the exception of one airfield for transit use which might be in Sinai. But in wartime there is no practical alternative to the use of Egypt because neither ports, railway facilities, roads, oil pipelines or labour are available in Cyrenaica, Sinai or Transjordan. In order to make sure that these facilities are available for rapid use in the event of war or threat of war, it is necessary to provide for their maintenance by Egyptians in a sufficient state of readiness and for certain construction and operational stores to be kept in Egypt and guarded by Egyptians with the assistance of some British personnel. The minimum total of such personnel from the three Services combined would be about a thousand, all of whom could wear civilian clothes with the possible exception of the 150 R. A. F. personnel for the transit airfield. If this field were in Egypt proper and not in Sinai, in other words was guarded by Egyptians, even these 150 men might be in civilian clothes. ~~Pending the receipt of the Chiefs of Staff's paper this paragraph is provisional.~~

4. Sinai

Since the requirements of the Services are now so low and are confined to the maintenance of physical installations which cannot be elsewhere than in Egypt, the lease of the whole or a part of Sinai would not be necessary unless the Egyptians prefer the transit airfield to be in Sinai rather than in Egypt. In that case it would have to be in the north of Sinai and

probably/

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probably at Rafa on the Palestine border. Anything else in Sinai would be in addition to and not in substitution for the maintenance of minimum physical installations in Egypt.

5. Minimum requirements for a Treaty.

The above clarifies and simplifies the position about our minimum requirements in peacetime. But there remain three other major difficulties, namely the right of re-entry, the Sudan, and the awkward but inescapable fact that if a treaty is not to be disowned it ought to bear the signature of all the principle parties, including the Wafd.

The questions of the right of re-entry and of the Sudan are under fresh study by the department concerned. But it looks as though on neither point can we now regard the Sidky proposals as any longer meeting our requirements.

6. Prospects for renewed negotiations.

It is difficult to see our way clearly at least until decisions have been taken on the Washington talks and we know more definitely what are the prospects of American support over Egypt and Cyrenaica; until the Assembly has reached a decision on Palestine; and until we know the result of the Iraqi negotiations. Meanwhile the 1936 Treaty remains in force with such bargaining advantages as that carries with it. If we were to embark now on renewed negotiations we should be hard pressed at once over evacuation and it would be more difficult to pursue the almost inevitable staging through Egypt of some of the troops to be withdrawn from Palestine. Finally the King of Egypt is acting in an irregular and perhaps even unconstitutional manner in suggesting what are virtually negotiations with us over the head of and perhaps behind the back of his government and we may get ourselves into an awkward position with the Egyptian Parliament and Parties if we go far down this road. All these considerations point to the desirability of feeling our way cautiously. By repeating our general willingness to resume negotiations but waiting for an actual approach from the Egyptian side we have already elicited feelers, although not of the most desirable kind. On balance it looks as though we may improve our position still more by continuing to take the same line. In undertaking to resume negotiations we have always had in mind open negotiations with the government of Egypt whichever it may be and not secret negotiations with the King acting independently.

*for us during such negotiations*

7. Overall Defence Arrangements in the Middle East.

There is the further consideration that our desire is for common defence arrangements with all the Middle East countries, and that we want an arrangement with Egypt which will fit into this pattern. Here again the pattern may well become clearer as the weeks go by and in particular as the Palestine situation develops and the revision of the Iraqi Treaty takes shape.

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8. Conclusions.

For these reasons it would be difficult and perhaps dangerous to make any definite and precise reply at this moment to the overture from the King, and a non-committal attitude seems to be wiser. We might however consider whether anything would be gained by following up the King's suggestion that Sir R. Campbell might come back to London for further discussion following the talks he has already had with the King. This might serve to keep the ball in play, and it would be desirable to discuss the various new developments with Sir R. Campbell personally. On the other hand it is doubtful whether the Secretary of State could see him until the Council of Foreign Ministers is over. Both on this ground and because the position about the Washington talks, Iraq and Palestine may be clearer by then, a visit soon after Christmas might be more fruitful. We might perhaps put the point to Sir R. Campbell and ask for his views.

I submit a possible draft telegram to Sir R. Campbell covering the above briefly and answering some of the questions he has put to us.

Mitchell

20th November, 1947.

Sir O. Sargent.

I have discussed all these Cairo telegrams with Mr. Wright and have agreed with him the minute and draft telegram as now submitted. A visit by Sir R. Campbell to London after the Conference of Foreign Ministers would, I think, be very useful.

O. Sargent

21st November, 1947.

Tel. approved by the S.ys.

v. 20/11?

PD.

24/11.

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The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of *Mr. C.H. Johnston, F.O.*

TOP SECRET

*60371/62989*

Copy No. *59*

*W.I.F.*  
The C.O.S. have made two minor alterations in J.P. (47) 146 (copy attached), as shown in marked passages in *60371/62989* and in *60371/62989* of the Annex, but the substance of the paper is unchanged. (This will be sent to *Mr. Johnston*.)

*Mr. Macleod*  
*Mr. Lavelle*  
*Mr. Burrows*  
*Mr. Knight*

*as officially with a covering letter from C.O.S. Secretariat*  
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

EGYPT - MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

Report by the Chiefs of Staff.

We have re-examined our peace time Military requirements in Egypt. Our examination takes into account a letter from the Foreign Office and the apparent improvement in our prospects of arriving at some satisfactory agreement with Egypt and has, as its object, the provision of an up-to-date brief for the Foreign Secretary for use in the event of the recent negotiations being re-opened. It also takes account of the recent discussions held, with the Americans, on this subject.

2. The Foreign Office have asked us to base our examination on the following assumption :-

- (a) A completely fresh start will be made in the negotiations; i.e. neither the 1936 Treaty nor the Rabin-Sidky draft will be taken as the basis for discussion.
- (b) There will be no chance of getting agreement with the Egyptians to the stationing of operational units, or even a nucleus regional Middle East Headquarters, in Egypt in peace.
- (c) We have no peace time facilities in Palestine but do have control of Cyrenaica.

The Foreign Office also request that every effort should be made to reduce the demands that are made upon Egypt in peace time, but they recognise that the right of full re-entry into the country when we consider it necessary is an essential requirement.

*60371/62989* O.O.S. (47) 236 (0)

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BACKGROUND

Previous Views of the Chiefs of Staff.

3. In August 1947 we restated<sup>d</sup> our minimum military requirements in Egypt in peace. These may be termed our basic requirements. They take no account of the Bevin-Sidky negotiations or the state of the dispute between the two countries, and may be summarised as follows:-

- (a) Maintenance of a nucleus organisation capable of rapid expansion into an operational and administrative base for war.
- (b) Right of re-entry on imminent threat of war.
- (c) Development and maintenance of airfields throughout Egypt and of an air defence organisation. S.A.F. assistance to the Egyptians will be required.
- (d) Adequate development and maintenance of naval facilities in Egyptian ports.
- (e) Maintenance of our imperial communications including transit rights.
- (f) Maintenance of a Middle East regional headquarters.

The maximum troops we would wish to maintain in Egypt in peace to cover the above requirements would be approximately 10,000.

Joint Anglo-U.S. Views.

4. During the recent discussions with the Americans on the subject of British Military requirements in Egypt, the United States Service representatives emphasised the view that the maintenance of our position in the Middle East is essential to the security of the United States and to world Peace.

5. For use in the discussions a joint paper was drawn up by the American and British Service Representatives. This paper endorsed all our basic requirements, with the exception of the right to maintain either operational forces or a regional headquarters in Egypt in peace. The State Department on the official level were sympathetic with these joint views and agreed with the general principle that His Majesty's Government should retain minimum strategic facilities in the canal area in peace, with the right of re-entry in war.

^ C.O.S. 915/16/8/7



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POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING OUR REQUIREMENTS IN THE  
POPULATED AREAS OF EGYPT.

6. The Foreign Office have suggested that, to improve our chances of obtaining a treaty which will meet our basic requirements, we might develop and use facilities in other less populated parts of Egypt, such as Sinai, or alternatively they had thought it might be possible to establish some bases in adjacent countries, such as Transjordan, and thus obviate our demands in the Canal area and Nile Delta.

7. In the past our peacetime requirements in Egypt have always been assessed on the basic assumption that we would remain in Palestine. Now that we are leaving Palestine our ability to return to Palestine quickly in an emergency assumes major importance and the strategic value of surrounding areas, such as Transjordan and Sinai, has therefore increased. These areas, however, could not, even with vast expenditure which could only be justified on military grounds and certainly not on economic grounds, be developed into a satisfactory main base, and, therefore, this examination is confined to an assessment of the extent to which to reduce our requirements in the more populated areas of Egypt in peace.

8. The difficulty in the way of this proposal is the absolute indispensability of Egypt as a base for a major war in the Middle East. There is no other area in the Middle East with the same industrial potential, port facilities, communications, airfields, administrative installations or ready availability of labour.

It is essential, therefore, that we obtain the right of re-entry into Egypt and also that we ensure that these facilities are adequately maintained in peace. This latter requirement means that we must keep some British technicians in Egypt in peace, since in our view, the Egyptians will not be able to maintain the facilities on their own.

It follows, therefore, that no facilities can be developed anywhere else in the Middle East, which could be accepted as complete substitutes for those in Egypt. Facilities elsewhere might however reduce our demands on Egypt in peacetime if they contributed to a rapid re-entry on threat of war, or if they fulfilled some of our normal peacetime requirements like air transit rights. No facilities in Sinai or Transjordan could alter the need for the establishment of the East African store holding area.

One further relevant consideration in examining the development of facilities in other foreign territories in Middle East is the insecurity of our tenure. It is, therefore, under present political and financial conditions, far better to develop facilities in British territories or in areas of which we have a reasonably secure tenure.

It is against this background that we examine below the possibility of using Sinai and Transjordan.

9. We recently approved<sup>x</sup> a paper<sup>z</sup> examining the possibility of increasing the speed of our withdrawal from Egypt by moving British troops, administrative installations and stores from the west to the east bank of the Suez Canal. This report which is, in fact, applicable to the whole of Sinai, pointed out the following:-

- (a) Accommodation. At present the only administrative installations in the Sinai Peninsula are the Ordnance Depot at Rafa on the Palestine frontier, and a few minor installations along the main Egypt-Palestine road. The only available accommodation is in a few skeleton camp sites on the east bank of the Canal. It would not, therefore, be possible to locate any appreciable accommodation in Sinai without first undertaking a large constructional programme.
- (b) Water Supply. The question of water resources in Sinai has been considered previously in detail<sup>z</sup>. Apart from wells on the coast and near the Palestine Frontier, and three pipelines supplying camps on the east of the Canal from the Sweetwater Canal, there are no appreciable water supplies available. Extensive water works would be required before troops could be stationed in Sinai.
- (c) Communications. There are no ports in Sinai capable of handling stores or troops in any quantity; the land communications within the Sinai Peninsula are also inadequate. It would be necessary therefore to continue to use Egyptian ports to the full and to develop land communications in Sinai.
- (d) Labour. There is no skilled labour and very little unskilled labour to meet the requirements for construction of accommodation and operation of installations and communications.

To use Sinai even as a temporary location for troops and stores would therefore be a very considerable undertaking involving great expense of money, time and labour. Moreover, it could only be undertaken at the expense of other projects, such as the construction of the store holding area in East Africa, upon which the speed of our actual withdrawal from Egypt very largely depends and the construction of accommodation in Cyprus and Cyrenaica on which the redeployment consequent on the withdrawal from Palestine depends.

10. The administrative and financial implications set out above also apply to the development of a strategic bomber base in Sinai. On the assumption that airfields and installations for the strategic bomber force would be developed and maintained in the Canal area in peace, our plan is to use Cyrenaica in war until the base in Egypt was ready for use. There would, therefore, be little advantage in undertaking an extensive airfield development project in Sinai.

x 140th Meeting, Item 3.  
 z C.O.S. (47) 229 (C)  
 J.I.B. 3/7 September, 1946.

Fe 37/62989  
11. On the credit side:-

- (a) It would be possible to construct and use airfields in Sinai for air staging in peacetime thus moving the area in which we require air transit rights further from Egyptian eyes. The administrative difficulties of development in Sinai, referred to in paragraph 9, and the cost of establishing air staging posts would, however, be considerable.
- (b) The establishment of radar coverage and a skeleton air defence organisation including one or two fighter strips in Sinai would enable us to reduce to some extent R.A.F. requirements in the Nile Delta and Canal area in peace.
- (c) The extra storage depot would not have to be constructed and could be used to store some of the equipment from Palestine. This would reduce the amount of stores that would otherwise be sent through the Canal area.

If these facilities are to be of value to us we would require transit rights in Sinai.

#### Transjordan and Aqaba.

12. As in the case of Sinai, Transjordan could never replace Egypt as the main administrative base in peace or war. Aqaba is the only place in which a port might be developed and it consists at present of a few wharves constructed during the war. Communications to the interior would for technical reasons be very difficult and costly to develop. Even with all the resources available during the war, it was not considered that Aqaba could be more than a minor subsidiary port and could never be developed as a substitute for the canal route.

This would prevent the deployment of large strategic bomber forces in Transjordan. The use of Transjordan would not therefore significantly reduce our requirements to supervise the development and maintenance of air facilities in Egypt.

#### Sinai and Transjordan in conjunction.

13. We have pointed out above that we do not consider that either Sinai or Transjordan could replace the Canal area. Even if considered in conjunction the case is no better since the only over land communications between the two areas all pass through Palestine and would therefore be denied to us in peace, unless this intervening area became part of an Arab State with which we might enter into an agreement.

#### Summary.

14. The above considerations show that our strategic requirements can only be met by the efficient maintenance in peace of the facilities and communications specified in the Annex to this paper and that all the facilities and communications, except certain of the R.A.F. facilities must be located in the developed areas of EGYPT.

#### MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS IN EGYPT.

15. In the light of the above considerations we have set out at Annex a list of our requirements.

16. Although we accept that the gaining of Egyptian agreement to the Combined Headquarters remaining in Egypt in time of peace is politically unobtainable, we must emphasise that, in war, it will be essential to re-establish the Combined Headquarters in Egypt and that, in pressing the Egyptians to make arrangements to that end, it should be stressed that the necessary communications must be maintained so as to be immediately available at the outbreak of war.

17. Apart from the overriding necessity of the right of re-entry into Egypt in war, our main requirement is that a limited number of British personnel, if necessary in civilian clothes, must be in the country in peace to supervise and in some cases direct the development and maintenance of the administrative facilities that we must keep ready for use in war.

We accept in principle that guard duties should, in the main, be carried out by the Egyptians.

18. The method of obtaining our requirements is largely a political matter but, militarily, we would welcome the establishment of some body on the lines of the previously suggested Joint Defence Board.

#### TRAINING FACILITIES FOR ARAB STATES.

19. The Foreign Office have asked whether, in order to assist the negotiations, it would be militarily practicable to offer Egypt, and possibly the other Arab States, facilities for training and in particular air training, in any base established in Sinai.

20. We have previously expressed the view that we should do what we can to strengthen military relations with the Arab States in the Middle East and, in particular, with Egypt. In this connection we have recently agreed to offer the Iraqis facilities for their Air Force at airfields and air firing ranges in adjacent British territory. Cyprus was particularised.

We see no objection to the extension of this principle to the armed forces of Egypt, or other Arab States, provided that it does not entail a large manpower commitment. The facilities could be offered in any suitable base whether in Sinai or elsewhere.

21. It would moreover be in our interests to co-operate with the Egyptian Air Force particularly in air defence training: having no British fighter squadrons permanently exercising the Egyptian air defence organisation we shall have to rely on Egyptian aircraft to maintain its efficiency. As a means of increasing Egyptian goodwill we see no objection to allowing them to make training flights to our air bases in Cyrenaica and Cyprus and using our air firing and bombing ranges.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.  
20th November, 1947.

(Signed)

TEDDER  
J.H.D. CUNNINGHAM  
F.E.W. SIMPSON  
(V.C.I.O.S.)

A J.P. (47) 126

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REQUIREMENTS IN EGYPT IN PEACE.

We set out below what we consider to be our minimum requirements in Egypt in peace.

OVERRIDING REQUIREMENTS.

2. In order to obtain any value from these requirements it will be necessary first to obtain agreement to the following:-

- (a) That when, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, a state of emergency exists, Imperial forces of all descriptions shall have complete freedom of movement into and throughout Egypt by road, rail, air, sea and inland water-way and the full use of tele-communications, ports, airfields and such other military facilities as may have been maintained in peacetime.
- (b) That the Egyptian Government permit the retention, in Egypt, of certain British personnel, if necessary in plain clothes, whose duty it will be to oversee and advise on the care and maintenance of the military facilities retained there in peace.

3. Further, although we accept that the gaining of Egyptian agreement to the Combined Headquarters remaining in Egypt in time of peace is politically unobtainable, we must emphasise that, in war, it will be essential to re-establish the Combined Headquarters in Egypt and that, in pressing the Egyptians to make arrangements to that end, it should be stressed that the necessary communications must be maintained so as to be immediately available at the outbreak of war.

SERVICE REQUIREMENTS.

Royal Navy.

4. It is not proposed to station any forces in Egyptian waters in peace. There is, however, a requirement to maintain one ammunition depot, and a few minor storage facilities for ships in passage.

5. On re-entry into Egypt there will be certain broad requirements. We would not expect that all these requirements are kept in a permanent state of care and maintenance solely for our use. It would be sufficient if they could be made available immediately a state of emergency existed. These requirements are:-

- (a) Suitable accommodation for Naval Headquarters, and Barracks.
- (b) Defence arrangements for the ports.
- (c) Suitable communications, including W/T.
- (d) Adequate mooring and berthing facilities.
- (e) Accommodation for stores of all kinds.
- (f) Repair facilities.
- (g) Airfields for Naval aircraft.
- (h) Aircraft repair facilities.

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6. Our preliminary estimate of the number of British personnel involved is 50, all of whom could be civilians.

ARMY.

7. Facilities for administration. We shall require to retain in the area of the Suez Canal and Sinai such stores and plant as will enable a rapid development of administrative facilities to be carried out as soon as our forces have again entered Egypt. The latter would include certain Ordnance stores and such heavy equipment, e.g., items of engineer stores, which it is considered undesirable to move to East Africa.

These installations and stores should be maintained and guarded by the Egyptian Government but it would be necessary for certain British personnel to be retained in the country for supervisory purposes. Our preliminary estimate of the personnel required to be located in the two areas is Canal Area 400 and Suez 100. All these personnel would be in plain clothes.

8. Right of Movement. We shall require landing and storage facilities for supplies in transit at Port Said and Suez, together with the right to retain small British administrative detachments (included in the 400 above) at these ports to supervise the handling of stores.

The British personnel retained in Egypt should be allowed normal and restricted movement in Egypt.

9. Communications. We shall require the Egyptian Government to maintain or construct the roads specified in Annex to Article 6 of 1936 Treaty. The Egyptian Government also to maintain the principal railways in a condition to ensure their effective use in war. In particular all Delta lines connecting Cyrenaica and Palestine with the Nile Delta and the principal internal railways in the latter area should be maintained.

10. Oil installations. The control of the oil pipe lines and other oil installations to remain, as at present, in British civilian hands (for details see C.S.A./P (47) 11).

Royal Air Force.

11. From the Air Force point of view our main object is to be able to create both offensive and defensive air forces from Egypt at the outbreak of war. Our peacetime requirements in Egypt are therefore conveniently considered under the headings of:-

- (a) The Strategic Bomber Base.
- (b) The Air Defence of Egypt.

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12. The Strategic Amber Base. Primarily our requirement is that existing airfields in Egypt should be maintained in peace as well as ready for use at the outbreak of war. The advent of heavier types of bombers will necessitate continual development, particularly as regards runway improvement, extra storage, fuel and explosive depots and repair facilities, and may involve considerable new construction.

From the practical point of view we consider that it is of great importance that the Egyptians should agree to our having on their territory a minimum number of skilled service personnel if necessary in plain clothes, to advise and assist in the above tasks.

13. Air Defence System. Our minimum requirement is that the airfields from which we shall wish to operate our fighters at the outbreak of war, and the radar coverage and communications which form an integral part of the air defence of Egypt, should be maintained and developed in step with scientific progress. With the exception of two or three airfields which we would like to establish in northern Sinai, in order to complete the defence system, we do not think that any new airfields construction will be needed.

We attach such importance to the efficient operation of the defence organisation that we consider it essential that the Egyptians should accept the advice and assistance of a number of skilled personnel.

Whilst accepting that it will not be possible to station operational units on Egyptian territory in order to ensure that the air defence system remains efficient, it would be of great advantage if British fighter squadrons could be allowed to visit Egypt for combined air defence exercises.

14. Air Transit Rights. In addition to the above main requirements our withdrawal from Palestine has increased the importance of obtaining air transit rights in Egypt. We would prefer to have the right to stage through the canal area, but provided the necessary airfields facilities can be developed, rights in Sinai would be acceptable. These rights will, however, entail the stationing of Service personnel who should preferably be in uniform at one or two selected airfields.

15. Personnel involved. The total number of R.A.F. personnel which we would require to station in Egypt in order to satisfy the requirements outlined above would be in the order of 350.

Total Service personnel involved.

16. Subject to a more detailed examination by the Principal Administrative Officers Committee, the total number of Service personnel we would wish to retain in Egypt in peacetime would seem to be of the order of 1,000.