

FO 371/62983

XC/A/59408

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- 2 -

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Noting that the Government of the United Kingdom while asserting the continuing validity of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 have already partially withdrawn their troops from Egypt and are ready to negotiate the completion of the evacuation;

Having confidence that the renewal of negotiations will result in early evacuation and also in the settlement of other issues in the dispute between the two parties;

Urges the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt

- (a) to resume direct negotiations and, should such negotiations fail, to seek a solution of the dispute by other peaceful means of their own choice;
- (b) to inform the Security Council of the result of those negotiations (and to report thereon to the Council in the first instance not later than 1st January, 1948)".

[Ends]

6371/62983

istry } J4177/12/16
nber }

TELEGRAM FROM
Mr Bowker CAIRO

1813

ed Sept 2, 1947
cived Registry } Sept 3, 1947

Possible Wafd policy in Egypt

Geoffri Boutros Ghali, Wafdist deputy, who is coming to London on September 15 said that he was entrusted by Nahas Pasha with making the latter's views known.

Nahas though he would have to demand complete evacuation proposed working for a Middle East defence scheme.

Last Paper.

J4151

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

2 Cairo
7/6 Sept. 13.

(Minutes.)

What Egypt will achieve, if any, by our acceptance of evacuation, will then become the subject of serious Arab states in which we have strategic problems. Their national wish will be that the onus of any Middle East defence scheme should not fall mainly on them. They will allow to them, with a possible towards such a scheme - the hope that the "next man" will be made to do more. They will concede that the way to escape from British pressure is the way Egypt had recourse to - by violence, in political ferment. Unless we stand firm with Egypt, I maintain, any Middle East defence scheme is sighted & weakened from the start.

C. Houston 3/7

Geoffrey Boutros Ghali is a son of the former P.M. who signed the 1899 Agreement with Cromer and was assassinated in 1910. He is probably the most serious emissary that we have had from Nahas lately.

As regards paragraph 2 I suppose what is meant is that Nahas would stick to a demand for complete early and unconditional evacuation. Otherwise I do not see that there would be much to worry about in Nahas's attitude. I don't think that we ever expected that Nahas would be willing to allow British troops to stay in Egypt under a new treaty to be negotiated with him.

D.H. Richards
3rd September

P.T.O.

Action completed.)

(Index.)

Cal. 4/9

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Next Paper.

J4179

20513 F.O.F.

FO371/62983

A paper is at present under submission to the Secretary of State suggesting that we should make contact with the Wafd. If that suggestion is approved we should consult Cairo as to whether Ghali would be a suitable ~~chairman~~ intermediary.

"Complete evacuation" in return for a satisfactory "Middle East defence scheme on a regional basis" would be about as good as we could hope to get from any Egyptian Government in present circumstances.

D. S. Hudson

R. D. J. Scott Fox

4th September, 1947

P. F. Grey ~~Parsons~~ 5/9.

Madame ~~Parsons~~ 5/9

The question is should this Wafd emissary be received here at the F.O. On balance I think he ought to be, but however necessary should confine himself to listening whilst he has got to say any comments or suggestions. We are not yet in a position to decide whether or not it will pay us to establish definite contact with the Wafd. That will depend largely

Nothing to be written in this Margin.

largely or how matters
 shape themselves in and
 after the Security Council,
 & how the King, Nkrumah
 and the staff itself
 react to these developments.
 Till then we must
 proceed very warily,
 but this need not mean
 that we must rebuff
 any official approach
 which the staff may
 make to us in the
 meantime.

BT Banzant
 Can we have
 talked to the staff about
 this? What steps could we
 take to make the staff
 P.T.O. *How to make*

I would not suggest "talking" to him in the sense of discussing possible plans with him. It was precisely because we obviously cannot make any promises, that I suggested that we should limit ourselves to listening and hearing what he has got to say.
BT Banzant

F0371/62983

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1	2	3	4	5

Minutes.

Sir O. Sargent discussed this further with the S/S today. It was agreed that someone in the office (preferably the head of Egyptian Dept.) should receive Ghalib and hear what he had to say. Sir O. Sargent would like to see the draft tel. informing Brig. Clayton.

A.A. Montague Browne
 (MONTAGUE BROWNE)
 11/9

Draft P. J. J. J.
 2/11/51

85

Nothing to be written in this margin.

Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

1	2	3	4	5	6

Fo 371/62983

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4177

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

Cypher/OTP

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Bowker
No. 1815.

D. 10.40 a.m. September 2nd, 1947.
R. 2.15 p.m. September 2nd, 1947.

September 2nd, 1947.

JJJ

SECRET

Geoffri Boutros Ghali a young Wafdist deputy of a prominent Coptic family told Brigadier Clayton yesterday that he was going to London on September 15th on a private visit and said confidentially that he was entrusted by Nahas with the task of making the latter's views known as far as possible. He will probably try to speak to a Chatham House group.

2. He said that Nahas's course of action, should he get into power, would be to stick to demand for our complete evacuation as he had committed himself too far to do anything else. That achieved however he proposed working for a Middle East defence scheme on a regional basis.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat.]

SEP 11 1947

SECRET

Reference:-

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Cypher/OTF

D PRIORITY No. 1.FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.No. 1716.

D. 3 p.m. 15th September, 1947.

15th September, 1947.

3 3 3

IMMEDIATE.SECRET.

Your telegram No. 1815 [of September 2nd: visit of Ghali on behalf of Safd].

We are not (repeat not) yet in a position to decide whether it will pay to establish definite contact with the Safd but we do not (repeat not) wish to rebuff any unofficial approach which they may wish to make to us by a serious emissary such as I understand Ghali to be. We think, therefore, that if Ghali wishes to get in touch with Foreign Office we should not (repeat not) refuse to hear what he has to say while refraining from any discussion.

2. Please, therefore, unless you see any objection, arrange to have hint dropped to Ghali that head of the Egyptian Department, if approached by Ghali while he is in London, would no doubt receive him and hear what he has got to say. You should so arrange matters that this hint cannot be construed as an invitation to open any form of discussion or exchange of views on matters under official negotiations.

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J 4.92/219

~~SECRET~~

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

Cypher/UTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTONNo. 9101

D. 8.30 p.m. 4th September, 1947.

4th September, 1947.

Repeated to : United Kingdom Delegation,)
 New York No. 2010) Important
 Cairo No. 1660)

IMMEDIATEIMSECRET

Cairo telegram No. 1820 [of 5th September: report that United States Government had assured Egyptians that Security Council Resolution would invite His Majesty's Government to evacuate unconditionally].

In view of Washington telegrams Nos. 4835 and 4836 to me (on which we shall be telegraphing separately) I take it that no such United States assurances can have been given. Nevertheless the whole American attitude over the Egyptian case at the Security Council has recently been so unsatisfactory that I am anxious that confirmation should be obtained from the American Government. Please therefore inform the State Department that this report is circulating in Cairo, that I am convinced that there is no substance in it, but that I should be grateful for confirmation that such is the case.

FO371/62983
[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

CYPHER/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Bowker.
No. 1,820.

D: 6.44 p.m. 3rd September, 1947.

3rd September, 1947. R: 8.30 p.m. 3rd September, 1947.

Repeated to: U.K.Delegation New York.

000 000 000

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

LIGHT

I have just been told by a reliable source, who particularly asked not to be quoted, that King Farouk has received a report from Azzam Pasha from New York to the effect that the United States Government have given him an assurance that they will see to it that the Security Council adopts a resolution in the first place inviting the United Kingdom to evacuate her forces from Egypt, and in the second place recommending negotiations between Egypt and the United Kingdom on other outstanding points.

2. According to source His Majesty was greatly elated over this report and regarded the victory as won. He was disinclined to consider any question of a change of Government since with such a resolution it went without saying that Nokrashy would continue in office.

3. It may well be that Azzam has exaggerated. But since, according to the source, his report was quite definite and as he is known to have been recently in Washington, it would seem desirable to let the United States Government know at once of the report he has sent to King Farouk and ask what is the truth.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No.82 and Washington as my telegram No. 51.

[Repeated to U.K.Delegation New York and Washington.]

Reference:-

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E. S.

4192/G

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4192 1 12 1916

Alleged assurance given by U.S. Govt to Azam Pasha

Mr Rowkes
 Cairo
 1800
 Dated 3 Sept
 Received 4 Sept.

Last Paper.

4141

(Minutes.)

References.

See reply of Washington's
 reply thereto confirming that King
 F's triumph was premature at
 least - perhaps wholly illusory.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

700-10101
 ✓ 4 Sept

[Signature]
 9/9

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

FO 371/62983

XC/A/594086

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S. W. 1.

28th August, 1947.

TOP SECRET

69

Many thanks for your secret letter of the 21st Aug (63/47) about Egypt and the Middle East.

I am much interested in Henderson's remarks as quoted in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your letter. For your information only I enclose a copy of a paper about Bases in the Middle East which is now being considered by the Secretary of State. If he approves the general lines you will of course hear further from us.

We had already been considering Henderson's suggestion in paragraph 3 of your letter. But we have decided that it is an illusion to suppose that any voluntary concession to the Egyptians in their present mood is likely to improve the atmosphere or to conduce to a return to reasonableness. On the contrary, the more voluntary concessions we make the wider are the Egyptians likely to open their mouths. The Secretary of State has therefore decided that our wisest tactics after the decision of the Council will probably be to sit tight on the basis of the 1936 Treaty and to wait for the Egyptians to approach us. Our only reason for adopting this attitude is that it seems to us the most likely to lead in the end to some reasonable agreement. If we are ever to get this it looks as though it must be by a process of hard bargaining in which we shall need all possible bargaining counters. However, final decisions will be taken in the light of events.

Yours ever,

John Balfour, Esq., F.C.I.C.,
Washington.

(... R. Wright)

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the Middle East. He fully realised the difficulty of finding alternative bases for our troops in Egypt, especially in view of the physical problems involved which I emphasised to him. But he wondered whether Trans-Jordan or perhaps Kuwait might not be possible. Cyrenaica too might be a suitable alternative base, although its present uncertain status was undoubtedly an obstacle.

5. In any event Henderson was at pains to assure me that, if we should decide on action of the kind he had mentioned, we could count on the United States doing everything possible to ensure that this development redounded to our advantage with the Egyptians and other Arab states. He did not elaborate his ideas in this respect but implied that inter alia the United States would give us their full support in dealing with the Egyptians over the Sudan question.

6. Whilst undertaking to pass on this personal expression of his views to the Department, I made it clear to Henderson that I could not answer for their favourable reception. Indeed I expressed my doubts as to whether we could do anything more about evacuation from Egypt than we are already doing - especially when our task of maintaining our position in the Middle East is being made so difficult by many of those who protest their desire to see us remain there.

Yousher
John Dalrymple

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1 SEP 1947

reply sent. Content + X

N4141

BRITISH EMBASSY, Mills

WASHINGTON S. D. C. 29.8

SECRET

22nd August, 1947

G 63/ 147

65

Lyden Michael,

In talk with me this week Loy Henderson expressed the following views about Egypt which he stressed were purely personal.

2. The presence of our troops in Egypt was, he said, "a splinter in the thumb" affecting generally our position in the Middle East. He realised how troublesome the Egyptians had been over the whole matter. But he maintained that their specious assertion that we are employing British troops in Egypt as a lever for settling the Sudanese question to our advantage had secured a certain amount of support for their cause from other Arab states.

3. In these circumstances Henderson wondered whether His Majesty's Government, without in any way departing from their attitude as to the validity of the 1936 Treaty, might not declare that they intended proprio motu to proceed with the evacuation of Egypt as near as possible within the timetable proposed in the Bevin-Sidky protocol. Such a move, he contended, might exercise a moderating influence on the Egyptians and would in any case have a good effect on the other Arab states. He incidentally told me that, in a recent talk with the Egyptian Ambassador here in which he had pointed out to Azzam Pasha that the withdrawal of Britain from the Middle East would hardly be in the interests of Egypt, the latter had expressed agreement and had said that if Britain showed signs of such action it would be necessary to drag her back by the coat-tails.

4. In making the foregoing personal suggestions Henderson was at pains to emphasise that the United States Government set great store on our preserving our military garrisons in

the /

Michael Wright, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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should take a suitable opportunity of making their attitude clear. I should be grateful if you suggest the same thing to the State Department.

4. Whether an American statement would be better made during the Security Council meeting or after it is one of tactics which can hardly be decided except on the spot. It might well be better to avoid it at the meeting if the debate goes well, in order not to arouse further controversy at this particular juncture.

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

SECRET

Cypher/OPr

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 9173
6th September, 1947

D. 2.15 p.m. 6th September, 1947

Repeated to New York (U.K. Delegation) No. 2947
Cairo No. 1678

addddd

IMPORTANT

GIANT

SECRET

My telegram No. 8342 [of 29th August: Egyptian dispute].

United States Embassy have given us text of a telegram of 30th August from State Department suggesting that we have misinterpreted Mr. Herschel Johnston's remarks and affirming that American policy regarding mutual Anglo-Egyptian defence arrangements following settlement of present dispute remains unchanged.

2. We greatly welcome this reaffirmation of policy and we note that the State Department telegram almost admits that Mr. Herschel Johnston's zeal for finding a solution outran his discretion. At the same time I feel that the Americans will be laying up trouble both for themselves and for us unless they continue to make it clear beyond doubt that their policy remains to encourage an agreement between the United Kingdom and Egypt of which mutual defence arrangements form an essential part. Despite assurances of State Department we fear that effect of Mr. Herschel Johnston's statement will have been to encourage Egyptians to think that the United States are indifferent on this basic question. However the debate over the present resolution goes, we shall be as far off agreement with the Egyptians as we were unless the principle of mutual defence is admitted in some form.

3. United States Embassy have offered to telegraph to State Department suggesting that United States Government

should/

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SECRET

- 2 -

stipulation in recommendations to two sovereign states. It seems to me that it might very well come out, and then the resolution would be acceptable to my delegation.'

"(The word 'pointless' does not appear anywhere in verbatim text of Johnson's statements on August 28).

"As should be apparent from foregoing text, Johnson did not at all mean to say that U.S. Government had slightest objection to future mutual defense arrangements between Britain and Egypt. He was merely expressing our view that specific recommendations to the two states that they conclude such arrangements went beyond the proper scope of the Security Council action in this case. Furthermore, to insist on clause in question, which was unacceptable to Egyptians, would defeat the purpose of the Council which is to find a solution acceptable to both parties regarding the method of reaching agreement on their present differences.

"Johnson, who was speaking extemporaneously, was addressing himself to the needs of the resolution before the Council and not to the merits of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.

"Our information does not indicate that the Council or the public interpreted Johnson's statement in the sense in which it appears to be understood by the Foreign Office. To remove any possible doubt you may assure the Foreign Office that this Government has not in any way changed its position regarding any mutual defense arrangements between Egypt and Great Britain which might follow settlement of the present dispute."

Sincerely yours,

W. Averell Harriman

F0371/62983

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4140

American Embassy,
London, September 2, 1947.

SECRET

Dear Mr. Scott-Fox,

Following is the text of the Department of State telegram of August 30, 1947 which I showed to you yesterday morning:

"The British Ambassador called yesterday afternoon to express the British Government's concern re Herschel Johnson's remarks. However he did not make clear that Foreign Office gave them such far-reaching interpretation as indicated your telegram.

"It would appear that Foreign Office has jumped to unwarranted conclusions based upon incomplete reports. For your information and for possible clarification to the Foreign Office, following is the exact text of paragraph in which the remark appears:

'I prefer the Brazilian resolution because I think it should be in general terms. The main object is to get a resolution which would commend itself to the loyal cooperation of the two parties, and on which the Council could reach a majority opinion. I must say that while I do not see any objection to it particularly, I do not see any reason why the second phrase of the first paragraph starting with the words "mutual assistance" should be in there, or why the Security Council should think it necessary to put such a mandatory

stipulation/

R.D.J. Scott-Fox, Esquire
Egyptian Department
The Foreign Office
London, S.W.1

SECRET

f0371/62983

I agree generally with what Mr. Scott Fox writes. The last thing we want to do is to upset Mr. Herschel Johnston by further recriminations. The State Department telegram almost admits that his zeal for finding a solution outran his discretion.

2. At the same time I feel that the Americans will be laying up trouble both for themselves and for us unless they make it clear beyond doubt that their policy remains to encourage an agreement between the U.K. and Egypt of which mutual defence arrangements form an essential part. However the debate over the present resolution goes, we shall be as far off agreement with the Egyptians as we were unless the principle of mutual defence is admitted, whether tacitly or no.

3. It is therefore for consideration whether we should not take up at once Mr. Lewis Jones' offer to telegraph to the State Department. If we do this, we might also telegraph to Washington suggesting that they should take a similar line. The question of whether an American statement would be better made during the Security Council meeting or after it is one of tactics which can hardly be decided except on the spot. It might well be better to avoid it at the meeting if the debate goes well, in order not to arouse further controversy at this particular juncture.

P. F. Grey
P. Grey,
3rd September, 47

Am Jett

Draft.

*When it is approved
will get in touch with the
U.S. Embassy*

*P. F. Grey
5/9*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FO 371/62983

XC/A/59408

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Brazilian resolution and that we were asking the State Department to bring what pressure they could to bear on the Colombian delegate who would once more probably hold the key to the situation if such a resolution came to be voted on. As we had ourselves telegraphed to Washington about this it seemed reasonable to hope that everything possible was already being done to take care of this aspect of the matter. I thought, however, that we might wish to ask him to telegraph to Washington on a further point, namely, what action the Americans should take to redress the impression left by Mr. Herschel Johnston's remarks on the members of the Security Council and in particular on the Egyptians. If, when the debate was resumed, we were to concentrate on getting back to a resolution in very general terms, it might in some ways be preferable for Mr. Herschel Johnston ^{about his way to} not to revert to the matter of the mutual assistance clause, but in that case it would I thought be desirable from our point of view for the U.S. Government to ~~have~~ taken an early opportunity to make a public statement to make their attitude clear ^{after the Security Council had disposed of the matter.}

3. Mr. Lewis Jones said that he would be very ready to suggest this to Washington if we wished.

Copy of the letter within should go to New York, Washington and Cairo.

D. Scott Fox

R.D.J. Scott Fox,
2nd September, 1947.

60371/62983

Registry Number | J4140/12/16

FROM Mr Lewis Jones
UNITED STATES EMBASSY
to Mr Scott Fox,
No.

Dated Sept 2, 1947

Received in Registry | Sept 2, 1947

United States delegate's remarks on the Brazilian resolution.

Gives text of the U.S. Dept. of State telegram saying that H.M. Government has jumped to unwarranted conclusions based upon incomplete reports. Mr Herschel Johnson did not at all mean to say that the U.S. Government had the slightest objection to future mutual defence arrangements between Great Britain and Egypt.

Last Paper (J4125)

J4139

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

The Washington
No 9173 Sept. 6
Tptd U.K. del. N.Y.
Sept 16/47

(Minutes.)

In view of the second sentence of the State Department's telegram within, I thought it well to tell Mr. Lewis Jones frankly when he showed me this telegram that we were indeed very seriously concerned by Mr. Herschel Johnston's remarks, and that I was afraid that the State Department's explanation would not be thought satisfactory here. For instance, it was surprising that the U.S. delegate should apparently prefer to propose the omission of a clause because it was "unacceptable to the Egyptians" when he had been told by Sir A. Cadogan that the omission would render the resolution unacceptable to us. Moreover, it seemed rather optimistic to suppose that the U.S. delegate's words had not been interpreted by the Council in the way we fear. The fact that when the mutual assistance clause of the Colombian resolution was put to the vote it was the only clause which had not been supported by any of the members of the Council, seemed to me in itself significant of the effect of the American lead on the other Council members. In any event we could be sure that the Egyptians themselves would not forget the U.S. expression of views and they would certainly remind us of it when negotiations came to be resumed. As I knew, he fully realised the Egyptians needed all the encouragement possible if they were going to be persuaded to negotiate a satisfactory treaty with us and they would need very little in the way of discouragement of this kind to stall.

2. Mr. Lewis Jones (who has been personally been consistently very helpful over all this) said that he appreciated all these points and that he would be glad to have a telegram sent to Washington in any sense which we might suggest. I explained that our feeling was that the best way out of the present impasse would be to get back to a resolution in very general terms on the lines of the original /Brazilian

Action completed.)

(Index.)

caj
11/9

10/3/47

Next Paper.

J4140 G

f0371/62983

En Clair

WORLD ORGANIZATION DISSEMINATION

FROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE :

123

Mr. Roberts
No. 1931

D. 8.30 p.m. 3rd September, 1947.
R. 3.35 a.m. 4th September, 1947.

3rd September, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo No. 41
U.K. Del. New York No. 53.

///

IMPORTANT

LIGHT

My telegram No. 1956.

Egyptian Complaint to United Nations.

Security Council's treatment of Egyptian case is the subject of a two column article by Belokon in Pravda of September 2nd.

2. Belokon begins by stating that although in the 1936 Treaty Britain recognised Egyptian independence in theory, the effect of this declaration was nullified by clauses providing that British armed forces should have the use of Egyptian ports, airfields, etc. and by the obligation placed on Egypt to "invite" a British Military Mission to help in training the Egyptian army. Thus the occupation regime was in fact preserved. Moreover, British troops still on Egyptian soil and their numbers considerably exceed the figures of 10,000 provided for in the Treaty. This is a violation of the sovereign rights of Egypt and the Sudan.

3. Turning to the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations for the revision of the Treaty, Belokon remarks that these demonstrated the complete inability of the Labour Government to give up the imperialistic policy of its predecessors. Britain had insisted on retaining its war bases in Egypt, while at the same time seeking to impose on Egypt a burdensome military alliance. These proposals had, however, been rejected by the Egyptian people and Sidky Pasha, who had been prepared to sacrifice the nation's interests in order to reach a compromise with Britain, had been forced to resign. The new Government decided to appeal to the Security Council, but only succeeded in doing so after seven months, during which they were subjected to strong pressure by pro-British circles led by Sidky Pasha and by British and American diplomats.

/4. In the



4. In the Security Council the British representative sought by juridical pettifoggery to confuse the issue, basing himself on the fact that the stationing of British troops in Egypt had been provided for in the 1936 Treaty. However, by agreeing to negotiate a new treaty Britain had recognised that the existing treaty was not in accordance with the new situation which had developed from the victory of the United Nations over Fascism. The presence of British troops in Egypt and the Sudan ("which had been virtually transformed into a British Colony") was in fact in contradiction to the General Assembly resolution of December 14th, 1946 to which Britain herself subscribed.

5. Belokon goes on to assert that in these circumstances the Council should have quickly reached a decision satisfying Egypt's just demands, which have the "sympathy and support of all progressive forces in the world". In fact, however, attempts were continuing to prevent a solution of the Egyptian problem. After criticising the Brazilian and Colombian proposals in this connexion, Belokon goes on to suggest that the United States is also using its influence to bring about a settlement on the lines desired by Britain, because of its extensive economic interests in Egypt. He adds that the new influence of the dollar, which is growing at Britain's expense is by no means unwelcome to certain Egyptian ruling circles.

6. Belokon also refers to the "slandorous assertions" disseminated by British propaganda in Near East before the Security Council meeting to the effect that the Soviet Union had agreed not to support Egypt in the Council. These "unintelligent fabrications" had now been fully disproved by Gromyko's statements unconditionally supporting Egyptian demands for withdrawal of British troops from Egypt and the Sudan.

7. As regards Sudan, Soviet view was that its future could only be decided by Security Council after hearing opinion of Sudanese people. All obstacles to this must first be eliminated. The fact that few British officials had been sent to New York to defend Sudanese interests was commentary enough on present situation.

8. Belokon ends by referring to the "Tribune's" criticism of your "clumsy policy" which pointed out that even if Britain could achieve a settlement on the lines she desired, this would hardly improve Anglo-Egyptian relations. Attempts to impede a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, he states, as well as to disregard the Egyptian peoples desire for liberation from the imperialist yoke, is further evidence of the undemocratic nature of the foreign policy of the present Labour Government.

9. Full text sent by bag.

Foreign Office please pass U.K. Del. New York as my telegram No. 53.

[Repeated to New York United Kingdom Delegation.]

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Cypher/OTF

DIPLOMATICAL No. 2

4126

FROM JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Clarke

No. 309

D. 3.00 p.m. 30th August, 1947

30th August, 1947

R. 12.30 a.m. 31st August, 1947

Repeated to Amman
 Cairo
 Damascus
 Bagdad
 Beirut

8 8 8 8 8

SECRET

Your telegram No. 1304 to Cairo.

Egypt.

U224

Ibn Saud's interest lies in the preservation of the status quo in the Middle East and he looks to His Majesty's Government now as in the past as guardians of peace in this area. His concern at the present situation in Egypt and at the disturbing influence of King Abdullah was indicated briefly in my telegram No. 308. I am sure that he would warmly welcome consultation on a situation which is causing him so much disquiet. Moreover, he has recently reiterated his desire to do anything in his power to help in finding a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. I think this is a particularly suitable time to raise with him the question of Middle East defence and I believe that he would be receptive to suggestion outlined in your telegram under reference, provided he receives a fully reassuring reply on the point reported to you in my telegram No. 301.

Foreign Office please pass to Amman as my telegram No. 47 and Beirut to Damascus as my telegram No. 42.

[Repeated to Amman]

1947
 AUG 31 1947
 FOREIGN OFFICE

Reference:-

14-70
F.O 371/62983

XC/A/59408

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1	2	3	4	5	6

610

J

J 4135

1947

EGYPT and SUDAN

2 1947 42

Registry Number J4135/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM Mr Evans BEIRUT

No. 639

Dated Aug. 31, 1947

Received in Registry | Sept. 2, 1947

Syrian delegate's speech in support of Egypt.

Refers to Beirut telegram 632 of August 29 (J4117/12/16)

Lebanese President also spoke of Syrian President's deep distress at the behaviour of his delegate. His recall has been mooted. Syrian delegate's speech on handing over to his successor to the chairmanship of the Security Council would be a suitable swan song.

Last Paper.

J4125

(Minutes.)

see J 4145

26/4/47

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Amended list.

(Action completed.)

OK

(Index.)

RM

Reference:-

F0371/62983

XC/A/59408

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Evans
No. 639.

D. 12.41.p.m. 31st August, 1947.
R. 5.25.p.m. 31st August, 1947.

August 31st, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York

Cairo	} Saving
Bagdad	
Jedda	
Amman	
Damascus	

-----o.o-----

SECRET.

By telegram No. 632. Egypt.

Lebanese President (on whom His Majesty's Minister called August 30th) also spoke of Syrian President's deep distress at the behaviour of his delegate. His Excellency confirmed that his re-call had been mooted and suggested that His Majesty's Minister Damascus might prompt the Syrians in this sense. On a hint from Mr. Houston Boswell that there might be advantage in the suggestion coming direct from His Excellency, the President immediately and in our presence, telephoned Shukri Bey and spoke to him accordingly. The Syrian President undertook to discuss the matter with his Prime Minister.

2. Syrian delegate's speech on handing over to his successor to the chairmanship of the Security Council would appear to be a suitable swan song.

Foreign Office please pass to New York as my telegram No. 12.

[Repeated to New York (United Kingdom Delegation)]



1747
f0371/62983

Registry Number J4139/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Mr Bowker CAIRO

No. 1808

Dated Sept 1, 1947

Received in Registry, Sept 2, 1947

Great Britain and the Middle East defence scheme

Refers to Foreign Office telegram 1604 of August 26
(J3978/12/16)

Even if King Ibn Sa'ud consented to approach King Farouk considers that his representations would be unavailing in preventing the Egyptians from insisting on unconditional evacuation of Egypt itself as a pre-condition of any talks on a Middle East defence scheme.

Last Paper.

J4137

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

ended with
UK Reg. N York
no. 3023

(Minutes.)

In short, if we try to mobilise the Arab League States to bring pressure on Egypt we are likely to end by finding Egypt using them to press us to agree to unconditional evacuation.

See now J4221

D.S. [Signature]
7/9

E. Dept. [Signature]

See with: J.K. Ind. New York [Signature] 12/9
(copy) 2575 of Sept. 11..

Tels repeated

[Signature] 9/9

ation plotted.)

(Indus.)

24/9
21/9

[Signature]

Next Paper.

J4140

11 20513 F.O.P.

ADMITTED DISTRIBUTION (8/9/47).

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Cypher OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

INDEXED

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Bowker
No. 1808

D. 4.36 p.m. 1st September 1947.

1st September 1947. R. 8.25 p.m. 1st September 1947.

Repeated to Middle East capitals

IMMEDIATE

rrrrrr

Foreign Office please pass to Amman as my telegram No. 77.

Beirut pass to Damascus as my telegram No. 124.

SECRET
LIGHT

Your telegram No. 1604.

I think it is quite possible we may eventually be able to find a solution to our defence requirements in this part of the world on Middle East instead of purely Egyptian lines. But I do not think present nor any other equally minority Egyptian Government could now agree to discuss any defence arrangements with us, whether on Anglo-Egyptian or Anglo-Middle East lines except on basis of evacuation of British forces from Canal as a pre-requisite. I think this would apply also to a Wafd Government. For a variety of reasons, viz. breakdown of protracted negotiations, Government's reiteration (owing to strength of the Opposition) of ultra nationalistic appeal and most of all the proceedings before Security Council, evacuation of Egypt itself has become an obsession and I doubt whether any Egyptian Government could now afford not to give it first priority. I doubt moreover whether Ibn Saud or any other Arab League statesman, whatever his personal views would be willing officially to take any action which would be interpreted as implying anything but full support for Egyptian attitude on this point.

2. Therefore I think even in the (I should imagine) doubtful event of King Ibn Saud consenting to approach King Farouk on lines suggested in your telegram under reference, his representations would be unavailing in deterring the Egyptians from insisting on unconditional evacuation of Egypt itself as a pre-condition of any talks on a Middle East defence scheme and might well even prejudice chances of such a scheme proving successful in the future.

[Repeated to Amman].

FO 371/62983
1947

4145

EGYPT

72

Registry Number J4145/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM

Mr Scrivener

No. 385 DAMASCUS

Dated Sept 1, 1947

Received at Registry Sept 2, 1947

Syrian delegate's speech supporting Egypt.

Interview with the Prime Minister who stated that the Syrian President and himself had been snocked as Sir A. Cadogan on reading the speech.

Does not see what further action can be taken.

(Handwritten notes)

Last Paper.

J4143.

See within (Minutes) see also J4117 + 4135.

References.

See minutes re separate sheet 26/9/47

(Print.)

*Amendment (How disposed of.)
Tel Damascus
No 461 Sept 5.
Iptd Fedda 355,
Bagdad 739,
Cairo 1662, Amman 336,
U.K. Tel. N.Y. 2917,
Beirut 564,
Khartoum 4(5)*

(Action completed.)

*ced
10/9.*

(Index.)

[Handwritten initials]

Next Paper.

J4101

371/62983

Minutes
14/12/47

73

I do not think that we ought to act on the suggestion in Beirut telegram No.639. If the Syrian delegate were recalled immediately it would certainly get out that this was done in response to pressure from us, and I think that the general impression created in the Security Council would be unfavourable. As regards para 2 of that telegram, there will presumably be a "swan song", since the Russian delegate will I think be in the Chair from the start of the next session of the Council on September 9th.

On the other hand, I think that we should react strongly to the deplorable telegram from Damascus.

Draft submitted.

[Signature]
D. S. G. for

3rd September, 1947.

Eastern Dept

I think that in any further representations to the Syrian Govt, we should be careful to avoid any implication of bad faith on their part (which, whatever our suspicions, I do not think we can substantiate). At the same time we should clearly insist on action to put things right and not words only. I submit a suggested alternative draft in rather less menacing language, ~~omitting two~~ ~~sentences~~ ~~of the~~ original draft.

[Signature]
Curran

3/9

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FO 371/62983

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Minutes.

I think draft B is
strong enough generally.
Mr Sciscower implies that
the Syrians cannot in fact be
induced to go further than
they have done. But I
have added a sentence
suggesting that they should
abandon their representatives
if he does not remedy the
situation.

Mr Jett (see also draft B
Sir A. Cadogan's
letter from him in
J 4083/12/G)

P. E. Grey

I prefer draft B
with the last §



M. S. G.

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Cypher/UTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTIONFROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Scrivener

D: 7.14 a.m. 2nd September, 1947

No. 585

1st September, 1947.

R: 10.10 a.m. 2nd September, 1947

Repeated to Jeddah

Bagdad

Cairo

United Kingdom Delegation New York

Beirut Saving

Khartoum "

Amman "

A A A . .

REPORT.[? reference omitted] *Tour tel. No 451*

When I started to act on your instructions during [grp undec.] interview with the Prime Minister today His Excellency took the words out of my mouth and said that he had expected a protest from His Majesty's Government. Khoury had been rebuked and asked for an explanation but had furnished no satisfactory one to date: he had bungled his task completely and I was to be assured that the Syrian President and himself had been as "shocked" as was Sir A Cadogan on reading the speech. I emphasized the deplorable impression the speech was bound to make in the United Kingdom but as recounted above I encountered no defence.

3. Whatever may be the explanation of this regrettable episode e.g. Khoury's lack of judgment or the duplicity of the Syrians (which I am inclined to doubt) I do see what further action can be usefully taken.

Please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

[repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York].

Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

FO 371/62983

XC/A/5940'6

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SECRET
Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DAMASCUS

No. 461

D. 12.30 p.m. 6th September, 1947

5th September, 1947

Repeated to: Jedda No. 355,
Bagdad No. 739,
Cairo No. 1662,
United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 2917,
Beirut No. 584,
Khartoum No. 4 Saving
Amman No. 33 Saving

u u u u u

IMPORTANT

SECRET

Your telegram No. 385 of the 1st September [Syrian attitude to the Egyptian dispute].

You should make it clear to the Syrian President and Prime Minister that we cannot consider it as sufficient that the Syrian Government should be "shocked" and that Faris Bey should be rebuked. We must ask the Syrian Government to do what they can to undo the harm that has been done and we therefore expect them to send Faris Bey precise and categorical instructions which will ensure that his attitude when the hearing is resumed on September 9th is such as to remedy (so far as can be done at this stage) the deplorable impression that has been left on the minds of ourselves and of other members of the Security Council. We find it difficult to believe that Faris Bey would disobey if his Government sent him categorical instructions in that sense; but if he did it would be open to Syrian Government to disown or recall him, explaining that he had disobeyed instructions.

Reference:-

F0371/62983

Xc/A/5940's

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J

J 4193

1947

EGYPT

122

Registry Number | J4194/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Mr Roberts MOSCOW

No. 1981

Dated Sept 3, 1947

Received in Registry | Sept 4, 1947

Soviet press on the Egyptian dispute.

Refers to Moscow telegram 1956 of August 30
(J4118/12/16)

Security Council's treatment of
the Egyptian case is the subject of an article
by Belokon in "Pravda" on September 2nd.
Comments in detail.

Last Paper.

J4193G

(Minutes.)

See J4196

References.

①
4/9

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

GA
15/6

(Indx.)

1/16
15/3/47

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Reference:-

FO 371/62983

XCA/59408

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607

J

J 4117

EGYPT and Syria

33

Registry Number : J4117/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Mr Houston-Boswall
BEIRUT
No. 632

Dated Aug, 29, 1947
Received in Registry Sept. 1, 1947

Syrian delegate's speech supporting Egypt.

Refers to Beirut telegram 612 of August 19
(J3926/12/16)

The Syrian President was deeply shocked and overcome by the delegates behaviour. The Minister of Foreign Affairs considered that he had betrayed his Government for the sake of cheap popularity.

Last Paper.

J 4116.

(Minutes.)

See J 1140

References.

See 4/7

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Amended list.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

2/1

6371/62983

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall.

No. 682

D. 7.57 a.m. 30th August, 1947

29th August, 1947

R.10.15 a.m. 30th August, 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York

Cairo)	
Bagdad)	Saving
Jedda)	
Aman)	
Damascus)	

.....

SECRET

My telegram No. 612.

Egypt.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Syrian President who had just heard of Syrian Delegate's speech in the Security Council as he was leaving Damascus to visit the Lebanese President on August 27th, had been deeply shocked and overcome by this unexpected behaviour. Even when discussing other subjects he had repeatedly reverted to the situation created by that speech which he described as catastrophic. Syrian Prime Minister appeared to be similarly affected.

2. The President had immediately telegraphed asking Syrian Delegate to explain his conduct which contradicted flatly the two letters which Fares himself had written expressing concurrence with terms of his instructions. Telegram had been carefully drafted in case Fares should show it to Egyptians.

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Syrian President considered Syrian delegate had betrayed his Government for the sake of cheap popularity. Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that he would be recalled at the end of the present session and if Anglo-Egyptian dispute remained on the agenda Syria would be represented by somebody else.

Foreign Office please pass to New York as my telegram No. 10.

[Repeated to New York (United Kingdom Delegation)].

SECRET

Reference:-

F0371/62983

XCA/59408

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620.

J

J 4179

1947

89

Registry Number } J4179/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM Mr Evens BEIRUT

No. 643

Dated Sept 2, 1947

Received in Registry } Sept 3, 1947

Syrian delegate's speech in support of Egypt refers to Beirut telegram 639 of August 31 (J4135/12/16) and Foreign Office telegram 555 of August 29 (J4080/12/16)

Discussion with the Lebanese President on September 1st. and with the Prime Minister. Everything possible would be done to induce the Syrian Government to take appropriate action.

Last Paper.

J4177

References.

(Minutes.)

See further telegram to Damascus on J. 4080.

Eastern Dept. 4/9
Sept. 8

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Action completed.)

(Index.)

94d

F0371/62983

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Cypher/OTP

CABLES DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

L.R. Evans.

D. 12.55.p.m. September 2nd, 1947.

No. 643.

September 2nd, 1947.

R. 3.40.p.m. September 2nd, 1947.

Repeated to Damascus

- Cairo.)
- Bagdad.)
- Jedda.)
- Amman.)
- U.K. Delegation New York.)

SAVING.

6 6 6 6 6

SECRET.

Your telegram 555.

Egypt.

I was received by the President on September 1st and spoke to him as authorised. His Excellency said that the question had been discussed by the Syrian and Lebanese Prime Ministers but that he had not so far received a reply from the Syrian President to his suggestion that Faris El Khoury should be recalled without delay - my telegram 639. His Excellency said he would do everything in his power to induce Syrian Government to take appropriate action and would if necessary arrange for the Prime Minister to visit Damascus within the next day or so.

2. Prime Minister whom I saw later professed to be disturbed at the Syrian delegate's attitude. Telegram giving Faris his instructions had been drafted and despatched from his house: had it been sent from Damascus there might be grounds for suspecting that its terms had been altered. Moreover he had himself been present at all meetings when the question had been discussed. As regard Faris' recall the matter was delicate: he had suggested that date of opening of Syrian Chamber should be advanced in order to induce Faris (who wished to stand for speakership) to return to Syria before the next meeting of the Security Council.



f0371/62983

Registry Number J4126/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM Mr Clarke JEDDA

No. 309

Dated Aug. 30, 1947

Received in Registry Sept. 1, 1947

King Ibn Saud and the Egyptian dispute.

Refer to Foreign Office telegram 1604 to Cairo of August 26 (J5972/12/16), and Jeddah telegrams 301 of August 24 (E7890/42/65) and 303 of August 25 (J4044/12/16)

Ibn Saud's interest lies in the preservation of the status quo in the Middle East and he looks to H.M. Government now as in the past as guardians of the peace.

Last Paper.

J4125

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Provided Ibn Saud is reassured that Great Britain will prevent an attack on his domains by Abdullah, he will turn to us rather than to Egypt for his main ally in the M.E. If we reveal ourselves as unable or, worse, unwilling to keep the peace in this region, Ibn Saud will naturally seek more binding ties with Egypt, the next strongest power in the M.E., ^{some assistance &} ~~turning~~ warning to Abdullah; and will have practically no choice, even, to commit himself to Egypt's anti-British policy in return.

If, therefore, we stand by Ibn Saud & keep his enemies quiet & immobile, we gain his support for a peaceful Middle East with mutual defence arrangements protecting the "status quo", & his influence against Egypt who wishes to disturb the peace & the "status quo" of the M.E. by quarrelling with us.

C. Howson 2/7

(Sgd.) C. HOWSON.

But see on J4139 & J4221

E. Dept. 10/10

D. S. ...

7/9

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

cal 7/10

128
29/10

Next Paper.

J4135

40513 F.O.P.

10/10

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621

J

418

1947

Registry Number | J4181/12/16

FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

No. Comps

Dated AUG 27, 1947

Received in Registry | Sept 4, 1947

Message from Field Marshal Smuts : Egyptian Case.

Refers to C.R.O. circular telegram 702 of August 20 (copy within)

Copy of a letter from Union of South X Africa to C.R.O. of August 22 conveying message from Field Marshal Smuts about the reference of the Egyptian Treaty to the International Court.

Last Paper.

J4179.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Mr. Buckett would like to see this,

Janey.

There has been no reaction from the S/P.

R 3/5

C. H. ... 5/5

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

[Handwritten mark]

FO 371/62983

XC/A/59408

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Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations

93

24 AUG 1947

418

O.P.

LETTER

From: High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa,
in London.

To: Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

D. 22nd Aug., 1947. (Ref: P.S.26/44/28)
Rcd. C.R.O. 22nd Aug., 1947.

IMMEDIATE

My dear Secretary of State,

Field Marshal Smuts has asked me to transmit the following message to you in reply to your circular D.702:-

"Egyptian Case.

Reference of validity of Egyptian treaty to international Court without more (? word omitted) would be most serious step. Personnel and composition of international court create additional risk. It is clear that sanctity of Treaties is not a matter to be questioned or even submitted to Court. This may well become a most dangerous precedent for future of U.N.O. However awkward for United Kingdom Government this is an issue calling for greatest circumspection and greatest firmness in interests of U.N.O. itself".

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) G. Heston Nicholls.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. F.T... Ashton-Gwatkin

Mr. J.P.G. Finch

Mr. R.D.J. Scott-Fox

f0371/62983

COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATIONS

OUTWARD TELEGRAM FROM DOMINIONS OFFICE

F 2311/24
CYPHER (TYPEX)

O.D.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA "
NEW ZEALAND "
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 6.0 p.m., 20th Aug., 1947.)

D.No. 702 SECRET

My telegram 9th August D.No. 683.

EGYPTIAN CASE

Reports from United Kingdom Representative to United Nations indicate that Security Council are unlikely to dismiss Egyptian plea outright and that our hope for solution which would both maintain validity of 1936 Treaty and provide for resumption of direct negotiations with case removed from agenda of Security Council is not (repeat not) likely to be realised.

2. Although majority of members of Security Council privately agree that our case at low is unassailable, they appear to be searching for some solution which might save Egyptian face by avoiding expression of opinion as to validity of 1936 Treaty. Our view is that such a solution would be most undesirable in that (a) it would imperil principle of sanctity of treaties; (b) any attempt to appease Egyptian Government, as suggested by United States Representative among others, which must be at our expense, would undermine our position in Middle East generally.

3. One suggestion which has been made in New York is that both parties should have recourse to International Court of Justice, for opinion as to validity of 1936 Treaty. Whilst indications are that decision of International Court would be in our favour, we cannot regard such reference as wholly satisfactory in that validity of 1936 Treaty is challenged. In all the circumstances, however, we are considering whether we should not be well-advised to acquiesce in a recommendation for reference to International Court. We should in any case be prepared to accept a recommendation for resumption of negotiations. But in any event it would in our view be important that Security Council's resolution should make it clear (a) that Security Council does not (repeat not) accept Egyptian contention that 1936 Treaty is no longer valid; and (b) that case is removed from agenda.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office	Mr. P.T.A. Ashton-Cwatkin
	Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)
	Mr. D.M. Riches
C.R.O. (King Charles Street)	Mr. K. Barnes (2)

E. S.

TK193/G

8 371/62983

TK193/12/916

Egypt: H.M.C.'s proposals.

103

Lord Sverdrup
W'lon
4835

Dated 3 Sept
Received 4 Sept.

Last Paper.

TK193

(Minutes)

See within

1. W'lon 4836

3 Sept.

Both repeated to Bogota.

References.

TK193/12/16

Made World Org. distribution
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(Print.)

See out tds.

(How disposed of.)

9) Nanking No 456
Brussels No 632
Paris No 1163
Warsaw No 460
Moscow No 976
Rio No 244.

Copy Nanking
Brussels
Paris
Warsaw
Moscow
Rio
Canberra (U.K.H.C.)
Damascus

19) Damascus No 136
Canberra

See New York 9th Sept 2936.

Rptd with 9159 P.T.O.
Cairo 1673

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

31 1/9

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10/9

Next Paper.

FO371/62983

DEFERRED DISTRIBUTION

(4th September 1947)

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANIZATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel
No. 4855

D. 9.45 p.m. 3rd September 1947
R. 3.40 a.m. 4th September 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York
Cairo

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Your telegram No.8944: Egypt.

Your message has been conveyed to State Department for Marshall who returned from Rio de Janeiro today.

2. I have informed State Department of your proposal for getting the Security Council out of its present impasse. They said that the Colombian Delegate had stated in the Security Council that he would not vote for the Brazilian resolution unless the Egyptian Prime Minister indicated that he was prepared to accept it. They are therefore convinced that a resolution substantially following the lines of the Brazilian resolution would not secure his vote.

3. State Department said that they had themselves worked out a formula, the text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. After discussion with Cadogan, United States delegation gave this formula to the Syrian and Egyptian representatives with an intimation that, if acceptable to them, the United States delegate would vote for it. No reply from the Syrians or the Egyptians had so far been received.

4. The State Department who liked your own draft resolution said that Herschel Johnson was due in Washington this afternoon when they would discuss the whole matter with him. Their preliminary idea was that, after prior agreement with Cadogan, the Chinese delegate should be asked to sponsor an agreed version and that the latter would be the best person to make the approach to the Colombian delegate. They stressed once again the difficulty of dealing with Lopez and of manoeuvring him in the right direction. Although Marshall is no longer in Rio de Janeiro, they will discuss with Herschel Johnson your

suggestion

Reference:-

FO 371/62983

XC/A/59408

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- 2 -

suggestion that approach might be made to the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs. They are themselves disposed to think that the method suggested above is more likely to prove effective.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 46.

[Repeated to Cairo].

100
5

FO 371/62983

104

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION.

4th September 1947.

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Cypher/OTP WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel
No. 4836

D. 10.23 p.m. September 3rd 1947
R. 3.55 a.m. September 4th 1947

September 3rd, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York
Cairo.

SSSSS

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text:-

Draft resolution in the Egyptian case used by the United States Delegation in conversations, the Security Council having considered the dispute between the United Kingdom and Egypt, brought to its attention by the letter of Prime Minister of Egypt, dated July 8th, 1947, recognising the natural desire of the Egyptian Government for the early and complete evacuation of British troops from Egypt, having confidence that the renewal of negotiations between the parties will result in the early evacuation of British troops from Egypt and also in the settlement of the other issues in dispute between the parties, recommends that the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt

(a) resume their negotiations, and

(b) keep the Security Council informed of the progress of these negotiations, and report thereon to the Council in the first instance not later than January 1st, 1948.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 47.

[Repeated to Cairo]

f0371/62983

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

CYPLER/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To Permanent United Kingdom Representative
to the United Nations)

No. 2,936.

D: 11.43 p.m. 5th September, 1947.

5th September, 1947.

Repeated to: Washington No. 9,159,
Cairo No. 1,673.

@@@ @@@ @@@

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

SECRET

Washington telegram No. 4,835 [of September 3rd:
Egyptian dispute].

The State Department formula is, of course unsatisfactory to us. If, as stated in paragraph 3 of Washington telegram under reference, this formula was shown to you, I assume you must have made this clear to the United States Delegation. They should also be told that we assume that they will not either put it forward or vote for it, even if it is acceptable to the Syrian and Egyptian representatives.

2. The over-riding objection to the State Department formula is that it is unduly balanced in favour of the Egyptian point of view. The effect of this is to put His Majesty's Government in the dock and this they feel is quite unjustified.

3. On reconsideration therefore I am not prepared to go further than the formula contained in my immediately following telegram, and this should at once be made clear to your American colleague. You will note that this text is less forthcoming than the text contained in my telegram No. 2,865 which you were authorised to canvass a few days ago. In particular:

(a) I have replaced the phrase "recognising the natural desire of the Egyptian Government" by the phrase "noting the desire of the Egyptian Government". I now feel that the original formula went too far, especially since there was a lack of balance between it and the following phrase regarding continuance in force of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which merely spoke of noting;

/(b)

Fo 371/62983

XC/A/59408

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- 2 -

(b) The phrase about the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in my telegram No.2865 was doubtful, since the excess of troops over 10,000 who are at present in Egypt cannot be said to be there, as implied, by virtue of the Treaty. I have therefore re-drafted this phrase to clarify that point and also to make it clearer that in our view the Treaty of 1936 is still in force.

(c) I have struck out the bracketted phrase in the last sentence of all, since I do not consider that we should be tied down to reporting by a certain date.

(d) I should prefer but should not insist on the concluding phrase in (a) at end of my immediately following telegram providing for a solution of the dispute should direct negotiations fail.

4. I quite recognise that it may be impossible to get the Security Council to adopt a resolution in the sense of my immediately following telegram. On the other hand the chances may well be that the Security Council will not be able to adopt any resolution at all. If this situation occurred it would be no disadvantage so far as we are concerned. Indeed it would be infinitely preferable to the passing of any resolution which was at all objectionable from our point of view. For if the Security Council is powerless to pass any resolution the Egyptian appeal will in effect have failed and we shall then be left with the 1936 Treaty whose validity we shall continue stoutly to maintain.

5. If, however, after trying this line on your American colleague, you come to the conclusion that it is too tough i.e. that there is any danger of its resulting in seven members of the Security Council becoming seriously annoyed and passing anything objectionable over our heads, you should at once report to me and suggest any modifications that seem good to you.

f8371/62983

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No. 2957

September 5th, 1947. D. 12.03 a.m. September 6th, 1947.

Repeated to Washington No. 9160 Immediate
Cairo No. 1674
Bogota No. 255

SSSSS

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

GIANT

My immediately preceding telegram [of September 5th: Egyptian dispute].

Following is text referred to.

[Begins]

"The Security Council:

Having considered the dispute between the United Kingdom and Egypt brought to its attention by the letter of the Prime Minister of Egypt dated July 8th, 1947;

Considering that the methods of adjustment provided for by Article 53 of the Charter have not been exhausted; and believing that the settlement of the dispute may best be obtained under existing circumstances through recourse to those methods;

Noting the desire of the Egyptian Government for the early and complete evacuation of British troops from Egypt;

Noting also that the Government of the United Kingdom, notwithstanding the fact that the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 is still in force, have shown their willingness to negotiate a revision of that Treaty which would involve the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt;

Having confidence that the renewal of negotiations will result in agreement between the two parties;

Urges the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt

/(u)

Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

F0371/62983

XC/A/59408

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-2-

(a) to resume direct negotiations and should such negotiations fail, to seek a solution of the dispute by other peaceful means of their own choice; and

(b) to inform the Security Council of the result of those negotiations.

[Ends]

Secret.
Confidential
Restricted.
Open.

6037/62983

F. O.,

(19/194)

Guaranteed Despatched 12 50 PM

Draft.
UNDEL
NEW YORK

DEDIP
SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Following for Cadogan from Sargent.

Telegram.
No. 2938
(Date) Sept 5-4

Original telegram No. 2136

Repeat to :—

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

PRIPER

~~En Clair.~~
~~Cable~~
Cypher.

Distribution :—

~~WORLD ORG.~~

Copies to :—

As it seems to me, two delegates really hold the trump cards in this affair so far as we are concerned. In the first place the French are sympathetic to our general point of view and could in the last resort veto any resolution which did not have our approval. On the other hand, in view of our general attitude towards the veto, we would not wish to put the French in an embarrassing position unless it was absolutely vital. Consequently, we could not altogether rely on this element for rejecting some resolution which, though not entirely acceptable to us, might form the basis for agreement in the Council.

2. The second delegate with the trump card, however, is of course the Colombian, and it occurs to me that it might not be impossible to play on this gentleman's vanity, or indeed on any other unsuspected weakness that he may possess, to the extent of getting him to agree that he should stick to his lofty and judicial attitude of not voting in favour of any resolution which is unacceptable to either party. It is not quite clear from your telegrams whether the Colombian has definitely committed himself to this attitude; but he has come very

/near

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

f0371/62983

near it, and I do not see why we could not suggest to him that this is in any case the path of wisdom. If so, then I should see every advantage in your handing Senor Lopez a copy of the draft resolution contained in ^{our} ~~my~~ ~~immediately~~ ^{Mr. P. J. E.} following telegram explaining that we cannot, for our part, willingly accept anything which goes beyond this, though naturally we might accept some shortened version devised by the Brazilian, the Chinese, or even by such a master of formulae as himself. The point is that if by one means or another the Colombian can be induced to abstain from voting when it comes to the point (always supposing that the resolution voted on is acceptable from our point of view) the Council may be unable to get the necessary majority of seven - unless indeed the motion is so objectionable as to recruit the suffrages of the Syrian, the Pole and the Russian which (we may hope) is unlikely. If the Council is paralyzed in this way it is true that its prestige may sink even lower; but at least the Egyptians will have gained nothing by bringing their case before it.

3. If by any chance you should be unable to approach the Colombian or if he is reluctant to display his hand please let me know at once so that we may consider taking up the matter in Bogota.

4. This telegram is ~~entirely personal~~ and I am not repeat not repeating it anywhere.

is has been seen by the S/S unit

BP
ep-5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

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F0371/62983

XC/A/59408

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1947

1947

Registry Number : J4098/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM U.K.DEL. NEW YORK

No. 2418

Dated Aug. 29, 1947

Received in Registry } Aug. 30, 1947

Egyptian dispute : Security Council meeting, Aug. 29.

Hearing of the case ended in completely negative result, and the case was adjourned until September 9th.

Last Paper.

J4083 G

(Minutes.)

OSS. 1/9.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

See repetition slip within

62983

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Red.

Handwritten initials

F0371/62983

4098

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No: 2418

D. 11.35.p.m. 29th August 1947

29th August 1947

R. 4.50.a.m. 30th August 1947

Repeated to Cairo

Washington

X:X:X:

LOST IMMEDIATE

Giant.

Secret.

Hearing of Egyptian case this afternoon ended in completely negative result, and case was adjourned until Tuesday 9th September, one day having already been taken out of Security Council's planned holiday in order to attempt to finish it.

2. Instructions resulting from your remonstrances to State Department were only telephoned to United States Delegate after hearing had been proceeding for some time. We ourselves gathered from a telephonic message from Washington that these instructions were satisfactory as regards United States support on question of Brazilian resolution, but did not cover the further point about pressing Colombian delegate to come into line, since it was realised that there was no time for such pressure to be brought to bear by United States Delegate or anyone else. In fact Colombian Delegate's continued unwillingness to abandon his own resolution in favour of the Brazilian was the main cause of the unsatisfactory outcome of today's meeting.

See my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo as my telegram No: 74.

[Repeated to Cairo].

AGG
1947
AUG 30 11 35 AM

Reference: -

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Xc/A/59408

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J 4099

30 11 1947

5

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number } J4099/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM
 Lord Inverchapel
 No. WASHINGTON
 4758

Dated } Aug. 29, 1947
 Received in Registry } Aug. 30, 1947

United States attitude to the Egyptian dispute

Refers to Foreign Office telegrams 8842 and 8843 of August 29 (J4081/12/16)

Information has been conveyed to the United States Government, who have recommended the course of action desired to their delegation at the Security Council.

Last Paper.

J4098

(Minutes.)

see out tel.

References.

DSS.
1/9.

See within: Tel. from Athens 1636 of Sept 9.

Repeated by Southern Dept.

Drury

(Print.)

*(all) Athens, Oct. 1875
 Tel. Washington
 10844 Sept 1.
 Jptd. J.K. Del. N.Y. 2866
 Cairo 1646 J.*

Action completed.)

(Index.)

Call

NY

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on].

Cypher OFF

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel

No. 4758

D. 7.30 p.m. 29th August 1947.

29th August 1947.

R. 12.53 a.m. 30th August 1947.

Repeated to U.K. Del. New York
Cairo

IMMEDIATE
SECRET

rrrrrr

Your telegrams Nos. 8812 and 8813 - Egypt.

Lovett was not able to see me until 2.30 p.m. today when I urged him to telephone to United States Delegate on the Security Council in the sense you suggest.

2. I thought it best to drive home orally the substance of your proposed message to Marshall and of the first paragraph of your telegram No. 8813 rather than request him to convey your message to Marshall.

3. Although he was obviously not aware of what Herschel Johnson had said yesterday until I told him, Lovett was inclined to defend the latter's conduct on the ground that a certain amount of manoeuvring appeared unavoidable in the Security Council in cases such as these. He likened the Security Council to a "concrete mixer" the shape of whose products it was impossible to determine precisely in advance. It seemed to him that our representatives had to exercise a certain amount of discretion in finding loopholes and byways to secure the best possible result.

4. At all events Lovett instructed Rusk, Head of the Office of Special Political Affairs, to telephone at once to the United States Delegation to recommend the course of action you desire. This was done and the State Department and we ourselves are now waiting to hear from New York how the matter turns out. The State Department officials concerned appear to foresee some difficulty in dealing with the Colombian Delegate.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 45.

[Repeated to Cairo].

FO 371/62983

XC/A/59408

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Cypher/ TP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTONNo. 8944

1st September, 1947.

D. 9.45p.m. 1st September, 1947.

Repeated to : United Kingdom Delegation,
New York, No. 2866
Cairo No. 1646

IMMEDIATELISECRET

Your telegram No. 4758 [of 29th August: Egyptian dispute].

You should ask State Department to transmit my message to Mr. Marshall as soon as possible.

2. State Department appear inclined to make light of the harm which we fear may have been done by Mr. Herschel Johnson's remarks and I am anxious that we should not repeat the error which we made at an earlier stage of failing to make our views perfectly clear to the Secretary of State and State Department (see my telegram No. 8241).

3. You will see from my telegram No. 2864 to New York that it appears to us that if the Security Council are to get out of their present impasse, satisfactory solution can only be on the lines of original Brazilian resolution with minimum of alteration. Attitude of Colombian delegate is once more likely to be decisive. You should therefore express to the State Department the hope that they will bring what influence they can to bear on him. It might be very helpful if General Marshall were to urge the Colombian Minister for Foreign Affairs at Rio de Janeiro to see that satisfactory instructions are sent to the Colombian delegate.

6371/62983

Registry } J4100/12/16
 Number }
 TELEGRAM FROM
 U.K.DEL. NEW YORK
 No. ~~TEXT~~ 2419
 Dated Aug. 29, 1947
 Received }
 in Registry } Aug. 30, 1947

Egyptian dispute : Security Council meeting, Aug. 29

Refers to New York telegram 2418 of Aug. 29 (J4098)

Gives summary of the speeches made by the various delegates at the meeting dealing with the Egyptian dispute.

Last Paper.

J4099

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

- 9) Hanking No. 455
 - Warsaw No. 458
 - Paris No. 1159
 - Rio de Janeiro No. 243
 - Bogota No. 118
 - Damascus No. 155
 - Buenos Aires No. 630
- Sept. 9

Tel. U.K. Del N. York
 No. 2864 Sept 1.
 Rpt. Washington 8942
 P.S.O.

(Action completed.)
 102
 12/9

(Index.)
 R/L
 11/3/49

Next Paper.

J 4104

(Minutes.)

See int tels.

OSS.
1/7.

Letter from Ti Lasceles
of 3rd Sept.

Copy Cairo, Damascus,
& Paris.

R
8/9

fo 371/62983

En Clair

WORLD ORGANIZATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No. 2419.

August 29th, 1947.

D.

R. 7.15 a.m.

August 29th, 1947.

August 30th, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo

Washington SAVING

JJJ

LOST IMMEDIATE

GIANT by immediately preceding telegram.

Colombian opened debate. He said he had no objection to latest Chinese amendment ("legitimacy" point) which was implied in his own resolution. As regards first paragraph of his resolution several objections had been raised to the clause relating to mutual assistance and he therefore thought that the two parts of this paragraph should be voted upon separately. If however, the clause about mutual assistance were rejected or not voted upon separately the 1936 Treaty would in his view remain in full force. He could not object if Security Council as a whole deleted mention of any of objectives he had enumerated. He might have redrafts of his own to propose later e.g. to effect that mutual assistance "should be discussed once evacuation had been completed". But he did not think it in accordance with Council's rules for a member to suggest amendments to his own resolution before it had been passed upon.

2. Soviet Delegate declared mutual assistance clause totally unacceptable as it would be tantamount to putting fetters upon Egypt. Furthermore the clause regarding mutual assistance was clearly intended to ensure that foreign troops should remain in Egypt "though under certain conditions". As regards Colombian resolution the clause relating to Sudan also was quite unacceptable as indeed anything else would be which did not prescribe immediate and full evacuation of foreign troops.

3. I observed that on seeing text of Colombian resolution I had realised that we were in for trouble. It seemed to me that as Brazilian Delegate had pointed out this resolution was attempting to "spell out" too much. Security Council wanted parties to get together and it would not facilitate this if Council at present stage were to be too specific about subject matter of negotiations and limits within which they were to be confined. I could not however, agree with Soviet Representative that either resolution imposed unfair conditions on Egypt: provision that parties were to report on progress to Council provided necessary safeguard. As regards Colombian

proposal/....

proposal for separate voting on two clauses while at first sight this might appear unexceptionable, the fact was that each clause balanced the other, one being intended to please the Egyptians and other ourselves. The paragraph should therefore be voted on as a whole. If the first half were accepted and the second rejected this would be totally unsatisfactory and unacceptable to my Government. The first half would give the Egyptians all they wanted while suppression of second half would deny to us (since suppression of a phrase once proposed would amount to a positive denial) what we considered to be an essential condition of early total evacuation before expiry of a Treaty under which we had right to maintain troops. As regards the Sudan clause in Colombian resolution, I must assume it to imply that termination of Administration would not take place until Sudanese had been brought to an advanced state in which they would be capable of self-Government. In fact therefore the meaning of this clause must be that two parties should discuss acceleration of measures introducing self-Government. Finally as regards Chinese amendment I saw no objection to general sense of it but suggested that "legitimacy" was wrong as it implied Egypt had a legal grievance. I added that I greatly preferred Brazilian resolution.

4. French Delegate said that though Brazilian resolution had been acceptable to him yesterday he regretted that with subsequent additions it was no longer so. At present stage Security Council had no other task than to invite parties to enter into direct negotiations. It was not for Council to give a date for starting them or to say how they should be conducted. There should be no attempt to prescribe evacuation of Egypt or a new regime for Sudan. Only in case of failure of negotiations might Council be called upon to arbitrate on these questions.

5. Belgian insisted that Council's resolution should remain within framework of Article 35. It was for this reason that he had signified his intention to vote for Brazilian resolution. Colombian resolution was entirely different in spirit. It attempted to go into merits of case and could only add to difficulties of Council. As Colombian delegate had himself emphasised co-operation between two parties was an essential condition. After Nekrashi's statement and mine, the Council could have no further illusions about ultimate result of Colombian resolution if adopted.

6. Polish Delegate said that while majority had shown marked sympathy for Egyptian case the Council as a whole had shirked its duty. Brazilian resolution was quite useless and Colombian resolution was worse. Latter indeed went further than original British demands. His Majesty's Government had, he said, recognised fully that provisions of 1936 Treaty were untenable and out of date but Colombian resolution tried to impose status quo indefinitely. In any case it went far beyond competence of Council, for who was to determine when a threat to peace became imminent or from what quarter it was to be apprehended? As

regards/.....

regards the Sudan the Council could not allow negotiations on the future of that country to be made a condition precedent to withdrawal of troops from Egypt.

7. Australian Delegate said that had Colombian resolution been put at an earlier stage it would have been regarded as merely an amendment to the Brazilian and would have been treated as such. He objected to it anyhow because

(1) it seemed to him in some respects "loaded" against Egypt as compared with Brazilian resolution

(2) it attempted to place whole question under Chapter 7 of Charter by its use of mandatory phrase "calls upon". Once the Council attempted to embark upon definition of objectives to be negotiated there would be no end. All objectives must be mentioned or none at all. Security Council must deal in general principles only. He had heard no approval of Colombian resolution except from Brazilian delegate and he preferred the latter's resolution. He therefore urged the President somehow to get back to it.

8. Colombian Delegate said one of reasons for rejection of Brazilian resolution had been that it had not been acceptable to Egyptians. Reason now advanced against his own resolution was that it was acceptable neither to him nor Nokrashi. Was it now suggested that Brazilian resolution was acceptable to both? He objected to Australian demand for withdrawal of his resolution without vote as not in accordance with Council's rules. After some plaintive remarks to effect that he had accidentally incurred odium generally reserved for great powers possessing veto he attempted to defend his resolution against Australian criticism. It was not his resolution but situation itself which was "loaded" against Egypt. He then read out at length extracts from Articles 7 and 8 of 1936 Treaty emphasising that Treaty was still a valid instrument but baring the Council in process. However if Nokrashi signified readiness to accept Brazilian resolution he himself would vote for it after asking permission to withdraw his own.

9. Nokrashi said Brazilian resolution was not acceptable to him.

10. Syrian President thereupon interposed what he called a "clarification" of his speech of yesterday. Gist was that Article 8 of Treaty was exceptional in that it contained no reciprocal obligations. Under it British were merely authorised to maintain troops in Egypt. If His Majesty's Government withdrew troops now the question of validity of Treaty would not be effected. Under Article 7 military alliance would continue and presence of troops was not necessary to ensure such collaboration. There were some 50,000 British troops stationed in the Canal Zone now and during the recent war there had been many hundreds of thousands. He once more urged withdrawal of British troops as a spontaneous gesture preceding any resumption of negotiations.

See
connection
within

11./.....

11. Colombian Delegate said he had been disposed at an earlier stage to comply with Australian request for withdrawal of his resolution but Council was now running away from his proposal when it seemed on verge of success. Evidently a majority was in favour of evacuation of troops and objected to clause relating to mutual defence. He therefore pressed for voting separately on two clauses but emphasised again that Treaty would stand if second clause were rejected.

12. At this point I reminded Council that as Chinese Delegate had stated yesterday the real objective was to reach a solution tolerable to both parties. Egyptians had objected to Colombian resolution (as I had not pace Colombian Delegate) and many members of Council were still trying to meet Egyptian Prime Minister. But my Government were also a party to this dispute and I had already pointed out that deletion of clause relating to mutual assistance would render whole Colombian resolution totally unacceptable to us. I was surely entitled to object just as much as Nekrashi was. Treaty would indeed remain in force if this clause were deleted but was this really what Council wanted?

13. After further speech by Colombian Delegate his resolution was then put to vote clause by clause as follows:

First part - words down to "with a view" five in favour (Brazil, China, Colombia, Syria, United States)

five abstentions

Second part: words down to "from Egyptian territory" same five in favour, five abstentions

Third part: mutual assistance clause ten abstentions (including United States)

Fourth part: Sudan clause four in favour (Colombia, Brazil, United States, Syria) six abstentions

14. President nevertheless then attempted to put also to vote the final clause about keeping Security Council informed. Australian Delegate pointed out that this was ridiculous. Soviet Delegate supported Australian contention insofar as attempted vote had been specifically upon last paragraph of Colombian resolution but urged that if it were a question of dispute remaining on Agenda there must either be a vote on this or a statement by President that all members were in favour. President said that matter must certainly remain on Agenda. Council could not dismiss it if no majority decision had been given.

15. Chinese Delegate observed that both resolutions having failed a different angle of approach must be tried. Key to whole problem was evacuation of troops after which there would be a better atmosphere. Therefore while not making a formal motion he suggested that Council might "recognise reasonableness of Egyptian aspirations, take note that His Majesty's Government had already partially withdrawn British troops, and urge the two Governments to proceed with their negotiations".

16./.....

FO 371/62983

XC/A/59408

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- 5 -

16. United States Delegate said that unless United Kingdom and Egypt indicated such strong objection to this Chinese proposal as would make it obviously impossible to implement he would be glad to support it. He would like to add a phrase to effect that Council "having confidence that renewal of negotiations will result in early evacuation of British troops from Egypt and also in settlement of other issues in dispute between the two parties etc....". Chinese Delegate said that he would be glad to incorporate American idea in his own new proposal which had been designed to show confidence in success of negotiations for early evacuation.

17. President after consulting with Grayke (who becomes President from tomorrow) said that these new ideas required study and that case would therefore have to be adjourned until September 9th.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 75.

[Repeated to Cairo.]

F0371/62983

SECRET

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTI

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(TO U.K. DELEGATION)

No. 2834.

D. 9.00 p.m. 1st September, 1947.
1st September, 1947.

Repeated to Washington No. 8943
Cairo No. 1844
Bogota No. 225
Moscow No. 2848
Warsaw No. 1155
Nanking No. 948
Brussels No. 570
Paris No. 1718 Saving.
Damascus No. 453
Canberra No. U/N (U.K. High Commissioner)
Rio de Janeiro No. 147

IMMEDIATE.

GI NT.

SECRET.

Your telegram No. 2419 [of 29th August: Egyptian dispute].

Best course now appears to be to work for approval by Security Council of the Brazilian resolution in something as near as possible to its simple original form. If however it proves unavoidable that some amendments should be embodied in that resolution then least objectionable form would be that contained in my immediately following telegram, but I should in any event much prefer that passages in brackets in the text in that telegram should be omitted.

2. You will note that text in my immediately following telegram includes the United States suggestion and substance of Chinese proposal in paragraphs 15 and 16 of your telegram under reference. This has necessitated changing order of paragraphs. The Chinese suggestion is open to objections explained in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 2827 although reference to "reasonableness" would be rather less objectionable than reference to "legitimacy".

/3.

Fo 371/62983

XC/A/59408

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3. I take it that Chinese proposal is not meant to secure omission of (a) and (b) of last paragraph of Brazilian resolution, but if it did we should for our part see no objection, since although we see some advantage in inclusion of reference to "seeking a solution of the dispute by other peaceful means of their own choice" that would be more than offset by advantage of omission of requirement that Security Council should be kept informed of the results of the negotiations.

4. Even if the resolution only speaks of Egyptian desire that British troops should be withdrawn, this statement must in common fairness be balanced by a corresponding statement showing that His Majesty's Government hold the 1936 treaty to be valid. The points of view of the two parties can either be ignored in the resolution or both can be placed on record. But it would be quite improper to state the view of only one of the parties, i.e. Egypt. Hence addition suggested in paragraph 4 of text in my immediately following telegram.

5. As regards fixing a date for the parties to report back to the Council, I hope that you will be able to resist this. It would be illogical to stipulate that the Council be informed of the "result" of the negotiations and at the same time to fix here and now a date to report back to the Council since it would be premature to assume that any result could be achieved in a definite brief period.

F0371/62983

OUT FILE 23

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION
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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To Permanent United Kingdom Representative to
United Nations)

No. 2865

D. 1.0 a.m. 1st September, 1947.

1st September, 1947.

Repeated to : Washington No. 8943 Brussels No. 571
Cairo No. 1645 Paris No. 1719 Saving
Begeza No. 226 Damascus No. 457
Moscow No. 2849 Canberra (United Kingdom
Warsaw No. 1156 High Commissioner)
Nanking No. 949 Rio de Janeiro No. 448

IMMEDIATE

IM

SECRET

GLANT

My immediately preceding telegram [of September 1st:
Egyptian dispute].

Following is text referred to.

[Begins]

"The Security Council:

Having considered the dispute between the United Kingdom
and Egypt brought to its attention by the letter of the
Prime Minister of Egypt dated July 8th, 1947;

Considering that the methods of adjustment provided for
by Article 33 of the Charter have not been exhausted; and
believing that the settlement of the dispute may best be
obtained under existing circumstances through recourse to these
methods;

Recognising the (natural) desire of the Egyptian
Government for the early and complete evacuation of British
troops from Egypt;

Neting

Reference:-

FO 371/62983

XC/A/59408

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UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
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NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

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REPLIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED
P. O. Box 304
NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

4100/12/16

3 September 1947.

My dear David,

On looking at the stenographic record produced by the Secretariat of the meeting on 29th August, I find that paragraph 10 of our telegram number 2/19, of that date, is incorrect. What Fares el-Ihouri actually said was not that we had 50,000 troops stationed in Egypt now, but that Egypt was "now able to station there not only 10,000 troops, but 50,000". He also made the astonishing statement that in the First World War more than a million "men of Egypt" were engaged in the defence of the Canal.

I don't think this really matters at all. The only thing that does matter is that this (despite the dreadful concern felt by the Syrian President according to Damascus telegrams) is the third of Fares el-Ihouri's out-and-out pro-Egyptian speeches before the Council. The Secretariat's record is not, of course, available when we telegraph the results of the meeting, and it is sometimes difficult to get everything down in longhand that matters. Probably my guilty conscience in regard to the number of troops still stationed in Egypt was the cause of my mishearing what Fares said on this point! However, I have felt it best to draw attention to the inaccuracy "for the record".

Yours ever,

R.D.J. Scott Fox Esq.,
Egyptian Department,
Foreign Office.

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Registry Number } J4125/12/16
 FROM Mr M.R. Wright
 (P.O. MINUTE)
 No.
 Dated AUG 29, 1947
 Received in Registry } Sept 1, 1947

Conversation with Mr Lewis Jones , U.S. Embassy
 on August 29th.

H.M. Government were perturbed by Mr Herschel Johnson's statements at the Security Council as if they represented the United States policy this could only mean that they were opposed to mutual defence arrangements between H.M. Gov't and the Middle East countries. The political and strategic implications were obvious and disturbing.

Last Paper. J4118
References.
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I saw Mr. Lewis Jones of the American Embassy at 3 p.m. today. I gave him the gist of our telegrams to New York and Washington respectively and underlined how seriously we were perturbed by Mr. Herschel Johnson's statements before the Council. If they represented the United States policy this could only mean that the United States Government were opposed to mutual defence arrangements between H.M.G. and the Middle East countries. The political and strategic implications were obvious and profoundly disturbing. If this was really the view of the United States Government they would presumably be approaching us and we should have to review our whole policy in the Middle East. If, on the other hand, Mr. Herschel Johnson's statements did not reflect the policy of the United States Government we earnestly hoped that Mr. Marshall would take an early occasion to make the United States attitude clear.

I added that we were extremely disappointed that Mr. Herschel Johnson should have openly stated to the Council that he interpreted the Brazilian resolution as meaning that the question stayed on the Agenda of the Council. We had repeatedly informed the United States Government of the importance we attached to the matter coming off the Agenda. If the United States Government thought that we were unwise in pressing this we had at least hoped that they would abstain. In going out of his way to take the opposite view Mr. Johnson had acted in a manner which seemed to us as unfriendly as it was embarrassing.

I told Mr. Jones that our Chiefs of Staff would probably be taking up with the American Chiefs of Staff the strategic importance of Mr. Johnson's statements.

MR Wright

29th August, 1947.

Mr. Scott-Pox. ^{ESB}
Mr. Makins. ^{29/8}

We might copy this to Washington, N. York & Cairo, ref. our tel. no. 8842 to Washington

DS. Tu form
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EGYPT

Registry Number J4151/12/16
 FROM Mr Scott Fox (F.O. MINUTE)
 No.
 Dated Aug. 30, 1947
 Received in Registry Sept 3, 1947

Egyptian dispute at the Security Council

Discusses the sequence of events with reference to the Brazilian and Colombian resolutions. Attaches two out telegrams outlining the solution that is the best likely to be obtained when the Council discusses the matter again on September 9th.

Last Paper.

J4145

References.

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EGYPTIAN DISPUTE.

I submit two draft telegrams, drafted after discussion with Mr. Jebu, which we suggest should be discussed with the Secretary of State on Monday. A further telegram will also be required to urge the State Department to see that the U.S. Delegate supports us and to try to bring the Colombian Delegate into line.

2. Very briefly the sequence of events has been as follows. When the Brazilian Resolution (Flag A) was voted on in the Council on the 28th August it received six favourable votes and thus just failed to be carried. There was only one unfavourable vote (Poland) but there were three abstentions (Syria, U.S.S.R. and Colombia). The scales were tipped against it by the insistence of the Colombian Delegate in putting up a resolution of his own (Flag B). At this juncture we were completely let down by an extraordinary speech by the U.S. Delegate in which he said that he considered the clause about mutual assistance pointless, (paragraph 18 of New York telegram No.2406 - Flag C). At Flag D. are the telegrams which we sent to New York and Washington to remonstrate, and Washington's reply just received. The matter has also been taken up with the U.S. Embassy here, and with the U.S. War Department by the Chiefs of Staff.

3. The Colombian Resolution was voted on yesterday clause by clause and failed to get the requisite number of favourable votes on any clause. You will see from the last 3 paragraphs of New York telegram No.2419 (Flag E.) that at the end of the debate the Security Council appeared to be feeling their way back towards some amended version of the Brazilian Resolution and in the light of Sir A. Cadogan's reports so far received, we consider that a solution on the lines of the attached drafts is the best that we are likely to be able to obtain when the Council discusses the matter again on September 9th.

D. Scott Fox
R.D.J. Scott Fox,
30th August, 1947.

Sir O. Sargent.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Proposed Resolution before meeting
of the 29th August.

The Security Council having considered the dispute between the United Kingdom and Egypt brought to its attention by the letter of the Prime Minister of Egypt dated July 8th 1947.

Considering that the methods of adjustment provided for by Article 33 of the Charter have not been exhausted; and believing that the settlement of the dispute may best be obtained under existing circumstances through recourse to those methods.

Noting that the Government of the United Kingdom have already partially withdrawn their troops from Egypt and are ready to negotiate on the completion of the evacuation.

Invites the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt

(a) to resume direct negotiations + [which, in so far as they affect the future and the administration of the Sudan, should include consultation with the Sudanese⁺ and, should such negotiations fail, to seek a solution of the dispute by other peaceful means of their own choice⁺ [including the reference to the International Court of Justice of any dispute relating to the validity of the Treaty of 1936;]⁺

(b) to keep the Security Council informed of the results of these negotiations and to report thereon to the Council in the first instance not later than 1st January 1948.

* Both these amendments were voted on and rejected by substantial majorities before the substantive Brazilian resolution was put to the vote.