

FO 371/62978

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THE WAR OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.1

114

2nd August 1947.

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10/1/47

6 AUG 1947

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Dear Scott Fox,

Please refer to Charteris' letter under above number to Acheson dated 24th July, 1947.

Attached are two copies of the brief which has been prepared by the War Office in consultation with the Admiralty and the Air Ministry for the case of Lieut-General Stone, CB., DSO., MC, should he be required to go to America to assist Sir Alexander Cadogan.

I am sending a copy of this letter and the brief to Colonel Haddon.

Yours

Sincerely

Ned Harcourt

Hyp. 65

R.D.J. Scott-Fox Esq.,
Egyptian Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

(Operations Duty Office)

EGYPT - Appeal before the Security Council U.N.O.

This memorandum, prepared in accordance with instructions of the Chiefs of Staff, is divided into four parts :-

- Part I - General
- Part II - Army assistance to the Egyptians
- Part III - R.A.F. assistance to the Egyptians
- Part IV - Naval assistance to the Egyptians.
- Part V - Conclusions

PART I - GENERAL

1. It is possible that the Egyptians may accuse us before the Security Council of having failed to train and equip the Egyptian Armed Forces sufficiently well to enable them alone to undertake the defence of the Suez Canal.
2. Under the terms of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance we are bound to :-
 - (a) Provide Army and Air Force instructors.
 - (b) Provide proper training in the United Kingdom for any personnel of the Egyptian Forces which the Egyptian Government may desire to send for the purpose of being trained.
 - (c) Supply such armament and equipment from the United Kingdom, at prices similar to those which would be paid by His Majesty's Government, whenever the Egyptian Government so desire.
3. In order to fulfil these terms a British Military Mission consisting of 100 Army and 25 R.A.F. all ranks was appointed. During the war these numbers were increased to a total of approx. 200 all ranks.
4. Since this Mission has been the agent through which His Majesty's Government have attempted to carry out their military obligations, the Egyptian accusations will presumably be directed chiefly against it, and will try to prove that it has failed to do its job.
5. It is not the intention of this paper to argue that it has succeeded in making the Egyptian Army and Air Force efficient fighting weapons, nor that the Egyptians are in any way capable of ensuring, unaided, the defence of the Canal. They are NOT. Their Armed Forces are woefully inefficient and inadequate. It is however contended that their inefficiency can in no way be blamed on His Majesty's Government nor the Military Mission. It springs from their inherent lack of soldierly qualities and their unwillingness to devote sufficient funds to the equipment of their forces.
6. We have considered the grounds on which the Egyptians are most likely to accuse us, and these appear to fall under three main heads :-
 - (a) Equipment. It is probable that we shall be accused of having failed to supply them with sufficient equipment, of the required standard, or in having provided it after undue delay, ~~and at exorbitant prices.~~

(b) Training. On this score we may be taxed with having granted them an inadequate number of courses, and in having charged unduly high prices for those we have given them. The Mission may also be charged in having failed to train the Egyptian Army sufficiently well.

(c) Advice. It may be said that the advice we have given them has been inadequate and faulty.

These three questions are dealt with in detail in the various parts.

FINANCE.

7. Apart from the detailed refutation of the various likely accusations which the Egyptians may bring against us there appears to be at least one point with which we may fairly tax them: that is that they have failed to make their armed forces efficient by failing to make adequate financial provision. It is axiomatic that an armed force cannot be efficiently equipped or organised unless the Government of its country is prepared to spend sufficient money on it. Below are the amounts which have been voted yearly for the maintenance of all the Egyptian armed forces:-

| SERIAL | YEAR | AMOUNT IN £E | REMARKS |
|--------|---------|--------------|--|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| 1 | 1935-36 | 1,900,984 | |
| 2 | 1936-37 | 2,050,298 | |
| 3 | 1937-38 | 2,862,645 | |
| 4 | 1938-39 | 4,999,537 | |
| 5 | 1939-40 | 7,688,000 | } Cost of Egyptian Coastguards added to Armed Forces budget in Serials 5 - 10. |
| 6 | 1940-41 | 6,362,892 | |
| 7 | 1941-42 | 6,161,620 | |
| 8 | 1942-43 | 6,156,468 | |
| 9 | 1943-44 | 7,067,298 | |
| 10 | 1944-45 | 7,230,502 | |

It will be seen that from 1939 onwards the budget for the armed forces has also included an amount for the Coast guards. The breakdown, as between the various arms, of the total figures is not available but it is known that in the region of £E2½ millions were spent on the Coast guards yearly between 1936 and 1939.

On the assumption that the expenditure on the Coast guards remained approximately the same after 1939 it can be deduced that the total amount left for the Army, Navy and Air Force was in the order of £E4½ millions.

/The Egyptian Army...

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The Egyptian Army consists of between 25,000 and 30,000 all ranks. It is organised on the following basis:-

One Training Brigade
Six Independent battalions
One Divisional artillery in cadre form.
Two heavy *AA* Regiments.
One light *AA* Regiment.

There are in addition a large number of schools.

The Egyptian Air Force consists of approximately 6 squadrons organised as follows:-

Three fighter squadrons.
One general reconnaissance squadron.
One intercommunication flight.
One training squadron.
One meteorological flight.

There is in addition a flying and technical training school. It is obvious therefore that the sum allotted annually, even on the assumption that it is fully expended, is hopelessly inadequate for the purpose.

3. In answering the three main accusations which we may expect the Egyptians to bring against us, (see para 6 above), we have concentrated largely on the period from the end of the late war until the present day. We consider that any accusations they may produce against us for the period 1936-1939 may be dismissed as irrelevant, whilst any accusation of failure on our part to train and equip them during the war can be answered in the sense that our own shortages, at least until 1944, made it impossible to provide equipment for foreign forces that were not actively engaged in fighting with our allies.

PART II - ARMY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPTIANS

EQUIPMENT

1. General. As has already been said our own shortages during the war largely precluded the possibility of supplying the Egyptians with equipment. Nevertheless from time to time in this period the Egyptian Army asked for and obtained from us, very small amounts of equipment, chiefly for *AA* and coast defence units. Wherever possible the War Office has met all requests for maintenance of equipment already in the possession of the Egyptian Army, even to the detriment of our own requirements. There is no new production of many types of stores and equipment, and the Egyptians can only be supplied out of War Office stocks which can not at present be replaced.

The details of the negotiations which took place between the Egyptians and ourselves over the supply of equipment for a brigade group are of interest as typical of:-

- (a) The difficulties which the Egyptians themselves place in the way of equipping their Army through procrastination.
- (b) Their unwillingness to spend money on their armed forces.

2. Equipment for Egypt's brigade group.

In October 1944, following a request from the Egyptian Government, C-in-C Middle East, recommended that Egypt should be provided with sufficient modern equipment for approximately one infantry brigade group. The War Office immediately agreed in principle to the equipping of this brigade group, and undertook to examine further proposals for equipping the post-war Egyptian Army and Air Force when concrete recommendations were forwarded. In December 1944 as a result of fresh requests from the Egyptians, GHO Middle East forwarded fresh demands which cancelled all previous outstanding requests. These demands comprised equipment for:-

- (a) Two light car regiments.
- (b) One infantry brigade group (already approved by War Office).
- (c) Certain outstanding ordnance and MT demands.

3. Early in 1945 therefore, the War Office sought the approval of the London Munitions Assignment Board (LMA.B) to make available this equipment, which was nearly all of British manufacture, without whose approval no issues could be made. The LMA.B agreed, but owing to the objections of the American member, equipment could not actually be dispatched. In this connection it should be remembered that during the war all equipment, whether produced in this country or in the United States was pooled and assignments made by a Joint Anglo-American Assignments Board.

4. The American objections to supply were on the grounds that the Egyptians were not fighting and, although most of the equipment was available in Middle East, it could be better used in other theatres. Further, most of the equipment that we wished to supply was of a similar type to that for which we were at that time "bidding" on the United States.

5. Protracted negotiations took place with the Americans on a very high level, and it was not until the middle of August 1945 that the Americans finally agreed to our supplying the equipment to the Egyptians. In the meantime, the C-in-C Middle East had made certain issues of equipment under his emergency powers.

6. On receipt of the American approval, steps were taken to issue the equipment required but Middle East were immediately forced to amend the Egyptian requirements owing to a revised Order of Battle. It was not until 10th December, 1945 that Middle East informed the War Office that the Egyptian Army had made a firm and final bid for the equipment for their brigade group and certain other internal security battalions.

7. A comprehensive table showing the revised requirements for the brigade group and the extent to which we were prepared to meet them is given at Appendix I A. It will be seen that with very few exceptions the War Office undertook to provide the whole of these requirements.

At this stage the Egyptian Government insisted that all vehicles and equipment still to be provided by the War Office should be issued as opposed to being in serviceable condition. This serviceable equipment was exactly what we were issuing to our own Army at that time. In view of the importance of meeting Egyptian requirements, the War Office made a special effort to select and earmark new equipment against this requirement although it entailed much extra work in the depots and preferential treatment to the Egyptians over all other Allies and indeed our own forces.

During January the Egyptians were informed that we could meet their requirements with new equipment and that it was being earmarked for them.

8. On the 10th February, 1946 the British Military Mission informed the War Office that the Egyptians were unable to find the money to pay for the vehicles and equipment that we offered, since no financial provision had been made in that year's Budget. The Mission requested that we should continue to hold the vehicles and equipment until the Egyptian Government could find the money.

9. For the whole of the next year the War Office continued to earmark the equipment as far as possible, though some of it had of necessity to be issued elsewhere during this period. The War Office frequently asked the Mission if the Egyptians had made up their mind to purchase as the storage of the equipment was embarrassing us. The Mission informed us that the Egyptians had not yet been able to decide on placing firm orders.

10. Finally, on the 17th April, 1947 the War Office told the British Military Mission that the earmark against their requirement could no longer be maintained and the equipment previously earmarked had had to be used for other purposes.

11. Supply of tanks.

In December, 1946 C-in-C Middle East recommended that some tanks should be supplied to the Egyptians for training. As British types were not available and we held surplus Lend/Lease tanks in Egypt, he recommended that these should be supplied. The War Office asked the Americans to agree to the re-transfer of these tanks but the Americans refused this agreement and the matter was dropped pending the outcome of the Treaty negotiations.

12. Supply of vehicles and spares.

The War Office now have no further fit vehicles to spare for the Egyptian Army and their needs can only be met from new production. It is NOT yet known to what extent this will be possible. The Egyptians have recently (February 1947) submitted a very tentative enquiry about new vehicles (and other equipment) and the possibility of meeting this from production is now being investigated.

13. It is arguable that the Egyptians have a justifiable complaint that we have NOT always been able to supply spares for equipment and vehicles we have sold them. This is because our own stocks of spares are very unbalanced. In the last six months, however, we have handed over 180 tons of minor ordnance stores, chiefly spares.

14. During the War it was necessary for us to take back a certain number of Anti-Aircraft guns and searchlight equipment which was urgently required at that time for the defence of Egypt, and Egypt had not declared war. This equipment was subsequently returned to them.

TRAINING.

15. In addition to courses, the Mission has arranged a considerable amount of other assistance to the Egyptian Army which includes the following:-

- (a) Yearly attachments of officers to British units in MELF.

It is hoped to get approximate numbers from General Headquarters Middle East Land Forces.

/(b).....

- (b) Yearly R.I.C, R., Infantry, M.O.C, R.M.C, R.A.S.C and R.E demonstrations are arranged.
- (c) Tours for officers to schools and British training establishments in UK and ME.
- (d) Free loans of equipment varying from complete guns and vehicles to small components and spare parts, including all training equipment for the Egyptian's 'armoured element'. Without these loans many units of the Egyptian Army could not function. The total value of equipment, excluding equipment for the Armoured School, at present on loan is approximately £138,180.
- (e) The following Egyptian training establishments owe their origin entirely to our Mission:-

| | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Infantry School | School of Administration |
| Armoured School | Trade School |
| Staff College | Artillery School |
| Senior Officers School | School of Air Support |
- (f) Large number of outside lectures.

16. The Mission continued to assist in the training of the Egyptian Army throughout the war and Egyptian personnel were allotted vacancies on courses in the UK and Middle East where first class schools of instruction in all subjects had been set up.

17. Training Exercises.

Officers of the Mission are unanimous in stating the great difficulties encountered in getting the Army to carry out field training. Every conceivable difficulty is put in the way of the British training officer, who in effect is left to organise any form of field training that is done. It is almost impossible to induce even a company to carry out training away from its barracks.

18. Organised Tours.

The Mission has frequently attempted to organise tours for Egyptian officers both in M.E.F., the UK and other commands. In more cases than not, these tours never materialise owing either to lack of financial approval, or lack of enthusiasm by the senior officers. Such a case is in hand at the moment, whereby a party of 12 Egyptian officers were due to visit schools in ME, UK, and ~~tour the Normandy battlefields.~~ All arrangements having finally been made, and only a short time before the officers were due to arrive, a signal was received at the War Office to the effect that financial approval has been withheld. Such instances illustrate Egyptian parsimony in regard to their Armed Forces.

19. Courses.

The details of courses showing the numbers asked for by the Egyptians the number allotted by the War Office and those refused by the Egyptians are shown in Appendix I B.

It will be seen from this Appendix that a large number of courses are rejected for financial reasons. It is worthy of note that the amount charged to the Egyptian Government for courses

/in the...

In the United Kingdom is the same as that charged to the Dominions, and is in fact less than the full cost to ourselves.

If the Egyptians further accuse us of not giving them sufficient vacancies on courses in the United Kingdom to enable them to train their Army efficiently it can be pointed out that only five per cent of the total vacancies on courses in this country can be allotted to students from all foreign countries.

ADVICE.

20. Officers posted for service with the Mission have at all times since its establishment been carefully selected. This has particularly been the case since the end of the war, when the Egyptians asked for officers with operational experience. This request has been fully met, and only first class and highly trained officers with battle experience have been chosen. In this connection it is noteworthy that the Egyptian Government is entitled to terminate an officer's service on the Mission within a period of three months. This in fact has never been done. The point could therefore be made that the Egyptians were apparently fully satisfied with our officers and with their efforts to train and advise the Egyptian Armed Forces. If they were in fact not satisfied, the remedy lay in their own hands.

21. One of the greatest difficulties encountered by the Mission has been in connection with re-organising the officer corps. The main reasons why the officer corps is not all that should be desired are as follows:-

(a) Promotion.

This is on a time political and string pulling basis. Political outcasts are posted to battalions in upper Egypt, and morale is consequently extremely low.

(b) Medical Boards.

These are non-existent.

(c) Selection of officers.

This is by being 'known' and not through military prowess.

(d) Postings.

Officers are not posted to the jobs most suitable to their capabilities. A case in point is that in the MG battalion there are no trained machine gunners, the reason being that those trained on courses provided by the British Army, were all posted to the Infantry.

Concrete suggestions have been submitted by the Mission for the re-organisation of the Officer Corps. They have NOT been followed. In addition various recommendations regarding the Officer Corps which have not been implemented are:-

lists

(a) Introduction of corps/~~posts~~ vice general lists.

(b) Increased intake into REE: the result of not implementing this is that the corps is 3% below establishment.

(c) Recruitment of specialist officers particularly for RA, RE and Royal Corps of Signals.

22. To the charge that we have deliberately withheld advice so that the Egyptian Armed Forces would continue to be untrained and incapable of ensuring their own defence we can make the following points:-

/(a)...

- (a) Officers selected for the Mission have been hand picked (see para. 26 above).
- (b) All future planning for the Egyptian Army has been done by the Mission, this includes:-
 - (i) The five year plan of 1940, for the expansion of the Egyptian Army and Air Force which was shelved owing to lack of financial provision.
 - (ii) The three year plan of 1946.
 - (iii) A plan for the reorganisation of the Egyptian Ordnance Corps.
 - (iv) All these plans are major tasks of staff work. None have in fact been implemented.
- (c) Headquarters of the Egyptian Army have been continually supplied with advice and data as to suitable types of equipment to be procured in accordance with Note 3 of the 1936 Treaty.
- (d) All Ordnance and electrical and mechanical engineer installations have only been kept going by means of ceaseless supervision by the Mission's advisors. Without this supervision administrative services would have collapsed.

PART III - RAF ASSISTANCE TO THE EGYPTIANS

1. The present organisation of the RAAF was virtually planned by the Air Wing of the Military Mission and implemented under their close supervision. The internal administration, due to the weakness of the Egyptian national temperament, has been maintained even at its present level of efficiency only by the ceaseless guidance of the British Officers and airmen.

It can safely be said, that without the advice of the Air Wing the RAAF would never have developed since the latter, even at the present time, lack senior officers with experience in air matters.

EQUIPMENT.

2. Before the war the RAAF purchased most of their aircraft through the Egyptian Inspecting Engineer in London, accurate figures of the number of aircraft supplied through that channel are not available. However, some aircraft were supplied to the RAAF through the Air Ministry before 1939. The Air Ministry also took a hand in processing the equipment demands and in this way assisted the Egyptians to obtain equipment more promptly than would have been the case if contracts were placed direct with firms. After 1939 in the case of aircraft and 1941 in the case of equipment all RAAF requirements were met from RAF sources in the Middle East or UK.

Attached at Appendix II is a list of aircraft spares and equipment together with their values, supplied to the RAAF through the Air Ministry on loan or repayment.

3. The selection of the appropriate aircraft and equipment for the RAAF has been made almost entirely on the advice of the Air Wing. The Egyptians even now have little idea of the technical and training problems involved in the operation and maintenance of modern high performance aircraft. One of the main tasks of the Air Wing has been to educate them to a realization of their very limited resources and capabilities.

4. The technical personnel of the Air Wing have, apart from their advisory supervision, given physical assistance. With the withdrawal of the Air Wing and the RAF from the Delta Area the problem of servicing aircraft and the supply of spares is likely to become so acute that it is doubtful whether the R.E.A.F will be able to function as an air force at all.

TRAINING.

5. Since October 1946 numerous requests have been received through the Air Wing of the British Military Mission and from the Egyptian Air Attache asking for vacancies for Egyptian officers, ORs and civilians at British Training Establishments. ~~Recently all these demands have been placed, sometimes for a second time, through the Egyptian Air Attache. The only training requests from the Air Wing in recent months have been for signals and navigation courses.~~

6. In reply to the Egyptian request the Air Ministry refused them vacancies on armament and intelligence courses on security grounds, but offered them vacancies in navigation, wireless and Radar.

7. There are no suitable R.A.F courses in engineering or photography as asked for. However, it was stated by the Air Ministry that in the case of photography, the Egyptians should re-submit their request in 3 months time when a decision on the future of R.A.F courses on the subject had been reached; while in the absence of suitable R.A.F engineering courses, they were prepared to recommend to the Egyptians appropriate civil engineering schools or colleges.

8. Since January 1943 the following are the numbers of personnel of the R.E.A.F who actually attended courses in the UK and Middle East:-

In the Middle East.

| | | | |
|----------------|-------------|---------|--------------|
| <u>Flying.</u> | 84 Officers | 15 WOs | |
| Non-Flying. | 53 Officers | 115 ORs | 6 Civilians. |

In the United Kingdom.

| | | |
|-------------|------------|-------|
| Non-Flying. | 7 Officers | 1 WO. |
|-------------|------------|-------|

9. Training in R.E.A.F schools in Egypt has been organised entirely by R.A.F Officers and NCO instructors. Without the assistance of the British Military Mission it is doubtful whether a proper standard of technical efficiency and flying discipline could be maintained in the R.E.A.F training organisation.

10. The Air Wing, too, have been the channel by which the R.E.A.F have kept abreast of training developments in the R.A.F. Without them the R.E.A.F would rapidly have fallen out of date.

PART IV - ROYAL NAVAL ASSISTANCE TO THE EGYPTIANS.

1. Under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 we are only bound to equip and provide assistance to the land and air forces of Egypt. We can not therefore, be accused of having failed to give them Naval assistance. On the other hand, any Naval assistance we have provided, without obligation, may be considered gratuitous, especially as, except for a small port party at Port Said and the C-in-C's staff at GHQ, the navy have completely evacuated Egypt. There is no Naval Wing attached to the British Military Mission, ~~and our assistance has been confined very largely to courses.~~

/EQUIPMENT.

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| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| | | | | | |

EQUIPMENT

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2. In December 1945 the Egyptians presented a list of the ships they required to develop their Navy. Appendix III-B shows what the Admiralty have been able to offer at various dates, the Egyptian reaction has so far been confined, in the main, to complaints about the prices quoted.

3. In addition to the offer of ships a certain amount of equipment such as wireless, marker light floats, mine disposal tools and clothing have been supplied as requested.

TRAINING

4. Royal Egyptian Naval Officers have attended various courses in the UK and have been attached to HM Ships during exercises and manouvres. A list of courses covering the period are shown at Appendix III-A.

PART V - CONCLUSIONS

We suggest that the following conclusions arise from the foregoing brief:-

(a) Generally speaking the work of the Mission has been hampered not so much by definite refusals by the Egyptians, as by their unwillingness to implement plans and recommendations.

(b) One of the main stumbling blocks has been the lack of financial approval for all servicematters and the apparent lack of coordination and sympathy between the Egyptian Treasury and Service Chiefs.

(c) There is evidence to prove that considerable efforts have been devoted by our Mission and the Royal Navy, in order to equip, train and advise the Egyptians. That they have failed to do so can only be attributed to the lack of interest, inherent idleness and inefficiency of Egyptian Ministers and senior officers.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that this paper should be used as a brief for the officer nominated by the War Office (Lt.General R.G.W.H. Stone, CB., DSO., MC.), after submission to the Foreign Office for approval.

STATEMENT SHOWING REVISED REQUIREMENT AND
LIST FOR (C) AND AUXILIARY (S) OF DISTRICT HQ.

APPENDIX I - A

| Serial | Item | Total Qty Required | Issued or Allocated | Remains to be provided by War Office | Availability of items listed at Col.(a) | Remarks |
|--------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| 1. | Cars 2 str 4 x 2 | 33 | - | 33 | 33 | Cars 4 x 2 Utility (Austin) |
| 2. | Cars 4 str 4 x 2 | 34 | - | 34 | Nil | |
| 3. | Cars 4 str 4 x 4 | 3 | - | 3 | Nil | |
| 4. | Cars 5-seater 4 x 4 | 229 | 30 | 199 | Nil | It is understood that 15-out 4 x 2 are not acceptable. |
| 5. | Cars Utility 4 x 2 | 11 | - | 11 | 11 | Cars 4 x 2 Utility (Austin) |
| 6. | Cars 300 Bty Arm 75 mm Guns | 10 | - | 10 | 10 | 300 Cars (Arm): 100 5-seater cars in 1 (Class I) |
| 7. | Cars 1000 Arm 81.4 IV 37 mm Guns | 44 | 32 | 12 | 12 | Class I ex CMP |
| 8. | Cars Lt Recon | 104 | 69 | 35 | 35 | Morris (Mk.I): or Humber (Class I). |
| 9. | Cars Arm 1 or Arm 2 | 6 | 6 | - | - | |
| 10. | Carriers Truck Towing No.2 | 115 | 28 | 87 | 87 | Class I ex CMP |
| 11. | Carriers Univ. No.3 Mk.II | 170 | 162 | 8 | 8 | " " " " |
| 12. | Carriers 3" Mortar | 53 | 46 | 7 | 7 | " " " " |
| 13. | Lorries 3-ton 4 x 4 GS | 558 | 365 | 193 | 193 | Ford; Canadian. |
| 14. | Lorries 3-ton 4 x 4 1/2 ton | 3 | - | 3 | 3 | Karrier |
| 15. | Lorries 3-ton 4 x 4 Sigs Office | 2 | - | 2 | 2 | Doxford; 4 x 2 |
| 16. | Lorries 3-ton 4 x 4 1/3 I.30 Bty Ch. | 2 | - | 2 | 2 | Ford |
| 17. | Lorries 3-ton 4 x 2 General LF | 2 | 2 | - | - | |
| 18. | Lorries 3-ton 4 x 4 Blinded | 9 | - | 9 | 9 | Ford - Store Blinded |
| 19. | Lorries 3-ton 6 x 4 B'down | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | Lorry 3-ton 6 x 4 B'down Contry: 4 |
| 20. | Lorries 3-ton Petrol | 10 | 10 | - | - | |
| 21. | Lorries 3-ton Sewage | 10 | - | 10 | Nil | Not available at the moment. |
| 22. | Lorries 3-ton City Storage | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | Lorry 3-ton 4 x 2 Bty Storage: Aus |
| 23. | Lorries Mackey Type 'X' 6 x 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Ford |
| 24. | Lorries Mackey Type 'H' 6 x 4 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | Ford |
| 25. | Lorries 30 out 4 x 2 GS | 55 | 15 | 40 | 40 | Lorry 3-ton 4 x 4 Ford (Canadian) |
| 26. | Lorries 30 out Inter 300 gall | 15 | - | 15 | 15 | 5 Lorries 3-ton 4 x 2 (Doxford) in lieu |
| 27. | Tractors 6 x 4 B'down | 3 | 4 | - | - | |
| 28. | Tractors 4 x 4 FO Arty | 24 | 3 | 21 | 21 | Morris (Mk.5) |
| 29. | Tractors Recovery 40 ton | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | Beamsel Transporter 30-ton 6 x 4 B |
| 30. | Tractors Defors 40 mm | 26 | - | 26 | 26 | Beauford Tractors 4 x 4 L.L.A. |
| 31. | Trucks 15-out 4 x 4 Lt 1/3 Type 'K' | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 32. | Trucks 15-out 4 x 2 GS | 708 | 266 | 442 | 442 | Beauford (Rebuilt) |
| 33. | Trucks 15-out 4 x 2 Office | 14 | 5 | 9 | 9 | Ford |
| 34. | Trucks 15-out 4 x 2 Personnel | 26 | - | 26 | 26 | Beauford Trucks 15-out 4 x 2 GS (16 seats to be fitted) |
| 35. | Trucks 15-out 4 x 2 Inter | 34 | 31 | 3 | 3 | Beauford 200 gallons |
| 36. | Trucks 15-out 4 x 2 Air Comp | 5 | 5 | - | - | |
| 37. | Trucks 15-out 4 x 2 Mess House | 27 | 22 | 5 | 5 | Morris 15-out 4 x 2 1/2 T |
| 38. | Trucks 15 out 4 x 4 Arm | 69 | - | 69 | 69 | G.M. (Canadian) Trucks 15-out 4 x 4 |
| 39. | Trucks 15-out 4 x 4 GS | 12 | - | 12 | 12 | Chevrolet |
| 40. | Trucks 15-out 4 x 4 1/3 Welding T.L. | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | Ford |
| 41. | Trucks 15-out 4 x 2 fitted 1/2 T | 26 | 22 | 4 | 4 | Beauford |
| 42. | Trucks 15-out 4 x 2 Elec. Repair. | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | Ford |
| 43. | Trailers 2 whld water 180 gall | 19 | 19 | - | - | |
| 44. | Trailers Mortar | 6 | 12 | - | - | |
| 45. | Trailers 2-ton 2 whld GS | 2 | - | 2 | 2 | Trailers 2 ton whld G.S. in lieu |
| 46. | Trailers 2-ton 4 whld 1/3 | 2 | - | 2 | 2 | " " " " 1/2 ton servicing |
| 47. | Trailers 1/3 Servicing Light | 2 | - | 2 | 2 | " " " " " " |
| 48. | Trailers 7 1/2-ton 4 whld Lt Rec | 8 | - | 8 | 8 | Trailers 7 1/2-ton, 6 whld, Lt recon |
| 49. | Trailers 40-ton 12 whld Transporter | 1 | - | 1 | 1 | Included in serial 29 |
| 50. | Trailers Arty No.27 | 32 | 16 | 16 | 16 | |
| 51. | Motor Cycles Solo | 361 | 361 | - | - | |
| 52. | Bicycles Mk.IV | 249 | 117 | 132 | 132 | |
| 53. | OMP 25 pr Mk.II on Carr. Mk.I | 19 | 19 | - | - | |
| 54. | OMP 6 pr 7 out | 56 | 56 | - | - | |
| 55. | OMP 40 mm Defors SP | 19 | 19 | - | - | |
| 56. | OMP 40 mm Defors | 25 | 25 | - | - | |
| 57. | Projectors Inf 4/Tk | 230 | 230 | - | - | |
| 58. | OSB 4.2" Mortar Mk.II | 6 | 6 | - | - | |
| 59. | OML 3" Mortar | 54 | 54 | - | - | |
| 60. | OML 2" Mortar Mk.II | 220 | 100 | 120 | 120 | |
| 61. | Discharge Snake 4" | 98 | 98 | - | - | |
| 62. | Guns M/C Iron .303" | 517 | 668 | - | - | |
| 63. | Guns S&W Thompson .45" | 2781 | - | 2781 | See Col.(c) | These are Lend-Lease items. 1/2 of Mk.II Sten which will not be sent. |
| 64. | Pistols Revolver No.2 .380" | 532 | 1295 | - | - | |
| 65. | Pistols Signal | 278 | - | 278 | 278 | |
| 66. | W'less Stns No.12 LP Truck | 9 | - | 9 | 9 | |
| 67. | W'less Stns No.18 Mk.II Ground | 90 | 60 | 30 | 30 | |
| 68. | W'less Stns No.19 Scout Car | 48 | 3 | 45 | 45 | |
| 69. | W'less Stns No.19 1/2 Truck | 51 | 21 | 30 | 30 | |
| 70. | W'less Stns No.19 Personnel | 16 | 16 | - | - | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|

| Serial | Item | Total Qty Required | Issued or Hidden | Quantity to be provided by War Office | Availability of items listed at Col.(c) | Remarks |
|--------|------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| 71. | W/less Stns No.19 HP Trk Pers | 12 | 3 | 9 | 9 | |
| 72. | W/less Stns No.19/19 Trk Pers | 3 | - | 3 | 3 | |
| 73. | W/less Stns No.22 | 28 | 42 | - | - | |
| 74. | W/less Stns No.22B | 6 | 6 | - | - | |
| 75. | W/less Stns No.38 Mk.II | 231 | 124 | 107 | 107 | |
| 76. | Reception Sets R.109 Aux Stns | 18 | 18 | - | - | |
| 77. | Chests Tool Filled Fitters MF | 40 | 40 | - | - | |
| 78. | Chests Tool Filled M/O Artif. | 17 | - | 17 | 17 | |
| 79. | Chests Tool Filled RELE Artif. | 23 | 28 | - | - | |
| 80. | Chest Tool Filled Blacksmiths | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| | Fd RE Supplementary | | | | | |
| 81. | Chests Tool Filled Carpenters | 2 | 2 | - | - | |
| | Fd RE Supplementary | | | | | |
| 82. | Chests Tool Filled Plumbers Fd | 2 | 2 | - | - | |
| 83. | Chests Tool Filled Instr Mech | 8 | 8 | - | - | |
| 84. | Chests Tool Filled Fitters AFV | 64 | - | 64 | - | |
| 85. | Cases Tool Filled Sigs Electr. | 18 | 18 | - | - | |
| 86. | Cases Tool Filled Instr Mech | 9 | 9 | - | - | |
| 87. | Kits of Hand Tools D/Mech | 19 | 19 | - | - | |
| 88. | Kits of Hand Tools Electr Fd RE | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 89. | Kits of Hand Tools Textile Refitt | 3 | 3 | - | - | |
| 90. | Kits of Hand Tools Armourers | 3 | 3 | - | - | |
| 91. | Kits of Hand Tools AA Fitters | 12 | 12 | - | - | |
| 92. | Kits of Hand Tools AA Instrum. | 2 | 2 | - | - | |
| 93. | Kits of Hand Tools Wrls Mech. | 2 | 2 | - | - | |
| 94. | Kits of Hand Tools Blacksmiths | 4 | 4 | - | - | |
| 95. | Kits of Hand Tools Elec Fd RE | 3 | 3 | - | - | |
| 96. | Kits of Hand Tools Instr Mech | 3 | 3 | - | - | |
| 97. | Kits of Hand Tools Panel Beator | 2 | 2 | - | - | |
| 98. | Kits of Hand Tools Welder Acety | 11 | 11 | - | - | |
| 99. | Kits of Hand Tools Wheelers | 3 | 3 | - | - | |
| 100. | Charging Sets 300 Watt No.1 | 37 | 37 | - | - | |
| 101. | Charging Sets 1250 watt. | 19 | 19 | - | - | |
| 102. | Charging Sets 550 watt. | 16 | 12 | 4 | 4 | |
| 103. | Stand Instr. No.13 Mk.III | 8 | 8 | - | - | |
| 104. | Stand Instr No.17 Mk.II | 12 | 12 | - | - | |
| 105. | Stand Instr No.18 Mk.II | 12 | 12 | - | - | |
| 106. | Stand Instr No.27 Mk.I | 10 | 10 | - | - | |
| 107. | Stand Instr No.27 Mk.IIA | 22 | 22 | - | - | |
| 108. | Telescope Sig Mk.VII | 9 | - | 9 | See col(c) | There has been no proof of this it 3 yrs. what is required? |
| 109. | Telescopes Identification AA Mk.II | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 110. | Compasses Prism Liquid Mk.VIII | 287 | - | - | - | |
| 111. | Compasses Prism Liquid Mk.IX | 2 | - | 298 | 298 | These will all be Mark III. |
| 112. | Compasses Prism Liquid Mk.III | 9 | - | - | - | |
| 113. | Watches GS Mk.II | 252 | 252 | - | - | |
| 114. | Rangefinders No.12 Mk.VII | 3 | - | 3 | 3 | |
| 115. | Rangefinders No.13 Mk.III | 8 | 8 | - | - | |
| 116. | Binoculars Prism No.2 Mk.II | 339 | 546 | - | - | |
| 117. | Glinometers Sight Mk.IV | 4 | 4 | - | - | |
| 118. | Glinometers Lar. r No.2 Mk.I | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 119. | Sights Dial 7A Mk.II | 10 | 10 | - | - | |
| 120. | Sights Correctional Mk.V | 18 | 18 | - | - | |
| 121. | Wrenches Adjust No.7 Dial Sights | 5 | 5 | - | - | |
| 122. | Boards Arty No.3 Mk.I | 10 | 10 | - | - | |
| 123. | Boxes Connector AA No.2 Mk.I | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 124. | Revolvers Puzc No.2 Mk.I | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 125. | Boxes Intell GFO Mk.II Filled | 8 | - | 8 | 8 | |
| 126. | Directors No.7B Mk.II | 15 | 15 | - | - | |
| 127. | Cases Water Testin; Sterilisation | 14 | 14 | - | - | |
| 128. | Telephone Sets D Mk.V | 40 | 40 | - | - | |
| 129. | Telephone Loudspeaking No.2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | |
| 130. | Telephone Sets F Mk.II | 34 | 34 | - | - | |
| 131. | Telephones No.110 | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 132. | Switchboards W 10 Line | 4 | 4 | - | - | |
| 133. | Apparatus Cable Layin; No.2 | 5 | 5 | - | - | |
| 134. | Amplifier RF No.2 or 3 | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 135. | Voltmeters LG 3V-Scay Coll Mk.I | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 136. | Voltmeters Pocket 250 V | 4 | 4 | - | - | |
| 137. | Wavemeters Class B No.1 Opt Stns | 23 | 23 | - | - | |
| 138. | Superposing Units One Transformer | 4 | 4 | - | - | |
| 139. | Batteries Scay 24V 35AH Mk.II | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 140. | Detectors Mine Polish No.3 | 62 | 62 | - | - | |
| 141. | Pumps Diaphragm 2" Mk.II | 10 | 10 | - | - | |
| 142. | Pumps Flex Driven 1 1/2" | 12 | 12 | - | - | |
| 143. | Boats Rooco Mk.I | 7 | - | 7 | 7 | |
| 144. | Camouflet Equipment Mk.I | 2 | 2 | - | - | |
| 145. | Concrete Breakers Pneum.No.2 | 3 | 3 | - | - | |
| 146. | Drives Flex 17.5 hp 8 ft Sections | 4 | 4 | - | - | |
| 147. | " " " " 16 ft " | 4 | 4 | - | - | |
| 148. | " " " " 24 ft " | 6 | 6 | - | - | |
| 149. | " " " " 4 ft " | 4 | 4 | - | - | |
| 150. | " " " " 8 ft " | 4 | 4 | - | - | |
| 150. | Engine Petrol 8 HP | 4 | 4 | - | - | |

FO 371/62978

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|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

| (a) Serial | (b) Item | (c) Total Qty Acquired | (d) Issued on Request | (e) Remains to be provided by War Office | (f) Availability of Items Listed at Col.(e) | (g) Remarks |
|------------|---|------------------------|-----------------------|--|---|-------------|
| 151. | Stra Postmatic | 5 | 5 | - | - | |
| 152. | Wood Bore Pneumatic | 5 | 5 | - | - | |
| 153. | Spares for Air Compressor TS 20 | 4 | 4 | - | - | |
| 154. | Raways Portable 15 cwt | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 155. | Raways Portable 3 ton | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 156. | Rollers Ground 2 Ft 6 5" | 3 | 3 | - | - | |
| 157. | Grainstones PD Service | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 158. | Radiother | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 159. | Forges Port 26" x 20" Combined hand and Electro fan | 3 | 3 | - | - | |
| 160. | Machines Drill Electro Port 5/16" | 2 | 2 | - | - | |
| 161. | Machines Drill Electro Port 3/8/64" | 2 | 2 | - | - | |
| 162. | Machines Drill Hand Fall or Post | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 163. | Machines Grind Flex Shaft 6" x 1" shaft | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 164. | Machine Shear Hand Lever 1/2" shear | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 164a. | Forges Port 2 speed No II | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 165. | Jacks Lifting Garage Hydraulic 25-ton | 1 | 1 | - | - | |
| 166. | Plants Folding and Cutting Org-Assey Lt 7' Outfit | 8 | 8 | - | - | |
| 167. | Shelters Portable No-1 | 2 | 2 | - | - | |
| 168. | Shelters Port No-3 | 2 | 2 | - | - | |

3

COURSES FOR EGYPTIAN OFFICERS

APPENDIX I - B

| Sl. | Year | Course | Vacancies | | Egyptian Reply | | Remarks |
|-----|---------------------------------|--|-----------|---------|----------------|--------|--|
| | | | Requested | Offered | Accept | Refuse | |
| | 1945 and continually since then | Staff College | 4 | - | - | - | No vacancies available for Foreigners. Vacancies at Senior Officers School in lieu - see Serial 53 2 vacancies earmarked on Jan. 48 Staff College Course NOT yet offered; matter in hands of Foreign Office. |
| | 1945 | R.A.C. D. & M. Course | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | |
| | | Wireless Course | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | |
| | | Gunnery Course | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | |
| | " | R.A. War Gunnery Course (Field) | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | |
| | " | " " " " (A.A.) | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | Special course at School of A.A. Artillery in Feb |
| | " | " War Special Radar | 2 | | | | |
| | " | " Coast Arty Course | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | Special attachment at Coast Arty School |
| | " | " Searchlight Course | 1 | - | - | - | Course no longer held |
| | " | R.E. Pd. Engineering Course | 1 | 2 | 2 | - | |
| | " | " I.O's, R.E. | 1 | 2 | 2 | - | |
| | " | " Offrs. Bridging Course | 1 | - | - | - | No bridging Course available. |
| | " | " Railway Svy and Construction Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | No reply to offer received |
| | " | " Railway Operating Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " |
| | " | R. Sigs Tactical Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " |
| | " | " Advanced Line Course | 1 | - | - | - | No Foreigners permitted to attend; course "SECRET" |
| | " | Infantry Pl. Wps Course | 3 | 4 | - | 4 | No reply to offer received. |
| | " | " " Comds " | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | " " " " " |
| | " | " 3" Mortar " | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " |
| | " | " 4.2" " " | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " |
| | " | " 6 pr. A. Tk Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " |
| | " | R.A.S.C. Senior Offrs (Pd. Force) Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " |
| | " | " Initial POL Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " |
| | " | " " R.A.S.C. Course (Pd Force) | 1 | 9 | - | 9 | " " " " " |
| | " | " S & T Staff Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " |
| | " | R.A.C.C. IOO's Course | 1 | - | - | - | Course SECRET; no Foreigners accepted. |
| | " | " War Ord Offrs' Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | No reply to offer received |
| | " | R.E.M.E. Officers FAE Course | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | |
| | 1946 | R.A. Long Gunnery Staff Course (Field) | - | 2 | 2 | - | C.M.G., MEIF pressed us for vacancies for the Egyptians, but no specific number of vacancies was requested. |
| | " | " " " " " (A.A.) | - | 2 | 2 | - | |
| | " | " " " " " (C.A.) | - | 2 | 2 | - | |
| | " | R.E. Works Offrs Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | Accepted at first - then refused later. |
| | " | R.A.C. Technical Adjutants' Course | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | |
| | 1947 | R.A.C. Wireless Instructors | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | Financial approval withheld. |
| | " | " D & M Instructors, 2nd Cd. | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | No notification of surrender received; offrs did NOT arrive. |

COURSES FOR EGYPTIAN OFFICERS

APPENDIX I - D

| Serial | Year | Course | Vacancies | | Egyptian Reply | | Remarks | |
|--------|--|---|-----------|---------|----------------|--------|--|---|
| | | | Requested | Offered | Accept | Refuse | | |
| 1. | 1945 and contin- ually since then | Staff College | 4 | - | - | - | No vacancies available for Foreigners. W at Senior Officers School in lieu - see S. 2 vacancies earmarked on Jan. 48 Staff Co. Course NOT yet offered; matter in hands Office. | |
| 2. | 1945 | R.A.C. D. & M. Course | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | |
| | | Wireless Course | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | | |
| | | Gunnery Course | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | | |
| 3. | " | R.A. War Gunnery Course (Field) | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | | |
| 4. | " | " " " " (A.A.) | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | Special course at School of A.A. Artillery | |
| 5. | " | " War Special Radar | 2 | | | | | |
| 6. | " | " Coast Arty Course | 1 | | 1 | 1 | - | Special attachment at Coast Arty School |
| 7. | " | " Searchlight Course | 1 | - | - | - | Course no longer held | |
| 8. | " | R.E. Pd. Engineering Course | 1 | 2 | 2 | - | | |
| 9. | " | " I.O's, R.E. | 1 | 2 | 2 | - | | |
| 10. | " | " Offrs. Bridging Course | 1 | - | - | - | No bridging Course available. | |
| 11. | " | " Railway Svy and Construction Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | No reply to offer received | |
| 12. | " | " Railway Operating Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " | |
| 13. | " | R. Sigs Tactical Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " | |
| 14. | " | " Advanced Line Course | 1 | - | - | - | No foreigners permitted to attend; course | |
| 15. | " | Infantry Pl. Wms Course | 3 | 4 | - | 4 | No reply to offer received. | |
| 16. | " | " " Comds " | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | " " " " " | |
| 17. | " | " 3" Mortar " | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " | |
| 18. | " | " 4.2" " " | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " | |
| 19. | " | " 6 pr. 4. Tk Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " | |
| 20. | " | R.A.S.C. Senior Offrs (Pd. Force) Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " | |
| 21. | " | " Initial POL Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " | |
| 22. | " | " " R.A.S.C. Course (Pd Force) | 1 | 9 | - | 9 | " " " " " | |
| 23. | " | " S & T Staff Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | " " " " " | |
| 24. | " | R.A.C.C. IOO's Course | 1 | - | - | - | Course SECURE; no Foreigners accepted. | |
| 25. | " | " War Ord Offrs' Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | No reply to offer received | |
| 26. | " | R.E.M.E. Officers PAE Course | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | | |
| 27. | 1946 | R.A. Long Gunnery Staff Course (Field) | - | 2 | 2 | - | G.H.Q. WELF pressed us for vacancies for Egyptians, but no specific number of vacancies was requested. | |
| 28. | " | " " " " "(A.A.) | - | 2 | 2 | - | | |
| 29. | " | " " " " "(C.A.) | - | 2 | 2 | - | | |
| 30. | " | R.E. Works Offrs Course | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | Accepted at first - then refused later. | |
| 31. | " | R.A.C. Technical Adjutants' Course | 2 | 2 | 2 | - | | |
| 32. | 1947 | R.A.C. Wireless Instructors | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | Financial approval withheld. | |
| 33. | " | " D & M Instructors, Land Co. | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | No notification of surrender received; off. NOT arrive. | |

COURSES FOR FOREIGN OFFICERS (Continued)

129

| Serial | Year | Course | Egyptian Officers | | Remarks | |
|--------|---------|--|---------------------|----------|---------|----|
| | | | Vacancies Available | Accepted | | |
| 36. | 1947 | Gunnery Instructor, 1st Co. | 1 | 1 | | |
| 37. | " | Technical Adjutant, " " | 2 | 2 | | |
| 38. | " | Short Gunnery Staff Course (Under S.I.L.) | 3 | - | | |
| 39. | " | " " " " (Civilian) | 1 | 1 | | |
| 40. | " | " " " " (yield) | 2 | 2 | | |
| 41. | " | Long " " " (Gr) | 2 | 1 | | |
| 42. | " | Signals Telecommunications Course | 2 | - | | |
| 43. | " | Center Officer. Re. An. Insuring | 2 | - | | |
| 44. | " | Advanced S & P Course followed by attachment to civilian firms | 2 | - | | |
| 45. | " | Infantry SIG Course | 2 | 2 | | |
| 46. | " | Org. Census Course | 2 | 1 | | |
| 47. | " | Sig. Course " " | 2 | - | | |
| 48. | " | Infantry SIG Course | 2 | 2 | | |
| 49. | " | RAF " " | 2 | - | | |
| 50. | " | Wireless " " | 2 | 2 | | |
| 51. | " | R. & S. C. Regular Officer Course | 2 | - | | |
| 52. | " | S & P Staff Course | 1 | - | | |
| 53. | 1946/47 | Senior Officers School | - | 16 | | |
| | | | 81 | 92 | 34 | 53 |

Remarks:
 No courses running before Jan. 48.
 Having refused 1 vacancy, Egyptians later asked for 2 vacancies on the same course.
 2 vacancies offered on special course, which has had to be postponed temporarily.
 No reply yet received.
 Course SECDEF. Special course will be run in May 48 and every 2 years thereafter. Egyptians will be offered vacancies.
 Course classified SECRET.
 No vacancies available. Civilian firms unwilling to accept Egyptians.
 Financial approval withheld.
 " " " "
 " " " "
 " " " "
 No courses available at present.
 No reply yet received.
 " " " "
 " " " "
 No courses available at present.
 Vacancies accepted on first two courses in 1945 only. Courses now discontinued.

6371/62978
col

J

3638

EGYPT AND SUDAN

AUG 1947

26

Registry Number } 3638/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM
Sir R. Campbell CAIRO
No. 1668

Dated } Aug. 4, 1947
Received in Registry } Aug. 5, 1947

America and the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.

U.S. Embassy views are :

- a) Bevin/Sidky texts - Security Council may ask for earlier withdrawal of troops from Egypt.
- b) Whether Sudanese and Egyptian aspects be separated.
- c) appointment of United Nations Commission of enquiry for the Sudan.

The U.S. Government would be concerned about the possible danger of Russia obtaining entry to the Sudan by means of this Commission.

Last Paper.

J3625 .

References.

J3430.
J3129.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

As regards para 1 (1)
See Mr. Jones's remarks as reported in J3430

As regards para 1 (3)
or para 2 the Americans are certainly optimistic in assuming that a commission composed of small nations would not include a Russian satellite. We did in fact give the Americans a lead towards a commission - see J3430 again. But since that time our views have changed.

Now see J3679

D.H.H. Risher

8/8

27 11.8
UN Dept
NA Dept

While we must certainly get down to the 10,000 figure

(Action completed.)

ced
25/8

(Index.)

23/9/47

Next Paper.

J3640.

FO 371/62978

50222

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

as soon as possible, I should have
 thought that we ought finally
 to refuse to commit ourselves
 at this stage as regards
total evacuation

D.S. [Signature]
 9/8.

Mr Wright ✓ certainly
 C.N. Dept. 9.8
 N.4 ✓ CR 2/8

11

F0371/62978

13630

28

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTF

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R.I. Campbell
No. 1666

D. 7.06 p.m. August 4th, 1947.

August 4th, 1947.

R. 10.15 p.m. August 4th, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York

SSSSS

IMPORTANT

I report the following views expressed to me yesterday by First Secretary of United States Embassy in case they might reflect the attitude of the State Department.

(1) Security Council while they would probably be impressed by Bevin-Sidki texts, might well press us to improve on September 1949 as the date for complete evacuation. His tone was that this would not be unreasonable and that we would probably find it difficult not to conform.

(2) Could not the Sudanese and Egyptian aspects be separated? If they could

(3) The best course would seem to be for the Council to appoint a United Nations commission of enquiry (if possible excluding a Russian member) which could find the real feelings of the Sudanese majority and which would, he felt confident, explode Nokrashi's charges against the Sudanese (British) administration. Delay would also thus be secured during which Nokrashi might perhaps be able to get on with a programme of social reform and thus divert attention from the Sudanese question to the benefit of its solution when United Nations Commission reported.

2. Mr. Ireland said that the danger of Russia getting an entry through the appointment of United Nations commission of enquiry would be a matter of great concern to the United States Government; but he thought this danger could be avoided by the commission being composed of representatives of small nations.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 42.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York]

FO 371 / 62978 40222

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3622

EGYPT and SUDAN

4 AUG 1947

21

Registry number

J 3622 / 12 / 11

ELEGRAM FROM

Sir R. Campbell

Cairo 1655

Received Registry } 2 Aug 47
4 Aug 47

Egyptian official - meeting between
Tripty of Egypt and Grand Ulama.

Newspaper from Aug 2nd reports
that Tripty of Egypt and Grand Ulama
meeting and issued appeal urging all
Egyptians and all nations to support
Egypt's cause. Reports that Ulama has sent
a telegram to U.N.

Last Paper.

J 3621

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Religious dignitaries
Should keep out of politics even
when incited to do so by
King Farouk (as has presumably
happened in this case)

D.H.H. Liche

4/8

DSS. 4/8.

1398
Eastern Dept

on ed.)

(Index.)


10/47

FO 371/62978

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22



En Clair

GENERAL DISTRIBUTIONFROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell D. 7.35 p.m. 2nd August, 1947
No. 1655
 2nd August, 1947. R. 10.40 p.m. 2nd August, 1947

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York No. 58.

0 0 0 0

(Foreign Office please pass to U.K. Delegation New York).

Newspaper Misri August 2nd reports that Mufti of Egypt and Grand Ulama met August 1st and issued appeal urging all Egyptians to unite and back Egyptian delegation and appealing for support of all nations for Egypt's case. Report adds that Ulama have sent telegram to Secretary General of U.N. urging that Security Council should restore Egypt's rights.

[Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York].



FO 371/62978

34222

7

1947

J

J 3640
AUG 1947

Registry Number } J3640/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir R. Campbell CAIRO

No. 1668

Dated Aug. 4, 1947

Received in Registry } Aug. 5, 1947

Telegram to the United Nations expressing support for Egypt.

29

Refers to Cairo telegram 1655 of August 2 (J3640/12/16)

Press reports that various other Egyptian personalities and organisations are sending telegrams supporting Egypt.

The Wafd press criticises these messages as pro-governmental propaganda.

S.K.

Last Paper.

J3638

(Minutes.)

See J3641

References.

R
5/8

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action)

(Index)

FO 371/62978

En Clair

GENERAL DISTRIBUTIONFROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE30
1 3640
AUG 1947Sir R. Campbell
No. 1665D. 2.32 p.m. 4th August, 1947.
R. 5.45 p.m. 4th August, 1947.

4th August, 1947.

Repeated to U.K. Del. New York

///
My telegram No. 1655.

Press reports that various other Egyptian personalities and organisations have sent or will send telegrams to United Nations expressing support for Egypt's claims. Those reported to have sent telegrams already include Grand Rabbi of Egypt on behalf of the Egyptian Jewish community Hafez Ramadan Pasha, Ibrahim Dessouki Abaza Pasha on behalf Constitutional Liberals, Council of Order of Press, Egyptian Chamber of Commerce, Egyptian Federation of Industries, President of Senate, Coptic Patriarch, Alexandria University Council and judges of National Courts. Some telegrams are apparently addressed to Secretary General of United Nations and others to Fares Al Khoury. Most messages according to press specifically urge unity of Nile Valley, total and immediate evacuation of all Nile Valley and cancellation of 1956 Treaty.

2. Wafd press criticises these messages as pro-Governmental propaganda inspired by Governments (see my immediately following telegram).

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 41.

[Repeated to U.K. Del. New York.]

1747

E: F-37/62978

DAN

AUG 19 1947 31

J3641/12/16
GRAM FROM
Campbell CAIRO
1662
Aug. 4. 1947
Aug. 5, 1947

Statements by Sidky Pasha and Ali Maher Pasha.

Refers to Cairo telegram 1661 of Aug.

"Journal d'Egypte" of Aug. 3 reports statements by :
Sidky - that although he preferred continuation of negotiations he wished the Egyptian Delegation every success.
Ali Maher - though the Egyptians could have divergencies internally the causes of nations before the outside world should be sacred.

Last Paper.
J3640.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

The two leading independents in Egypt show no special confidence that the Security Council will give the Egyptian Govt what they want. The collection listed in J3640 (which includes the Grand Rabbi of the Coptic Patriarch) are probably no more confident. I take it that the telegrams referred to in J3640 will only be circulated to Delegations to the Security Council if the Delegations ask for them & in fact their value is really only for morale purposes in Egypt itself.
D.H. Richardson
5/8 21/8

(Index.)
23/9/47

Next Paper.

J3643

26522 F.O.P. 11/10

UN. Dept

Reference:-

FO 371/62978

49222

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En Clair GENERAL DISTRIBUTIONFROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

3641

AUG 7 1947

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Sir R. Campbell

No. 1662

D. 1.47 p.m. 4th August, 1947

4th August, 1947

R. 5.45 p.m. 4th August, 1947

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation, New York.

8 8 8 8 8 8

2 1663

My immediately preceding [sic] telegram.

"Journal d'Egypte" August 3rd reports the following statements by Sidky and Ali Maher Pashas:

Sidky: "At first I opposed recourse to international arbitration and preferred continuation of negotiations. I did not conceal that and I proclaimed it frankly and clearly. Despite that and in consequence of departure of Egyptian delegation, I deem it my duty as Egyptian to wish it full success. In any case, no patriot could adopt any other attitude, for opposition to Egyptian delegations will only benefit British and is irreconcilable with sincere patriotism."

Ali Maher: "We can have divergencies internally as much as we like but the causes of nations before the outside world should be sacred. All Egyptians must be one man and form one rank before the international struggles. If we win, so much the better. Otherwise we shall be able to win even after some time, thanks to our union and strength of our faith."

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 40.


[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York]



1947

J
f0371/62978

EGYPT and SYRIA



72

J3665/12/16

Egyptian case at the Security Council

AM FROM
DEL. NEW YORK

Nokrashi spoke on the lines more or less as expected.

16

Reply was to the Egyptian letter of July 8 and right was reserved to reply to Nokrashi's speech at a later meeting.

Aug. 5, 1947

Suggestions have been made privately that the Security Council should recommend reference in International Court on validity of the Treaty. Comments on this.

Aug. 6, 1947

Last Paper.

J 3657.

See within

(Minutes.)

References.

Rpta

- Nanking
- Moscow
- Paris
- Rio de Janeiro
- Bogota
- Warsaw
- ~~The Hague~~ Brussels
- Damascus
- U.K. High Commissioner, Canberra

(Print.)

C. Houston 7/8

How disposed of?
in Addis no 10.
on the 11th
Aug 7th

Please see within minutes and records of meetings. Telegrams have now been sent to the U.K. Delegation New York, Paris, Washington and Canberra.

New York 2519
Aug 7th

Draft telegram to Damascus submitted.

Paris 1474.
Geneva 507
London 851.
Bogota 192.
Rio de Janeiro 276
16 7952
1793.
1715.
1278

DSS.
8th August, 47.

ion
eted.)
216/8
23/9/47

(Index.)

Next Paper.

J3666 G

F0371/62978

Egypt

74

Meeting with Secretary of State
on 7th August about tactics

Secretary of State
Sir O. Sargent
Mr Wright
Mr Fitzmaurice
Mr Scott Fox
Mr Riches
Mr Henniker

The Secretary of State said that the draft to New York which had been put up to him was far too involved. As he read the Charter the Egyptians had no right to question the validity of a freely negotiated treaty before the Security Council. He could not understand how the Australian representative could suggest a reference to the International Court where her interests were vitally affected. As for America the State Dept should be told of our surprise that where any question of the validity of a treaty was involved they should not be forthrightly on the side of those who having paid the price wanted the sanctity of treaties maintained.

He had the impression that there was some weakness in New York. Our representatives should be urged to stand firm.

The Secretary of State said that if the Council recommended the resumption of negotiations he would veto its being kept on the agenda.

Mr Fitzmaurice said that as a party to a dispute we should have no vote.

The Secretary of State asked why New York should take up the attitude reported in paragraph 4 (1): Why didn't they fight back? If our opponents quoted the Persian case the answer was that Russia had no treaty to stay in Persia. The cases were not comparable at all.

The moral cowardice of the Belgians and Australians drove him to despair.

If the case went to the Court who knows but that the question of sovereignty over the Sudan might also be raised. He would not mind a reference to the Court on the general issue of whether or not a freely negotiated treaty can be referred to the Council under the Charter or not; but it would be difficult to arrange a reference in these terms.

What treaty was safe under these conditions?

It was not H.M.G. who broke off negotiations, and he would not negotiate while the question remained on the Council's agenda.

The ideal would be a clear cut decision by the Council that the Egyptian affair did not menace peace and security and should be rejected forthwith. He did not think that Russia would vote against us.

The following action should be taken :-

- (1) a telegram to New York saying that on Monday next in his next speech Sir A. Cadogan should stick to the point that the Security Council should throw out the Egyptian plea; and that we /should

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

FO 371 / 62978

40222

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Minutes.

should stand firm.

Enquiries should be made of the three delegations who had suggested a reference to the Court whether they did so on the instructions of their Governments.

Ask about the attitude of the Chinese, Colombians, Brazilians and French.

(2) Take up with the U.S. Australian and Belgian Governments the attitude of their representatives in suggesting a reference to the Court

McWhirter

7/8

75.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

8371/62978

76

Mr. Wright.

The Secretary of State believes he has seen a telegram from New York showing that the Americans are putting pressure on us to agree in the Security Council to make further concessions to the Egyptians about the date of evacuation. I cannot find the telegram from New York but it seems possible that the Secretary of State is referring to paragraph 1 of Cairo telegram No. 1666. He has also heard that our delegation were very much inclined to get the case considered in Committee rather than by the full Security Council. He is most disturbed lest our delegation should waver in any way in their certainty that we have a very strong case. He therefore wishes a telegram sent as soon as possible to New York, pointing out to Sir A. Cadogan that we must on no account temporise, that our case is absolutely unchallengeable and our record completely clean. We must therefore stand absolutely pat on the point that we hold that the 1936 Treaty is perfectly valid, and that we cannot agree to any unilateral denunciation of the Treaty, though we would of course, and have already shown ourselves ready to, negotiate a change with the Egyptians.

We must on no account give way to any pressure in the Security Council or outside it. If we are pressed by the U.S. Government to make any concessions to the Egyptians we should make it clear that we consider such pressure absolutely wrong, and we should point out that it is especially impossible for us to make any concession after Nokrashy's statement that the 1936 Treaty is a treaty of convenience. If we give any ground it will be tantamount to an admission that we feel that our hands are not entirely clean.

The Secretary of State is also disturbed with the suggestion contained in paragraph 3 of New York telegram No. 2116 that the matter should be referred to the International Court to decide on the validity of the Treaty. His feeling is that if we did this we might again weaken our case and that the best thing to do is to pursue our present course without any apparent doubt as to its rightness.

The Secretary of State will be glad to know the views of the Department on this latter point. Could a telegram to New York also be drafted on the lines suggested above?

Mr. Truman

7th August, 1947.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

F03.71/62978

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

As regards point (1) of Mr. Riches' minute, Sir A. Cadogan no doubt feels that unless an initiative is taken at an early stage to get the validity of the treaty referred to the International Court, some other less desirable suggestion may be put up and attract sufficient support to make it difficult for agreement to be reached subsequently on such reference. As regards (2) of Mr. Riches' minute, it is I think clear from para 3 of the telegram, that what is proposed is an advisory opinion on the particular point of the validity of the treaty. There is no suggestion that the dispute itself shall be decided by the International Court, and the dispute would presumably remain on the agenda of the Security Council and be discussed again by the latter in the light of the findings of the International Court in perhaps a year's time.

2. We have the highest legal authority here for supposing that we shall in all probability get a favourable decision out of the Court (though as against this if our calculations are inaccurate and the decision should go against us after all, the results would be more serious than a Security Council decision which would probably be in the nature of a compromise). I think that we must be guided by New York's views as to what would be likely to be the most satisfactory manner of handling the case in the light of the local circumstances such as the attitude of the various powers on the Council. There is however, a Cairo as well as a New York facet. If reference is made to the International Court there will be a very considerable delay. Will such a delay be to our advantage from the point of view of our relations with Egypt generally?

3. It is not easy to give the answer to this question. On the one hand the fact of the Egyptian case remaining subjudice may help Nokrashi to remain in power, and in the present situation the maintenance of the status quo means that although we shall remain entitled to keep 10,000 troops in the Canal Zone, (which is in itself hardly an advantage since we should in any case not be able to reduce our troops below that figure within the next 12 months and the indecision as regards our future relations with Egypt will prevent the strategic decisions being taken which are so urgently required) in every other respect our position would be likely to deteriorate unless there were some unexpected change in the political wind. As against that, it is unfortunately difficult to see that any other decision by the Security Council even if it led to Nokrashi's fall would be likely to allow us to satisfactorily conclude our negotiations with Egypt within the next 12 months or to arrest the general decline in our position there.

FO 371/62978

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Minutes.

4. To sum up, unless there is a definite balance of advantage or disadvantage from the Cairo point of view as regards a delay which a reference to the International Court would involve, I think that we should be guided by the tactical advice that we have received from the New York point of view.

D.S.G.
6th August, 1947.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Hason

At bottom the Egyptian case is a political one though they have been obliged to use legal arguments. There is therefore much to be said in principle for pinning the Egyptians down to the legal point by a reference to the Court and thus by-passing the political arguments.

The S/S's objective is the resumption of negotiations and the removal of the question from the agenda of the Council.

- (a) It will be very difficult to obtain a clear-cut decision from the Council.
- (b) The question of troops will probably be raised anyway in the forthcoming meeting of the Assembly and the case of Egypt will almost certainly be cited. It will help us if the whole question is then sub-judice.
- (c) We might push our contention to a vote in the Council and secure a recommendation that the parties should resume negotiations but it is unlikely that we shall be able to get the matter taken off the agenda. We should then be negotiating "under duress"

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Fitzmaurice.

If the question is not taken off the agenda, the recommendation to resume negotiations will certainly be more embarrassing to us than a reference to the International Court. The Egyptians' second line of defence, if the Treaty is considered to be valid, may be to say that, while it may have been negotiated freely in 1936, it has now been superseded by the coming into force of the Charter, and Egypt tried to negotiate in order to bring it into compatibility with the Charter, but failed.

Wright.

The alternatives are :-

- (i) To take the question to the Court ; or,
- (ii) To keep the matter on the agenda, securing a recommendation for the resumption of negotiations
 - (a) Without a pronouncement on the validity of the Treaty ; or,
 - (b) With such a pronouncement.

Fitzmaurice.

The Council may pronounce on the validity of the Treaty when it was negotiated but it is not certain that the Council would agree to go on record regarding the present compatibility of the Charter without some pronouncement from the Court. We ought, however, certainly to be able to get the Security Council to say, if the matter is referred to the Court, that, meanwhile, the Treaty remains valid.

We should get the worst of both worlds were the Council to recommend a reference to the Court at the same time that negotiations

/might be ...

might be re-opened and we should resist such a proposal unless the Egyptians raised it, in which case we should tell them that their first action should be to take the matter off the agenda.

A pronouncement on the validity of the Treaty would also cover the Sudan.

One objection, ^{probably} in the minds of our Delegation in New York was to reduce discussion in the Council to a minimum.

This cannot be cut short by more than a certain amount, since once the matter is put in the agenda all the Delegations must have their say. But of course it would prevent the discussions dragging on to an interminable and acrimonious length.

It was agreed that a telegram should be sent to New York on the following lines:-

(1) Our objective remains that we should induce the Council to declare that the present difficulties with Egypt are not likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and in short to throw the Egyptian case out.

(2) If, in the end, we are unable to achieve this, we have the choice between

- (a) A reference to the International Court ;
- (b) A recommendation that negotiations should be resumed while the matter remains on the agenda.

Of these, we prefer (a), subject to the views of Cairo regarding the political effect of the wait of up to one year, which a reference to the Court would necessitate.

(3) On this point they will hear further later. Meanwhile they should see what other Members of the Council say.

(4) If (2) (a) is decided upon, it will be left to the discretion of the Delegation whether they prompt our friends to put forward the proposal or put it forward themselves. It may be that other Delegations will be

/put forward ...

F0371/62978

Mr Scott Fox.

Mr Fitzmaurice.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FO 371/62978

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Minutes.

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put forward the proposals simultaneously. If other obnoxious proposals are put up, we ourselves could, in the last resort, ask for a reference to the Court, and it would be almost impossible for the Council to reject it.

(5) If the Egyptians see the way in which the wind is blowing and, fearing a reference to the Court, make proposals for the re-opening of direct negotiations, we should, in that event, inform them that their first step must be to take the matter off the agenda.

J.H. Paken

7th August, 1947.

Dpf. submitted
J.S.F.
7/8.

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37/62978

J 3865
5 AUG 1947

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Cypher/OTP.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No. 2116.

D. 10.58 p.m. 5th August, 1947.

R. 5.16 a.m. 6th August, 1947.

5th August, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo,
Washington - Saving.

IMMEDIATE.

- - - -

GIANT.

SECRET.

Egyptian case.

Nokrashy made speech of one and half hours, more or less on lines expected. He went through history since 1882 in endeavour to blacken reputation of His Majesty's Government in Egypt and Sudan. He declared Treaty of 1936 to have been signed under "threat" contained in intimation to King Fuad about what consequences of failure to reach agreement would be, and completely misrepresented tenour of reassurance subsequently given by His Majesty's Government on this subject. Inconsistently he also referred to Egyptian fears of Italian aggression. He said Treaty of 1936 was "temporary expedient".

2. I replied to Egyptian letter of 8th July and reserved right to reply to Nokrashy's speech at a later meeting. At this meeting I shall probably make another speech of some length to clear our reputation as regards past history. I have already made point that these allegations are legally irrelevant.

3. Suggestions have been made privately by Belgians, Australians and Assistant Secretary General that proper course for Security Council to take is to recommend reference in International Court on validity of Treaty. Furthermore Americans have twice asked us privately whether we would object to such a solution.

4. Views here on this suggestion are as follows:-

/(1)

6 AUG 1947
RECEIVED
SECRETARY GENERAL
UNITED NATIONS

- (1) We are unlikely to be able to induce Security Council simply to reject Egyptian application.
- (2) A recommendation for further negotiations with matter still on agenda is likely to be an alternative proposal to reference to the Court; and in that event we are convinced that we could not by any means count on securing removal from agenda.
- (3) Course (2) would naurally be interpreted by Egyptians as meaning that Security Council considered that His Majesty's Government should offer something better than Bevin-Sidky Agreement and indeed you have already expressed your objections to it
- (4) On the other hand the Law Officers and Lord Chancellor have expressed view that His Majesty's Government would succeed before the Court. Reference to Court would take time but we might try for a recommendation that status quo must be preserved by both parties pending decision of Court.
- (5) Egyptians evidently fear a reference to International Court. At least one of their Legal Advisers has counselled them to avoid this at all costs. Fact that it was hanging over them as a result of Security Council's action might therefore conceivably render them more amenable to a direct settlement with us than if Council had given a point in their favour by virtually imposing resumed Treaty negotiations to which they have no legal right.

5. I should be grateful for your urgent comments on this possibility.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 22.

[Repeated to Cairo]

COPY OF DRAFT TELEGRAM TO U.K. REPRESENTATIVE,
CANBERRA

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Please give following personal message from
Prime Minister to Mr. Chifley at once.

Begins. I am concerned at a report which we
have received from our Delegation to the Security
Council that your representative there has suggested
privately that proper course for Security Council to
take on the Egyptian dispute is to recommend a
reference to the International Court on the validity
of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty. Our case rests on
the sanctity of treaties and is so strong that our
view is that the only course open to the Security
Council is to reject the Egyptian plea outright and
declare that the situation does not repeat ~~not~~
threaten international peace and security. A vital
matter of principle is at stake of fundamental
importance to all members of the United Nations and
no treaty would be safe if the Security Council were
to burke the issue by some compromise solution such
as a reference to the International Court. We
cannot conceive the Security Council doing other than
making a clear cut decision dismissing the Egyptian
Appeal out of hand. Any other decision would cut
at the root of the principle of the sanctity of
treaties.

2. Matter is moreover one which must be of
particular concern to the Australian Government in

view/

Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

FO 371 / 62978

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- 2 -

view of the fact that our strategic position on the Suez Canal is at stake. I feel sure therefore that I shall be able to count on the Australian delegate at New York receiving instructions to support us to the hilt on this clear cut issue.
Ends.

F0371/62978

100

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To Permanent United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations)

No. 2519

D. 1.00 a.m. 8th August, 1947

7th August, 1947.

| | | |
|---------------------------|---|-----------|
| Repeated to Cairo No.1474 |) | |
| Beirut No.107 |) | |
| Nanking No.851 |) | Important |
| Bogota No.192 |) | |
| Rio de Janeiro No.578 |) | |
| Washington No.7952 |) | Immediate |
| Paris No.1795 |) | Immediate |
| Brussels No.515 |) | |
| Warsaw No.1078 |) | Important |
| Moscow No.2665 |) | |

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

SECRET

Your telegram No.2118 [of 5th August: Egyptian appeal to Security Council].

I have no doubt whatever that our case which rests on the sanctity of treaties is so strong that we must firmly maintain our view that the only course open to the Security Council is to reject the Egyptian plea outright, and declare that the situation does not (repeat not) threaten international peace and security. A vital matter of principle is at stake of fundamental importance to all members of the United Nations and no treaty would be safe if the Security Council were to burke the issue by some compromise solution such as a reference to the International Court. You should therefore give no official or unofficial indication that we can conceive the Security Council doing other than making a clear cut decision dismissing the Egyptian appeal out of hand. Any other decision would cut at the root of the principle of the sanctity of treaties.

2. It is clear for all to see that we have shown ourselves ready to negotiate a revision of the treaty in accordance with the provisions contained in the latter and

even

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- 2 -

even to go beyond the letter of our obligations therein. We remain ready to negotiate such a revision, but it must be in accordance with the treaty provisions for revision and not under the duress of an appeal on the Agenda of the Security Council.

5. As the issue is so clear cut I am amazed at the suggestion made by our friends mentioned in paragraph 5 of your telegram under reference, and I find it difficult to credit that the United States and Australian representatives are acting under the instructions of their governments in making such a suggestion. I am putting our views urgently to the United States, Australian and French Governments.

4. In the meantime I should be grateful if you would let me know urgently whether you have any indication of the views of the representatives of the other Governments on the Security Council, and in particular of the Chinese, Brazilian, and Colombian, and also whether the United States, Australian and Belgian delegates are acting on instructions from their Governments in advising reference to International Court.

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OUT FILE

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTIONFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

No. 1795

August 7th, 1947.

D. 11.35 a.m. August 7th, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York
No. 2521.

SSSSS

IMMEDIATESECRETGIANT

My telegram No. 2519 to New York [of August 7th:
Egyptian appeal to Security Council].

Please speak to French Minister for Foreign
Affairs on lines of paragraphs 1 and 2 and ask him
to brief the French representative on the Security
Council accordingly in accordance with undertaking
he gave to support us (see my telegram No. 1702)

FO 371/62978 10222

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Registry No.

Top Secret.
 Secret.
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Draft.

WASHINGTON

Telegram.

No. 7953

(Date) Aug 7th

Repeat to :-

U.K. DELEGATION
NEW YORK

2520 ✓

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
 Cypher.

Distribution :-

WORLD ORG.

Copies to :-

OUT FILE ^{F.O.} 194

Despatched ✓

1 am M.

~~IMMEDIATE~~
 GIANT
 SECRET

2519 to New York

My telegram No. A

of 7th August; Egyptian appeal to Security Council

I should be grateful if you would speak to Mr. ^{Marshall} ~~Byrnes~~ as soon as possible on the lines of paras 1 and 2 of my telegram under reference. I am most concerned at the ^{para 3 of} indication in New York telegram 116 para 3 that the U.S. ^{may be} ~~are~~ weakening over this. A vital question of principle is involved and I trust that Mr. ^{Marshall} ~~Byrnes~~ will instruct the U.S. delegate urgently to support us unreservedly ~~over this~~.

[Handwritten signature]

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FO 371 / 62978

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3800
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Cypher/OTP.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

- FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO RIO DE JANEIRO NO. 585
- BOGOTA NO. 197
- NANKING NO. 865
- BRUSSELS NO. 525

11th August, 1947. D. 8.40 a.m. 12th August, 1947.

Repeated to New York (U.K. Delegation) No. 2580
Cairo No. 121 Saving
Washington No. 845 Saving

IMPORTANT.

GIANT

SECRET

My telegram No. 2519 to United Kingdom Delegation New York [of August 8th: Egyptian case at the Security Council].

Please speak to Government to which you are accredited on lines of paragraphs 1 and 2 and urge that their representative on the Security Council should be briefed accordingly.

FO 371/62978

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J3665/12/16.

Cypher/UTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTIONFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO DAMASCUSNo. 404.

August 8th, 1947. D. 5.0.p.m. August 8th, 1947.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York No. 2533.

| | | |
|--------|----------|------------------|
| Cairo | No. 114) | } <u>Saving.</u> |
| Beirut | No. 45) | |
| Amman | No. 27) | |
| Jedda | No. 25) | |
| Bagdad | No. 41) | |

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IMMEDIATE.GIANT.SECRET.

Your telegram No. 351 [of 5th August; Egyptian appeal to Security Council.]

Please speak to President of the Republic on the lines of paragraphs 1 and 2 of my telegram No. 2519 to the United Kingdom Delegation New York. You should tell him that I feel sure that if he considers the case on its merits he will realise the grave dangers for the future that would be involved by anything less than a clear cut decision by the Security Council on the vital question of principle which is at stake. Once such a decision has been made by the Council and the matter removed from its Agenda the way would of course be open, if Egypt so desires, for a resumption of negotiations for the revision of the treaty in accordance with the procedure provided therein.

2. You should ask him to instruct Khoury accordingly.

FO 371/62978

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTIONFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO RIO DE JANEIRO

No. 416
21st August, 1947

D. 4.00 p.m. 21st August, 1947

Repeated to Bogota No. 211 Immediate
New York (U.K. Delegation) No. 2707

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MOST IMMEDIATECONFIDENTIAL

You should personally see the Colombian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once and point out to him the importance of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute from the point of view of sanctity of treaties (see my telegram No. 2519 to United Kingdom Delegation New York). Brazilian recommendation proposed at the Security Council yesterday while rather more favourable to the Egyptians than we should have liked, represents the minimum to which Security Council should agree if they are to safeguard this fundamental point of principle vital to all members of the United Nations.

2. I am therefore confident that the instructions of the Colombian delegate to the Council will be such as to ensure that he supports the Brazilian resolution.

3. Colombian delegate has not yet spoken since Brazilian resolution was proposed, but resolution is likely to be put to the vote tomorrow Friday and his attitude may have great importance in the voting.

| S# | a) Year | b) Type | c) No. | Value | | Total | Remarks |
|-------|---------|--|---|---------------|---------------------|-------------|---|
| | | | | (d) On Report | (e) by Gift or Loan | | |
| 1 | 1943 | Lyons Gladiators Ansons Perovial C.C. Auto-Commander Hart variants Hobbs Harrington I. Harrington Alre 626 Aulax | 29 2 1 1 20 1 5 34 16 10 | \$1,445,000 | - | \$1,445,000 | |
| 2 | 1943 | Tombs Harrington II Harvard | 26 20 1 | \$ 145,000 | \$150,500 | \$ 295,500 | On loan and subsequently returned to R.A.F., H/o completed. |
| 3 | 1944 | Anson I Anson XII(V.I.P) Harrington III. | 9 1 12 | \$ 108,000 | \$ 84,871 | \$ 192,871 | Gift to King Parrot. |
| 4 | 1945 | Spiritus V.B. Anson XII(V.I.P) Harrington III. | 20 1 20 | \$ 304,871 | \$100,000 | \$ 404,871 | |
| 5 | 1946 | Spiritus IX Oxford | 45 3 | \$ 211,000 | \$ 22,000 | \$ 233,000 | On purchase at normal price. |
| 6 | 1946 | Equipment for overhaul of Merlin Engines Spares for Anson XII for 18 months | | \$ 21,000 | - | \$ 21,000 | On purchase at normal price |
| TOTAL | | | | \$2,234,871 | \$357,371 | \$2,592,242 | |

NOTE:- To these figures, which are conservative and are probably under estimated due to lack of complete records, must be added the equipment supplied to No. 2. (KITE) Squadron when operating with the R.A.F. at HERB. WARRICK, amounting to approximately £250,000. Also the value of HERB. WARRICK, fields, and radio ground equipment to the value of approximately £15,000, most of which is still on loan.

SHIPS

APPENDIX III B

| Serial | Type | Requested | Offers |
|--------|--|-----------|---|
| 1 | HERM Class Sloops | 3 | No surplus available. We have offered to have them constructed in this country and to lend one of our own reserves until the first ship is ready. |
| 2 | GASPER Class Corvettes | 2 | No surplus corvettes available. Suggested that requirements should be reviewed because the draught of this class is too great for the purpose which the Egyptians have in mind. |
| 3 | ALGERINE Class minesweepers | 4 | These have been earmarked for sale to the Egyptians. |
| 4 | British Yacht minesweepers | 8 | British Yacht minesweepers are Lease Lend ships and could not be sold to third parties. We offered 110 feet motor minesweepers instead. Egyptians have now bought British Yacht minesweepers direct from United States. |
| 5 | Motor Torpedo Boats | - | Now construction proposed because the Egyptians did not require those craft until 3 years after the date of their application and the boats could not be kept in reserve for so long. |
| 6 | Harbour Defence Motor Launches | 3 | These have been offered for sale. |
| 7 | High Speed (20 knots) outgoing diesel launches | 6 | Not used in the HERY. We have offered to ask the Royal Air Force if they had phosphores which would meet this requirement. |
| 8 | Air-Gas Rescue Launches | 2 | These have been offered for sale. |

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NAVYAN ASSISTANCE TRAINING APPENDIX III A

| Label | Date | Requested | | Arranged | | Remarks |
|-------|--------|-------------|--|-------------|---|---|
| | | Numbers (c) | Type of Course (d) | Numbers (e) | Type of Course (f) | |
| 1 | 1946 | 15 | Sub Lts Course U.L. | 16 | Preliminary sea training with Mediterranean Fleet during 1946. Courses completed 1947. | (a) 2 officers unavailable. (b) Remainder sea training in Aircraft Carrier, destroyers and frigates of Mediterranean Fleet. |
| 2 | 1946 | 3 | Sea Training in Mediterranean Fleet | 3 | See Training in Mediterranean Fleet 1946/7. Commenced Sub Lts Course in U.L. June 1947 (to last till November 1947) | Possibility of further sea training in Mediterranean Fleet to be investigated later. |
| 3 | 1946 | 1 | Long Investigation Course | 1 | Preliminary sea training in destroyer 1946. Investigation course 1946/47. | Has also visited Meteorological Service Departments to study meteorological arrangements. No progress reports yet came to hand |
| 4 | 1946/7 | 30 ER4 | To join small ships of Mediterranean Fleet to pass for E.A.R. after 6 months and gain V/K certificate after 9 months | 27 | Under training in cruisers and destroyer depot ship for initial training. Joined Dec 46 & Jan 47. | No progress reports. |
| 5 | 1947 | 2 E/6 | To join small ships of Mediterranean Fleet | 2 | In destroyer depot ship for initial training | No progress reports. |
| 6 | 1947 | 2 | To obtain V/K certificates for small ships | 2 | Joined cruiser in Mediterranean Fleet 1947. Gained V/K certificate Kopman Jan 1947. | Have been returned to Egypt |
| 7 | 1947 | 9 | To join R.N. Engineering College for 15 months followed by sea training and obtain V/K certificate | 9 | Joined R.N. Engineering College Kopman Jan 1947. | See Training to be arranged later if possible. |
| 8 | 1947 | 1 | To specialise in Gyro, Echo sounding, Radar, Indicator Loop and Radar. | 1 | Joined "Northborough" Jan 1947. Will complete at OSREY late Sep. 1947. | |

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| Serial | Date | Requested | | Arranged | | Remarks |
|--------|------|-----------|---|----------|---|---|
| | | Numbers | Type of Course (d) | Numbers | Type of Course (e) | |
| 9 | 1946 | 2 | Long Oceanographic Course in order to advance date of turning over Delta Oceanographic | 2 | Course 1946/47 | One will probably take Radio Engineering Course in order to take over Delta W/T systems. |
| 10 | 1947 | 2 | Medical Gunnery Course up to 60 guns and training in torpedo, mine sweeping, paravane and Depth Charges | 2 | Joined DEPTARK for torpedo etc training 1947. Now joined EXCELLENCE for Gunnery Course of 10 weeks | |
| 11 | 1947 | 3 | R.N. College Greenwich for 6 months. From short technical hydrographic courses | 3 | R.N. College Greenwich 1947. IRIND for short Navigation Course, one specializing in meteorology, started Long Meteorological Course (May-June). Other two current Affairs and Instructional Courses then sea training in training battleship. July. Attached to Home Command education officer for visit August. All to take Divisonal Course, then meteorological specialist to take Instructional technique Course. | All to return to Egypt Sep-47. |
| 12 | 1947 | 2 | University of Greenwich | 2 | Course in Hydrographic Department June 1947 for 6 months | |
| 13 | 1947 | 6 | To go to sea in ships of Mediterranean Fleet for 6 months. | 6 | Joined destroyers of Mediterranean Fleet 1947. Sub Lt. Course in U.K. early Feb. 1948. | A further 8 to join Mediterranean Fleet before Feb. 1948 and go to U.K. on Sub Lt. Courses. |
| 14 | 1947 | 2 | To join small ships of Mediterranean Fleet for 4 months | 5 | Five sweeping Course in U.K. and training in operational mine-sweeper. One to undergo training at RFRM/SH 1947. | |

TRAINING

| Serial | Date | Requested | | Arranged | | Remarks |
|--------|--------------------|-----------|--|----------|--|---|
| | | Numbers | Type of Course | Numbers | Type of Course | |
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) |
| 15 | 1947 | 3 | To go to sea for 10 weeks in Heli-torpedo Fleet, then 2 weeks at Jalta | 3 | 1 visited Poolerich. 1 joined course - Jul 47 | Proposed to should do 2 weeks at Jalta then cruise. Availing C-in-C Heli-torpedo's reports. |
| 16 | 1947 | 2 | Same as 10 above | | | Details not yet arranged. |
| 17 | 1947 | 1 | Same as 5 above | | | Details not yet arranged. |
| 18 | 1947 | 1 | 4 months sea training in Heli-torpedo Fleet | | | Details not yet arranged. |
| 19 | 1947 | 2 | Long (C) Course | 1 | Long sea course Radio Engineering Course | |
| 20 | 1947 | 1 | To obtain E/R certificate after sea experience in Heli-torpedo Fleet | | | Rejected by C-in-C Heli-torpedo owing to lack of accommodation. |
| 21 | a) 1948 b) 1949 | 14 10 | Training as at 7 above Training as at 7 above | 14 10 | 1948 R.N. Engineering College, Keyham 1948 sea train R.N. College, Plymouth Two terms in training college. 1949 R.N. Engineering College Keyham (11 terms) | Programs for "Special Entry" Heli-torpedo (B) aged 17½ |

TRAINING

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E. & S.

V3666 / G

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V3666 / 12/916

Egypt: Appeal to Security Council.

Maj Message
 to Mr Scott Fox
 B4/2213/404
 Dated 2 Aug
 Received 6 Aug.

Last Paper.

V3618

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8) with Mr Scott Fox's
 copies
 Mr Lascelles Navin
 V1312 Aug

(Minutes.)

Copm covers 4 spare
 of enclosure to Mr Lascelles
 UK. Del New York with Mr
 Scott Fox's compliments.

J. H. H. Richards

7/8

Mr 15. iii.
 Sr. Dep-

Q
 3/9

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

1947

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Registry Number J 3625/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir R. Campbell
No. 1654
Dated 1654
Received in Registry } 2 Aug 47

Instructions to statement on Treaty negotiations: Sudan.

Refer to 7. 11 2709 to New York (33289/12/16). Suggest that Nkrumah will comment on the question of annexation of the Sudan (as well as Egypt) as well Egyptian claims, and not with determination to the Sudan which he may say is a right to be conceded.

Last Paper.

J. 3622

References.

1019/12/16

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

M. 2/8
23/9/47

Next Paper.

J 3638

(Minutes.)

This is true enough, is well known to our experts in New York, & has been incorporated in the brief for the U.K. Delegation. But it is also a fact that earlier in his statement of March 3rd Nkrumah said that "The unity of Egypt and the Sudan is the will of both Egyptians and Sudanese"; and throughout his abortive talks with Sir R. Campbell from 15th Dec. 1946 to 25th Jan 1947 over the interpretation of the Sudan protocol he always reverted to what he called the facts of the situation, namely that all Sudanese wanted to be

be united with Egypt and
 only British machinations
 (4 troops) ~~that~~ led any
 Sudanese to express a contrary
 opinion. A free plebiscite
 in the Sudan could only,
 in Nokrashi's view, lead to
 an overwhelming vote for
 union with Egypt.

I myself doubt
 whether Nokrashi will openly
 admit the right of the Sudanese
 to choose independence if they
 so wish. It will make it
 very difficult for him to
 explain why he did not
 sign the Benin-Sidky texts
 for one thing. For another, it
 would seriously weaken his
 position in Egypt.

No action required.

D.H.A. Richey


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DSS
5/8

FO 371/62978

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CYPHER/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICESir R.I. Campbell.
No. 1,654.

D: 5.07 p.m. 2nd August, 1947.

2nd August, 1947.

R: 8.12 p.m. 2nd August, 1947.

Repeated to: New York,
Washington.IMPORTANT

000 000 000

-J 3289/12/46

Your telegram No. 2,249 to New York paragraph 2.

My telegram No. 557 shows under point two that Nokrashi in his statement of March 3rd went a good deal further in the direction of our own principle of helping the Sudan towards self-government and also stated "Egypt wants the Sudanese to be able as soon as possible to express their views freely, which can be accomplished only when British troops have evacuated the Sudan. It is likely therefore that he will concentrate on the question of evacuation of the Sudan (as well as Egypt) as real Egyptian claim, and not self-determination for the Sudan which he may say is a right already conceded. Hassan Pasha's remark reported in paragraph 1 of New York telegram No. 1,845 seems to point in the same direction.

Foreign Office pass to New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 37 and 50 respectively.

[Repeated to New York and Washington.]

