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revision negotiations including both the presence of British troops in Egypt and the Sudan question. The matter of troops is clearly within the Security Council's jurisdiction. The U.S.S.R., however, would undoubtedly support the proposal for the immediate withdrawal of British troops, and in so doing would transform a matter on which considerable agreement already exists between the United Kingdom and Egypt into a major political issue in the Security Council and would align Soviet with Arab countries.

The Department of course reaffirm the general principle that all States should have free access to the Security Council and recognises that much unfavourable publicity might ensue if any suggestion be made to the Egyptian Government that the matter should not be brought to the Security Council. Such a danger, however, would be lessened if the suggestion were confined to an intimation that the Sudan problem should be dealt with by General Assembly rather than the Security Council.

FO371/62969

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP DIPLOMATIC SECRET.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON.

No.4533
1st May, 1947. D: 10.50 p.m. 1st May, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo No.892.
A A A A

IMMEDIATE.

TOP SECRET.

Your telegram No.2515.

We should greatly prefer that the Americans should make no such approach to the Egyptian Government, even informally. In the form suggested it would definitely encourage the latter to appeal to the United Nations (whether to the Security Council or to the General Assembly), and this they may be still hesitating to do. An approach in any form would at the least tend to involve the United States Government in tendering advice, and this would be dangerous from the point of view of Stalin's assurance to me.

2. According to our information moreover the Egyptians are unlikely to appeal on the issue which prevented us from reaching agreement with them, i.e. the question of the right of the Sudanese people ultimately to control its own destinies. Their appeal will probably take the form of a demand for the immediate and total evacuation of British troops from Egypt and the Sudan on the grounds that the 1936 treaty is incompatible with the Charter and with the Resolution adopted by the last General Assembly. On this hypothesis, the suggested American approach would be beside the mark. So too would its assumption that the Soviet Government would support Egypt on the Security Council - provided that Stalin's assurance to me is honoured.

3. Since the State Department officials at the level at which this proposal emanated are apparently unaware of Stalin's assurance, you may be able to secure the abandonment of the proposal by explaining the real position in confidence to Acheson or Henderson.

difficulty Egyptians ready to collaborate with us. One by one our different institutions will attack as has already been the case with Maronis and the Anglo-Egyptian Union. There will be no halting the Egyptians on this road as long as they think we are powerless to hold our friends here and make things unpleasant for our enemies. Sources of this move are both Nokrashi himself and the Palace. Nokrashi is taking this line because when aggrieved he can become "awkward". The Palace is encouraging it partly because of an innate anti-British tendency which is one facet of King Farouk's character dating from his very accession, partly because of royal pique over reference to a minority Government, partly because His Majesty desires to reinsure with the public after failure of the treaty policy. Both Nokrashi and the Palace are actuated partly by the need of a minority régime to compete with the majority in anti-British extremism. The majority meanwhile likewise indulges in extremism in order not to be outdone by the Palace and in order to make it difficult for the present régime to accept any settlement by forcing them yet higher in the ascending spiral.

5. There is every indication that King Farouk and Azzam are endeavouring to undermine friendly Hashemite rulers in Iraq and Trans-Jordan thus the Egyptian influence is being used to alienate Arab states generally from Great Britain. Causes of this are (a) fear of a Hashemite Greater Syria which would compete for leadership of the Arab countries with Egypt, (b) belief that we are backing Greater Syria and resultant fear that Saudi Arabia is most likely to desire to back us at U.N.O.

4. It seems to me that an essential condition of maintaining our positions in the Middle East is that we

should ....

should show firmness by which both friends and enemies will realise that we are not going to allow ourselves to be driven out of the Middle East by Egypt and that our patience and conciliatory attitude during negotiations does not mean we can be driven to any position the Egytpians choose.

5. I think the line we now should take is that the Egyptian Government have by this statement of Nokrashi grossly misrepresented causes of the breakdown of negotiations and been guilty of bad faith, that we will always be prepared to negotiate revision of the 1936 Treaty with any Egyptian Government, prepared and able to study our common problems on their merits and that meanwhile we will stand on the 1936 Treaty particularly on Article 8 which makes Egypt a strategical area as being an essential means of communication between different parts of the British Empire and also a universal means of communication. As regards temporary presence in Egypt of military elements in excess of thomestipulated in the 1936 Treaty we would [gp. undec.] troops come here to save the world and Egypt from Nazi and Fascist domination during the World War. They had incidently saved Egypt from complete material destruction. They were being removed as quickly as circumstances would permit. It would in my opinion be well for us to get this line taken in general terms in the press as soon as possible (tone should be good tempered) and we should prepare a closely argued and detailed case on this basis for use at U.N.O. We should seek America's support at U.N.O. for this attitude.

6. As regards the Sudan we would stand on the principle of self determination while we would be prepared to consider any reasonable extension of claim as regards

their ....

(4)

their participation in the preparation of the Sudanese for self Government, this would be impossible as long as the Egyptians maintain their present unreasonable attitude and continue to misrepresent British past and present policy.

7. I submit that we are forced to take up an attitude on these lines unless we are prepared to be driven from pillar to post until we are driven out of the Middle East.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

FO371/62969

J

J 1579

8 APR 17

EGYPT and SUDAN

.1579/12/16

M FROM CAIRO
, Campbell)

3

pril 1947

} 8 April 1947

Treaty Negotiations.

Refs. Cairo No. 859 (J.1571/12/16.)

"In view of the flagrant lie that Egypt did not approve the Bevin-Sidky draft I suggest that the press be informed of the substance of the letter of the Egyptian Ambassador to the Secretary of State of Dec. 8th stating that the Egyptians were ready to sign."

t Paper.

1578

ferences.

(Minutes.)

The letter referred to must be the note of 1/12/46 in J5112/39/16. The substance of the last two paras has already been made public. See PM's reply to Mr Eden on 11th March, 1947 p. 2. (To tel No 554 to Cairo - copy attached)

As regards the general question of publicity on Heikal's remarks see Mr Nash's minute on J1601.

D.H.H. Riley
10/4

(Print.)

ow disposed of.)

action on
J 1601

DSS
11/4.

on
ed.)

(Index.)

17/9/47

Next Paper.

26513 F.O.P.

J

DEPARTMENTAL NO:1

18

CYPHER/OTP

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R.Campbell
No:863
7th April 1947

D.6.17 p.m. 7th April 1947
R.6.25 p.m. 7th April 1947

4 4 4 4

J 1579
8 APR

IMPORTANT.

My telegram No:859. J 1571/12/16

In view of the flagrant lie that Egypt did not approve the Bevin-Sidky Pasha draft I suggest that the press be informed of the substance of the letter of the Egyptian Ambassador to the Secretary of State of December 8th stating that the Egyptians were ready to sign.

F.O.371/62969

PM/OB/47/60.

PRIME MINISTER.

You have already seen Cairo telegram No. 636 of March 12th, but I attach a copy of it at Flag A for ease of reference.

2. In commenting on this telegram to the Secretary of State in Moscow, we agreed with Sir R. Campbell's view that it would be futile to try to get the Egyptians to re-open negotiations, but thought that we should do nothing to discourage mediation by the other Arab States. As regards the line proposed by Sir R. Campbell in paragraph 5 of his telegram, we noted that your own statement in the House on March 11th was almost identical, except for the point on extension of Egyptian participation in the preparation of the Sudanese for self-Government.

3. In a subsequent telegram we suggested that, should relations with Egypt continue to deteriorate, it might be wise to examine the means of replacing the present minority régime in Egypt by a more representative form of Government.

4. The Secretary of State agreed with our comments as in paragraph 2 above, but did not approve the idea of undermining Nokrashi's position until we had had the chance to see

/whether

whether Sir R. Howe's appointment would have any effect on the situation in Egypt. The Secretary of State suggested that Sir R. Howe might talk to King Farouk on the lines of paragraph 6 of Cairo telegram No. 636. If, thereafter, relations continued to deteriorate, we might attempt to change the political set-up in Cairo and the Secretary of State asked that we should make concrete proposals with this end in view.

5. In reply we advised that the removal of Nokrashi might be accomplished by (a) an approach to King Farouk or (b) an approach to the Wafd in the first instance. On the whole we preferred course (a). We also suggested that Sir R. Campbell should be authorised, when he judged it opportune, to give the King a message from the Foreign Secretary to the effect that while not wishing to interfere in Egyptian internal affairs, he felt that our special relations with Egypt entitled him to give a word of advice; that with the present régime Mr. Bevin saw no chance of establishing Anglo-Egyptian relations on a basis which the King himself had frequently assured us was his aim, and that he regarded the present internal situation as very threatening and its

/continuation

continuation as likely to have serious consequences not only on Anglo-Egyptian relations, but on the King's own position.

6. At this point in the correspondence the Secretary of State expressed some doubt as to whether we had understood his intentions. (Moscow Delegation telegram No. 353, at Flag B). The first step to his mind should be an attempt to create a better atmosphere over the Sudan. He did not feel that the policy we had followed in 1924 and again in 1942 would do us credit, if the dispute came before the United Nations. The question arose whether an improvement in the atmosphere could be achieved by negotiation with the Egyptians or by taking administrative measures in the Sudan. The Secretary of State suggested that Sir R. Howe (whose early departure for Khartoum he advocated) should see King Farouk in Cairo and acquaint him with the policy he had been instructed to carry out in the Sudan. This policy would broadly be the association of the Egyptians with ourselves in the administration of the condominium without compromising the right of the Sudanese to self-determination. Such an approach to the King might give the Egyptian Government a chance of changing their attitude and so make possible a

/resumption

resumption of talks. If this approach failed, the Secretary of State thought it useless to seek to change the Government through the King's instrumentality and favoured an attempt to put the Wafd back into power. In a subsequent telegram (Moscow Delegation No. 440, at Flag C), the Secretary of State indicated the lines on which Sir R. Howe should speak to King Farouk.

7. In the meantime I had replied to the Secretary of State suggesting that we should avoid giving the appearance of making any further concessions. I attach a copy of this telegram (Foreign Office telegram No. 425, at Flag D) together with a copy of the reply that it has provoked (Moscow Delegation telegram No. 524 at Flag E).

8. I apologise for having to burden you with this long story, but I feel that the discussion has reached a stage where I can go no further without your express approval. I therefore attach a draft telegram (Flag F) for your consideration and, if you concur in it, would like to add in a final sentence that you have been acquainted with the tenor of this correspondence and have approved the present reply.

3rd April, 1947.

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10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

7th April, 1947.

My dear Aubrey

The Prime Minister has read Sargent's Minute PM/OS/47/60 and also Moscow telegram No.551.

The Prime Minister approves the draft telegram sent under cover of Sargent's minute, unless Sargent wishes to alter it in any way in the light of the Moscow telegram.

This is in confirmation of my telephone message to McAlpine this morning.

Yours ever
John Anderson

A.S. Halford, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

FO371/62869

For entry

Copy to Egyptian Desk.

Cypher/OTP

PRIPER

42

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

(To United Kingdom Delegation to Council of Foreign Ministers)

No. 626 D. 1.10 p.m. 8th April 1947

8th April 1947

c c c c c

IMMEDIATE
DEDIP
TOP SECRET

Your telegrams Nos. 497, 524 and 528 [of 31st March and 1st April, Sudan].

Following for Secretary of State from Sir O. Sargent.

I am very sorry that you should have thought that my recital of the concessions we have made to the Egyptians to secure a new Treaty was uncalled for. I of course had no intention of criticising the underlying policy which was clearly the right one and indeed the only one in the circumstances. My object was merely to show that the Egyptians, owing to their peculiar oriental mentality have misinterpreted and taken unfair advantage of our genuine efforts to reach a freely negotiated Treaty on the give and take basis, and that we are bound to take this into account, in considering future tactics.

2. Sir R. Howe whom I had already consulted as to his first interview with the King, considers that he should confine himself on this occasion more or less to generalities. This is in keeping with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 524 on which Sir R. Howe will model himself. He would propose, if you agree, to say to the King that it will be his duty as Governor General to see that the Egyptian interests in the Sudan are safeguarded, that the policy of the Sudanese Government shall not in any case be directed against those interests, that he will hope to have the fullest and frankest co-operation of the Egyptian Government in carrying out a policy of eventual self-government and that he will keep them informed of all developments and progress in this direction and he will hope to have their fullest support in this task. He would then mention the idea of an Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese Council (which of course has already been put to Sidki and Nokrashi in the past).

3. I would suggest that as soon as Sir R. Howe reaches Khartoum he should examine the whole situation in the Sudan and furnish you with a full report on the matters dealt with in your telegram No. 498 in the spirit of paragraph 9 of that telegram.

/ 4....

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4. Incidentally, as regards the Customs and Currency Union mentioned in the last sentence of paragraph 7, it appears that such a Union already exists in as much as there are no Customs barriers between Egypt and Sudan and there is the same currency in both countries.

5. As for the King, I must confess that I feel very suspicious of him, especially as regards the Sudan. He is no friend of ours and bears a grudge against us. His attitude over the Sudan is and always has been inspired by self-glorification and personal prestige. He has no interest in the Sudan for its own sake but only as a means for securing political success for the régime. His only reason for working in with us at all is because he is unsure of his own future. His dynasty may be in danger in the event of a popular movement led by the Wafd and exploited by the Communists when we might, he thinks, be the only Power to come to his help.

6. The Prime Minister has seen this telegram and concurs in it.

F.O. 371/62919

1947

E. S.

1916 / G

39

116 1[illegible]/G 16

Anglo-Egyptian relations 53

Refer to F.O. tel 626 (J1653/12/G)
Agrees with proposed line to take at Sir R. Howe's interview with the King.

Moscow
Y08

To 11 April
rec'd 15 April

Last Paper.

J1674

References.

(Minutes.)

Sir R. Howe has seen this telegram & has discussed it with Sir O. Sargent.

D.M.H. Rickett
15/4

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Khartoum 125
12 May

I think that we ought now, with reference to Cairo telegram in J1022 to which we have not replied, to put Sir Ronald Campbell in the picture as regards the ~~proposed~~ interview which the Secretary of State wishes him and Sir R. Howe to have with the King.

2. There are two points involved, (a) the Sudan, and (b) the possibility of provoking a change of Government in Egypt. As regards the latter point, we should perhaps review the position in the light of the new difficulties with the Egyptians in connexion with the movements of our troops in Egypt.

3. Sir R. Campbell in his telegram in J1022 recommended that if we wished to take any action in this matter it would be safer to go to the King rather than to approach the WAFD, since any approach to the WAFD would get known to the King and make the latter the more determined to support Nokrashi. He suggested that the King might be given a message from the Secretary of State that a continuation of the present internal situation would be likely to have serious consequences, both on Anglo-Egyptian relations and on the King's own position. He did not see how we could enforce any advice, but thought that such a message might possibly prompt the King to broaden the basis of the Government.

4. In our telegram to Moscow in J1287 we suggested to the Secretary of State that Sir R. Campbell should speak on the lines proposed when he

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

(Flag D)

/considered

FO371/62969

considered that the right moment had arrived. The Secretary of State had in the meantime, in his telegram in that paper, said that he did not wish to make any move until we had had time to see whether Sir R. Howe's appointment had had any effect on the situation in Egypt, but that if, after Sir R. Howe had taken up his appointment, our relations with Egypt continued to deteriorate, we should use all our resources to secure Nokrashi's removal. In his telegram in J1409 the Secretary of State said that if there was no change in the present trend of anti-British policy it would be useless to try and secure Nokrashi's dismissal by a further approach to the King, and enquired what direct measures it would be possible to take to put the WAFD into power. In his telegram in J1553, however, the Secretary of State reverted to the idea of a talk between the Ambassador and the King on the lines which we had suggested, and said that he assumed that the Ambassador would accompany Sir R. Howe to the audience, and that he did not favour any approach to the King before then. (Flag J)

4. It is now unfortunately only too clear that Sir R. Howe's appointment has not improved our relations, at least so far as concerns Nokrashi. On the other hand, we do not know what is the King's attitude to the latest manifestations of his Prime Minister's policy, although we have had indications that the King is very anxious to ingratiate himself with the Egyptian army. It is therefore for consideration whether, in view of the difficulty of any effective reprisal, it would not be better to pursue the possibility of securing a change of Government, and whether, in these circumstances, it would not be better for Sir R. Campbell to see the King at once rather than wait for the interview which will be arranged for Sir R. Howe. So far as we know, H.M. Ambassador has not yet carried out his instructions to see the King about the British Military Mission (J1224 - Flag H), and if he sees the King in that connexion it would provide a peg on which to hang a discussion with the King about the general deterioration of relations, if such were required.

5. Unless we can be certain that a direct approach to the WAFD would be effective in producing a change in the Government (it has so far been ~~almost~~ impossible to suggest how satisfactory contact with the WAFD could be initiated), any approach would merely make the King more determined to stand by Nokrashi, if the approach became known, as it surely would. Unless there is, therefore, some new factor in the situation since Cairo sent their views in the telegram referred to in para. 3 of this Minute (J1022), we can only go to the King and try to drive a wedge between him and Nokrashi by persuading him that it is not in his interest to allow the present situation to continue. In addition to speaking on the lines agreed, it might be pointed out to King Farouk that if matters were allowed to drift the rift between the two countries might become so wide that it would be difficult to bridge in the future, and that, although the policy of pin-pricks which Nokrashi was pursuing had so far been given no publicity outside Egypt, this would not necessarily continue to be the case, particularly if members of the British armed forces were subjected to indignities (as could hardly fail to occur if matters went on as they were going at present), and that such publicity would give rise to an outburst of public resentment in England, and could hardly prove helpful to the Egyptian case before the United Nations.

/Unfortunately

R371/62969

6. Unfortunately we can not reckon with such advice having much effect on the King unless he was already anxious to get rid of Nokrashi (and there has been some small indication that he may be toying with that idea) or unless we had something substantial in the way of a carrot or a stick with which to support our advice. We have little left to offer in the way of carrots, although there does seem some possibility that we could offer the Egyptians a rather larger share in the administration of the Sudan and Sir R. Campbell might drop a hint on the lines of para. 6 of his telegram in J1178. As regards the stick, it is clearly no use using force unless we were prepared to go to the limit despite local and international repercussions, and it would hardly be wise to make threats that we were not prepared to implement.

7. There is, perhaps, one other possibility which it is just worthwhile mentioning, namely, that although advice from H.M. Ambassador might not be sufficiently effective in the circumstances just described, similar language from the Secretary of State himself would, of course, carry greater weight. Once again this is a card which ~~it would be too risky~~ we could not afford to play unless we could be certain that it would be effective, although the risk would be somewhat less if the Secretary of State could call in at Cairo on his way back from Moscow than if there were any question of a specific visit to Egypt for that sole purpose.

D. Scott Fox

D. Scott Fox,
18th April, 1947.

In the telegram which went off this morning to Moscow, we suggested briefly and without much detail the ~~possibility~~ desirability of reconsidering the plan to unseat Nokrashi. The telegram was repeated to Cairo and expressed the hope that Sir R. Campbell would comment on it. I don't think there is much that we can do to fill in the picture for Cairo's benefit at the present stage.

2. I agree that an approach to King Farouk, and one made by Sir R. Campbell without waiting for Sir R. Howe's arrival, would be the best ~~pro~~ procedure if we are to do anything at all on these lines. But it is very doubtful whether

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FO371/62969

whether remonstrances on the lines suggested in Mr Scott-Fox's minute above would sway him. He is, of course, no friend of ours; and I don't think that the Egyptians would lose much, from the point of view of international opinion, if there were full publicity for the sort of pinpricks we have suffered from so far. In a great many countries, the British troops would be regarded as fair game for such sport, and the publicising of our inability to hit back would react adversely upon our general prestige. (Incidents such as riots endangering foreign civilian, or native Christian, lives — e.g. the anti-Coptic affair at Zagazig — are another matter, and are really damaging to the Egyptian government).

3. As regards "carrots", I doubt very much whether the present moment is suitable for even a conditional offer of a larger Egyptian share in the administration of the Sudan. For one thing, we could not go back on our side of that bargain, whereas the Egyptians could very easily go back on theirs. For another, the offer seems to me too suggestive of an uneasy conscience about this aspect of our eventual case before the U.N., and too much of an admission that Nokrashi's pinprick policy pays.

4. The line of approach which seems to me to be the most promising is to

to tell the King that Nokrashi's policy of pinpricks, though annoying for us, is not going to achieve that we believe to be its object, viz. to bounce us into some ill-considered action, whether by way of some act of reprisal which would put us in the wrong or of an appeal by us to the U.N. on some inadequate ground. We should indicate to the King that we quite realize Nokrashi's personal gamble, being convinced that an Egyptian appeal to the U.N. on the general issue would fail; that we remain averse from UN intervention not because we fear the result, but because an amicable settlement à deux is obviously preferable from the point of view of future cooperation in regard to our common problems of defence; and that consequently Nokrashi's continued holding of office involves a continued deadlock which is not in the interest of either country.

To this argument Sir R. Campbell might add two hints:—

(a) that each pinprick merely makes us dig ourselves in more firmly in the Canal Zone and defer the evacuation of that zone which was provided for under the Bevin-Sidki agreement; and

(b) that if the King won't replace Nokrashi himself, the growing unrest which Nokrashi's policy is causing amongst the Egyptian masses may very well break the deadlock in

Minutes.

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in another fashion which would be much less acceptable to the King.

[illegible]
April 19th

I agree.

M Butler
24/iv.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

enter 59

Cypher/OTP

PRIPER
21916

FROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

15 APR 1947

(From United Kingdom Delegation to Council of Foreign Ministers)

No. 708 D. 4.07 p.m. 11th April, 1947.

11th April, 1947. R. 2.20 p.m. 11th April, 1947.

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IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Following from Secretary of State for Sir O. Sargent.

Your telegram No. 626. — J1653

I entirely agree with the line you propose Sir R. Howe should take when he sees the King.

2. I suggest that when Sir R. Howe has had time to assess the position in the Sudan he might return to England to report to me and clear up any business he has had to leave undone in England owing to his rather hurried departure.

3. I fully share your views about the King and base no hopes whatsoever on his being friendly towards us except in so far as he feels this to coincide with his narrow and rather sordid interpretation of what he considers the interests of himself and his dynasty to be. Nevertheless, I think the policy we intend to follow in the Sudan is the right one and will strengthen our case at the United Nations.

P 3371/62969

E. S.

J1867 | G.

67 | 12 | 1916

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty: Nokrashi

106

R Campbell
Cairo
964

Refs to F.O. tel 827 (J1862 p/G) comments on probability of dismissal of Nokrashi.

Last Paper.
J1863

References.

(Minutes.)

D. H. H. Williams
25/4

This does not get us much further, since we will know that there was no certainty of our being able to induce the King to dismiss Nokrashi. What we particularly wanted to know was Sir R. Campbell's estimate of the risks involved in making the attempt and failing. (Admittedly we did ask him specifically to do so). It would also have been useful to know whether, in Sir R. Campbell's opinion and provided that we could in fact oust Nokrashi, we would be likely to get anybody better, or still worse.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

2. A new factor has however been introduced meanwhile by the Ambassador's report of his representations to Nokrashi. The latter's reactions were of the interim variety, but they were not uncompromising and (in some respects) fairly satisfactory. It seems best therefore to refer our plans for an assault on Nokrashi via King Farouk, at any rate until we have the final upshot of the representations. If that result is favourable, it will presumably be followed by instructions by Nokrashi to the Egyptian officials concerned, laying down an acceptable

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ted.)
30/4

(Index.)
Unfit.

Next Paper.

acceptable procedure for the admission of British troops to the Delta — as also, we hope, for the registration of military vehicles without payment. It would be valuable to get this procedure laid down before a new Prime Minister emerged who might start again from zero. (The new P.M. could of course cancel any concessions made to us by Nokrashi; but the forces of precedent and inertia would be on our side).

3. Even if we do get a satisfactory modus vivendi out of Nokrashi in regard to the various immediate problems which have been under discussion, it will remain true that he is personally committed to taking us to the U.N. and that, whoever else can resume negotiations, he certainly can't. It is however also true that, if the King and Nokrashi want a 100% acceptance by us of the Egyptian demands as the price of resuming negotiations instead of going to the U.N., no other conceivable Egyptian P.M. could afford to resume negotiations without a considerable "percentage" of concessions by us; and that we for our part can make none at all. The two sides are in fact so far apart that, although this is perhaps largely Nokrashi's own doing, the prospects of resuming negotiations and avoiding recourse to the U.N. are practically nil whether he goes or stays.

[illegible]
April 25th

Mr. Butler

I am not altogether convinced by Sir R. Campbell's "100%" point, for the King & Nehrushi can hardly be counting upon the Security Council conceding their demands 100%, if these include denying the Sudan the full right of self-determination, and they risk a rebuff from the Security Council on this and on the Evacuation issue.

I agree that we should defer our attack on Nehrushi via King Farouk until we have heard more and can judge whether he really wishes to make things intolerable for us. We have so far had very little advice as to possible alternatives to Nehrushi, and we may need to consult Sir R. Campbell specifically.

MButler
25/iv.

BBA 26

J 1867 109

24 APR 1947

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell.
No. 964.

D. 9.13. a.m. 24th April 1947.

24th April 1947.

R. 11.30. a.m. 24th April 1947.

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MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

Your telegram No. 827 to United Kingdom Delegation Moscow paragraph 5.

Personal for Sir O. Sargent.

I agree that we cannot be positively sure that an attempt to dislodge Nokrashi might not produce the opposite effect of strengthening his position. At the same time I think we should need a good deal more evidence than we have at present before we build on the supposition that King Farouk may be contemplating the dismissing of Nokrashi in order to facilitate the resumption of negotiations. No doubt both the King and Nokrashi ~~[groups omitted]~~ United Nations but it would be on the lines representing 100% acceptance of Egyptian demands. It seems doubtful whether the King would wish at this juncture to appoint another Prime Minister who would be able to conclude a treaty on our terms.

would prefer to have a treaty rather than go to the

[Copy sent to Sir O. Sargent.]

E371/62969

J

EGYPT and SUDAN

J 1564
3 APR

M FROM

t Paper.

561

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(Print.)

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(Index.)

17/9/47

xt Paper.

1568

(Minutes.)

C. Fowler 4/4

The trouble is that - as pointed out in Cairo tel No 636 - our friends in Egypt are largely of the fair weather variety: an apparently weak Britain does not appeal to them.

See also minute on J1562.

J.H.H. Riley
5/4.

Repeat Cairo

D. Scott
8/4.

DSC.
10/4.

371/62969

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP DIPLOMATIC SECRET

FROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to Council of Foreign Ministers)

No. 551. D. 6.00. p.m. 3rd April 1947.

3rd April 1947. R. 4.30. p.m. 3rd April 1947.

Repeated to Cairo,

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IMPORTANT

Top Secret

Cairo telegram No. 636 to Foreign Office.

2. As you know I share Sir R. Campbell's view that a firm and stiff policy is required with the Egyptian Government in their present mood.

3. At the same time I think that it is important for us to continue to treat Egypt in a normal and friendly way as a country with whom we have close treaty relations.

This attitude towards the Egyptian people need not be incompatible with a policy of firmness. Even if it should [gp. omitted ? be] interpreted for the moment as showing that we are not reacting strongly enough to Nokrashi's provocative behaviour and may thus lose us friends temporarily I think it will prove right in the end. It will show to the Egyptians that we are perfectly confident about our position under the 1936 Treaty and that we feel that nothing since the negotiations for its revision were opened has done anything to affect our position in Egypt. I do not regret the intemperate and anti-British policy which Nokrashi is at present following and which I think will in the end recoil on his own head. What I am sure we must avoid is to give the appearance of playing Nokrashi at his own game or by reacting too vigorously to his outbursts to show that we consider that they impair our position.

On all matters of principle we must however remain quietly firm, basing ourselves on the 1936 Treaty. A group of Egyptian politicians cannot drive me into hostility to their country if I want to remain friends with it. I want to practise self-assurance and friendship to our friends in Egypt.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo as my telegram No. 9.

[Repeated to Cairo.]

FO371/62969

35

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell D. 4.21 p.m. 12th March, 1947
No. 838
R. 5.15 p.m. 12th March, 1947
12th March, 1947

u u u u u

IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET

LIGHT

My telegram No. 557.

Nokrashi's statement makes it most undesirable if not futile for us to pursue any longer the task of getting the Egyptians to reopen treaty negotiations. Efforts by his Majesty's Government to this end would only be regarded as indicating a degree of weakness on our part which must encourage those Egyptians who are so minded to go further and further towards destruction of our positions not only in Egypt but also in the Middle East. I think therefore that the time has come to stiffen our whole attitude to Egypt as long as the present situation continues.

2. A small reactionary group in Egypt is deliberately and strongly promoting anti-British feeling in Egypt and is trying to do the same thing in Arab countries perhaps as a long term policy likewise for the purposes of its policy in connexion with Treaty revision. This move is making considerable progress largely owing to the bewilderment of Egyptians who think that our failure to reactiagainst this obvious anti-British drive is due to Great Britain's weakness. If this goes on much longer friendly Egyptians (whatever exhortations we may make in appropriate quarters) will little by little fight shy of us and we shall find with

difficulty ...

66

F0371/62969

1947

J

EGYPT and SUDAN

J 1682
12 APR 44

Registry Number J1682/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM U.K. Del. (MOSCOW)

No. 706

Dated April 11, 1947

Received in Registry April 12, 1947

Soviet non-interference in British Policy in Egypt.

Ref. to his tel 495 of March 30 (J1511/12/16). Moscow Tel. 890 of April 7 (J1629/12/16) & Cairo Tel 46(S) of April 2 (J1576/1/16). Soviet Govt may now be preparing to back on the pledge saying that present policy is an Anglo-American one.

Last Paper.

J 1653.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Tel. [illegible] 3763 Apr. 17

Repd. [illegible] Moscow 712 & Cairo 808

Moscow Tel 706 sent to New York on J1511/9 June 21.

(Minutes.)

While the U.S. Govt would undoubtedly be glad to see us reach agreement with the Egyptians I think it is an exaggeration to say that the U.S. Govt are "attempting to help us" or contemplating intervention. They did, in fact, intervene in about May 1945 and were not thanked for their pains by the Egyptians. It is very likely that they will not wish to try again.

J. E. H. Riche
14/4

Mr. Lewis Jones of the American Embassy recently told me that his Embassy had received a telegram from the State Department making it clear that their general policy was not to try to dissuade any member of the United Nations from having recourse to the United Nations Organisation and that they did not in any case consider that U.S. Government could suggest that they had in any way prejudged the dispute before it came up before that organisation.

take any action which ed.

(Action completed.) Col 21/4

(Index.) 17/9/47

Next Paper.

(J1719)

J 1710 G

/ I

26513 F.O.P.

F0371/62969

I am sure that it is quite true that any attempt at mediation would fail so long as Nokrashi remained in power. What I am not so certain of is whether pressure from some important third party like the Americans on the King to get rid of Nokrashi might not help to turn the scale against the latter if, as some of our reports suggest, the King is in fact already contemplating the possibility of a change.

I think that we should proceed as suggested and submit a draft telegram. If approved, Moscow telegram No. 334 will be repeated to Washington.

D. Scott Fox

R.D.J. Scott Fox

16th April, 1947.

~~Northern Dept.~~ } ~~S.A.~~
~~N.A. Dept.~~ }

Approved
April 16th

When I was in Cairo before Easter Sir R. Campbell had got the impression from Mr Tuck that he did not think that U.S. intervention wd. be desirable. Possibly he had just received the general instruction from the State Dept. referred to by Mr Lewis Jones.

I do not think that we need invite Sir R. Campbell to comment on our tel. to Washington. It will be sufficient to repeat it to him.

M Butler
17/iv

Done

FO 371/62969

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP. DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to Council of Foreign Ministers)

No.706. D. 5.50 p.m. 11th April, 1947.
R. 4.01 p.m. 11th April, 1947.
11th April, 1947.

- - - - -

IMPORTANT.

TOP SECRET.

Following from Secretary of State for Sir O. Sargent.

My telegram No.495. J 15/11/12/G

I feel that reports mentioned in Moscow telegram No.890 to you confirm my view that Stalin's assurance should be held to apply to non-interference with purely British policy in Egypt. It looks to me as if the Soviet Government may now be preparing a case for going back on Stalin's pledge to me by representing that the policy we are following in Egypt is an Anglo-American and not a purely British policy. I imagine that the Tass report is based on Mr. Tuck's interview with Nokrashi, reported in Cairo telegram No.46 Saving to you.

2. This new development convinces me more than ever that the United States Government should not at present intervene in this matter. I suggest, therefore, that Inverchapel should explain my views very confidentially to Acheson, saying that while I am grateful to the United States Government for attempting to help us in this matter I feel that their intervention may make our position more difficult when the case comes before the United Nations. He should go on to tell Acheson that our feeling is that the Egyptian Government have now committed themselves so far that they cannot for internal political reasons go back on their decision to refer the question to the United Nations, and that no attempt at mediation will make them reverse that decision. United States efforts to induce the Egyptian Government to settle the dispute out of court are therefore not likely to have any effect and might at the same time afford the Soviet Government an excuse for opposing us in the United Nations.

/If

47

If I can hold Stalin to his pledge the matter may pass off quietly. On the other hand if the United States having left this to Great Britain then see their way to support us at the United Nations, their position will be much stronger with the Egyptians.

3. If you agree would you please send Inverchapel instructions to speak in this sense, and repeat to him my telegram No. 344. It is better done orally than risk documents.

3143/12/6

[Copy sent to Sir O. Sargent]

F 371/62969

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OUT FILE

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

J 1682/12/16

Top Secret

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC SECRET

DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No: 3763

17th April 1947 D. 9.50.p.m.17th April 1947

Repeated to U.K.Delegation Moscow No: 797
Cairo (Personal for Ambassador) No:808

X:X:X:

IMPORTANT

TOP SECRET

Following for Lord Inverchapel from Sir Orme Sargent.

Moscow telegram No: 544 [of March 25th: Soviet attitude to Anglo-Egyptian dispute].

Secretary of State considers that Stalin's assurance should be held to apply to non-interference with purely British policy in Egypt. Subsequent information suggests Soviet Government may now be preparing a case for going back on Stalin's pledge by representing that the policy we are following in Egypt is an Anglo-American and not a purely British policy.

2. Secretary of State therefore feels strongly that United States Government should not at present intervene in the dispute. He suggests that you should explain his views very confidentially to Acheson saying that while he is grateful to the United States Government for attempting to help us in this matter he feels that their intervention may make our position more difficult when the case comes before the United Nations. (It should be remarked in parenthesis that, although United States Ambassador recently warned Nokrashi - copy of Sir R. Campbell's No: 46 Saving sent to New York Delegation on April 14th by bag - that American opinion would not back the Egyptians on the issue of the Sudanese right of self-determination and warned him that he must expect a rough passage at the United Nations, we have no

(repeat

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(repeat no) evidence that United States Government are proposing to try to help us by any further intervention at Cairo. Indeed, we understand from United States Embassy here that State Department's view is that it would not be in line with American policy to attempt to dissuade any member of the United Nations from having recourse to the United Nations Organisation or to take any action which would suggest that the United States Government would pre-judge the issue before it came up before that Organisation).

3. Secretary of State suggests that you should tell Acheson that our feeling is that the Egyptian Government have now committed themselves so far that they cannot for internal political reasons go back upon their decision to refer the question to United Nations and that no attempt at mediation will make them reverse that decision. If the United States were to try to induce the Egyptian Government to settle the dispute out of court this would therefore not be likely to have any effect and might at same time afford the Soviet Government an excuse for opposing us in the United Nations. If Secretary of State can hold Stalin to his pledge the matter may pass off quietly. On the other hand, if the United States having left this to Great Britain then see their way to support us at the United Nations, their position will be much stronger with the Egyptians.

4. Unless you see objection I should be grateful if you would speak in this sense. It would be better to do this orally than to risk documents.

J

EGYPT and SUDAN

J 1570

3 APR

RAM FROM

ast Paper.

1568

References.

(Print.)

now disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Crocodile tears!

Eastern Dept

D.H.H. Riche
10/4

(Index.)

f0371/62869

J 1570
3 APR

Cypher/OTP GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Houstoun-Boswall, D: 1.20 p.m. 3rd April, 1947.
No.255
2nd April, 1947. R: 7.25 p.m. 3rd April, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo,
Bagdad,
Jerusalem,
Amman (Jerusalem please pass as my telegram No. 40.)
Jedda Saving
Damascus Saving.

A A A A

E 2133/951/91

Cairo telegram No.751 to you.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that he had been very much disappointed at the lack of success which had attended his efforts to find some means of bringing the Egyptian Government to reason. His first shock had been the opening remarks of Sheikh Y.Y who in his opinion had evidently been hobbled by Egypt (cf Cairo telegram No.32 to Jedda). But he had not been entirely discouraged by that and had continued his efforts to spending the whole [grp undec] Transjordan Prime Minister and Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs in an endeavour to draft a satisfactory formula. Both had expressed their anxiety to avoid a reference of the dispute to UNO. He had been astonished when on the very next day the Transjordan Prime Minister had taken an entirely different line from that to which he had previously agreed and had made it plain that he prepared to go even further if the line he then advocated was not considered strong enough by the rest of the Council. (This was possibly gesture on the part of the Transjordan Prime Minister to give the lie to those who regarded his country as tool of Great Britain). Finally at a meeting of the Arab Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, resolution finally adopted had been drafted (Cairo telegram 761) but with omission of the word: "permanent" in the last sentence which had been added at the full meeting after he had left. His Excellency once more referred to the extreme delicacy of his position as a Christian among so many Mohammedans. If only they had had a decent lead from anybody - and he had looked for one from Saudi Arabia and possibly Transjordan and Iraq Leban delegation would have been loyal supporters of it.

5

FO371/62969

1947

J

EGYPT and SUDAN

J. 1864

24 APR 99

Registry Number } J1864/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM Mr. Scrivener

No. 125 (DAMASCUS)

Dated April 22, 1947

Received in Registry } April 24, 1947

Syria v. the Arab League Resolution

Ref. to Damascus despatch 40 of April 4 (J1723/12/16)

Conversation with the Head of the Syrian President's office whether Article 7 of the Arab League's Charter "bound" Syria to act on the Resolution.

Last Paper.

J1863G

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

9) U.K. Del New York No. 166 April 26.

(Minutes.)

Eastern Dept. U.N. Dept. (for obs.)

J.M.H. Riche 24/4

U.K. Delegation, New York

D.S.5W for 25/4.

Would it not be desirable to go into this point in some detail? It seems to be one of importance. I suggest that a full memo. be prepared for consideration by the U.N. (Pol) Dept. and the Legal Advisers.

W. Barton 25/4

E 3025/154/65 may also be interesting on the resolution support for Egypt.

See memo. by F.O.R.D. inserted within a J1987.

J.M.H. Riche 5/5

D.S.5W for 5/5

M. Beckett 26513/F.O.R.D. 1/5

(Action completed.) Col 10/6

(Index.) 17/9/47

Next Paper.

J1867G

FO371/62969

In general I agree with paragraphs 10 and 11 of
e F.O.R.D. memorandum. I do not think we should
riously try to deprive Syria of her vote when the
tter comes before the Security Council. On the
her hand, I think it is quite a good thing that the
egation at Damascus raised this matter and worried
e Syrians with it a bit. Further, this is a
atter which I think we can touch lightly on as
pportunity offers, i.e. make the point that, if
embers of the Arab League bind themselves in advance
n issues which are supposed to go to the Security
Council for impartial investigation, they are not
acting as members of the Security Council should act
and further do at any rate raise the question as to
whether they should be qualified to vote. We should
make a mistake to press this too far, I think,
because we know perfectly well that the Soviet group
act like a mechanism, though we have not got the
benefit of resolutions and so forth by which we can
approve it. Further, Australia comes pretty near
to being an interested party in our dispute with
Egypt.

W.A. Brockett
6th May, 1947.

I quite agree.
P. Mason
8.5

D.Ft.
D.S. Walker
8/5.

(B)

I should like to press the Syrians harder than is suggested by Mr Beckett's minute and the draft letter attached. We cannot afford to forego any available means of weakening Arab League support for the Egyptian case. I agree of course that we should make no public attempt to deprive Syria of her vote when the appeal comes up before the Security Council; but, short of that, I think we should run the point home (at Damascus) in such a way as to make the Syrians fear that we may make such an attempt.

2. As regards para 10 of the FORD memorandum below, I venture to suggest that, although the parallel which Mr Scrivener uses about the British & French abstention from voting on the Levant States dispute may not be an exact one, it is not so far out. Syria is not actually a party to the Egyptian dispute, but she has made it quite clear that her foreign policy is tied up with Egypt's through the medium of the Arab League and, consequently, she must be regarded as an interested party.

party.

3. As regards Mr Beckett's reference to the Soviet group and to Australia, the essential difference from the point of view of Mr Scrivener's harassing of the Syrians, is surely that the Slav bloc don't advertise as such and therefore give us no handle for similar protests, and that Australia not only does not advertise allegiance to a British bloc, but by Loftus taken a practical line very different from that of Hong in the U.K.

I submit an alternative draft (A).

(15 May)

Discussed with Eastern Dept. Draft A agreed upon, slightly modified. (sent on 5/1987)

MB.
15/V.

FO 371/62463

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Scrivener, D: 7.42 a.m. 23rd April, 1947
No.125.
22nd April, 1947. R: 11.10 a.m. 23rd April, 1947

Repeated Saving to Cairo,
Bagdad
Beirut
Jedda
Amman.

J 1864
24 APR

A A A A J1723/12

My despatch No.40 to Minister for Foreign Affairs about the Resolution.

In informal conversation some days ago the Oriental Secretary discussed with the Head of the Syrian President's Office whether Article 7 of the Arab League's Charter "bound" Syria to act on Resolution of the Arab League Council concerning Egypt or whether Syrian constitution which requires ratification of a "Treaty" by Parliament, overrode any such "binding". Muhsin Bey took the line that Syria was "bound" as her delegates to the League meeting were appointed by presidential decree. Oriental Secretary then asked if Syria was "bound" to "fullest support of Egypt etc."; could she vote on Security Council if Egypt placed her case before it? Was she not committed beforehand to vote in a particular way on a matter which was to be decided by a Council of which she was a member? Neither the British nor the French Government had voted on the Levant States because they were parties of the dispute and might therefore be considered prejudiced. Would not the Syrian position be even more invidious.

2. Muhsin Barazi took the point and said that it would require very careful consideration. Later Dr. Jamali in conversation with the Oriental Secretary referred to the same point and said that Syria appeared to be in a very difficult position as would be all the Arab Governments except the Iraqi who did not consider themselves bound by the decision if the Egyptian case should go before the General Assembly of U.N.O.

3. Lately the Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted to me, if not in so many words, that he was uncertain how to answer the letter in my despatch under reference.

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FO371/62969

ARAB LEAGUE SUPPORT FOR EGYPT.

There are two points for consideration:-

1). Whether a unanimous resolution of the Arab League requires Parliamentary approval in the Member-countries before action can be taken upon it; and

2). Whether a Member (Syria in the particular case) should vote on a United Nations resolution in regard to which she has already been committed by a decision of the Arab League Council.

2. The answer to the first question depends upon the type of resolution passed, and upon whether the subject has been debated in Parliament before the session of the League Council. In the latter case the delegate may have already received Parliamentary approval in the sense of a resolution before it is voted in the League (e.g. 'Iraq and the Palestine resolution).

3 Under the Charter of the Arab League (Article 2) resolutions would appear to be likely to fall into one of four categories according to whether they involve (a) the conclusion of a treaty or treaties; (b) conclusion of agreements; (c) financial expenditure by the Member-States; and (d) policy decisions.

4 It is laid down in Article 26 (4) of the 'Iraqi Constitution that the King may not ratify treaties until they have been approved by Parliament. Article 74 of the Syrian Constitution says that treaties "concerning the safety of the State or the public finances, as also commercial treaties, and, in general, all treaties which cannot be denounced at the expiry of any year, shall not come finally into force until they have been adopted by the Chamber."

5 The Constitutions of both Syria and 'Iraq require Parliamentary sanction for the expenditure of money.

6 Article 7 of the Arab League Charter lays down that "unanimous decisions of the Council are binding on all Members of the League, those that are taken by a majority of votes will bind only those States that accept them.

7 In both cases the execution by a Member-State of the Council's decision will be in accordance with its organic status."

/In

8. In the Alexandria Protocol of October, 1944, which led to the formation of the League and which was superseded by the Charter of the following year, the first Article contained the sentence: "Members of the League are not in any case allowed to follow a foreign policy antagonistic or harmful to the policy of the Arab League or any State which it embodies." This provision does not occur in the Charter of the League, although Article 2 defines one of the objects of the Members of the League as being "to co-ordinate their political action .... to safeguard their independence and sovereignty."

9. Damascus telegram No: 125 of the 22nd April indicates the view that the resolution of the League Council concerning Egypt might be regarded as a treaty. I can see no ground for such a view, and suggest that it is no more than a decision on policy which, by its acceptance, is binding on Member-States and does not need approval of Parliament according to the Constitutions of 'Iraq and Syria. If the Cabinet of either country were now to seek such approval and fail to get it, its own position and the position of the country as a Member of the Arab League would be extremely difficult (see Amman telegram No: 101 of 31.1.47). It is hardly to be expected that any Cabinet would put itself voluntarily in such a position. One must therefore assume that in voting for such a resolution each Member-State was prepared to take any further action which was implied.

10. The suggestion that Syria as a Member of the Security Council should not vote because she was committed beforehand, is in no real sense parallel with the case quoted in which both Great Britain and France voluntarily abstained from voting. Syria is not a party to the "dispute" between His Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government, but has pledged herself to support Egypt's policy. The fact that this came about through the medium of the Arab League Council, rather than by private agreement, is relevant only in the unlikely contingency that there is intended to question the right of the Arab League Council to discuss matters which are to come before the United Nations, and to agree in advance upon the line which a Member State or States should follow.

/As

11 As indicated above, I can find ~~on~~ no reference in the 'Iraqi Constitution which justifies Nuri's claim that the resolution was illegal or that it needed confirmation by the Council of Ministers and Parliament. If the 'Iraqi delegate failed to follow his instructions the matter becomes one for internal settlement. It seems hardly possible for the Council of Ministers to come to Parliament to get a vote against the action of one of their number. Their position would be farcical if the vote went in favour of the action he had taken, as it very well might in this case.

RESEARCH DEPARTMENT,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

3rd May, 1947.

1947

J

EGYPT and SUDAN

J 1568

3 APR

6

}d.1568/15/16
RAM FROM
t. Campbell)
15 Saving
Apl. 1947.
ry } 7 Apl. 1947

Egyptian intention to "Lobby" at International Parliamentary Union Conference.

Sir Ralph informed of bad effect of "lobbying" by Egyptian delegates at the International Parliamentary Union Conference. He undertook to mention the matter to King Farouk and the Egyptian Govt.

ast Paper.
J1564

eferences.

(Print.)

w disposed of.)
J1571

(Minutes.)

Copied to UK Delegation Cairo - Moscow

The Egyptians will certainly not miss this opportunity for propagating their cause. See also J1571

J.M.H. Rilands
7/4.

DSS.
7/4.

(Index.)

JVR
Egypt 7

En Clair GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell
No. 45 Saving

1st April 1947. R. 3.40 p.m. 4th April 1947.

CONFIDENTIAL
LIGHT

rrrrrr

I told Amr Pasha on the 29th March that the newspapers had hinted at the intention on the Egyptian side of using the forthcoming Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference for lobbying in favour of the Egyptian cause. I said that if any such intention were put into practice, it would have the worst effect, and would surely be unwise from the point of view of Egypt's reputation as the meeting place for the Union. Amr Pasha expressed horror over the following of any such intention, and took note to mention the matter to King Farouk and the Egyptian Government. His Majesty, he was sure, would forbid any such thing.

I had a long talk with Maj. Buhler on this subject and warned him of the difficulties inside as well as outside our delegation.

17 FO371/62969

J

EGYPT and SUDAN

J 1900

20 APR

110

Registry Number J 1900/12/16

FROM Sir R. Campbell (Cairo)

No. 329(121/40/47)

Dated 19th Apl:1947

Received in Registry 25th Apl:1947

Speech at Inter-Parliamentary Congress on 11th April.

Refers to Cairo telegram 859 of April 6th (J 1571/12/16).

Transmits extract from "Bourse Egyptienne" of 12th April reporting speech by Mamdouh Riaz Bey, Egyptian Minister of Commerce and Industry on the decision of the Egyptian Government to appeal to the United Nations.

Last Paper.

J1867G

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Diff Chancery (Cairo) from Egyptian Dept May 12

(Minutes.)

This was reported briefly by telegram – see para 5 of Cairo tel No 937 on J1809.

Para 3. Have you a record please of what the S/S did say; or any comments?

J.H.H. Richards 28/4

O.N. Dept

Eastern Dept

I attach the record in question. Mahmoud Riaz Bey seems to have taken this passage of his speech word for word from the French text (which, incidentally, is not a very good translation) version. But he omitted two passages which I have marked in square brackets & added. The word "incompréhensible", which does not appear in the French texts – is supposed to translate

(Action completed.) Cal 15/5

(Index.) 17/9/47

Next Paper.

J1902

32003 F.O.P.

thereby the S.of.S's "aunt would be misunderstood." He also omits the last two paragraphs of the S.of.S's statement on that occasion.

As a result the meaning of the statement is distorted. What the S.of.S was saying was that Persia was negotiating at a disadvantage, that in order to compensate for this she should have the Security Council at her elbow, that the item in question should therefore be left on the Council's agenda.

What Mr. Bey is trying to make the S.of.S. say is that reference to International Arbitration should take the place of direct negotiations. This is not correct.

W. Smallwood
29/4

(A)

DSt.

F. Sidebotham
8/5.

There are of course obvious differences between the two cases and the main one is that the Soviet troops are actively preventing the Persians from maintaining order in their own country. (They are also about to overstay their treaty right to be present in Persia at all, though that is a point which it would be difficult to make in this connexion.) Nevertheless, I doubt whether it would be at all easy to make, in public debate, the point at (A) above. We do not want Egypt to

to have the Security Council "at her elbow" during discussions with us, though it may well come to that. We don't, that is, want the Anglo-Egyptian dispute to be put on the agenda at all.

3. I think it would be well to warn Sir A. Cadogan (by letter) that this may constitute one of Egypt's talking points if she makes her appeal to the U.N.

[illegible] 6/5

? agree.

Private Secretary to see first.

PD. 7/5.

JMB 6/V.

This paper did not come back to me, and on asking for it in another connexion I find that no action was taken to warn Sir A. Cadogan as suggested.

I think that Mr Beckett and Mr Mervyn-Jones should see it, since they may be able to suggest better counter-arguments than those outlined above.

FW 30/5

For the moment I think it is probably sufficient to remember the Persian-Soviet case and that the Secretary of State made these remarks in that case.

As I see it, our main task when this matter comes before the Security Council is to demonstrate that Egypt has no case on the merits in law or otherwise. Assuming that Egypt had a case on the merits, which

of/

Minutes.

113

of course we deny, I do not think we shall wish to argue that we should not have brought it before the Security Council. We shall certainly wish to make the point that it is not of any urgency from the point of view of peace and security even to the point of showing that no issue of peace and security is really involved at all. It is not a case, I think, where we should do well to try and argue that Egypt ought to have tried other methods of settlement indicated in Article 33 before she brought the case to New York. In any event, we cannot really, I think, elaborate our tactics in great detail until we have actually seen the Egyptian case. In general I think we shall do well to avoid making small tactical points of the kind where it is not certain that they will turn out in the end to be perfectly valid ones. Having, as we think and as it appears the Egyptians think, very good answers on the merits, we must be careful not to spoil the effect by looking as if we were frightened of the issue and are therefore manoeuvring. For the moment I think we can just be mildly grateful to Riza Bey for reminding us of this passage of the Secretary of State's speech in another affair, and we had better take a copy of this passage with us to New York.

x tho' we shall say that she should have worked in detail first whether case was

NWB
2nd June, 1947.

NW 2/6

Copies taken for New York

DP
11/6

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

/GBA

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.
19th April, 1947.

114

LIGHT.

NO: 329
(121/40/47)

Sir,

With reference to Cairo telegram No.859 of 6th April, I have the honour to transmit the enclosed an extract from the newspaper "Bourse Egyptienne" of 12th April, reporting a speech by Mamdouh Riaz Bey, Egyptian Minister of Commerce and Industry, at the meeting of the inter-Parliamentary Congress on 11th April, on the subject of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty negotiations and the decision of the Egyptian Government to appeal to the United Nations Organisation.

2. It will be seen that Mamdouh Riaz Bey pointed out that it was wrong to regard the Egyptian Government's decision to refer to international arbitration as an unfriendly gesture towards His Majesty's Government. On the contrary, he stated, he was convinced that once this difference between Great Britain and Egypt was removed, by means of recourse to the United Nations, there would remain no obstacle to the tightening of the bonds of friendship between British and Egyptian Governments.

3. I would invite particular attention to the two paragraphs under the sub-title "L'Exemple de l'Iran", according to which Mamdouh Riaz Bey quoted a passage from a statement you made at a meeting of the Security Council in London, when the Persian

/complaint ....

The Right Honourable
Ernest Bevin, M.P.,
FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W.1.

complaint against Soviet Russia was being examined. An English translation of the relevant passage is enclosed herewith.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Acting Governor General of the Sudan, Khartoum, and to the British Middle East Office.

I have the honour to be
With the highest respect,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble Servant

Ronald Campbell

References:-

FO 371/62989

89267

RH/Ind

4 p

258

J

1947

EGYPT and SUDAN

J 1600

8 APR 19

Registry Number } J.1600/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM CAIRO
(Sir R. Campbell)

No. 47 Saving

Dated 3 April 1947

Received in Registry } 8 April 1947

Iraqi Foreign Minister on his audience with KING FAROUK and his talk with NOKRASHI.

Emphasised to KING FAROUK how much the Arab states desired England and Egypt to reach agreement. He also emphasised the importance of England's friendship in view of Russian menace.

NOKRASHI argued that English should be grateful to him for having referred question to U.N. which had enabled him to maintain order.

Last Paper.

1579

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Nokrashi might have added the handing over of the Sudan to Egypt would also "facilitate understanding"

J.H.H. Ritchie
8/4

Foreign Dept

DSS.
8/4

En Clair

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell
No. 47 Saving
3rd April, 1947. R. 2.10 p.m. 7th April, 1947.

0 0 0 0

Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs told Oriental Minister that in his audience with King Farouk he had emphasised how much the Arab States desired that England and Egypt should come to an understanding, how important was England's friendship to the Arab States in view of the Russian menace. King Farouk had replied that he quite understood this and was all in favour of a friendly understanding with Great Britain.

2. Jamali said that the audience was fairly brief.

3. Jamali said that he had had a much longer conversation with Nokrashi to whom he spoke on the same lines as above. Nokrashi gave him a long account of all the Treaty difficulties. Nokrashi said that he had given strong proof of his desire of a treaty with the English. He argued that the English should be grateful to him for his having referred the question to United Nations Organisation which had enabled him to maintain order against many elements opposing a treaty settlement. He assured Jamali that he was quite alive to the Russian factor and that in the event of any war Egypt would most certainly be in the British camp.

4. When asked what the British could do to facilitate an understanding he remarked that the best thing would be evacuation.

269

1947

J

EGYPT and SUDAN

J 1723
16 APR
69

Registry Number | J.1723/12/16

FROM Mr. ~~Eyres~~ Scrivener.
(Damascus).
No. 40

Dated 4th April, 1947.
Received in Registry 16th April 1947.

Support of Arab Powers for Egypt.

Reference to Foreign Office Telegram 279 of the 27th March (J.1412/12/16).

Transmits copy of letter to Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the 4th April enquiring whether the Arab League Council resolution of the 23rd March, represents the views of the Syrian Government.

Last Paper.
J1719.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Eastern Dept
21 APR
19/4

Action (Completed.) | (Index.)

FO371/62969

71

BRITISH LEGATION,

DAMASCUS,

76/47.

4th April, 1947.

I have received a copy of a translation of an official communique issued by The Arab League Council announcing that the following decision was taken unanimously at the Council's meeting on March 23rd:

"Whereas the Arab Powers have repeatedly expressed their total support for Egypt as regards her cause and national claims, and whereas they confirmed that support at the meeting of the heads of their States at Zahrat Inchaas on the 28th - 29th May, 1946, and affirmed it in the extraordinary session of the League Council which met at Bloudan from June the 8th to the 12th, 1946, whereas the negotiations between Great Britain and Egypt have not realised an agreement and whereas the Egyptian Government has proclaimed its decision to submit its cause to the United Nations' Organisation, The League Council takes the opportunity of its present session to reiterate once again the absolute support of the Arab Powers for Egypt in her national claims, namely immediate and total evacuation and permanent unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown."

I shall be glad if Your Excellency will inform me whether this resolution represents the views of yourself and of the Syrian Government, and to what extent and in what manner you feel yourself bound by it.

P.S.SCRIVENER

His Excellency
Nairi Bey Anteki,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

E. S.

FO371/62969

EGYPTIAN

Times /G

19 MAR 1947

a/c 16

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 76

Refer 10 D.O letter (T 827/12/16)
Attached report by J.P.S. approved by Chiefs of Staff.

don
/Def
ett Fox
24/7
16 April
15 April

Paper.

(Minutes.)

Para 14 of the J.P.S report contains the C.O.S's conclusions.

There seems to be a slight error in the map: we are allowed to train British forces at all times of the year "East of the Canal as required (para 10(b) of Annex to Article 8) & the dotted lines East of the Canal should therefore follow the boundaries of Egypt East of the Canal & not be prolongations of the lines of latitude through El Kantara & Suez.

Mr. Beckett W.O. 5/5 J.M.H. Rishe
S.L. Dept. 24/4

I think that we ought to inform Cairo very briefly of the C.O.S.'s views

D. Scott for
25/4.

Tel. despatched

F.O.R. ~~[illegible]~~. The relevant part can

nces.

nt.)

posed of.)
E. Campbell
Cairo
89
5th May

(Index.)

Paper.

can be repeated in a tel. to Cairo — but departmental distribution, I think, of comparisons of other people's opinions are liable to give offence!

MW 23/4

In connexion with point 12 it is worth bearing in mind that Dr Jamali told me recently that Nuri Said & he felt strongly the M.E. Defence ought to be considered as one whole by the individual M.E. countries; it was not fair that only Iraq & Transjordan wd. be contributing to effective defence of the area by the easily "misrepresentable" action of giving a foreign power bases & military facilities in their territories. He implied that Syria & the Lebanon should also. For us voluntarily to relieve Egypt of a Treaty obligation in this sense wd. set the clock back as far as these Iraqis are concerned as well as to expose them to increased attack for not kicking us out.

S.L. Dept. to [illegible] 1/5

MB 30/iv.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S. W. 1.

No. 289.

5th May, 1947.

(J 1765/12/G)
TOP SECRET

Sir,

The question of the value of the military rights of His Majesty's Government under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, referred to in my despatch No. 180 of the 18th March, has now been considered by the Chiefs of Staff.

2. They consider that the advantages of His Majesty's Government insisting on their rights under the Treaty are:-

(a) that His Majesty's Government could substantially satisfy their minimum strategic requirements over the next nine years. They would be able to maintain a force of sufficient size to exert a stabilizing influence in the Middle East, a limited number of heavy bomber airfields from which the Royal Air Force could operate immediately in war, nucleus base facilities capable of immediate expansion if necessary; and they could ensure their hold on the Suez Canal area and a vital link in British air communications; and

(b) that a firm attitude is likely to have a favourable effect in the Arab world generally apart from Egypt.

3. It is recognised that considerable ill-will must be expected from such insistence and little co-operation will probably be forthcoming from the Egyptians at least in the short run. It is also realised that in 1956 His Majesty's Government may find the Egyptian Government more intractable than ever.

4. The Chiefs of Staff's conclusion is that from the military point of view it is of great importance that His Majesty's Government's rights under the 1936 treaty should be maintained and that His Majesty's Government should not forego them for political reasons.

I am, with great truth and respect,
Sir,
Your Excellency's obedient Servant,
(For the Secretary of State)

His Excellency
Sir Ronald Campbell, G.C.M.G., C.B.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Cairo.

F0371/62969

1947

J

EGYPT and SUDAN

J 1915

28 APR

138

Registry Number } J1915/12/16

TELEGRAM FROM Sir R. Campbell

No. 975 (CAIRO)

Dated April 25, 1947

Received in Registry April 28, 1947

Supposed American mediation offer.
Ref to Cairo 46 (S) of April 2 (J1576/1/16).
Conversation with Mr. Ireland on subject of date fixed for final evac.
– Sidky. Benina draft.
Press have received rumours of intended American mediation on a basis including early withdrawal.

Last Paper.

J 1913.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

From the State Department's attitude as revealed to the Washington Embassy, we have every reason to believe that the U.S. Govt do not intend to attempt mediation in any shape or form. Meanwhile we have these rather monotonous references from Cairo to the "thoughtful" attitude of the Americans there. One could wish that Sir R. Campbell would tackle the Americans on the spot in a more forthright fashion, and ask them point-blank whether they considered our evacuation programme unreasonably slow. If the State Dept hold this view, it can only be because their local representatives have said so.

Pg: merely copy to Washington.

Campbell
April 29th

Action (completed.) CAC 12/5

(Index.) 18/9/47

Next Paper. (J1936)

J1926G

Mr Butler
N. Afr. Dept a.a.
26513 F.O.P.

Draft tel. to Washington sub. with an J. 1936.

14/5

30/iv.

139

J 1975
28 APR

Cypher/OTP

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R.I. Campbell
No. 975

D. 1.00 p.m. 25th April 1947
R. 5.45 p.m. 25th April 1947

25th April 1947

c c c c c c

SECRET

J 1576/1/12

LIGHT

My telegram No. 46 Saving, last paragraph.

Treaty revision.

I received the same impression of thoughtfulness on the subject of date fixed for final evacuation in Bevin-Sidki draft in a recent conversation with Mr. Ireland, First Secretary of the United States Embassy.

2. Press here in last few days have carried rumours of intended American mediation on a basis including early withdrawal, at least conditionally.

3. It occurs to me that whether United States Government intended to intervene or not it might be useful to try to discover whether they have had in mind any proposal involving early withdrawal since this might be admitted openly or behind the scenes during United Nations discussions.

FO371/62969
43

E. 3.

EGYPTIAN

J1908/G

26 APR 1917

308/12/G16

Anglo-Egyptian negotiations

130

Refs to W'ton Tel 2398 (J1862/12/G) Reports that Soviet press reports were probably based on story in Egyptian newspaper Mr Barough.

Sub Suvereinapes W'ton 2462 dated 24 April received 26 April.

Last Paper.

J1867

References.

(Minutes.)

D.H.H. Riches 26/4

N. Am. Dept

M.N. Dept

Copy Cairo

D. Stafford 28/4.

Nevertheless there have been one or two indications from Cairo that the Americans there — or at any rate certain members of the U.S. Embassy — may have been imperfectly neutral and have encouraged the Egyptians to think that they could get an accelerated evacuation out of the U.N. Probably the American military on the spot are, as so often, taking a line of their own.

Mail 27th

MB 29/iv.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Cairo No 306

9 May

(Indicate disposition 16/1)

(Action completed.)

25/10/5

(Index.)

Next Paper.

28888 F.O.P.

J. 908

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]. 1947 131

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel
No. 2462.

D. 10.50.p.m. April 24th, 1947.
R. 6.35.a.m. April 25th, 1947.

April 24th, 1947.

Repeated to Cairo.

---oOo---

J1629/12/16

TOP SECRET.

My telegram No. 2398: Egypt.

Henderson told Balfour today that the Soviet press reports in question may have been based on a story which appeared in the Egyptian newspaper Al Bahagh on March 16th to the effect that the United States were going to mediate in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. When the author of the story was tackled by the United States Embassy in Cairo he admitted that this report was a pure fabrication and intended as a ballon d'essai.

2. Henderson was at pains to assure Balfour that the United States Government had no intention of attempting to mediate and had never contemplated doing so.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

194	E. & S. EGYPTIAN	21863 /G 24 APR 1917

3 1 12 1916

Anglo-Egyptian negotiations

97

Ref. to F.O. (E) 2962 (21682/12/16)
Reports interview between Mr Balfour and Mr Acheson who agreed that it would only do harm if U.S. Govt intervened with Egyptian Govt.

C.O.

d Sweetchapel
w'ton
2898
ed 22 April
wed 24 April

Last Paper.
21765

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)
pto. Berlin 1240

(Minutes.)

Repeat U.K. Del. Moscow.
D. H. H. Rithe
24/4

Repetition made
D. Scott for
25/4.
25/4

Action | (Index.)

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21863

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher OTP DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel
No. 2398 D. 9.02 p.m. 22nd April 1947.

22nd April 1947. R. 3.35 a.m. 23rd April 1947.

Repeated to Cairo

IMPORTANT
TOP SECRET

rrrrrr

Your telegram No. 3763.

Egypt.

Following for Sir O. Sargent from Balfour.

In Ambassador's absence I saw Acheson today and spoke to him along the lines of telegram under reference. Both he and Loy Henderson, who was present at our talk, fully grasped the point that, in the light of Stalin's assurance, it would only do harm if the United States Government were to intervene with the Egyptian Government with the object of trying to settle the dispute out of court. Henderson incidentally said that some weeks ago the Egyptian Minister had called on him and had shown a disposition to enlist United States interest in an out of court solution. Henderson had then taken the line that he did not see what the United States Government could do in the matter. The Egyptian Minister had implied that he would communicate further with Henderson on the subject but he had so far failed to do so.

FO371/62969

1947

J

EGYPT and SUDAN

J.1719

15 APR

62

Registry Number J1719/12/16.

FROM Mr. Hemmings (U.K. Del. Moscow) to

No. Sir O. Sargent.

Dated April 11, 1947

Received in Registry April 15, 1947

Possible danger from American intervention in Egypt.

Ref. to U.K. Del Moscow Tele. 495 of March 31 (J1511/12/G) & 706 of April 11 (J1682/12/16).

Egyptian Minister is at present trying to secret Mr. Marshall in American mediation. He is still probably working with Soviet.

Last Paper.

J1686G

References.

(Minutes.)

copy "Top Secret" to U.K. Delegation New York & to Cairo, ref. out tel. on J1682

D.S. Sutton
16/4.

16/4

MB 17/4

See within: New York Tel 62 (S) of May 2.

See within: U.K. Del. New York to Egyptian Dept. 108/113/47 of May 28

28/6

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

a) U.K. Del New York No 162 April 25
Cairo No 264 April 25

Tel. New York (UK Del) No 1390 May 9.

(Action completed.) 00L 15/5

(Index.) 17/9/47

Next Paper.

J1723

32003 F.O.P.

63

United Kingdom Delegation to the
Council of ~~Foreign Ministers~~,
MOSCOW.

J 1719

11th April, 1947.

15 APR

My dear Sargent,

You will have seen the Secretary of State's two telegrams No. 495 of the 31st March and No. 706 of the 11th April pointing out the danger which he feels may arise if the Americans intervene in Egypt.

The Embassy have just given us some further information which may have some bearing on this. Frank Roberts was told by the AP. correspondent here that the Egyptian Minister, Bindari Pasha, is intensifying his efforts to see Mr. Marshall, although no longer, as was the case when he first applied for an interview, for the purpose of interesting America in the Egyptian case before the United Nations. The Minister is said, on the contrary, now to be taking the line that he wishes to see Mr. Marshall in order to interest him in American mediation between Egypt and Britain. Bindari's argument is that since America has now shown an interest in the Middle East in the Truman pronouncements, she could carry things a stage further and interest herself in Egypt as the richest and potentially the most important country in the Middle East.

So far, General Bedell Smith has kept Bindari away from Mr. Marshall.

The natural explanation of Bindari's changed attitude would be that the "Truman Doctrine" has persuaded him to put his money on the United States instead of on the Soviet Union. It seems to us, however, possible that Bindari, who is an unreliable

Sir Orme Sargent, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. and/

56

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and tortuous character, and has hitherto been at pains to curry favour with the Soviet Government, might, on the other hand, be working in with the Soviet policy which, as you know, the Secretary of State believes may be aiming at showing that our policy in Egypt is not a purely British, but an Anglo-American policy.

In view of Bindari's activities, we are asking Frank Roberts to give Bedell-Smith, in strict confidence, an outline of the Secretary of State's views as set out in our telegram No.706 to you.

Yours ever

John Henniker

fo 371/62469

10A7

E. & S.

EGYPTIAN

J 1926/G

23 APR 1947

26/12/46	Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations. 140
shington	Rep. to Kio tel. 2398 (J1863/12/G)
and. 2516.	State Department believe that Egypt's
pt 26th.	case should be presented to the Assembly rather than to the Security Council. J gives text of draft telegram to Cairo on these lines.

Last Paper.
J1908

References.

(Minutes.)

Sp. in Dept.
Spares & w/p. attached.

An enquiry on these lines would be off the rails and embarrassing for us. A draft reply is under consideration (already submitted on un-entered M).

AW 29/4

N. A. Dept

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)
W 6511 4233
1 Mary
Cairo 892

tion pleted.)	(Index.)
15/5	

Next Paper.
J1927

28888 F.O.P.

Registry No. F0371/62969

TOP SECRET

April, 1947.

IMMEDIATE *Despatched* *M.*

Draft.

Washington.

Telegram.

No.....

Date.....

Repeat to:-

Cairo.

Mr. Beckett see
N.American Dept.
U.N. Dept. R1244
N. Dept.

Cypher

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Your telegram No. 2515.

Such an approach by the Americans would embarrass us for the following reasons.

2. We agree that if the Egyptian Government's appeal were on the Sudan issue alone, the General Assembly would be more suitable technically than the Security Council for dealing with it. (Incidentally the Assembly would also be the better body from our point of view, since it would be more likely to react emotionally to the plea which we should make for recognition of the inherent right of the Sudanese people to control their own destinies after they have achieved self-government).

3. We have, however, good reason to believe that the Egyptian Government, who no doubt realise the political weakness of their case on the specific Sudanese issue on which Treaty negotiations broke down ~~were it brought before any international tribunal~~, ~~and particularly~~ before the General Assembly, are on the contrary intending to appeal for the immediate and total evacuation of British troops from Egyptian territory and also possibly from the Sudan on the ground that the Treaty of 1936 is invalid as contrary to the Charter and Resolution of last General Assembly. Indications are that on this issue the Egyptians consider their case weaker on legal than on political grounds. They will no doubt bring up some issues relating to the Sudan but not the one on which negotiations broke down. If they do so,

it/

147

it will be for us to bring up the real Sudanese issue, both because it is a good one from our point of view and also because it is essential for us to show that negotiations did not break

down/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

down over evacuation of Egypt, on which agreement between the two parties was actually reached.

4. In these circumstances the whole line of argument suggested by the State Department would probably ~~merely~~ encourage the Egyptians to choose the Security Council. We should, indeed, prefer that they should go to the Security Council rather than to the Assembly if their appeal is of the sort which we anticipate; and this, for the same ~~converse of the~~ reason given above, i.e. because the Assembly is the more emotional body and more likely to side with a small nation regardless of the merits of the case. But we have some reason to think that they anyhow intend to go to the Council if they ~~do~~ appeal at all, being unwilling to wait till September; and meanwhile we do not want them to be given any encouragement to appeal to either body.

5. Furthermore, in so far as Stalin's assurance to the Secretary of State is honoured, the effect of the American approach would be not only to confirm the Egyptians in their preference for the Council, but also to make them over-estimate their chances of appealing successfully. Although it is difficult to see how the present deadlock can be broken otherwise than by an Egyptian appeal to the United Nations, it is not yet absolutely certain that the Egyptian Government, despite their public pronouncements, will make such an appeal if left alone. They have delayed a long time, and are obviously none too sure of their chances. Though the deadlock is irksome, we should

Transpose to end of this paragraph

/ prefer

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FO371/62969

prefer that the Egyptians should not appeal to the United Nations, good though our case on either count appears to us to be, and that the deadlock should if possible be broken in some other way - as it might conceivably be if the Nokrashi Government fell. We feel that even informal American enquiries as to the Egyptian Government's intentions (specially in so encouraging a form) would tend to commit Nokrashi still further, since he could not afford to show any hesitation to the American Ambassador. Furthermore, in so far, . . .

6. Finally [~~- and this is perhaps the most important objection of all -~~] there are some indications, to judge from the tone of the Soviet press, that the Russians are seeking for a pretext to go back on Stalin's assurance. Even the most informal American representations would be likely to come to their knowledge, since nothing can ever be kept secret in Cairo, and might well be regarded by the Soviet Government as a sufficient pretext. They would in fact have some justification for this, since one of the avowed American motives is to avoid a situation in which the Soviet Government would be "aligned with the Arab countries".

7. I realise from your para. 4 that Stalin's assurance is probably not known to State Department officials below the Acheson level, and that this ignorance of a vital factor may be a contributory cause of the misunderstanding. The best course would therefore appear to be to explain matters in confidence to Acheson himself.

f0371/62969

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Lord Inverchapel D. 10.00 p.m. 26th April, 1947
No. 2515
R. 5.50 a.m. 27th April, 1947
26th April, 1947

Repeated Cairo

u u u u u

IMPORTANT

TOP SECRET

My telegram No. 2398. Egypt.

Member of my staff was called to State Department on April 25th to discuss Egyptian appeal to United Nations.

2. State Department began by stressing what Henderson had told Balfour on April 22nd (my telegram No. 2462) that United States Government had no intention of mediating between British and Egyptian Governments in an attempt to dissuade the latter from appealing to United Nations. However, State Department have been giving much thought to presentation of Egyptian treaty of peace to United Nations and are considering asking Mr. Tuck to enquire informally what course of action Egyptian Government propose to take. The State Departments's view is that case should go to General Assembly rather than Security Council and they have it in mind at a later stage to communicate to the Egyptian Government their reasons for prefering the Assembly to the Security Council.

3. My immediately following telegram contains paraphrase of a draft telegram which State Department wish to send their Embassy at Cairo. Before despatching it State Department seek His Majesty's Government's view upon it. I shall be grateful for early instructions.

4. State Department officials were inquisitive [gps. omitted] know the grounds for our insistence that United States Government should not intervene in Egyptian question. It was only in strictest confidence that Balfour gave Acheson [gps. omitted] American participation, and these have presumably not been passed down to the competent desk.

[Note by Communications Department: Repetition of missing groups being obtained].

FO371/62969

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Inverchapel
No. 2516

D. 10.25 p.m. 26th April 1947
R. 5.50 a.m. 27th April 1947

26th April 1947
Repeated to Cairo

c c c c c c

1926/C

IMPORTANT
TOP SECRET

My immediately preceding telegram.

Egypt.

Following is text of paraphrase of proposed telegram from the State Department to United States Embassy Cairo.

[Begins]

You are requcsted to comment on the following views of the Department sent you as background information and are authorised at your discretion to enquire informally regarding Egypt's proposed course of action in United Nations. Until further instructed , however, you are not (repeat not) to repeat these views to the Egyptian Government.

We consider that on technical grounds General Assembly is a more appropriate organ that the Security Council for a solution of the Sudan question because:

(1) Egypt will undoubtedly have difficulty in establishing that this question endangers international peace in vi w of long standing relationship between Egypt and the United Kingdom. If this cannot be established, Security Council would have the jurisdiction to ask [gp. undec.] to negotiate in accordance with Article 55 or to make other recommendations pursuant to Article 58 only in the event that the consent of the United Kingdom be obtained.

(2) A possible recommendation by General Assembly that would be unsatisfactory to Egypt would place less onus on the great powers than would a Security Council decision.

(3) The Sudan question involves a proposed [gp. undec.] revision of the Anglo- Egyptian treaty and as it might be considered a situation likely to impair the general welfare under Article 14 it would properly be a General Assembly matter.

An Egyptian complaint to Security Council at this time would be likely to raise the entire subject of treaty

/ revision....