

F 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

J

J. 1002

90

4 MAR

1947

Registry Number | J1002/2/16  
 FROM Sir R. Campbell  
 to. 161 (CAIRO)  
 (134/12/47)  
 dated Feb. 24, 1947  
 received Registry March 4, 1947

Disposal of Alexandria Coast Defences.  
 Rep. to Cairo despatch 99 of Jan. 31 (J598/2/16).  
 Transmits copy of letter to Lt. Gen. ALLFREY  
 of Feb. 24 regarding the handing over of  
 Alexandria Coast defences to the Egyptian  
 authorities.

Last Paper.

J983

References.

(Minutes.)

Spans to

Mr. McEwing TWSy  
 Mr. McGregor W.D.

ref J550.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Mr. McEwing (TWSy)  
 Mr. McGregor (W.D.)  
 March 13

S.L. Dept

D  
12/3

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

RV

No. 161  
(134/12/47)

91. J

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
CAIRO.

24th February 1947

J. 1002  
4 MAR

Reference to previous communication: -

Cairo I.D. No. 99 dated 31.1.47.  
Description of Enclosure.

Name, Date, etc.	Subject.
------------------	----------

To Lt.-General  
C.W. Allfrey.  
No. 134/12/47  
Dated 24.2.47.  
with 2 enclosures.

Regarding the handing  
over of Alexandria  
Coast defences to  
Egyptian authorities.

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

92

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

24th February, 1947.

RG/RV  
134/12/47

Sir,

I thank you for your letter No. 2/85386/G of 6th February reporting successful progress in the handing over of the Alexandria Coast defences to the Egyptian authorities.

As suggested in your last paragraph, I doubt whether it would be advisable at present to press the Egyptian Prime Minister for a decision on outstanding problems such as the future of the equipment recommended in the Rice report.

I shall be glad to hear in the course how matters are progressing.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Chief of the British Military Mission, to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Force, and to the Senior British Naval Officer, Middle East.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant,

Lieutenant-General G.W. Allfrey,  
K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,  
General Officer Commanding,  
British Troops in Egypt.

(Sgd) RONALD CAMPBELL

Reference:-	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	1	2	3	4	5	6
FO 371/62950 59044		1	2				
COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION							

/RV COPY

SECRET

93

Headquarters,  
British Troops in Egypt,  
M.E.L.F.

2/85386/G

6th February, 1947.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to your GLMcD/JK 134/5/47 dated 27 January 1947.

I agree that the Prime Minister's letter was more reasonable than might have been expected in the present circumstances, and I am glad to say that the hand-over is going smoothly and quickly. The hand-over of the installed equipment will be complete by 8 February, and that of the uninstalled equipment by 21 March.

*in J550*

With regard to sub-paragraph (d) of the Prime Minister's letter, the Minister of National Defence is selecting the Egyptian personnel to be trained. He appreciated the point that it was necessary to select men who have already got a good technical grounding. The Egyptian personnel will be trained by four British technicians who are being attached to the British Military Mission, as it is virtually certain that training will not be completed before 31 March 1947.

The four British personnel referred to above will also be responsible for the maintenance of the uninstalled equipment. The Minister of National Defence realized that as the Egyptian Government had not yet decided whether or not they required the equipment, we had the right to see that it was properly maintained in the meantime.

Unfortunately, the ammunition for the guns of the Barron Scheme is not on the gun-sites. It had therefore been arranged that, in order not to delay and complicate the hand-over, it should be handed over to the Egyptians at a later date in the Canal Zone, together with certain other equipment being despatched from England. I understand, however, that this has aroused suspicions in the minds of the Egyptians that we do not intend to let them have the ammunition, and in order to allay these suspicions I have ordered that the hand-over of at least token quantities of ammunition will start as soon as possible. Only ammunition belonging to the guns included in the Barron Scheme will be handed over at present.

The War Office have been informed of the situation and no doubt we will be receiving further instructions with regard to outstanding problems such as the future of the equipment,

recommended/

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

94

- 2 -

recommended in the Rice report. I will be communicating with Your Excellency on this subject in due course. I daresay you do not consider this an appropriate moment to press the Prime Minister for a decision.

I have the honour to be,  
Your Excellency's most Obedient Servant

(sgd) C. W. Alfrey.

LT GEN  
GOC

H.E. Sir Ronald Ian Campbell, K.C.M.G., C.B.,  
H.B.M.'s Ambassador,  
The British Embassy,  
CAIRO.

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

95

/RV COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

27th January, 1947.

GLMcD/JK.

134/5/47

Sir,

You have seen a copy of the Egyptian Prime Minister's letter No. 90 of 15th January about the Alexandria coast defences. I believe you feel, as I do, that it is if anything more reasonable than might have been expected in present circumstances.

I hope that you will be able to arrange for the training facilities for Egyptian personnel requested in sub-paragraph (d) of the letter.

I understand that you have discussed the letter with the Egyptian Minister of National Defence. I shall be glad to learn how your discussions progress, and to have your comments on the points mentioned above and on any others that may arise in this connection.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant,

(sgd) Ronald Campbell.

utenant General G. W. Allfrey,  
K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,  
General Officer Commanding,  
British Troops in Egypt.

J

PO 371/62950

J. 136  
10 JAN

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number | J 136/2/16

FROM Mr. I. J. PITMAN

No. M.P.

Dated Dec. 31, 1946

Received in Registry Jan. 10, 1947.

Attacks on British Personnel in Egypt.  
Ref. to F.O. letter of Dec. 3, 1946 (J 5096/39/16)  
Transmits the whole correspondence of  
the case of Mr. W. BURCH employed by  
RAF in Egypt.

Last Paper.

J2

See Minutes within: (Minutes.)

References.

J 5096/39/16-1946

R  
14/1

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

~~D.H.~~ A.M. (Priv. Sec.)

11 Jan.

~~Mr. Pitman~~

10 Jan.

(Action completed.)

cat  
14/1.

(Index.)

23/9/47

Next Paper.

10

Mr Pitman M.P.'s letter of  
31<sup>st</sup> December

The Minister of State's letter of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Dec (p. 15) was written in reply to a letter stating that a constituent of ~~the~~ Mr Pitman's had been assaulted in Heliopolis. Since Mr Pitman originally addressed his letter to the S/S for War we assumed that the constituent was a soldier & Mr McNeil suggested that since we knew nothing about the particular incident the Wo. should be asked to report. This now clarifies that the man in question was an employee of the RAF.



Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59014

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

Minutes.

RAF. reported the matter  
 when it occurred to the  
 RAF authorities. The case  
 is therefore one for the  
 Authority & drafts are  
 submitted accordingly.

D. H. RICHES.

8/  
1

Nothing to be written in this Margin.

Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

FO 571/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

ACKNOWLEDGED INT. ACK ✓ 3/1/47

Egyptian Dept  
For draft reply

39 Parker Street,  
Kingsway, W.C.2. Please.

LOF/ES

J 136  
10 JAN

31st December, 1946.

P.K.  
12

10

My dear Secretary of State,

I have now heard further from the constituent referred to in your letter to me of December 3rd (J.5006/39/10) and she has (resulting from a letter from me) obtained from her husband the latest information. I am sending you the whole correspondence.

You will notice that my letter of November 5th starts: "My dear Secretary of State". It was intended for you, but unfortunately I got muddled and in consequence it got addressed at the bottom to the Secretary of State for War. I apologise for that error.

Perhaps, as suggested in that letter, there is some explanation which could be given before the time comes for putting down any question.

Yours sincerely,

J. J. Pitman

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,  
Foreign Office,  
Downing Street, S.W.1.

FO 571/62950 59044

1	2	3	4	5	6

Registry 136/2/16  
No. J5096/39/16

2 drafts filed

10

8th January, 1947.  
M.

Confidential, Despatched

13

Draft letter to  
Private Secretary, A.M.

Dear

Register (from  
Private Secretary).

I enclose papers concerning the  
arrest of Mr. W. G. Burch, Station  
Engineer at No. 1 Works Area, R.A.F.,  
M.Q.F. by the Egyptian Police on the  
6th September, 1946. His case has been  
taken up by Mr. I. J. Pittman M.P.

Copy of letter  
from Mr. Pittman  
with original  
enclosed in

In his letter no. J5096/39/16 of the  
3rd December the Minister of State  
informed Mr. Pittman that this  
Department had no details of the  
incident, though Sir ~~Sidky~~ ~~Proke~~ had  
expressed his indignation at other  
attacks made on British personnel in  
Egypt. The Minister further suggested  
that Mr. Pittman should furnish  
all available information on the  
arrest of Mr. Burch <sup>in order</sup> to assist the

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*[Handwritten signature]*

Private Secretary

RS/1

Reference:

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	2	3	4	5	6

wa office in calling for a report.  
 Since Mr. Burch is in fact employed  
 by the R.A.F., it would seem probable  
 that the report should be called for  
 by the Air Ministry, and I am  
 therefore sending you the relevant  
 papers.

10/21 74

~~I am sending a copy of this letter  
 to Mr. [Name]~~

R. King

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1. 15

11th January, 1947.

(J 136/2/16)

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Private Secretary,

I enclose papers concerning the arrest of Mr. W.G. Burch, Station Engineer at No. 1 Works Area, H.A.P., S.W., by the Egyptian Police on the 6th September, 1946. His case has been taken up by Mr. I.J. Pitman J.I.

In his letter No. J 5096/39/16 of the 3rd December the Minister of State informed Mr. Pitman that this department had no details of the incident and suggested that Mr. Pitman should furnish all available information on the arrest of Mr. Burch in order to assist the War Office in calling for a report. Since Mr. Burch is in fact employed by the H.A.P., it would seem preferable that the report should be called for by the Air Ministry, and I am therefore sending you the relevant papers.

*Yours sincerely*

(Sgd.) J. N. Henderson.

Private Secretary

Private Secretary,  
Air Ministry.

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

OUT FILE

17

FOREIGN OFFICE

S.O.1.

13th January, 1947.

(J 136/2/16)

CONFIDENTIAL*Dear Sir,*

Thank you for your letter of the 31st December, enclosing correspondence concerning the arrest of Mr. W.G. Burch by the Egyptian Police on the 6th September, 1946.

Since Mr. Burch is employed by the R.A.F., it would seem preferable that the report should be called for by the Air Ministry, to whom the correspondence has therefore been sent.

*Yours sincerely**(Sgd) E. Barin*

J.J. Pitman, Esq., M.P.

F0371/62950 59044

1	2	3	4	5	6

J

J 221  
15 JAN

1947

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number J221/2/16  
 FROM A. SCRIVENER.  
 No. (F.O. Minute)  
 Dated Jan. 13, 1947.  
 Received in Registry Jan. 15, 1947.

Supply of Tanks to Egyptians.  
 Egyptians have requested urgently to be supplied with 40 tanks: W/O. propose to provide them with Shermans out of the large number held in British Army stocks.

Last Paper.  
 J220.

References.  
 J4336/58/16-1946

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

F.T.E. Hale  
 15/11  
 D.L. Dept  
 N. American Dept  
 18/27/11  
 15/11

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

Minutes.

J 25

221 17.04 (Colonel Atkinson) told me that  
 the Egyptians have asked to be supplied  
 urgently with 40 tanks. The W.O.  
 propose to provide them with Shermans  
 out of a large number which are  
 held in British Army stocks. As these  
 are lease-lent, American approval is  
 required. So far as purely British  
 tanks are concerned, I gather that even  
 if they could be made available  
 the cost would be prohibitive. The War  
 Office asked if this was all right.

I replied that as there were  
 from British stocks and as we had  
 used Shermans extensively, we were not  
 resigning the treaty policy of equipping  
 the armies with the same equipment (the  
 same problem has arisen over training  
 aircraft)

Nothing to be written in this margin.



Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

Minutes.

aircraft) and I felt that the main thing  
 was to get the equipment delivered  
 in view of past Egyptian quarrels  
 about failure to supply. It therefore  
 the W.C. thought Shermans were suitable  
 we should not wish to object.

*[Signature]*  
 13/11

R.S.M.  
 13/11

26

RECEIVED IN O.B.  
 14 JAN 1947  
 SENT TO DEP.

Nothing to be written in this Margin.

1947

Lo 371/62950

EGYPT and SUDAN

J. 418

27 JAN 60

J 418/2/16.  
Sir R. Campbell  
(CAIRO)  
61  
(40/44/46)  
Jan. 20, 1947  
ed (istry) Jan. 27, 1947

Supply of tanks to the Egyptians.  
Rep. to Cairo dep. No 1111 of Oct 5, 1946.  
(J 4336/58/16-1946)  
Transmits letter from British Military  
Mission Cairo No M/68/8/9 of Dec. 29 giving  
record of discussion with C.G.S. of the  
Egyptian Army regarding proposed supply  
of tanks.

Next Paper.  
J 357. (J 221)  
References.

(Minutes.)

S. L. Dept. <sup>11/20/46</sup>  
N. American Dept. <sup>1/1/47</sup>

P. J. Hale 28/1

MO4 have told me  
that we have telegraphed to  
Washington about this. The terms  
for transfer with the Americans  
agree, be settled direct between  
the Egyptians & Americans

Bv. 28/2 D 28/1

The Americans have  
refused to supply 600 and  
wants to find out why & will  
keep us informed

Bv. 28/3 D 28/2

(Print.)  
How disposed of.)

ion eted.)  
et 16/4  
(Index.)  
24/1/48

Next Paper.  
(J 1005)

J 431.

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

/GBA

No. 61

0/14/46

J. 61

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
CAIRO.

20th January 1947

J. 418  
27 JAN

Reference to previous communication

Cairo despatch No. 1111 of 5th October 1946.

Description of Enclosure.

Name, Date, etc.	Subject.
------------------	----------

FROM: British Military Mission, Cairo, Letter No. L/69/1/G, of 29th December '47

Record of discussion with C.G.S. of the Egyptian Army regarding proposed supply of tanks.

29th December 1946.

M/68/S/G.

GH. (S.D.B.) F.E.L.P.

Reference your telegram 91915 S.D.B. dated 11th December '46 Para 3, and my conversation with CGS and BGS Ops and also with Brig. Foote, VC, DSO and Major Lockwood S.D.

1. I have discussed the matter informally with the CGS of the Egyptian Army and he showed great interest, I feel that there is no doubt that provided the tanks were available at a reasonable cost the Egyptians would be delighted to have some.

2. The CGS naturally was anxious to have confirmation on the following points :-

- (a) That the Tanks would be in reasonable running order.
- (b) That ammunition would be available.
- (c) That wireless sets and optical instruments would be provided in adequate numbers.
- (d) That spares to cover the useful life of the tanks would be available. On the assumption that the Egyptians would wish to re-equip their army with later designs of tanks when they become available, this period might be considered to be two or three years. I have to request therefore that the War Office be requested to put the matter up to the U.S. authorities in the form of a tentative request for say up to 40 Sherman Tanks to be transferred to the E.A. and asking that a favourable price should be quoted.

3. The CGS of the Egyptian Army is most anxious that a few tanks should be loaned to the Egyptian Cavalry for trial. In this connection I would suggest that a demonstration troop of three or four tanks with one NCO in charge and one driver and one operator per tank should be attached to the Egyptian Cavalry Bde. for two or three months. By this means it would not be necessary to hand these tanks over to the Egyptians. If for any reason the transaction fell through they could be returned to the British Depot whence they came.

(Sgd.) R.K. Arbuthnott

MAJOR-GENERAL,  
CHIEF OF THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION.

Copy to :-  
British Embassy,  
Cairo  
Hq. B.M.

1947

J  
F0371/62950

J. 1005  
4 MAR

96

Registry member J1005/2/16.  
COM Capt. THORNTON.  
OFFICE) E.H. Rider.  
dated March 1, 1947  
received Registry March 4, 1947.

Shenan talks for the Egyptian Army.  
Transmits signal W.O. to B.A.S. Washington  
80000 of Feb. 25 together with their  
reply AR 1335 of Feb. 27. reporting that  
the matter has been taken up with the  
U.S. State Dept.

Last Paper.  
J1002. (J418)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

ion eted.) (Index.)  
AL 16/4  
N.Y.  
24/1/47

Next Paper.

J1036

(Minutes.)

We are waiting to  
us about this now.

BV. 21/3

DR 14/3

See within.  
Tel. from War Office to B.A.S. Washington 81177  
of March 11.

DR 18/3

BV. 4/4

DR 21/3

Major Ronan (MO. 6) says up on 7th of April to note  
what was the attitude of the F.O. towards the supply of  
Army equipment to the Egyptians in view of their  
demand that the M.M. depart. He would also know  
this because, if it was thought we should continue  
to supply equipment, the Americans, though reluctant,  
might be persuaded under pressure to release sufficient  
stores to meet our needs. (See within B.A.S. Washington  
22 1335)  
G. Hawton  
14 TOWER

I think that we should  
make a decision on this dependent  
on the result of Sir R. Campbell's  
interview with King's favour on the  
Military Mission. If it looks as  
though the decision to dispense  
with the Mission is final the  
Egyptians, if they get the tanks  
will require American instructions  
to teach them how to operate them.  
By pressing for the supply of tanks  
we should then be in effect  
pressing the Egyptian Govt to  
break the treaty (which prescribes  
that instructors shall be British  
only).

J.H. Riche

10/4

I am not sure that our  
ultimate decision ought to be  
based only on the subtle argument  
put forward by Mr. Riche.  
The point is rather one of general  
policy: if the Egyptians persist  
in dispensing with our mission  
are we going to continue  
special efforts to help us  
regards equipment? But I  
agree that we should await  
the interview with the King  
which should take place any  
day now.

S. L. Dept. ...

11/4

J. ...

F0371/62950

FO 371/62950 59044

1	2	3	4	5	6

Minutes.

secret. It is just a question as to whether we are prepared to ~~continue~~ to show the Egyptians that we are prepared to <sup>to continue</sup> help them. We shall probably have to do this, but let us continue to wait for the interview with the King about the Military Mission.

D. Sidat  
 27/4.

ms  
 27/4

99

ش

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Fo 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

394551

ONE-TIME SYSTEM

101

Recd 27 Feb 47

From: BAS Washington

D.T.O. Nil 9310

TO: War Office (for GS(W)1)

IMPORTANT

SECRET AR 1355

Your 80000(GS(?)1) 25 Feb.

Transfer I/L tks to Egypt action taken as requested.  
Understand informally state depart regard as border-line  
case and pressure may result reversal decision. Embassy  
willing assist but cannot act without F O instructions.  
Advise quantity men involved.

Message Control.

Tc:- GS(W)1(for action).  
Distn by GS(W)1.

Copies to:- DMO.  
DDMO(A).  
NO 1, 4.  
GS(W)1.  
RAC 1.  
Ord 13.  
F 1.



Reference:-

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	2	3	4	5	6

102

SECRET

G.S.(W).1./9310.

D.T.O.251000 Feb.

Disp. 25 Feb. 47

From :- War Office.

To :- B.A.S. Washington.

SECRET. 80000

G.S.(W).1.

Subject Sherman Tanks for Egyptian Army. Ref your cipher AR1334 of 19 Feb 47. ONE. Our Ambassador and C-in-C considered supply of these tanks for purely training purposes of great importance. TWO. Grateful if you could press matter with US State Dept or state if decision is final.

Message Control

IMPORTANT.

Copies to :-

- D.H.O.
- D.W.D.
- D.D.H.O.(A).
- Col. G.S.(W).
- H.O.1, 4.
- G.S.( ).1.
- R.A.C.1.
- F.1.

Reference:-		PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
FO 371/62950 59044		1	2	3	4	5	6
		1			2		
COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION							

Pps

E 27/11/47  
12/3

1005/2 16 **CIPHER TELEGRAM**

This message will not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being paraphrased. (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased)

From:- THE WAR OFFICE. D.T.O. 110930 MAR

To:- B.A.S. Washington Desp 11 Mar 47

Info:- C.-in-C. M.E.L.F.

SECRET 31177

G.S.(a) 1.

Subject: Shermans for Egyptians. Ref your AR 1335 not to H.E.

FIRST. Note pressure may result in State Department reversing its decision. Will ask P.O. to assist. SECOND. We can spare NO rept NO 75 mm am as our existing stocks insufficient to meet our own essential needs. THIRD. Americans should be pressed to supply am. Consider that scale Egyptians will want in r.p.g. is U.S. 79 AP 83 Sm 74 Total 186 r.p.g. This allows no first line etc holdings but is trg scale only.

Message Control.

Copy to:- D.T.O.(.),  
Col G3(a).  
O.H.  
G.S.(a) 1.  
R.A.C.1.  
C.I.  
Foreign Office (J.R. Mayall).

1947

F.371/62950

J.1170

13 MAR 1947

Registry Number

J1170/2/16

FROM MIN. OF DEFENCE

No.

(Cont'd)

Dated

Received in Registry

March 13, 1947

Withdrawal of British Troops.

Copy of Tel. from SHQ MEM to Min. of Defence 58241/MIL. of March 8 showing strengths as at March 1st.

Last Paper.

(J1094)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

These figures show very satisfactory reductions except as regards POW. Cairo City is almost cleared

J.R.H. Lihens

14/3

See within:

G/C. Stapleton to Prime Minister COS. 288/7 of March 11.

The S/S's copy is being sent to Moscow for to Dixon.

Q  
15/3

See within: C.O.S (47) 39th meeting of March 14.

6/4-21/3

~~See within: Mr. Bavin (host) to Mr. Alexander of April 4.~~

(Action completed.)

Cal  
17/3

(Index.)

24/9/47

Next Paper.

J1180. (J1363)

*10000 of Egyptian*

# TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

**WARNING** The text of this message must be thoroughly paraphrased if it is to be published or otherwise communicated to persons outside the British or U.S. Government Service. If re-transmitted unparaphrased, the originator must mark it to be sent in "O.T.P." (One-Time Pad).

105

R371/62950

*with*

I 914  
TCO 080925Z  
TOR 081840Z

IMMEDIATE

From : G.H.Q. H.E.L.F.

To : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON

J 1170  
13 MAR

COS A

58241/MIL

8th March, 1947

For Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee from Secretary Commanders-in-Chief Committee.

Reference letter COS 1295/6 21st October as amended by Cabinet Office telegram 3538 dated 11th November 1946.

Progress Report.

1. strengths as at 1st March, 1947.
  - (a) Egypt (including Alexandria Cairo and Canal Districts)
    - (1) British. Army 59989(59189 ?) R.A.F. 12057
    - (2) Non-U.K. 20840 (including R.A.F. element 153)
    - (3) P.W. 76083
  - (b) Cairo District (including Cairo City)
    - (1) British. Army 7386 R.A.F. 3505
    - (2) Non-U.K. 1062 (including R.A.F. element 73)
    - (3) P.W. 3861
  - (c) Cairo City
    - (1) British. Army 1489 R.A.F. 426
    - (2) Non-U.K. 51 (including R.A.F. element 8)
    - (3) P.W. NIL

CIRCULATION

TCO 080925Z

D.C.O.R.

Foreign Office  
First Sea Lord

Message Control, War Office  
A.M.C.S.

Reference:-

FO 571/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	2	3	4	5	6

J Copy to <sup>the</sup> W. G. Hayter, P/O.

Min. Secs. 288/7

M. 24/9/47

Lyttelton Diff. 6 re

106  
19/3

H70 2 16

INDEXED

Further to my minute dated 27th February 1947, I attach a progress report on the evacuation of British troops to the Canal Area as at the 1st March 1947.

2. I also attach graphs showing progress up to that date.

3. I am also sending a copy of the attached progress report to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his information.

(Sgd) D. C. STAPLETON

11th March 1947.

<u>In Cairo City</u>		
<u>British</u>	<u>Non U.K.</u>	<u>E.C.M.</u>
2,419 (1,713 Army 706 R.A.F)	67	-
1,915 (1,489 Army 426 R.A.F)	61	-
504 (224 Army 280 R.A.F)	6	-
	<u>510</u>	

P0371/62950

Minutes.

98

Major Vernon of M.O.U. rang up again about this question of Sherman tanks. He said that the Egyptians attribute the American refusal to supply to machinations by us, and are extremely annoyed.

There has been no reply to our telegram in J. . . . to Cairo asking how the matter now stands and we might send a further reminder. Paragraphs 8-10 of

the COS. paper on J1585 lead to the conclusion that a policy of failing to help in the provision of equipment would produce no military advantages & considerable disadvantages.

A further matter is the provision of secret "Staff Tables" for which the Egyptians have asked. M.O.U. would like a ruling on whether they should be provided or not.

D.H.F. Pike

The "Staff Tables" are <sup>26/4</sup> not really very

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

FO 371/62950

/NEA

COPY

TOP SECRET

39

Military Division,  
British Middle East Office,  
General Headquarters,  
Middle East Land Forces  
M.E. Ext. 702.

MIL/13A/ME

21st December, 1946.

Sir,

I am instructed by Commanders-in-Chief to forward to you the attached copy of a telegram 135/CCL dated 20th December, 1946, sent by them to the Chiefs of Staff.

2. It would be convenient from the point of view of Commanders-in-Chief, if the official to be appointed in due course as their Chief Financial Adviser in connection with the work of the Anglo-Egyptian Defence Board, could be the Chief Treasury Representative in the British Middle East Office. This arrangement would appear to be appropriate since the repercussions of the financial questions involved will extend beyond Egypt. The British Middle East Office will thus, inevitably, be concerned. Commanders-in-Chief also envisage, however, that to assist the Joint Defence Board and its Working Committee, a financial representative of H.M. Embassy should also be associated with the Committee proposed in paragraph SEVEN of Commanders-in-Chief's telegram. It is understood that such a Committee has already been informally constituted.

3. I have written to Sir Arnold Overton in the same sense.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

R.J. Bowker Esq., C.M.G.,

H.M. Embassy,  
Cairo.

(Sd) L.L.G.O. JENKINS

Colonel. 168



convenience & common sense will be of much value: we shall have to stand on the Immunities Convention of 1936.

But could we not suggest that for the time being in order not to provoke incidents British soldiers should be discouraged from going to Cairo & Alexandria on leave?

D.H.H. Pike

14/3

It is possible that General Alfrey's reply to Nokrashy's letter (paragraph 4) may elicit some further indication of what that letter ~~means~~ (last sentence of paragraph 1). If it does not, I should be inclined to think that we could take a chance and go ahead with the arrangements for visits to Cairo on leave, although it might be as well if a special warning were issued to the men to keep out of trouble. After all, it is quite reasonable that Cairo should be open to British soldiers in civilian clothes on bona fide leave as much as to any other tourists, and the return of British soldiers on leave to Cairo might well be welcome to the Egyptians from the commercial point of view as making good to some extent the losses incurred by shops, hotels etc. ~~by~~ evacuation.

If Nokrashy does prove difficult and H.M. Ambassador is obliged to take up the matter with him, then I see no harm in both the arguments in paragraph 2 being used.

D.S. Scott Fox

(D. SCOTT FOX)

14th March, 1947.

Mr. Beckett for obs.

I agree in general. In the first place, I think we should not precipitate an argument on the question of principle. But if it becomes necessary we should take the line (1) the U.K. maintains that the Treaty of 1936 and its immunities convention is at present in full force: Egypt has said that in her view the Treaty of 1936 is no longer valid: Egypt is submitting the difference on this point to the United Nations. Consequently, the matter is sub judice at present. (2) While the matter is sub judice the status quo should be maintained and there are the strongest reasons for accepting the argument of

practical/

.J11

PC371/62950

F0371/62990

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

practical convenience and common sense without prejudice to the position when a decision is given on the question in dispute. (3) It is quite true that the immunities convention does not provide in terms that British troops stationed in the Canal Zone shall have the right to visit Cairo for purposes of leave and recreation. Article 6 (a) and (g), however, imply ordinary freedom of movement for individuals, and there was no doubt that this amenity was contemplated under that convention.

However, it does seem to me to be very desirable that, after the evacuation of the two big cities is complete, British troops should not appear in uniform in Cairo or Alexandria if possible for some time. As Palestine is in such a disturbed state, is it not possible to arrange for local leave and recreation elsewhere, such as, for instance, Cyprus?

W. B. ...  
15th March, 1947.

Pl. submit draft reply, as in above minutes.

12 ✓  
18.3

Draft submitted  
H. H. ...

See within: 21/3  
Gen. Ward (War Office) to Sir R. Howe of ...  
The draft reply was sent to HQ at the WO. for concurrence, and General Ward has replied strongly deprecating any discouragement of troops wishing to go on leave to Cairo or Alexandria (Flag A.)  
/In

17/62950

that paras 1 & 2 and the second word ("then") of para 3 of the draft be struck out

*J. Pett Richards*

30/3

(Signed) D. M. H. RICHES

It is an unsatisfactory prospect. We are inviting an Egyptian slap in the face, and, in practice, if the Egyptians are determined to make it impossible for our soldiers to come to Cairo etc. on leave, it is they who will have the last word - a point which the War Office perhaps fail to appreciate. Whatever legal arguments we produce in these circumstances will be of no help in getting our soldiers their leave facilities if the Egyptians dig their toes in, as they presumably will. At best such arguments may be of some slight help as regards our case at the United Nations.

3. At the same time it is difficult to see what else we can do in view of the War Office attitude. The only alternative tactics would be to discuss the matter in advance with Nokrashi, and to take the line that the interests of both parties would be best served by some reasonable practical arrangement pending the United Nations' decision. Although the Egyptians have some commercial incentive to meet us over this in their own interests, I am afraid that Nokrashi in his present mood would refuse.

*D. Scott Fox*

D. Scott Fox  
31st March, 1947.

We can take it as quite certain I think that Nokrashi is going to make things as difficult as he can for us in this matter. Our troops have however certain rights under the 1936 Treaty and we have maintained that we regard that Treaty as in force. We must therefore stand our ground and as it seems that Cairo and Alexandria are the only leave places possible for our troops, insist on our right to send them there in mufti. If we give way on this to the Egyptians they will have undermined the 1936 Treaty in a very important respect.

Draft telegram to Cairo attached.

sent  
(706)

*R. V. Howe*

31st March, 1947.

OK. 8/5

RECEIVED THE SECRETARY OF STATE 1 APR 1947

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

5. <sup>C.O.S. (47) 35th Mtg. 2 March 47</sup>  
EGYPT - PROGRESS REPORT ON THE WITHDRAWAL  
TO THE CANAL AREA

*Egyptian*  
↓

(Previous Reference: C.O.S. (47) 35th Mtg., Min. 16)

THE SECRETARY was supplied by the Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Middle East with the necessary details<sup>o</sup>, and a Progress Report<sup>o</sup> on the evacuation of British troops to the Canal area as at 1st March, 1947 was submitted to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

108

o 58241/MIL  
o Annex I.

INDEXED M. 24/9/47

1170/2/16

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

109

ANNEX I

COPY OF MINUTE (REFERENCE C.O.S. 288/7) DATED 11TH MARCH  
1947 FROM THE SECRETARY, CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

Further to my minute dated 27th February, 1947, I attach a Progress Report on the evacuation of British troops to the Canal Area as at the 1st March 1947.

2. I also attach graphs showing progress up to that date.

3. I am also sending a copy of the attached Progress Report to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his information.

30  
1947

J

J. 1276  
19 MAR  
133

Registry Number } J1276/2/16  
TELEGRAM FROM  
Sir R. Campbell  
No. 672 (CAIRO)  
Dated March 15, 1947  
Received in Registry } March 19, 1947

Withdrawal of British Garrison from Egyptian Cities.  
Gives details of the arrangements that have been made by the Egyptian authorities for the handing over of the KAOR EL MIL barracks in order to minimize the risk of incidents.

Last Paper.

J1268

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

3) Col. Atkinson  
✓ (104 W.O.)  
March 19.

(Action completed.)

ced.  
18/4

(Index.)

24/4/47

Next Paper.

(Minutes.)

I think these arrangements unexceptionable in the circumstances, though rather humiliating.

C. H. ... 19/3

Yes; very humiliating  
D. M. H. Lister

copy W.O. 3  
15/3

D.H.  
1940/3.

See within:

- Extract from "Times" of April 1.
  - "Daily Telegraph" of April 1.
  - "New York Herald Tribune" April 11.
- CH 16/4



10371/62958

Extract from New York Herald Tribune

Paris, Friday April 11th, 1947.

# Egyptians Beginning to Worry Over the British Withdrawal

## Faced by Russian Ambitions in the Middle East, Some Factions May Move for a Settlement Before Case Is Sent to United Nations

By Stewart Alsop

CAIRO.

THIS week, for the first time in 45 years, there is no British soldier in the whole fertile triangle of the Egyptian Delta, between Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said. The official Egyptian attitude is jubilant. Salutes by innumerable guns, long speeches, and the hoisting of the Egyptian flag by the fat, pleasure-loving Egyptian King Farouk over the vast Victorian barracks of Kasr el Nil, have marked the occasion of the British withdrawal.

Yet already some of the ruling class Egyptians, sitting nervously on top of the miserable and slumbering Egyptian masses, and confronted by Russian ambitions in the Middle East, are beginning to feel a trifle lonely. Among them there is already noticeable a tendency to cry, like suddenly repentant lovers: "Stop, stop. It's all been a horrible mistake."

These internal hesitations within Egyptian government circles may well increase, and may make possible a compromise with the British before the Egyptian case is taken to the United Nations. Yet the official Egyptian position still calls for the immediate and unconditional evacuation of the British from the Suez Canal, and the permanent unity of the Sudan with Egypt, "whether," according to the British, "the Sudanese want it or not."

### Premier Holds Firm

Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha, a large, genial man who is both honest (a fact usually mentioned in tones of hushed amazement), and stubborn (the British call him "bloody minded"), shows no signs of retreating from his position.

There has been much oratory and persuasion on both sides, and there will doubtless be more. The Egyptians talk lovingly of their little brothers, the Sudanese. They insist that no more than Iran with Russia can Egypt make a treaty with Britain while British troops are still on Egyptian soil. The British claim, with what appears to be real sincerity, that they cannot abandon the Sudanese to the tender mercies of Russian exploitation, while the Sudanese themselves have had no opportunity to express their views.

They point with real pride to the efficiency and selflessness of British administration in the Sudan, a pride which, in the opinion of qualified American observers, is wholly justified. As for the Suez Canal, the British point out that British troops guard the canal in accordance with a treaty with Egypt, that they have already offered to evacuate the canal by 1949 (which has seemed to many Englishmen like a good big slice of what Winston Churchill called "the clattering down of the British Empire"), and that thus the parallel with the Iranian case is ridiculous.

The arguments and counter-arguments of the Egyptians and the British could easily fill a number of very dull volumes. But behind all this passionate persuasion, there are certain simple realities.

The Egyptians fear that as long as the control of the head waters of the Nile is in British hands, Egyptian independence will be as illusory as when "advice" of Brit-

ish advisers to the Egyptian government had the force of law, or when, in the recent war, British tanks surrounded the palace, and the British Ambassador named a new Cabinet.

For the merest whisper that the Nile waters, without which Egypt would be just so much desert, might be diverted, could bring any Egyptian government to heel. The demand for the immediate evacuation of the Suez Canal area is widely regarded as an afterthought, an added bargaining point.

The essentials of the British position are equally simple. For the Sudan, and to a lesser extent the Canal area, are vital parts of the emerging British strategic pattern for the defense of the Middle East against further Russian encroachment. The details of this pattern are unknown, probably even to the planners in London, but its outlines are reasonably clear.

Forward areas—air bases in Habaniyah in Iraq, and in Transjordan—will be lightly held. The Canal itself will be evacuated, but airfields and, above all, radar installations must be maintained in the area, for quick re-occupation in case of war.

The Sudan will constitute the perimeter of the main defensive area. There is no present intention to build great bases in the Sudan, but neither is there any intention to risk total control of the Sudan by some future pro-Soviet Egyptian government. For just south of the Sudan lies the heart of the British strategic defensive area. Kenya will be its center, linked by air and road to a supply base in Nigeria, on the west coast of Africa.

### Power Politics

There is nothing blimpish about this plan. It recognizes the new realities of the immensely long-range plane and the guided missile. It is designed to make the Soviet rulers think twice before risking military adventures in the Middle East.

It involves, of course, that horrid phrase, power politics. Since the British are willing to evacuate Egypt completely, provided there is a treaty for the mutual defense of the Suez Canal, and since they are willing to give any guarantees which the Egyptians may wish on the headwaters of the Nile, it is power politics in kid gloves, in contrast to the heavy-handed methods of a Lord Kilrain or of the Russians in Azerbaijan or Korea.

Yet the disagreeable fact is that here as everywhere, power and politics are inseparable. The American policy is clear. It is to resist further Soviet expansion. Soviet expansion cannot be resisted only by loud words or even by American dollars. It is also necessary that Russian military expansion should not be lightly undertaken.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

1276 2 16

Put with



F-371/62950

DAILY TELEGRAPH.

Cutting dated

1 APR 1947 1276

2/1K  
M.I. 24/9/47

MARCHING OUT

WHEN in a brief ceremony King FAROUK yesterday hoisted the Egyptian flag over the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks in Cairo, evacuated by British troops after nearly 65 years of occupation, an epoch came to an end. Egyptian rejoicing over the departure of a foreign garrison is understandable, but let it not be forgotten that the soldiers who marched out were the shield under whose protection the present Egyptian State has grown up. They took up this task after defeating the

INDEXED

136

DAILY TELEGRAPH

1 APR 1947 1276

2/1K  
M.I. 24/9/47

EGYPTIANS TAKE OVER KASR-EL-NIL

From Our Special Correspondent CAIRO, Monday.

Kasr-el-Nil barracks here were taken over by the Egyptian Army today. They were evacuated on Saturday by British troops after nearly 65 years' occupation. King Farouk raised the Egyptian flag over the barracks while fighters of the Egyptian Air Force flew overhead.

To-night large crowds thronging the streets are celebrating with fireworks. The flag is hoisted. British staff in offices nearby were ordered to leave at 8 p.m. as a precautionary measure.

INDEXED

ten in this Mar.

TIMES

1276  
1 APR 1947

M.I. 24/9/47

Cutting dated

BRITISH EVACUATION OF CAIRO CELEBRATED

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

CAIRO, MARCH 31

Spitfires of the Royal Egyptian Air Force roared past and hundreds of pigeons were released as King Farouk this morning hoisted the Egyptian flag at the Kasr el Nil Barracks, which were evacuated by British troops last Saturday.

All Egypt was on holiday to-day in celebration of the British evacuation of Cairo.

Jubilant with a certain amount of restraint is the tone of the Egyptian Press to-day. Most newspapers in special editions declare that this is only the first stage, and that the people of the Nile Valley are looking forward impatiently to the evacuation of the whole land.

INDEXED

revolt of ARAM Pasha in 1882. They sustained the work of Lord Cromer, under whose beneficent hand Egypt, fertilised by British capital, became a prosperous and stable State. They protected the country from ravage in two great wars. Their presence during the last conflict has enriched Egypt to the tune of about £450,000,000. The 1936 Treaty, under which the troops leave to take station in the Suez Canal zone, confirmed the full independence of the young Egyptian State which, with British support, then took her place in the League of Nations. The good offices of Britain secured, under the Montreux Convention, the virtual abolition of the Capitulations, setting the seal on the internal sovereignty of the Egyptian Government.

It is well that these facts should be recalled when Egypt has announced her intention of asking the United Nations to annul that 1936 Treaty, demanding sovereignty over the Sudan and complete withdrawal of British troops from her territory. The present condominium in the Sudan exists as the result of a British victory. Our responsibilities to the Sudanese cannot be a pawn in internal Egyptian politics. The defence of the Canal is a joint commitment of both Powers in a freely negotiated arrangement which, as Mr. Ewen showed in the debate last May, is paralleled by that under which the United States has occupied bases on British territory in the West Indies. It is regrettable that the troops were not withdrawn from Cairo earlier, as Mr. CHURCHILL urged. Much ill-feeling might thus have been saved. It is even more regrettable that the Government, by its precipitate offer of complete withdrawal last year, has appeared to admit a doubt as to their right to continue in the Canal zone, where their presence is vital to Britain, Egypt and the world.

J

140

F0371/62990

J. 1363

1947

Registry Number J1363/2/16.  
FROM Min. of DEFENCE  
No. (Contd.)  
Dated March 22, 1947  
Received in Registry March 25, 1947

Withdrawal of British Troops.  
Copy of Tel. from GHQ. MEHQ of March 22  
61584/MIL. showing strength as  
at March 15, 1947.

Last Paper. (J1170)  
J1330.

(Minutes.)

(B) & (C) are going down

References.

fast.

J. K. R. R. R.

25/3

S.L. Dept.  
27/3

D.S.F.

25/3.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

See within: Maj. Gen. Wallis to Mr. Dixon  
C.O.S. 349/7 of March 25.

See within: G.O.S. (47) 45th. Mtg of March 26.

DR  
29/3

~~See within: Mr. Devin (Moxon) to Mr. Alexander~~

See within: Mr. Devin (Moxon) to Mr. Alexander  
April 4.

6. Form 1/4

Action completed.)

(Index.)

Exl  
28/3

24/9/47

The Chiefs of Staff considered  
the copy of State's letter this  
morning; to what effect we do  
not

Next Paper.

J1366.

yet know. The matter is very relevant to the difficulties in connexion with Delta leave; if there were less troops in the Canal Zone, not only would there be less leave to be catered for but accommodation difficulties in the zone would be less acute & the need of Delta leave less urgent. After consultation with W.O. I have added at a para. to our dft. tel. to Moscow on

141  
F0371/62950

B.O.  
April 14<sup>th</sup>

D.S. Station  
11/4

S. L. Dept.  
✓  
14/4

✓  
14/4

Sir O. Sargent  
✓  
14/4

The draft reply to the S/S which COS. Sec<sup>t</sup> have put up to the Minister of Defence is being copied to us today

J.M.H. Richards  
16/4

See J1730

R 19/4

F0371/62950

**TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM**

Head of Egyptian

**WARNING** The text of this message must be thoroughly paraphrased if it is to be published or otherwise communicated to persons outside the British or U.S. Government Service. If re-transmitted unparaphrased, the originator must mark it to be sent in "O.T.P." (One-Time Pad)

J. 1363  
25 MAR

LI 1124.  
TOO 221015Z.  
TOU 230450Z.

142

IMMEDIATE

From: G.H.Q., I.M.E.F.  
To: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON. COS A

61589/MIL. 22nd March, 1947.

For Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee from Secretary, Commanders in Chief Committee.

Reference letter COS 1295/0 21st October as amended by Cabinet Office telegram 3533 11th November 1946.

Progress Report.

1. Strengths as at 15th March 1947.
  - (A) Egypt (including Alexandria, Cairo and Canal Districts,
    - (1) British Army 65,653; R.A.F. 12,019.
    - (2) Non-UK 20,915 (including R.A.F. element 184).
    - (3) F.S. 75,133.
  - (B) Cairo District (including Cairo City)
    - (1) British Army 5,625; R.A.F. 1,541.
    - (2) Non-UK 680 (including R.A.F. element 28).
    - (3) F.S. 1,933.
  - (C) Cairo City,
    - (1) British Army 910; R.A.F. 107.
    - (2) Non-UK 10 (including R.A.F. element 2).
    - (3) F.S. Nil.
2. Increase in Army strengths at (A) (1) above due to arrival of units from C.I.F., India, Greece and U.R. temporarily accommodated in Canal Area.

TOO 221015Z.

CIRCULATION  
D.C.C.R.  
Foreign Office.  
First Sea Lord.  
Message Control. W.O.  
A.M.C.S.

FO 371/62950 59014

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	2	3	4	5	6



Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000

**TOP SECRET**

**INDEXED**

1363 2 16

M.I. 249/42

REF. S. 349/7

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
S.W.1

25th March, 1947.

3. Egyptian dept.

143

*Dear Bob*

Further to my letter of the 11th March, 1947, I attach for the information of the Foreign Secretary, a Progress Report on the evacuation of British troops to the Canal Area as at 15th March, 1947.

*Tom*

*To Hollis*

P.J. Dixon, Esq., CMG.,  
Foreign Office.

f3371/62950

EGYPT - WITHDRAWAL TO CANAL AREA

Progress Report 25th March, 1947.

STATEMENT OF FORCES IN EGYPT

	<u>In Egypt (including Alexandria, Cairo &amp; Canal Districts)</u>		<u>In Cairo District (including Cairo City)</u>	
	<u>British</u>	<u>Non U.K.</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>Non U.K.</u>
				<u>P.O.W.</u>
(i) 1st March 1947	72,046 (59,989 Army (12,057 RAF)	20,840	10,891 (7,386 Army (3,505 RAF)	3,861
(ii) 15th March 1947	77,702 (65,653 Army* (12,049 RAF)	20,915	4,966 (3,625 Army (1,341 RAF)	1,933
<u>REDUCTIONS</u> (over last 14 days)	5,656* (5,604 Army* (52 RAF)	75*	5,925 (3,761 Army (2,164 RAF)	382
<u>NET REDUCTIONS</u> <u>BY AREAS</u>		<u>4,781<sup>b</sup></u>		<u>8,215</u>



\* Increase  
<sup>b</sup> Increase due to arrival of units from C.M.F., India, Greece and U.K. temporarily accommodated in Canal Area.

<u>In Cairo City</u>			
<u>British</u>	<u>Non U.K.</u>	<u>P.O.W.</u>	
1,915 (1,489 Army 426 RAF)	61	-	
1,017 (910 Army 107 RAF)	10	-	
893 (579 Army 319 RAF)	51	-	
	<u>949</u>		

Reference:-

FO 571/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	2	3	4	5	6

*7/2/47*

*Mr. Bevin's private*

145

United Kingdom Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, MOSCOW.

*67*

*PPS*

*soon please R*

4th April, 1947.

1363 2 16

*H. 24/9/47*

Dear Albert,

I do not know whether you will have seen the Prime Minister's telegram No.21 having to me. In case you have not I enclose a copy.

On receiving it, I looked up my latest figures on the evacuation of British troops from Egypt. I see from these that on the 1st March we still had some 93,000 troops in Egypt together with 76,000 prisoners of war.

I feel that the number of British troops is still far too high, and I shall be glad if you will look into the possibility of reducing more rapidly. I shall, I think, find our position hard to defend when Egypt's case is considered by the United Nations, unless there has been a substantial reduction.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) ERNEST BEVIN

The Right Honourable  
A.V. Alexander, C.H., M.P.



FO 371/62950 59044

1	2	3	4	5	6
1			2		

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

9. C.O.S. (47) 45<sup>th</sup> Mtg of March 26<sup>th</sup>. *Egyptian*  
EGYPT - FULFILMENT OF OBLIGATION WITHDRAWAL TO THE CANAL *dept.*  
AREA.

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(47) 39th Mtg. Min. 5) 146

THE SECRETARY was supplied by the Secretary, Commander-in-Chief Committee, Middle East with the necessary details and a Progress Report on the evacuation of British troops to the Canal Area on 15th March, 1947, was submitted to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. INDEXED

A 61589/HLL  
 Annex II  
 Ministry of Defence, D.S.I.

26TH MARCH, 1947. -7-

*Put with H-1 24/9/47*  
 J 1363/ 2 / 16

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
1	2	3	4	5	6
Reference:-					
FC 371/62950			59044		
COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION					

147

ANNEX II.

Copy of a Minute (Reference C.O.S. 349/7) dated 25th March, 1947, from Lieut-General Sir Leslie Hollis to the Prime Minister.

Further to my minute dated 11th March, 1947, I attach a Progress Report on the evacuation of British troops to the Canal Area as at the 15th March, 1947.

2. I also attach graphs showing progress up to that date.

3. I am also sending a copy of the attached Progress Report to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his information.

25th March, 1947.

FO371/62950

EGYPT - WITHDRAWAL TO CANAL AREA  
Progress Report 25th March, 1947.

STRENGTH OF FORCES IN EGYPT

	<u>In Egypt (including Alexandria, Cairo &amp; Canal Districts)</u>			<u>In Cairo District (including Cairo City)</u>		
	<u>British</u>	<u>Non U.K.</u>	<u>P.O.W.</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>Non U.K.</u>	<u>P.O.W.</u>
(i) 1st March 1947	72,046 (59,989 Army (12,057 RAF)	20,840	76,033	10,891 (7,386 Army (3,505 RAF)	1,062	3,861
(ii) 15th March 1947	77,702 (65,653 Army <sup>+</sup> (12,049 RAF)	20,915	75,133	4,966 (3,625 Army (1,341 RAF)	680	1,933
<u>REDUCTIONS</u> (over last 15 days)	5,656 <sup>+</sup> (5,664 Army <sup>+</sup> 8 RAF)	75 <sup>+</sup>	930	5,925 (3,761 Army <sup>+</sup> (2,164 RAF)	382	1,928
<u>NET REDUCTIONS</u> <u>BY 15th</u>		4,781 <sup>6</sup>				8,215 <sup>6</sup>

+ Increase due to arrival of units from C.M.F., India, Greece and  
 6 Increase due to units temporarily accommodated in Canal Area.

<u>In Cairo City</u>			
<u>British</u>	<u>Non U.K.</u>	<u>P.O.W.</u>	
1,915 (1,489 ARMY 426 RAF)	61	-	
1,017 (910 ARMY 107 RAF)	10	-	
698 (579 ARMY 319 RAF)	51	-	
			<u>945</u>

6371/62950

(6952) Wt 18301/3876 20m 6/46 C&Co 745(8)

*Head of Egyptian*

19  
J

# TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

**WARNING** The text of this message must be thoroughly paraphrased if it is to be published or otherwise communicated to persons outside the British or U.S. Government Service. If re-transmitted unparaphrased, the originator must mark it to be sent in "O.T.P." (One-Time Pad).

*Ente*

IZ 135  
TOO 111155Z  
TOR 120016Z

IMMEDIATE

FROM : G.E.N. H.E.L.F.  
TO : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

J 193  
XIGOS JAN

93636/MIL

11th January 1947

For Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee from Secretary Commanders in Chief Committee.

Reference letter COS 1296/6 21st October as amended by Cabinet Office telegram 3538 11th November, 1946.

Progress Report.

1. Strengths as at 4th January, 1947.

*Change in strength  
state since 21. vii. 46  
[52/12/16]*

- (A) Egypt (including Alexandria, Cairo and Canal Districts)
  - (i) British. Army 69017  
R.A.F. 13500
  - (ii) Non U.K. 25203 ( including R.A.F. element 200 )
  - (iii) P.F. 80861
- (B) Cairo District (including Cairo City)
  - (i) British. Army 12832  
R.A.F. 5600
  - (ii) Non U.K. 1989 (including R.A.F. element 90)
  - (iii) P.F. 5303
- (C) Cairo City
  - (i) British. Army 3475  
R.A.F. 900
  - (ii) Non U.K. 136 (including R.A.F. element 10)

- 100  
- 108  
+ 5450  
- 4549  
- 1473  
- 57  
- 406  
- 461  
- 18  
- 79  
+ 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

F0371/62950

6

EGYPT - WITHDRAWAL TO CANAL AREA

Progress Report 31st December, 1946

STRENGTH OF FORCES IN EGYPT

	In Egypt (including Alexandria, Cairo & Canal Districts)			In Cairo District (including Cairo City)		
	British	Non U.K.	P.O.W.	British	Non U.K.	P.O.W.
(1) 7th December 1946	82,675 (69,354 Army (15,341 RAF)	19,777	84,329	19,597 (13,426 Army (6,171 RAF)	2,400	5,389
(11) 31st December 1946	82,785 (68,177 Army (15,608 RAF)	19,753	85,413	18,962 (13,305 Army (5,657 RAF)	2,305	5,782
<u>REDUCTIONS</u> (over last 14 days)	110+ (187 Army (207 RAF)	24	1,081 <sup>+</sup>	635 (121 Army (514 RAF)	5	105
<u>NET REDUCTIONS IN TOTALS</u>	<u>1,167<sup>+</sup></u>			<u>745</u>		

+ Increase  
 + Increase due to arrival from Palestine of three Italian P.W. Companies for repatriation.

<u>In Cairo City</u>		
<u>British</u>	<u>Non U.K.</u>	<u>P.O.W.</u>
5,631 { 3,527 Army (1,504 RAF	143	103
4,472 { 3,493 Army ( 979 RAF	133	91
559 { 34 Army (525 RAF	10	12
	<u>531</u>	

1947

EGYPT and SUDAN

60371/62950

2-2  
-1 JAN 1947

Registry Number 152/2/16

FROM Cdr. Offices

No. Contd.

Dated  
Received in Registry Jan. 1, 1947

Withdrawal of British Troops from Egypt.  
Ref. to Cdr. Off. Tel. 3538 of Nov. 11 (14714/58/9)  
Copy of Tel. from MELF to Cdr. Offices  
89634/MIL of Dec. 28 giving strength  
as at Dec. 21.

5351) Last Paper (15422)  
15519/58/16 - 1946.

References.

14714/58/9 - 1946.

Little change. (Minutes.)  
R.M. Edwards.  
2/1.  
J.M.H. Richards  
2/1

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

62950

Very little: + we have less than  
three months to go.

I would have submitted the 8/8  
private telegram from New York - and  
subsequent minutes - with this paper,  
but they have not been available for  
some days.

Vicars  
4/1

See now Gen. Helio's letter of

3/12 + minutes hereon.

J. 4/1

(Action completed.)

cas  
18/1/47

(Index.)

23/9/47

Next Paper.

(193)

1136

See within: C.O.S. 3rd meeting Jan. 3.



F0371/62950

Area of Egypt 4

**TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM**

**WARNING** The text of this message must be thoroughly paraphrased if it is to be published or otherwise communicated to persons outside the British or U.S. Government Service. If re-transmitted unparaphrased, the originator must mark it to be sent in "O.T.P." (One-Time Pad).

Ents

J...2  
-1 204 1947

IZ 5210.  
TOO 280911Z.  
TOR 290501Z.

IMMEDIATE

From: G.H.Q., I.M.E.L.F.

To: CABINET OFFICE.

X COS A

89631/RIL.

28th December, 1946.

For Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee from Secretary Commanders in Chief Committee.

Reference letter COS 1295/6 21st October as amended by Cabinet Office telegram 3538 11th November, 1946.

Progress Report.

1. Strengths as at 21st December:

- (A) Egypt (including Alexandria, Cairo and Canal Districts)
  - (1) British. Army 69177  
R.A.F. 13608
  - (2) Non-U.K. 19753 (including R.A.F. element 221)
  - (3) P.M. 85410
- (B) Cairo District (including Cairo City).
  - (1) British. Army 13305  
R.A.F. 5657
  - (2) Non-U.K. 2395 (including R.A.F. element 90)
  - (3) P.M. 5784
- (C) Cairo City.
  - (1) British. Army 3493  
R.A.F. 979
  - (2) Non-U.K. 135 (including R.A.F. element 13)
  - (3) P.M. 91/95 ?

2. Reference para 1 (A)(3) above. Increase of 1081 is due to arrival from Palestine of three Italian P.M. Companies for repatriation.

TOO 280911Z.

CIRCULATION

Defence Office.  
Foreign Office.

First Sea Lord.  
Message Control.

A.M.C.S.

Minutes.

J 2.

Secret

3

The S/S yesterday received assurances from the Service members of the Defence Committee which have satisfied him on the score both of the evacuation of the Delta and of the use of Prisoners of War.

In particular the military are afraid of possible delays (which they are not averse to) to the works programme in the Canal zone as a result of the disaffection - for whatever reason - of Egyptian labour.

x

J. 10/11

S. L. Dept. to see.

W. H. G.

Nothing to be written in this margin.

FO 371/62950 59044

INDEXED

5

REFERENCE: C.O.S. 6/7

23/9/47

TOP SECRET

2 / 2 / 16.

31st December, 1946.

1) Sys.

2) Egyptian Dept.

PD. 400

Put with 32/2/16

Dear Bob 3/1.

I attach for the information of the Foreign Secretary a copy of a Progress Report on the evacuation of British troops to the Canal area showing the position as at the 21st December 1946.

2. A copy of this Progress Report has also been submitted to the Prime Minister.

*J. Hollis*

*THIS IS TYPED  
This is correct  
What about the  
Do a note to PM  
FB*

*Draft submitted*

*V.M. 7/1*

P.J. Dixon, Esq., CMG.,  
Foreign Office.

Reference:-		PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
FO 371/62950 59044		1	2	3	4	5	6
		1			2		
COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION							

7

ANNEX II

Copy of a Minute (C.O.S.5/7) dated  
31st December, 1946, from the Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Prime Minister.

Further to my minute dated 16th December, I attach a Progress Report on the evacuation of British troops to the Canal area as at the 21st December, 1946.

2. I also attach some graphs which have been prepared in this office, and which may show more clearly the position regarding the withdrawal of our troops to the Canal area. May I ask that these graphs be returned to me in about ten days time, so that I may arrange for them to be re-submitted to you together with the next Progress Report.

3. I am also sending a copy of the attached Progress Report to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his information.

J 2 / 2 / 16.

C.O.S. 3rd Mtg. 3/1/46

INDEXED

5. EGYPT - PROGRESS REPORT ON WITHDRAWAL TO THE CANAL AREA.

(Previous Reference: C.O.S.(46) 184th Meeting, Minute 6)

THE SECRETARY was supplied\* by the Secretary, Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Middle East, with the necessary details, and a Progress Report on the evacuation of the British troops to the Canal Area as at the 21st December 1946 was submitted to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

*See Liaison*  
*Egyptian*  
*Dept. with*

8

+ 89634/MIL  
/ Annex II

~~JAN 10~~  
9 JAN

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION


J

18

J. 193.

14 JAN

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number

J193/2/16.

FROM

Min. of DEFENCE

No.

(Contd)

Dated

Received in Registry

Jan. 14 1947

Withdrawal of British Troops from Egypt.  
 Rep. to Col. Off. Tel. 3538/Nov. 11 (J4714/58/9)  
 Copy of Tel. from MELF to Min. of Defence  
 93636/MIL of Jan. 11. Progress Report  
 giving strength as at Jan. 4, 1947.

Last Paper.

J136.

(J2)

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

little progress - see comparative figures  
 indicated in telegram. The increase of  
 5450 non-UK. troops in Egypt is unfortunate.

S.L. Dept (and minute on  
 J2/2/6)

P.J.E. Male

Para 2 is pretty bad.  
 ER 15/1

And see, for tabular statement, J288/2/14

P.J.E.  
 21/

Action completed.)

(Index.)

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

20

- 2 -

- 9/195 (iii) T. T. Nil.

2. Increase in strength at 1 (A)(ii) due to arrival in Egypt since 26th November 1946 of 19 East African Pioneer Companies. Regret that this increase has not been reflected in earlier Progress Reports.

TOO 111155Z

CIRCULATION

Defence Office  
 Foreign Office  
 First Sea Lord  
 Message Control W.O.  
 A.M.C. S.

Reference:-

FO 571/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

*at 11.2, Dec 1946*

J

27

J 288  
20 JAN

1947

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number

J288/2/16

FROM MAS. GEN. HOLLIS

(Ch. of Defence) to the Dir.

Dated

Jan. 14, 1947

Received in Registry

Jan. 20, 1947

C.O.S.

Withdrawal of British Troops to Canal Area  
Ref. to his letter of Dec. 31 (J2/2/16).  
Transmits copy of Progress Report on  
evacuation of troops, as at Jan 4.

Last Paper.

J221.

(Minutes.)

This is a tabular statement of the figures in  
J 193/2/16

P.J.E.M.

*3/1*

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)



Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION



*S/S*

REFERENCE: C.O.S. *Enter*  
OFFICES OF THE CABINET  
AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE,

*J 28*

GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
S.W.1

TOP SECRET

*See h S/S  
PK 6/1*

*Egyptian Dept*

14th January, 1947

*J.A.*

*Dear Bob* 16/1 JAN

Further to my letter of 31st

December, 1946, I attach for the  
information of the Foreign Secretary,  
a Progress Report on the evacuation  
of British troops to the Canal Area  
as at 4th January, 1947.

*John*  
*J.A.*

P. J. Dixon, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference:-

FO 571/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	2	3	4	5	6

STRENGTH OF FORCES IN EGYPT

Progress Report 14th January, 1947

	In Egypt (including Alexandria, Cairo & Canal Districts)			In Cairo District (including Cairo City)		
	British	Non U.K.	E.O.W.	British	Non U.K.	E.O.W.
(5) 21st December, 1946	82,765 (69,177 Army 13,608 RAF)	19,753	85,410	16,962 (13,305 Army 5,657 RAF)	2,395	5,784
(14) 4th January, 1947	82,517 (69,017 Army 13,500 RAF)	25,203	80,861	16,432 (12,832 Army 5,600 RAF)	1,989	5,303
<u>REDUCTIONS</u> (over last 14 days)	268 (160 Army 108 RAF)	5,450 <sup>d</sup>	4,549	530 (473 Army 57 RAF)	406	481
<u>NETT REDUCTIONS BY AREAS</u>	<u>633<sup>d</sup></u>			<u>1,417</u>		

<sup>d</sup> Increase due to arrival of 19 East African Pioneer Company  
+ Increase

In Castro City

British                      Non U.K.                      F.O.W.

4,472 ( 3,493 Army                      133                      91  
          ( 979 RAR

4,375 ( 3,475 Army                      136                      -  
          ( 900 RAR

97 ( 18 Army                      3+                      91  
     ( 79 RAR

185

Registry Number

J315/2/16.

FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

58/15

Jan 17, 1947

Jan 21, 1947

Joint Defence Board

Re: Mr. Spraight's letter (201/1/479) of 12/24 (J290/2/16)

Enclosed copy of a letter to Mr. GADY of Dec 24 regarding the problem in which the Joint Defence Board are likely to be concerned.

Last Paper.

J291.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Sir Arnold Overton expresses his consent in a letter from the Secretary of the C in C committee, M.E. (copy in J290 ref MIL/17A/ME), about the appointment of a Chief Financial Adviser in connection with the work of the Anglo-Egyptian Defence Board. He agrees that the Treasury rep at B.M.E. should hold this position.

He strongly supports the C in C's proposal of a (financial) working committee, and give the command of the existing working committee over which Cliff presides, and in which Johnson sits when Egyptian affairs are discussed.

I suggest that this working committee is being is the answer to Spraight's request for Embassy representation with the financial adviser, in his letter 201/1/479 in J290.

I suggest we copy this letter as for letters in J290. Draft submitted on J290.

P.J.E. Male  
27/

I don't think we need copy this  
D 287/1

(Action completed.)

CAF  
31/1

(Index.)

24/1/47

Next Paper.

J357

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	2	3	4	5	6

46 J

BRITISH MIDDLE EAST OFFICE  
10 SHARIA TOLUBAT  
CAIRO

88/15

17th January, 1947.

1 315  
 JAN

Dear Scrivener,

With reference to Speaight's letter (201/1/47C) of 14th January to Jenkins about the composition of the Joint Defence Board, of which a copy was sent to you, I enclose a copy of a letter I recently sent to Eady on the same subject.

Yours sincerely,

*Al. Martin*

*Warrant my congratulations on your new appointment. Al*

P. H. Scrivener, Esq., C. M. G.

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

COPY.

47

TOP SECRET.British Middle East Office,  
Cairo.

24th December, 1946.

Dear Wilfrid,

...

I enclose a copy of a letter which has been sent to me by the Secretary to the Commanders-in-Chiefs Committee, forwarding a copy of telegram 135/001, dated 20th December, 1946, which has been sent by the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, to the Chiefs of Staff.

2. I think the proposals in this telegram represent a sensible approach to the financial problems with which the Joint Defence Board is likely to be concerned. While the financial questions that are likely to arise will primarily be concerned only with Anglo-Egyptian relations, there are wider implications. It is, therefore, appropriate that the Treasury representative in this Office should act as "Chief Financial Adviser" to the Commanders-in-Chief. I do not know,

With Wilfrid Eady, M.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G.

/however,

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

FO 371/62950 59044

1	2
---	---

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

-2-

48

however, what view you will take of the proposal that such a Treasury representative should be vested with a wide measure of power to incur financial commitments, which I take to be the intention of the Commanders-in-Chief. An arrangement of this kind would certainly make for expedition in the work of the Joint Defence Board, but there are other considerations which the Treasury would have to take into account when considering such a proposal.

3. I am entirely in favour of the Commanders-in-Chiefs' ideas about a Working Committee. As Jenkins points out in his letter, there is such a Committee in existence at the moment, over which Illiff presides, and which is composed as follows:-

The Financial Adviser to  
The Commander-in-Chief, M. E. L. F.

The Financial Adviser to  
The A. O. C. -in-Chief., M. E. D. M. E.

A representative of the Navy.

Johnson (the financial Counsellor to the Cairo

/Embassy

FO 371/62950 59014

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

49

Embassy) sits in this Committee when Egyptian affairs are being discussed. I know that the Services have found this Committee a useful instrument for co-ordinating Services financial policy in the Middle East and for keeping the Services in touch with one another on financial matters.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bowker.

Yours ever,

Sgt. L. G. Bowker.



f 371/62950

J

31

1947

290

EGYPT and SUDAN

20 JAN

Registry Number J290/2/16  
 FROM CHANCERY (CAIRO)  
 No. (Cont'd)  
 Dated Jan. 20, 1947  
 Received in Registry

Evacuation: Joint Defence Board.  
 Letter to Cairo from B.M.E.O., M14/13A/ME of Dec. 21 enclosing copy of Tel 135/CC of Dec. 20 from Chief of Staff, and reply from Mr. Speaight 20/1/47 of Jan. 14 re. composition & functions of the Joint Defence Board.

Last Paper.  
 J288

References.

J5441/58/16-1946

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

B) (without Tel.)  
 C.O.S. Sect (C/S. Simpson)  
 T.S.  
 W.O.  
 A.M.  
 J. 6 Feb

(Minutes.)

There is something in this I think. We should copy the exchange of letters (not the telegram) to:-

- C.O.S. Sect (C/S Stapleton)
- Treasury
- WO
- AM.
- Admty

ref.  
 D. S. 21/1  
 D.S. 21/1

S.L. Dept.  
 by

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

col. 7/2

Wm 24/9/47

Next Paper.

J291.

Action as above, now with a copy of the letter (not the enclosure) in J 315.

P.F.E. Male 27/

Copy this paper (not J315)

32003 F.O.P. as indicated

DR 28/

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

RJB/NEA

801/1/47G

Dear Jenkins,

✓ 280  
 20 JAN

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

14th January, 1947.

I write to acknowledge - with some delay - the receipt of your official letter MIL/BA/ME of the 21st December enclosing a copy of a telegram sent by the Commanders-in-Chief to the Chiefs of Staff about the composition and functions of the Joint Defence Board.

In your covering letter you say that the Commanders-in-Chief would find it convenient if the official to be appointed in due course as their chief Financial Adviser in connection with the work of the Anglo-Egyptian Defence Board could be the Chief Treasury Representative in the British Middle East Office, and that they suggest a financial representative of the Embassy being associated with the Working Committee.

We of course fully appreciate the wish of the Commanders-in-Chief to have as their chief Financial Adviser an official with Middle East functions. At the same time, since most of the financial problems with which the Joint Defence Board will have to deal will be mainly Anglo-Egyptian and not Middle East problems, it is important that full provision shall be made for obtaining advice on them from the Financial Counsellor at the Embassy.

Colonel H. G. O. Jenkins, C.B.E.,  
 Military Division,  
 British Middle East Office,  
 10 Sharia Tolubat,  
 Cairo.

166

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

I am sending copies of this letter to Overton and also to Scrivener in the Foreign Office, to whom I am sending a copy of your letter of the 21st December.

Yours sincerely  
(for H. M. Minister)  
Ed. R. L. Spraight

33

J  
60371/62950

J. 220  
15 JAN 1947

EGYPT and SUDAN

Registry Number | J220/2/16.  
FROM WAR OFFICE.  
No. (Com'd)  
Dated  
Received in Registry | Jan. 15, 1947.

Release of Water Breakwaters - Port Said

Tel. from C. in C. MELF to W.O.  
93219 9(6)2 of Jan 13.  
Suez Canal Co. are demanding complete  
release of breakwaters including permission  
to demolish all buildings to enable  
breakwaters to be used again as promenade.

Last Paper.

J 193.

References.

(Minutes.)

I think the argument that a concession here would  
ease our relations with the Canal Co. a good one.  
We could use it in connection with the FIRDAN bridge.

S.L. Dept.

P.F.E. Male

15/1

I agree. Presumably  
we need not express our  
opinion until asked by W.O.

D 15/1

See within: Tel. W.O. to C. in C MELF 78109 of 31/1

W.O. have now agreed to the release. Should  
we inform Lord Hankey for his amony?

P.F.E. Male

4/2

Draft to Lord Hankey submitted

P.F.E. Male

6/2

I think that Lord H.  
will have heard about this  
in Egypt.

D 6/2

otion plotted.) (Index.)  
1/2  
18/1.7/2 24/9/47

Next Paper.

J 221.

30371/62950

CIPHER TELEGRAM

391345  
22

This message will not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being paraphrased. (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased.)

J 220  
15 JAN

J / /  
4 JAN 47

Recd. 13 Jan 47.  
D.T.O. 100950B Jan.

From:- C in C MELF.  
To :- War Office.  
Info:- Advanced Egyptforce.

SECRET. 93219G(0)2.

Subject is release of western breakwater Port Said to Suez Canal Company.

One. All armaments consisting of twin six pounder gun and three searchlights together with engines have been removed and stored centrally. Only buildings and holdfasts for these equipments now remain.

Two. Canal Company are demanding complete release of breakwater including permission to demolish all buildings to enable breakwater to be again used as promenade. Canal Company point out existence of international convention of 1888 relating to Neutrality of Suez canal.

Three. Consider agreement on above may avoid Canal Company pressing removal of other defences and benefit relation between ourselves and the Company. If removed the defences could be rebuilt and installed within the limit of 12 months state of readiness. We are being pressed for immediate reply.

Four. May authority be given to meet this request.

Message Control. Distn by M.O.4. (M.O.4 for action).

- |              |            |                            |
|--------------|------------|----------------------------|
| Copies to:-  | D.D.R.M.   | Q.6.                       |
| J.M.O.       | E.L.3.     | D.F.(a)                    |
| D.Plans.     | D.E.in C.  | F.1.                       |
| D.D.M.O.(B)  | B.1.       | D.P.(c)                    |
| Col. G.S.(O) | Q(Ops)1.5. | V.P.                       |
| M.O.1.4.(12) | Brig C(13) | I of L(Disposals).         |
| D.D.M.I.(1)  | Q(E)2.     | Foreign Office.            |
| M.I.1.3.     | D.O.       | Mr. Riches(Egyptian Dept). |
|              | D.D.C.(B). |                            |

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

CIPHER TELEGRAM

M 1 24/9/47

220/2/16.

This message will not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being paraphrased. (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased).

23  
INDEXED

Putworth

BM/2151(MO4)

From :- The War Office

DTO 311030 Z/Jan

To :- G-in-C MELF

Desp 31 Jan 47

SECRET 78109 (MO4)

Your 93219 G(O)2 cipher of 10 Jan .

- One . Agree to release of western breakwater to Suez Canal Company subject to conditions in para two below .
- Two . Your two obtain advice of D Hirings as to whether there exists a fixed asset element which should be sold before release .

Message Control.

IMPORTANT

Copies to:- DMO  
 D Plans  
 DDMO(A)(B)  
 Col GS(O)  
 MO 1, 4(10)  
 DDMI(I)  
 MI 1, 3.  
 DDRA  
 RA 3  
 DE in C  
 E 1  
 Q(Ops)1, 3.  
 Brig Q(AE)  
 Q(AE)2  
 DQ  
 DDO(B)  
 Q 6  
 DF(a)  
 F 1  
 DF(c)  
 WF  
 I of L (Disposals)  
 Foreign Office  
 (Mr. Riches - Egyptian Department)

Registry Number J1366/2/16.

FROM Col. ATKINSON

(WAR OFFICE) & Staff

No. 3M/2119 (M04)

Dated March 24, 1947

Received in Registry March 25, 1947

Quarters for British Troops - Canal Area.  
Ref to W.O. letter of Oct. 30 (J4560/58/16-1946)  
Transmits copy of letter from GHQ MELB  
of Feb. 3 + copy of the schedule of  
accommodation in the Canal Area for  
Middle East.

Last Paper.

J 1363.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

This is useful information to have if  
the Suez Canal Co. raises any points, in the future,  
concerning their relations with British forces  
over properties occupied by the latter.

The S.C.C. are still short of houses for their  
employees in Damietta. (See Lord Hankey's report  
on his recent visit to the Suez Canal Area in J. )  
We should continue to watch.

C. Howson 25/3

(Sgd.) C. HOWSON

The figure of over  
£1/4 m in Appendix B is formidable.  
It is anticipated - not yet  
actual - went in respect of  
certain properties in the Canal  
Co's zone occupied by the Br.  
forces.

J. H. Riker  
25/3

S2 Dept  
26/3

D.S.  
26/3.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

col  
29/3

24/9/47

Next Paper.

J1400  
J1367.

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

RECEIVED IN C.B.
16 JAN 1947
SENT TO DEPT.

38

was still outstanding, the Ministry should be allowed freedom to conclude a direct global deal; and this view was generally accepted.

I mention this background because the Director General (Brigadier Mount) of our Disposals Mission is coming home next week and is anxious to pursue the question of a global deal, not only in Egypt but also in Iraq. I have, therefore, arranged (through Cairncross) to continue the discussions with the Treasury and 10 a.m. Thursday morning, the 23rd inst. has been tentatively suggested as a convenient time, though x Friday, the 24th might be equally convenient for us. I should be glad to know who will represent the Foreign Office at these discussions. If more than one representative is necessary it may be convenient to discuss Egypt first and then Iraq, say at 10.30.

Yours sincerely,

Geoffrey Elton

P.S.

x Discussions fixed for Friday, 22<sup>nd</sup>.



Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

Whitehall 9400  
Extension 200BM/2119(MO4)THE WAR OFFICE,  
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

150

21<sup>st</sup> March, 1947.

J. 1366

25 MAR

Further to my letter MO4/BM/2119 of  
30th October, 1946 to Scrivener. 4560/58/16

We have now received a copy of the schedule of accommodation in the Canal Area from Middle East. I attach a copy of this schedule together with a copy of a letter from Director of Hirings Middle East (Hgs/ME/Egypt/3820 dated 3rd February, 1947) for your information. I understand that our Finance Branch are writing to the Treasury on this matter and you will receive a copy of the correspondence in due course.

Once again I am sorry we have been so long replying, but it is due to the pressure of work at GHQ Middle East.

*Yours sincerely,*  
J.S. Atkinson

R.D.J. Scott-Fox Esq.,  
Egyptian Department,  
Foreign Office.

P 371/62950

Hirings & Disposals (F.A) Directorate,  
G.H.Q.,  
EBLEF.

Ref: Hqs/NE/Egypt/3820

3 February, 1947.

I. of L.,  
Lands,  
War Office.

Subject: Increase of rentals for hiring taken over from the  
Suez Canal Co.

Shortly after assuming the Directorship of Hirings in Oct 1940 I discovered that the War Department were paying the Suez Canal Co. pre-war economic rates for the occupation of quay space at Port Said, Port Foad and Port Tewfik. Mov. & Tn. were hiring areas by the week and month which was more costly than on the yearly basis. Mov. & Tn. agreed to adopt the yearly basis and fixed areas which they definitely knew would be required for their purposes.

2. As a result of personal contact with the Superior Agent of the Suez Canal Co., Baron Benoist, arrangements were made to reduce the economic pre-war rates to a more nominal one - in certain cases rent free - which resulted in several tens of thousands of pounds being saved in rentals.

3. This arrangement for the payment of reduced rates was not queried by the Suez Canal Co. until April, 1946, when that Company informed this Directorate that they intended to take the liberty for action in so far as tariffs for quay space rental were concerned. They pointed out that now the war was over no further justification existed or could be given to their shareholders for maintaining the wartime conditions which they were very happy to grant as their contribution to the common war effort. They also stated that as from 1 January 1947 the rates payable by the War Department would be in accordance with their general tariff. Moreover, this H.Q. was informed under War Office No. M.O.4/BM/2119/Q.6 of 14 Sept 46 that a warning had been received from the Foreign Office that the Suez Canal Co. were likely to raise officially the question of releasing accommodation occupied by the Service in the Canal zone. The Suez Canal Co. also addressed a letter dated 9 Nov 46 to H.Q., B.T.E. requesting the return of properties at present occupied by the War Department, and reiterated their intention of raising rentals for W.D. occupations in accordance with normal tariff prices with effect from 1 Jan 47.

4. As a result of these requests arrangements were made by H.Q., B.T.E. to investigate all W.D. hirings in the Canal zone, and after consultation with the sections concerned, considerable progress was made towards the immediate handing back of all areas and sheds etc. which were no longer required (not included in appendices attached) and plans were made for those which would be surrendered in the future.

5. This Directorate in turn made a detailed survey of W.D. hirings and went into the question of the economic rates which would have to be paid as from 1 Jan 47. Attached herewith are appendices A, B, C & D prepared by Hirings, B.T.E. showing hirings affected with areas, terms clauses, the present annual rentals and the new rates per M2 which will have to be paid as from 1 Jan 47.

(Appendix "A") - properties for which lease addendums for increased rental have been submitted by the Coy. Details are given of old rental and also rental claims w.e.f. 1 Jan 47.  
/(Appendix "B").....

F37/62950

152

(Appendix "B") - list of properties for which no rental increase has been demanded but for which it is anticipated that the Coy will claim increases as the Land occupied is either good commercial or Quay sites.

(Appendix "C") - list of properties held for which no increase has been demanded and for which no demand is anticipated. These Lands are mostly Desert areas.

(Appendix "D") - details of R.N., R.A.F. & N.A.A.F.I. Hirings for which addendums have been received. Details of rental claimed w.e.f. 1 Jan 47 are shown but it is not possible to show comparative previous rentals as this information is not held at this H.Q.

The total increase in W.D. Rental liability is as follows:-

		Previous Rentals	Rentals w.e.f. 1 Jan 47.
Appendix "A"	Land	££ 9,802.153	££ 24,172.538
	Hangers	1,873.788	2,480.080
Appendix "B"		1,361.691	264,301.460
		££ 13,037.632	££ 290,954.078

The legend to the letters inserted in the first column of the appendices is as under:-

- B - Building sites
- C - Commercial sites
- D - Desert lands
- G - Gardens
- Q - Quays
- S - Will be surrendered in the near future

6. The increases required for Appendix "A" have been amply allowed for in estimates for 1947-48. No provision has been made for anticipated increases in Appendix "B" as no demands have yet been received. Hiring No. 1715 has had provision made for the possibility of an increase which represents most of the £236,000 of the increase involved.

7. Land Hirings outside Port areas referred to above will continue to be held on a rent free basis as at present in agreement with the Suez Canal Co.

8. May approval please be given to pay rents to the Suez Canal Co. on their present economic tariff, and detailed in attached lists.

(Sgd) W.M. HAYES Brigadier  
Director, Hirings & Disposals(F.A.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Reference:-

F0371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

SUEZ CANAL CO. PROPERTIES ON WHICH INCREASE HAS BEEN DEMANDED

REG No.	ADDRESS	TERM CLAUSE	AREA	PRES. RATE Pt. p/100
Q 472	Cold Store E. end of Cherif Quay, Port Said.	31 Dec. 41	3,839	15.5
Q 473	W. of Cold Store of Cherif Quay, Port Said.	31 Dec. 40-yearly.	1,920	9
C 480	W. of Olivado Co., Abbas Quay, Port Said.	31 Dec 40-yearly	7,290	9
Q 1639	Cherif Quay, W. of Shed 215, Port Said.	War	269	9
C 1701	Abbas Quay N. of Slavick Shed, Port Said.	31 Dec 40-yearly	161	9
C 1702	Abbas Quay N. of United Yeast Co. Port Said.	31 Dec 40-yearly	59	9
Q 1703	Abbas Quay - Port Said	31 Dec 41-yearly	51,554	9
C 1704	Abbas Quay S.E. of Olivado Co., Port Said.	31 Dec 41-yearly	1,709	9
C 1714	Abbas Quay - Port Said.	War	7,925	9
Q 1724	S. Quay Cherif Basin - Port Said.	War	1,234	9
C 1745	M.T. of Cattle Quarantine Park, Abbas Helmy Quay Port Said.	War	5,024	9
Q 1617	Mouvello Darze, Port Saïd	War	13,803	4
Q 1518	- do -	War	593	4
Q 723		War	1,440	9
Q 861	Plot No. 1 Bis.	31 Dec 46 & yearly	8,447	7

N DEMANDEDAPPENDIX A

AREA	PRES. RENT		NEW RENT	
	RATE	ANNUAL	RATE	ANNUAL
	PT. per m2		PT. per m2	
3,839	15.5 : 13.5	525.610	31 & 27	1050.181
1,920	9.7	186.240	31	564.171
7,290	9.7	804.020	19.4	1414.260
269	9.7	26.093	19.4	52.186
161	9.7	15.639	19.4	31.279
59	9.7	5.723	19.4	11.446
51,554	9.7	5005.747	27	13919.604
1,709	9.7	165.773	19.4	331.546 S
7,925	9.7	768.925	19.4	1537.522
1,234	9.7	119.741	27	333.302
5,024	9.7	487.338	19.4	974.675
13,803	4.7	648.734	15.6	2153.245
593	4.7	27.890	15.6	92.570
1,440	9.7	139.680	27	388.800
8,447	7.8	875. -	15.6	1317.751
		££ 9,802,153		££24,172,538

60371/62950

SUEZ CANAL CO. PROPERTIES ON WHICH INCREASE HAS BEEN DEMANDED (HANGARS).

APPENDIX A

154

REG. No.	ADDRESS	TERM CLAUSE	AREA m <sup>2</sup>	PREV. RENT ANNUAL	NEW RENT RATE PT. PER. m <sup>2</sup>	NEW RENT ANNUAL
303	Hangar 213, Cherif Basin	Tour	2,096	189,192	34.8	250,560
304	Hangar 214, Cherif Basin	Tour	1,440	378,384	34.8	501,520
347	Hangar 275, Cherif Basin	Tour	3,600	1306,212	48	1728, -

80371/62950

155

SUEZ CANAL CO. PROPERTIES ON WHICH INCREASE HAV BE PAID BUT NO DEMAND YET RECEIVED. APPENDIX B

HC No.	ADDRESS	TERM CLAUSE	AREA	PREV. RENT RATE ANNUAL PT. per m2	NEW RENT RATE ANNUAL PT. per m2
0	466 N. of United West Co., Abbas Quay, Port-Said.	Hostilities	745	FREE	19.4
0	471 N.W. of Cold Store, Cherif Quay, Port-Said.	On August	5	28.8	31
0&0	474 Abbas Quay & Cherif Quay, Port-Said.	31 Dec. 40-yearly	3,899	9.7	31,27, 19.4
0	514 N. of Cement Store, Port-Fouad.	Hostilities	853	-	15.6
0	1680 Port-Said Quays.	Hostilities	69	-	27
0&0	1715 El Rassaa - Port-Said.	Hostilities	1,219,122	-	19.4: 36,508,568
0	3116 Adj. to water works, Eastra, Port-Said.	Hostilities	2,850	-	19.4
0	4741 E. of General Stores, Port-Fouad.	Hostilities	4,000	-	15.6
0	4758 E. Bank Interior Basin, Port-Said.	Hostilities	7,537	-	8
0	4759 O & I Petroleum Basins, Port-Said.	Hostilities	45,727	-	8
0&0	4760 Abbas Quay - Quay S. of Abbas Quay, Port-Said.	War	944	-	31:19.4
0	4776 Cherif Basin, Port-Said.	War	10,125	9.7	31.27
0	4826 Rive Asie N. of Ferry Boat St., Port-Said.	Hostilities	4,022	-	15.5
0	4868 Arsenal Basin, Port-Said.		6,242	-	19.4
				221361.691	22246,301.460

3  
 10371/62950

SUEZ CANAL PROPERTIES FOR WHICH NO INCREASE HAS BEEN DEMANDED  
 OR IS ANTICIPATED

APPENDIX C

REG. No.	ADDRESS	TERM CLAUSE	PRES. RENT	AREA	
456	E. end of Chevalier Island - Ismailia	Hostilities	FREE	167,500 m2	G
457	N. of Abbesia Canal - Ismailia	"	"	33,880	D
459	S.W. of Paly Point - Ismailia	"	"	109,000	G
523	Gabal Maryam S. of Ismailia	"	"	298,000	D
524	Doversoir - Ismailia	"	"	159,300	D
546	N. of Birket Abu Gamous - Ismailia	"	"	1,900	D
553	Gibry Ferry	"	"	15,820	D
554	Ishatot el Fordan	"	"	23F. 18Q	D
565	El Kirsh (Fordan)	"	"	6,788 F.	D
576	W. Helene - Port Terfrik	"	"	3,060	
590	Between Rue el Kemissa & W. Helene, Port Terfrik	"	"	1,300	B
1603	N. of rue du Port - Ismailia	"	"	10,200	G
1604	N.E. of Petrol Basin, Port Said	"	"		D
1605	Bathing Beach N. of Port Terfrik	"	"	140	Beach S
1606	Between Gamayen & Birket el Garira, Suez	"	"		Canal Bank
1623	S. of Rue de Rome - Ismailia	"	"	13,000	Q S
1650	N. of Ismailia to Jetty on Lake Elnaseh	Tar	"		



60371/62950

HC. No.	ADDRESS	FREEM CLAUSE	FREES. RATE	AREA	
1655	Farikos Bangalore, Qantara E.	Hostilities	FREE	600	Canal Bank
1656	Av. Helena & Rue du Transit, Port-Twefik	"	"	670	B
1658	From Qantara to El Shatt	"	"		Canal Bank
1673	E. of Petroleum Basin - Port Fouad	"	"	580,000	D S
1679	N. of Firo Station, Port-Twefik	"	"	1,500	G
1683	Suez Canal Coy Station - Kabrit	"	"	69	D
1611	Route des Bains - Port Twefik	"	"	900	S
1613	Port Fouad to S. of Petrol Basin	"	"		D S
1708	S. of Golf Course - Port Said	"	"	42,500	C
1709	E. of El Bassara Cattle Quarantine Park Port Said	"	"	930	Road
1717	Waterworks - Port Said	"	"	16,971	C
2513	N. of Firdan Fly Str. W. Bank of Suez Canal	"	"	854,250	D
2514	N. of el Ballah Fly St.	"	"	5,000	D
2515	N. of Kantara E.	"	"	182,000	D
2516	N. & S. of Customs House - Kantara East	"	"	132,000	D
2517	1 1/2 Km. S. of Kantara West	"	"	49,000	D
2518	Port Said to Kantara	War	"		D
2519	Gebel Marjan South of Ismailia	Hostilities	"	230,000	D
2520	"	"	"	255,500	D

F0371/62950

HG No.	ADDRESS	TITLE CLAUSE	PREM, RENT	AREA	
2521	Ferry Post, E. of Suez Canal, ISRAELIA	Hostilities	FREE	160 Hectares	D S
2524	South of Gobel Maryan	"	"	1,440	D
2526	Firdan Km. 64 East bank of Suez Canal	"	"	28,100	D
2536	South of Gobel Maryan	"	"	454,500	D
2537	North of Gobel Maryan	Hostilities	"	720,000	D
2538	Opposite Gobel Maryan East bank of Suez Canal	"	"	850,000	D
2539	S.W. of Ferry Point, ISRAELIA	"	"	23,500	G
2540	N. of Doversolt, Canal Co. Station	"	"	197,000	D
3122	Chevalier Island, ISRAELIA	"	"	78,000	
3123	Abou Rakhan Gardens, ISRAELIA	"	"	6,000	D
3127	Marina Gardens, S. of Sue do Rome, ISRAELIA	"	"	30,000	G
3128	El Shatt, Hod el Tarakeb, Port-Saïd	"	"	430,000	D & Q
3129	South of Marina Gardens, ISRAELIA	"	"	6,780	Beach
3132	Monument, Gobel Maryan S. of ISRAELIA	"	"	280,000	D
4742	E. end of Chevalier Island	"	"	19,000	
4747	E. banks of Suez Canal Km. 40 - 41	"	"	240,000	D
4749	N. & E. of Water Works, Port Saïd	"	"		Q

4/.....

Pa 371/62950

- 4 -

APPENDIX C

IG. No.	ADDRESS	TERRITORY CLAUSE	PROS. RENT.	AREA	
4752	Various Areas in Suez	Hostilities	FREE		Canal Bank
4755	Bet. Chanter Island & Island No. 1, Port Said	"	"		Cable
4768	S. Shore of Chevallier Island	War	"	5 sq	Beach
4769	N. of Doversole Suez Canal Station	Hostilities	"	120,000	D
4777	E. & W. Jetties Outer Basin, Port Said	"	"		Broadcasters
4804	N.E. of Petrol Basin, Port Fouad	"	"	16,500	D

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

160

## APPENDIX D

SUZUKI CANAL PROPERTY (NAVY, R.F. & M.L.A.P.I)  
SHOWING NEW RENTAL W.E.F 1 JANUARY 1947.

HG.No.	ADDRESS	NEW RENT	
		RATE PT. per m <sup>2</sup>	ANNUAL
<u>NAVY</u>			
266 / 1.3.1940	Raswa	16	8,226.960
297 / 1.1.1942	Raswa	16	27,176
337 / 1.1.1943	Rive Asie	15.6	636.480
343 / 1.9.1943	Abbas Basin	19.4	142,916
347 / 1.10.1943	Ilot 5	15.6	679. -
<u>R.F.</u>			
312 / 1.1.1942	Chalands Basin	15.6	1562,318
359 / 1.1.1944	Cherif Basin	27	15,358
<u>M.L.A.P.I</u>			
306 / 1.1.1942	Abbas Basin	19.4	38,800
338 / 1.1.1943	Abbas Basin	19.4	1797,474
		ΣE 13,126,482	

No.

Top Secret.  
 Secret.  
 Confidential.  
 Restricted.  
 Open.

60371/62950

F. O.,

204

April 1947.

Despatched 12.45 AM 13/4

Draft.

U.K. Delegation  
Moscow.

IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

Telegram.

No. 713 ✓

(Date) April 12<sup>th</sup>

Repeat to :-

H.M. Ambassador,  
Cairo. 776.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is proposed reply to Cairo telegram No. 882. Please telegraph whether you approve. Begins.

Point (2): we agree with action proposed.

Point (3): Action proposed in first part of first sentence tallies with that proposed in para. 2 of my immediately preceding telegram to Moscow. As regards representations to Nokrashy we are still considering what precise form these should take. Meanwhile should representations be necessary you should confine yourself to those suggested in my telegram No. 706, making it clear however that this is your own first reaction and that you may well receive instructions from H.M.G. to take a stronger line.

Point (1): it will be seen from para. 6 of my immediately preceding telegram to Moscow that a clear distinction must be drawn between transit of troops to and from Canal Zone and transit of troops to other destinations. In respect of latter we have in fact no treaty rights at all. We consequently consider that troops proceeding to and from places other than Canal Zone should not only wear civilian clothes but also have passports and Egyptian visas as soon as arrangements for these can be made. As regards armed personnel/

*En-Clair.*  
*Cods.*  
*Cypher.*

Distribution :-

Cabinet.

Copies to :-

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Reference:-

F0371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

personnel in uniform travelling as units, we have treaty rights as regards those proceeding to or from Canal Zone but not in respect of others. We therefore see no alternative but to say that armed parties should not pass through the Delta to other destinations. However, in view of General Dempsey's opinion in the last sentence of para. 1(1) of your telegram No. 882, please consult him again and explain that it would seem that we shall have to accept the inconvenience of not enjoying the facilities he would wish. Indeed, it is to be hoped that even the transit of such parties to and from Canal Zone will in practice be rare.

pw  
12/4

205

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

Minutes.

193

Flag A

The <sup>attached</sup> following telegram has been drafted after consultation with Mr. Beckett and representatives of the War Office and Air Ministry.

Flag C

2. In view of Moscow telegram No. 663 we ought presumably to get the concurrence, not only of the Service Departments, but also of the Prime Minister, and I attach a draft minute to Mr. Attlee.

Flag B

D.S. Fox

D. Scott Fox.  
11th April, 1947.

Nothing to be written in this Margin.

Flag D

Flag E

We have since received Cairo tels. Nos 881 and 882 (copies attached). They do not, I think, call for any amendment of the draft tel. to Moscow referred to above; but they require an immediate answer, which should also, presumably, be passed by the S. of S. after obtaining the concurrence of the Service depts. and the P.M. Draft submitted herewith.

D. Scott Fox  
11/4

Sir O. Sargent.

Please see marginal

Jervis.

11 April

→ Sir/

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

Minutes.

194


Sir Orme Sargent

Please see the amendments to the two passages which you queried.

It seemed essential to get the two telegrams off to Moscow before the week-end and it was not possible in these circumstances to obtain the Prime Minister's concurrence. We should presumably now send him copies of the telegrams under cover of ~~an~~ explanatory minute attached below. (Flag B).

I discussed your two queries with Mr. Beckett. As regards the first of them (marked A), Cairo telegram No. 855, paragraph 1 (B) does seem to indicate that General Alfrey proposed to Nokrashy the course which we suggested following. I have, however, cut out the sentence in question, which is not essential. (Flag A)

As regards your query (marked B) in the second telegram, I hope that the amended version makes the position clearer. It seemed safer, pending further consideration, to restrict Sir R. Campbell's representations to the text already authorised by us in our telegram No. 706, since the additional remarks suggested by him in paragraph 4 of his telegram No. 855 would have the effect of further emphasising the contention that the 1936 Treaty fully covers us as regards rights of ~~withdrawal~~ leave, and this, as has now become clear, is not really so. (Flag F) (Flag A)



(D.W. Lascelles)

12th April, 1947.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to Council of Foreign Ministers).

J 1599

16 APR

No. 614.

7th April 1947.

D. 12.15 a.m. 8th April 1947.

R. 11.00 p.m. 7th April 1947.

PPP

IMPORTANT.

SECRET.

Following from Secretary of State for Sir O. Sargent.

Your telegram No. 545.

If report mentioned in paragraph No. 5 is correct I think that the Egyptian attitude is quite intolerable. We should make the strongest possible protest if any attempt is made to arrest British personnel in transit or with destination in Egypt in defiance of articles 6(A) and (G) of The Immunities Convention. The Egyptian Government must understand that the 1956 Treaty is in force and that we are entitled to expect them to abide by its provisions.

2. I am not, however, so sure about the question of leave. I agree that if need arises Campbell should take the line with Nokrashi suggested in your telegram No. 706 to Cairo, but I feel that in present circumstances it would be better if troops from the Canal Zone did not take their leave in Cairo where they would be under the eyes of the Egyptian Government and any incidents in which they might become involved would therefore be liable to be magnified. Same objection applies to Alexandria during the summer months when the King and Government are normally there.

3. I have consulted Sir M. Peterson who tells me that when he was in Cairo it was the view of the Military Authorities that it was preferable from all points of view for troops to take their leave in the Canal Zone, rather than in Cairo. I understand that it is a slight exaggeration to call living conditions in the Canal Zone very hard and uncomfortable and that it might be possible for troops to go on leave to Ismailia, Port Said or to Special Leave Camps of which I believe there are a number in the Canal Zone. Leave facilities could perhaps be further developed either at Ismailia or Port Said.

4. Subject to your views and those of the War Office I would therefore suggest that for the present British Troops should be prohibited from going to Cairo on leave or to Alexandria at any time when the King and Government are there. I would have preferred to suggest a complete ban on leave to Alexandria as well as to Cairo for the present but I do not feel this can be done if the Canal Zone is the only alternative. Cyprus would of course have been the ideal solution and I am very sorry to see that you say there is no prospect

..... of leave/

F6371/62950

1150/2/116  
1150/2/116

Handwritten initials and scribbles

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

196

2.

of leave being taken there. I wonder whether the question of using Cyprus could not be re-examined and some special arrangements made to accommodate troops on leave from the Canal Zone. As regards movement facilities, could not ships taking troops from Palestine to Cyprus call in at Port Said to collect troops from the Canal Zone before going on to Cyprus?

5. There may be other alternatives, which I have not mentioned. I should be grateful if you would go into the whole matter carefully with the War Office and let me know your views.

Registry  
No. J1599/2/16.

F2371/62950

OUT FILE

197

Top Secret.
Secret.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Restricted.
Open.

F. O.,

April, 1947.

Despatched 3.40 a M.

13/4

Draft.

U.K. Delegation  
Moscow

IMMEDIATE  
SECRET

Telegram.

No. 712 ✓

(Date) Apr 12<sup>th</sup>

Repeat to :—  
H.M. Ambassador,  
Cairo.

✓ 775

Your telegram No. 614 [of 7th April:  
position of British troops in Egypt].  
Following from Sir O. Sargent for  
Secretary of State.

Matter has been discussed with Service  
Departments. On information received from  
Middle East, they conclude that it would be  
insupportable for all leave to Delta  
for British troops stationed in Egypt to be  
prohibited. Sir M. Peterson's impressions  
of amenities of life in Canal Zone in early 1930s  
are no longer applicable now that <sup>some</sup> 50,000 men  
have had to be hurriedly dumped there under  
canvas. Moreover, a certain number of men  
have wives and families resident in Cairo  
(see para. 1(7) of Sir R. Campbell's telegram  
No. 856). We are investigating whether  
it would be possible, while sending a limited  
number of men on leave to the Delta, to provide  
leave facilities for the balance elsewhere in  
the Middle East, for instance in the Levant  
States or Greece. (Accommodation in Cyprus/being  
increased as quickly as possible but <sup>is</sup> not yet  
sufficient to cater for leave for our forces in  
Palestine.)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

En Clair.  
~~Cote.~~  
Cypher.

Distribution :—

Cabinet  
for prior concurrence  
of W.O., A.M.,  
Admty.

S.L. Dept a.a.

Copies to :—

2. As Immunities Convention unfortunately does not provide in terms for recreational facilities in the Delta for troops stationed in the Canal Zone, this is not the best issue on which to have a serious contest with the Egyptian Government if it can be avoided.

Subject to your views and those of Sir R. Campbell, we suggest that a limited number of men should continue to proceed on leave to the Delta in plain clothes and furnished with appropriate documents of identity which should include photographs (but without Egyptian visas). ~~This is in fact what General Allfrey has already proposed to Nokrashy (Cairo telegram No. 855).~~ Cairo can best advise on how large the number can safely be under present circumstances. The number of men from EgyptForce entitled at any one time to long leave is at present 2,500 from the Army alone, and in addition there are large numbers of men away on 48 hours' leave. We are disposed to think that the number of men from EgyptForce on leave in the Delta at one time should at any rate be considerably less than 2,500.

3. An alternative but possibly less desirable course of action would be to proceed at once to take up Nokrashy's oblique suggestion that men from EgyptForce proceeding on leave in mufti should have Egyptian visas (Cairo telegram No. 855) and endeavour to make an arrangement under which a given number of visas would be granted each week without question.

/ The

But is it?  
De J. A. ...  
to appeal  
1926  
which does  
not apply  
to any  
documents  
Halt with  
minutes  
for

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

F0371/62950

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

The dangers of taking this course immediately are:

(1) Notwithstanding any "without-prejudice" which stipulations/would of course be included, in fact we should at the beginning have accepted the Egyptian contention that no visits from EgyptForce to the Delta can be made without an Egyptian visa, and

(2) Nokrashy might refuse to consent to the grant of visas, in which case it would be more difficult to go back to course (1).

4. Leave to the Delta from forces stationed outside Egypt has already been suspended for the time being. There can be no conceivable Treaty claim for this since Immunities Convention is limited to forces stationed in Egypt. It might, however, be possible to arrange for some leave from other forces in the Middle East under the visa system. We think that Egyptian reaction to this might be more favourable after the lapse of a short time when (i) they have got tired of the novelty of having very few British troops in Cairo and (ii) the Egyptian shopkeeper is complaining of loss of profits.

5. As regards transit the position is as follows. Our rights under Article 6, paras. A and G of the Immunities Convention only apply to British troops stationed in Egypt. Under these provisions members of our EgyptForces are entitled to pass backwards and forwards between the Delta and the Canal Zone even.

in uniform. We agree that if this right of passage is denied by the Egyptians we have a good legal case on which to fight them, although we are uncertain whether it would be advisable for uniform to be worn for the time being. While we have not so far been able to think of any suitable means of retaliation, Sir Ronald Campbell has suggested that we might ourselves make an issue of this before the U.N.

6. We have no rights of passage through Delta for members of forces stationed outside Egypt, not even for those stationed in the Sudan, and we see no case upon which we can claim any such right of passage. If, of course, they come individually in mufti with passports and visas no objection to their passage is likely to be made. So far the Egyptians have in practice allowed transit in mufti without visas.

7. We are urging the withdrawal as soon as possible of the small numbers of British Military personnel which are still remaining in Cairo to complete the winding up (para.1(1) of Sir Ronald Campbell's telegram No. 356).

8. We think it both legally questionable and certainly politically unwise to continue to claim rights under Article 7 of the Treaty of 1936 on the ground that we are still technically at war with Germany. It would be better to justify the presence in Egypt of troops exceeding the number of those sanctioned by Article 8 of the Treaty, and the presence of the depots at Tell-el-Kebir, on the ground that this is merely a temporary position

/ due

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

200

due to the fact that it is not physically possible to reduce the number of our forces in Egypt more quickly, rather than to rely upon Article 7.

9. In the meantime, the possibility of reducing the number of troops in the Canal Zone is being considered urgently.

10. The foregoing was drafted before receipt of Cairo telegrams Nos. 881 and 882 which are being repeated to you. For our suggested reply to these please see my immediately following telegram.

*509 7/2/71*

*509  
12/4*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

1947

F371/62950

8 APR

EGYPT and SUDAN

192

Registry Number } J.1599/2/16

TELEGRAM FROM MOSCOW (UK Del. To C.F.M.)

No. 614

Dated 7th April, 1947

Received in Registry } 8 Apl. 1947

British Military Personnel in the Delta.  
Immunity Convention.

Refs. F.O. Tel. No. 5.3 (J.1180/2/16)

Suggests strongest possible protest if British Military Personnel arrested.

Believes it would be better if troops did not enter the Delta on leave. Alternative places for leave available in Canal Zone and possibly Cyprus.

Last Paper.

1575

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Col. A. [unclear] [unclear]

NO. 4 W.O.

2 J.1578, 1579 and 1580

1 AMM [unclear] (A.M.) (as above) April 9  
2. Moscow No 712  
[unclear] Cairo 775  
April 12

Action completed.)

Col. [unclear]

(Index.) T.O.

24/19/47

Next Paper.

J1614

(Minutes.)

Discussed with Sir O. Sargent on 8th April. A meeting is to be arranged as soon as possible with the W.O. to discuss the S/S's view that leave should be ~~discouraged~~ <sup>prohibited</sup> at present & to endeavour to get the W.O. to accept it. Also to examine the S/S's suggestions as regards Cyprus.

D.M.H. Rihe

9/4

Now see minute written

24/19/47





1936 treaty a very shabby, would  
not be a good basis for an appeal  
to the U.N.; the denial of  
transit facilities to our troops  
stationed in the Canal Zone  
would be better. It would  
be useful to have docs. on  
the general question of the  
advantage or disadvantage of  
ourselves taking the initiative  
if a good opportunity ~~was~~ were  
given us by the Egyptians

D.S. 5 W

13/4

I have not been in on the Egyptian picture  
quite fully and may, therefore, not have got it straight.  
But, as I understand it, we are hoping that the  
result of the Egyptian appeal to the Security Council  
will (even if it does not provide a fresh incentive to  
our treaty negotiations) at least leave our position, resting  
on the 1936 Treaty, ~~unimpaired~~ unimpaired. If that is so,  
I would have thought it might be well better to take  
an initiative at this stage (i.e. in advance of the Egyptian  
appeal to the Security Council) based on the 1936 Treaty.  
It would come with even greater force & urgency; and  
if we acted now we might be thought to be trying to confuse  
the issue before the Security Council (where I gather we  
have a good case) because we were doubtful about our  
chances. The two things are not related, <sup>and</sup> ~~but~~ I would  
have said it was in our interest to keep them distinct  
in time. But we might be able to hint to the Egyptians <sup>now</sup>  
that once the Sec. Council issue had been considered  
we would then take this one up unless they proved  
more accommodating.

J. Mason  
14/4

I'm afraid I don't quite understand Mr. Mason's  
minute above, which seems in fact — though I may  
well be wrong myself — to be off the mark. If the  
main

184  
F0371/02980

F0371/62950

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

issue, i.e. the validity of our treaty of 1936, were in fact taken before the U.N. (which we wish to avoid if possible), and if the U.N. were to come down on our side (as we hope), then it is improbable that the Egyptian Government of the day, which would certainly not be under Nokrashi, would resort to this sort of piracy. And if they did, we should presumably have no hesitation about hauling them before the U.N. again on the ground that they were defying the U.N.'s ruling.

The real point, however, is that no incident which the Egyptian Government have yet created gives us a satisfactory case for taking to the U.N. on its merits (this point has been amply brought out by us in recent telegrams to Moscow which are, I think, an adequate <sup>indirect</sup> reply to this Cairo suggestion); and that, even if the Egyptian Government do later give us a satisfactory case on its own merits, we could not hope to have it dealt with by the U.N. without dropping in the major issue as well. A sufficiently outrageous Egyptian action might force us into this; but it would have to be much worse than anything which has yet

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	2	3	4	5	6

Minutes.

It happened and it is difficult to weigh the pros and cons of a purely hypothetical case.

8w  
19/4

Mr Beckett

paper  
21  
18/4

off submitted.

(Pro) call  
April 22nd

MB

22/iv.

180  
C

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

187

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

J. 1575  
7 APR

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell  
No. 857

D. 7.54 p.m. 5th April, 1947.

5th April, 1947.

R. 10.43 p.m. 5th April, 1947.

IMPORTANT  
SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

My telegram No. 855 and my telegram No. 856.

If action suggested in paragraph 4 and paragraph 6 of my telegram No. 855 fails, I submit we should consider whether it might not be in our interests to take the wind out of the Egyptian Government's sails by seizing on a case favourable to ourselves for appealing to United Nations on the ground that they refused to implement a treaty which we regard as binding upon them.

APR 11 1947

Registry  
No. J 1575/2/16

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open.

Draft.

Mr. J. Bowker CMA  
British Embassy,  
Cairo.

(from Mr. Lascelles)

f0371/62956

J. I. C.

25 April, 1947.

188

My dear Jim

I find that we have not replied specifically to your telegram No. 857 of April 5th, in which you raised the question of our "seizing on a case favourable to ourselves for appealing to <sup>the</sup> United Nations on the ground that [the Egyptian Government] refused to implement a treaty which we regard as binding upon them".

You will have seen from the welter of telegraphic exchanges between here and Moscow which have been repeated to you that in our view no sufficiently good case has yet arisen. Of the extremely irritating pinpricks that Nokrashi has so far devised, some have been ruled out by the weakness of our treaty grounds while others, on which we are on sound treaty grounds, have been far too unimpressive as grievances.

Admittedly, your telegram, though linked up with incidents which had already occurred when you sent it, makes the point that our case must be a good one. Even, however, if we consider the matter hypothetically and for the future, we feel that there would be great disadvantages <sup>in</sup> about taking Egypt to the United Nations ourselves. In the first place, although ex hypothesi we should be taking up a specific and excellent case, it is of course inconceivable that this case would be dealt with by the

/ United

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Nations without the whole major issue being dragged  
in too. Consequently we should have indirectly  
provoked what we still wish to avoid. In the  
second place, <sup>we</sup> cannot help feeling that, in the  
light of such precedents, <sup>certain</sup> as the ~~Corfu incident~~,  
even the most glaring case of Egyptian mis-  
behaviour would provide us with no guarantee of  
victory, quite apart from the practical  
impossibility of confining discussion to the case  
on its merits. (This, at any rate, is my own view, though

f037/62950

~~Handwritten scribble~~

it may be too  
pessimistic).

This is not to say, of course, that a really  
glaring case would not force us to take ~~the~~ some  
action resulting in reference to the United  
Nations. But ~~we must feel~~ that in that event  
our action should <sup>we feel</sup> be a physical one, e.g. some  
form of military enforcement of our rights, and  
~~that~~ the onus of approach to the United Nations  
<sup>w</sup> should thus still be left with the Egyptians.

The implication of your telegram is perhaps  
that if we took the initiative as the injured  
party, the psychological atmosphere would be more  
favourable to us than if the Egyptians took the  
initiative. I wonder however whether this is  
really so? After all, it is common knowledge that  
the Egyptians mean to take us before the United  
Nations in the near future; and <sup>consequently</sup> ~~secondly~~. I think it  
would have no real psychological effect if we had  
evidently jumped them to it and got in first by  
a short head ourselves. The world in general  
would continue to regard Egypt as essentially the  
plaintiff.

W.B. Goussier  
(Sd) D. W. Hamilton  
22/iv.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

reference-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1947	J	J 1574 7 APR 180
	EGYPT and SUDAN	

J. 1574/2/16  
 GRAM FROM (CAIRO)  
 R. Campbell)  
 356  
 5 Apl. 1947  
 ed }  
 istry } 8 Apl. 1947

British Troops in the Delta.

Gives seven categories of troops living or passing through the Delta on basis of military papers and without pass-ports and visas.

*Discussion of the...*

Last Paper.  
 J1573.  
 References.  
 (Print.)  
 How disposed of.)  
 - *...* (w.o.)  
 - *...* (w.o.)  
 - 515993

(Minutes.)

*Copied to U.K. Delegation*

*Moscow*

*See minutes on J1573*

*J.H.H. Richards*

*7/4*

*D.S.S. 8/4*

*W.G.B. 16*  
*to Beckett*



F0371/62950

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

181

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

J. 1574  
7 APR

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R. Campbell  
No. 858

D. 7.40 p.m. 5th April, 1947.

5th April, 1947.

R. 10.58 p.m. 5th April, 1947.

IMPORTANT  
SECRET

MMMM

My immediately preceding telegram.

British Troops in Delta.

Following seven categories at present resident in or passing through Delta on basis of military papers and without passports or visas:

*30 Supply  
reports  
mission*

(1) Military personnel and para-military personnel remaining in Cairo to liquidate necessary business. These include branches of Claims Commission, Hirings, Financial Units and Civil Affairs Office, for whom contact with Egyptian authorities is essential, and various Signals personnel maintaining our communications with Canal Zone under Embassy cover. Also B.S.D.M., which could however probably be placed on civilian basis without compromise [gp. undec.].

(2) Members of the British force in Egypt travelling between Canal Zone and countries outside Egypt and moving to or from ordinary points accessible to Egypt by water, land or air under Article 6 (a) of Immunities Convention.

(3) Military personnel, not attached to the British force in Egypt, travelling on duty across Egypt in order to reach their stations (e.g. to or from East Africa).

(4) Members of the British force in Egypt visiting Cairo in order to transact business either with the Embassy or Egyptian authorities.

(5) Members of the British force in Egypt visiting the Delta on leave.

(6) Military personnel from other parts of Middle East Command (mostly from Palestine) visiting the Delta on leave.

(7) Wives and families of members of British force in Egypt who have remained in Cairo. These could also probably be put on a civilian basis, provided that the Egyptians guaranteed that visas would not be withheld.

APR 11 1947

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

182

- 2 -

2. Although we should clearly insist on our right to send Service personnel to the Sudan via Cairo in uniform and without passports, we can scarcely claim the same right under the treaty for others in category (3). Category (4) is also doubtful and G.O.C. is having leave to the Delta from Palestine suspended. Remaining categories are in my view all covered by the meaning, if not the letter, of the 1956 Treaty and Immunities Convention. Category (2) is expressly covered by Article 6 (a) and (g) of the Convention and this is probably the best category on which to make a stand. Legal Counsellor considers another good case would be that of a member of the British force in Egypt entering the Delta in his privately owned motor car in view of Article 7(D) of the Convention.

5. Egyptians have not yet taken any action about categories (1) and (7), probably because they are not alive to their existence. Sooner or later however such persons will need to travel between Cairo and the Canal Zone or else to leave the country, and there may then be trouble. There is an Egyptian police check on both roads leading to the Canal Zone where secret (gps. undec.) closely scrutinised as was done yesterday in the case of members of my staff on the way back from their visit to the G.O.C. B.T.E.

4. Free movement for categories 1, 2, 3 and 4 is essential (gp. undec.) now probably be administratively impossible to ensure that all had passports and Egyptian visas, even if we were ready to concede the point.

5. As regards category (3), notification of restrictions has been made to the Dutch and French air lines as well as to B.O.A.C. but not yet to T.W.A., although Civil Air Attaché understands that there would be measures that may be contemplated at Farouk Field which T.W.A. use. Egyptian authorities have now agreed that these persons need not have passports and visas provided they do not (repeat not) wear uniform. I see no reason why this procedure should not be conformed with since there is no question of treaty rights, and I have agreed that Middle East Director, B.O.A.C., should issue instructions to his branch managers accordingly.

Registry Number } J.1573/2/16

TELEGRAM FROM CAIRO  
(Sir, R. Campbell)  
No. 855

Dated 5 Apr 1947

Received in Registry } 7 Apr. 1947

British Troops in the Delta.

Refs. Cairo Tel. No. 713 (J.1180/2/16)  
Egyptian P.M. thinks no British Military Personnel should be allowed on leave outside Canal Zone.

Civil Air Lines informed service personnel can land only if in plain clothes and furnished with passport and Egyptian visa.

Recommends that all rights of transit etc., under 1936 treaty should be exercised. If this is prevented a firm line should be taken to frighten the P.M. into climbing down.

Last Paper.

J1515

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

[Copied to W.O., A.M., 7  
adv - J1599]

(Action completed.)

Col.  
i/r

(Index.)

24/9/47

Next Paper.

J1574.

(Minutes.)

*Copied to U.K. Delegation,*

*Moscow.*

*This telegram is not wholly clear (e.g. there seems to be a redundancy "not" in para 4 or para 5 (c) is confused). But I agree that (i) there is no need to rush into protests; it is far better to wait until Nokrashi puts himself irrevocably (as in writing) in the wrong; and that when he does (ii) the action proposed in para 4 is correct.*

*The various categories of British personnel involved are enumerated on J1574.*

*D.M.H. Ribeiro*

*7/4*

*Li Beckett*

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59049

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

176

I agree. Most of the categories in J 1574 are covered, if rather precariously, either by the G.O.C.'s letter in para. 1(2) of this telegram or by the arrangement in para.5 of J 1574. In both cases the Egyptians are apparently prepared to acquiesce provided that uniform is not worn. The major category not covered are the personnel remaining in Cairo who are of course in uniform (category (1))

This telegram and J 1574 have been copied to the War Office.

Now please see J/599/2/16 containing the Secretary of State's view.

D.S. Scott

D.J. Scott Fox

8th April, 1947.

D 19/4

371/62950

17

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J 157  
7 APR

Sir R. Campbell  
No. 855

D. 5.13 p.m. 5th April 1947.

5th April 1947.

R. 7.55 p.m. 5th April 1947.

IMPORTANT  
SECRET

FRITTF

Your telegram No. 713: British troops in the Delta.

The position is at present as follows:

(1) Under-Secretary for Interior told a member of my staff in strict confidence last week that the Egyptian Prime Minister was doing his best to exclude all British service personnel from the Delta as part of his policy of posing as national leader against the British. The Under-Secretary had done his best to persuade His Excellency to be reasonable but the latter insisted on issuing instructions that no British service personnel were to enter the Delta in uniform or without visas.

(2) Under-Secretary for the Interior informed G.O.C. by letter last week that "the Prime Minister thinks that no British military personnel should be given leave in the cities outside the canal zone". The G.O.C. asked what exactly this meant and Nokrashi arranged to see him on April 3rd to clarify the position. In order that there should be no misunderstanding the G.O.C. then wrote to Nokrashi stating that he had arranged that service personnel would only come to Cairo in civilian clothes and by civilian transport and that if Nokrashi agreed he proposed to let these arrangements stand until they had discussed matters together. This letter was not acknowledged but on April 2nd Nokrashi telephoned headquarters B.T.E. in G.O.C.'s absence to announce that he would be unable to see the General on the following day adding that if the General wanted to see him he would no doubt write to him. Nokrashi must have received the G.O.C.'s above quoted letter before telephoning.

(3) B.O.A.C. and other civil air lines using Aluzza have been notified that service personnel can only land if in plain clothes and furnished with passports with Egyptian visas. This notification was oral only and has not been confirmed in writing: nor has the Egyptian Government made any communication on the subject to His Majesty's Embassy. Several British officers have arrived in uniform and without passports since April 1st and have been subjected to long delays; but after much trouble all have been allowed to proceed.

APR 7 1947

2. We are thus up against a much wider problem than mere exclusion of British troops wishing to spend leave in Cairo. My immediately following telegram explains the full implications of Nokrashi's policy. Apart from the treaty aspect it will cause serious hardship and inconvenience to British forces in Egypt and elsewhere if strictly carried out. J1574

3. There can presumably be no question of giving way under Nokrashi's challenge but I consider that there is nothing to be gained by a too hasty protest. Nokrashi's evasive attitude suggests that he is uneasy at the consequences of what he has undertaken. Possibly he realizes that he will prejudice his chance at United Nations by an open breach of the 1936 Treaty and hopes that he will be able to achieve his object without this by frightening us into keeping our troops out of the Delta of our own volition so as to avoid incidents. I think it most important to resist this manoeuvre by saying nothing for the moment to Nokrashi and continuing to exercise all rights of transit etc which we claim under the Treaty until it is clear that Egyptians are effectively obstructing the movements of British troops. Another advantage of this course is that it enables us to choose a case on which we make a stand and to ensure that it is a water-tight one under the Treaty.

4. If, however, various indirect intimations are strictly executed I propose to go to see Nokrashi accompanied by the G.O.C. B.T.R. and make very strong representations to His Excellency on lines of your telegram No. 706. If he refuses to modify his attitude I would remind him of public statements of members of His Majesty's Government about our intention to stand on the 1936 Treaty, tell him that I shall seek further instructions and add that in the meantime British military authorities will continue to exercise the rights which they enjoyed under that Treaty unless forcibly prevented from so doing, and express the hope that in the interests of both parties no incidents will occur. In actual fact G.O.C. would by that stage probably decide to suspend Cairo leave and reduce other visits to the Delta to a minimum in order to avoid incidents, but this would not of course be admitted to Nokrashi. If, as suggested in previous paragraph, he is trying to frighten us into keeping our military personnel out of the Delta I am not convinced that the only counter measure open to us is to try to frighten him into climbing down by taking a firm line.

5. As I understand it, His Majesty's Government's view that the Treaty of 1936 and its Immunities Convention are at present in full force implies the following:

(a) fresh treaty and the technical continuance of a state of war alone provide for our continuing justification for excess of troops including the G.H.Q.

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

179

- 3 -

of the M.E.L.F. and installations outside the Canal Zone e.g. at Tel-El-Kebir and must therefore be relied upon in any case.

(b) Our substantial completion of the withdrawal from the two cities and the Delta was a voluntary act not (repeat not) referable in terms to Article 8 (repeat 8) of the Treaty but done in spite of Article 7 continuing to be applicable and in spite of the Prime Minister's statement of Hansard ~~on 7th May 1946~~ <sup>attached 5/4</sup> column 857 about condition for the building of barracks in the Canal Zone under Article 8 not having been carried out.

(c) Consequently, although the facilities we claim are mostly of a kind of <sup>recognition</sup> ~~recognition~~ for peace-time by the Treaty and convention we must frankly admit and claim that as a matter of law they are our right under Article 7 which in fact covers much more than what is at present being asked for by us and denied by the Egyptian Government.

(d) Consequently I must avoid giving the impression that we no longer rely on Article 7 and I must if the occasion arises rebut any claim by the Egyptian Government to relate the present dispute to what is provided by the Treaty and convention minus Article 7. If we try to rely on the Treaty minus Article 7 in these matters we shall be sacrificing the sole justification for the excess of troops and installations. e.f. end of paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 637. — J.1150

6. If I get no satisfaction from Nekrashi it might be worth appealing to King Farouk though there is little enough reason to suppose that this would have any effect.

7. Feregoing has been drafted on basis of a discussion between General Allfrey and members of my staff at Meascar yesterday. The General is in substantial agreement with the action proposed.

Fo 371/62950 59044

29

J

130

J. 1268

19 MAR

Registry Number J1268/2/16.

FROM Sir R. Campbell

No. 213 (CAIRO)

(11668/20/47)

Dated Feb 13, 1947

Received in Registry Feb 17, 1947

Leave for British troops to Cairo & Alexandria  
W.S.  
Ref. to Cairo Tel. 637 of March 12 (J1180/2/16)  
Transmit copy of a letter from Egyptian  
Gen. to General Allfrey of Feb 25 re.  
the granting of leave to British troops  
from March 21, to Cairo & Alexandria

Last Paper.

J1209.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8) W.O. (1404)  
March 20

(Minutes.)

Every effort should be made to allow  
British troops to spend their leaves  
unobtrusively in civilian clothes in  
Alex or Cairo.

G. H. H. 19/3

Copy to WO HQ  
of resubmit

DR 19/3

DR 19/4

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

10/47



FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

C  
O  
P  
Y

132

9 25th February, 1947

Dear General Allfrey,

In the course of our conversation when we met the other day, you asked me if I would consider your suggestion about granting facilities to groups of British warrant officers, N.C.O. and men to visit Cairo on holidays after the evacuation of Alexandria, Cairo and the Delta has been effected, as well as keeping for them certain clubs, hostels etc. which they use at present.

You know, I am sure, how highly sensitive Egyptian public opinion is, with regards to the whole question of evacuation and everything appertaining to it. The mere moving of the troops to the Suez Canal Zone, where they will stay for some time pending their final departure, is already giving rise, among certain sections of the population, to grave doubts amounting to suspicion, as to the sufficiency of this measure. Fears are lurking that, being on Egyptian soil and so near, soldiers can trickle back to cities they have already evacuated.

In the present psychological times, it would seem therefore, highly advisable to try to dispel all doubts and anxieties, and to refrain from doing anything that may, in any measure, aggravate a situation already tense.

Needless to say that, if clubs, hostels and whatever buildings now in the hands of the British fighting services were not returned to their owners or to the Government before the end of March 1947, serious embarrassment to the Government will be the result. The Press and Parliament here will take the matter up, and believe me, much ill-feeling will be un-avoidably created by bitter criticisms, exaggerations and misrepresentations which will be damaging in the extreme. I am sure neither you nor I would care to face a situation of this description. What we really must do is to try to allay fears and suspicions, and avoid what will most certainly be a cause of profound concern and misunderstanding.

I do hope you will see eye to eye with me on this question.

(Sgd.) Yours sincerely,

NOKRASHY.

3.

be accommodated in future in pensions and hotels under arrangements made with latter by the services. He can also arrange [grp. undec.] of men on leave and information about domestic accommodation to be dealt with by Thomas Cook instead of by a separate information bureau set up by B.T.E. in Cairo main station. Men will of course be in civilian clothes.

4. I have therefore agreed with General Allfrey that he should reply to Mokrashi's letter simply to the effect that His Excellency wishes as regards clubs and hostels are being met and these institutes will be relinquished by the end of March. Meanwhile General Allfrey will start at once making arrangements for troops to come to Cairo on leave from the Canal area in accordance with the arrangements described in preceding paragraph.

5. It is of course possible that at any moment Egyptian Government may notify General Allfrey or Embassy official that they cannot agree to any British troops from the Canal coming to Cairo on leave after March 31st. It is also possible that at any moment after that date a British soldier on leave in Cairo may be arrested by the Egyptian Police for being without the usual civilian identity papers. I agree with G.O.C. B.T.E. that in either of these events I should take the matter up strongly with the Prime Minister. But I should be glad to know as soon as possible whether you would wish me in doing so to claim the right of British troops to come to Cairo on leave on 1936 Treaty or on general argument of convenience and common sense.

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

From: Major General A.D. Ward, CB, CBE, DSO,

M. 124/19/47  
 Room 225,  
 The War Office,  
 Whitehall, S.W.1.

J 1180 / 2 / 16

25 March, 1947.

BM/2170(MO4)

*See Sir Robert* INDEXED *Put with J 1180*

We have been asked by the Egyptian Department to agree the attached draft telegram to H.M. Ambassador, Cairo about leave facilities in Cairo for British troops after 31st March, 1947. 118

I feel very strongly that leave facilities in Cairo and Alexandria should continue to be granted, and troops should not be discouraged from going there. Troops have been evacuated to the Canal Zone where living conditions are very hard and uncomfortable. Cyprus is used largely as a leave centre for troops in Palestine, and there is not sufficient accommodation for troops from Egypt. In any case it is unlikely that adequate movement facilities could be provided. Palestine cannot be used for leave. There are leave camps at Port Said and Ismailia (the latter closing down in the autumn) but the accommodation is quite inadequate for the troops requiring to use them and they do not provide the change of atmosphere which is essential to the troops well being.

There is no doubt that the morale and health of the troops stationed in the uncomfortable conditions of the Canal Zone would suffer unless they are allowed some relaxation and can get to areas more suitable for leave. General Dempsey has expressed himself strongly in this matter and he has the full support of the War Office.

In view of the fact that the leave hostels in Cairo and Alexandria have been closed and that troops will go on leave in plain clothes, I feel the objections are very much less.

I ask, therefore, that you will be good enough to reword the attached signal to the effect that British troops need NOT be discouraged from going on leave to Cairo.

*Yours sincerely*  
*A.D. Ward*

Sir Robert Howe, K.C.M.G.,  
 The Foreign Office,  
 S.W.1.

J.1180/2/16.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

B371/62950

119

March, 1947.

H.M. Ambassador,  
CAIRO.

IMPORTANT

Your telegram No. 637 of the 12th March  
leave facilities in Cairo for British troops  
after March 31st

No. . . . .

Dated. . . . .

Cypher.

Cabinet  
Distribution.

It seems preferable that after the  
evacuation of the two big cities in Egypt  
is completed, British troops - even in multi-  
should be discouraged from going into the  
towns on leave for the time being. Might it  
not be possible to arrange for local leave  
and recreation elsewhere, for instance, in  
Cyprus?

2. Nevertheless, we recognise that it  
will probably be impossible wholly to prevent  
British soldiers going into Cairo on leave,  
and particularly in view of the attitude  
adopted by the Egyptians at the time of the  
London conversations last October, incidents  
as envisaged in paragraph 5 of your telegram  
may ultimately be inevitable.

Copy to:

M.O.4, War Office  
(for concurrence)

Air Ministry

ref.

3. If, then, it becomes necessary, you  
may take the following line with Nokrashi:-

(1) the U.K. maintains that the Treaty of 1936  
and its immunities convention is at present  
in full force; Egypt may say that in her  
view the Treaty of 1936 is no longer valid,  
and intends to submit the difference on this  
point to the United Nations. Consequently,  
the matter is sub judice at present. (2)

While/

While the matter is sub judice the status quo should be maintained and there are the strongest reasons for accepting the argument of practical convenience and common sense without prejudice to the position when a decision is given on the question in dispute. (3) It is quite true that the immunities convention does not provide in terms that British troops stationed in the Canal Zone shall have the right to visit Cairo for purposes of leave and recreation. Article 16 (a) and (g), however, imply ordinary freedom of movement for individuals, and there was no doubt that this amenity was contemplated under that convention.

4. The above is on the assumption that General Allfrey's reply has not cleared up ambiguity referred to in paragraph 1 of your telegram under reference.

5. Presumably military authorities are issuing special warnings to troops to keep out of trouble.

386

el

W.

F-371/62950

Registry  
No. J1180/2/16

XXXXXX  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
XXXXX

D.H.R.

Draft.

MOSCOW (U.S. Delegation)

Telegram.

No. 543.

(Date) April 3.

Repeat to :-

Ex Clair.  
Code.  
Cypher.

Distribution :-

Cabinet distn.

Copies to :-

OUT FILE

121

F. O.,

3 April, 1947.

Despatched 5 40 P M.

IMPORTANT Secret.

Following for Secretary of State from Sir Crane Sargent.

British Military Authorities in Egypt are much concerned over question of leave facilities in Cairo for their troops after March 31st. Troops have been evacuated to Canal Zone where living conditions are very hard and uncomfortable. Cyprus is used largely as leave centre for troops in Palestine, but there is neither accommodation nor movement facilities for troops from Egypt. Palestine cannot be used for leave. Military Authorities consider that morale and health of troops stationed in the uncomfortable conditions of the Canal Zone will suffer unless they are allowed some relaxation and can go to areas more suitable for leave.

2. There have been indications that the Egyptians may make difficulties about ~~returning~~ <sup>with</sup> troops (who would of course be in <sup>going</sup> multi) to Cairo and Alexandria for leave, and it is possible that at any moment they may inform us that they cannot agree to such movement, or that a British soldier on leave in Cairo may be arrested by the Egyptian police for being without the usual civilian identity papers. H.M. Ambassador in Cairo agrees with G.O.C., B.P.E., that in either of these events the matter should be taken up   
/strongly

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

F0371/82950 59044

1	2	3	4	5	6

*Egyptian*

strongly with the Prime Minister, and has asked for instructions as to the <sup>most appropriate</sup> grounds on which he should do this. My immediately following telegram contains the text of our reply.

3. It is reported that Air Lines in Cairo have received verbal notification that any service personnel in uniform disembarking, either in transit or with destination in Egypt, will be subject to arrest, or if in plain clothes must be in possession of civilian passport with normal endorsements and visas. We are seeking confirmation of this, but if it is true it would indicate that Egyptians intend to ignore Article <sup>6</sup> (a) and (g) of the Immunities Convention, and will undoubtedly make difficulties about leave for troops.

*App 3*

122

[B]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

J 1180/2/16

Secret

Cypher/OTF

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

(To United Kingdom Delegation to Council of Foreign Ministers)

No: 543

3rd April 1947

D. 5.40.p.m. 3rd April 1947

X:X:X:

IMPORTANT

Secret.

Following for Secretary of State from Sir Orme Sargent.

British Military Authorities in Egypt are much concerned over question of leave facilities in Cairo for their troops after March 31st. Troops have been evacuated to Canal Zone where living conditions are very hard and uncomfortable. Cyprus is used largely as leave centre for troops in Palestine, but there is neither accommodation there nor movement facilities for troops from Egypt. Palestine cannot be used for leave. Military Authorities consider that morale and health of troops stationed in the uncomfortable conditions of the Canal Zone will suffer unless they are allowed some relaxation and can go to areas more suitable for leave.

2. There have been indications that the Egyptians may make difficulties about men (who would of course be in mufti) going to Cairo and Alexandria for leave, and it is possible that at any moment they may inform us that they cannot agree to such movement, or that a British soldier on leave in Cairo may be arrested by the Egyptian police for being without the usual civilian identity papers. His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo agrees with G.O.C., B.T.E., that in either of these events the matter should be taken up strongly with the Egyptian Prime Minister, and has asked for instructions as to the most appropriate grounds on which he should do this. My immediately

following



Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

- 2 -

124

following telegram contains the text of our reply.

5. It is reported that Air Lines in Cairo have received verbal notification that any service personnel in uniform disembarking, either in transit or with destination in Egypt, will be subject to arrest, or if in plain clothes must be in possession of civilian passport with normal endorsement and visas. We are seeking confirmation of this, but if it is true it would indicate that Egyptians intend to ignore Article 6 (a) and (g) of the Immunities Convention, and will undoubtedly make difficulties about leave for troops.

P 371/62950

In want tele U. 125  
S/S at the new club  
this. [Signature] Pubwork 5118

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

J. 1180/2/16.

Cypher/OTP.

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO.

No. 706.

D. 9.55 p.m. 1st April, 1947.

1st April, 1947.

IMMEDIATE.

Your telegrams Nos. 637 and 820 [of the 12th and 29th March: leave facilities in Cairo for British troops after March 31st].

If it becomes necessary, you should take the following line with Nokrashi:-

(1) the United Kingdom maintains that the Treaty of 1936 and its immunities convention is at present in full force. Egypt may say that in her view the Treaty of 1936 is no longer valid, and intends to submit the difference on this point to the United Nations. Consequently, the matter is sub judice at present.

(2) While the matter is sub judice the status quo should be maintained and there are the strongest reasons for accepting the argument of practical convenience and common sense without prejudice to the position when a decision is given on the question in dispute.

(3) It is quite true that the immunities convention does not provide in terms that British troops stationed in the Canal Zone shall have the right to visit Cairo for purposes of leave and recreation. Article 6 (a) and (g), however, imply ordinary freedom of movement for individuals, and there was no doubt that this amenity was contemplated under that convention.

2. Presumably military authorities are issuing special warnings to troops to keep out of trouble. It is of course most important that every precaution should be taken to avoid precipitating an argument with the Egyptians over this.

Badly  
Dipl. in  
Pub 1320  
↓

637/62950

Registry Number } J1180/2/16.

TELEGRAM FROM

Sir R. Campbell

No. 637. (CAIRO)

Dated March 12, 1947

Received in Registry March 13, 1947

Leave facilities - Cairo for troops of the 31st

On Feb. 25th Egyptian P.M. Gen. ALFREY note stating that all buildings in the hands of the British fighting service should be returned to their owners before end of March. It is not known yet whether troops will be allowed to enter the evacuated area.

Last Paper.

J1170

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

- G.L. Atkinson 17.04. A.M. 16 Mo.

1. H.T. Del. 17.04. Mo. 543 Apt. 3

- Cairo 706 Apt. 1 (Rpt. U.K. Del. 544) - Cairo 713 Apt. 2 - W.O., A.M., Addy - 21599

(Action completed.)

COE 7/1-

(Index.)

24/9/47

Next Paper.

J1209

(Minutes) ... Copy M.O. 47 arranged / How 13/ AM. 5

At the time of the discussions in London with Sir Pasha last October the Egyptians strongly contested the retention by the British forces of their immunities in the Delta after the 31st March. See 54634/39/9 attached pp 1 & 5. We are not of course bound by the results of those discussions (in any case the point only resulted in agreement to discuss further) but we can be certain that the Egyptians will be difficult as suggested in para 5. In the event of Sir R. Campbell being obliged to protest I do not think that the general argument of convenience

In short from this letter and from Cairo telegram No 820 just received it looks as though the choice is between eventual mutiny among the troops and serious trouble with the Egyptians. This latter should not be underestimated: it may extend to raids by the police on cafes, cinemas etc & the arrest of British troops under humiliating conditions to road blocks on the roads in from Suez & Ismailia. And I think that in practice the Egyptians have it in their power to bring leave in Cairo & Alex. to a standstill.

Nevertheless stalling fast will, I think, get us further with the Egyptians than coming in. And if there are incidents we should be able - provided they are in fact provoked by the Egyptians - to make damaging use of them at the U.N. i.e. the Egyptians having announced their intention of seeking international arbitration also seek to upset the status quo in anticipation.

I suggest therefore  
/that

[Flag 'B']

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

TOP SECRET

FO371/62956

EGYPT - MEMORANDUM TO CANAL AREA

Progress Report 15th March, 1947

STRENGTH OF FORCES IN EGYPT

→

In Cairo District (including Cairo City)

In Egypt (including Alexandria, Cairo & Canal Districts)

British  
13,156 (8,578 Army  
4,578 RAF)

British  
75,582 (63,111 Army  
12,471 RAF)

Men U.K.

P.O.W.

Non U.K.

P.O.W.

1,412

76,294

21,589

76,083

4,198

(i) 15th February 1947

(ii) 1st March 1947

10,891 (7,386 Army  
3,505 RAF)

76,083

20,040

76,083

3,861

REDUCTIONS  
(over last 14 days)

2,265 (1,192 Army  
1,073 RAF)

211

749

357

NET REDUCTIONS BY  
15/2/47

1,426

2,552

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

371/629.50

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

J. 1180

13 MAR

Sir R. Campbell D. 1.30 p.m. 12th March, 1947.  
No. 687  
12th March, 1947. R. 2.20 p.m. 12th March, 1947.

0 0 0 0

IMMEDIATE

G.O.C. B.T.E. and A.O.C. are both much concerned over question of leave facilities in Cairo for their troops after March 31st. The former first raised the matter with Egyptian Prime Minister early in February and on that occasion His Excellency appeared to be favourably disposed towards the retention by the services of their clubs and hostels in Cairo after their evacuation of the city. On February 25th however he handed General Alfroy a letter gist of which was that he had reconsidered his attitude since his earlier conversation and that "if the clubs, hostels and any other buildings now in the hands of the British fighting services were not returned to their owners to the (Egyptian) Government before the end of March 1947 serious embarrassment to the (Egyptian) Government will result". His letter however, copy of which is being sent by bag, did not make it fully clear whether his objection was only to services retention of their clubs or also to visits by any troops whatever to the evacuated area after

/March



1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

1	2	3	4	5	6
---	---	---	---	---	---

FO 571/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION



..82

- 8) Mr. Platt (T.S.P)
  - Mr. Kirtz (A.M.)
  - Mr. Dooder (A.M.)
  - Mr. McEwing (T.S.P)
  - Mr. McGee (W.O.)
- 4th June



Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

ARCHIVES

J 598/2/16

83  
EGYPT AND SUDAN  
February 6, 1947  
Section 1

Copy No. 8

## EVACUATION OF BRITISH FORCES

*Nokrashy Pasha to Sir R. Campbell. (Communicated in Cairo Despatch No. 99 of 31st January; Received 6th February)*

(No. 54/2/36)

Cairo,

My dear Ambassador, 26th January, 1947

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 21st December, 1946, informing me that when the buildings and installations occupied by British forces and evacuated by them are handed over to the competent Egyptian authorities, it is understood that the financial settlement relating to them is reserved for later discussions.

I agree upon any procedure which can accelerate the operations of evacuation and should be grateful if you let me know the nature of the financial questions mentioned in your letter which the British Government consider as an object of future settlement.

Believe me, &amp;c.

M. F. NOKRASHY.

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

AJB/  
No.99  
(134/7/47)

J 84

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to  
His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-  
mentioned paper.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
CAIRO.

31st January 1947

J 598

6 FEB

Reference to previous communication:

Cairo P.D. to Foreign Office No. 1340  
of 21.12.46.

Description of Enclosure.

Name, Date, etc.	Subject.
------------------	----------

From: Nokrashi Pasha.	Re financial settlement relating to buildings and installations occupied by British Forces.
No. 54.2/36	
Dated 26.1.47.	

FC 571/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

COPY/AJS

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

85

No: 54.2/36

Cairo, January 26, 1947.

My dear Ambassador,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No.40/51/46 of December 21st, 1946, informing me that when the buildings and installations occupied by British Forces and evacuated by them are handed over to the competent Egyptian Authorities, it is understood that the financial settlement relating to them is reserved for later discussions.

I agree upon any procedure which can accelerate the operations of evacuation and, should be grateful if you let me know the nature of the financial questions mentioned in your letter which the British Government consider as an object of future settlement.

Believe me,

My dear Ambassador,

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) M.F. NOKRASHY

H.E. Sir Ronald Ian Campbell,  
K.C.M.G., C.B.,  
H.M. Majesty's Ambassador,  
Cairo.

Reference:-

FO 571/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

JC.

598 2/16

M 1.  
24/9/47

J 86

INDEXED

134/17/47.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.


30th April, 1947.

Dear Department, J 29-31

We sent you under cover of printed despatch No. 99 of March 31st a copy of a letter of January 26th from the Egyptian Prime Minister, regarding the financial settlement in respect of buildings and installations handed over to the Egyptian Government by the British military authorities.

Further consideration of this matter was suspended pending the exploratory talks at Cairo about sterling balances. We should be glad to know what reply, if any, you consider should now be returned to Nokrashi Pasha.

Yours ever,



Egyptian Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

SECRET

89

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

3rd June, 1947.

(J 598/2/16)  
Confidential.

Dear Churchill,

Your letter No. 134/17/47 of the 30th April about the financial settlement in respect of installations handed over to the Egyptian Government on our military evacuation of the Delta.

You should take no further action until we have reconsidered the position after the completion of the forthcoming negotiations in London on the Egyptian sterling balances.

Yours ever,  
EGYPTIAN DEPARTMENT.

The Chancery,  
British Embassy,  
Cairo.

FC 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

*Handwritten notes:*  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10

**J**

J 550

FEB

76

1947

LUYIT and SUDAN

istry  
iber | J550/2/16.  
M Sir R. Campbell  
84 (CAIRO)  
(134/5/47).  
d  
eived  
egistry | Jan. 27, 1947  
Feb. 5, 1947

Disposal of Defence Works.  
Rep. to F.O. Dep. N° 4 of Jan. 2 (J5412/58/16-46).  
Transmits copy of a letter from the Egyptian  
P.M. 90-8/3 of Jan. 15 stating that the  
Egyptian Govt will take over all defences  
included in the Barron scheme, financial  
settlements to take place later.

Last Paper.

J480.

(Minutes.)

PTE Male 5/2

References.

Spans to  
Mr. McEwing Tisy  
Mr. McGregor W.O.

(Print.)

ref J5513/58/16/46.

(How disposed of.)

This seems satisfactory  
some perhaps (c)

SZ Dept

R  
5/2

Mr. McEwing Tisy  
Mr. McGregor W.O.  
Feb. 7

ll

/JK

No. 84  
(134/5/47)

His Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copies of the under-mentioned paper.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
CAIRO.

27th January, 1947.

FEB

Reference to previous communication:

Your Printed Despatch No. 4 of 2.1.46.

## Description of Enclosure.

Name, Date, etc.	Subject.
FROM: H.E. Mahmoud Fahmy El Nokreshi Pasha, No. 90-8/3 of 15.1.47.	Coast Defences in Alexandria: Egyptian Government will take over all defences included in Barron's scheme. Financial settlements to take place later.

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE.

No. 90-8/3.

Cairo, 15th January 1947.

Dear Ambassador,

27 Dec  
(J5573)

I am now able to answer Your Excellency's letter dated the 5th instant, regarding Coast Defences in Alexandria.

In 1938 the Egyptian Government sanctioned General Barron's scheme. Funds as estimated by General Barron were voted for the same year and equipments and stores required for Coast Defences both for Alexandria and Mersa Matruh were immediately indented for from the War Office in London. The arrival of the equipment was expected in the early part of 1939.

After surveying thoroughly the existing Coast Defences in Alexandria, Barron's scheme, Col. Rice's Report and additional defences installed during the last war, I am in a position to decide the following rulings:-

- a) The Egyptian Government is ready to take over from the British Military authorities all the defences included in Barron's scheme. Financial settlements to take place later when financial authorities of our respective Governments reach an agreement regarding the principles for the adjustment.
- b) The date for proofing the guns Ramleh Battery will soon be notified.
- c) Regarding the additions installed during the war and the equipment and stores required for the execution of Rice's recommendations already stored in Alexandria, I wish to inform Your Excellency that I instructed their transfer to the custody of Egyptian Military authorities without any financial commitment on the Egyptian Government, pending the decision of the High Council of Defence and approval of the Council of Ministers and Parliament.
- d) Regarding the maintenance of the stores and equipment (which have not yet been installed), the Egyptian Government will be pleased if Your Excellency care to instruct the British Military authorities to train twenty Egyptian personnel on their care and maintenance until the end of next March.

Regarding the completion of the whole scheme for Coast Defence of Alexandria, the advice and experience of technical experts will be required when wanted.

I take this opportunity to appreciate the work done for the Coast Defence in Alexandria.

Believe me,  
My dear Ambassador,  
Yours very sincerely,

(sgd) M.F. NOKRASHY.

His Excellency  
Sir Ronald Ian Campbell,  
G.C.M.G., C.B.,  
H.R. Majesty's Ambassador.

See J1002



F0371/62950

E. & S.

J 569 / G  
~~759~~  
79

EGYPTIAN

~~7/2/16~~  
69/2/16

Alexandria Coast Defence

2/CC

The copy led from G.H.Q. MELF  
to Ministry of Defence reporting  
that Egyptian Govt have  
agreed to take over the  
equipment of the Barron Scheme.

28 Jan  
wed 31 Jan.

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.  
2/58/C-1946

2/58/C-1946

References.

Cairo Embassy presumably knows  
all about this? - or do we have  
to tell them to get a copy of this  
telegram from G.H.Q. MELF?

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

noted.

From [unclear] 27/2  
(F.H. TOMLIN)

They will know about  
it - they have reported  
themselves that Alex. is now  
completely evacuated.

G. Dept  
[unclear]

[unclear]

(Action  
completed.)

(Index.)

2/58/2

[unclear]

Next Paper.

F0371/62950

**SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM**

*Head of Egyptian*

**WARNING** The text of this message must be thoroughly paraphrased if it is to be published or otherwise communicated to persons outside the British or U.S. Government Service. If re-transmitted unparaphrased, the originator must mark it to be sent in "O.T.P." (One-Time Pad).

80

*Super J*

IZ 350  
TCO 281730Z  
TOR 291215Z

IMMEDIATE

*25691*

From : G.H.Q. M.E.L.F.

To : MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Info : ADVANCE EGYAFORCE

AF

142/CCL.

28th January, 1947

From Commanders-in-Chief Middle East for Chiefs of Staff.

Subject. Alexandria Coast Defence.

Reference your 3513 COSME 115 of 8th November, 1946.

1. Egyptian Government have agreed to take over the equipment of the Barron Scheme. Also agreed to take over solely for custody all other equipment of coast defences now in Alexandria. Egyptian Government have not, however, yet accepted financial liability for war time additions nor decided whether they will accept RICE recommendations. The custody of the equipment in no way prejudices them in their decision.
2. Present position of handover to Egyptians all completed except Ramleh Battery which should be completed 8th February 1947 and uninstalled equipment in Schuna Stores which should be completed by 21st March 1947.
3. Egyptian Prime Minister has stated in writing. "The date for proofing the guns Ramleh Battery will soon be notified." Nevertheless we are not optimists that proofing will in fact be carried out before 31st March or even thereafter. We are continuing to emphasise the great importance which on operational grounds we attach to proofing, but in view of satisfactory progress made with all other aspects of handover we are arranging for Ramleh Battery to be handed over without proofing.

TCO 281730Z

CIRCULATION

Defence Office  
Foreign Office  
First Sea Lord  
Message Control

A.M.C.S.  
S/S Colonies



J 480

Y

75

En Clair 30 JAN CAIRO-REMAC DISTRIBUTION  
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir R.I. Campbell R. 11.25 a.m. 29th January 1947  
No. 2 Remac Saving

28th January 1947

c c c c c

SECRET

My immediately preceding telegram.

The following is a schedule of the claims that we would propose to regard as falling into paragraph 9(3) of my telegram under reference:-

(1) The Barron Defence Scheme, including the Admiralty claim.

(2) The Alexandria Signals Service.

(3) The Lake Mariut Road.

(4) Stores supplied to the Egyptian Government by the Services or by British Stores Disposals Mission for which payment has not yet been made, although financial liability has been accepted by the Egyptian Government.

(5) Cost of training of Royal Egyptian Air Force personnel (excluding training during 1945, in respect of which some doubt exists - see penultimate paragraph of Blunt's letter to McGregor - No. S.44644/6 dated 10th September, 1946).

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat]

*ie. for presentation as when assessed.*



points in this telegram: . . . f0371/62950

- 64
- (1) the juridical interpretation of paras 5 & 6, &
  - (2) Para 8. Whether it is a fact that if we stand on the treaty the Egyptians can claim ownership of all fixed assets in existence prior to 1939...

As regards (1) paras 5 & 6 seems to me to be a statement of fact & the juridical aspect of the matter hardly enters into it as it is clear to everyone that the letter of the treaty has not been adhered to.

As regards (2) the relevant clause of the treaty is para 8 of the Annex to Article 8. Provided the conditions recited in the beginning of this para have been fulfilled I do not think that we could contest such an Egyptian claim.

W.H. Riches  
13/2

I think Mr. Riches is right, and I am not sure that there is anything more to be said from the legal point of view. As regards paragraph 9 of the telegram it may be that the whole matter will be settled best simply on the basis of bargaining over the settlement of the sterling balances. It may be, however, that we cannot get a settlement that way because the Egyptians will not admit even in principle the credit items on our side in so far as they depend on the 1936 Treaty or upon other undertakings by the Egyptian Government. If this should be so, it may then be necessary to consider whether we should suggest some form of arbitration, and no doubt in this event there would also be some hard bargaining over the terms of reference of the arbitrator.

W.H. Riches

F0371/62950

J. 479  
30 JAN

66

En Clair  
CAMER/REMAC DISTRIBUTION  
FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir. R. Campbell  
No. 1 Remac Saving  
26th January, 1947.

R. 11.25 a.m. 29th January, 1947.

0 0 0 0

SECRET

*In ref.* Reference Foreign Office telegram to Alexandria  
No. 1 Saving dated 10th September, 1946.

1. An informal Financial Working Committee has been considering the procedure to be adopted for the presentation of claims against the Egyptian Government in accordance with the lines of policy laid down in the telegram under reference.

2. The Working Committee consists of

(a) the Treasury representative in British Middle East Office as Chairman;

(b) the Financial Counsellor to the Embassy;

and

(c) the Financial Adviser to the three services.  
The Committee reports as follows.

3. We interpreted His Majesty's Government's intentions as follows:-

(1) Claims against the Egyptian Government should be categorised as follows:-

A. Claims arising out of the 1936 Treaty and the Protocol thereto (Treaty Claims).

B. Claims, other than Treaty claims, in respect of matters where the Egyptian Government have already, at some time or other, specifically accepted some degree of financial responsibility.

C. Claims, other than those arising under A and B above, relating to expenditure by His Majesty's Services in Egypt towards which His Majesty's Government feel that, in equity a contribution may justifiably be expected from the Egyptian Government.

(2) Claims in Categories A and B above should be prepared and presented at once.

/(3)



(3) Claims in Category C above should be prepared; but their representation to the Egyptian Government should be deferred, and use made of them in the forthcoming negotiations for settlement of the sterling balances.

4. No serious difficulty is likely to arise in preparing schedules of those of our known claims that fall into Categories B and C above, and work on these is already in progress. But when we have come to consider the preparation of a schedule of Treaty Claims we have run into trouble.

5. As is well known, the construction and financial provisions of the 1936 Treaty were never fully put into operation. The Egyptian Government was short of available funds; but war imposed upon His Majesty's Government the necessity of proceeding with the construction of military works (Treaty works as well as others) at their own expense and without any specific agreement with the Egyptian Government in regard to apportionment of financial liability. The programme of actual construction carried out subsequent to the signature of the 1936 Treaty has, in fact, departed very substantially from the programme in mind when the financial provisions of the Treaty were drawn up, and, moreover, has not been a programme supervised by a Joint Anglo-Egyptian technical committee, as was envisaged by the Treaty itself. It is not possible today to say of any particular installation constructed in the Treaty Zone that it represents precisely, or even approximately, a "clear Egyptian Treaty liability". We cannot say this even with respect to the five so-called Treaty airfields, which constitute what is probably our best particular case. But even here the type and extent of construction actually carried out have so far departed from the original Treaty plans as to make it possible for the Egyptians to argue that the five airfields do not constitute "Treaty works" within the meaning of the Treaty.

6. We do not think that, in the present political atmosphere, the Egyptian Government will entertain any Treaty claim that we present to them, unless we can establish it on a firm juridical basis and can document it accurately on that basis. For the reasons mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph, we are not in a position to do this.

7. The most that it is possible to say today is that if the original programme of Treaty works had actually been carried out, the financial liability that would have fallen on the Egyptian Government under the Treaty would have been £X millions. (But we have not sufficient information available in this Command to enable us to establish a firm figure even for X, although you may be able to do so).

8. There is at least one counter-claim arising out of the Treaty which the Egyptians would be able to table in the event



event of our pressing our own claims, namely, the £321,000 for the construction of barracks at Abbasieh (see paragraph 4 of Annex to Article 8 of 1936 Treaty); and, of course, if we stand on the Treaty, the Egyptians are certain to claim ownership of all pre-1939 fixed assets in Cairo, Alexandria and the Delta area, "save in so far as they may belong to private persons."

9. Basing themselves on the considerations set out in paragraphs 5 to 8 above, the Working Committee therefore recommend that:-

(a) As the construction and financial provisions of the 1936 Treaty have in the main never been implemented His Majesty's Government's Treaty claims against the Egyptian Government (and Egyptian Treaty counter-claims against His Majesty's Government) cannot be negotiated on a juridical basis but rather upon the basis of equity.

(b) His Majesty's Government should accordingly reserve their financial position with respect to:-

(i) All constructional costs incurred by His Majesty's Services in Egypt at any time;

(ii) All installations handed over to the Egyptian Government in consequence of the evacuation of Cairo, Alexandria and the Delta Area; and

(iii) Ownership of all installations already constructed, or to be constructed in the Canal Zone.

(c) A possible approach would be to propose to the Egyptian Government a new financial protocol to the 1936 Treaty, providing for a settlement of outstanding British and Egyptian claims in the light of the programme of works actually carried out in substitution for the original programme of Treaty works. We do not, however, think that there is the slightest chance that the Egyptian Government would enter into negotiations with us on this basis at this point of time.

(d) A settlement of our outstanding Treaty claims can be most properly and effectively made during the negotiations for a sterling balance settlement, together with our claims under Category C of paragraph 8 above.

(e) His Majesty's Government's financial claims against the Egyptian Government falling into Category B of paragraph 8 above should be presented by the Services as and when they are prepared. Claims for stores supplied

/and

See  
JSS  
1940  
1548

FO 371/62950 59044

69

4.

and services rendered would be presented under this heading.

10. Ambassador supports recommendations in paragraph 9 above, which have the concurrence of the Commanders-in-Chief, Senior British Naval Officer and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

11. Please see my immediately following Saving telegram.

[Copy sent to Middle East Secretariat].

Top Secret  
Secret  
~~Confidential~~  
Restricted  
~~Open~~

D.M.H.R. *ca*

*Draft*

Mr. A.W. McEwing,  
Treasury.

(From Mr. <sup>K.P.I.</sup> Scott  
Fox)

*W.P.H.*  
*Mr. Backett*

*25 February, 1947.*  
*F0371/62950*

70

You asked Riches on the telephone the other day for the Foreign Office views on two points raised in Cairo telegram No. 1 Remac Saving of the 29th January, about claims against the Egyptian Government in respect of installations in Egypt.

The first point was the legal aspect of the position under the 1936 treaty, dealt with in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Cairo Savingram. These paragraphs seem to us to <sup>contain</sup> be a statement of fact, and the juridical aspect of the matter hardly enters into it, as it is clear to all concerned that the letter of the treaty has not been adhered to in so far as its construction and financial provisions are concerned.

The second point was the validity of an <sup>possible</sup> Egyptian claim to ownership of all pre-1939 fixed assets in Cairo, Alexandria and the Delta area "save in so far as they may belong to private persons" (paragraph 8 of the Savingram). The relevant clause of the 1936 treaty is paragraph 8 of the Annex to Article 8, and provided the conditions recited in the beginning of this paragraph have been fulfilled, we do not think that we could contest such an Egyptian claim.

As regards the recommendations of the Working Committee contained in paragraph 9 of the Savingram, it may eventually be that the whole matter will be settled best on the basis of bargaining all our assets in Egypt against a settlement of the sterling balances. Possibly, however, /

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Reference:-

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

1	2	3	4	5	6

however, we shall not be able to reach agreement that way because the Egyptians will not admit even in principle the credit items on our side in so far as they depend on the 1936 treaty or upon other undertakings by the Egyptian Government. If this should be so, it may then be necessary to consider whether we should suggest some form of arbitration, and no doubt in this event there would also be some hard bargaining over the terms of reference of the arbitrator.

*I am sending copies of this letter to McQuevor at the W.O. Kitch at the A.M.C., & Dodds at the Admiralty*

*DR*  
*19/2*

71

C

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Reference:-		PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE					
FO 371/62950 59044		1	2	3	4	5	6
		1			2		
COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION							

FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

72

(J. 479/2/16)

25th February 1947.

SECRET.

You asked Riches on the telephone the other day for the Foreign Office views on two points raised in Cairo telegram No. 1 Remac Saving of the 29th January, about claims against the Egyptian Government in respect of installations in Egypt.

The first point was the legal aspect of the position under the 1936 treaty dealt with in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Cairo Savingram. These paragraphs seem to us to contain a statement of fact, and the juridical aspect of the matter hardly enters into it, as it is clear to all concerned that the letter of the treaty has not been adhered to in so far as its construction and financial provisions are concerned.

The second point was the validity of a possible Egyptian claim to ownership of all pre-1939 fixed assets in Cairo, Alexandria and the Delta area "save in so far as they may belong to private persons" (paragraph 8 of the Savingram). The relevant clause of the 1936 treaty is paragraph 8 of the Annex to Article 8, and provided the conditions recited in the beginning of this paragraph have been fulfilled, we do not think that we could contest such an Egyptian claim.

As regards the recommendations of the Working Committee contained in paragraph 9 of the Savingram it may eventually be that the whole matter will be settled best on the basis of bargaining all our assets in Egypt against a settlement of the sterling balances. Possibly however, we shall not be able to reach agreement that way because the Egyptians will not admit even in principle the credit items on our side in so far as they depend

on/

A.W. McEwing, Esq.,  
Treasury.

116

FO 571/62950 59014

73

on the 1936 treaty or upon other undertakings by the Egyptian Government. If this should be so, it may then be necessary to consider whether we should suggest some form of arbitration, and no doubt in this event there would also be some hard bargaining over the terms of reference of the arbitrator.

I am sending copies of this letter to McGregor at the War Office, Kitts at the Air Ministry and Dodds at the Admiralty.

(R.D.J. Scott-Fox)

F0371/62950

J

291

36

1947

EGYPT and SUDAN

20 JAN

Registry Number: J291/2/16.  
 FROM Mr. G. ELEY (Min. of SUPPLY) to Mr. No. Scissors  
 12/OVERSEAS/1152.  
 Dated Jan. 15, 1947  
 Received in Registry Jan. 20, 1947

Disposal of H.M.G. assets in Egypt.  
 Ref. to a conversation re. the effect the draft Treaty might have on disposal of assets.  
 Gives details of a meeting to be held at the Treasury on Jan. 24 to discuss the question of a global deal with Egypt.

Last Paper.

J290.

(Minutes.)

References.

J5519/58/16.-1946

I attended a meeting on this at the Treasury this morning. I had previously consulted Mr. Baker, who said that Eastern Department did not wish to be represented, but that the view could be expressed that so far as Iraq was concerned, any action designed to expedite the disposal of surplus stores would be welcome.

It should be noted that this <sup>paper</sup> ~~question~~ relates to consumable stores only, and not to fixed installations, which are dealt with elsewhere.

(Print.)

After an exposition by Mr. <sup>Figures</sup> ~~Riches~~ of the Treasury of the importance of having all possible cards in our hands in connexion with the sterling balance negotiations, it was agreed that global deals should not be negotiated, at least until after Sir Wilfrid Eady's visit to the two countries in connexion with sterling balances at the end of February and beginning of March. Brigadier Mount pointed out that in Iraq the Iraqis were already fairly well aware of the real value of our available stores, that a stable government would not come into power at least until after the 10th March, and that the Iraqi Government were contemplating the creation of a Government Disposals Corporation.

(How disposed of.)

As regards Egypt, Brigadier Mount said that the Egyptians appeared to contemplate a global deal <sup>with us perhaps</sup> because they had done very well out of such a deal with the Americans.

*D.M.H. Riches*

(D.M.H. RICHES)  
 24th January, 1947.

(Action completed.)

col. 26/2

(Index.)

24/1/47

*W.R. Department*  
 Eastern Department  
 W.R. Department.

Next Paper.

J315

See within:

Minutes of Treasury meeting on Jan. 24 dated Feb. 13.  
 32008 F.O.P.

*DR 25/2*

FO 371/62950 59044

COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

(20/20)

TELEGRAMS: AIRPROB, LONDON.  
TELEPHONE: FRANKLIN 2211.

Extm. 1320

Any communications on the  
subject of this letter should be  
addressed to:-

THE SECRETARY.

Our Reference 12 Overseas/1152.

Your Reference

DIRECTORATE OF OVERSEAS DISPOSALS,

MINISTRY OF SUPPLY, 37

MILLBANK,

S.W.1.

15th January, 1947.

20 JAN

Dear Scrivener,

Immediately before my departure for the Middle East in November last I had a talk with you about the draft Treaty which had then been negotiated with Sidky Pasha because I was interested to know what effect it might have had on the disposal of H.M.G. assets in Egypt. You may remember that you gave me to understand that the draft Treaty omitted all references to H.M.G. assets and that the intention was that the disposal of these assets should be dealt with by means of understandings or arrangements outside the Treaty.

About the same time, Hutchinson and I also had a discussion with Flett of the Treasury, and Curran of the Middle East Office, about the possibilities of negotiating a global deal with the Egyptian Government for the balance of our surpluses which remained undisposed by our Disposals Mission. The Treasury view was that they hoped to use our surpluses as a bargaining weapon in reducing our huge sterling indebtedness to Egypt, and although discussions were intended to commence in the near future it was considered unlikely that final agreement would be reached before the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed. Whilst recognising the advantage of such an approach to the sterling balances problem, we pointed out the heavy costs of upkeep of the Ministry's Disposals Mission and said, in effect, that if within a reasonable time - Easter 1947 was mentioned - the sterling balances question

P.S. Scrivener, Esq., C.M.G.

/was

