

NO 20  
M R R

CONFIDENTIAL



*Enta*  
*12/3/64*  
British Embassy,  
Jedda.  
September 8, 1964.

1571  
BM 107/1574 *Dear David,*

The Ambassador reported in his tel. No: 532 (para. 4) that Mas'ud had read over to him a long report which Prince Sultan produced on Egyptian intrigues against the British and Saudi positions in the Peninsula.

2. The Prince has now sent on a copy of the report, a translation of which I enclose. There is as you will see little to justify the title but the names of tribes involved may be of interest to you, Bahrain and Political Officer Middle East Command to whom I am copying this letter with the enclosure.

*Yours ever,*  
*J.P.*  
(J.P. Symons)

D.C.P. Gracie, Esq.,  
Foreign Office.

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1964  
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TRANSLATION

Detailed information of the Egyptian preparation for the Revolutionary goal

Abdul Nasir is convinced that the South of the Arabian Peninsula and Hadhramut and the regions of Mahra, Dhofar, Oman and Muscat all constitute an open door through which the entry of the Egyptians is much easier than in any other Arab region.

In all these regions there are Sheikhs and Sayyids and Sherifs who are largely ignorant and it is the easiest of matters to subvert their consciences with a little money or by threats or political seduction and the wise ones among these Sheikhs and Sherifs are inclined to believe that the continued presence of Britain in the Arab South will not last long and that if they side with Abdul Nasir they will ensure for themselves a portion of the rule at the expense of those Sheikhs and Sherifs who insist on remaining under the protection of Britain.

We have found out that the bargainings which went on between Sultan Abdullah al-Fadhli, Sultan of the Fadhli State and Minister of the Interior in the Federal Government, and the Egyptian agents in London during the South Arabian Constitutional Conference in London (between June 25 and July 6, 1964) were on the basis of the seduction of the Sultan Abdullah with the promise of overall rule of the region in the event of the cessation of the British Protectorate.

The Egyptians did not pay the Sultan any money because this man is rich. He had deposited to his account in a Swiss bank half a million sterling, this sum being the revenue of Sultan Abdullah from the vast cotton trade which has prospered in the State in recent years.

We learnt too from the Swiss source himself that Sultan al-Fadhli is convinced that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will not help any of the Sheikhs or Sherifs in the South of the peninsula against Abdul Nasir if the British Protectorate is withdrawn from there. The Sultan instanced what had happened to the Imam of Yemen and the numerous announcements by the Saudi Government that it is not and will not help the Imam Badr.

Abdul Nasir's programme for revolutionary expansion on the borders of Saudi Arabia relies on the preparation of its administrative centre in Cairo and its executive set-up in Sana'a.

Of the administrative centre in Cairo we know little except that it bears the name of "The Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab South" among its most notable members being:-

- Abdulla Asnaj - Head of the Aden P.S.P.
- Abdul Hadi Awad Ba Awad, - Representative of the Liberation Movement in Hadhramut.
- Sheikh Hassan Ali - Representative of the Protectorate

The headquarters of the execution side in Sana' also bears the name of the "Front for the Liberation of the Arab South" and in this headquarters there are representatives of the following bodies, tribes and groups:-

- Nasir al-Sa'id from Saudi Arabia (he being known as Muhammad al-Hikmi - Aden PSP representative in Sana')
- One of the Shaban Sheikhs from the Yemeni tribes

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These tribes do not submit to order but they have ancient ties with Najran and the Wadi Dawasir

One of the Sheikhs of the Awamir Tribes - These tribes have ties with the North and East of Yemen and the South of Saudi Arabia.

One of the Sheikhs of the Manahil tribes - These tribes border on the Awamir and have ties with the people of the Hadramut and the Protectorates.

One of the Sheikhs of the Sa'r tribes - whose country is the traditional route between Hadramut, the Tihama, Azir and the Wadi Dawasir.

One of the Sheikhs of the Hamum tribes - whose dira is close to the Hadami coast near the capital of Mukalla.

Two Sheikhs from the Bani Ahani tribes - whose country is the sand route between Yemen and Mahra.

Two Sheikhs from the Beit Khawar tribes - whose country is the threshold of the Kara Mountains which surround Mahra.

One of the Sheikhs of the Bani Kathir tribes - who inhabit the mountains of Mahra and some sand regions in the Rub' Al Khali.

One of the Sheikhs of Beit Hawsan who inhabit the South Eastern sands of the Rub' al Khali.

One of the Sheikhs of the Harsis tribes between Dhofar and Mahra.

Two men from the Wahiba tribes at the foot of the Omani mountains on the Saudi border.

One of the men of the Januba tribes on the coast of Atfa, Oman and Muscat.

One of the men of the Southern Rashid tribes in the Eastern sands of the Rub' al Khali on the Saudi border.

Two men from the Northern Rashid Al-Awamir tribes - whose country stretches to Buraimi and the Gulf.

Two men from the Duru tribes at the foot and in the middle of Oman and near Buraimi.

One of the men of the Manasir tribes in the region of Buraimi and Abu Dhabi.

One of the men of the Bani Kitab tribes at the foot of Oman and Buraimi and the Trucial Coast.

One of the men of the Bani Yas - which is Saudi and is from the region of Buraimi.

And men from the tribes near the Jabal Alahdar and from Muscat such as the Bani Buhasan, the Harith, Bani, Bu Ali Al Bu Shamis, the Babush and the uskira.

There are also some Sheikhs from the Yemeni tribes of the Yan and Hadami and Protectorate tribes of Karb whose names we have been unable to learn. The Yemeni Republican authorities Co-operate in recruiting the Yemeni tribes loyal to them and which have family or traditional ties with the Saudi tribes in the South and East.

/One of the ....

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One of the journalists who visited Sana' recently told us that Sayyid Hamud al-Jaifi, Prime Minister of the Yemen, had told him that it was one of the aims of Abdullah Sallal's Government to recruit the tribes beyond the Saudi and Amami Nafudand to join up with the revolution in Oman to help the revolutionary movement there.

There in Sana'a training of groups is going on in the ways of infiltration and guerilla warfare under Egyptian officers. We also learned that some Omani rebels were being trained there and that there is a link between Yemen and Oman by way of the tribes living in the South of Saudi Arabia on the edges of the Rub'al Khali when it is difficult for the British authorities and the Sultan of Muscat to observe the comings and goings.



O N R E F E

much direct benefit would accrue to them, but if this answer is correct they are getting ready to cause us considerable discomfiture.

3. It is interesting that as mentioned it made of Bahani.

Dunlop 16/12

Mr. G...  
 Mr. Barclay & M...  
 Mr. S... 16/12  
 P. S. O. (Mr. Green...)  
 & ...

It is true that Doob was acting on behalf of the Ruler of Fujairah in negotiations with H.L. Hunt of Texas, that

separate minute F2W 95A/17 the negotiations fell through, and that Doob was in association with Victor de Taranto, a naturalized British businessman of unenviable reputation who operates from Beirut. So Mr. McKeaney points out there are many other points which the Res<sup>t</sup> and other Gulf posts will be able to check.

M. G. Gould  
 16/12

17/12

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*This sounds  
virtually not  
improbable.*

J.A. Snellgrove, Esq., *in reply*  
Arabian Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

*Thompson  
10/12  
Entire*

With the Compliments  
of  
The Political Agent in Qatar

*B103116/5*

British Political Agency,  
Doha.  
December 7, 1964

16)

BRITISH POLITICAL AGENCY,

DOHA.

December 7, 1964

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Mohammad Mahdi, (Cochrane), the Commander of Qatar's security forces, has given me the enclosed papers about an alleged Egyptian plot to raise a rebellion in the Gulf next summer. The papers are an account of his interview with one Adel Mustafa Deeb, a Lebanese working in Dubai, who came to Qatar at the Ruler's request after writing to say that he had secret and important information to divulge. The remaining enclosures are photostat copies of what are said to be letters to the source from one Fawzi al Kaumuji who is referred to in the record of conversation. I am not sure that Cochrane's rendering of the name is correct; I think it should be Qawuqi if it is the man I am thinking of.

2. The substance of the alleged plot is that Egypt and Iraq believe that there will soon be a settlement of the Arab question which will be favourable to their interests and which will permit them to turn their attention to subversion in the Gulf. The idea is to ship in arms from Basra and raise an armed insurrection, using dissident Yemenis and Yafa'is under the command of Fawzi Qawuqi. Egypt and Iraq would accuse the British and Iranian Governments of inspiring the rebellion and would offer assistance to the states to repress it. They would not be able to do much physically, but would create a situation suitable to put before the United Nations; this would lead to pressure on Britain to withdraw from the Persian Gulf.

3. A certain proportion of the information given by Deeb can presumably be checked, and I should be interested to hear your comments and those of other recipients of this letter. The most we can say from here at the moment is that there may be something in the story and that Deeb is apparently offering to double-cross his associates in the hope of gain.

4. I am sending copies of this letter, with the first enclosure only, to Snellgrove in Arabian Department, the Political Agents in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and to the Consul-General in Muscat.

(P. McKearney)

J.R. Rich, Esq.,  
British Political Residency,  
Bahrain.

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Source - Adul Mustafa Deeb, Lebanese, engineer, Dubai (probably Syrian or Palestinian by origin), has had discussions with P.A. Mr. Tait, Dubai, whom he later described as "secretary to the Deputy P.A."

He, the source, at the opening stage of the conversation, asked me if I had come to see him, or had any knowledge of him via the P.R. I told him my instructions came from the Ruler of Qatar, and that I had no connection with the P.R.

He said that he badly wanted a visa for a man by the name of Mohamed Khair bin Tawfic Sufan, age 35 years, a Syrian. He said that he had been asked to assist in getting this visa by Fawzi as Fawzi, who is a friend of his, wanted this man to come and have a look round.

He said that Shaikh Mohamed bin Fajaira knows him, the source, very well and, in fact, he was about to become his secretary.

At this stage I had a recollection of having heard of such a person. My recollection was that he was giving some concern on the Trucial Coast as to who and what he really was.

He told me that he had been, as a young man, the bodyguard of Fawzi Basher Al Kaumuji (فوزي باشا الكاومجي) who was the leader of the Syrian toughs who entered Palestine during the Palestinian war. He also said that Fawzi took a major part in the Lebanese rebellion a few years ago, and was, in fact, Chief of Staff to Jumblat.

Just over 1½ months ago source was in Lebanon, and he was invited to visit Fawzi. Fawzi related to him that he had been approached by an Egyptian General a month previously, and discussions had taken place on the possibility of raising a rebellion in the Gulf generally. Fawzi was offered the position of Qaid, and it was proposed that the centre of the operation be Basra. Fawzi was amenable to the proposal, and there was some question of 1,000,000 Lebanese lira having been passed, but on this he was not too clear. The Egyptian General returned to Egypt to report, and then returned for further discussions with Fawzi. A definite agreement was made between them. The man who actually paid the cash was one Talat Karim (طلعت كريم) who has a secretary by the name of Sa'adi Bus Boos.

(?covert)  
(?covert)

Fawzi and company are openly opening an organisation called مؤسسة اتحاد الوطن العربي (Establishment of the Development of Arab countries). It will have the appearance of a trading concern, but will, in fact be the centre of the overt organisation. Karim and Bus-Boos are to specialise in operating the open concern, and channel the affairs of the overt concern. Either one, or both of them, is from Trablis (Tripoli).

Source related that when Shaikh Sager bin Sultan of Sharjah was in Lebanon, they gave a very blase reception for Sager, and the expenses were met by Talat Karim. Source was invited, but did not go.

During source's visit to Fawzi he was asked to provide the names of Palestinians, their age, occupation and country in which resident without necessarily making direct approach to them. (This, in fact, could easily be what source is doing in Qatar). Source was also asked to get a plan of the Gulf showing mountains, wadis, means of access from the sea, and important points,

/particularly

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particularly vulnerable points, not so much from the point of view of oil installations, but points whereby a little activity would create the maximum civil disturbance, and also to ascertain who was in occupation of important buildings.

Source produced two letters purporting to be from Fawzi to him. I looked at the letters, folded them up, and put them in my pocket. To this he objected. I assured him that he would get them back the next day. Although he remonstrated a good deal he subsequently accepted the situation.

He said that he had declined to sponsor the visit of Mohamed Sufan as he was afraid of what he might do, and that he might be associated with the responsibility. I asked him what he thought he might do, and he said that he thought he might kill somebody. He said that he had persuaded the P.A. to seek permission for the visa without a sponsor, and that he had agreed to do this, but quite some time had passed, and there had been no reply. The P.A. had explained to him that, in a matter of this nature, it had to be channelled via Bahrain Embassy, Beirut and Syria. The last time he saw Tait at Sharjah was yesterday, the 2nd. There was still no reply, and he left for Qatar.

I questioned him concerning the letter he had written to Shaikh Ahmed. He said that he had written the letter, but that at the time he wrote it he had not informed Shaikh Mohamed Al Fajaira, but when he told the Shaikh of Fajaira that he was going to Qatar he was instructed to inform Shaikh Ahmed of all that he knew.

He also said that he had informed Shaikh Sultan bin Sager of Sharjah of the information. I questioned him as to the sense of this as he must, of necessity, have known that he was a friend of Fawzi and, having regard to the fact that Fawzi's organisation had entertained the Shaikh of Sharjah in Lebanon, that the Shaikh of Sharjah was very pro-Nasser. He rather cleverly escaped from this by saying that that was exactly the reason he felt quite safe in telling the Shaikh of Sharjah, as he felt quite sure he would already know. He told me that he wrote his letter to Shaikh Ahmed from Dubai via D'jani who told him that he could come to Qatar. He was accommodated at the Oasis Hotel, and provided with transport.

He said that the arms were now in Basra, and that Fawzi's idea was to send them into the Gulf in boxes of cement. He also said that there was a second centre of supply in the Yemen, but he did not know where that was. He related that the object of the operation was to raise rebellion by providing arms to dissident elements, particularly Yemenis and Yafis, and then by means of propaganda to accuse the British and Iranis of being responsible for the rebellion, and that Egypt will offer physical help, and thereby create an international situation, suitable to raising in the United Nations, in the Persian Gulf, being the focal point of international politics, but this had to be coincidental with the settling of affairs in Aden, which is considered imminent owing to the visit of Greenwood, whom it was accepted was to offer some generous terms to Aden whereby Egypt and Iraq could reduce their interest in Aden and concentrate on the Gulf. He said that they appeared to be quite confident that the British would be asleep, off their guard, and not particularly interested.

Source related that he had been told by Fawzi that the General had said that the important places were Qatar and

/Fajaira;

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Fajaira; Sharjah being "in the bag", and Shakbut "easy meat" because of his dyed-in-the-wool attitude towards things in general. It appears to have been agreed that the removal by assassination of the Shaikh of Fajaira, Rashid of Dubai and Ahmed in Qatar, together with a few more selected personalities was an essential to the success of the rebellion. On being questioned, source assured me that, although he had been in the company of Shaikh Rashid bin Maktoon of Dubai, he had not told him anything because he was afraid of one Mohamed Abdulla Ghaz who was closely associated with Rashid, and on most intimate terms, but whom he knew had very strong connections with the United Arab Republic.

He then made a proposal that, if the P.R. could be influenced to grant the visa to Mohamed Sufan, and provide him, the source, with a good topographical map, he would be prepared to take it to Lebanon and give it to Fawzi, and thereby get further information.

On being questioned as to when he first came to the Gulf, he said that he came in 1962, and admitted that he was sponsored by the Shaikh of Sharjah on the basis of a business visit for ten days. He said that he was then representing a company known as "V.D. De Terranta", and that during those ten days he made a business of developing a friendship with Suger in which he succeeded, and thereby obtained a return visa and subsequently a Sharjah passport. Throughout the conversation he said several times that Suger was a great friend of Fawzi.

I questioned him as to how his friendship with the Shaikh of Fajaira had developed, and he said that, being an engineer, when Kuwait made money available to the Trucial Oman States for the building of schools he had worked on building a school in Fajaira, and thereby had got to know the Ruler. He did not find it very difficult, he said, to develop an intimate friendship, and for a time divided himself between the Shaikh of Sharjah and the Shaikh of Fajaira. He said that he eventually succeeded in becoming the Agent of the Shaikh of Fajaira in his negotiations with the International Oil Company, and had thereby succeeded in making for himself quite a position, but that the picture changed considerably when the International Oil Company cancelled their concession, and the Shaikh of Fajaira could no longer pay him his salary, and there was no Oil Company to "skin". He said that, at the moment, prospects were much brighter as another Oil Company was interested in taking a concession in the territory of the Shaikh of Fajaira. He was unable to name the Oil Company, but said that he was already in contact with a Lebanese - Muhran Bamukjian - an Armenian whom he said is employed by a London company called "Rainash". He obviously had great hopes for the success of this gentleman and himself. It was interesting to hear that this Armenian was now in Dubai, and that he was associated in some way or other with Shaikh Rashid's Port project.

He volunteered the information that the rebellion would take place in the middle of the summer, as that was likely to be the time when it was least expected.

/N.B.

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N.B. The Ruler's attitude.

It appeared to me to be one of uncertainty, but he clearly attached importance to the information. He had obviously handled the man very carefully and very cleverly, and told me that I was to be the last person to see him, and that I should judge for myself whether or not I thought it worthwhile to inform Her Majesty's Government. It was quite clear that the Ruler had no intention of seeing the man himself.