

British Ambassador. The Egyptian press... Nothing accidental about the events of February 15, 1952, which represent a calculated step in a wider plan of action.

Nasser's aim?

What is the object of all this frenzied activity of the press campaigns, the organized demonstrations, the unending series of conferences (a new "Arab Congress" is to be opened by President Nasser this week, and the manoeuvres of the Arab delegates to the United Nations)?

Nasser's more objective critics would say that he is trying to gain international bargaining position for the Afro-Asian world, to East and West alike. Some would go further and say that he seeks an escape from the failures of his pan-Arab policies, or that he simply cannot resist an opportunity to extend his own political influence, or even to end his "neutralism" (a unique feature for a secret alliance with the Soviet Union, whose aims he is deliberately furthering by an African policy which has certainly brought him close to the Soviet line in the Congo).

Nasser's more subjective critics would say that he is trying to keep the cold war "out of Africa," and to ensure to Africans their freedom to choose their own political future. And perhaps he is rejecting the "neutrality" of his approach to the African scene. It is apparent while looking at the events of the last year, in the Congo in particular, if only because the exercise may help us to understand the motives behind the vehemence with which he has taken his stand on all sides, has done more than anything else to bring the United Nations mission to the Congo so near to failure.

Israel's advance

Before the beginning of the Congo crisis, Nasser's interest in Africa was lukewarm. He was committed to opposing "imperialism," wherever it still existed, but his demand for a general propaganda campaign directed against the colonial powers in Africa: but Nasser was convinced that the current of events would sweep the colonial powers out of Africa anyway, and that all his need do was to hurry their retreat. He had been counselling him from some of his advisers, to the effect that after the Suez campaign had opened up to him the Gulf of Aden, that a blockade escape route through the Arab blockade of the Red Sea, and marked on a cartographic map, would be a sure way to penetrate the Afro-Asian world, by establishing close relations with the new nations rising to independence. But it was only when the political line was drawn that this policy dawned on Nasser that Nasser became seriously concerned. And he was worried for two reasons.

Embassy burned

Perhaps it is unnecessary to underline the violence of that reaction—but it is important to recognise it, and to note the sacrifices which Nasser has made in the hope of maintaining his reputation in the Afro-Asian world. To think himself as closely as he did with the Soviet approach to the Congo was not an easy or a welcome step for Nasser, to whom a Communist victory in Africa would be no less a disaster than an Imperialist one. To break relations with Mr. Hammarskjöld, with whom his relations have always been excellent, can have been no more palatable. But the episode of the burning of the Belgian Embassy in Cairo perhaps gives the picture better than any other. In defiance of protest, which he felt were vital to him. The events of February 15, when the Cairo mob and the American Embassy and Information Centre were attacked and destroyed, are a page in the history of revolutionary Egypt. Before 1952 mob violence was a traditional feature of Cairo political life, one which reached its culmination in the "Black Saturday" of January 26, 1952. Six months later Nasser staged his revolution—

and since July, 1952, Cairo has

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FB 371/158798 89075.

KEEPING AFRICAN STATES OUT OF COLD WAR

BRITAIN ASKED TO BE "FAIR AND JUST"

From Our Special Correspondent

CAIRO, May 14

It was complete nonsense to talk of there being a Cairo party and a Tunis party inside the "Algerian Provisional Government". He declared: "We do not impose our ideas on anyone. To do so would be treason to a cause for which one million people have died. We only express our views when the Algerians ask for them."

When I asked whether he felt that a peaceful solution was now possible, the answer was: "I cannot say I feel, but I hope."

For the suggested Tunisia-Algeria union, or the President's intention of any federation in the Arab world that is not influenced by foreign countries," There was naturally, also, a good deal of discussion of relations between Britain and the United Arab Republic. I had suggested that, with the exchange of ambassadors and the recent credit agreement, it might be possible to think about completely normal friendly relations. President Nasser's first comment was: "It is not our object to be in bad relations with Britain." But, after the visit with a broad grip—there was a 50c. The situation talk by the Suez affair.

His small daughter, for example, who was only five years old, had asked him: "If Britain, France, and Israel came to an end, would that mean there would be no more war?"

Another grin—"that was only an example." Did he mean that there was bound to be mistrust for a generation at least? Not necessarily, he said. But the real chance for a new start, in 1954, had been missed. Then someone had even tried to assassinate him because he had made a speech in favour of agreement with Britain.

IRAQ "MANOEUVRING"

That his own suspicions of Britain are still lively was shown in his expressed conviction that Britain had "manoeuvred" Communists in Iraq. Admittedly Britain had, he said, kept quiet from the time of the revolution until about October of November, 1958, but then she saw that Iraq was divided into two groups and decided to back one of them to keep the country divided.

When I protested that Britain had then neither the will nor the power to intervene in Iraq, he commented: "Perhaps not to intervene, but for manoeuvring inside Iraq."

I pointed out that manoeuvring inside Iraq was precisely what he himself had been often accused of. "Yes," he said, "Mr. Salwyn Lloyd used to think I had a lot of Lloyds on my desk and could start a revolution in any Arab country just by pressing one of them. This was absolute nonsense, but one of the many reasons which led to the clash between our two countries."

However grotesque the idea of Britain wanting to support communism in Iraq or anywhere else may seem to most people, it does not appear more odd to the President than that Britain should have chosen to attack with Israel in 1956.

"I still have the military appreciation I wrote myself at that time," he said. "I put myself in Mr. Eden's position. I wrote down that the first course of action open to Eden would be to attack with Israel. But I decided there was not even a 1 per cent chance of that. The second course—attacking with France—I thought offered a 60 per cent chance."

READY LAUGHTER

It was Britain's attitude towards the Arabs and Israel that would ultimately determine the course of relations between the two countries. "We feel," said the President, "that you are on the side of Israel. She receives tanks and submarines from you. But Britain is a big Power and should be fair and just."

Throughout our conversation President Nasser was informal and relaxed, showing no signs of the strenuous week—and indeed years—behind him. He laughed readily, particularly when looking back at the various phases of Anglo-Egyptian relations, which seemed to impress him as containing almost as much comedy as tragedy.

He was asked about our Africa Correspondent on the Monrovia conference in page 12.

14-MONTH DELAY FOR ASWAN DAM

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

CAIRO, May 14

The announcement by Dr. Vittorio Veronesi, the Director-General of Unesco, reported from Khartoum, that the construction of the Aswan High Dam will be delayed and that 14 more months will be available for the Nubia salvage programme, means a welcome change of fortune for the archaeological teams now working in the area. Even 14 extra months, however, are unlikely to provide much of a margin before the inundation, as most of the archaeologists considered the time previously said to be available as altogether inadequate.

The additional months will enable individual teams to extend their plans and make possible more careful work as well as further digs. The Ministry of Culture here, which is directing the Nubia campaign in conjunction with Unesco's international advisory committee, has as yet said nothing regarding the enlargement of its timetable. However, an indication that the programme is now being handled in a less hurried fashion may be seen in the fact that no decision has yet been taken, apparently, on whether an attempt will be made to save the Abu Simbel temples by building a protecting dam or by raising them above the level to which the Nile waters will rise behind the High Dam.

President Nasser received me last night at his home in the Cairo suburb of Helwan. White-uniformed troops were lining the streets and brilliantly lit triumphal arches were spanning them in honour of President Sekou. Four of Guinea, who was giving a banquet to his hosts. This visit, coming on top of the meeting in Cairo, the Foreign Ministers of the Casablanca Powers should be natural that the conversation should have largely on Africa.

The United Arab Republic, said President Nasser, could not help the African states by being the victor of the cold war. When I put in that this was what Britain wanted from the President objected that the west always talked about the dangers of communism infiltrating into Africa. "We think this is not a danger."

It was not really a question of the newly independent African states being communist or capitalist. What they wanted to do was to end corruption and exploitation and to raise the level of society. "People used to say that I was a communist and Egypt was communist," said the President. "Now we read the same things about Guinea and Sekou Touré."

EXISTING GROUPS

But the Guinea experiment consisted of creating a completely new type of society. There was no "closed road" beginning with capitalism and ending with communism. The African states had to choose the sort of society they wanted. They must not be subjected to outside pressure, because if they were it would only provoke reactions.

I asked whether he thought there was a danger of Africa's being split into two blocks—what might be called the Casablanca and Monrovia blocks. The President's answer was that Africa in fact already contained two groups—one independent and one influenced by foreign countries—and that Britain and France, and particularly the French Community idea, were mainly responsible for the division.

How was the Casablanca group developing? Did not the protocol published last week go beyond the stage of simply expressing a common point of view? The President's answer was that this "African charter" was still in its early stages.

There would be a meeting of the newly formed African Command at the end of July. People in Britain made the mistake of thinking that this command was intended for the Congo. Not at all. "We do not believe in military intervention in the Congo in any form. We think it will only complicate matters more and more."

Although the functions of the military committee under the African charter had not been decided in detail, it would be there to help member countries if they asked for help. Non-member countries could also apply for help, but their requests would have to be unanimously approved by the political committee.

CYPRUS EXAMPLE

This seemed an opportunity to ask for an alternative definition of non-alignment, which has almost completely replaced "positive neutrality" from the political vocabulary here. The President's explanation was that alignment meant that you supported someone else's policies, right or wrong, non-alignment meant: "We say what we believe, whether this pleases or displeases."

He gave as an example that after the 1954 agreement with Britain the British Ambassador had said: "Now we are your friends, we hope you will support us over Cyprus."

"We said, 'No. We are in favour of independence for Cyprus. That is non-alignment. This is different from neutrality because we have to live in this world and take decisions. Neutrality is for countries like Switzerland."

The President dismissed with a laugh the idea that Switzerland might be invited to the forthcoming conference of non-aligned countries. "She is not even a member of the United Nations." The conference, when it met, would aim at only moral results, rather on the lines of the suggestion, put forward after the collapse of the summit meeting by President Nasser and President Tito of Yugoslavia, that the small countries should act as the conscience of the world. There was no intention of forcing anything like a new camp or bloc.

I asked whether there were any ideas for closer political association in Africa. For example, did suggestions that the United Arab Republic might join the Ghana-Guinea-Sudan federation conflict with prospects of closer political unity in the Arab world centred on the United Arab Republic?

President Nasser answered that there need be no conflict since Africa contained many Arab countries. In any case, the African charter was mainly a basis for the solidarity of African states.

SYRIA SURPRISE

Asked about the next stages in the political development of Arab unity, the President said that he had never, from the beginning, put great emphasis on the political side. Arab unity could not be forced by anyone. "We have no plans for it. What we can do is only to say ideas, only to give thoughts." The results of these ideas and thoughts would work themselves out in their own time.

He admitted that he was surprised when the union with Syria came so quickly. He had thought it would take another five years to prepare the ground. On Algeria, he insisted that, contrary to what was often said, he had always been in favour of a peaceful solution. He had even arranged a meeting between the French and the F.L.N. (National Liberation Front), but the French had left the meeting suddenly.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

PRES. NASSER REVIEWS HIS POLICY OF KEEPING AFRICAN STATES OUT OF COLD WAR

RECEIVED IN DIVISION 18 MAY 1967

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARG

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The United Arab Republic, said President Nasser, could best help the African states by keeping them out of the cold war. When I put in that this was what Britain wanted too, the President objected that the west always talked about the dangers of communism infiltrating into Africa. "We think this is not a danger," I said. "It is not really a question of the newly independent African states being communist or capitalist. What they wanted to do was to end corruption and exploitation, and to raise the level of society. "People used to say that I was a communist and Egypt was communist," said the President. "Now we read the same things about Guinea and Sekou Touré."

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His small daughter, for example, who was only five years old, had asked him: "If Britain, France, and Israel came to an end, would that mean there would be no more war?"

And what, I asked, was his answer. Another grin—"That was only an example."

Did he mean that there was bound to be mistrust for a generation at least? Not necessarily, he said. But he had doubts for a few years. In 1954, had been missed. Then someone had tried to assassinate him because he had made a speech in favour of agreement with Britain.

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A message from our Africa Correspondent on the Memorandum conference is on page 12.

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The announcement by Dr. Vittorio Veronesi, the Director-General of Unesco, reported from Khartoum, that the construction of the Aswan High Dam will be delayed and that 14 more months will be available for the Nubia salvage programme, means a welcome extension to their timetable for the archaeological teams now working in the area. Even 14 extra months, however, are unlikely to provide much of a margin before the inundation, as most of the archaeologists considered the time previously said to be available as altogether insufficient.

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V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VG.1022/2.

FROM Mr. M. J. Weir, Washington
to Mr. P. J. G. Regan.

Confidential.

No. 10420/2/61.

Dated January 31

Received February 3

SUBJECT:

Conversation with BREWER of the State Department -
NASSER's interview with the American Ambassador on
January 21.

References

VG.1017/1/2.

MINUTES

I think that the views in paragraph 6 are nearer the mark than the suggestion in Arnold Smith's telegrams (VG 1017/1 - Flag A) that Nasser has taken a deliberate decision to abandon non-alignment. It is perhaps worth adding that Nasser may well believe that he can use the Soviet Union to further his own aims in Africa without great danger to himself.

2. To-day's newspapers report that the U.S. Administration has come out with a firm warning to the U.A.R. about their activities in the Congo. This seems to indicate that those in the State Department who wish to take a stronger line with Nasser, have had some success (see para. 9).

3. Paragraph 10. We have no paper on U.A.R. policy of the kind Mr. Weir has in mind, though Arnold Smith's telegrams are considered in the submission at Flag B. Subject to anything which we may have said to the U.S. Embassy, we could send Mr. Weir some notes based on that submission and the minutes on it.

4. I see no objection to inviting the State Dept.'s comments on the Annual Review for 1960 (Flag C). There are some references to the United States which I have marked on pages 3 and 9 of the Despatch but I do not think they need prevent us passing it to the State Department.

5. *Li H.* Beeley should see these papers, which should be circulated to other Departments in the Foreign Office in due course.

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

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P.A.R. Blaker.
(P.A.R. Blaker)
February 17, 1961.

Mr Brewer a rather stumpy eyes, but today's story (a leak from the Congressional letter, on

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which the State Dept are avoiding comment, according to a telegram shown to me by US Embassy today) re-confirmation that the jet engine line with Wasser has proceeded.

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Feb 20

Mr Tom. Wain.

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Mar 14

See -/8.

PARB.
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CONFIDENTIAL

BY AIR BAG
10620/2/61

Much of the [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
to [unclear]
4.

British Embassy,
Washington, D.C.
January 31, 1961.

- 7 FEB 1961

V41022/a.

Don O'Regan,

*No: 1
only spoke
from an
interview
Sept.
min etc*

Brewer, the officer-in-charge of UAR Affairs in the State Department, asked me to call yesterday to hear an account of an interview which the American Ambassador in Cairo had with Nasser on January 21. He led off by referring to a recent conversation between Newsom and Beith, where Newsom had been given an outline of a paper the Foreign Office were engaged in drafting about UAR policy, in the light of the Canadian Ambassador's final interview with Nasser which appeared to have caused much concern in Whitehall. As reported by Newsom your views seemed to approximate closely to those of the State Department, although Brewer admitted that there was no unanimity on the subject in Washington. Accordingly they thought it might be useful to you to have an account of Reinhardt's interview, which is not available to the American Embassy in London.

2. The conversation was described as lengthy and cordial. Nasser again went over the argument that Palestine constituted a built-in problem in United States-U.A.R. relations. He denied that recent UAR attacks on the new Administration on this score represented a new departure; they had been made in pursuit of long-standing policy. The Arabs were not prepared to submit to pressure, by which he presumably meant President Kennedy's campaign statements. (However Brewer claims to have detected a falling off in such attacks since the Inauguration).

3. Nasser expressed pleasure at the outcome of the Casablanca conference, without making extravagant claims for its achievements. He remarked that the representative nature of the conference was not as limited as its opponents had made out, as many of the absent African states were not truly independent. On Algeria he "did not rebut" the argument put forward by Reinhardt that de Gaulle had made progressive moves, but said that the conference felt that de Gaulle's objective was a divided Algeria.

4. The Congo was the "only possible low note" in the conversation. Here Nasser expressed bitterness at Western policy. Reinhardt tried to get him to make some positive suggestions as to what should be done, without eliciting much. Nasser said that there should be a meeting of all Congolese leaders, that Parliament should be re-convened and that all outside intervention should cease; the United States should take a lead in promoting this policy.

/5.....

P.V.O'Regan, Esq., M.C.,
Levant Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL



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5. As regards Israel, Reinhardt himself brought up a report, about which several Arab Ambassadors in Washington had made enquiries at the State Department, to the effect that the United States was about to supply Israel with missiles and explained that it was without foundation. Nasser "seemed to accept" this. Nasser confirmed that the passage in his Port Said speech describing what the UAR would do if Israel were to acquire nuclear weapons correctly represented his Government's attitude.

6. In general Reinhardt felt that the interview was more in accordance with Nasser's standard line than other recent Egyptian utterances which had caused alarm, notably the interview with Arnold Smith. It did not, he felt, reflect these previous indications that a considerable modification of the UAR policy of non-alignment had taken place, in spite of the anti-Western slant of Nasser's remarks. One had to remember that for Nasser the definition of true independence for African states meant the removal of all Western influence from the continent. Reinhardt did not believe that the recent course of the UAR policy in Africa should be attributed to Soviet influence; it was simply that as various issues arose UAR interests happened to coincide with those of the Soviet Union.

*What Nasser
said*

7. Brewer said that the State Department were inclined to agree with Reinhardt's interpretation. They thought that perhaps the tone of Smith's interview was mainly accounted for by its having taken place soon after the news broke of Israel's nuclear activities. I did not take serious issue with all this, but suggested that even supposing there was nothing more than a coincidental identity of interest in the Congo between the UAR and the Soviet Union this did not make the UAR threat to our interests any the less, at least in the short term, or indeed much difference to our choice of tactics. Brewer did not agree, especially on the latter point. He thought that if we had concluded that the UAR were on the way to becoming committed to the Russians we might want to make our displeasure public in the hope of damaging their credit internationally. In fact, however, he thought there might well be differences between the two governments still. He quoted the reference in Khrushchev's speech of January 6 to the imprisonment of communists in various countries which he mentioned by name, including the UAR. The State Department had subsequently had from their Embassy in Cairo a report that about 20 Egyptian communists had been arrested at the end of December. Furthermore it seemed possible that Semenov's current visit to Cairo might mean that differences had arisen which it was thought were necessary to thrash out. As regards the Congo in particular, the withdrawal of UAR troops seemed to indicate that Nasser felt he had got in too deep, and that if only for financial reasons it would be wiser to pull out.

8. As possible confirmation of Reinhardt's more encouraging assessment Brewer referred to an article by Hassanein Heikal published in Ahran of January 27, which had all the marks of having been written to rebut the suspicion that the UAR had abandoned the policy of non-alignment. It might even have been written and published at this particular time in order to demonstrate to Semenov that the UAR were in no position to come off the fence on the Soviet side.

VG 102 v/3

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9. As noted above Brewer admitted that opinion in the State Department was by no means unanimous on the implications of recent UAR behaviour. In fact I suspect from other conversations that he and Hart, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and Asian Affairs, are in a minority in taking a comparatively sanguine view. While basically one might not quarrel with it, all too often its most prominent features seem to be the implication that Nasser's policies can only be really damaging to the West if he is consciously in league with communists; a tendency to accept uncritically Egyptian professions of non-alignment; and a similar sympathy for Nasser's line that all his actions are only reactions to what others have done to him (Brewer argued for instance that the recent anti-Western trend only became pronounced following Ghalib's expulsion from the Congo and the Israel reactor story). The indications are that these views have encountered growing resistance in the State Department of late, and that there has been some pressure for taking a tougher line with Nasser. (And not only in the State Department - vide the enclosed letter from Senator Lehman, a former Governor of New York and an influential Democrat, albeit Jewish). It is unlikely that this would go beyond private and possibly public remonstrances, although threats might conceivably be used over economic aid, as Nasser himself has conceded. For the present however it looks as if there will be no departure from existing policy.

10. If your paper on UAR policy when complete is suitable for showing to the Americans I think it would be useful if we could try to obtain an official State Department reaction to it. Meanwhile, unless you see objection, I shall invite their comments on the Annual Review for the U.A.R. for 1960, which does not entirely support the thesis outlined above.

11. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries in Cairo, Tel Aviv, Beirut and to POMEF.

*Yours sincerely,
Michael Weir*

(M.S. Weir)

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK TIMES, January 24, 1961.

Join 24/61

Letters to

Warning on U. A. R. Role

Domination of New African Group Held Threat to Peace in Area

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES: On Dec. 9 the U. N. General Assembly awarded the United Arab Republic a seat on the Security Council—a position of great honor and power. As far as anyone knows or can find out, the United States went along with this action. Certainly in the months that preceded the vote the State Department was an apologist, if not an open advocate, for giving the U. A. R. this seat on the central peace and law enforcement body of the United Nations.

When in a letter to The Times early in October I protested against the possibility of the election of the U. A. R. to the Council, representative of our State Department hastily tried to explain and justify the proposed selection. I found the explanation most unsatisfactory.

My original protest was doubly based on the dubious wisdom of seating on the Council a nation which persisted in violating and defying the Council's own resolutions on the Suez Canal, and was the most constant mischief-maker in the Middle East; and on the even greater error of failing to award this seat to one of the black African nations, who, at that point, had no representation whatever on the Security Council. Instead of taking a course of constructive leadership in this situation, the United States went blindly along in the same old rut of appeasing Nasser, supinely accepting the mistaken notion that the seat in question "belonged" to the Arab League.

Effects Being Felt

Now American and the rest of the free world are reaping the dubious dividends of this latest cultivation of the goodwill of Nasser.

At the beginning of this month there was held in Casablanca a conference of five neutralist nations: Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Mali and the U. A. R.—all black African, except for the U. A. R. From this conference Nasser's voice and views emerged as the most potent, thanks in part at least to Egypt's recent elevation to membership on the Security Council.

At this Casablanca conference an African organization, modeled along the lines of NATO, was projected. Nasser, of course, expects to dominate this organization which he hopes to utilize for the advancement of his own designs—his dream of the creation of a great Afro-Asian empire, with himself at the head of it. This has always been his vision.

The first steps on the road could be to use this new African organization to wage political and military war, first against Israel, and then against others who have resisted or thwarted him—Jordan, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq and Turkey.

Already at the Casablanca conference Nasser showed what was on his mind by forcing through an unscheduled resolution denouncing the acceptance from Israel of technological assistance or advice. Several African nations, including Ghana, have long been profiting from such assistance and cooperation.

What has been our recent reward from Nasser in return for our indulgence of him?

Daily Attacks

We are being attacked and vilified almost daily in the Egyptian press and over the official Cairo radio. While almost the entire rest of the world is hailing the inauguration of a new United States President, shrill and discordant notes arise along the Nile, with violent assaults against President-elect Kennedy and denunciations of his views and proposals.

What does this mean for the problems and challenges which confront the United States in this area? First of all, there must be a careful and incisive review of the substantial implications of the new African organization and its possible or potential impact on the world power structure and on the diplomatic alignments in the Afro-Asian area. It may well be that forces have been set in motion which are beyond reversal and must be met at the next intersection rather than at the one already passed.

Where the point of next impact of these forces might be, or where the point of equilibrium might be, is beyond seeing at the moment. But we dare not avert our eyes from this situation, or from the real consequences of our past policies.

HERBERT H. LEHMAN

New York, Jan. 19, 1961.

SIR R. STEVENS HAS NOT SEEN O.R. 24/2.

CONFIDENTIAL



- 9 FEB 1961

V61022/s.

1) Mr Beaumont
2) Levant Desk
3) Mr. [unclear] [unclear]
BRITISH EMBASSY,

BAGHDAD.

February 2, 1961.

1054/22/61

Dear Roger,

I have just seen Dr. Fawzi for an hour. The only points of interest were the following:

- (a) I said that I hoped that neither in this meeting nor in the United Nations would statements be made that would make a settlement of the Oman question more difficult. He said that he thought that the Buraimi question was ripe for settlement and that the Oman question could be settled after that. Meanwhile they would be giving full support to the Omanis. I pressed him on our usual line, but he was fairly evasive.
- (b) He said that relations with Iraq had improved and would get better. They were always trying to improve their relations with Tunisia.
- (c) They were increasingly concerned about arms for Israel, especially from France. I said that they must be very well-supplied themselves, to which he replied that arms nowadays tended to be obsolete as soon as they had left the factory and their supply was a constant drain on countries which could not afford it. They were also concerned about the possibility that Israel was seeking to make atomic bombs. I asked him whether they had any evidence of this, to which he gave no definite reply. I said that we were wholly against the extension of atomic bombs to any other powers and suggested that the Israeli reactor, which I understood to be intended for peaceful purposes, was smaller than the reactor being built in the U.A.R.
- (d) He had warned Dag Hammarskjöld eighteen months ago that there would be trouble from his principle of "leave it to Dag". Khrushchev's triangular proposal did not make sense. A triumvirate had never worked. But Hammarskjöld needed real support at the top of the secretariat by way of a kind of cabinet composed of men prepared to give him independent advice. He hoped to see Hammarskjöld soon; they had assured him that in spite of all that was said in the press, they really wanted to cooperate with him. They had intended to take their troops out last September, but had waited until now in deference to his wishes. Hammarskjöld made a mistake in taking a defensive position for so long. He should have been more positive. Instead of telling the Congo not to receive assistance, he should have encouraged other countries to give assistance to the Congo through United Nations' channels. It was essential now to have a new deal

/in

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

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in the Congo. The United Nations Secretariat should not be left in sole charge of United Nations action there, but must have some political body appointed by the Assembly or the Security Council to direct its operations in the Congo. It was essential to prevent assistance getting to the Congo from any quarter other than the United Nations and any country which was found out giving such assistance should be denounced, including the U.A.R., if it were found doing this. The Russians were angry ~~with~~ those who had caused the removal of their representation in the Congo and the whole situation was complicated by the involvement of outside powers. Nobody wanted to see civil war in the Congo, but it would be better to let the various elements in the Congo fight it out, isolated from outside assistance, rather than that the Congo should become a major danger to world peace. If such a policy were adopted, there might be a little tribal fighting but nothing very serious.

What is secret?

2. I told Dr. Fawzi what a lot of nonsense had been talked in the press about the Anglo-Communist conspiracy in Iraq, and he agreed and characteristically added 'including from official sources'. The conversation on the restoration of Anglo-U.A.R. relations went on expected lines.

I am copying this letter to the Chanceries at Cairo, Bahrain, Tel Aviv, Washington,, to the United Kingdom Mission in New York and the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

Yours ever
Peter Heyes

For: HUMPHREY FREVELYAN

CONFIDENTIAL



BRITISH EMBASSY,
BRAZZAVILLE.

G.1013/61

SECRET

February 2, 1961.

10 FEB 1961

Dear Department,

VG.1023/61

Some time ago you sent us a copy of your letter VG.1023/33 of December 8 about the United Arab Republic's activities in Africa and elsewhere.

2. During his recent visits to the capitals of the other three countries which, together with the Congo (Brazzaville) cover the area formerly known as French Equatorial Africa, the Ambassador picked up one or two small points of information about relations with the U.A.R. which may be of interest.

3. In general, it is true to say that none of the Governments of the Congo, Gabon, the Central African Republic or Chad would be favourably inclined towards U.A.R. activities in their territories. The inhabitants of the first three are not Muslim and in some areas, particularly the Central African Republic, they have a historical dislike for the Arab and Muslims dating from the day of the slave traffic. It is only in the Chad that there is any substantial number of Muslims. There the northern part of the territory and half the population are Muslim, and many of them speak some sort of Arabic.

^ more than

4. In all these countries, even in the Chad, the Israelis have been making a substantial effort. It must have annoyed the Egyptians very much when the Chad sent an official mission to Israel at the beginning of 1960. An agricultural mission, headed by the Minister of Agriculture, is also due to leave for Israel this week. On the other hand, there must be a potential pull towards Cairo amongst some of the Muslims in the Chad. It was interesting in this connection that the President of the Chad (a Christian from the South) told the Ambassador that no representative was coming to Fort Lamy for the recent Independence celebrations from Cairo. Nevertheless, the U.A.R. Ambassador in Tripoli turned up for 24 hours and was taken under the wing of the Libyan Consul in Fort Lamy. The Ambassador was told (though he does not vouch for the truth of the story) that this resulted from a casual invitation given in New York by the Chadian Foreign Minister, Monsieur Toura Gaba, a Muslim, who had been the object of U.A.R. flattery whilst he was there.

VR1234 (no)

5. Whilst the Ambassador was in Bangui the Foreign Minister of the Central African Republic was much exercised about the difficulty of sending a party of Central African students to Israel. These students, who have been sent to follow courses of study in Israel, had to travel via Europe because the U.A.R. had refused clearance for Israeli planes to fly over its territory. This refusal had evidently come as a surprise to the Foreign Minister.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

Levant Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

SECRET

SECRET

Office of the United Kingdom
Representative in the
Republic of Cyprus,

3 Duplicates

NICOSIA.

27th February, 1961.

- 1022/1(A)

Thank you for your letter of 2nd February enclosing a letter from Blaker of the Foreign Office asking for information about the U.A.R. Mission's activities in Cyprus. Your letter was received here on the 10th February, but as I was in hospital at the time it was put on one side. I have only just returned to duty. I apologise nevertheless for the delay in answering your letter.

The U.A.R. Mission in Cyprus was opened on 16th October and their Ambassador did not arrive here until 10th January. It is too early, therefore, to obtain any clear pattern of their activities in Cyprus. However, the following information may be of some use to the Foreign Office.

The Greek Cypriots as a whole are well disposed towards the U.A.R. because of the presence of a large number of Cypriots in Egypt, U.A.R. sympathy and moral support for the EOKA struggle and because they hope to increase trade between the two countries. At the same time the Cyprus Government is seeking as far as possible to steer a middle course in the Arab/Israeli conflict, although if it comes to the point Cyprus would undoubtedly tend to lean towards the U.A.R. As a result of U.A.R. pressure, the Israeli Ambassador was not allowed to present his credentials until after the U.A.R. Ambassador had done so, although agreement for the Israeli Ambassador's appointment had been obtained in August and he had been in the Island since Independence.

After the U.A.R. Ambassador presented his credentials, both he and Archbishop Makarios said they hoped a meeting could be arranged between Colonel Nasser and the Archbishop in the not too distant future. The Ambassador added that he saw no point of friction between their two countries, apart from the possibility of the British Bases being used against the U.A.R. or any other Arab country, but on this he believed that the repeated statements made by the Archbishop constituted a guarantee against this ever being allowed to happen.

The U.A.R. boycotted the Cyprus Trade Fair last September because of Israeli participation, but at the same time they sent a trade and economic mission to Cyprus to investigate the possibilities of promoting trade between the two countries.

L. P. Widdows, Esq.,
Commonwealth Relations Office.

/The

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The U.A.R. Ambassador held a large reception on the occasion of his country's Independence Day on 22nd February, which was attended by the President, Vice-President, Ministers and members of the Diplomatic Corps (excluding, of course, the Israelis). As they arrived at the reception, the guests were presented with a well produced propaganda pamphlet about the achievements of the U.A.R. and its close ties with Cyprus.

According to local press reports of 26th February, the Cyprus Foreign Ministry and the U.A.R. Embassy in Nicosia have denied a report which appeared in the Daily Telegraph of 24th February that the U.A.R. had warned the Cyprus Government that an exchange of Ambassadors between Cyprus and Israel would have grave consequences. So far as we know, the Cyprus Government has no intention at present of opening a diplomatic mission in Israel.

(A. G. Sheridan)

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1967

V

North and East African Department

VG 1022/8.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

FROM Mr. G. Minnie, Mr. J. G. Smith

SUBJECT:

U.A.R. Foreign Policy.
Comments on the Canadian Ambassador's farewell interview with NASSER.

Secret.

No.

Dated January 31.

Received March 15.

References

VG 1017/1

MINUTES

The tels at VG 1017/1, received from the Canadians, are now somewhat old but ~~you~~ interested Dept may wish to see them at leisure.

(Printing Instructions)

I wd be interested in the comments of General Dept (Mr. Ballentyne) on Nasser's remarks about the NEACC in para 18 of tel No 693 (flag #).

(Outward Action)

Sp. Mr. M. J. Blair, Washington
for Mr. G. J. Smith Mar 15.
carried to:
L. H. Wright, Cairo.
Mr. J. Richardson, Addis
A.B.A.C., Juyuan.
J. J. Eddon, Beirut
J. W. Redford, C.A.O.

PARB.

2/3.

General Dept. first.

Eastern Dept (Mr. Smart) Juyuan

tels No 692 + 693 at VG 1017/1.

A.E.T.D. (Mr. Brooke-Turner).

para 18. at flag A. + VG 1022/3.

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

D 13/10 2/6

J.R.D. (Mr. Riley) - to see VG 1022/8.
Then back to NEAD (Mr. Blake).

FOLD.

Nasser's

Nasser's interpretation of NEACE is quite wrong of course. It was set up in 1952, and was joined by Italy in 1956, to coordinate the supply of arms to the Middle East generally. The original intention was to ensure that the supply of arms to the area, in accordance with Tripartite Declaration of 1950, should not exceed quantities legitimate for internal security and self defence. This formula is open to a very wide interpretation of course, and since the Ctee has no power to control arms exports (in fact this was expressly excluded in the terms of reference), it has merely become a forum for the exchange of information. Even this function is doubtful since the French, at least, have been less than honest in declaring their exports to Israel. A tacit understanding has come to be that the USA supplies virtually nothing to the M.E. and we have tended to supply land equipment to Israel, leaving aircraft to be supplied by France; but this was not done by design and there has, of course, been no agreement regarding atomic weapons.


[Signature]

Thank you. As above.

M.H.B.
2/3.

Number of copies.....

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CONFIDENTIALU.A.R. Foreign Policy

The three telegrams at VG 1017/1 report various discussions which Mr. Arnold Smith, until recently Canadian Ambassador to the U.A.R., had before leaving Cairo. The most important is No. 693, reporting his farewell interview with President Nasser, of which the main points were:-

Flag A
V61022/1

- (a) the U.A.R.'s policy of non-alignment is ended, principally because the U.A.R. is threatened by U.K./U.S./French aid to Israel, including aid in the nuclear field and the supply of French supersonic aircraft.
- (b) The U.A.R.'s new policy is increased co-operation with the Soviet bloc.
- (c) The U.A.R. has lost faith in the United Nations and now shares the Soviet view that it is an instrument of the United States.
- (d) The U.A.R. will support "genuinely independent" states in Africa. This seems to mean states intent on eradicating Western influence.

Flag B

2. The Prime Minister has commented "these reports are certainly not very encouraging" and the Secretary of State has indicated that he would like to discuss them.

Flag C

3. The Department's view, which we understand is broadly shared by the State Department, is that:

- (a) the Canadian Ambassador spoke very well. This is in keeping with the very useful influence he exerted while in Cairo.
- (b) There is nothing absolutely new in this unfavourable turn in the relations between the U.A.R. and the West. In contrast with the trend in 1959, the

/U.A.R.

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U.A.R. moved steadily closer towards the Soviet Union during 1960. This process was accelerated in the latter part of the year by U.A.R. disappointments in the Congo, which she attributed to Western manoeuvres, and by frustration at the way African nationalism was failing to suit her. It received a further sharp impetus with stories that Israel might be developing the capacity to make atomic weapons.

- (c) Nasser is more antagonistic towards the West and more confident of his star than some other members of his régime. This confidence is nothing new and he stands to gain considerably in prestige if his African policy is successful. But he is also an opportunist and reacts to situations rather than creating them.

4. Much depends on what Nasser means when he says he has abandoned non-alignment. There is no indication that he intends to be any less severe with Communism within his own borders. As regards foreign policy, we must not underestimate the sense of frustrated bitterness on the subject of Israel which all Arabs share to greater or lesser extent and which the U.A.R. régime feel bound to represent (and sometimes they seem to be putting on a show for our benefit - "When Israel crops up we go crazy"). But if Nasser means that he has decided, e.g. to accept the Soviet line automatically on international issues or, which seems very unlikely, to accept Soviet bases on his territory, he will have to reckon with the possibility that this will make his leadership less acceptable to many independent African states. It is possible, however, that what he has in mind is merely an even greater dependence on

/the

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the Soviet Union in the military and economic fields. Either prospect would be a gloomy one. Although he was probably speaking partly for effect, in the knowledge that his words would reach a wider circle in the West through Mr. Smith, we cannot ignore them and shall have to watch the situation carefully for any new major U.A.R. commitment to the Communist bloc.

5. Mr. Smith's reports preceded our agreement on Ambassadors and consulates, which may be something of a watershed in our relations with the U.A.R. As the State Department say, the present situation offers scope for skilful diplomacy and the exchange of Ambassadors will help by allowing us direct access to Nasser and thus giving us some chance to combat Soviet trickery in feeding him false reports, to which Mr.

Flag D

Smith refers in paragraph 18 of his telegram No. 693. This question, and that of the steps to be taken to calm U.A.R. fears about Israel atomic developments are being pursued separately.

6. To sum up, these reports present a good account of Nasser's recent thinking. They undoubtedly make gloomy reading but we must await further practical evidence before we conclude he is lost to the Soviet bloc.

*Do not think
this is what the
SAC suggested.*

7. The Department do not think these reports merit a special meeting between the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, but we shall of course be briefing Ministers for discussion with Mr. Beeley later ^{in February} ~~this month~~.

John Beith
(J. S. Beith)
January 31, 1961.

Copy

Lord Privy Seal

Mr. Godber

/I agree

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I agree with the foregoing minute although I am not sure that the word "watershed" is the right description of the U.A.R. agreement to exchange Ambassadors. It is true that this seems to have been a personal decision by Nasser but it may well have been only a tactical move in the interests of improving his chances of penetrating the British East African territories later; moreover he has established the principle of consular representation in the Persian Gulf. There is also the, to me, somewhat puzzling decision that this was the moment to withdraw the U.A.R. contingent from the Congo which, though doubtless a tactical and not a strategic retreat, must make Nasser's immediate opportunities for trouble-making smaller.

2. I have a feeling that Nasser is at present waiting on events and that, possibly, the Russians are still playing their relations with the U.A.R. somewhat cool. This may well continue while they are assessing the policy of the new U.S. Administration and the chances of Summit meetings.

3. It is interesting to see that in Nasser's Port Said speech, despite strong words about the Israeli atomic reactor, he referred to the principle Arab objective as Arab nationalism, and to entanglement with Israel (and with Jordan) as a "side battle". If the Arab countries continue to mend their fences among each other, and the Arab League meeting in Baghdad may provide fresh indications of this, we must expect that Arab attacks on the remaining Western positions in the Arab world, not only Algeria but no doubt also the Persian Gulf and Aden, may be stepped up. If there should be a prospect of a measure of East-West detente, this is perhaps the more likely.

R.S. Crawford

(R.S. Crawford)
February 1, 1961.

*I agree with Mr. Crawford that there are certain puzzling aspects about Nasser's policy. But I do not think that a possible detente with the West has any part in them; it may be rather a question of *rencler pour mieux sauter*. As for the consequences of an exchange of Ambassadors, it is obviously better to have direct access to Nasser, but it would be wise not to expect too much — the Americans have not made any progress in the last 18 months!*

M.B. Stevens

1/2

S E C R E T

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(Vr 1022/8)

March 15, 1961.

Dear Michael,

In your letter 10620/2/61 of January 31 you referred to a paper about United Arab Republic policy which we were said to be drafting in the light of the farewell interview with Nasser of Arnold Smith, the former Canadian Ambassador in Cairo.

2. We have not in fact prepared any such paper, though we considered Arnold Smith's telegrams carefully and have discussed them and other recent indications of U.A.R. policy with the United States Embassy.

3. We agree that our views seem to be close to those of the State Department. As we see it, there is no doubt that the U.A.R. moved steadily closer to the Soviet Union during 1960. The process was accelerated in the latter part of the year by U.A.R. disappointments in the Congo, which she attributed to Western manoeuvres, and by frustration at the way African nationalism was failing to suit her. It received a further impetus with the stories that Israel might be working on an atomic bomb.

4. But there seems to be little evidence to support the suggestion in Arnold Smith's telegrams that Nasser has taken a decision to abandon non-alignment. Indeed in the recent Security Council vote on the Congo the U.A.R. took a quite different stand from the Russians. In any case, even if Nasser were contemplating some such move as Arnold Smith's telegrams suggested, a good deal would depend on what he meant by "abandoning non-alignment". There is no suggestion that he might intend to be any less severe with Communism within his own borders. As regards foreign policy, we must not, of course, under-estimate Arab frustrations and bitterness about Israel, which the U.A.R. represent. In particular we consider we must take very seriously the statement in Nasser's Port Said speech in December about what the U.A.R. would do if Israel got the atomic bomb (you will have seen the separate correspondence about what can be done to calm U.A.R. fears on this score). But if Nasser really were to decide e.g. to accept the Soviet line automatically on international issues or, which seems very unlikely, to accept Soviet bases on his territory, he must know that this would make him less acceptable to many independent African states, not to mention the Arab world. It may be that what he had in mind was merely an even greater dependence on the Soviet Union in the military and economic fields.

5. Our assessment of Nasser's policy is closer to what was indicated in his interview with Reinhardt. We agree that the tone of his talk with Arnold Smith may have been affected by the fact that the interview took place soon after the news of Israel's nuclear activities. It may also be that Nasser spoke partly for effect, in the knowledge that his words would reach a wider circle in the West through Arnold Smith. But it would clearly be unwise to reject altogether the more pessimistic view, and we shall have to continue to watch the situation carefully for any possible new major U.A.R. commitment to the Communist bloc.

/ 6.

M.S. Weir, Esq.,
Washington.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

6. It is true that U.A.R. policies and actions have recently tended on most occasions to be very close to those of the Soviet Union and have often been detrimental to our interests. But so far we consider that this is more probably the result of a belief on the part of Nasser that his interests coincide with those of the Soviet Union, at least in the short run, than a conscious desire to play the Communist game. We think that this does make a difference to the tactics we adopt towards Nasser in practice. For example, there are obvious dangers in statements such as the one Mr. Ruak recently made in Congress (your letters of February 17 and 18, not copied to all), which would predictably be interpreted (or misinterpreted) as meaning that the U.A.R. is a tool of the Russians. It seems to us that this sort of statement would probably be taken by Nasser as proving that the Americans have failed to comprehend his policy; and in that case it could hardly improve matters between the two countries. I should add that we did not take this particular case too tragically; it was useful that the Americans publicised the U.A.R.'s aid to Gizenga.

7. As regards our own relations with the U.A.R., we do not of course expect any sensational or immediate results from the exchange of Ambassadors. But it will obviously be an advantage to have direct access to Nasser himself. This may amongst other things help us to expose the false information which the Russians seem to have been feeding Nasser (paragraph 18 of Arnold Smith's telegram No. 693). We are considering what steps should be taken about this and hope to be able to give Harold Beeley some ammunition soon after he arrives in Cairo.

8. We have no objection to your inviting the State Department's comments on the Annual Review for the U.A.R. for 1960.

9. I am sending copies of this letter to Wright in Cairo, Pakenham in Tel Aviv, Edden in Beirut, Political Office Near East Command (Cyprus) and the Commonwealth Relations Office.

*Yours ever,
Howard Smith*

(H.F.T. Smith)

S E C R E T


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BY AIR BAG
UNCLASSIFIED
10620/11/61



Extract from The New Republic,
March 13, 1961.

Forwarded with the Compliments

of the British Embassy.

Washington, D.C.
(M.S. Weir)

Levant Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

Also to Chancery,
Cairo.

March 15, 1961

Neutralism—the Nasser Brand ^{10620/11/61}

by Elizabeth Monroe

Anyone is entitled to be baffled by President Nasser's conception of neutrality. His overtures now to one side, now to the other of the middle course that he says he is pursuing puzzle even Egyptians. For instance, within the last two months he has ordered a new roundup of Egypt's Communists, yet on Lumumba's death he allowed Cairo (where demonstrations are strictly controlled) to stage one of the biggest of the attacks on Belgian ambassadors that Communist Parties synchronized all over the world. And the Belgians promptly severed diplomatic relations. More significantly, he has oscillated between impetuously ordering the withdrawal of Egypt's UN contingent from the Congo (January), and ardently sponsoring a Security Council resolution in favor of UN intervention there, including the use of force "as a last resort" (February). Blowing hot and cold is not everyone's synonym for neutralism.

At least, so the Ambassadors of Canada and Pakistan thought when, independently, they recently pursued a Cairo rumor that Nasser was leaning too far to the left for the taste of some of his closest henchmen. They inquired officially how matters stood. The Egyptian response was immediate, and was made public. An inspired article in Cairo's leading newspaper (*Al-Ahram* of January 27) blasted the doctrine. Egypt, it said, was as neutral as India. Departure from the sphere of Western influence did not entail entry into the sphere of any other bloc. Further, Egypt's neutrality was positive, meaning nationalist and it was domestically reformist and egalitarian. "Positive neutrality is not opportunism."

"Nasser," the article continued, "is a symbol of the will of the nation and the echo of its voice," but a point that was passed over in silence is that he personally is making a positive—indeed, a dashing—role also in foreign policy, and aspiring to leadership first in the Arab world (where he has had some rebuffs and has made only limited progress) and more lately in Africa south of the Sahara. So long as the Cold War lasts, any neutral leader who seeks to better his standing outside his own frontiers is virtually bound to act in ways that seem both opportunist and like taking sides. This fact of life becomes obvious to anyone who tries to derive a list of Nasser's preoccupations at any mo-

ELIZABETH MONROE is a fellow of St. Anne's College, Oxford, and was formerly Middle East correspondent of *The Economist*.

ment. To list the top three: the craving for leadership among the uncommitted nations, the wish to thwart and curb Israel, and the determination to oust all vestiges of Western control from Africa in order to make room for African management. The chief reason why his neutralism so often looks unneutral is that active pursuit of any of the three objectives brings him into conflict with the West, owing to the West's very presence in the areas where he hopes to shine. Imperialism may be shaky, but the marks of its passage still balk his first ambition—French marks in North Africa, British ones in Ghana and Nigeria, and so on.

As to Israel, his anti-Western temper rises as he watches its atomic energy plant going up in hush-hush security conditions not far from his frontier—a development which he ascribes to French expertise and US money. His resentment against the Israelis, whom he describes as the "tools of French and British imperialism," swells when he contemplates their successful drive for trade and adviserships in West Africa. Lastly, each move he makes to rid Africa of direct Western imperialism—moves against France in Algeria, Belgium in Katanga, Britain in the Horn of Africa, or against use of the Sahara for nuclear experiments—are not only bound to be anti-Western but are also likely to be in line with Soviet policy. And so, in many Western eyes, he becomes a pink, if not a red.

But closer scrutiny shows that his alignment with Soviet Russia is far from complete. There is a difference of aim. Where the Soviets see no objection to sowing lawlessness provided it makes trouble for the capitalists, Nasser hopes to keep the Cold War out of Africa. In this sense, he is a neutral pure. Analysis of his acts suggests that they are contradictory only in the terms of the Cold War—terms in which we are too apt exclusively to think; and that they become logical, even if impetuous to a fault, when studied in the light of his own ambitions.

As he sees the score, the West is entrenched in Africa (bad) and the Soviet Union is not (good). He is content to let the Russians catch up with the West in realms of commerce or advice, but not to let them win political footholds. As soon as there is a risk that they will arm Congolese vassals, and split Africans into Communists and anti-Communists, he shifts balance and throws his weight onto the side of moderation and the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Fable and history are full of Nassers—from the seer's apprentice to the pre-partition Pole who

MARCH 15, 1961

thought that they could manage forces greater than themselves, and were wrong. But President Nasser's chances of successful management are rather greater than theirs on account of the current change which is taking place in the distribution of power - a change due partly to the proliferation of new small states, but chiefly to the strange boon of a nuclear stalemate. In any situation short of world war, the power once wielded by the European imperialists has not been shared out between the successor giants; it has been fragmented. And Nasser is prominent among the competitors for the fragments.

The competition is hot. In keeping pace with it, he is bound to deviate from the dead center of neutrality; and, whatever his protestations to the contrary, opportunism is inevitable. But he will defeat his own ends if his deviations are all to one side of the line, and they are not likely to be so.


Lastly, there is a parochial and material reason that may help to steady his course. In the short run, he can look impressive to the new states he hopes to lead if he moves from conference to conference proposing, as

he did at Casablanca in January, resolutions that they all applaud but that none of them is in a position to carry out. But in the longer run his quest for leadership is vain unless he can point to Egypt as an example of good management at home. In his awkward Syro-Egyptian parish, this is not easy. The unequal resources and economies of his two provinces are not smoothly marriageable, and population pressure dogs him in the Nile Valley. The temptation to distract attention by dabbling in international pyrotechnics is very great. But, unless he begins to withstand it, he cannot concentrate on the backyard business by which he will, in the end, stand or fall. In particular, he cannot create - as India has created, and Ghana, Nigeria and Morocco are on the way to creating - a climate that attracts foreign investment. This he must have. Nowadays, the borrowers who are doing best are getting it from both East and West. He is one of them, but needs more than he has had. He is a shrewd man and may see before long that, in order to attract substantial funds from both sources at once, the only course is not merely to be neutral, but to become dependably so.

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,
CAIRO.

(1623/61)

March 17, 1961

CONFIDENTIALDear Department, *JK1621/13* *V61621/13*

Abdul Aziz Ishaq (see correspondence resting with your telegrams Nos. 370 and 371) returned to Cairo on March 15 after a tour of nearly two months in East and South Africa. We enclose a summary translation, published by the Middle East News Agency, of the statement which he made at Cairo airport on his arrival and which was published in "Al Ahram" on March 16. What will puzzle a good many people here is that he should have been admitted to Tanganyika, the Union of South Africa, the Central African Federation, and even Mozambique, and yet denied entry to Zanzibar.

2. None of us has yet met Abdul Aziz Ishaq. We understand that he is between 40 and 45 and was originally a school-master. He was apparently teaching in the Sudan when Zulficar Sabri (now Deputy Foreign Minister) was the Egyptian member of the Governor-General's Commission in 1954/55. Zulficar was apparently impressed by his abilities and persuaded him to abandon teaching for service in the Foreign Ministry. He first came into the public eye in the late summer of 1960, when he was sent to Leopoldville to prepare the ground for the opening of a U.A.R. Embassy in the Congo. When the Embassy opened he was appointed Cultural Attaché, apparently because he was still on secondment from the Ministry of Education and could not be called anything else. He returned to Cairo in December 1960, when the U.A.R. Ambassador and his staff were expelled from Leopoldville; and soon after that he was transferred from the Ministry of Education to the African Department of the Foreign Ministry in the rank of Counsellor. In *January* ~~June~~ this year he went to Dar-es-Salaam with Fuad Galal for the meeting of the Steering Committee of the All Africa Peoples Conference. He is clearly going to be one of the main Foreign Ministry experts on East and South Africa. It can also be assumed that he works for the General Intelligence Department, though we have no actual proof of this. He has been in the news a good deal since his return from Leopoldville, particularly since his wife is the guardian of Lumumba's children.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

Q.

North & East Africa Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.CONFIDENTIAL

C O P Y

REPORT ON IMPERIALIST PLANS IN AFRICA
UAR ENVOY VISITS EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA
("Al Ahram" of March 16)

The nationalist political parties in the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland have as one of the main items on their programmes the dismantling of the Federation of Central Africa which was forced on them by the Europeans.

This statement was made by Dr. Abdel-Aziz Is'haq, Counsellor for African Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, who returned to Cairo yesterday from a 53-day tour in East and South Africa. He visited countries with which UAR have no diplomatic relations, namely Tanganyika, Central Africa Federation, Mozambique and Basutoland, as well as the Union of South Africa.

Dr. Is'haq said he studied the problems facing these countries in the social, economic and political fields. He will make an extensive report on the currents prevailing in the area and the trends of Western countries and their policies there.

The UAR envoy started his tour by visiting Dar el-Salaam, capital of Tanganyika. In this country, the first experiment of a multi government has been applied where all races participate in the legislative and executive councils. This is preparatory to the application of this system in other British protectorates.

From there, he proceeded to Salisbury, capital of Central African Federation. He visited the African residential quarters 20 kilometers out of the city. He met the leader of the African Democratic Party Joshua Nkomo who had recently been in Cairo and had a conference with President Gamal Abdel-Nasser in Damascus.

In Cape town, the UAR envoy noticed the state of tension which existed between Europeans and Africans, on account of the State policy of apartheid. The Union government is preparing a project to clear Cape town from all the coloured residents. They will be deported to distant areas outside the town, come in the morning to do their work and clear out in the evening.

From there, Dr. Is'haq visited Basutoland which is something of an 'island' in the heart of the Union. The population of Basutoland is some 300,000 people under British protection.

Next the UAR envoy proceeded to Mozambique, the Portuguese authorities prohibit the entry of Arabs. The Africans of Mozambique are prevented from forming political parties and trade unions, and from publishing newspapers.

The UAR envoy could not visit Uganda and Zanzibar where colonialist authorities make it difficult for Arabs to get in. Likewise, at the Nairobi airport, Dr. Is'haq was prevented by the British officer from entering the city. The UAR envoy insisted that he should cable his Government in Cairo to register this arbitrary treatment on the part of the British. He was forced to spend 14 hours at the airport hall.

Dr. Is'haq concluded his tour by a short visit to Khartoum. From there he flew back to Cairo.

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Minutes.

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PA Mr. Sighen
DAILY TELEGRAPH
29 MAR 1961
Cutting dated 16/02/1961

CAIRO EYES ON AFRICAN TRADE

THREAT TO WEST

From Our Own Correspondent
CAIRO, Monday.

A 30-man mission from the United Arab Republic is leaving Cairo next Monday on an extensive African tour, ranging from Ethiopia to Cameroun and Nigeria. The primary object is to counter Israel's commercial activities in Africa and if possible to "freeze" her and all the Western Powers out of the continent.

The mission, headed by Mr. Mahmoud Hamza, director of the commercial representation department at the Ministry of Economy, is ostensibly economic. But in fact its task is both economic and political.

The 30 members have been chosen carefully. They are fast-talking, highly qualified men who will be taking with them hundreds of samples of United Arab Republic products.

The United Arab Republic hopes that the wave of nationalism sweeping Africa will help her eventually to replace Britain as the biggest supplier of consumer goods in the continent.

CONFIDENTIAL

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The Turkish Ambassador called on me this afternoon at his request. His main object was to ask for our views about the method by which the new Secretary-General of CENTO should be selected. I spoke to him on this subject on the lines suggested in the departmental minute. I added that if the Turkish Government was anxious to secure this appointment it was up to them to put forward the name of a really good candidate.

2. Mr. Erkin then told me that he had recently been in Paris where he had an interesting conversation with a former resident in Egypt. The latter had told him that rumours were current in Cairo, that Nasser might be moving towards a new policy of reconciliation with Israel based on a desire to settle the Palastine problem in order to be able to devote more time and energy to Africa. I asked the Ambassador whether his friend had any solid evidence in support of this view which was new to me. He replied that he had not and admitted that he did not think the story very probable. I said that Nasser would have to be very convinced of his ability to carry the rest of the Arab world with him if he were to execute such a welcome change of policy. It was true that his reconciliation with King Hussein (which was not otherwise easy to explain) could conceivably be interpreted in this light but I did not see any other indication supporting the theory.

3. Mr. Erkin then said that his Government had heard reports (he implied that they came from the Turkish Ambassador in Cairo) that the United States Ambassador in Cairo had recommended to the State Department that, in view of the difficulties that Nasser was making in Africa, the United States Government should drastically revise its policy towards the United Arab Republic and in particular United States aid to the United Arab Republic should be cut. The staff of the Embassy should/reduced and the Point 4 Mission recalled. Mr. Erkin said that he thought that this report was contributed by several newspaper articles in the United States press. I told him that we had heard absolutely nothing to suggest that this report was true nor were we aware of any recent developments in United Arab Republic policy which might have provoked it.

/be

ll
ROGER STEVENS
April 6, 1961.

Eastern Department JTW

Mr. Hillier 9/4
7/4
Mr. Smyth

Copied to:

(2 copies to P.O.S. in conjunction with NEAD Dept)

North-East African Department.

NEAD are reporting accordingly.

Jacob Smart
7/4
Mr. Hillier JTW
7/4

CONFIDENTIAL

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

April 15, 1961.

Dear Department,

1. During the past two or three months we have periodically reported the gist of Hassanain Heikal's articles in the weekly supplement of "Ahram".

2. This supplement, which comes out every Friday, first appeared on January 20. It is twelve pages long, and the whole of the front page is always taken up by a signed article by Heikal entitled "Frankly Speaking". The remainder of the supplement consists of articles, often translated from foreign books, newspapers and periodicals, on political, cultural, social, scientific and literary subjects. The layout is obviously based to some extent on the Observer "Magazine Section".

3. It is quite clear that the supplement is designed to play a major part in the U.A.R. propoganda machine. To begin with, Heikal's weekly article is always on an important topical aspect of foreign affairs, and can be assumed to represent the thinking of the regime. The Political Counsellor of the American Embassy (who has been attacked by name in one of Heikal's articles) has expressed the view that the existence of the supplement has made political contacts, and studying the rest of the Cairo press, unnecessary: all one has to do is to read Heikal once a week and one then knows everything one is likely to find out about the regime's attitude to important problems of foreign affairs. This is perhaps an extreme view, but there is certainly something in it. Moreover, the material published on the inside pages of the supplement represents a serious attempt by the regime to woo the Egyptian intellectuals, who have recently been showing signs of restiveness. They have full opportunities for contributing articles expressing controversial views on a wide range of non-political subjects, and we understand that this has done much to improve their morale. For example, the British and American staff at the American University here, some of whom themselves contribute to the supplement, say that it is read avidly by the staff and students of the University. On the political side there is also evidence that Heikal's articles serve a double purpose, first as pure propoganda, and secondly as an indirect means of orchestrating the rest of the press. It is noticeable that the other papers often wait for the "Ahram" supplement to appear before expressing views on a particular political matter, and then slavishly follow the line taken by Heikal. In this context we had an interesting experience. When the Ambassador arrived there

/was ..

North and East African Department,
Foreign Office.

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was a good deal of euphoria in the Cairo press. The editor of the illustrated weekly "Musawwar" took an early opportunity of asking for photographs of the Ambassador for inclusion in a double page article. The following day Heikal produced a somewhat cutting but generally realistic effort on Anglo-U.A.R. relations in the supplement. The editor of Musawwar subsequently told Parsons that he no longer needed the photographs, as the tone of Heikal's article indicated that it would be inappropriate to publish what he had planned in Musawwar for the time being.

4. So far the general tone of Heikal's political articles has been depressing from the Western point of view. Although there has been comparatively little direct praise of the Soviet Union, he has taken every opportunity of castigating the West, and particularly the United States, on all counts, e.g. the Congo, imperialism in Africa, Arab nationalism, East/West relations and so on. His latest effort consisted of a summary of the "main points of danger" through out the world, which boiled down to a series of detailed allegations of the aggressive attitude of the new United States administration - the size of the American defence budget was cited as an example, whereas nothing was said about the Soviet equivalent. The activity of local Communist parties was criticised, but mainly because of the danger that they might involve the Soviet Union "against its will".

5. In view of the increasing importance of the supplement we propose to report Heikal's weekly articles regularly and fully in future.

6. We are sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Amman, Baghdad, Beirut and Washington, to the Consulate-General at Damascus and to PONEC (Cyprus) and POMECC (Aden).

Yours ever,

Chancery



<p>1967</p>	<p>V</p> <p>North and East African Department</p> <hr/> <p>UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC</p>	<p>VG 1022/16</p>
<p>FROM Press Extract "The Times"</p> <p>No.</p> <p>Dated May 15</p> <p>Received May 16</p>	<p>SUBJECT:</p> <p><u>U.A.R. Foreign Policy</u></p> <p>"The TIMES" special correspondent had an interview with Nasser; policy towards Africa; Britain asked to be "fair and just".</p>	
<p>References</p>	<p>MINUTES</p>	
<p>(Printing Instructions)</p>	<p>This is a useful survey of Nasser's views. They have been slightly slanted with his British audience in mind, but contain little that is new. The fuller record at VG 1053/7 confirms the version in "The Times".</p>	
<p>(Outward Action)</p>	<p><u>Africa</u></p> <p>2. When Nasser says he wants to keep the African states out of the cold war it seems that what he really means is that he does not want them to be responsive to Communist or Western influences. He wants them to be amenable only to African influences, of which he hopes to be the dominant one. This explains why he objects to the West talking about the dangers of Communism in Africa. He regards this as an argument used by the West to justify a continued Western presence in Africa. It also explains why he argues that African states which are still influenced by foreign countries (e.g. the Monrovia group) are not independent.</p> <p>3. Nasser's statement that he does not believe in military intervention in the Congo in any form is satisfactory. (This statement does not appear explicitly in the record at VG 1053/7.)</p>	
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p>7/2/67</p>	<p>(Main Indexed)</p> <p>2/2/67</p>	<p><u>Non-alignment</u></p> <p>4. His use of the word "non-alignment" instead of "positive neutrality" does not appear to reflect any change of substance. He makes it clear that he will feel free to take a stand on any international issue anywhere. The fact that he has recently made public statements about Cuba and Laos bears this out.</p>
<p>J136 58267-3</p>		<p>/5.</p>

Conference of non-aligned countries

5. His remarks confirm the impression that the conference will be intended to harmonize attitudes rather than to set up any new organisation. On page 3 of the record at VG 1053/7 Nasser is reported as saying that the preliminary meeting will be held at the end of this month.

The Arab world

6. It is interesting that Nasser now admits that he was working for political union with Syria in 1954 (even though he claims that he then regarded its attainment as distant).

U.K./U.A.R. relations

7. Nasser's remarks confirm that he does not wish to move too fast towards cordial relations with us, and indeed that he feels that it would be dangerous from the point of view of his own public opinion to try to do so.

8. Nasser's answer to the last question at VG 1053/7 is interesting. Our relations with Israel are in fact those which one would normally expect between two non-Communist countries, but Nasser regards them as taking the Israeli side. His attitude on Israel is that he who is not with him is against him.

PAK Blaker
(P.A.R. Blaker)
May 23, 1961.

W.C.A.D.
Eastern Dept
New Dept
I.P. 26214
F.O.R.D. (15/8/61)

KS with 24

Paras 6 & 7 above are worth noting. 7 has always been clear to me; 6 I am not so sure (or was not).

Sw R Strength
07/2/76

JD
May 25

The

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Minutes

The weakness of Nasser's argument in regard to Africa seems to me twofold:

- a) he will not realise, or at least not admit, that some "black" African countries feel themselves to be different from the "Arab" ones and - without any pressure from the West - do not want to have much to do with Egypt (the West had no hand in arranging the Monrovia conference);
- b) Nasser apparently thinks that Egypt has a right, as an African country,

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country, ^{Minutes} to influence the
affairs of the continent
in a way that European
countries (according to him)
have not; similarly, he
thinks that Egypt should
exercise influence, as an
Arab country, in the
Middle East; but where
is a maritime country
like the U.K. to
exercise influence? - This
is like the one-sided
Soviet interpretation of
colonialism.

2. Nasser thinks
that Communist
infiltration of Africa
is not a danger.
But

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Minutes

But how can he dismiss
his danger if he is
so convinced of the
dangers of neo-colonialism?
If the African countries
are not capable of
resisting pressures from
their former imperialist
masters, who are on
the way out, why should
they be capable of
resisting pressures from
the Communists, who
are on the way in?
Either the Africans
are genuinely independent
- in which case
Nasser has no need
to

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Minutes

to wong about us -
or he must logically
admit that the Russians
could step into our
shoes.

R. Fisher

8/6

NEEDS

Useful.

PAAL

9/6

Mr. Hambley Dick
FORD (me) 6. 1966.

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Minutes

AMERICA AND THE U.A.R.

1. Mr. Newsome of the American Embassy mentioned to me recently a farewell conversation of the United States Ambassador in Cairo with President Nasser. Apparently Mr. Reinhardt appears to have spoken with some fervour about American concern at the hostile manner in which their policies were misrepresented in the U.A.R. and by U.A.R. propoganda. He contrasted the U.A.R. attitude to America with the American attitude to the U.A.R. which was manifest in the American willingness to provide economic and technical assistance. In this connection he expressed regret that the U.A.R. authorities had not agreed to the establishment of an American Economic Mission in Syria to help to administer the aid which the United States was prepared to provide. Nasser replied that he could not agree to a separate mission; arrangements for administering the aid could surely be made within the American Consulate General in Damascus.

2. Mr. Newsome also mentioned the various indications of friction between Moscow and Cairo. I said that in this connection we were writing to H.M. Embassy in Washington to ask them to put to the State Department our view that it would be a mistake to try to make propoganda out of these differences. Mr. Newsome said he entirely agreed and implied that this would be the view of the State Department too.

H.F.T.


(H.F.T. Smith)
June 2, 1961.

Mr. Blaker

Para 1. dff to Cairo.
2. Para 2. See addition
to dff letter to N. Wright.

A.A.B.
5/6.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

(1031/61)

May 27, 1961.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Department,

There have been some indications recently that all is not entirely well in U.A.R./Soviet relations and also that relations between the U.A.R. and the United States have, at any rate publicly, taken a slight turn for the better.

- 5/27/61
2. First, it is now well known in Cairo that Khrushchev and Anwar Sadat had a sharp row when the latter was in Moscow with the U.A.R. Parliamentary Delegation (see our letter 1031/61 of May 16 to Moscow). Mohammed Hassanein Heikal told the Ambassador on May 24 that Khrushchev had tried to haul Sadat over the coals both for the U.A.R. treatment of communists and for general aspects of the revolutionary regime here. Sadat had telegraphed for instructions and had been told to inform Khrushchev that his remarks amounted to interference in U.A.R. internal affairs and that he, Khrushchev, should realise that all revolutions need not necessarily follow a path leading inevitably to communism. According to Heikal, Khrushchev took this riposte in good part.
 3. Secondly, the Cairo press reported on May 23 that the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zulficar Sabri, had summoned the Soviet Ambassador on the previous day and had drawn his attention to a Moscow Radio broadcast which had mentioned "tendentious" press reports that a communist named Riad el Turk had been killed in a U.A.R. prison. According to the press Sabri told the Soviet Ambassador that el Turk was in the best of health, and suggested that Moscow Radio should be careful in its treatment of reports carried by prejudiced newspapers (we understand that the press report referred to appeared in the World Marxist Review).
 4. Thirdly, the Russians are believed to be a bit peeved with Nasser for sponsoring the neutralist summit conference which does not apparently suit their book, and for associating himself in this venture with Tito. There is a fairly well authenticated story going round Cairo that the Soviet Ambassador has already been to five "neutralist" Embassies in an attempt to persuade them to recommend to their Governments that they should not be represented at the preparatory conference scheduled to open here on June 5.

/5.

North & East African Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

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5. Fourthly, Kemaluddin Hussein, the Supervisor General of the National Union, made some nasty remarks about communism in a speech which he made a few days ago in the course of a provincial tour. Hussein said that the U.A.R. would find its own road to socialism and had no intention of adopting any atheistic, materialist and internationalist creed.

6. As regards U.A.R./United States relations, the anti-American press campaign which has been such a prominent feature for some months, was called off a few weeks ago. We have been told on good authority that orders to stop attacking the Americans were in fact issued to the press on about May 3. Apart from a little muted growling these orders have been generally obeyed. No paper has of course said anything nice about the Americans but the absence of attacks and the relatively objective reporting and comment on matters concerning the United States, is a welcome relief after the storm which has been raging since the end of last year.

7. The importance of these developments should not be exaggerated: Nasser's basic attitude towards both sides almost certainly remains the same and the indications mentioned above probably represent no more than a slight movement of the pendulum away from the extreme Easterly position in which it has been stuck almost continuously since the beginning of 1960. The American Embassy believe, probably with some justification, that the propaganda cease-fire was prompted by the fact that agreements for American aid, particularly for 200,000 tons of PL 480 wheat, are now being renegotiated and that the Egyptians are anxious not to queer the pitch. One member of the American Embassy told us on May 25 that they had procrastinated over signing the agreement for the PL 480 wheat in such a way as not to call Egyptian "face" into question, but making it clear at the same time that an improvement in U.A.R. public behaviour towards the United States would probably expedite the conclusion of the agreement. As he put it "we kept losing our pens at the crucial moment and finding that no one had the key to the cupboard containing the relevant papers". As a result the anti-American propaganda had suddenly stopped and the PL 480 agreement will probably be signed to-day.

8. We are enclosing an extra copy of this letter and are sending copies to the Chanceries at Moscow, Belgrade and Washington and to the United Kingdom Mission, New York.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

H.T.S.

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Draft.

letter to
Carol Charney.
for
I.R.D.


Dear Charney,

We have read with interest
your letter 1031/61 of May 27
about UAR/Soviet relations. It
would be helpful if you would
send correspondence on this and
related subjects in the "S" series.
This ^{automatically} provides us with other interested
departments with our own copies.

Yours ever
I.R.D.

Det. 2/1

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CONFIDENTIALAIR BAG
10620/32/61BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
June 14, 1961.

Dear Howard,

In your letter VG 1022/18 of June 6 to Wright in Cairo you asked me to put to the State Department your views about how we should handle the row between the U.A.R. and the Soviet bloc.

2. I had already discussed the matter with Brewer, the officer in charge of U.A.R. affairs, and he himself made the point that the Russians were now making the same mistake in trying to put pressure on the Egyptians that the West - including the United States - had occasionally made in the past and which he hoped would never be repeated. I have since spoken to him on the basis of your letter and he confirmed that the State Department agreed that we should keep out of the dispute and not try to make any capital out of it on the information side. The subject also came up in the course of a talk I had the other day with the new American Ambassador to the U.A.R., Dr. Badeau, and he took the same line. While naturally gratified that he should be embarking on his mission in such a favourable atmosphere he was not disposed to regard the current dispute as more than part of the normal ups and downs of U.A.R. relations with the Communists, and was quite prepared to see the pendulum swing in the other direction before long. Finally I have had a word with Halsema, the Director of Planning at the U.S.I.A., who is shortly going out as Information Officer to the American Embassy in Cairo, and he confirmed that his people were remaining silent on the subject.

3. As for the American press it is taking a fairly balanced view. There are of course various pieces appearing in a self-congratulatory vein under such headlines as "U.S. wooing Nasser - he tiffs with Reds" (New York Herald Tribune) but the general conclusion is that if Nasser is reverting to a genuine neutralism this is good enough for the United States. To quote from a C.B.S.

/ broadcast:

H.F.T. Smith, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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- 2 -

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broadcast: "Probably there is very little this country could or should do in the circumstances. Any attempt to exploit the rift might have the effect of healing it."

4. The article about wooing Nasser referred to new negotiations with the U.A.R. for further aid under PL. 480. The State Department confirm that these are under way, and that the U.A.R. is asking for approximately the same quantity as they had in the current year. This is in fact the normal season for such negotiations, and the State Department point out that if the Russians had been concerned about an improvement in U.A.R./United States relations they could hardly have chosen a worse moment to pick a quarrel themselves.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to Wright in Cairo and Reddaway in Beirut.

Yours ever

M. S. Weir

M. S. Weir.

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British Embassy,
Cairo.

10312/61

July 25, 1961

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ARCHIVES
27/08/1961

VA.1022/24.

Dear Department,

In his speech to a popular rally on July 22 Nasser finished with some short references to Africa, the non-aligned conference and the United Nations.

2. He said that the U.A.R. was working for the liberation of Africa and for African solidarity. Imperialism had enabled Israel to infiltrate into Africa, in order to pave the way for its own return. The Africans now realised that Israel was a tool, a springboard and the vanguard of imperialism.

3. Turning to non-alignment Nasser said that the countries which would take part in the Belgrade conference did not constitute a bloc. The U.A.R. was against the policy of blocs and military alliances. The non-aligned countries represented the conscience of the world: the conference would ease tension between the two opposing blocs and would help to find solutions for complicated problems.

4. Finally Nasser said that the U.A.R. supported the United Nations but that the Congo experiment had shown that the United Nations structure should be revised. The number of independent countries had doubled since 1945. The United Nations should be reorganised to meet the requirements of the present era.

5. We are sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Belgrade, Djakarta and Washington, to the U.K. High Commissioners' offices at Accra and New Delhi and to the U.K. Mission, New York.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY
#26.

North and East African Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

RESTRICTED

1961

V

North and East African Department

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

V G. 1022/25

FROM Mr Armitage-Smith
Colonial Office
To Mr J.G.S. Beith

SECRET

No. 151. 102/25/01

Dated August 3.

Received August 4.

SUBJECT:

U.A.R. Activities in East Africa.

Points illustrating the Colonial Office's attitude towards the U.A.R.

References

Va. 1141/2/A.

Va. 1141/2/A/B.

MINUTES

This letter provides further confirmation of the basic divergence of views between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office on the problem of U.A.R. propaganda and subversion in the East African colonial territories.

2. Mr. Armitage-Smith says in his second paragraph that the "basic reason" for the reluctance of the Colonial Office to facilitate contacts between the U.A.R. and individuals from the East African territories is that, although the territories will soon be independent, "even a short period of protection" may help to equip them better to deal with the threat of U.A.R. ambitions. This is diametrically opposed to our view, expressed in paragraph 5 of our memorandum on visa policy in East Africa, sent to the Colonial Office with Sir R. Stevens' letter of April 26 at /29, that H.M.G. should allow the Africans to acquire some experience of U.A.R. activities while we are still around to give the Africans good advice.

3. This important Foreign Office argument was deleted from the memorandum as re-drafted by the Colonial Office (see paragraph 2 of Mr. Blaker's minute of June 30 at /38). The final version of the memorandum also excludes it, although the final sentence of para. 4 goes some way towards covering the same ground (/45-Flag "C").

4. In his paragraph 3, Mr. Armitage-Smith overstates our point of view: we do not assume that U.A.R. activities are "harmless"; in paragraph 3 of his letter of May 31 at /26 (on which, incidentally, the Colonial Office have been very slow to comment), Mr. Beith says clearly enough that we simply want to avoid treating the U.A.R. as more of a bogey than she really is. It is I suppose natural that the Colonial Office and the East African Governors should be more frightened of the U.A.R. than we are. If her external policy really does "further the Communist cause in the short term", it is not because it is designed to do so, but merely because it is on occasion contrary to our interests and therefore incidentally useful to our opponents at large. But surely this is all the more reason for our seeking to cultivate friendly relations with the U.A.R.?

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How else can we hope to diminish the hostility of her external policy towards H.M.G.'s interests in our various colonial territories elsewhere?

5. Although I do not think it will do much good, I think we should put these views to the Colonial Office. I submit a draft.

D. A. Hamley
 (D. A. Hamley)
 August 14, 1961

I do not think it will do any good to return to the charge with the C.O. We have put our views to them ad nauseam and at a high level. I suggest we should let the matter drop.

2. The C.O. have the last word about what shall be done in our colonies. We shall merely irritate them by pursuing the matter.

PAH/Blaker.
2/8.

R.S.
23/8

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SECRET

COLONIAL OFFICE

GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON S.W.1

Telephone: ABBEY 1266 Ext.—

Your reference:
Please quote: ISD 103/63/01

3 August 1961

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4 AUG 1961

Va 1022/25

Dear Beith,

With reference to your letter to Fairclough of 31 May about Sheikh Iga, you will have seen from our savingram No. 988 of 18 July 1961 to the Governor of Uganda (a copy of which we sent to you) the action which we took on this case and also the general advice which we gave to the Governor. I am writing now not to pursue the general question of policy towards the UAR in East Africa (which is currently being discussed in the correspondence between Stevens and Martin) but to let you have one or two comments.

2. First, as to the points made in your para. 2, despite what you say, there is little that the UAR does in Africa that is not damaging to the interests of our territories. It needs to be remembered that despite our territories' approaching independence, most of their inhabitants are still, if not primitive, at any rate unsophisticated and very liable to be taken in by UAR blandishments. We naturally recognise that in a short time they will have to fend for themselves anyhow. But even a short period of protection may mean that by the time they do meet the threat which UAR ambitions represent they will be better equipped to deal with it. This is the basic reason for our reluctance to facilitate contacts between the UAR and individuals from our East African territories.

3. With reference to para. 3 of your letter, we do not "assume automatically" that UAR policy is aligned with that of the USSR or China, far from it. But we think that it is a fallacy to assume that UAR activities are harmless in so far as they are not aligned to Communism. Indeed, such activities often seem to the East African territories a more real and imminent threat than activities of the USSR or Communist China. Although in the long term the main threat is from the Communist world, in the shorter term Nasser's policies towards East Africa are directly subversive both of our United Kingdom interests in the area and of the best interests of the territories themselves. Moreover, whether or not Nasser's internal policy is attuned to that of the USSR, his external policy often in fact furthers the Communist cause in the short term.

4. I hope these thoughts will be useful by way of explanation of our attitude towards the UAR.

Yours sincerely,
J.N.A. Armitage-Smith

(J.N.A. Armitage-Smith)

J.G.S. BEITH, ESQ.,
Foreign Office.SECRET