

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

The Viscount Hood

No. 2616
September 30, 1961

D: 10.40 p.m. September 30, 1961
R: 11.09 p.m. September 30, 1961

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2616 of
September 30

Repeated for information to:

- | | |
|--------------|-----------------------|
| Amman | Kuwait |
| Tel Aviv | Rabat |
| Cairo | Tunis |
| Beirut | Benghazi |
| Baghdad | Tripoli |
| Tehran | Khartoum |
| Bahrain | Ankara |
| POMEC (Aden) | U.K. Mission New York |

RECEIVED IN
2 OCT 1961
VG 1016/127

and Saving to Damascus. — VG 1016 — VG 1016/124

Your telegram No. 1047 to Amman and my telegram No. 2594 (not repeated to all): Syria.

State Department say that United States Consul General in Damascus was asked to call on the Syrian Prime Minister earlier today. The Department have not yet received his report, but they think it probable that Kuzbari will have requested United States recognition of his Government.

2. The State Department are examining the legal aspects of recognition, and say that they would in any case not (repeat not) take action to recognize over the week-end. They still hope that at least some of the Arab States, preferably those which are not regarded as subservient to the West, will recognize before it becomes necessary for the United States to do so. At the same time they remain anxious not to withhold recognition for a long time.

13.

RECEIVED IN
2 OCT 1961
VG 1016/124

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Washington telegram No. 2616 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

3. The State Department do not think there would be any particular advantage in British and American recognition being accorded simultaneously. They do however wish to keep in close touch with us on this subject, and they have undertaken to consult us again before according recognition.

Foreign Office please pass to Amman, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad, Tehran, Bahrain, POMEC (Aden), Kuwait, Rabat, Tunis, Benghazi, Tripoli, Khartoum, Ankara and saving to Damascus as my telegrams Nos. 21, 17, 31, 23, 26, 40, 29, 15, 24, 3, 18, 3, 5, 5, 56 and 5 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Private Secretary
Sir H. Stephenson
Mr. Marett
Head of Eastern Department
Head of N.E.A.D.
Head of News Department
Resident Clerk

GGGGG

CONFIDENTIAL

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

RECEIVED IN

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir B. Burrows

U/1016/128

No. 1361
 September 30, 1961

D: 1.13 p.m. September 30, 1961
 R: 2.30 p.m. September 30, 1961

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1361 of September 30.

Repeated for information to:

Washington	Tel Aviv
UKMIS New York	Tehran
Cairo	Bahrain
Baghdad	PONEC (Cyprus)
Beirut	POMEC (Aden)
Amman	Kuwait


My telegram No. 1360: Syria. — U/1016/

Asked whether he could give us the reasons for Turkey's early recognition the head of department concerned in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the Minister the following this morning. Iran and Iraq appeared to be thinking of recognising (and Qasim's statement this morning could be interpreted as tending to confirm this for Iraq). Nasser's speech of yesterday indicated that he thought it was too late for him to do anything. In any case Turkey's relations with Nasser could not be made much worse than they were at present. All information tended to show that the new Government was in full control, and that the new Ministers were nationalistic and not pre-Communist. The new Syrian Prime Minister had received the consular corps (with the exception of the East Germans) yesterday to inform them of the formation of the new Government and to say that they considered the corps accredited to them. Finally, as a neighbour Turkey had many practical problems on which they had to transact normal business with a Syrian Government. In answer to a question the official concerned said that internal politics here had played no part in the decision.

2. The official concerned also said that the Turkish Government had not thought it necessary to take any restraining

/action

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Ankara telegram No. 1361 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

action in Baghdad and that the time for that and, indeed, the danger of intervention was now past.

Foreign Office please pass Priority to Washington 72, UKMIS New York 17, Routine to Cairo 11, Baghdad 26, Beirut 72, Amman 8, Tel Aviv 7, Tehran 218, Bahrain 13, PONEC (Cyprus) 439, POMEK (Aden) 1 and Kuwait 13.

[Repeated as requested.]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Lord Privy Seal
Sir H. Stephenson
Mr. Marett
Head of Eastern Department
Head of N.E.A.D.
Head of Central Department
Head of News Department
Resident Clerk

4444

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir B. Burrows
No. 1364 D. 10.44 a.m. October 2, 1961
October 2, 1961 R. 11.10 a.m. October 2, 1961 ✓

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1364 of October 2.

Repeated for information to: Cairo

- | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------|-------------|
| Amman | Tehran | 42 OCT 1961 |
| Beirut | Washington | |
| PONEC (Cyprus) | UKMIS New York | ✓ 1016/129 |
| and Saving to Damascus. | | |

Cairo telegram No. 956 to you: Turkish/U.A.R. Relations.

Following is translation of Ministry of Foreign Affairs communiqué issued late last night.

Begins

"As is known, the revolutionary action of the armed forces of Syria on the night of September 27-28 and the Government subsequently formed under Dr. Memun el Kuzberi ended the union between that country and Egypt and proclaimed Syria's independence. The revolution ended in success and the Syrian armed forces took complete control of the country. In a speech given in Cairo on September 29, President Nasser said that it was not through force but through the will of the peoples concerned that the union could survive. Therefore, our Government accepting the Syrian withdrawal from the union as an accomplished fact, decided to recognize the new Syrian State and so informed the Kuzberi Government today, the 1st of October 1961, at 3 p.m.

The Egyptian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs summoned our Ambassador in Cairo and informed him that they had decided to break off diplomatic relations with Turkey in view of Turkey's recognition of Syria. Our Government can only regret this action by Egypt. The national importance of our relations with Syria, who is the neighbour with whom we have the longest land border, as with all other Arab States, based on the traditional bonds of brotherhood, cannot be overemphasized. This friendship and closeness above all else made it necessary for us to recognise a Syria who had in very fact attained and proclaimed its independence. In our recognition of Syrian independence, which President Nasser himself had accepted, there was absolutely no hostile intention towards Egypt, whose friendship we value.

/Just



Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

Ankara telegram No. 1364 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Just as in 1958 Turkey recognised the Union of Syria and Egypt as an expression of the will of the two peoples, so this time Turkey has done no more than record, as a friend and neighbour, the will of the Syrian people to withdraw from the union and return to the status of an independent nation. As our Government has always emphasized, it hopes that the Arab nations will continue to live together in brotherhood and peace and that the two sides will continue the friendly relations with this country which are consistent with tradition and their true interests. Finally, let it be said that despite the action of the Egyptian Government and the breaking off of diplomatic relations, the Turkish nation will always continue to harbour sincere feelings of friendship for the Egyptian nation."

Ends

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and UKMIS New York as my telegrams Nos. 73 and 18 and Saving to Damascus as my telegram No. 1.

[Repeated as requested.]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary
Sir F. Hoyer Millar
Sir R. Stevens
Mr. Crawford
Head of Eastern Department
Head of N.E.A.D.
Head of Central Department
Head of News Department

XXXXX

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION ✓

Mr. Henniker-Major

No. 813

October 2, 1961

D. 2.0.p.m. October 2, 1961
R. 2.25.p.m. October 2, 1961IMMEDIATEAddressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 813 of October 2.

Repeated for information to: Washington, Cairo,
Beirut, Baghdad, P.O.N.E.C. (Cyprus),
P.O.M.E.C. (Aden), Tel Aviv,
Damascus

and Saving to: Jerusalem, Kuwait, Bahrain

Syria. King Hussein's broadcast on October 1.

A lengthy speech mainly devoted to praise of the Syrian revolution and to support for it.

2. He said "we have seen in this step taken by Syria a true expression on freedom for whose name martyrs have shed their blood. These martyrs have not... devoted their energy and lives for the sake of some people who have defied themselves and whose only aim is to have incense burnt at their feet. We see in the revolt in Syria a true means toward an Arab unity which is not founded on fear and terrorism".

3. He said "our support for the Arab glory, the sun of which has risen in Syria, has no limits and our blood and our souls and everything which our faith in our country holds is a sacrifice for the great national aims to which our nation is looking forward and which have undammed the spring of happiness and power in this sister country a few days ago, just as they will undam it in every other Arab country in the coming days".

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Damascus as my telegrams Nos. 96 and 19 respectively.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Lord Privy Seal

Sir F. Hoyer Millar

Sir R. Stevens

Mr. Crawford
Head of Eastern Department
Head of News Department
Head of N.E.A.D.



CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Henniker-Major

No. 814
October 2, 1961

D. 1.24 p.m. October 2, 1961
R. 2.00 p.m. October 2, 1961

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 814 of October 2.

Repeated for information to:	Cairo	POMECC (Aden)
	Beirut	Washington
	Baghdad	Tel Aviv
	PONEC (Cyprus)	Damascus

and Saving to: Jerusalem
Kuwait
Bahrain

OCT 1961
VG 1016/131
VG 1016/132

My immediately preceding telegram : Syria.

Whilst I have no reason to believe that there is imminent danger of Jordan army moving into Syria, King Hussein's public declaration of unlimited support for new régime means that if Nasser attacks, a pro-Nasser counter-coup is staged, or if new government runs into other difficulties and Jordan is appealed to, he will feel bound to respond. In any case, statement issued at time of recognition virtually said as much. It is also clear that he regards this attitude as an important deterrent to the use of force by Nasser, which indeed it probably is.

2. I have, as you know, taken every opportunity to urge restraint on the King, but circumstances have now rather changed. I do not want to chivvy him unnecessarily. Such action might be counter-productive since he is already irritated with the B.B.C. but I shall assume, unless you instruct me to the contrary, that you still wish me, if I think it necessary, to make it clear that I associate with the points made by my United States colleague on September 30, viz:

- (a) That we should deplore intervention of Jordanian forces in conflict in Syria, and
- (b) As Jordan's closest friends and supporters, we would expect to be consulted before an irrevocable decision were taken.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3. If



CONFIDENTIAL

Amman telegram No. 811 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

3. If I am informed that Jordan army is to move, or learn that it has begun moving, I propose to instruct Joint Training Mission to stand down at once, and, if it seems appropriate, to inform King Hussein in advance that this will happen. As none of the Mission now have executive functions, this is not a difficult problem. It will, in these circumstances, no longer be a very effective threat.

4. I do not pretend that the King will be likely to heed our advice. He regards his continued existence as being at stake and, unlike last year, there are no military risks involved which we could invoke to dissuade him. In fact he would feel certain of success. He may also calculate that, though his action would temporarily alienate us, he would in the event of success, inevitably become more important to us.

Foreign Office please pass Priority Baghdad 113, PONEC (Cyprus) 97, POMEK (Aden) 31, Washington 97, Tel Aviv 79 and Damascus 20.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Lord Privy Seal
Sir F. Hoyer Millar
Sir R. Stevens
Mr. Crawford
Head of Eastern Department
Head of News Department
Head of N.E.A.D.
Head of Consular Department

CONFIDENTIAL

77777

SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

Cypher/OTP and By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 1104

October 4, 1961

D. 6.47 p.m. October 4, 1961

PRIORITY

SECRET

Addressed to Amman telegram No. 1104 of October 4.

Repeated for information to Cairo	Kuwait
Baghdad	POMEC (Aden)
Damascus	Beirut
Bahrain	Tel Aviv

and Saving to Washington No. 4893

Your telegrams Nos. 814, 818 and 819.

I agree that you should take every opportunity to counsel restraint on Jordanians. Syrian revolt has passed off apparently without bloodshed and our main hope must be that it does not lead to instability elsewhere, and above all to the outbreak of violence. Consequences of the latter throughout the Middle East might be most grave. Egyptians are admittedly still hinting darkly at intention to reverse the coup in Syria but we have made clear to Ambassador in London how much concern we should feel if use of force were contemplated (see my telegram No. 1471 to Cairo). It is not in fact clear what action is open to Nasser other than a long-term policy of pressure and subversion in Syria, and it may well be that he will make the best of a bad job and accept a fait accompli for the time being. Paragraph 4 of Cairo telegram No. 971 (not to all) is perhaps a hopeful sign. It is therefore very important that neighbouring countries, including Jordan, should do nothing to raise the temperature and increase the risks of a violent Egyptian reaction.

2. It is not perhaps surprising that Qasim is seeking to encourage Jordan to take a hand in Syria. Anything which distracts Jordan and increases for her the difficulty of maintaining the contingent in Arab League forces in Kuwait might provide opportunity there for Qasim to exploit. Removal of Jordanian contingent would very seriously reduce the deterrent value of Arab League force and it is important to keep it there during the coming months when

/Kuwaiti

SECRET

SECRET

Foreign Office telegram No. 1104 to Amman.

-2-

Kuwaiti armed forces are being expanded and trained. Qasim may be preoccupied for the present with Syrian developments but anything he may hope to gain by intervention in Syria would be small compared to what is at stake in Kuwait and latter is likely to remain his principal objective. I suggest that by keeping alive the idea that Qasim may be trying to hoodwink the Jordanians you may be able to discourage them from policy of cooperation with him over Syria.

3. Question of recognition of new Syrian Government is under examination and I will keep you informed of development of our views. Early decision to recognise is unlikely but in any case I agree with Sir H. Beeley (Cairo telegram No. 973) that our recognition would not in present circumstances be likely to have a restraining effect on Nasser.

SECRET

SECRET

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Henniker-Major

No. 818

D: 5.00 p.m. October 2, 1961

October 2, 1961

R: 5.40 p.m. October 2, 1961

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 818 of October 2
Repeated for information to:

Cairo	POMEK (Aden)
Beirut	Washington
Baghdad	Tel Aviv
PONEC (Cyprus)	Damascus

and Saving to:

Jerusalem	Bahrain
Kuwait	

My immediately preceding telegram.

Simultaneously with my summons to the Queen Mother, the King sent for my First Secretary and his American opposite number.

2. He expressed his continued deep concern and annoyance with the attitude of the BBC. He had also summoned Noel Barber, of Associated Newspapers to ask if the Daily Mail could do something about it.

3. He said that he had believed recognition by Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Lebanon was imminent. He had been in touch with Qasim who had said that the reference to imperialism in his speech was directed against Nasser and no one else and that he would intervene in Syria if there was a Nasser counter coup. The King was confident that recognition would follow shortly. The Saudi Arabian Chargé d'Affaires in reply to messages from the King to King Saud, had assured him that he expected an answer

/this

SECRET

SECRET

Amman telegram No. 818 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

this evening. He had cause to believe that the Lebanon was about to recognize, but was also concerned about information he had concerning the arrival in Beirut of large numbers of Egyptians. He feared that they were there to organize a counter coup and cause trouble within the Lebanon.

4. The Syrian Government had asked the Jordan Government to pass a cypher message to the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo from the Soviet Consul General in Damascus who were out of touch with their Embassy. This had been done and he naturally feared that this was the prelude to early Soviet recognition.

Foreign Office please pass Priority to Baghdad, PONEC (Cyprus), POMEK (Aden), Washington, Tel Aviv and Damascus as my telegrams Nos. 115, 99, 33, 99, 81 and 22 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

Lord Privy Seal
Sir F. Hoyer Millar
Sir R. Stevens
Mr. Crawford
Head of Eastern Department
Head of N.E.A.D.
Head of News Department
Head of Arabian Department
Resident Clerk

GGGGG

SECRET

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/GTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Ar. Henniker Major

No. 831
October 4, 1961

D. 12.45 p.m. October 4, 1961
R. 2.14 p.m. October 4, 1961

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 831 of October 4
Repeated for information to: Cairo

Washington
Beirut
Baghdad
Tel Aviv

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
5 OCT 1961
VE 1016/139

My telegram No. 817. ✓ 28/10/61

There is some evidence that the King's resentment against us and the United States Government is building up. He was most indignant when he saw First Secretary (see my telegram No. 818) he has also criticized us sharply when urging recognition on other Ambassadors.

2. When considering recognition I am sure that you have taken all factors affecting this post into account, and I fully realize that there are many more important considerations at stake.

3. Any serious delay in recognizing will, however, have damaging effect on our relations with the King for the following reasons:

- (1) He believes that recognition by United States Government and ourselves by putting an end to uncertainty will reduce possibility of conflict and at least temporarily preserve stability: which he understands to be our main aim in the Middle East. He does not, I think, calculate that recognition by Her Majesty's Government and United States Government would by itself restrain Nasser, but is certain that it would give the lead to general recognition and build up confidence inside Syria. If he is now called upon to help the Syrian Government he will do so and probably blame us for having forced him into this situation by not having taken our chance to stabilize situation by recognition.

/(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES
5 OCT 1961

CONFIDENTIALAmman telegram No. 871 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

(2) We have dissuaded the King from Syrian adventures and intrigue in the past on the grounds that outside intervention is no way of achieving his aims. He has, I think, continued to cherish the belief that, provided it does not result in conflict we should like, as we should have done in the past, to see a curtailment of Nasser's power and influence. He is at a loss to understand how, when a coup has taken place in the most favourable circumstances, i.e. without his interference or a conflict, we should not welcome it.

(3) He now genuinely believes that a desire to please us was a major factor in causing him to send troops to Kuwait, and that this antagonized Qasim who might otherwise have been a valuable ally at this juncture. He was at the time deeply concerned with the danger of prejudicing his relations with Iraq and an apparently unhelpful attitude on our part might cause him to contemplate a deal with Qasim by withdrawing his troops. The Syrian coup will in any case add substance to Nasserite dreams and to hope that Qasim may soon go the way of Nasser. This may make him the more anxious not to appear as the opponent of what he believes to be an Iraqi national aspiration.

(4) His internal position is becoming more difficult the longer he remains isolated in his present peer company. There are still many Jordanians who, in any case, favour Nasser, if not as ruler of Jordan, at least as the champion of Arabism. But these who do not, welcomed the King's move as long as it seemed likely that he would be in the van of a general movement. They are now criticising His Majesty for being hasty, irresponsible and un-Arab. Fuel is added to the flames by the anger caused by the rigging of elections. This leads to charges that his only real interests are in foreign adventure and the advancement of his personal aims.

4. I do not think that any of these considerations is over-riding; and I am sure that we should not in any case act in advance of the Americans. There seem to me advantages on acting in concert with them and clearly the more countries we can take with us the more difficult it will be for Nasser to retaliate.

5. From local point of view it is desirable that we should recognize appreciably more quickly than we did new regime in Iraq in 1958 i.e. 17 days. Belief that we were more forthcoming

/tc

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: FO 371/158790
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

CONFIDENTIAL

Amman telegram No. 831 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

to Qasim already rankles.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington, Baghdad and Tel Aviv as my telegrams Nos. 103, 118 and 84.

[Repeated to Baghdad, Tel Aviv and Saving to Washington].

CONFIDENTIAL

82555

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
4 OCT 1961
VG 1016/138

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Beeley
No. 973
October 3, 1961

D. 7.40 p.m. October 3, 1961
R. 8.6 p.m. October 3, 1961

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 973 of October 3.
Repeated for information to:

Washington Amman
Damascus Beirut

Mr. Arthur's telegram No. 961 (not to all): Recognition of Syria.

While it is evident that Nasser recognizes the impossibility of overt military action against the new Syrian regime, at any rate in the absence of any military breakaway in Syria, it does not follow that he has decided to acquiesce in the defection of Syria. In the speech he made to students yesterday his targets, in descending order of importance, were the Syrian reactionaries, King Hussein and imperialism. I believe he will not neglect any opportunity which presents itself to underline his thesis that these are the guilty parties, and we should consider the problem of recognizing Syria in this context. I agree with Mr. Arthur that a breach of diplomatic relations with Her Majesty's Government would be more than likely if we were to accord recognition before Nasser was obliged by others to accept the inevitability of the recognition of Syria by governments represented in Cairo.

2. I fully understand the anxieties of King Hussein and the Government of Jordan, but I do not believe there is any force in their argument that recognition by Her Majesty's Government would have some restraining effect on Nasser. In fact the effect might well be a contrary one. My American colleague, with whom I discussed this today, shares this opinion and is urging caution on the State Department. We agreed, however, that if the new Syrian Government maintained its control recognition could not be long delayed, and that the problem was to bring it about in a way calculated to make it as difficult as possible for Nasser to retaliate against the Western Powers. I do not myself think it likely that the United States themselves would run much risk if they took the lead, but I did not suggest this and I do not know

/if

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 973 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

if Mr. Badeau shares this view. Certainly the West Germans will tread carefully in view of the risk that Nasser might recognize the D.D.R., and I do not think we can expect any other major Power to make the running.

3. My American colleague is recommending to the State Department that they should wait for about two weeks and should then authorize him to see Nasser and explain that in view of the material interests of the United States in the Syrian area it was necessary for them to accord de facto recognition to those actually exercising authority there. This would not be done with a view to making action dependent upon Nasser's consent, but as a courtesy and presumably also in order to give an opportunity for reconsideration if new factors were disclosed in the interview. I said that this seemed to me the right way to approach the problem, though I was not sure whether it would prove possible to wait for as long as two weeks before moving.

4. There is perhaps something to be said for as many as possible of the Western Powers acting simultaneously, though this might add to the risk that Nasser will infer from recognition by Her Majesty's Government and their Allies that the western world is irredeemably hostile to him. In any event it seems to me imperative that we should not act in advance of the Americans.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Damascus as my telegrams Nos. 55 and 43 respectively.

[Repeated as requested.]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

Eastern Department
N.E.A.D.
Arabian Department
Information Policy Department
Information Executive Department
Information Research Department
Protocol Department
News Department

XXXXX

CONFIDENTIAL

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Henniker Major

No. 833
 October 4, 1961

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES 5 OCT 1961
VE1016/14

10.13 p.m. October 4, 1961
 10.50 p.m. October 4, 1961

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 833 of October 4.
 Repeated for information to Beirut
 Baghdad
 Washington
 Cairo
 Tel Aviv

My telegram No. 831. ✓ 1016



My American colleague and I decided that we should see the King today in case he should infer that we were trying to avoid an interview. We both found him very relaxed and in no way angry or bitter, though as insistent as ever on the need for early recognition. He repeated his previous arguments and said that he also had indications that the Syrians were now annoyed at our failure to recognise. He added that he now felt that, much though recognition might anger Nasser it might extricate him from a difficult position by providing him with an honourable excuse for doing nothing more in Syria. He appeared to agree that recognition by Her Majesty's Government might particularly provoke Nasser, and said that he thought we should act with the United States Government and as many other friendly Governments as possible in order to minimise the dangers of retaliation. The other Ambassadors whom he had tackled had all said that their Governments would follow the example of Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government. I said that I could not predict what we should do, but that I had kept you informed of His Majesty's views.

2. His Majesty added that the B.B.C's reporting was now much more satisfactory, and he apologised that the Hashemite Broadcasting Service had had to take issue with them the other day. I gathered that what in fact the Jordanians had said was that it was hard, in the light of the B.B.C's comments, for Nasser to maintain that the revolt had been inspired by imperialists. The King agreed, however, that it was perhaps an /advantage

CONFIDENTIAL

1	2	DATE	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	82073
Ref: FO 371/158790				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet				

CONFIDENTIAL

Amman telegram No. 833 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

advantage that the B.B.C. line should allow this point to be made.

3. He said that he had reports that the Egyptians might land parachutists in Syria, though he thought this danger exaggerated because many of their parachutists were Syrian and there were not many trained Egyptians. He also believed that the Egyptians were perhaps making their main effort in the Lebanon and Iraq. They were pouring in money and were planning wide-spread pro-Nasser demonstrations for Friday. He believed that the present Lebanese Government were tottering and might soon be succeeded by one less favourable to Nasser; he understood that the President was working to this end. Qasim was aware of Egyptian plans and had informed the Jordanians that he was proposing to have a show-down with pro-Nasser elements before recognising Syria. His Majesty confirmed what the Queen Mother had told me - that Qasim had said that he would intervene if there were a counter coup in Syria. Saudi Arabia was canvassing the opinion of other Arab States. His Majesty had, however, considerable hopes that Bourguiba was moving in the right direction. He did not make any reference to pressure on him to remove his troops from Kuwait, and I do not think that we need yet fear that he is even contemplating this.

4. The King said that his own personal emissary had just returned from Damascus where he had found the Government confident, in complete control and enjoying a wide measure of popular support. The only trouble had been with Palestinians who had been trained as Fedayeen. Everyone, including the Baathist leader, Akram Haurani, had been anxious for close co-operation with Jordan. There had even been some serious talk of eventual plans for federation between Jordan and Syria. His Majesty's action in cancelling the state of alert had been taken in response to the request of the Syrian Government, though he thought that his original action was appreciated by them as having been a deterrent to Nasser. He had not, however, withdrawn his troops from their positions round Mafraq, but had merely stood them down and put them at eight hours' notice. He thought that he must keep them prepared for action for about another week in case they had to go to Syria's help. I said that I was glad that this did not now seem likely and impressed

/en

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: FO 371/158790

82073

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

CONFIDENTIAL

Amman telegram No. 833 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

on him Her Majesty's Government's grave concern about any military action. His Majesty said there could be no argument about this: Jordan must, at this stage, help the new Syrian Government, since it was a matter of life and death to prevent Nasser from re-establishing himself in Syria.

Foreign Office please pass Baghdad 119, Tel Aviv 85 and Washington 104.

[Repeated as requested]

F F F F

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

RECEIVED IN
FOREIGN OFFICE
43 OCT 1961
VE1016/143

✓
FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 1337
October 2, 1961

D. 5.30 p.m. October 2, 1961
R. 5.56 p.m. October 2, 1961

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1337 of October 2.

Repeated for information to Amman Kuwait
Cairo Bahrain
Beirut PONEC (Cyprus)
Ankara PONEC (Aden)
Tehran
and Saving to Washington

Iraq-Syria.

The Iraqi Press has mostly been left free to comment on Syrian events. Papers close to Qasim are cautious and follow the line in his speech of September 30 (my telegram No. 1329 - not to all addressees). A number of papers, including the nationalist Fajr al Jadid, the individualist al Thawra and Left-Centre Al Ahali oppose the revolt as a setback to Arab unity. The Communist paper generally approves it without endorsing the political complexion of the new government. VE1016

2. Wasfi Tel, in the course of a campaign to promote early recognition of the new Syrian régime, has seen Qasim. He claims that Qasim is in favour of the revolt and will soon recognise the new Syrian Government even if this means breaking relations with Nasser. According to his account, Qasim said that references to foreigners in his speech of September 30 were to Nasser and that he had alerted the Iraqi Army to intervene in support of the new régime against an Egyptian attack.

/s. Wasfi

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIALBaghdad telegram No. 1337 to Foreign Office.

-2-

3. Wasfi Tel is of sanguine temperament. Qasim may well continue to wait and see for some time without committing himself to a break with Nasser in face of the volume of local opposition to what can be [grp. undec] described as a set back to the course of Arab unity. But the new situation clearly has its great attractions for Qasim who can only be pleased at the removal of threat to his position arising from a common frontier with Nasser and at the severe blow to Nasser's prestige. Fertile crescent dreams are doubtless already in Qasim's mind.

Foreign Office pass Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Ankara, Tehran, Kuwait, Bahrain, POMEK (Cyprus), POMEK (Aden) and Saving Washington as my telegrams Nos. 66, 70, 233, 47, 135, 194, 186, 102, 85, 131.

[Repetitions to Kuwait and Bahrain referred for Departmental decision, repeated as requested to remainder]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE




ypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 1344
October 3, 1961

D: 6.50 p.m. October 3, 1961
R: 7.05 p.m. October 3, 1961



PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1344 of October 3.
Repeated for information to: Amman

And Saving to: Beirut Tehran
Damascus Ankara
Cairo Washington

N/R

My telegram No. 1341: Iraq-Syria.

A feature of divided opinion in Iraq about the Syrian revolt is the publication by prominent personalities of their support for the U.A.R. and opposition to the new Syrian régime. Both Mohammed Mehdi Kubba and Hussain Jamil sent telegrams to Nasser. The presidents of six professional associations have issued a strong statement attacking the new régime as traitors, agents of imperialism etc.; on the left Ibrahim Kubba's denunciation is clear while Kamil Chaderchi in more guarded terms has deplored further division of the Arab nation.

2. Nationalist papers continue their strong attack on the new régime and now attack Jordan, while the remainder hedge or are silent. There is an unconfirmed report of large numbers of arrests of nationalists in Baghdad.

Foreign Office pass Amman 68 and Saving to Beirut 27, Damascus 6, Cairo 19, Tehran 14, Ankara 6, Washington 132.

[Repeated as requested.]

ADVANCE COPIES:
Private Secretary
Sir F. Hoyer Millar
Sir R. Stevens
Mr. Crawford
Head of Eastern Department
Head of N.E.A.D.
Head of News Department



444

CONFIDENTIAL

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Edden

No. 118 Saving
September 30, 1961

R. October 3, 1961

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVE
4 OCT 1961
VG 1016/146

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 118 Saving
of September 30.

Repeated for information Saving to:- Amman
Damascus Cairo Baghdad
Ankara Tel Aviv Washington
U.K. Mission New York

U91016

My telegram No. 843 of September 29.

Syria.

Lebanese reactions to events in Syria are inevitably divided. Arab Nationalists were jubilant when it seemed at one moment that insurrection had failed and they are now discomfited. Christian attitude, though circumspect, is strongly coloured by satisfaction at Nasser's failure. The fact that Syrians and Lebanese have never been on very good terms, and a fear of instability, are complicating factors however in Christian sentiments, while bourgeois Lebanese Moslems, other than a few extreme Arab Nationalists, had been for some months of the opinion that Nasser had gone too far in his dirigiste policies in the United Arab Republic.

2. Yesterday there were orderly and relatively small-scale Arab Nationalist demonstrations in Beirut, Tripoli, Baalbek, Sidon and Tyre. An unofficial Government Press censorship imposed on September 28 helped to keep things calm and has now been replaced by an agreement by the Press Syndicate to exercise voluntary restraint. This has not prevented P.P.S., pro-Hashemite and Communist newspapers from expressing their delight, and the Arab Nationalist Press from giving violent support to Nasser. Two Arab Nationalist papers have accused the British of being behind the revolutionaries.

CONFIDENTIAL

/3.



CONFIDENTIALBeirut telegram No. 118 Saying to Foreign Office

- 2 -

3. The Lebanese Government is acutely embarrassed. For both domestic and external reasons they will be very reluctant to offend Nasser but they have strong trade and transit traffic reasons for coming to terms with Damascus. There have been long Cabinet meetings and the President has twice received the U.A.R. Ambassador. Prime Minister made a statement yesterday to the effect that the Government was following the development of the situation "in the Syrian Province" with anxiety and could not define its position before the situation had been clarified. "In any case" he said "we hope that the present movement will not shake the Arab front".

4. Comment by political leaders has been on the whole restrained. Abdallah Mashnouq, Minister of the Interior and Information, a strong Arab Nationalist, has said nothing since the fait accompli. Pierre Gemayel, addressing yesterday the Annual Congress of his right-wing Phalange, limited himself to quoting an Arab proverb: "If your neighbour is all right, you will be too." His party has decided to refrain from comment. Adnan Hakim, popular resistance deputy and currently in opposition to the Government, has said that the Syrian Army's action is retrograde and should be firmly checked by President Nasser and that the Union should be preserved at all costs.

5. Middle-of-the-road Lebanese opinion is expressed by leader writer in today's L'Orient who, while believing in Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity and realising that Syrians have yet to show how they can successfully manage their own affairs, argues that: "the consolidation of the independence (of Syria) would be a factor of peace, stability and progress for the whole region".

*****CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP and
By Mag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 1471
October 4, 1961

D. 5.58 p.m. October 4, 1961

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 1471 of October 4.
Repeated for information to:

Amman	Beirut	
Baghdad	Tel Aviv	Damascus

and Saving to:

Washington No. 4892		
Paris No. 4164	U.K.Del.NATO. No. 4055	

Recognition of Syria.

Following is extract from record of conversation between Sir R. Stevens and U.A.R. Ambassador on October 3. Full record follows by Saving telegram.

On the subject of recognition the Ambassador was told that we certainly did not intend to take precipitate action, that we had not as yet had any request from Damascus, (this of course has since been overtaken by events), and that if and when we did it would have to be most carefully weighed. In considering this difficult problem we should not be swayed by political emotions; we should have to examine the position quite cold-bloodedly. One factor in this connexion which he must bear in mind was that the British Government had always taken a realistic and so to speak non-political attitude towards recognition. This had been our basic position for so long that if after a time the group in Damascus appeared to have assumed all the attributes of government, and stability and security were maintained throughout the Syrian region, it might be very difficult for us, on the basis of long-accepted practice, to withhold recognition, at any rate de facto. He was being told this by way of warning as to what might happen in the future and not because we thought that the situation was imminent.

During the conversation Mr. el Kony said that in the view of his Government the U.A.R. continued to exist and that the coup of September 28 would have to be reversed. Sir R. Stevens said that he took note of these words with some concern. If the

/Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: FO 371/158790

82073

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office telegram No. 1471 to Cairo.

- 2 -

Ambassador was referring to the possibility of the use of force he knew that that was a position which Her Majesty's Government would view with great anxiety; it might lead to the most serious repercussions throughout the Middle East. He expressed the earnest and sincere hope that the problems created by the Syrian affair could be settled amicably between Arabs on a mutually satisfactory basis. This was the United Kingdom's main concern, since if it did not happen most serious consequences might ensue for us all.

CCC

CONFIDENTIAL

Extract from S.O.P. No. 755

8 Sept 29th

ME/755/A/5

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVE
5 OCT 1967
UG 1016/150

THE ARMY REVOLT IN SYRIA

Timetable of Broadcasts Heard (04.15-14.05 GMT 28.9.61)

- 04.15 GMT Damascus: communiqué No.3 (Egyptians and foreigners to be well treated, Government and foreign establishments to be protected, action to be taken against saboteurs and intriguers).
- 04.58 GMT Cairo: Nasir to broadcast.
- 05.00 GMT Amman: report of Damascus communiqué No.1 (said to have been broadcast at 04.30).
- 05.00-05.15 Cairo: review of the Cairo press of 28th September (no mention of the revolt).
- 05.13 GMT Damascus: [repeat of] communiqué No.21 (the revolt is against deviation from Arab unity).
- 05.33 GMT Damascus: [repeat of] communiqué No.1 (the Army has begun to remove corruption and tyranny).
- 05.37 GMT Damascus: communiqué No.4 (closing airports and seaports).
- 06.00 GMT Israel: home-service in Hebrew, report of the revolt quoting Damascus radio announcements ("at present the only source").
- 06.07-06.29 Cairo (home service linked with the "Voice of the Arabs"): Nasir's broadcast.
- 06.15 GMT Baghdad: end of morning transmission (no mention of the revolt).
- 07.00 GMT Cairo MENA: text of Nasir's broadcast.
- 07.00 GMT Tunis: short report of Nasir's broadcast.
- 07.12-07.34 Cairo: repeat of Nasir's broadcast.
- 07.40 GMT Damascus: communiqué No.5 (complete success of the revolt).
- 07.43 GMT Damascus: repeat of communiqué No.5.
- 08.00-08.22 Cairo: repeat of Nasir's broadcast.
- 08.10-09.10 Damascus: various telegrams of support for the revolt from Army officers and civilians (see Index of Names mentioned in Broadcasts, below).
- 08.30 GMT Damascus: communiqué No.6 (public not to demonstrate its support for the revolt).
- 09.00 GMT Cairo: short summary of Nasir's broadcast.
- 09.10 GMT Aleppo: (746 kc/s) Northern Area Commander's statement (against the revolt). Dayr az-Zur and Tartus in parallel with Damascus.
- 09.12 GMT Damascus: (665 kc/s) Northern Area Commander's statement (for the revolt).
- 09.13 GMT Aleppo: telegram by OC Coastal Area (denying Damascus radio report that he supports the revolt). Songs in praise of Nasir.

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

ME/155/A/6

09.15 GMT Aleppo: Iatakia Governor's statement (supporting Nasir).
09.50 GMT Damascus: communique No.7 (call for calm).
09.55 GMT Aleppo: telegrams of support for the Northern Command (against the revolt).
10.00 GMT Beirut: Lebanese Information Ministry statement (Lebanon is following events with a fraternal interest and prays that bloodshed may be averted).
10.00 GMT Ankara: end of morning home service transmission (no mention of the revolt).
10.10 GMT Dayr az-Zur (1313 kc/s): hitherto in parallel with Damascus, began relaying Cairo.
10.11 GMT Damascus: communique No.8 (no gatherings or demonstrations).
10.26 GMT Damascus: communique No.9 (situation normal, Army problems referred to F-M Amir).
10.40 GMT Cairo: report of Aleppo radio support for Nasir.
10.40 GMT Dayr az-Zur: began relaying Aleppo instead of Cairo.
10.50 GMT Dayr az-Zur: dropped relay from Aleppo and went back to relaying Damascus.
10.57 GMT Damascus: (announced as "Radio Station of the UAR in Damascus"): repeat of communique No.9.
11.00 GMT Ankara: Turkish Foreign Ministry statement (the revolt is an internal Syrian affair, the situation is being watched).
11.15 GMT Aleppo: summary (citing Damascus radio as source) of communique No.9.
11.15 GMT Damascus: news, beginning with a repeat of communique No.9 and continuing with foreign news. After the news, broadcasts returned to their usual schedule and, for the first time on 28th September, included popular songs as distinct from military music.
11.30 GMT Cairo: (Text) The UAR radio from Damascus announces the return of the situation to normal and expresses its confidence in the wisdom of F-M Abd al-Hakim Amir, the Vice-President of the Republic and the C-in-C of the armed forces. Aleppo radio broadcasts a denunciation of the action carried out by the separatist element and announces its support of Arab unity.
11.35-11.57 Cairo: repeat of Nasir's broadcast, followed by patriotic songs.
14.05 GMT Damascus: communique No.10 (withdrawing No.9).

Nasir's Broadcast

Cairo (home-service and "Voice of the Arabs" frequencies) 06.07 GMT 28.9.61 (live)

Text of Nasir's broadcast:

Compatriots, I am speaking to you from the radio station in Cairo. This is the first time that I have come to the radio station to speak to the people. In all the situations that we have faced I did not come to the radio station, but today we face a lesson which affects the major targets for which we have struggled. Some small army units in Damascus this morning moved from the Qatanah camp and took over the radio station in Damascus. They surrounded the command headquarters and issued successive statements. This act affects our national unity. This is the reason why I came to the radio station to talk to you.

ME/755/A/7

In 1956 we faced the British-French-Israeli aggression. I did not then go to the radio station because I knew that all of us have sacred duties for the protection of our country. I came to the radio station today because what occurred today is more serious than what happened in 1956. What happened in 1956 was a foreign attack, and what happened today is an act which affects the targets which we have all demanded. It is an act which affects our long struggle for our Arabism and for our Arab nations. It affects the call for Arab nationalism for which our fathers and grandfathers were martyred. It is an act which affects all the slogans we have issued. It affects our present and our future lives.

Any division in the national unity is much more dangerous than any foreign aggression. The national unity has always been a sacred demand and a dear target. The national unity has always been the protective shield for this UAR against its enemies who, from the first day of its establishment, began to fight it and work for its destruction. The national unity is the thing which impelled me to come to the radio station to talk to you. The foreign aggression did not in any way impel me to come to the radio station to talk. The national unity is the security of this Republic.

Some army forces moved and surrounded the army command and took over the radio station and broadcast four statements. Who is responsible for protecting the UAR? Who is responsible for the protection of the Arab unity and Arab nationalism? The statements issued dealt with the Arab nationalism and the Arab unity, and also with the sacred unity; but is this action carried out by members of the First Army today compatible with the talk about the Arab unity and with the talk about the sacred unity, or with our targets which always called for Arab unity and Arab nationalism? Any action affecting the national unity is nothing but a stab in the heart of the unity and in the heart of Arab nationalism.

Some people may believe that I shall take this opportunity to proclaim the dissolution of the UAR. I am unable to dissolve the UAR and it is not in my power or my nature in any way to proclaim the dissolution of the UAR or its disintegration. Our enemies have been calling for the dissolution of the UAR for four years. Israel calls for the dissolution of the UAR; imperialism and the imperialist agents call for the dissolution of the UAR; all the enemies of the Arabs everywhere call for the dissolution of the UAR.

I cannot in any way join the enemies of the Arab nation. I cannot in any way join the enemies of the Arab homeland and proclaim the dissolution of the UAR. I am responsible for every Syrian, every Egyptian, and every Arab in this Arab homeland. I am responsible for this Republic and for its protection. Every individual of the UAR is responsible for the protection of this Republic and its targets. Every member of the UAR army is responsible for the protection of this Republic and its targets. Every individual of the Arab home is responsible for the protection of this Republic and its targets, because this Republic is the vanguard of the Arab struggle, the vanguard of Arab unity, the base of the Arab struggle, and the base of Arab unity and Arab nationalism.

Syria has always been the one who called for these targets. Damascus has always been the throbbing heart of Arabism calling for Arab unity throughout the centuries. Damascus has always been the fortified castle in the face of imperialism, the enemies of the Arab nation and the Arab homeland. Castles used to surrender but Syria never surrendered at all. It continued to raise the banner of Arab unity and the banner of the Arab nationalism on high. By its determination and will, it was able in 1958 to impose this unity, establish it, put it into practice, and announce the emergence of the UAR.

I am unable, brothers, in any way to proclaim the outcome of this rash action carried out by certain deceived members - that the UAR has been dissolved. I will never proclaim this at all or by any means, no matter what hardships I may face. Many hardships faced me in the past four years. I faced hardships created by all the Powers which always and throughout the years stood against Arab unity and Arab nationalism. I have not ever relinquished Arab nationalism nor will I ever relinquish Arab nationalism. I have not felt any difficulty from the hardships I met.

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

NE/755/A/B

All of you, brothers, know how the unity was established in 1958. The Syrian army was at that time divided into factions and parties. The coups which took place in Syria before that were known to every one of you. I spoke about the first basis for this unity to those who talked to me about the unity - national unity and the exclusion of the army from politics - because, when the army interferes in politics, it divides the country into factions and parties. If the army interferes in politics, or if some members of the army interfere in politics, other members must oppose them. What will be the result? What will be the fate?

The enemies are lying in wait for us on all sides. Israel is lying in wait for us. Reaction-ism is waiting for us. Imperialism is lying in wait for us. Syria has always been the target of imperialism. Imperialism aimed at dividing it and dismembering it. I said in a speech I made some days ago, when referring to a statement by one of the Israeli parties during the electoral campaign: They said: We had an opportunity, when the coups in Syria came one after the other, to occupy the areas near Lake Tiberias from which the Syrian army controls the Israeli positions. This is the situation.

Any action against this Arab unity and against the UAR is an action against every individual in this Republic and against every individual of the Arab nation, as well as against the emblems cherished and raised high by every one of us and the objectives which we have sought to fulfil.

This, brother citizens, is my first reaction to this movement which was carried out by a small force of the First Army forces in Qatanah. When I scanned the communiques issued by this force, I noticed that they speak about Arab nationalism and the sacred unity, and then speak about imperialism. How can there be unity and imperialism together? This talk about imperialism is nothing but a reiteration of the utterances of the imperialist circles and of the enemies of Arab unity and Arab nationalism.

Since the first day when the UAR was established your Republic was exposed to recurrent campaigns laden with slanders with the purpose of affecting and abating this people's morale and ardour. But have these campaigns affected the ardour or morale of this people? Or have they affected the army which has pledged itself to protect this Republic and its aims? In no way have they affected them. The people are the same people who have always espoused Arab nationalism and Arab unity. The army is the same army which set up this UAR to fulfil the aims and emblems of the people.

Today, brothers, a small force of our armed forces engineered this movement to strike at the unity - the great hope and the emblem of Arab nationalism - then claimed in the communiques it issued that it had carried out this movement for the sake of the sacred unity and for the sake of revolutionary Syria. It also announced that it carried out this movement for revenge. From whom will this group seek revenge? How can an Arab, who acts against his own people, homeland, and countrymen, wreak revenge on another Arab? How can we claim to be wreaking revenge when we are fulfilling the aims of the enemies of the Republic and Arab nationalism?

Brother citizens, I am seized with sorrow and regret as I address this talk to you this morning. That is because, for the first time, I feel that the national unity is affected by the movement carried out by a First Army force which marched from its camp in Qatanah, surrounded the headquarters in Damascus, took over the radio station, and released communiques speaking about the sacred unity and Arab unity from the Ocean to the Gulf.

Then, speaking about the revolutionary decrees, these communiques stated that the Government has issued decrees called by it "revolutionary" although they contain nothing of revolution-ism in them. These decrees, the communiques said, have an outward facade of mercy but contain torment in their depth. Therefore, the movement carried out by this small force is declaring itself against the revolutionary, socialist decrees which we have issued. For whom have we issued these decrees? Is it for a single individual or a bunch of people? We have issued these decrees for the sake of the people and their rights, for the sake of doing away with exploitation and despotism, for the sake of establishing social justice. In no way will a people feel real freedom unless they feel social justice.

ME/755/A/9

This small force carried out this movement, released these communiques, and made these broadcasts. What will our attitude be now? We want to avoid bloodshed. The forces of the First Army everywhere are now marching on Damascus to resist this force which has mutinied against the people's will and which engineered this movement to jeopardise the safety of the Republic. I declare that the continuation of this movement and the continuation of this mutiny pose a threat to the safety of the Republic and to the call of Arab nationalism and Arab unity, and represent a great setback to our unity which has been supported by all people everywhere.

The First Army in every place in Syria is now moving to Damascus, after orders have been issued to it to stop this movement and to put an end to this mutiny - to stop the stab thrust at the heart of Arab nationalism and in the back of Arab unity, and to stop the stab against Arab dignity and the Arab revolution.

But for whose sake and in whose interest is blood to be shed? The soldiers who carried out this movement are from the people. For whom have the revolutionary decrees been issued? They were issued for the sake of these soldiers. The soldier is but a peasant or a worker or the son of a peasant or a worker. The revolutionary, socialist decrees have been issued for the sake of the worker and in order that he may enjoy real social and political equality in his country. This, brother citizens, is what I say.

Under no circumstances will I declare that, following the hardships I have encountered, I will seize this opportunity to proclaim the dissolution of the UAR. I am responsible for this Republic from Qamishli to Aswan. I am responsible for every individual in this Republic. I am responsible for the aims you have proclaimed, the aims which I have agreed to attain with you. I am responsible for Arab unity and for the call of Arab nationalism. I will not seize this opportunity, brothers, and say: Away with troubles, then pronounce the dissolution of the UAR. Never, under no circumstances, will I say this. I will not say it of my own free will or against my own will, because I have placed my faith in the aims advocated by this people, the aims advocated by the Arab nation, the aims which Syria has determined to cherish and realise. Syria told me: co-operate, so I did. Syria told me: Let us unite, so we united. Syria told me: Let us march along, so I marched along with it.

I had already realised in 1958, brothers, that unity - in its constitutional validity - is not an easy matter, but a difficult one. I said this to those who asked me to bring about the unity in 1958. I told them: Let us pave the way for the unity because the unity needs preparation, because unity is tantamount to troubles and problems, and because it is an intermixture. I said this, but they told me: Where are the aims you have advocated, where are the aims you have proclaimed? Will you go back on these aims? I said: Never. I am not disavowing my aims, but I want to feel reassured about the future.

They said: What about Syria? Will you leave Syria to be torn by strife? Will you let Syria be lost? I said: Never, to me Syria is my homeland. To me, it is my mother and a sector of the Arab homeland in which I have laid my faith. I said: I agree to the unity, and now that I accept it, under no circumstances will I forsake it. Now that I have accepted unity, I will march along the path of our revolution whose principles we have pledged ourselves to carry out, namely, to do away with feudalism and the domination of capital, to establish social justice, and to create a strong national army.

I pursued this planned course which we have always advocated. I sought to fulfil its aims for the sake of the freedom and dignity of the individual. I adopted this planned course and felt that, by doing so, I am fulfilling the aims of every individual of the UAR, whether in Syria or Egypt.

Today, brother citizens, I feel grieved as I address this talk to you after our Republic had already begun its move along the road of social justice, strength, and construction. I feel grieved as I talk to you from the depths of my feelings that the national unity was affected today by the movement of these forces and by the issuing of these communiques. Today, brothers, I am grieved because I cannot imagine that Arab blood can be shed by Arabs, because I do not want Arab blood to be shed.

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

ME/755/A/10

I feel grieved, but at the same time say: The UAR will remain the vanguard of the Arab struggle and the base of the Arab struggle. The UAR will continue to live on, thanks to the Arab people and the Arab army. It will live on thanks to the faith of the Arab people and the Arab army. It will live on, and the aims of the enemies of the Arab nation will not materialise. The aims of Israel to strike at Arab unity and Arab nationalism will not come through. The aims of imperialism to strike at Arab unity and Arab nationalism will not materialise. The aims of reactionism to strike at Arab unity and the socialist revolution will not come to light. These aims will not come true.

It is your aims, you, the Arab people who have fought for the Arab nation, Arab unity, and Arab nationalism, which will be realised. It is the aims which you have proclaimed - your aims for unity - which will rise. Syria has always been the heart of the unity, the heart of Arabism. It was the Syrian people who ever raised the banners of unity and Arabism when these banners were plucked down. Our banners - the banners of Arab nationalism - brothers, will not be pulled down. The Arab people will never consent to seeing their political and social revolution rocked by a setback.

May God grant you success, brothers. Peace be with you.

The Damascus Announcements

Damascus home service (times below) 28.9.61

Text of communiques, each signed by "The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces":

No.1 05.35 GMT: Your Army, which has been and always will remain a firm national support in protecting the safety, freedom, and dignity of the homeland, this morning began removing the corruption and tyranny and returning the legitimate rights to the people. We announce that this national uprising has no connection with any particular person or group, but is a movement aiming at the amendment of the unlawful situation.

Arab people: trust your army; we are strong by the help of God. We did everything possible for reform before we exploded. We could not find any other way than to get rid of the exploiters and to follow the road of freedom and power, so that the freedom of people and the dignity of the army may be restored. We shall never henceforth accept anything for Arabism but victory. This is our blood in which we write that we have fulfilled our pledge and refused to live except with dignity. God is great and glory to the Arabs.

No.2 05.13 GMT: The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces declares to the struggling Arab people in Syria and in Egypt in particular, and to the Arab countries and the world in general, the following:

The struggling Arab people in Syria and Egypt, supported by the Arab army in both countries, have carried out, with the help of Almighty God, an Arab-organised revolutionary movement to quash the deviators, those who have struck the sacred Arab unity in the heart - this sacred unity for whose sake the fathers and forefathers sacrificed their blood in every Arab country. This sacred unity, the first lights of which shone in the beating heart of Arabism, in Syria, the revolter against all kind of tyranny; the strong and believing Syria, which has eliminated the imperialists and the plotters through history, avenges and rises up, with the help of God, today to eliminate the semi-tyrants and imperialists, the exploiters and deviators to whom the noble Arab people in Syria handed over all their potentialities, thus pursuing the sacred Arab unity for whose sake they lived, are still living, and will die.

But the oppressive clique has betrayed the trust and has struck at the unity. It even estranged the sister Arab countries from anything connected with unity. The concern of this oppressive clique was to maintain firmly the magic chairs of power and nothing else; thus it turned the pledges, agreements, and constitutions into ink on paper. This corrupt clique tried to find ways to make the people poor and kill the

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet

ME/755/A/11

torch of virtue, dignity, and redemption among the people. It also misused the public funds for unannounced bribes in the form of salaries, with a view to planting suspicion among the brothers so that fear and submission might prevail among them.

It also went on to issue from time to time decisions which it called "revolutionary decisions" from which the revolution dissociates itself - decisions whose outward appearance shows mercy while their covert side hides misery - all this was done to deceive the sons of this nation, particularly the workers and peasants, the strong backbone of the nation and its faithful hand. This is in addition to the vile plan followed by this criminal clique to purge the army - the shield of the nation - of its faithful sons and heroes when they were in their youth and full strength. This clique has also spread misleading propaganda to divert attention from the crimes it committed, its corruption, and the many other things which are known by the Arab people, such as theatrical behaviour, allegations, lies, and acts of treason.

The fever of power has blinded this clique. It has thus forgotten that the revolutionary Arab people, who confided their trust to them to preserve it, are capable of crushing them and silencing their voices and stopping their breath. The Arab people are now stretching forth their honest and strong hands to take over their sacred right, and to work with loyalty and faith to strengthen the sacred Arab unity between the sister Arab countries from the Gulf to the Ocean on a strong basis of equality, freedom and fraternity, and to preserve the agreements, laws, and international systems and to adopt anything that will improve relations with the sister States in particular, and with the foreign States in general. Almighty God is the best supporter.

No.3 04.15 GMT: In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate: Communique No.3: The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces announces to the Arab people in Syria that it is in full control of the situation and is fully confident that the vigilance of the people will completely protect their brothers the Egyptians and treat them with the best treatment given by a brother to his brother - with generosity, care, and sincerity. We draw the attention of the honourable people to the fact that the Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces will strike with an iron fist at the hands of the saboteurs and intriguers. Protect your Egyptian brothers and the foreigners. Protect the Government offices and the national and foreign establishments. We are assured of the soundness of your vigilance and good behaviour. Go ahead to the sure victory. God be with you.

No.4 05.37 GMT: All Syrian airports and harbours will be closed as from the time of issuing this communique and until further notice. The guard units will be entrusted with carrying out this order.

No.5 07.40 GMT: To the citizens, praise be to God. Praise and thanks be to God. The revolutionary movement has succeeded in all parts of Syria. The situation is completely calm in all towns and provinces of Syria. The revolutionary movement has succeeded without one single casualty, thanks to the solidarity of the people and the army. God is great and glory to the Arabs.

No.6 08.30 GMT: The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces, while thanking the citizens for expressing their feelings and supporting its movement, requests them all to remain calm and to cease expressing collective signs of support, so that opportunists and exploiters may not have a chance to try and harm the sanctity of the movement. The Command will not hesitate to strike with an iron hand at all who try to exploit or harm the movement of the Arab people.

No.7 09.50 GMT: Brother citizens: The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command appeals to the honourable citizens to be calm. It will suppress any attempt to disturb the peace or to attack public institutions and flags. It also confirms that it is necessary that demonstrations and gatherings should not be staged, regardless of the aims of these demonstrations and gatherings.

ME/755/A/12

No.8 10.11 GMT: Honourable citizens, in order to prevent the exploitation of the revolutionary movement carried out by your army on the part of certain outcasts and mercenaries, who have committed actions harming the public interest, and in order to prevent the exploitation of your emotions, we ask the inhabitants not to assemble or demonstrate. We have issued orders to our forces to suppress any gathering or demonstration on the spot.

No.9 10.26 GMT: The Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces, which has been motivated by its fear concerning the unity of the Arab ranks, its ardour for and support of Arab nationalism, and its defence of the potentialities of Arab nationalism, declares to the honourable Arab people that it does not intend to jeopardise the victories accomplished by Arab nationalism. It also declares that it has felt the presence of subversive, opportunist elements which sought to harm our nationalism, and therefore carried out its blessed movement in response to the desire, hopes, and aims of the Arab people.

The command also declares that it has submitted the problems and aims of the army to HE the Field Marshal, the Vice-President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, who understood the real affairs of the army and took appropriate measures to solve them in the interest of the unity and strength of the armed forces and the UAR.

Military matters have returned to their normal course through confidence in the prudence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Commander of the First Army who realises the aims of the armed forces and the UAR.

No.10 14.05 GMT: The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces announces to the Arab people that, upon contacting F-M Abd al-Hakim Amir, he promised to do away with the opportunists and the saboteurs, a fact which prompted the Command to issue its Communique No.9. However, the Marshal soon went back on his promise and, therefore, the Revolutionary Command, in order to protect the victories of the Arab people and Arab nationalism, declares to the people that it considers its Communique No.9 as cancelled, and announces that it has placed its hands on everything, and that it pledges to God and the country to protect the nation's security, to preserve its rights and dignity.

The Revolutionary Command, depending on the wide vigilance of the people, requests that the opportunists and the hirelings, if any, be prevented from infiltrating into the ranks of the people, for the movement is for the people and to the people.

Index of Names Heard in Broadcasts

Amir, F-M: Problems referred to him (Damascus: communique No.9 but withdrawn by No.10)

ad-Dayah, Brig. Hikmat Jamil, OC Northern Area: against the revolt (Aleppo 09.00 GMT), for the revolt (Damascus medium-wave 09.12 GMT)

Jabir, Col. Fu'ad, police commander in Dayr az-Zur Governorate: against the revolt (Aleppo)

Jassumi, Abdullah, Governor of Latakia: against the revolt (Aleppo)

Khayri, Brig. Rifa't, OC Southern Area: supports the revolt (Damascus 06.47 GMT)

ar-Rafani, Brig. Farhan: OC (?Nakb) position, on behalf of 1st Training Centre and 80th Brigade, supports the revolt (Damascus)

Tabbakh, Lt-Col. As'ad: OC Qabul camps, supports the revolt (Damascus)

ME/155/A/13

Wani, Lt-Col. Ahmad Safi: OC Field Artillery Brigade and Qutayfah position, supports the revolt (Damascus)

Zaytunah, Col. Kazim: denied from Aleppo (09.13 GMT) a Damascus (09.10 GMT) claim that the Coastal Area supports the revolt

[Not named], OC South-West Area, Artillery Commander, Air Force Commander, officers and men of the Engineers Corps, Ordnance Corps, Social Military Foundation, Vehicles Department: support the revolt (Damascus)

Aleppo Reports of Declarations of Loyalty

Aleppo 09.10 - 10.45 GMT 28.9.61

Text or abstract (as stated) of reports:

09.10 GMT (Text) Honourable citizens, the officers, NCOs and soldiers of the Northern Area, out of their desire to maintain the unity of the ranks of the Arab people in both the northern and southern regions, proclaim their adherence to Arab unity and their denunciation of any action aiming at separation and the dismemberment of the unity of the Republic. We will strike with an iron fist at every separatist element serving imperialism and weakening the unity of the Arab ranks. We demand the carrying out of necessary reforms (Arabic: islahat) to maintain the safety of the situation. Signed: Commander of the Northern Area, Brig. Hikmat Jamil ad-Daysh.

09.13 GMT A cable has been received from the commander of the Coastal Area, Col. Kazim Zaytunah, and his officers denouncing what has been attributed to them by Damascus radio, supporting the attitude of the Northern Area, and proclaiming their adherence to Arab unity.

09.25 GMT (Text) The Latakia Governorate denounces every act which might lead to the destruction of unity and the separation of the two regions of the Republic. It does not see any justification for any act of force because this will benefit the enemies of unity and Arabism. We support everything said in the speech of the President of the UAR which was broadcast this morning over Cairo radio. We request our brethren who carried out the movement this morning to use their common sense and their strong belief in their Arabism and not to fulfil the ambitions of the imperialists. May they realise that we are not working for ourselves or for people, but that we are working for the future generations and for the protection of our unity and dear Republic. God is the Giver of success. Signed: Governor of Latakia, Abdullah Jassumi.

09.45 GMT (Abstract) A cable has been received from the merchants of the Suq ash-Shah quarter in Aleppo expressing support for Nasir and denouncing the movement in Damascus.

09.50 GMT (Abstract) Cables received include the following: "The Ismailia youth support your blessed steps against the isolationists. May God support you. We are with you and HE the vanguard of Arab nationalism, Jamal Abd an-Nasir." Cables expressing support for Nasir have also been received from the merchants of the Aleppo Suq al-Attarin and Suq al-Muhammas.

10.00 GMT (Abstract) Cables supporting Nasir and his policy have been received from the Lawyers' Union in Aleppo, textile merchants in Aleppo, merchants of the Hajjarin quarter, cotton market merchants, and merchants of the Suq al-Abid in Aleppo.

10.45 GMT (Text) The Dayr ar-Zur Governorate, the commander of its police, Col. Fu'ad Jabir, the police officers and all the Arab people in Dayr ar-Zur represented in the National Union, all the trade unions and deputies denounce the isolationist movement to destroy Arab unity for the sake of which we worked for a long time and sacrificed our blood and accepted nothing in return. Long live the UAR, and long live President Jamal Abd an-Nasir.