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R
17 OCT 1961
EY1023/55(B)

PW

Recognition of the new Syrian Government

For the record I would like to comment briefly on paragraphs 2 and 7 of Mr. Hiller's submission of October 10. It is stated in paragraph 7 of the submission that in coming to the conclusion that recognition should be unqualified the legal advisers have taken into account the Syrian Government's declared intention to be provisional and the steps which will be required for the legal separation of Syria from the United Arab Republic.

2. I should merely like to say that the legal advisers have only taken into account "the steps which will be required for the legal separation from the United Arab Republic" in the sense of regarding them as being completely immaterial and irrelevant. The point is that we are here faced with a revolutionary situation and that it is not to be expected that any action will be taken either within Syria or within Egypt to repeal or revoke the various legislative or other instruments whereby the union of Egypt and Syria was formally constituted. The criteria which we adopt for according recognition to a new régime do not, in any sense, depend upon whether the new régime is established by constitutional or unconstitutional means; indeed they are designedly framed to operate in just such a revolutionary situation as this. Where a new régime is established by constitutional means, the criteria are, in any event, satisfied more or less automatically; it is only when the new régime establishes itself by unconstitutional methods that the question of the permanence and stability of the new régime really arises in a concrete form.

I. M. Sinclair
(I.M. Sinclair)
October 12, 1961.

Mr. Hiller.
✓
GPH
13/10

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17 OCT 1961

EY1023/5

Recognition of the new Syrian Government

The Consul General in Damascus has sent a despatch transmitting the ministerial declaration of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic dated September 30. The statement makes inter alia the following points:

Flag F
V61016/152

- (a) that the aim of the Syrian Arab Revolutionary Command is to safeguard Syria's frontiers and to defend the country;
- (b) that the administration is in the hands of a transitional government;
- (c) that the government hope to achieve constitutional stability within four months;
- (d) that the Syrian government will take steps to preserve Syria's good reputation in the accomplishment of its obligations towards those who have had faith in Syria and its currency;
- (e) that Syria will respect and safeguard international treaties and the Charter of the United Nations and would work to foster good relations with all friendly states.

Flag G
V61016/2

Flag H
EY1023/4

This ministerial declaration was referred to in a statement by the Prime Minister to the Consular Corps in Damascus and in a circular note from the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to consular missions in Damascus, also on September 30, asking for it to be communicated to foreign governments, "hoping to receive their recognition as soon as possible, so that good amicable relations might be resumed between the two countries."

Flag I
EY1023/4

2. A note on the steps required for the legal separation of Syria from the United Arab Republic is attached, together with a list of agreements to which the U.K. and the U.A.R. are parties.
3. H.M.G. has only two bilateral agreements with the U.A.R. One concerns British property in Egypt, which does not affect our position in Syria, and the other is a civil air agreement which has been initialled but not signed. General Department are satisfied that recognition of Syria as an independent state will not in any way prejudice our rights under this agreement either

/in Syria

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in Syria or Egypt.

4. As regards British claims on Syria the Treasury say that these consist principally of a few small pre-Suez bills owed to the Armed Services.

5. The assurances given by the Syrian Government (paragraph 1(d) and (e) above) are very general. But it is not part of our doctrine to make recognition dependent on such assurances and moreover, what we have at stake is small (paragraphs 3 and 4 above).

6. So far as we know, the government in Damascus has the country well under control and it is living up to its statement of aims in the ministerial declaration referred to above. The time has now come, therefore, when we can say that our doctrine of recognition is satisfied, namely that the Syrian Government "enjoys, with a reasonable prospect of permanency, the obedience of the mass of the population and the effective control of the greater part of the territory".

7. The Legal Adviser considers that recognition should be unqualified (i.e. de jure). In coming to this conclusion he has taken into account the Syrian Government's declared intention to be provisional and the steps which will be required for the legal separation of Syria from the U.A.R.

8. The procedure for recognition, which has been agreed with Protocol Department and the Legal Adviser, is as follows: Recognition should be conveyed to the Syrian Government by means of a note to be handed to the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Mr. Clarke on the lines of the draft telegram at "Y". The description of the Syrian Government is that which it has itself prescribed (Damascus telegram No. 109). Flag H It is not possible for Mr. Clarke to propose himself to the Syrian Government for acceptance in a diplomatic capacity. A second telegram should therefore be sent shortly after the first containing a message from the Secretary of State to the Syrian Ministry of

/Foreign

Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposing Mr. Clarke as Chargé d'Affaires - see draft at "Z".

9. Further action which will be required after our act of recognition has been completed will consist mainly of our own domestic arrangements to give effect to an exchange of Ambassadors and to setting up an Embassy. When we have decided who is to be the Ambassador we shall have to seek his agreement in the usual way.

10. I recommend that

(a) the attached draft telegrams to Damascus ("X" and "Y") should be sent, to be followed shortly afterwards by *see below* the third draft telegram "Z";

(b) Personnel Department and E. and O. Department consider whatever arrangements may be necessary under paragraph 9 above.

11. As soon as Ministers have reached a decision about timing a separate submission will be made about action in Cairo, Bonn, Rome, Paris, NATO, Commonwealth posts, and finally Damascus. *Not done yet*

12. N.E.A. ^{*Political Department*} Department and the Legal Adviser concur.

G.F. Hillier
(G.F. Hillier)
October 10, 1961

Copies to:

Lord Privy Seal
Mr. Thomas
Mr. Scrivener
Mr. Sinclair
Mr. Muirhead
Mr. Stark

I suggest delaying the despatch of the third tel. at least until tomorrow, to give time for Mr Clarke to be warned of what is proposed and Mr. Hillier has approved
T. W. [unclear] 10/10/61
A.T.O. [unclear]

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EY1027/54(19)

The Secretary of State spoke to me about recognising Syria this morning. I had not then seen his minute. I gave him the latest information on the subject including the news of Nasser's broadcast and said that we were really awaiting the results of the probe which Mr. Badeau, the United States Ambassador in Cairo, was supposed to be conducting. It was quite possible that, on the assumption that Nasser would not now break off relations with them, the Americans would recognise fairly quickly and this would enable us to follow suit. The Secretary of State wondered if we should not concert a plan with the French, Germans, Italians and other NATO powers but he agreed that we might await further information as to American intentions and that in any event it would not seem desirable for us to act until next week. It would not matter our recognising ~~after~~ *before* the Americans and we need not take it tragically if the Russians got in first.

2. The Italian Minister came to see me this morning on this subject. I am recording our conversation separately.



October 6, 1961

Eastern Department

Copied to: Mr. Crawford

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H.M.G's attitude towards the
Syrian Revolutionary Government

EGY 1023/54

The object of this submission is to examine the main considerations affecting our attitude towards the Syrian revolutionary government, with particular reference to the problem of recognition.

2. The following seem to be the main factors which we must take into account:

(a) It is uncertain whether an independent Syrian Government will survive in the long term and it is possible that Nasser will recover control of Syria.

(b) We want to continue to adhere to our policy of non-involvement in Arab affairs. In this case we have no strong reason to ^{prefer} an independent Syria to a Syria linked with Nasser, since what we might gain from a weakening of Nasser is likely to be more than offset by the instability which an independent Syria will introduce both within Syria and in the Middle East in general. We can therefore reconcile ourselves either to an independent Syria or to its eventual return to the United Arab Republic.

(c) We want, however, if possible, to avoid a civil war in Syria, since this would tempt Syria's neighbours, and in particular the Jordanians, to intervene with very serious consequences for the stability of the Middle East as a whole.

(d) We want to antagonise the U.A.R. as little as possible, both because of the possible impact on the Arab League force in Kuwait and because we do not want to set at nought our efforts to rebuild relations with the U.A.R. on a reasonable footing.

(e) We must at the same time pay due regard to the views

/of

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of the Jordanian Government in view of the important contribution they are making to the Arab League Force in Kuwait.

3. As regards recognition our general policy is to recognise a government more or less automatically when it can be held to enjoy with a reasonable prospect of permanency the obedience of the mass of the population and the effective control of the greater part of the territory. For reasons of broad policy we think it important that recognition should be based on these objective criteria and not on political expediency. The fact that we are faced in this case with secession from the territory of a recognised state complicates the problem somewhat but does not justify a radical departure from our basic policy.
4. Recognition can be de facto or de jure. de jure recognition can in our view be properly withheld if there is some doubt about the stability or permanence of a government. de facto recognition is normally accorded either in time of civil war or when an emerging state (as Israel) is not in full control of its territory. In the case of Syria once we are satisfied that the criteria in paragraph 3 above are met there would be no legal reason for according de facto recognition because the conditions for de jure recognition would obtain. If we were to recognise de facto, diplomatic representation would have to be below ambassadorial level (Minister or Diplomatic Agent).
5. As regards timing of recognition there is no justification for substantial delay once the criteria in paragraph 3 above are fulfilled. But there is a margin for consultation etc. Recognition is rarely given in less than a fortnight, and we
- /could

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-2-

could wait for two or three weeks. Longer delay would require very careful consideration. *We recognized Gasum after two weeks.*

6. We should also bear the following considerations in mind:

(a) The Cairo Government has proclaimed that the U.A.R. remains in being.

(b) The Cairo Government has also said that countries recognising the Damascus authorities cannot be represented in Cairo (it remains to be seen of course how long Cairo will wish to maintain this attitude).

(c) The U.A.R. will, presumably, continue membership of the United Nations, and Syria is already seeking separate membership. This will certainly lead to a constitutional wrangle in the United Nations, from which we shall wish to disassociate ourselves as much as possible.

(d) The question also arises of Syria's membership of the Arab League, and Tunis Radio has announced that the Tunisian Government has asked for an immediate meeting of the Arab League to examine the situation arising from the secession of the Northern region from the U.A.R. and of the formation of an independent Syria. This is likely to lead to a fairly bitter inter-Arab dispute and, again, we should not wish to appear to be taking sides.

(e) We want to be able to protect our commercial interests in Syria and, particularly, the operations of the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipeline.

7. H.M. Consul General at Damascus has reported that the Syrian Government have formally requested recognition in a circular note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Clarke has discussed this situation with his American, Pakistan and Danish colleagues, and the first two are satisfied that our criteria for recognition are adequately met. The Danish representative agreed generally, but had some reservations.

/Mr. Clarke

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*No, they are acting
- True way but
have not stated
a position
no change.
JCC*

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Mr. Clarke himself considers that the new Government now satisfies our criteria. H.M. Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo had reported earlier that he agreed with the Department's view that we should, if possible, wait until the large majority of Arab states had recognised the Damascus Government before doing so ourselves and that if the Arabs temporised too long we should wait until some prominent uncommitted country, such as India, had done so. He has also recommended that recognition should be de facto rather than de jure.

8. The attitude of other countries towards recognition is at present as follows:

Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Guatemala and Nationalist China have granted unqualified recognition. The Jordanians are also anxious that we should recognise soon. The attitude of the Arab countries is not yet clear. The Jordanians are hopeful that Qasim will recognise soon, but our own impression is that he may proceed cautiously. The Lebanese are also likely to sit on the fence. The Americans have had no clear indication of the attitude of the Saudis but their impression is that they might recognise fairly soon. The American Embassy have told us that, provided the Syrian Government continues to maintain control, the American Government might respond favourably within the next few days to a request for recognition. Publicly the State Department has confined itself to saying that they have received a request which requires careful consideration and that they hoped to make a reply by the end of the week. The Americans have also heard that the French would like to have an honourable position in the second group of powers to recognise Damascus. The odds are that neither the rest of the Arabs nor the neutrals will recognise the new Syrian Government soon enough to make it easy for us to follow suit.

9. In the light of all this it seems that while there are

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/strong

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-3-

strong political arguments in favour of delay, our worldwide policy on recognition will not permit us to wait for very long unless there are some unexpected developments in Syria. For whatever doubts we may have about the long term prospects of an independent Syrian Government, its short term prospects of survival (which are decisive from the point of view of recognition) seem satisfactory. Moreover, the political arguments are not all in favour of delay, since we do not want to do anything which will heighten the sense of instability in Syria and so increase the risk of civil war.

10. In the circumstances it is recommended that

(a) we should wait if possible until the large majority of Arab states or, failing that, a number of major neutrals, have recognised the new government before doing so ourselves. We can afford to wait three weeks. If the situation has not been clarified we must consider again.

(b) If no neutrals or Arabs have recognised within this period we should either encourage the Americans to do so or reach agreement with as many NATO countries as possible on what our line should be.

(c) unless the situation in Syria deteriorates, our eventual recognition of the Damascus Government should be on a de jure basis, provided other countries do likewise.

(d) if, however, other countries are recognising on a de facto basis it would be difficult for us to do so from the legal point of view (see paragraph 4 above), although we might have to consider doing so. The alternative would be to postpone de jure recognition.

11. I submit draft telegrams outlining our views and instructing posts to exchange views with friendly governments on this subject. The Legal Adviser and North and East African Department concur.

G.F. Hillier

Copies to: Lord Privy Seal
Mr. Thomas

October 4, 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

Jt

It is also important to bear in mind the possible implications for the Arab League force in Kuwait. Unfortunately, these point in opposite directions. To antagonise the Egyptians by premature recognition might cause them to work for the disintegration of the force which they were mainly responsible for establishing. On the other hand, failure to recognise soon may lead King Hussein, who is already cross with us, to withdraw his contingent - nearly half the whole - either out of spite or out of genuine belief that he may need to use them soon in Syria. We must try to discourage King Hussein from taking this action but it is on the whole, I think, the lesser of the two dangers.

I agree with the draft tel.
 J. Crawford 5/x

I agree. My amendments are aimed only at shortening the tel.
 W.B. Stevens
 5/x

I think we must keep a close watch on this & prevent delay until a) some other Arab countries have recognised - b) some N.A.T.O. countries have recognised
 I should not be work hard to get U.S.A. France Germany Italy to do so simultaneously with us. I hope we can do this.
 Please keep us in close touch.

J.C.

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13 OCT 1961

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Recognition of the Syrian Government

flor. A, B

(1)

(2)

(3)

The situation has altered radically since Ministers last considered the problem. Nasser has said that he will not oppose the admission of Syria to the Arab League or to the United Nations. The Russians have recognised and as a result of this the Americans who were previously inclined to go slowly have decided to recognise also. On October 8 the Americans so informed Nasser who said that he had no objection. We have asked H.M. Embassy, Washington, to let us know urgently when the Americans propose to inform the Syrian Government that they recognise them.

2. We are also seeking the views of the French, Germans and Italians. The French who have had an informal approach from the Syrians would like to recognise but preferably after several other Western Governments. We have no indication yet of German or Italian views. We will also exchange views in the Political Committee of NATO tomorrow but we will not try to arrange a concerted recognition by all NATO countries.

3. The Arab countries seem to be moving towards recognition though still cautiously. The attitude of the neutrals seems to be even more cautious.

4. The only reaction we have had from the Commonwealth is that of the Canadians who even after Nasser's change of attitude are inclined to proceed cautiously.

5. The situation in Syria seems quiet with only minor disturbances and the Government seems to fulfil our criteria for recognition.

6. Ideally it would be better if a number of Arab and neutral countries were to recognise before we do, but in view of Nasser's change of attitude there seems no objection to our recognising soon after the Americans.

/7.

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7. It is recommended that Ministers should:

- (a) agree that we should recognise within 48 hours after the Americans;
 - (b) that prior to doing so we should inform the Egyptian Government of our decision;
 - and (c) that we should encourage Germany ^{and} Italy ~~and France~~ to recognise at about the same time as we do, and inform the French Government of what we propose - as well as the NATO Council.
- North and East African Department and the Legal Adviser concur.

G.F. Hiller
(G. F. Hiller)
October 9, 1961.

Copies to:
The Lord Privy Seal
and
Mr. Thomas

K. Stanford

*The Nato Council meets on Wed. Oct. 11.
The above minute is intended as a
brief for the SPS at tomorrow's Cabinet.*

U.B. Stevens

*I hope the SPS will
agree to this for you to
get the Cabinet's concurrence
tomorrow. Proceed with Americans
Lowe*

CONFIDENTIAL

have recognized, I don't think
 it makes much if we are or
 but what of the Germans & the
 Italians.

F. Hoyer Millar
 9. 10

I have not yet seen the minutes of this morning's Cabinet. The Secretary of State said, however, that he had told the Cabinet that we would probably be recognising the Syrian Government within the next day or two.

His view is that we should not do anything today (October 10) but should recognise them within the next two days or thereabouts. He thinks it would be preferable to get one other European power, for example the Italians, to recognise the Syrian Government before we do.

M. Acland

October 10, 1961

Sir F. Hoyer Millar

copied to: Sir R. Stevens
 Mr. Crawford
 Mr. Hiller
 Mr. Figg, Eastern Dept.
 Mr. Saunders, Eastern Dept.

Have see told as
 despatched after further
 discussion between the 57's
 & the Pres. I also told Mr de Zulueta
 of no decision. A... 19/10

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9PM 11/10

See sep minute

lll

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SECRET

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL
DISTRIBUTION

No. 1173

October 11, 1961

D: 7.22 p.m. October 11, 1961

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Your telegram No. 867 [of October 11: Recognition of Syria].

The fact is that choice of October 13 as date on which recognition of Syria would be communicated to the Government in Damascus was made to enable the other powers with whom we have been in consultation, including Jordan, to be given advance notice. It is natural that we should also inform government in Cairo in advance since recognition implies acceptance of break-up of U.A.R. Period was not chosen simply with latter consideration in mind and there was no question in our case of consulting President Nasser as you suggest. We are not of course responsible for the terms of ANA report quoted in your telegram No. 865, which was probably based inaccurately on a leak which we are investigating. I will telegraph further on this.

2. I agree that King Hussein should be treated as a special case and that he should be told about our proposed action without further delay. In speaking to him you should tell him that we have had his preoccupations very much in mind. It is, however, our invariable practice when recognising new regimes to proceed on the basis of factual situation, while avoiding taking sides in disputes. This enjoins need for caution and we therefore tend to move slowly: it also means that we do not use grant or withholding of recognition as a political weapon. In this case we acted after obtaining full reports from our representative in Damascus and after consulting other countries who had the same problem as ourselves. It does not seem to us important that Soviet bloc countries granted recognition ahead of us. What matters for the future is how new regime in Syria

/conducts

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Foreign Office telegram No.1173 to Amman

- 2 -

conducts itself. AS present government has stated itself to be provisional only, political party activities remain banned and intention of the army is obscure, this is difficult to predict. We would hope to keep in close touch with Jordan Government as situation develops to exchange information.

3. If King Hussein refers to ANA press report, you should say that it was not officially inspired and was probably the result of guesswork based on the likelihood that once United States recognition had been given our own would not be long delayed; message must have been sent from London before final decision had been made here.

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Eastern Department

GGGGG

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FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL

DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Henniker Major

No. 867

October 11, 1961

D. 2.07 p.m. October 11, 1961

R. 2.07 p.m. October 11, 1961

IMMEDIATE

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Following personal for Sir Roger Stevens.

Your telegram No. 1165: Syria: Recognition.

While (as I said in my telegram No. 831) I do not think that considerations relating to Jordan should have been overriding in our decision on recognition of the new régime in Syria, it has been embarrassing that I have not been instructed to give any reply from Her Majesty's Government to King Hussein's repeated representations on the subject. Our friendship is an argument we frequently use to enlist his help, and it has been useful on this occasion for trying to restrain him, but it has not been thought appropriate to take him into our confidence about our intentions. I had hoped that when our decision was taken, some advance message might have been sent to him at least explaining that his views had been reported and taken into consideration, and perhaps adding some explanation as to why it had been impossible or unwise to meet his wishes.

2. It is therefore disappointing that I am now instructed to tell him "in strict confidence" of our decision "to recognise very shortly" 36 hours after the local Press has published a London report that our decision is being delayed 48 hours to enable us to consult President Nasser.

3. You know from my reporting that I am far from sharing King Hussein's estimate of his own importance. But it seems that on the most hardheaded assessment of our interests (e.g. in Kuwait) we need to maintain a tolerable relationship with him, in which there must be some give and take. I am afraid that our handling of a problem which is of vital concern to Jordan may make it difficult in future to persuade him that consideration for his views plays any part in our calculations, and at least lays us open to a charge of discourtesy, especially

/now

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Amman telegram No. 867 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Now that our prior consultation with Nasser has leaked from London.

4. Nevertheless I think that some message on the lines of paragraph 1 might still help.

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Eastern Department

ADVANCE COPIES
Private Secretary
Sir F. Hoyer Millar
Sir R. Stevens
Mr. Crawford
Head of Eastern Department

F F F F

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Original entered E.1073/

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FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP


DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Henniker Major

No. 875
October 12, 1961

IMMEDIATE

SECRET



D. 1.53 p.m. October 12, 1961
R. 2.31 p.m. October 12, 1961

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 875 of October 12.
Repeated for information to:

| | |
|--------------|------------|
| Cairo | Washington |
| Baghdad | Bahrain |
| POFEC (Aden) | Kuwait |
| Beirut | |

Your telegram No. 1173 of October 11 (not to all).

I informed His Majesty this morning in confidence that we should be recognizing Syrian Government tomorrow. I also delivered message contained in paragraph 2.

2. The King was obviously much gratified and commented that he thought that in the circumstances we had done very well.
3. His Majesty asked me whether I had any further news to give him. When I replied that I had not, he said that he had just heard that Nasser was pulling United Arab Republic forces out of Kuwait. If this was Nasser's idea of honour after he had taken the lead in recognizing Kuwait and urging the formation of an Arab force to protect its integrity, it was not a concept that His Majesty shared. It was his intention to consult with the Saudi Arabians and others involved, and he wanted us to know that if it seemed necessary, he was prepared to send any number of troops which might be required for Kuwait's defence. He spoke of the two regiments. As I knew, he had not, in the first place, wanted to send forces to Kuwait and would have preferred to see a political solution of the problem. But, having once embarked on his present policy, he had every intention of seeing it through. And he would like me to convey an assurance to you on this point. His forces would fight, however difficult their situation might be.
4. He added that he had some faint indications that Nasser might have been in touch with Qasim, and that he might be urging him to take action which would create confusion and from which Nasser would benefit to restore his position.

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Amman telegram No. 875 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

5. In conclusion, His Majesty said that he would be prepared to provide aircraft and possibly armour, though it would be difficult to get latter to Kuwait. He would be grateful to receive from us any assessment of what might be required. I pointed out to His Majesty that we had strictly taken the line that the Arab League force was an Arab affair, and that it would probably be difficult for us to comment on what was required. His Majesty suggested that we might advise the Amir on the needs of the situation, and said that he would then look into the possibility of providing whatever was asked for.

6. I told His Majesty that I knew that my Government had been concerned about the effects of recent developments on the Kuwait situation, and that I was sure that they would be much gratified to have His Majesty's assurances about the Jordanian attitude.

7. I should naturally be grateful for any information about the situation in Kuwait which I can pass on to His Majesty. I assume that his new-found satisfaction with the pace of our recognition is due to the fact that he now sees the wisdom of avoiding any suggestion of having provoked Nasser by our actions.

Foreign Office please pass Priority to Baghdad, POMEC (Aden), Washington, Bahrain and Kuwait as my telegrams Nos. 114, 38, 106, 60 and 69 respectively.

[Repeated as requested.]

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FROM UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO N.A.T.O. PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir P. Mason

No. 187
October 11, 1961

D. 7.17 p.m. October 11, 1961
R. 7.20 p.m. October 11, 1961

PRIORITY
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 187 of
October 11.

Repeated for information Saving to:- Washington
Bonn
Rome
Paris

12 OCT 1961

E-11023/43

Foreign Office telegram No. 1442 to Rome: Syria.

At today's meeting, I told the Council in strict confidence of Her Majesty's Government's decision to recognise the Syrian Government. Von Walther said that the Federal German Government would probably recognize the Syrian Government tomorrow. They had originally intended to wait until enough Arab countries had committed themselves, but since a number had now recognized, his Government would go ahead. Boon, (Netherlands) said that he could not give precise information since his Government had decided not to be among the first to recognize. He presumed that his Government would now take a decision soon. The Greek and Italian representatives both said that the position of their Governments was similar to the Dutch, and the latter added that his Government saw no great need for urgency. De Leusse said that the French Government probably would recognize the Syrian Government, but there were procedural difficulties since France was not in diplomatic relations with Syria at the time of the Union with Egypt.

2. The United States delegation had clearly made a poor impression by failing to inform N.A.T.O. beforehand of their decision to recognize. Leger, the Canadian representative, slyly remarked that his Government had not yet reached a decision, but when they did so, no doubt they would proceed either as the United States or the United Kingdom had done. The Secretary General expressed the hope that all members would continue to keep each other informed of their attitude to the new régime.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington 59, Rome 15, Bonn 63.

EEEEEEEE [Repeated as requested]

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12 OCT 1961

Recognition of the Syrian Government

641023/43

The Secretary of State informed the Cabinet that we would be recognising within the next day or two. The Secretary of State told the Private Secretaries afterwards that he thought it would be helpful if another major European country could be induced to recognise at the same time as us, *or preferably before,* though he did not want to make recognition conditional on this. Italy seems the best candidate since the Germans may be in difficulties as a result of the recognition of Damascus by East Germany and French recognition would not please the Arabs.

2. Iraq and Tunisia have just recognised and it looks as though Syria may be able to resume her former seat at the United Nations and not apply afresh for membership. The Americans are recognising this afternoon.

3. It would be preferable to recognise in the morning rather than the afternoon since a statement can then be made at News Department's 12.30 Conference. We could aim at recognising either on the morning of Thursday, October 12 or on Friday, October 13. On balance I recommend the latter date as giving us more time to secure a favourable Italian reaction and to inform the Egyptians and our friends and allies in advance. The Private Secretaries think that the Secretary of State would also prefer this.

4. In addition to approaching the Italian Government we should now, I think, inform the French and Germans and our NATO allies. We should also ask H.M. Ambassador at Cairo to inform the Egyptians though without specifying the exact date. We should also, I think, give our Representatives at Arab and CENTO posts discretion to inform the Governments to which they are accredited. They should not however mention the exact date. H.M. Consul-General at Damascus

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should also, I think, be given discretion to speak informally in the same sense to the Syrian Government in case there is a leak in Cairo or in one of the Arab capitals. The C.R.O. for their part will inform the Commonwealth countries. I think the old Commonwealth countries could be told the exact date and the others merely that recognition is imminent. North and East African Department and the Legal Adviser concur.

G.F. Hiller
 (G.F. Hiller)
 October 10, 1961.

Copies to: The Lord Privy Seal
 and
 Mr. Thomas

[Handwritten signature] 10/11

This shd go off tonight to enable action to be taken in Cairo Commov. Also Rome. M.B. Stevens.

10/11

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM
FROM AEMMA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
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Mr. Henniker-Major

No. 6 Saving
 October 6, 1961

R. October 11, 1961

11 OCT 1961
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 6 Saving of October 6.

Repeated for information Saving to:

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| Tel Aviv | Jerusalem | POMEC (Aden) |
| Baghdad | Khartoum | Bahrain |
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| Tehran | Benghazi. | |

Reactions in Jordan to the Syrian Coup

Reactions in Jordan have been complex and have reflected internal political attitudes more than any objective view of events in Syria.

2. Unrestrained jubilation has been confined to King Hussein, Army leaders and the inner circle of supporters of the régime. They see in the Syrian revolt not only the end of Jordanian isolation and of the constant threat of subversion and aggression mounted from Syria, but also a crushing defeat (which they hope will be mortal) for President Nasser, which opens the way for Jordan to play a more important rôle in a more congenial Arab world. Although the evidence seems to be overwhelming that they were taken completely by surprise, some of them are trying to claim credit ex post facto for Jordanian instigation or at least for Jordanian policies in encouraging anti-union feeling.

3. Other loyal Jordanians who welcome the change in Syria have more mixed feelings. Even among those who detest Nasser, there are few who do not have some feeling for Arab unity, and regret that the first serious attempt at it should have collapsed; they console themselves with the hope that a fresh start on more suitable lines may now be possible. Many recall the chronic political instability which characterised pre-Union Syria and

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Amman telegram No. 6 Saying to Foreign Office.

-2-

fear a reversion to the same state. There is also criticism of King Hussein for having rashly rushed in with recognition, and apprehension about the renewal of the cold war with Nasser.

4. Amongst the West Bank intelligentsia, the general reaction was of gloom and dismay. Though they were not unaware of Nasser's faults and of his mishandling of Syria, and though not many had sympathy with his economic policies, he remained for them the champion of Arabism and unity, and the Syrian revolt is a defeat for both. The U.A.R. also offered them hope, however dimmed in the past three years, of an escape from the present régime in Jordan. They are naturally casting around for excuses for Nasser's defeat. The favourite one, though it is doubtful whether it is seriously believed, is that the Americans organised the revolt; some versions add the Jordanians, and, with surprising infrequency, the British. The pessimists are also predicting that Syria may now go Communist.

5. The commercial community in Jordan were extremely critical of Nasser's July economic measures. Besides doing harm to their commercial interests in Syria and Egypt (the Arab Bank lost 15 of its most important branches), these measures offended the strong nationalist sentiment among them by imposing the thesis that Arab unity must go hand in hand with socialism. They are naturally pleased at the prospect of the resumption and expansion of traditional commercial ties with Syria.

6. Even those most critical of Nasser's economic policies, however, believe that they appealed to the impoverished masses in Jordan as well as - and perhaps more than - in Syria. Nasser's propaganda has been denouncing the revolt as a conspiracy of capitalism and imperialism to deprive the masses of the benefits of Nasser's Arab socialism and there is no doubt that this will have a strong appeal to the have-nots in Jordan.

7. Owing to the farcical rigging of the elections, the Jordan Government is going through a phase of unpopularity of more than usual intensity. This unpopularity has been reflected in Jordanian reactions to the revolt itself, as well as to the enthusiastic sponsorship of the revolt by their government, which is seen as another example of the King's interest in personal aggrandisement and foreign adventures without regard to the well being of his country.

/8. Nasser's

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Woman telegram No.6 Saying to Foreign Office.

-3-

8. Nasser's early abjuration of the use of force and now his change of front on recognition and membership of the Arab League (whether the result of force majeure or not) have won him respect. Unless the Jordan Government now quickly drop its revived anti-Nasser propoganda it will suffer by contrast.

9. All this makes a general picture showing the Jordan Government gaining little, and Nasser losing little, in Jordan. If the new régime in Syria consolidates itself, however, and if Nasser fails to turn defeat into victory in a more spectacular way than by being a good loser, his hold on opinion in Jordan is likely in the longer term to weaken, and Jordanians are likely to turn increasingly to alternative ideas about promoting Arab unity. We have not heard of any Jordanian, of any shade of opinion, who believes that the Egyptian union with Syria will ever be reconstituted the same shape as before.

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