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SECRET  
FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Henniker-Major

No.856  
October 9, 1961

D: 2.11 p.m. October 9, 1961  
R: 2.34 p.m. October 9, 1961

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A  
10 OCT 1961  
CY/1023/24

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 856 of October 9

Repeated for information to :

Baghdad	Bahrain
Beirut	Cairo
Kuwait	POMEC (Aden)
Tel Aviv	

And Saving to :

Damascus	Washington
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My telegram No.849 - *1110/15/17*

After telephoning earlier in the day to inform us of Soviet recognition of the Syrian Government, the King saw my United States colleague and me separately on October 7. I was accompanied by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, whom I was presenting to His Majesty.

2. We found him apparently tired and depressed. He said that he was deeply disappointed that what he had feared, and been particularly anxious to prevent, should now have happened, and that the Soviet Government had been the first major power to recognize. He had seen in events in Syria a vindication of the principles - the right of small nations to determine their own future and resistance to Nasser's attempt to impose his hegemony on the whole area - for which he had struggled so long and hard, and for which he and his country had faced so many dangers and difficulties. He had believed that he had the sympathy and support of Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in this struggle, and was distressed to see no tangible sign of this.

3. I told His Majesty that I was sure that we understood and sympathized with his feelings about events in Syria. We had, however, used our influence to try to restrain the Egyptians from using force to restore the situation, and the effect of these

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representations

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man telegram No. 856 to Foreign Office

-2-

representations would have been weakened by premature recognition. Moreover, we believed it wiser, and it was our normal practice, to move deliberately in matters of this kind. Dr. Hill suggested that we had shown in the past that we could when necessary act quickly. The King dissented. No purpose is served by using with His Majesty the argument advanced in your telegrams that the situation in Syria is still confused and uncertain. He has believed from the start that the new Government had the situation well under control.

4. I added that it seemed to me that the Soviet Government had a lot to lose from being the first to recognize. The King replied that he wished that we had been as quick and flexible as they had been to re-assess the situation. In his view, Nasser's influence in the Middle East had suffered an irreparable blow, and he would sooner or later be faced with a crisis in maintaining his position in Egypt itself. A new situation had arisen in the Middle East and he would like to have seen us taking advantage of it.

5. In conclusion His Majesty asked Dr. Hill to express his deep disappointment to Her Majesty's Government.

Foreign Office please pass to Baghdad, Bahrain, Kuwait, POMEC (Aden) and Tel Aviv and Saving to Damascus and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 113,58,67,37,89,25 and 51 respectively.

[Not repeated to Bahrain and Kuwait pending Departmental instructions, otherwise as requested].

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(1024/26/61)

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RECEIVED IN  
BRITISH EMBASSY

RABAT OCT 1961

October 6, 1961.

EY 1023/30

Dear Shakespeare,

The Syrian revolt certainly came as a shock to Morocco. The surprisingly quick official reaction was to deprecate it, as a blow to Arab unity, and to declare their support for President Nasser and the U.A.R. The King sent a fulsome telegram of condolence and solidarity to Nasser on September 28, and the Moroccan Minister for Information spoke in similar fashion later that day. This action has been followed up by the despatch of a royal message to President Nasser, which was handed over to him by the Moroccan Ambassador in Cairo, Abdelkhalig Torres. Replies to both messages have been received, but their contents, apart from the predictable thanks for the Moroccan attitude, have not been revealed.

2. Press opinion has been very slow to declare itself. Istiqlal have not commented very fully, but their reporting is angled on the general Government line. Tahrir has been much more impartial and on October 1 carried a leader which while expressing grief and regret at what had happened did not in so many words condemn the new regime, nor did it mention President Nasser or the U.A.R. at all. It urged Arabs not to despair of achieving unity and had no doubt that the people of Syria knew the truth and are aware of the dangers of colonial and feudal conspiracies. The paper urged the Syrians to make a special effort to preserve what they had gained, with particular reference to the recent steps taken in the social and economic fields which it described as practical steps towards setting up a progressive Arab socialist society.

3. Private persons are much less ready to make a firm judgement on the matter. There is little doubt that in this country where the establishment of the U.A.R. has been viewed as the first practical step towards complete Arab unity the feeling that the rebels were wrong to break away from the U.A.R. is strong. On the other hand there is a feeling that the Egyptian handling of their Syrian brothers has been less than fair and that the rebels may have some justification for their action. Left wing circles do not like the new Syrian government, which they regard as reactionary. It is expected by them that the new regime will seek to reverse the recently imposed socialising measures, which they assume were the reason for the revolt taking place. Nevertheless they too consider that Egyptian treatment of Syria lies at the root of the matter, and it is perhaps worth mentioning the reference, by a young U.N.F.P. supporter in conversation, to the behaviour of the Egyptian team at the Pan-Arab Games recently on which we have already reported. He said that if that was the way they behaved towards Moroccans, he could well imagine the Syrians resenting their all too ubiquitous presence in their country. In general therefore, while

/there

J. W. R. Shakespeare, Esq.,  
North & East African Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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there is more or less unanimous condemnation of the blow to Arab unity, more than one section of Moroccan opinion is equally disposed to blame the Egyptians.

4. The events have had one practical effect here. The U.A.R. Ambassador a Doyen of the Corps, Assad Mahassen, is a Syrian. A few months ago his fervent praise of Arab union began to be replaced by criticism of the Egyptians, chiefly because they had expropriated some of the property of Khalid el Azm's, a relative of his. Last week he was deprived of his functions by Nasser's orders, much to his delight, and the Embassy was taken over by the Counsellor. The Deanship of the Corps has accordingly passed to the totally ineffective Saudi Arabian Ambassador.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to Cairo, Damascus, Tunis, to the Colonial Secretary and Service Attaché's at Gibraltar, and to the consular posts at Tangier, Fez and Casablanca.

*Yours ever*

*Robin Andrew*

(R. McC. Andrew)

CONFIDENTIAL

enter

RECEIVED IN  
11 OCT 1961  
EY 1023/32

Syria

The Counsellor of the United Arab Republic Embassy (who is a Syrian) telephoned this morning and said that he had an urgent communication to make to me. He did not want to come to the Office, and I therefore arranged to meet him for a drink in the Ritz. He did not say what he wanted to talk about.

2. When we met he explained that he had been instructed by the authorities in Damascus to press Her Majesty's Government to accord them early recognition. In reply to a question he said that he believed that similar representations were being made by Syrian members of U.A.R. Missions elsewhere.

3. I spoke to him on the same lines as Sir Roger Stevens with the U.A.R. Ambassador. Dr. Mufti however asked me to let him have further news of our position to his home telephone number (AMBassador 3338).

4. In the course of our conversation I put two questions to Dr. Mufti. Firstly, I asked him if he had any idea of how Colonel Nasser might react. I had noticed that when his Ambassador had spoken to Sir R. Stevens he had stated very clearly that the new régime in Syria would not last for long. I wondered what this meant. Dr. Mufti said that he did not think, now, that Nasser would try to launch any kind of counter-coup. What he was planning - and Dr. Mufti seemed satisfied that he knew what he was talking about - was to see to it that the elections in Syria, when they were held in four months' time, would go the way he, Nasser, wished them to go. Nothing, Dr. Mufti thought, would happen before then.

5. I asked Dr. Mufti whether he himself had had any foreknowledge of the coup. He admitted that he had and, in reply to a further question, added that he knew Dr. Kuzbari personally and many members of the new Government.

6. I think this is just worth reporting very briefly by telegram and I attach a draft.

*R.S. Scrivener*  
(R.S. Scrivener)  
October 9, 1961.

Eastern Department

Copy to: Lord Privy Seal  
Mr. Thomas  
Sir Roger Stevens  
Mr. Crawford

*I don't think we should say anything more to Dr. Mufti until we have recognized in Damascus.*

*W. Saunders*  
9/10

*G.F. Miller*  
9/10

*T.R. 10/10*

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

*Syr*

Cypher/OTP and  
By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 1471

October 4, 1961

D. 5.58 p.m. October 4, 1961

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 1471 of October 4.

Repeated for information to:

Amman                      Beirut  
Baghdad                    Tel Aviv                    Damascus

and Saving to:

Washington No. 4892  
Paris            No. 4164            U.K.Del.NATO. No. 4055

Recognition of Syria.

Following is extract from record of conversation between Sir R. Stevens and U.A.R. Ambassador on October 3. Full record follows by Saving telegram.

On the subject of recognition the Ambassador was told that we certainly did not intend to take precipitate action, that we had not as yet had any request from Damascus, (this of course has since been overtaken by events), and that if and when we did it would have to be most carefully weighed. In considering this difficult problem we should not be swayed by political emotions; we should have to examine the position quite cold-bloodedly. One factor in this connexion which he must bear in mind was that the British Government had always taken a realistic and so to speak non-political attitude towards recognition. This had been our basic position for so long that if after a time the group in Damascus appeared to have assumed all the attributes of government, and stability and security were maintained throughout the Syrian region, it might be very difficult for us, on the basis of long-accepted practice, to withhold recognition, at any rate de facto. He was being told this by way of warning as to what might happen in the future and not because we thought that the situation was imminent.

During the conversation Mr. el Kony said that in the view of his Government the U.A.R. continued to exist and that the coup of September 28 would have to be reversed. Sir R. Stevens said that he took note of these words with some concern. If the  
/Ambassador

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Foreign Office telegram No. 1471 to Cairo.

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Ambassador was referring to the possibility of the use of force he knew that that was a position which Her Majesty's Government would view with great anxiety; it might lead to the most serious repercussions throughout the Middle East. He expressed the earnest and sincere hope that the problems created by the Syrian affair could be settled amicably between Arabs on a mutually satisfactory basis. This was the United Kingdom's main concern, since if it did not happen most serious consequences might ensue for us all.

CCC

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798

**E**

EASTERN DEPARTMENT

SYRIA

**E** 41023/36.

FROM Sir B. Burrows,  
Ankara.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

No. 1390  
Dated October 10  
Received October 11.

SUBJECT:

Recognition  
Turkish attitude towards recognition  
by Western Powers and towards  
the military and economic strength  
of Syria.

References

MINUTES

Para 2. ~~Co-operation~~ Co-operation in  
anti Communist intelligence.  
Shishakli was pro - Baghdad Pact.  
It is premature to think of this  
out of liaison with a CENTO power  
so soon after regaining his independence.  
It would have to be done very discreetly.  
Syria cannot afford the propaganda  
consequences of such excursions with a  
non Arab state, and a CENTO one at that,  
so early in their new freedom when  
Arab nationalism is the principal  
theme.

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

BWB  
19/10.

REN  
8/11/63

12/10

I agree it wd. wd  
do at all if the Turks develop  
this line of thought to the  
point of suggesting some association  
with



the counter-subversion work of C.I.F.O.  
 We must watch this; and we may  
 later have to explain our views  
 to the Parks.

1 Mr Cope.

6/12/10.

1. R. Dept first

We will let you know if any Turkish  
 initiative on this looks like developing in  
 the context of S.O.

*[Signature]*  
 16/10.

12. Meredith-Kouweine

*[Signature]*  
 16/10.

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FROM ANKARA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir B. Burrows  
No. 1390  
October 10, 1961

D. 12.50 p.m. October 10, 1961  
R. 1.50 p.m. October 10, 1961

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1390 of October 10.  
Repeated for information to Tehran

Damascus                      Amman  
Cairo                              UKMIS New York  
and Saving to Washington

RECEIVED IN  
AIR MAIL  
11 OCT 1961

Recognition of Syria.

Secretary-General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me last night in an informal conversation that he very much hoped that we and other Western Powers would recognize the new Syrian régime quickly. It was a great pity that the Russians had got in before us. The Turkish Government had recognized very quickly not because they felt that their troubles with regard to their Syrian frontier would no longer exist with an independent Syrian Government, but simply in order that there should not be a vacuum into which the Russians would step. By far the greatest danger which they saw was the increase of Communist influence in this area which was of such vital importance to Turkey. Turkey intended to make every possible effort to give political support to the new régime, and to remove any suspicion of Turkish intentions, just as they had done with fair success with the new Iraqi régime, after the revolution there. He hoped that we and others would join in this process. I asked what sort of support he thought Syria most needed and said I assumed that militarily the Syrian army was well able to look after itself. M. Yolga said that considerable economic support would be required which would no doubt have to come mainly from the United States. He agreed that there was no serious military problem. It was physically impossible for Nasser to attack. Jordan had offered military help but the Syrians had said that this was not necessary.

2. As regards the Communist threat, Yolga said that in the time of Zaim there had been cooperation in anti-Communist intelligence between Syria and Turkey. This had ceased in the time of

/Snshekli.

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Ankara telegram No. 1390 to Foreign Office

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Snshevikli. He appeared to hope that something of the kind might now be resumed. He was, however, a little apprehensive that the new régime might be more tolerant towards Communists than the U.A.R., and quoted a remark by a member of the Syrian Government to the effect that Communists would no longer be prosecuted for holding Marxist opinions but only if they carried out active subversion.

Foreign Office please pass Damascus 1, Cairo 14, Amman 11, UKMIS New York 20, and Saving Washington 57.


[Repeated as requested.]

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20506/



*Mr Hopper seems to be fast - good job 9/7*

*It says we should send a selection of telegrams by Hopper, bag with a covering note in reply to X.*

United Kingdom Delegation to NATO  
*I will deal separately with guidance about our attitude to recognition*  
 PARIS.  
 October 6, 1961.

*Dear Hiller*

*GPH  
6/10*

As Paul Wright forecast in his letter of October 4, a further discussion on the situation in Syria took place yesterday in the NATO Political Committee.

2. Subasi (Turkey) circulated a note, a copy of which I enclose, on the attitude of the Turkish Government and said that he had nothing to add to it. de Ranitz (Netherlands) said that his government had heard that the Consuls in Damascus had been asked if their governments would recognise the new Syrian regime. The Dutch Consul had been absent when the request was made, but his authorities felt that they could not take up a position on recognition as long as the present uncertainty prevailed.

3. I said that the United Kingdom Government would wait to see how the situation developed before taking any decision on recognition. There did not seem to be an immediate danger of intervention by Syria's neighbours and to that extent there was less risk of the instability spreading. I referred to the recent statement by our News Department to the general effect that anything which caused instability in the Middle East was a source of concern to Her Majesty's Government and I made it clear that we were not contemplating immediate recognition and would hope to exchange views on the subject with our friends and allies. There might be some advantage in waiting until a number of Arab states had first taken up a position on recognition. We thought it important that we should continue to be seen adhering to our policy of non-involvement in Arab affairs and in particular not to appear to be rejoicing at a setback for Arab unity.

4. Orlandi Contucci (Italy) said that his government were taking an attitude similar to the United Kingdom. They considered that it would be unwise to do anything which could damage the West, e.g. premature recognition. He said that his government would take no decision until the situation had developed further.

5. Schulze-Boysen (Germany) said that his government's position was also the same as the United Kingdom. There was however a special problem for Germany. He alluded to the possibility of blackmail over the question of the recognition of the D.D.R., but said that for the moment his government was waiting to see how the situation developed.

6. de Menthon (France) said that the position of his government was slightly different, since they were not in diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic. He

/thought

G.F. Hiller, Esq., D.S.O.,  
 Foreign Office,  
 LONDON, S.W.1.

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thought that a balanced view would have to be taken of the advantages and disadvantages of recognizing the Syrian regime. On the one hand, there was Nasser's attitude towards Africa. On the other hand, Nasser might be a greater danger because of his unstable position. Syria had always been an unstable country and at the time of the union with Egypt had been oriented towards Communism. It was interesting that Moscow seemed to be adopting a policy of "wait and see" and he thought that the Political Committee might make a study of the Soviet reaction to the events.

7. Hooper (in the Chair) commented that although it had been a military coup, the most likely people to profit from it were the merchant and middle classes. He suggested that they had reacted against U.A.R. inspired nationalization. It was interesting that the traditional political figures of Syria were emerging again. He wondered whether recent developments in Syria would have repercussions in Egypt and in particular whether the Egyptian commercial classes would be wondering about the possibilities of similar action. It certainly seemed a setback to Nasserism. Hooper also drew attention to the failure by Nasser to put the revolution down. It was possible that he did not dare take troops away from the Gaza strip and the Sinai peninsula and that his fear of the Israelis had contributed to the success of the Syrian revolt. There might be a danger moreover that the Israelis might try to exploit the situation in some way. He thought that a discussion on Israeli intentions might be useful.

8. It was agreed that discussion of the situation in the Middle East should be resumed at the next meeting of the Political Committee on October 10. We should be grateful if you could keep us informed of developments and if you could supply us with any comments on Hooper's line of thought.

*Yours sincerely*  
*F. S. Tomlinson*

(F.S. Tomlinson)

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**DÉLEGATION PERMANENTE DE LA TURQUIE**

AUPRES DE L'ORGANISATION  
DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

181, Boulevard Malesherbes  
PARIS - XVII  
TEL.: CAR. 52-72

DECLARATION DU MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE  
TURQUIE AU SUJET DE LA RECONNAISSANCE DE L'INDEPENDANCE  
DE LA SYRIE ET DE LA RUPTURE PAR L'EGYPTE DES RELATIONS  
DIPLOMATIQUES AVEC LA TURQUIE.

Le Gouvernement constitué par le Doct. Memoun Kouzbari à la suite du mouvement révolutionnaire déclenché par les forces armées syriennes dans la nuit du 27 au 28 septembre 1961 a mis fin à l'Union entre la Syrie et l'Egypte et proclamé l'indépendance de la Syrie.

Prenant en considération d'une part le succès obtenu par le mouvement révolutionnaire qui a pris complètement en main l'autorité dans le pays et d'autre part la déclaration faite le 29 septembre au Caire par le Président Nasser lui-même, selon laquelle l'union entre les deux pays ne peut exister qu'avec le consentement des peuples intéressés et non par la force, déclaration qui équivaut à reconnaître comme une situation de fait le retrait de la Syrie de l'Union, le Gouvernement turc a décidé de reconnaître le nouvel Etat syrien et en a informé le Gouvernement Kouzbari.

Le 1er Octobre 1961 à 15 heures, le ministre a.i. des Affaires Etrangères de l'Egypte a fait savoir à l'Ambassadeur de Turquie au Caire que son Gouvernement avait décidé de rompre les relations diplomatiques avec la Turquie, à la suite de la reconnaissance par celle-ci de la Syrie.

Ce n'est qu'avec regret que le Gouvernement turc prend connaissance de cet acte de l'Egypte.

La Turquie ayant des frontières terrestres les plus étendues avec la Syrie, l'importance que revêt pour elle l'existence avec ce pays, de même qu'avec les autres pays arabes, de relations basées sur des liens traditionnels de fraternité se passe de commentaires.

La reconnaissance de la Syrie, qui a effectivement acquis et proclamé son indépendance, est avant tout une nécessité découlant desdits liens de voisinage et d'amitié. D'autre part, cette reconnaissance d'une indépendance qui

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a été adaise par le Président Nasser, n'a absolument aucun caractère hostile envers l'Égypte à l'amitié de laquelle le Gouvernement turc attache du prix. En même qu'en 1958 la Turquie avait reconnu l'Union entre la Syrie et l'Égypte comme expression de la volonté des deux peuples, de même elle n'a fait cette fois qu'enregistrer, en tant qu'ami et voisin, la volonté du peuple syrien de se retirer de l'Union et de reacquerir le statut d'État indépendant.

Le vœu toujours réitéré du Gouvernement turc est de voir les pays arabes vivre entre eux dans la fraternité et la paix et maintenir avec la Turquie des relations d'amitié conformes aux liens traditionnels et aux intérêts véritables des Parties. Le Gouvernement turc tient à souligner que malgré la rupture des relations diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement égyptien du fait de ce dernier, la nation turque conservera et nourrira toujours les sentiments les plus amicaux envers la nation égyptienne.

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 9, 1961.

Would you please refer to your letter No. 20506 of October 6 about Syria?

2. You will have had already most telegrams of interest about Syria; I enclose some more to fill in the blanks.

3. As regards paragraph 7 of your letter, we agree that at first sight the most likely people to profit from the revolution will be the merchant and middle classes, but this view should perhaps be qualified by the fact that power in Syria is entirely in the hands of the Army and many of the middle-ranking and junior officers in the Syrian Army might fairly be described as left-wing. To this extent, therefore, we must expect any stable government (the present one is transitional) which has the confidence of the Army, to introduce some kind of social and economic reforms which might displease the merchant and middle classes. There is no evidence yet - rather to the contrary - that developments in Syria will have repercussions in Egypt. Nor do we think that the Israelis will try to exploit the situation. From what I have gathered from the Israeli Counsellor here, the Israelis will be as quiet and as unprovocative as possible until they see what the new Syrian Government do as regards the Arab/Israel problem. Of course they fear the worst, but meanwhile they will probably be on fairly good behaviour.

(L.C.W. Figg)

F.S. Tomlinson, Esq.,  
U.K. Delegation to NATO,  
PARIS.



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*M. C. [unclear] M. Sanderson*  
*9/10*  
*11/10*



RECEIVED  
 13 OCT 1961  
 E41023/37(A)

United Kingdom Delegation to NATO,  
 PARIS.

October 10, 1961.

20506/129/61

*Jean Hiller*

The NATO Political Committee resumed discussion of the situation in Syria to-day.

2. Subasi, the Turkish representative, said that according to his latest information the situation in Syria was normal and Kusbari was in complete control. Such slight disorder as there had been had been exaggerated by the United Arab Republic and by the Lebanon. With regard to the activities of the Syrian Communist party, the new government had made it clear that they intended that there should be no party activities allowed before the holding of elections. He then gave an account of the reasons for Turkish recognition of the Syrian régime. One of the main motives was to create a favourable atmosphere between Turkey and her neighbour Syria as a basis for future friendly relations. In this connexion he alluded to previous Soviet attempts to infiltrate Syria. He promised to circulate a statement in writing and we shall see that the Department is sent a copy in due course.
3. de Ranitz (Netherlands) referred to his statement in the Political Committee on October 5 and said that as the Netherlands Government were now inclined to recognise Syria fairly soon after the régime.
4. I then made the points as instructed in the first paragraph of Foreign Office telegram No. 1573.
5. Orlandi-Contucci (Italy) spoke of the need to consider the question of recognition in the light of the recent recognition accorded by the Soviet Union and recommended that the members of NATO should follow a common policy. His Government felt it desirable that the Arab countries should first be allowed to take a decision on recognition (at which the Turkish representative pointed out that four Arab countries had already recognised). Phrydas (Greece) agreed with this view and said that his government wished to avoid action which looked like interference in Arab affairs.
6. Hooper (in the Chair) said that it seemed that the members of NATO were moving towards taking a decision on recognition of the new régime. He thought that the situation should continue to be followed closely by the Political Committee and hoped that members would continue to keep each other informed on their attitude towards recognition.
7. I then gave our assessment (emphasising its tentative nature) of the situation on the lines of paragraph 3 of Figg's letter of October 9 to me. de Menthon, my French colleague, agreed with

our/

G.F. Hiller, Esq., D.S.O.,  
 FOREIGN OFFICE.

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our views on the Israelis and pointed out that the secession of Syria from the U.A.R. meant that Israel was less threatened than it used to be. He also remarked that in view of the Syrian Communist party's relatively strong position and the number of Leftist junior officers in the Syrian army, the present government might in time be forced to make room for a more "progressive" government.

8. Schulz-Boyesen (Germany) suggested that we should all agree not to recognise without first informing our allies. But it was generally accepted that although consultation was a good thing, a rigid formula of this kind was undesirable in a rapidly-changing situation.

*Tomlinson*

*F.S. Tomlinson*

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Mr. Panza, the Italian Minister, called at his request on October 6. He wanted to know what we thought about Syrian membership of the United Nations and about recognising Syria.

2. As regards the first he said that it had been suggested that, since Syria had been a member of the United Nations before her merger with the U.A.R., it might be possible simply for her to resume her former membership. I said that this was an interesting possibility which we had not so far examined and I was grateful to him for drawing it to my attention. As regards our attitude towards Syrian membership of the U.N. I said I did not anticipate that we would wish to oppose it and now that Nasser had said that he would not do so I did not imagine there would be much difficulty.

3. As regards recognition I told Mr. Panza how matters stood and said that we were really letting the U.S. Government make the running. There would, however, be some advantage if the principal Western Powers, say Italy, Germany and possibly France, were to recognise about the same time once the ice had been broken. I told Mr. Panza that we would keep in touch with him about this and in particular that we would give him advance warning before we recognised ourselves.

October 6, 1961

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P.U.S.  
U.N. Department

*M. Wapler of the French Embassy told me at lunch that he did not think any question of French recognition of Syria arose. The French were working on the assumption that Syria would not wish to have diplomatic relations with them. He personally thought the French would be most ill advised to do otherwise.*

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Signor Panza telephone to me this morning to say that he had received from Rome indication of Italian intentions about the recognition of Syria. While his telegram was not absolutely explicit on this point it appeared that the Italian Consul-General in Damascus had been instructed to recognise the Syrian Government today but the announcement would not be made until tomorrow.

*dl* ROGER STEVENS

October 12, 1961

~~Mr. Crawford~~ *T&E 12/10*  
~~Mr. Hiller~~  
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