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FROM ROME TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL

Sir A. Clarke

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
6 OCT 1961

DISTRIBUTION

No. 811
October 5, 1961
PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

D. 6.00 p.m. October 5, 1961
R. 7.46 p.m. October 5, 1961

241023/1

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 811 of October 5.
Repeated for information to :

Beirut
Damascus
Cairo

My Lebanese colleague, M. Moussa Mobarak, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is both well informed and friendly, spoke to me at some length about Syria today. I believe that when he was in Beirut last week he was in touch with Her Majesty's Embassy but for such interest as it may have I record the following points.

2. He asserted categorically that there was no question of its being possible to re-establish the United Arab Republic, Syria was now definitely independent. Nor did he believe that Nasser would have any success in promoting counter-movement in his favour in Syria. There might of course be another coup d'etat, though he doubted it.

3. He fully understood our reasons for caution over recognition.

But he thought it important that we should not allow the Russians to recognise before us. He thought we, the Americans and the French would be wise to stimulate other Arab countries, e.g. Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia to recognise before we did. As regards Egyptian reactions to recognitions which have already taken place, he said that Nasser regarded them as directed against him personally but had indicated that he would not necessarily follow the same course with countries that may recognise later on. He attributed delays in recognition in Iraq to Kassem's fears for his personal position and in Saudi Arabia to quarrels inside the royal family. He claimed that in the Lebanon relations were so close with Syria anyway that, on a de facto basis at any rate, the new régime had, for practical reasons, already been recognised.

Foreign Office please pass Beirut, Damascus and Cairo as my telegrams Nos. 13, 1 and 6 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO N.A.T.O.
PARIS

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

No. 1573

October 9, 1961

D. 9.10 p.m. October 9, 1961

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to UKDel N.A.T.O. telegram No. 1573 of
October 9

Repeated for information to: Bonn [Priority]
Paris [Priority]
Rome [Priority]
Washington [Priority]

My telegram No. 1124 Saving to Bonn and my telegram
No. 7287 to Washington [Syria].

We suggest that you should make the following points at
tomorrow's meeting of the Political Committee:

- (a) the situation seems quiet in Syria and we consider
that our criteria on recognition are largely met;
- (b) it now seems clear that Nasser's speech of
October 5 indicates that he has no objection to
the recognition of Syria by third countries;
- (c) although we have not reached a firm decision
yet it seems possible that we will decide to
recognise in the fairly near future especially if
the Americans decide to do so;
- (d) if we decide to recognise we will welcome early
decisions by other European countries.

2. For your own information only we are seeking Ministerial
approval to recognise within 48 hours of the Americans and to
encourage at least the Germans, and the Italians to recognise at
about the same time. We hope to be able to let you know what
Ministers have decided before the Council meeting on October 11.
Our intention is that you should be authorised to tell the

/Council

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Foreign Office telegram No. 1573 to UKDel N.A.T.O.

- 2 -

Council roughly the timetable we have in mind, which by then should be clearer. At the same time Her Majesty's Representatives at Bonn and Rome would be instructed to do what they can to encourage the Governments to which they are accredited to recognise; Her Majesty's Ambassador in Paris would simultaneously inform French Government of action intended.

3. We are sending you by bag some factual material about Syria for use in the Political Committee. In view of the uncertainty of the outlook in Syria we would like you to be guarded in any discussion about future prospects and to confine yourself largely to contributing information about the current situation.

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Washington telegram No. 2666 to Foreign Office.

-2-

Mr. Strong emphasized that the United States were content to "sit back"; they did not wish to appear to be organizing any body of opinion over this question of recognition.

4. Mr. Strong said that the State Department were not (repeat not) contemplating de facto recognition. There were a number of reasons for this, unconnected with events in Syria, and in any case the department doubted whether de facto recognition would be less bitter a pill for Nasser to swallow.

5. Mr. Strong added, however, that the State Department were considering an idea whereby, if the Arab States continued to delay recognition, the United States Consul General in Damascus might enter progressively into some sort of de facto relationship with the Syrian Government. This might be done by taking each day one or two steps in that direction which, however, would fall short of recognition. This might serve to demonstrate interest in and bolster the morale of the Syrian Government. The United States Consul General was being asked to say whether any such arrangement would be practicable.

6. At a separate tripartite meeting this morning Mr. Rusk himself raised the question of recognition. He said that the United States was moving towards it but could not at present specify their pace. Ideally they would like to be somewhere between the tenth and fifteenth government to recognize. He believed the qualifications for de jure recognition were there if we wanted to make use of them. He thought it would be helpful if a number of countries outside N.A.T.O., e.g. Mexico, decided to recognize at or before the time of United States recognition. He wondered whether we were consulting the Commonwealth, and if so, whether we were trying to concert Commonwealth action. I replied that I was sure we would be consulting the Commonwealth, but doubted whether we would try to concert identical action by all members of the Commonwealth.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo, Damascus, Amman and UKDEL NATO as my telegrams Nos. 35, 2, 23 and 399 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary
Sir E. Shuckburgh
Mr. A. Duncan Wilson
Head of Eastern Department
Head of News Department
Head of N.E.A.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

S E C R E T

FROM TEHRAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Sir G. Harrison

No. 1090

October 7, 1961

PRIORITY

SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET)
DISTRIBUTION

D: 2.31 p.m. October 7, 1961.

R: 3.09 p.m. October 7, 1961.

ey 1027/10

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1090 of
October 7

Repeated for information to UKMis New York, Ankara and
Saving to Washington

EY 11015/4

UKMis New York telegram No. 1636 to Foreign Office:
Syria.

Following is relevant extract from my record (by bag
on October 5) of my talk with the Shah on October 4:

"The Shah asked me whether we should shortly be recognizing the Syrian Government. I replied that I did not think we should be in any hurry to do so. We should probably prefer to await further reactions in the Arab world. As regards the prospects of the new government, I said that we thought it was too early yet for a firm assessment and it could not be excluded that Nasser might attempt to strike back in some way, perhaps by subversion. The Shah then pressed me to say that we welcomed this development. I replied that our interest was to see stability in the Middle East. The situation in Syria had been deteriorating rapidly before the U.A.R. was formed. The drift towards Communism had then been stopped. We might not be very fond of Nasser, but we liked even less the prospect of a Communist foothold in the Middle East. The Shah then said that, unless other countries soon recognized the new Syrian government, it might find itself in difficulties. If Nasser regained control of Syria, this would be a mortal blow to Jordan, and could have most dangerous repercussions in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. I replied that this reinforced my point that we were bound to view with great caution any development which might prejudice stability in the Middle East. The Shah concluded by saying that, although he had held up action for eight hours, he did not regret

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SECRET

Tehran telegram No. 1090 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

his recognition of the Syrian Government; but he understood the reasons for our greater caution."

2. As I was seeing the Acting Foreign Minister this morning, I spoke to him in similar terms, though I added that I did not know what would be the effect of Colonel Nasser's statement yesterday more or less accepting the fait accompli. I also gave him the substance of what Mr. Qods Nakha'i had said to the Minister of State in New York. Mr. Furughi expressed surprise that Mr. Qods Nakha'i should have been pressing us so hard on recognition. He also said that he had no knowledge of any pressure by the Iranian Government on Turkey to supply the Syrian régime with arms. I said that, though I was not speaking on instructions, I thought you would feel that intervention of this kind could be very dangerous. Mr. Furughi said that, personally, he agreed with this view and would raise the matter with the Shah when he next sees him.

3. I do not exclude that Mr. Furughi may not be fully in the picture and that the Shah may have been issuing instructions direct on both counts.

Foreign Office please pass UKM's New York and Saving to Washington as my telegrams Nos. 6 and 152 respectively.

[Repeated as requested.]

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE


Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Sir H. Beeley

No. 984
October 5, 1961

D: 8.45 p.m. October 5, 1961
R: 9.03 p.m. October 5, 1961



IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 984 of October 5

Repeated for information Saving to :

| | |
|------------|---------|
| Damascus | Beirut |
| Amman | Baghdad |
| Washington | Ankara |

President Nasser has just broadcast a statement to all Arabs. Much of it was devoted to a detailed defence of his record in Syria since the union and to warnings against the principal enemies of Arab unity-reaction, imperialism and Israel. After saying that it was not imperative that he should be President of Syria, Nasser announced:

- (a) That he had instructed the U.A.R. delegate to the United Nations not to stand in the way of a Syrian application for membership. He did not wish to isolate Syria.
- (b) That he would not oppose Syrian membership of the Arab League. But he wished the League to set up a committee with the following terms of reference:
 - (1) To establish that Syrian gold and currency remained in the Central Bank at Damascus.
 - (2) To prove his claim that Egypt had subsidised Syria at the rate of £83 million annually, made £9 million sterling available annually in foreign currency, shared with Syria the profits of the Suez Canal and provided subventions for defence.
 - (3) To establish that, contrary to hostile propaganda, only 95 Syrians had been in internment.

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Cairo telegram No. 984 to Foreign Office

-2-

- (4) To show that the paratroops who had landed in Latakia had orders not to open fire and were furnished with genuine not counterfeit money.
- (5) To investigate the activities of Egyptians in Syria. They had been sent to give service not to make money.

3. [sic] Nasser added that the U.A.R. would not agree to recognition of Syrian authorities as a government until the will of the Syrian people had been clearly expressed. Earlier in his speech he had sharply criticised the five governments which have already granted recognition.

4. Nasser concluded by thanking the Lebanese people for their sympathy to the Egyptians who had been expelled from Syria, and all Arab nations for their support. The U.A.R. would remain as a guarantee of the hopes and struggles of the Arabs. He had faith in the Arab nation.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Damascus, Amman, Washington and Ankara as my telegrams Nos. 105,43,101 and 7 respectively.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary
Sir F. Hoyer Millar
Sir R. Stevens
Mr. Crawford
Head of Eastern Department
Head of N.E.A.D.
Head of News Department
Resident Clerk

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL

RECEIVED IN
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Sir H. Beeley

No. 985

October 6, 1961

BY 1023/12/61
E 463116/11

D: 10.14 a.m. October 6, 1961

R: 10.50 a.m. October 6, 1961

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 985 of October 6.

Repeated for information to: Damascus Washington
Amman Ankara
Beirut Baghdad

My telegram No. 984 (repeated (Saving) to all).
- L 1103116/11

It now seems clear that Nasser's remark in his speech last night about recognition of Syria only after a free expression of the popular will, applied to the U.A.R. exclusively and not to third parties. The Press this morning emphasizes the lifting of the diplomatic blockade. The risks of the recognition by Her Majesty's Government are thus greatly reduced, but it still seems to me essential in the interests of our general position here that we should not move before the Americans. I hope also that I may be authorized to explain to the U.A.R. Government our decision to recognize as long as possible before it is publicly announced.

Foreign Office please pass Damascus, Washington, Ankara and Baghdad as my telegrams Nos. 44, 56, 8 and 82 respectively.

[Repeated as requested.]

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary
Sir F. Hoyer Millar
Sir R. Stevens
Mr. Crawford
Head of Eastern Department
Head of N.E.A.D.
Head of News Department

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FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

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FOREIGN OFFICE AND
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Her Majesty's Consul General

No.105

D. 11.15.a.m. October 6, 1961

October 6, 1961

R. 12.44.p.m. October 6, 1961

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.105 of October 6.
Repeated for information to: Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad, Amman

Dr. Kuzbari answering Press correspondent following President Nasser's radio broadcast on October 5, stated Nasser still does not realize that Syrian people, who voluntarily sought union in United Arab Republic, are same people who have supported revolt because Union had been perverted and become dictatorship.

Object of revolt was to preserve pure ideal of Union and hope of attaining genuine unity among all Arab people.

After countering arguments about Egyptian assistance to Syrian development plans, Dr. Kuzbari said Egyptian officials had been well treated prior to repatriation.

On subject of recognition he said President Nasser had realized that Syrian régime would be widely recognized, and it would be to his own disadvantage if he severed relations with all States recognizing Syrian Republic.

As regards elections Syrian Government had already proclaimed its determination that the people express their will.

He concluded "long live Syrian Arab Republic and long live true greater Arab Union."

Foreign Office pass Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad, Amman as my telegrams Nos. 17, 20, 19 and 15.

[Repeated as requested].

ADVANCE COPIES:

Private Secretary
Sir F. Hoyer Millar
Sir R. Stevens
Mr. Crawford
Head of Eastern Department
Head of N.E.A.D.
Head of News Department



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FROM TUNIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
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Mr Lambert

No. 663
October 7, 1961

RECEIVED IN
OCT 1961
E41023/13

D. 6.25 p.m. October 7, 1961
R. 6.46 p.m. October 7, 1961

PRIORITY

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 663 of October 7.

Repeated for information to:- Damascus Amman
Cairo Baghdad
Beirut

and Saving to:- Washington
U.K. Mission New York
U.K. Del. N.A.T.O.

Your telegram No. 1189 to Beirut: Syria.

I this morning drew the attention of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to News Department's remarks about the recognition of Syria as reported in this morning's Press, and asked if he could give me any indications of his Government's attitude. The Secretary General replied that they were in sympathy with Her Majesty's Government's approach to the problem. They recognized the need of avoiding precipitate action while at the same time realizing that to put off a decision on recognition too long might lead to a situation in which the new State would find itself deprived of support from the free world and obliged to seek it elsewhere. He thought, therefore, that a decision by the Tunisian Government would not be delayed more than a few weeks. The Secretary General said that the Tunisians felt sure that the secession of Syria from the U.A.R. was irreversible and had the support of the vast majority of the population. In deciding upon recognition, it was of course necessary to bear in mind the effect that events would have upon the position of Nasser, though the latter was now virtually inviting recognition as well as admission to the United Nations and the Arab League.

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Tunis telegram No. 663 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

The Secretary General seemed to regard full recognition as inevitable, if only because we might all be faced fairly soon with the necessity to vote upon the admission of Syria to the United Nations. He added that the Tunisians had felt that it might be useful in the general interest of stability in the area if the Arab League had been able to discuss the situation, but that since this was not to be, Tunisia would take her own decisions.

Foreign Office pass Damascus 1, Cairo 16, Beirut 15, Amman 10, Baghdad 13 and Saving to Washington 177, U.K. Mission New York 101, U.K. Del. N.A.T.O. 106.

[Repeated as requested].

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FROM RABAT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
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Mr. Beaumont

No. 376
October 7, 1961

D. 10.25 a.m. October 7, 1961
R. 10.45 a.m. October 7, 1961

RECEIVED IN
TELETYPE
9 OCT 1961
EY 1023/13

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 376 of
October 7.

Repeated for information to:-
Cairo
Damascus
Washington

Your telegram No. 588 to Addis Ababa: Moroccan
Attitude on Syria.

Moroccan attitude has been and will probably continue to be conditioned by Nasser's, both because of common membership of Casablanca group and because of the need for Egyptian support over Mauritania. Hitherto therefore they have supported Egyptian refusal to recognize the right of other Governments to have dealings with or discuss let alone recognize the new Syrian Government. Nasser's latest statement (Cairo telegram No. 984) however seems likely to allow them to modify this attitude and Chef du Protocole tells me that it will almost certainly make the Moroccan Government's position more easy.

2. Oriental Secretary is to see Director of Political Affairs at Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 9 and will sound him further.

Foreign Office please pass to Cairo 36, Damascus 1 and Washington 49.

[Repeated as requested]

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FROM RABAT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

RECEIVED IN
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10 OCT 1961

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
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Mr. Beaumont

No. 380

October 9, 1961

E 41023/13(n)

D. 9.00 a.m. October 10, 1961

R. 10.30 a.m. October 10, 1961

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 380 of October 9.

Repeated for information to:

Cairo

Damascus

Washington

and Saving to:

Baghdad

Beirut

Benghazi

Tunis

Tripoli

Kuwait

Amman

Bahrain

Khartoum

Taiz

E 41023

NEAD
12/10
11/10

10 OCT 1961

My telegram No. 376 (not to all addressees): Moroccan attitude on Syria.

Director of Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the Oriental Secretary this morning that owing to particularly close relations between Egypt and Morocco (he emphasized that of all the Arab States they were the only members of the Casablanca Group), Morocco would not wish to take any action which Nasser might construe as unfriendly.

2. Apart from this, Morocco was concerned about what internal policies the Syrian régime would follow, particularly in the economic field, and their attitude would to a large extent be guided by whether they thought that the new régime would cooperate in the best interests of the Syrians and Arabs as a whole.

3. The Director said that his Government was satisfied that the new régime had practical control and certain degree of popular support. They thought that the latter factor underlay Nasser's decision not to oppose the coup by force. They saw his latest statement as a move by Nasser towards allowing States in close relations with him freedom to make their own decisions on recognition, but until they had a firm intimation in this sense from Cairo, where the Moroccan Ambassador was in close touch with U.A.R. authorities, Morocco would not recognize.

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Rabat telegram No. 380 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. Looking to the future, the Director said the Moroccan Government hoped that Syria and Egypt would be able to work out between themselves the form of their future relationship. If this proved impossible Morocco intended to attempt a solution through the Arab League. The lesson of this affair for Moroccans was that unity needed to be built from firm foundations and could not be created by a stroke of the pen. They would attempt to develop the Arab League as machinery for more practical collaboration with the aim of political union coming a generation or more in the future.

5. In connexion with paragraph 2 above, M. Balafrej expressed to me misgivings lest the new Syrian Government might be too far to the right of the Syrian Officers' Corps, and resultant disagreements and weaknesses in the Syrian Government might create an opening for Communism. King Hassan expressed similar misgivings to United States Under-Secretary of State Williams.

Foreign Office please pass Cairo 38, Damascus 3, Washington 50 and Saving to Baghdad 9, Benghazi 15, Tripoli 13, Amman 8, Khartoum 9, Beirut 14, Tunis 35, Kuwait 7, Bahrain 7 and Taiz 2.

[Repeated Saving to Washington and to other posts as requested.]

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