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SECRETARY OF STATE'S FILE

*Minister of State*

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION AT THE U.A.R. PERMANENT MISSION,  
 NEW YORK, AT 5.30 p.m. ON WEDNESDAY, 23 DECEMBER 1960

**SECRET**

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*Present:*

The Prime Minister  
 The Foreign Secretary

President Nasser  
 Mr. Fawzi

Mr. Bligh  
 Mr. Samuel

Two Secretaries

*6/22912/109*

After an exchange of courtesies the Prime Minister thought it would be useful if they could exchange views about the present meeting of the General Assembly. He had detected a general sense of anxiety about the way the debate had gone. Perhaps he could say how glad he was that President Nasser's speech had exercised a moderating influence. President Nasser said that Egypt was a small country and desired peace throughout the world so that they could pursue their programme of development.

The Foreign Secretary said that there had been much talk in the past about disarmament and indeed much negotiation but so far no real progress had been made. Had the President any ideas as to how all this talk might now be translated into useful action. President Nasser said that the people were looking to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to "defreeze" the ice. He had, the previous day, proposed that there should be a meeting between the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. But, in reply to a question, he said he had not mentioned this point in the talks he had had with President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev.

The Prime Minister said it was possible to derive some encouragement from the fact that the Geneva talks on the cessation of nuclear tests had continued even after the failure of the Paris talks. Indeed good progress had been made and there now only remained a few points, albeit important ones, to settle. He was concerned to find some way in which vague talk in large assemblies about the need for disarmament could be translated into discussions by small committees of technical experts which might lead to some practical proposals. This was the way to make progress. President Nasser agreed on the desirability of discussions between different countries on disarmament questions, but thought that ultimately it was up to the big Powers to reach agreement, particularly in view of recent technical developments. He added that after the Paris talks had broken down the international atmosphere had developed a fever and he thought this might eventually lead to the collapse of the Geneva talks.

The Prime Minister then turned to the tasks facing the United Nations, and in particular the Congo. There might indeed be other parts of the world where the United Nations could serve some useful purpose.

President Nasser thought it most important to keep the cold war out of Africa and said there was much that the United Nations could do to improve the conditions of the people.

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The Foreign Secretary said that the United Nations had done a good job in the Congo but owing to the absence of any effective Congolese authority it had been well nigh impossible for Mr. Hammarskjöld to avoid making some mistakes. But this was not the fault of the United Nations Organisation. It was because of the difficulties inherent in the local situation. If the position in Ruanda Urundi deteriorated they would be faced with a even more difficult situation than in the Congo.

President Nasser said that there was a legally elected Government in the Congo. This must be supported. It was essential to bring Mr. Lumumba and President Kasavubu together. He thought that the United Nations had erred in preventing Mr. Lumumba from using his airfields and radio stations at a crucial time. There were many tribal conflicts within the Congo and it was difficult to see how the peoples could be persuaded to work together. He agreed that in order to avoid bloodshed and in order to continue with development some way must be found of uniting the different parts of the Congo. The Foreign Secretary said it was important that the large Powers were kept out of the Congo. President Nasser said that this was not possible. Even if they did not use men or send in armaments the large Powers had interests and ideas which they pursued. President Nasser agreed with the Prime Minister's view that the right solution would be to try to get the different interests in the Congo to agree on the appointment of a pacificator.

Turning to the Middle East, the Prime Minister asked President Nasser whether it was likely that there would be a period of calm and rest there. He thought it was useful that the President had not attacked Jordan in his speech to the General Assembly. Was there anything that could be done to help with the general climate in the Middle East? President Nasser said that Egypt did not want violence, which led to tension, in that part of the world.

The Foreign Secretary said that Cairo Radio had continually tied up the United Kingdom with Jordan and had tried to suggest that we were helping to incite King Hussein to pursue aggressive policies. This was the opposite of the truth. We had used all our influence to restrain Jordan. It was very hard that we should be accused of something which was the exact opposite of what we had actually done. President Nasser said that it was difficult to avoid an atmosphere of suspicion.

The Prime Minister said it was most important that steps should be taken to try to improve the relations between the United Kingdom and Egypt. The appointment of Ambassadors would be very useful. There was an increasing amount of commercial business being done. If diplomatic contacts were established this would build up, and there would be an increasing intercourse between the two countries.

President Nasser said that there was a period immediately after the evacuation of the base when it seemed that relations between the two countries would improve, but this, unfortunately, did not last long. It was in the interests of Egypt to avoid difficulties. If Israel was supplied with arms by the West they had to arm themselves in reply. The Prime Minister thought we had supplied more arms to the Arab countries than to the Israelis. President Nasser interjected that this included Jordan.

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The Foreign Secretary agreed that we did supply arms to Jordan but said that it was our endeavour to try to ration our supplies of armaments to Middle East countries so as to avoid any lack of balance in the area. After all, our arms deals were all open and above board. It was no good ignoring the existence of Israel. The country was there. It was a fact. The Prime Minister said that the problem of Israel should be faced by Egypt. It was not insoluble, but it was no answer to try to pretend that one could drive them into the sea.

*Eason**Curwood*

President Nasser said that never in any of his speeches has he suggested that this was what they wanted to do.

The Prime Minister said that if things could be unwound even a little, if some start could be made, there would be an improvement. When he had paid his visit to Moscow at the beginning of 1959 the situation had been bad. There had then been an improvement; but afterwards had come the failure of the Paris talks, but this meant only that we had to start again. Just as this patient approach was necessary in the widest field, so it should be applied in areas of the world where there were local strains and problems.

President Nasser said that in 1955 Sir Anthony Eden had made a speech in the Guildhall which he, Nasser, had described afterwards as constructive. Look what had happened. Israel had turned Sir Anthony's proposals down flat. Then there was the threat exercised by Israel. That too was a fact. There were at present 2 million Jews in Israel. What would happen when they had 6 million in so small an area? The Arab countries were convinced that Israel would try to expand. Then there were the refugees. He had seen the condition in which the refugees were living and he did not want his people to live like that. Twelve years had elapsed since the first refugees had been evacuated. Their condition in another ten years would be unchanged.

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Israel thus presented two serious problems, namely the refugees and the fear the Arab countries had that Israel would once more commit aggression against them.

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The President <sup>four</sup> took up the Prime Minister's comment about Jordan. He assured the Prime Minister that the U.A.R. had no designs on Jordan. It was true that they wanted the Arab world to be united but they did not want unity to come about as a result of war or bloodshed; they wanted it to be a unanimous decision of all the countries concerned.

The Prime Minister said that, however that might be, Cairo Radio put out propaganda which amounted to incitement of the people of Jordan to murder their King.

President Nasser launched into a long defence of his propaganda activities and claimed that in all cases the Jordanians had started the various slanging matches, that he had been patient for many months but in the end had been obliged to hit back. For example, after the revolution in Iraq it was the Jordanians who had taken the initiative in breaking off relations with the U.A.R.; recently he himself had gone to Syria at a time when the situation there was somewhat unstable (and here he said that everybody had their troubles with the Communists and other subversive elements) and King Hussein had attacked him, President Nasser. The President believed that these attacks had been made with the agreement of the United Kingdom. Again, however, he had been patient for four months and even when he had replied to the attacks he had referred only to the actions of King Hussein and had not mentioned him by name. The Secretary of State interrupted to say that the United Kingdom were concerned about the direct incitements to murder the King that Cairo Radio had been bearing since Jordan and offered to show Dr. Fawzi excerpts.

President Nasser said that there were other kinds of warfare besides military warfare: what he was conducting was psychological warfare and he claimed once again that he had not started it. He pointed out that his propaganda machine was no doubt better than King Hussein's and so he noticed it more. Had the Foreign Secretary, he asked, got excerpts of Jordanian broadcasts in his pocket? The Secretary of State replied that Russia had been attacking us for twenty years but we had not thought it necessary to reply in kind. President Nasser explained this by saying that the United Kingdom was a stable country with long traditions behind it.

The Prime Minister said that the trouble was to find a way of calming things down. He would like to get discussions going, or at a very least to make contact through ambassadors and commercial contacts. In this way complaints could be taken up and discussed quietly.

President Nasser said that the U.A.R. had been ready for an exchange of ambassadors but the actions of the United Kingdom had raised the old questions in his mind. The U.A.R. had asked for certain consular posts in British territories but had been turned down. Then when Field Marshal Lord had been appointed to Syria, an obscure Lebanese newspaper had published a hostile article and immediately the U.A.R. had taken this up and publicized it round the world. He could not but assume that the intentions of the United Kingdom towards the U.A.R. were basically hostile. After informing the Prime Minister that he read all the United Kingdom newspapers he said that they were always saying that Nasser was up to this or that piece of mischief and the Cairo

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press naturally had to reply. He thought the Daily Mail and the Daily Express were the worst and that they played a nefarious role in relations between the two countries.

The Secretary of State then suggested that perhaps one way of making a start in the process of calming things down would be for Dr. Fawzi and him to talk over the problems. ~~Dr. Fawzi~~ had already promised to look into the question of consular representation. The Prime Minister and President Nasser both agreed that this would be a useful step. Dr. Fawzi said that the more constructive things that could be done together the better. The Financial Agreement was an example of the sort of thing he had in mind.

The Prime Minister suggested that we should aim first to get increased contacts between the two governments and that business and commercial and private contacts would then follow.

Dr. Fawzi agreed and observed that it was impossible to get rid of suspicion by merely saying that it should cease. The two countries must talk to each other and there must be proof of sincerity. The Prime Minister said that he was very glad to have had this meeting with President Nasser and that they were agreed that the Foreign Secretaries should carry on their discussion so that a start could be made in improving relations between the two countries. He hoped that the two countries could also work together on the great international issues such as the Congo. It was essential to ensure that the Congo crisis did not repeat itself anywhere else in Africa. The powers must be ready for such an eventuality, perhaps by having some skeleton international pacification machinery ready. It was not enough simply to hold the ring while the various parties fought it out: that would bring financial and administrative chaos. Active steps had to be taken to bring the various sides together.

President Nasser agreed and said that he would like, before the Prime Minister left New York, to call on him.

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S FILE

*Jordan issue*

*Minister of State*

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION IN KING HUSSEIN'S SUITE  
 AT THE WALDORF ASTORIA  
 AT 5.30 p.m. ON THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1960

**SECRET**  
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Present:

The Prime Minister

King Hussein

*UN 22912/110*

Bahat Talhouni

Mr. Bligh

Lusa Nassir

Dr. Yusuf Maikal

After an exchange of courtesies, the Prime Minister asked King Hussein what his plans were. The King thought he would be staying in New York for about six days. He would be making his speech to the General Assembly on Monday. He had already had a meeting with the Secretary-General and now felt happier as the Secretary-General had appeared to understand Jordan's problems. The Prime Minister said his feeling of the mood of the General Assembly was that they tended to respond more to a moderate approach than to vehemence. There were nearly 100 nations represented, many of them small and relatively new. They really did seem to be interested to learn the truth, and were not to be put off with propaganda.

The King thought that the great debate in the Assembly was really between two different ways of thought. The problem that Jordan faced was a reflection of this wider issue. He hoped to engage the sympathies of the United Nations in his affairs as he thought they would assume responsibility for any resolution in which they were involved. The King went on to say that he had evidence that the recent assassination in Amman had been planned for over a year. The U.A.R. had, of course, been planning to destroy Jordan for a long time. He and his people were under great pressure, and matters might continue to a point where they might lose their self-control: if so, they would go down fighting. But of course the King hoped that this state of affairs would not be reached. President Nasser's tactics of bringing Communism into the Middle East had rallied opinion in Jordan.

The King would not deal with the special problems of Jordan in the General Assembly, but would confine himself to a general statement of his case.

The Prime Minister said that the U.K. had sympathy with King Hussein and great admiration for the strength he had shown in handling his difficulties. He was sure that the King was right to continue to follow a line of restraint and dignity.

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The Prime Minister went on to report briefly his conversation with President Nasser. The latter had made a clever speech to the General Assembly which had been very moderate in tone, and the Prime Minister had thought he should see him in order to establish a crise de contacts and had taken the opportunity to press upon him the importance of maintaining calm in the Middle East. Any Government which deliberately disturbed relationships in that area would bear a considerable responsibility. The Prime Minister had conf. onted President Nasser with recent outpourings from Cairo radio. President Nasser had, of course, argued that he was under attack himself and must therefore reply. Their meeting had been quite short and there would be further conversations between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mr. Nawzi.

The Prime Minister added that the somewhat aggressive tactics adopted by the Communists in the General Assembly had appeared to frighten President Nasser.

In reply to a question, the King said that after the murder of the late Prime Minister of Jordan, a note had been sent to the U.A.R. with a copy to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. They had, as yet, received no reply. Further plots against the regime in Jordan had recently been discovered.

The Prime Minister asked whether any action had been suggested by the Secretary-General. He thought that the position of the Secretary-General in the United Nations had been strengthened and not weakened by the recent attacks which had been made on him. The King said that Mr. Hammarskjold was quite hopeful that he would be able to have a useful talk with the U.A.R.

The King reviewed briefly the position of neighbouring countries in the Middle East. He thought that the position of Iraq was now somewhat stronger. The impact of Communism in the Middle East might be different from that which President Nasser expected. Though Nasser was himself anti-Communist, he was prepared to try and use Communism to further his policies. He might find them difficult allies.

The Prime Minister asked if the King had seen any other Heads of Government in New York. The King said he had seen the Lebanese but they would take no time at all in the General Assembly. They appreciated Jordan's difficulties, but were afraid to support them publicly.

The King said that it was President Nasser's purpose to destroy Jordan. They had always opposed his policies and had been gaining prestige in the area in recent months. If Jordan was destroyed, Nasser would have a freer hand with his plans in the Middle East and his control over Syria would be strengthened.

The Jordanian Foreign Secretary also spoke on this theme and described how the individuals concerned in recent plots in Jordan had come from Syria. They had very good secret evidence that this was so, especially in connection with the recently discovered plots against the King. They had not, of course, made this evidence available to the U.A.R. The people concerned were mainly low-grade types, messengers and so on. They were being given bribes of about £50 a month - their salaries would be about £20 a month.

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The King said that they had had news that morning that a Syrian Mig 15 had crash-landed near Amman two days ago. The pilot had been injured and was in custody. It would not be easy for the Syrians to explain this away as the aircraft was well over the border.

The Prime Minister thanked the King for seeing him and once more drew attention to the great effect that would be brought about in the General Assembly by a moderate speech. He hoped that the Jordanians would keep in touch with the U.K. Mission in New York, who would do what they could to help, especially in connection with the discussions with the Secretary-General.

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ideas; it had been naive of Nasser to think that President Eisenhower would believe this. The President's general impression of Nasser had been favourable but he felt that he was a man whom it would be difficult to trust.

The Foreign Secretary said that his feeling was that the neutral countries were now rather touchy. The Communists were blatantly wooing them and the Western Powers were naturally saying that the democratic way of life was best. It was perhaps rather patronising to say to the neutrals that the West had no objection to their neutrality. They were really irritated by the competition for their allegiance and ~~we should need to be very careful of that.~~ <sup>to be sure</sup> <sup>in handling this</sup> President Eisenhower agreed and said that he had asked the African countries if they were thinking in terms of a regional grouping because if they were then they would need no arms expenditure except for internal security. <sup>had</sup> He said that he hoped that no-one would be neutral on the question of freedom or slavery and right or wrong but military neutrality was a different matter. Of course the Africans to whom the President had spoken had all said they <sup>had</sup> ~~did~~ not suffer Communist domination but they were perhaps sceptical about the possibility of avoiding this. The Africa by whom President Eisenhower had been most impressed had been President Olympio of Togoland. Mr. Nehru had seemed rather depressed and had said how badly things were going on the Chinese frontier. Mr. Hartley suggested that Mr. Nehru was confused about his own role in the United Nations and seemed rather to regret having come at all. Both he and <sup>had</sup> ~~was~~ Prime Minister Khrushchev had expressed support for the United Nations but Khrushchev had then at once made a speech rather in the opposite sense.

The Prime Minister said that it was quite clear that we should support the United Nations in situations like the Congo.

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This was in the interests of peace. The difficulty was how to secure justice when ~~the~~ <sup>massive</sup> investments such as in Egypt or Cuba had been confiscated. As regards the Congo it was fairly clear that the United Nations would have to rule the country under the facade of a local government. Mr. Herter agreed and said that Mr. Varmarkjold had told him that the Chamaian troops would ~~release~~ <sup>allow</sup> Mr. Lumumba to ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~arrested~~ <sup>arrested</sup> if presented with a legally signed warrant. Apparently there was one magistrate in Leopoldville, the legality of whose appointment could not be disputed, and he had given a warrant for Lumumba's arrest to Colonel Mobutu who had had it in his pocket for some time but did not appear to have the courage to use it. The Foreign Secretary said that it was really essential to get rid of Mr. Lumumba because if he was recalled to power the whole Katanga question would become acute again and there would be a real danger of a struggle between black and white. The Africans would begin to waver again. It was ridiculous that Mr. Lumumba could not be disposed of. Mr. Herter agreed and said that President Nasser had expressed some doubts about the legality of some of the United Nations actions in the Congo, taking the view that Mr. Lumumba was the legitimate Prime Minister. The Prime Minister ~~agreed and~~ said that the difficulty was that Mr. Varmarkjold was not really governing in the Congo but was only keeping the ring. President Eisenhower said that he had tried to get Mr. Nehru interested in the Congo and had suggested that some Indian might come in place of Mr. Sanche who, excellent though he was, had the disadvantage of being an American. But Mr. Nehru had not been interested. The Foreign Secretary said that he noticed that Mr. Nehru was very touchy about the Belgians. President Eisenhower agreed. Mr. Nehru had said that the Belgians had been very wicked in leaving the Congo. *in class.*

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Mr. Harter said that there would be as big a problem in Luanda-Urundi if the Belgians left there. President Eisenhower wondered if Nigeria could perhaps exercise some leadership. The Foreign Secretary agreed that this might be possible. He asked that the United States authorities should do their best to see that there was no discrimination on grounds of colour in New York against the Nigerians. He had heard complaints about <sup>Lot</sup> visas being refused and this had made a deplorable impression. President Eisenhower and Mr. Harter both said that this must be dealt with and <sup>that</sup> they would do their best.

At this point a draft press statement for use after the meeting was brought in and agreed after amendment. ~~The meeting ended at about 10.15 a.m.~~

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SECRETARY OF STATE'S FILE.

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*UN 22912/111.*

*1/2* Record of a conversation in the Presidential Suite at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria at 9 ~~00~~ a.m. on Tuesday, September 27, 1960

*de* Present: Prime Minister President Eisenhower  
Lord Home Secretary of State Herter  
Mr. de Zulueta General Goodpaster

*—*

President Eisenhower and the Prime Minister had had an hour's private conversation from 8 ~~00~~ a.m. and were joined by the Foreign Secretary and the U.S. Secretary of State at 9 ~~00~~ a.m.

The Prime Minister said that

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