

V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

VG.1051/101.

FROM Mr. P. M. J. Wright,
 Secy to Sir Roger Stevens

Confidential.

No. 1045/60.
 Dated September 12.
 Received September 16.

SUBJECT:

Record of conversation between GEOFFREY ARTHUR and MAHMUD RIAD on September 12.

References

-/98.

MINUTES

This is certainly discouraging. Mahmud Riad appears no longer to be destined for London, and we are told flatly that the Cairo propaganda campaign against us in Africa, Southern Arabia and the Gulf will continue. Moreover, though President Nasser seemed prepared to concede (VG 1051/90 - Flag C) to Mr. Woodrow Wyatt that the Foreign Office accepted Arab nationalism, Mahmud Riad criticises the Foreign Office as well as the Conservative Party.

2. The fact that Israel was only mentioned twice and in passing bears out Sir Moore Crosswaite's thesis in his letter of September 6 (-/98 - Flag E) that it is our alleged attitude to Arab nationalism which is fundamentally crucial with the Egyptians rather than the question of Israel.

3. We await Cairo's further comments on Mahmud Riad's remarks, and also any comments they may make on Sir Roger Stevens' letter of September 8 (-/98 - Flag F).

(Printing Instructions)

150932-51600

(Outward Action)

Arabian Dept. 299
 African Dept. 3/10
 F.O.R.D. (M/E.)
 11.6.60

(R. Arculus)
 September 26, 1960.
 P. W. 29/6

(Action completed)	(Main Indexed)
225 11.14.60	31 8.11

I had some conversation at lunch today with Mr. Miles Copeland. He asked me what our news from Syria was and said that he hoped to discuss the situation there when he called on Sir Roger Stevens. He thought that the present Syrian discontent might cause Nasser to wish to make some concessions to the Ba'athists but that the absence of recent Egyptian successes would make it difficult for Nasser to do so. He said that he thought the Jewish Observer story about Nasser's diabetes was much exaggerated. He might

mild
 well be a diabetic but his general health seemed good. But he was frustrated by the lack of progress he was making as an Arab nationalist leader. The conference of oil producing states had been a piece of constructive Arab policy in which Nasser had had no part.

2. All this confirms what Mr. Arculus says in his minute and what Sir Moore Crosthwaite said in his perceptive letter (see paragraph 2 above). I think that it also explains a good deal of the increased hostility to us amongst the U.A.R. Government and Nasser's immediate entourage. When things go wrong for the Arab nationalist policy of Egypt, we are still easily the most convenient whipping boy.


J.G.S. Beith
 (J.G.S. Beith)
 September 27, 1960.


ll
28/9.

[Signature]

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Very interesting -
 1) Sir F. Hoyer Hillar *ll*
 2) Lord Privy Seal *17/9*
 3) *Leahurst Dept to order*
Sept. 16 *in 10/9.*

depressing
 (1045/60)
14.9

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,
 CAIRO.
 September 12, 1960.

former USSR Amb. despatch to London

Dear Roger,

I am enclosing a record of a conversation which Geoffrey Arthur had this morning with ~~Mahmud Riad~~ Geoffrey had been seeing Salah Gohar, the Head of the Office for Palestine Affairs, last week, and had said in passing that he wondered whether Mahmud Riad would receive him. Salah Gohar replied that he saw no reason why not. We decided to follow up this opening and, a little to our surprise, an interview was immediately arranged when Geoffrey rang up Mahmud Riad's office.

JG1051/98
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2. I will send comments on Mahmud Riad's remarks by the next bag. They are of course relevant both to the question of the supply of arms to Israel and, in the wider context, the correspondence which rests with your letter to Moore Crosthwaite of September 8. But these views are a depressing confirmation of much that Amer said to Colin Crowe when he saw him on August 22; and again confirm our feeling that relations are certainly showing no signs of improvement at the moment.

Yvonne Paul
 (P.H.G. Wright)

Sir R. Stevens, K.C.M.G.,
 Foreign Office.
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I called this morning on Mahmud Riad, Adviser on Foreign Affairs to the President. He was polite, good humoured and personally welcoming; but his remarks were uncompromising, as the following account of the conversation will show.

2. I remarked that we had hoped that Mr. Riad would have taken up his post as Ambassador in London by now. He replied that in the spring of this year the U.A.R. Government had hoped that their relations with Britain would soon improve; but these hopes had been disappointed. Our relations had if anything become slightly worse during the summer. He added rather sadly that at the time when he was Ambassador designate to London (he implied that he was no longer down for the job) he had thought that he might be able to make a contribution to the improvement of relations; but now he did not think there was anything that he could do.

3. I agreed that we had made no progress in our relations for some months and wondered what it was that was preventing the U.A.R. Government from responding to our desire for an improvement. Mr. Riad said that the answer was simple: Britain was still working against Arab nationalism and against the U.A.R.

4. At this point we had the usual passage on Jordan. I denied our responsibility for Jordanian propaganda and showed how the Cairo picture of our military involvement with Jordan was exaggerated beyond recognition. Rather to my surprise, Mr. Riad did not contest this. Instead, he said that it was not so much a question of Jordan only:

/indeed

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indeed he could understand our position there. He then treated me to a lecture about Britain's relations with Arabs from the end of the First World War up to the present time. Britain, he maintained, had always worked against Arab nationalism, and the final proof of her hostility was to be found in the creation of Israel in 1948 and the attack on Egypt in 1956. Against this background, it was very difficult for the U.A.R. Government to trust us, especially since the party which was responsible for Suez was still in power, and until recently the same Foreign Secretary still in the same office. We said that we had changed our attitude to Arab nationalism, but how - in view of our past actions and their justified suspicions - could the Arabs be expected to trust us? They wanted the evidence of deeds, and it needed to be positive evidence; and they had seen none. Mr. Riad added that they were in fact convinced that our policy was still hostile to the U.A.R. In 1956 we had tried to destroy Nasser by force. That policy had failed and he suspected that we had since been trying to destroy him by other and subtler means. The British press, the BBC, Sir Anthony Eden's memoirs, and many other phenomena, indicated that the mentality which had gone to the making of the Suez episode was still dominant in England, not only in the Conservative Party, but in the Foreign Office too. For example, we would not allow the U.A.R. to open consulates, even in places outside Africa and the Middle East, such as Singapore and Hong Kong: we were still clinging to the old idea that Egypt was not our equal, and that it was perfectly in order for us to have consulates all over the U.A.R. whilst giving nothing away ourselves. As long as these attitudes persisted it

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/would



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would be difficult to improve relations between us. They did not trust us, and we made it perfectly obvious by our actions that we did not trust them.

5. On the rare occasions on which I was able to stem the flow, I contested Mr. Riad's account of our actions and their motives. I said, for example, that we had got the impression from Murad Ghaleb that the U.A.R. regarded consulates as a matter of confidence and that it was all or nothing: that is why we had not got any further even on Liverpool, Singapore and Hong Kong. I tried to talk about the BBC and the press; but Mr. Riad anticipated my remarks, and said that if I were to argue with him for a week that the B.B.C. was independent and that the Foreign Office had no influence with the press, he would not believe me. As regards the press, it might be true in theory; but the Egyptians were not to be persuaded that the influence of the great organisation in Whitehall was as small as we made out. He could believe that the State Department sometimes had no say in policy; but H.M. Government was better organised.

6. I then said that whatever might be true of the past, we sincerely thought that we now had more to complain of in U.A.R. policy than they had in ours. I gave examples from Cairo radio, the press, the Voice of Free Africa and so on. Mr. Riad replied he did not approve of the violent abuse and obscenity which I had said marked some of the African programmes, nor did he think that the inaccuracies (e.g. about Oman) which were sometimes broadcast on the Voice of the Arabs were good propaganda for the U.A.R. But he must make it clear that the U.A.R. were against imperialism and foreign bases wherever they might be.

They

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They had been attacked from British colonial bases as recently as 1956, and they would feel safer if all our bases were removed. They would therefore continue their propaganda against us in Africa, Southern Arabia and the Gulf (though he specifically disclaimed any intention of interfering with our oil supplies). He did not in any case altogether agree that our record in Africa was good. It certainly was in West Africa: but he was not ^{at} all sure about East Africa, particularly Kenya and Rhodesia.

7. I tried several times to get Mr. Riad to be more specific in his complaints (e.g. against the B.B.C.) and in his advice (e.g. on what we ought to do), but in vain. I got the impression that his mind was almost closed; that to him Britain is the enemy of Arab nationalism almost ex hypothesi, and that it will take a lot to convince him that we have changed. But I think he would be easier to deal with on specific issues. I contested his remarks about the "old mentality" in the Foreign Office and suggested that he should see Sir Roger Stevens when the latter comes here in October. He said that he would be delighted to do so. I record his remarks because they seem to me to reflect faithfully the present mood of the U.A.R. Government. It is interesting that he only mentioned Israel twice in passing - once to refer to our responsibility for her creation and once to deplore our supplies of arms.

September 12, 1960.

G.G. Arthur.

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVE
23 SEP 1960
V61051/102

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The U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires called on me on September 22 at his request. He opened by saying he had no special questions to raise on instructions. He then asked how we proposed to vote on the U.A.R. candidature for the Security Council supported by the Arab League. I told him that we made a practice of not committing ourselves in advance and I therefore could not give him an answer. In general, however, we fell in with regional members' recommendations regarding regional seats.

2. Mr. Khalil then asked about our attitude on Algeria, implying that the recent vote on the Congo suggested that we did not see eye to eye with the French on African policy. I told him that so far as we were concerned the Algerian question was still under consideration. We had to take into account both our African policy, with which he was familiar, and our close friendship with the French Government. A good deal might depend on the form of any resolution on Algeria, and therefore the way in which we cast or withheld our vote might well be a matter for last-minute decision.

3. We then had a long discussion about the Congo and the withdrawal of U.A.R. forces. Mr. Khalil said that the Government of the U.A.R. while not backing Mr. Lumumba personally were intent upon achieving Congolese unity. He spoke as though their support for Mr. Hammarskjöld was still somewhat reserved despite the recent vote.

4. Mr. Khalil then asked me a series of questions about the decision by the Commonwealth Finance Ministers to set up a special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan; the future of Uganda and Tanganyika; Commonwealth views on our attitude towards the Common Market; the future of European economic cooperation; and East Berlin, all of which I answered to the best of my ability.

5. He then launched his broadside: he had read that a motion concerning the passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal was going to be brought up at the Labour Party Conference. He did not know what the attitude of the Government was on this question. I told him that we regarded the matter as in the hands of Mr. Hammarskjöld and we were not contemplating any initiative. We could not, however, feel happy about the present situation, which had political dangers. Mr. Khalil then produced a torrent of legal arguments as to why the U.A.R. were justified from a legal point of view in debarring any goods from or to Israel from passing through the Suez Canal. I retorted by saying that we had international lawyers who might think differently, and anyway the U.A.R. Government themselves apparently thought differently when they were negotiating with Mr. Hammarskjöld last year. Mr. Khalil vigorously denied that there had been any question at that time of any compromise derogating from the legal situation as he had just stated it. He then wanted to know why we did not support United Nations resolutions about the return of refugees to Israel, on which we had a further warm and very protracted debate.

6. The only point of practical consequence arising from this conversation was that Mr. Khalil said that Mr. Heikal's

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visit to London on October 4 might be affected by the length of President Nasser's stay in New York. I asked him to keep in touch with us about this.

dl

ROGER STEVENS
September 22, 1960

Before going to Cairo, I shd. like a full brief as the legal aspects of

- (i) ~~status~~ of Egyptian claims to the west bank with Israel
- (ii) status of UN resolutions on return of refugees to Israel.

Herat Dept.

dl

Mr O'Regan ^{PM} 2/18

Mr Arcady
FD 12/18
Sept. 22

for (i) see version 1/61.

PMB
1/5.

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The U.A.R. and the Congo Crisis

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Draft. note

There is no doubt that the U.A.R. are intensely interested in developments in the Congo; ^{but any} ~~The only~~ influence they have brought to bear so far has been largely behind the scene.

2. The Secretary-General of the U.A.R. Foreign Office, Murad Ghaleb, has been appointed Ambassador to the Congo. Shortly before United Nations control of airfields and radio stations was relinquished the U.A.R. announced that they were withdrawing their contingent from the United Nations forces in the Congo. There is, however, some reason to suppose that in fact they are remaining there with the object of protecting Mr. Lumumba. One thing that is quite clear is that they ~~unreservedly~~ ^{strongly} favour ~~a~~ ^{strong} central government solution. Doubtless they fear that the Congo/Katanga split might have its analogy as between Egypt and Syria. *It is difficult to imagine that they would welcome an increase of Soviet influence*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*I would like a look
at this tomorrow please*
H

Secretary of State

JK 1051/103A

I understand that the Prime Minister and you are to see Nasser tomorrow (Wednesday) afternoon. You may therefore like to read the attached letter (with enclosure) which I have had from Sir Roger Stevens suggesting the points which might be raised with Nasser and the line which the conversation might take.

2. I agree generally with Sir R. Stevens' recommendations - and in particular that it would be very useful if the Prime Minister and you could start the conversation off with a discussion on fairly general lines of the present world situation and the aims of the U.K. Not only would Nasser be flattered by this approach but we know that he has more than once recently expressed the wish to have some first-hand knowledge of H.M.G.'s views on questions of general international policy.

3. This general discussion would no doubt lead on to the Congo and provide an opportunity of explaining where the U.K. stands over the present dispute in the U.N. From this it might be possible to go on to try and persuade Nasser that H.M.G. have no desire to intervene more than can be helped in the affairs of the Middle East, that we have no objection to Arab nationalism as such and that we are not intriguing madly against Nasser in Syria or anywhere else, and that we are genuinely anxious to get our relations with Egypt back on to a more normal footing. In this connexion, I think it would be useful if you can say something about the present tension between the U.A.R. and Jordan and refer in general terms to the efforts which we have made in recent weeks to counsel moderation on King Hussein. You could go on to say that it is very desirable in everybody's interests that the present tension between the two countries should be lowered and that you hope that the Egyptians, on their part, will do what they can by damping down their propaganda and radio broadcasts, etc., to contribute to this end. You might say that you had noticed with appreciation that Nasser had refrained from criticising Jordan in his speech, that you hoped that King Hussein would be equally temperate when he speaks to the General Assembly and that both sides would continue to exercise moderation, etc., etc. Finally, if the conversation goes well, I would hope that it might be possible for something to be said about our feeling that it would be a real step forward in the restoration of friendly relations if we could each appoint Ambassadors before much longer.

4. I am sending a copy of this minute and its enclosures to Mr. Eligh and Sir P. Dean.

L. H. H. H. H. H.

September 27, 1960

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CONFIDENTIALForeign Office,
S.W.1.

September 26, 1960.

My dear Derrick,

I assume that during this week the Prime Minister, or failing him the Secretary of State, may have a conversation with President Nasser. A factual brief on certain aspects of Anglo/U.A.R. relations is enclosed. The purpose of this letter is to put down some more general reflexions which might be relevant if the meeting took place. In case you need them I enclose four copies of this letter, which represents purely personal views though the Department concurs with them and I have shown it in draft to the Lord Privy Seal who is in general agreement.

2. In what follows it is assumed that we wish to improve relations with the U.A.R. (a) because an exchange of Ambassadors would enable us to do business more efficiently, (b) because the U.A.R. is in a position to influence events in Africa as well as the Middle East - though it is not yet clear how that influence will be exercised.

3. Case for a meeting. I do not know whether Ministers will feel disposed, if no obvious opportunity offers, to take any initiative in arranging a meeting for the purpose of serious talk (I assume that in any

/event there

Sir F.R. Hoyer Millar, G.C.M.G., C.V.O.,
c/o United Kingdom Mission,
New York.

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event there will be social contact.) I can well understand that they might feel a certain reluctance in doing so. Nevertheless, I would hope that some means could be found of bringing them together so that we do not appear to be running after Nasser.

4. The positive benefits from a meeting might be small, but I believe that the negative disadvantages of not having one would be considerable. To put the thing in its simplest form: Nasser will have seen Khrushchév, Eisenhower, Nehru etc. and if he does not see the Prime Minister he will conclude that he is being deliberately cold-shouldered; the effect of this will be to introduce yet another element of mistrust and pique into our relations.

5. The fact is that the problem of our relations with the U.A.R. is in the first instance psychological. On Nasser's side there is profound mistrust of our intentions towards him; every act of British policy is interpreted as directed at him; and he regards us as the long arm and the unseen hand. Recent difficulties in Syria have increased these tendencies.

6. The first object of any meeting therefore would be to build if possible a small bridge of mutual confidence - and no more. It would be tempting, and may well be judged necessary for Parliamentary reasons, to use the occasion for going over the whole ground of our relations with the U.A.R. in detail and trying to secure Nasser's agreement on specific issues outstanding between us - the operation of the Financial Agreement, exchange of Ambassadors, Consulates, cessation of anti-colonial broadcasts etc. But I suggest that these matters, if mentioned at all, should only be touched on lightly and for the record so to speak. Until Nasser's psychological state is improved we cannot hope for much progress on practical matters or in negotiations. If Nasser leaves the meeting with the impression that it has been arranged for the purpose of lecturing him or

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/hectoring him

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hectoring him he is likely to become more cussed over specific issues. The way to make him more reasonable is to try and show him that we are not "against" him.

7. Substance of conversation. The first aim then should be to establish that we do not regard him as a kind of moral outcast; the second to indicate that though there are obviously many difficult issues between us, his own position in Egypt and Syria is not one of them - we are not trying to undermine it by our various outposts in the Middle East, as he almost certainly believes. Israel is a fact of life and a country with whom we want no more than normal relations, not a dagger in the heart of the Arab world; our support for Jordan is a positive contribution to Middle East stability; we have to take our relations with Iraq as we find them; our position in the Gulf derives from the vital importance of oil to our economy; our bases in Cyprus and Aden are part of the defence system against Communism, not aimed at the Arabs; and so on. If the subject of Jordan is raised, it is for consideration whether the Prime Minister should not hint at the restraint H.M. Government, in conjunction with the United Nations, have been exercising on the wilder elements (and of which Nasser is generally aware from press reports) - at least to the extent of saying that we should greatly deplore anything which disturbed the peace of the area or caused an upheaval in Syria. We hope that the U.A.R. feels the same way and will themselves show restraint.

8. But since these Middle East questions are sensitive subjects, and inevitably arouse controversy, it would be better if the conversation were not concentrated too exclusively on them, but dealt also with wider issues. It would be useful for instance to give him our ideas about the evolution of British Africa, to emphasize that we want emerging countries in Africa to be genuinely independent, that we are against Balkanisation, and that we are gravely

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/concerned

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concerned about the possible spread of Communism in Africa, and imagine he must be too, to judge from his own domestic policy. Anything in short which puts British policy in a world setting rather than a purely Middle Eastern one, is likely to do good.

9. Progress in relations. It would not I believe be wise to introduce bald headedly the matter of an exchange of Ambassadors. Distasteful though it must be, I suggest that it may be necessary to introduce an element of flattery at this point. We fully recognise Nasser's profound personal contribution to the Egyptian revolution, now symbolized in the Committee of National Union. We know the personal interest he takes in every aspect of national life and international activity and we understand his policy of positive neutrality. We recognise his key position at the junction of Asia and Africa, and the prime importance which he attaches to solving Egypt's difficult economic problems. These are all questions of much concern to us as well, and we would see advantage, from his point of view as much as from our own, in greater opportunities for frank exchanges of view at a high level between two important states with extensive interests outside their own frontiers on a basis of equality. We should gain nothing by fighting shy of contacts even where we differ. Has he any suggestions? If as a first step he was willing to agree that he should have occasional meetings with Mr. Crowe that would be a considerable advance and it might be better not to press for anything further at this stage. If we can convince him that he has nothing to lose, but something to gain by closer contacts, one of his principal objections to an exchange of Ambassadors will be removed.

10. Final point. Nasser is apparently obsessed by the belief that whatever the attitude of H.M. Government towards him may be the Conservative Party (exemplified in his mind to a large extent by the Daily Telegraph)

/wish him

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wish him no good at all and will seek every opportunity of doing him down. If the Prime Minister felt able at a suitable moment to say anything conciliatory about the attitude of the Conservative Party that might do a great deal of good.

Colin Arne has seen this and fully agrees

Yours ever

cloget.

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U.K./U.A.R. RELATIONS

Exchange of Ambassadors. We knew as soon as Chargés d'Affaires were appointed that Mr. Mahmud Riad was U.A.R. Ambassador-Designate for London (and we told the Egyptians that Mr. Beeley was our choice). Earlier this month, however, Riad was appointed Presidential Adviser on foreign affairs and made it clear to a member of our Mission in Cairo that he was no longer destined for London. He said that at one time he had hoped to be able to contribute towards the improvement of relations but there now seemed little to be done.

Consulates. The U.A.R. have withheld permission (on President Nasser's own instructions) for us to re-open our posts in Alexandria, Damascus, etc., unless we concede a number of new posts to them - Aden, three in East Africa, Hong Kong and Singapore as well as the U.K. consulates. We have refused to be rushed and the Egyptians have recently scaled down their demands by suggesting that we might allow them trade offices, if we would not allow consulates, and that we might give them some of their posts if we could not manage all. We have assumed that we should have to offer them something in East Africa to make a deal at all, and this the colonial territories have so far resisted. Unless there are developments, the intention is that Mr. Crowe should, towards the end of the year, see what can be done by offering only Hong Kong, Singapore and the U.K. posts anyway, and if possible something in East Africa.

Syria. The Jordanians think that Syria is ripe for revolt against Egyptian rule. We do not share this view, though there is certainly rising discontent, and the possibility of some move by disaffected army officers or politicians is not to be excluded. At present there seems no rallying point for

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discontent to lead to effective action. President Nasser suspects us of working to destroy the union, and this is probably why we have not been allowed back into Damascus.

Financial Agreement. While this is not now a major factor in our relations, the dissatisfaction of some of the property owners with the Agreement may cause further trouble in Parliament. The Egyptians are not in breach of the Agreement on any major issue but there are a number of points in dispute, some of them substantial, and a number of difficulties over procedure. But there are two main points which are causing difficulty. First, final Egyptian approval has not yet been given to a new Exchange of Notes which has been worked out to deal with questions of the disposal of unclaimed property and proposals for ensuring that effect is given to some of the exchange provisions of the Agreement to which British claimants attach great importance. The delay in putting this Exchange of Notes into effect is causing inconvenience. Secondly although the Agreement provided for the return of sequestered property within three months (i.e. from February 28, 1959) a large proportion of such property has still not been released and the rate of release is slowing down, partly due to administrative difficulties.

U.K. trade with Egypt. This is picking up but the Egyptians regard it as unsatisfactory because they say our exports to them exceed our imports from them and there is an imbalance of visible trade. Taking into account invisibles (mainly Suez Canal tolls) the balance is much in their favour. But it is clear that they will nevertheless try to keep imports and exports roughly balanced and this will hamper the increase of trade. Our firms could obtain contracts under the big development programmes, but there again the Egyptians want the credit facilities we are able to offer to be expressed in terms of £x million at y% over z years.

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This is not the way that normal E.C.G.D. cover works. We are trying to find a way of dressing up our credit terms to meet the Egyptian point, though probably the best hope of progress will be for British industry to get together and offer a line of credit, to get things going, assuming that this is worth their while.

Aswan Dam. There is now no Western interest. The Russians have undertaken to build the whole, merging the first and second stages. This will cost them £117 million, which will cover all the foreign exchange costs and about a third of the total costs. In theory the Dam scheme should be completed about 1969/70.

Nile Waters. We are this week instructing our representatives in Cairo and Khartoum to propose on behalf of the East African Governments that there should be technical conversations about the division of the Nile Waters at the beginning of December. The U.A.R. is in a position to put obstacles in the way of these talks and an improved political atmosphere is highly desirable.

Mr. James Zarb. The earliest Mr. Zarb could be released, without special intervention by the U.A.R. Government, would be January 1964, though he might benefit from an Amnesty (half-time) next year. He has asked if his case could be taken up with President Nasser in New York, perhaps through the Americans, or by Mr. Diefenbaker. We have been working towards an arrangement whereby Mr. Zarb would be found unfit to stay in prison and be transferred to a sanatorium outside the jail as a step towards his release. In the present state of U.K./U.A.R. relations, we are not likely to get far with this at present.

Jordan/U.A.R. King Hussein is thinking of going to New York on October 2 for the United Nations General Assembly. His

SECRET

/intention

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SECRET

intention is presumably to press Jordan's case against the U.A.R. over Hazza Majali's assassination. This suggests that the King is prepared to live up to his assurance that Jordan would not take action against Syria without first trying to obtain satisfaction through the Arab League and United Nations (though there is no sign so far of an approach to the Arab League).

Meanwhile the Cairo press has resumed its propaganda attacks and has publicised the Jordanian troop movements near the Syrian border. The frontier is now closed by the U.A.R. at night. On the other hand, U.A.R. propaganda has not played up a number of small explosions in Syria attributed to Jordanian agents; and the press has reported restraining action by British and U.S. representatives in Jordan without comment. The impression is that the U.A.R. are not keen to fan the flames of anti-Jordanian propaganda into something more violent at the present moment.

Nevertheless, although the danger of a sudden Jordanian attack on Syria has receded, Jordanian troops remain in a state of alert near the frontier. There is still a danger that the Jordanian army might be committed to action in support of some coup in Syria engineered partly by Jordanian agents. The Commander-in-Chief appears to have lost some of his over-confidence about the chances of the Jordanian army mounting a successful attack against Syria, but the King's absence in New York will leave him in an even more responsible position than at present.

The U.A.R. and the Congo Crisis. There is no doubt that the U.A.R. are intensely interested in developments in the Congo; but any influence they have brought to bear so far has been largely behind the scenes.

The Secretary-General of the U.A.R. Foreign Office, Murad Ghaleb, has been appointed Ambassador to the Congo.

SECRET

/Shortly

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Shortly before United Nations control of airfields and radio stations was relinquished the U.A.R. announced that they were withdrawing their contingent from the United Nations forces in the Congo. There is, however, some reason to suppose that in fact they are remaining there with the object of protecting Mr. Lumumba. One thing that is quite clear is that they unreservedly favour a strong central government. Doubtless they fear that the Congo/Katanga split might have its analogy as between Egypt and Syria. It is difficult to imagine that they would welcome an increase of Soviet influence.


ROGER STEVENS

SECRET

See to Mr. SLS

REC'D
12 1960
V6105/10300

Secretary of State

A-1 1979

Meeting with Nasser

In addition to the points I mentioned in my minute of yesterday, I would suggest that if the conversation goes well and the atmosphere is generally favourable, something might be said about Mr. Zarb - to the effect that his early release would greatly help to improve Anglo-Egyptian relations.

*See also
UG 1091/42(A)*

2. In connexion with any discussion on U.A.R.-Jordan relations and the desirability of the Egyptians moderating the tone of their radio attacks on Jordan, the attached telegram No. 965 from Amman is relevant as showing that the attacks by Cairo radio are still going on.

H. K. ...

September 28, 1960

Copies to:-

Mr. Bligh

Sir P. Dean

1/2 20/10.

By (1) ... (for Mr. ...)

V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

V G.1051/104.

FROM Sir P. Dean,
New York.

Confidential.

No. 254 I sing.

Dated September 26.

Received September 28.

SUBJECT:

U.K. - U.A.R. Relations.

Conversation with SA. FRAZI at his request on September 26.

References

(Printing Instructions)

MINUTES

In view of para. 4 S telephoned Mr. Ahmad Khalil at the U.A.R. Mission & told him that, contrary to our usual rule, we could now confirm our support. S judged it necessary to do this because Mr. Bassiomy had complained a day or two earlier that while S had refused to give a definite commitment, Mr. Wright in Cairo had done so. (S said Mr. Wright & S were working on the same instructions, & what we had said had evidently been taken in slightly different ways; the fact was that we had done everything short of giving a commitment, which our normal practice did not allow).

(Outward Action)

SA) Mr. Ross, Liaison Office G.S.T.

(Action completed)	(Main Indexed)
2	8.61

2. H.O. the undertaking in para. 5.

Mr G. Ruedel (6) o.p.

U.M. Dept. (4, 10)

Arabian .. (11)

FORD (M.E.)

M. Butler
 29/9
Riley
 29/9

position at present is that Mr. Crowe is due to say on his return to Cairo, that we can definitely offer Consulates at Liverpool, Singapore and Hong Kong. If the Egyptians say that they must have something in East Africa he would point out the difficulties and they might then be brought to suggest something less ambitious, which Mr. Crowe could refer to London.

A

2. We shall no doubt wish to remind the Secretary of State of this proposed line of action, when he returns, and see what he thinks of it in the light of the meetings in New York.

John Beith
 (J.G.S. Beith)
 September 30, 1960.

But as regards A ^{co.} ~~we~~ are surely putting a propose to the E. African Govts following our meeting of Aug 31 (para 5)?

dlf
 3/7/7

They are, but it is still in the course of preparation. We shall receive a copy of their telegram to E. African Govts, shortly & trust.

12.7/10.

A) B.B.C. Monitoring report. 30th Sept.

My 10/10

Flag A

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Fogelshelhaq

By Bag

OUTWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(U.K. Mission to the United Nations)

Sir P. Dean
No. 254 Saving
September 26, 1960

Despatched September 27

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 254 Saving of September 26, repeated for information Saving to Cairo No. 13 (S), Amman No. 22 (S), and Tel Aviv No. 10 (S).

Following from Secretary of State.

1 I saw Dr. Fawzi, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, in the United Nations Building on Monday, September 26, at his request.

2 I said that it was our genuine desire to improve relations with the U.A.R. but that we seemed always to be met by streams of propaganda accusing us of every known crime against the Arab countries. Dr. Fawzi must know that these accusations were not true and I was sure that if the U.A.R. wished for better relations the first thing they could do would be to turn off the propaganda tap.

3 Dr. Fawzi said our press were the trouble. What could they do but answer back? If we examined the "official" news put out on Cairo radio we would find it not nearly so bad as the Egyptian newspapers. He thought there was room for improvement on both sides.

4 I told him we would support the U.A.R.'s application for membership of the Security Council. He said he was grateful.

5 I asked how much importance he attached to consulates in some of our territories. He said that it was important to the U.A.R. to have such representation. I said that if we were able to meet his request it would have to be on a reciprocal basis. We should like to be represented in Damascus and Alexandria. He agreed. I said I would examine the matter when I got home.

6 We then turned to "desequestration". He promised to ask his Economic Minister (who is here) to hustle things on.

7 I then turned to Israel and said that the very existence of Israel and our recognition of the country as a fact of life seemed to be so much resented by the U.A.R. that normal relations between us were made almost impossible.

8 He said that was an over-simplification. What the U.A.R. disliked was the "dynamic" nature of our policies as for instance our trade in arms. I said that if he added up the number of arms we supplied to Arab countries as against those supplied to Israel he would find the Arabs had the great advantage.

/We

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

We must recognize Israel as a fact but our purpose was to ration arms so that the risk of Israel-Arab military conflict was not increased.

9 I think he knows this to be true but he gave no sign of agreement.

10 I said that the recent accusations against us (which were still going on) that we were inciting Jordan against the U.A.R. were quite the reverse of the truth. He said that he wanted to assure me that the U.A.R. was not stirring up trouble, they wanted to keep things quiet. They were going to support Jordan's membership of the Economic Committee of the United Nations.

11 He said that the U.A.R. Government did not wish to see Bureimi debated in United Nations and if they could be provided with an excuse hoped to avoid debate on Oman also.

12 The whole conversation was most amicable and it was agreed that it would be a good thing for the Prime Minister and the President of the U.A.R. to meet and talk.

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B17 'AL-AHRAM': MACMILLAN TO MEET NASSER AGAIN

INDEPENDENT AGENCIES REPORT MACMILLAN-ABRAM MEET AGAIN WITHIN THE NEXT TWO DAYS. IT HAS ALSO BEEN DECIDED THAT DR. FAWZI AND FOREIGN SECRETARY LORD HOME SHOULD START DISCUSSING PRACTICAL WAY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE NEWSPAPER SAYS THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS THE MAIN TOPIC IN THE NASSER-MACMILLAN TALKS.

MF BBC MON 1041 RP

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES
27 OCT 1960
JG1051/104(A)

B17 'AL-AHRAM' 2: +A NEW CHAPTER+

+INFORMED DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES, ACCORDING TO THE PAPER, SAY THAT A NEW CHAPTER HAS BEGUN IN CAIRO-LONDON RELATIONS WITH THE NASSER-MACMILLAN MEETING. THIS MEETING IS CONSIDERED TO BE A TURNING POINT IN RELATIONS SINCE 1956. IT ALSO EXPRESSES THE DESIRE OF BOTH LEADERS TO PREPARE AN APPROPRIATE ATMOSPHERE WHICH WILL ENABLE THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS TO DISCUSS THE PRACTICAL MEANS OF RENEWING AND IMPROVING RELATIONS.

MF BBC MON 1043 RP

Encouraging.

John Birch Oct 3

Palley 30/10 - 30/9

B17 'AL-AHRAM' 3

+MOST OF THE HARDSHIPS ARISING FROM THE SUEZ CRISIS WERE SETTLED DURING THE MEETINGS WHICH WERE HELD IN ROME AND CAIRO LAST YEAR. RELATIONS WERE ALSO RESTORED AT THE LEVEL OF CHARGE D'AFFAIRES LAST OCTOBER. WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE NOW IS TO EXCHANGE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES AT EMBASSY LEVEL AND RESTORE AND IMPROVE TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

END BBC MON 1044 30/9 RP KY

3/2

enter



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 RECEIVED IN
 ARCHIVES
 2 OCT 1960
 JG 105/106

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,
 CAIRO.
 September 29, 1960.

My dear Idun,

P1009

I see that Foreign Office telegram No. 317 Guidance mentions that the Cairo press seized on the IDC visit to Jordan as a stick with which to beat us.

2. I cannot help feeling that these distinguished but innocent officers provided some rather gratuitous ammunition for the Cairo press by visiting Jordan at that particular moment. I know that their programme is long and complicated and difficult to change. Equally there may well have been advantage from the point of view of Anglo-Jordanian relations e.g. boosting the King's morale etc., in their carrying on with the visit as planned in spite of the crisis. But, so far as Anglo/UAR relations are concerned, it would definitely have been better if they had cancelled or postponed the visit. As you have seen from our various reports the Cairo press really made the most of it and we found it quite impossible to convince the Egyptians that the whole affair had been misrepresented. It was all too pat and even many friendly diplomatic colleagues were taken in at first by the Cairo propaganda line.

3. The horse has bolted now but I think we should bear this experience in mind on future such occasions. I blame ourselves here to some extent. We had ironically enough cleared the overflight of Syria of the IDC aircraft with the Egyptians some time before the visit took place. Unfortunately we then quite forgot about the IDC in the heat of the moment, until it popped up in so unpleasant a way in the news. Otherwise I think we would have suggested that the visit might be put off for the time being. But perhaps you considered it anyway and decided to go ahead.

If we followed this advice we might as well go out of business completely! We are not committed JG

Yours Paul
 (P.H.G. Wright)

J.G.S. Beith, Esq., C.M.G.,
 Foreign Office.

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RA
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Draft.

letter to:
 P.H.G.
 Mr. Paul Wright,
 Cairo. *CMG OBC*
 from:
 Mr. J.G.S. Beith

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*gloss which
 was almost
 certainly be
 put on the
 visit in
 Cairo and
 decides that
 we did not
 call the
 arrangements
 off
 just because
 of that.*

+ Thank you for your letter of September 29 about the I.D.C. visit to Jordan.

2. ~~As you surmised, we ^{thought} ~~certainly~~ considered the ~~effect~~ ^{fact} that this was likely to have in ~~Cairo~~ ^{Cairo} and decided to disregard it.~~

We really cannot allow ourselves to be ~~put~~ ^{get} ~~into~~ ^{into} ~~the~~ ^{habit} position of cancelling or postponing every activity which the Egyptians may misinterpret, however indirectly ~~it~~ ^{they} may be concerned and however far-fetched the allegation. No doubt your Egyptian contacts profess to be unconvinced by your explanations, but I am sure that ~~this~~ ^{arrangement} when this has served its purpose as a stick with which to beat us they will not ~~press~~ ^{press} the allegation seriously. It was not raised with us here, and usually the U.A.R. Chargé is only too eager to rush round and complain of the latest example of our infamy which he thinks he has discovered. I suggest that you give a full explanation of what the I.D.C. is and does at a suitable level in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and leave it at that.

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*hd
 out 5*

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(VG 1051/106)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

October 5, 1960.

Thank you for your letter of September 29 about the I.D.C. visit to Jordan.

2. As you thought, we considered the gloss which would almost certainly be put on the visit in Cairo and decided that we could not call the arrangements off just because of that. We really cannot allow ourselves to get into the habit of cancelling or postponing every activity which the Egyptians may misinterpret, however indirectly they may be concerned and however far-fetched the allegation. No doubt your Egyptian contacts profess to be unconvinced by your explanations, but I am sure that when this instance has served its purpose as a stick with which to beat us they will not press the allegations seriously. It was not raised with us here, and usually the U.A.R. Chargé is only too eager to rush round and complain of the latest example of our infamy which he thinks he has discovered. I suggest that you give a full explanation of what the I.D.C. is and does at a suitable level in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and leave it at that.

P.H.G. Wright, Esq., CMG, OBE, (J.G.S. Beith)
Cairo.

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RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
-7 OCT 1960

Record of a conversation between Sir Roger Stevens and ~~Mr. Heikal~~.

Mr. Hassanein Heikal at 3.30 p.m. on October 5 at the
Foreign Office

Also present: Mr. C.T. Crowe
 Mr. J.G.S. Beith
 Mr. R. Arculus

Sir Roger Stevens opened the conversation by referring to the two meetings of the President of the U.A.R. with the Prime Minister in New York. He understood both had gone well. It was very important that mutual confidence was being built up at this level. The United Kingdom Delegation had been impressed with President Nasser's speech. Mr. Heikal hoped that this confidence would not now be destroyed, since the President would be delivering a riposte to King Hussein's United Nations speech as soon as he got back to Cairo. We must recognise that he had two personalities, that of a statesman and that of a revolutionary. As a revolutionary he must attack the last of the Hashemites. Public opinion in the Arab world required it. For example, there had been much criticism of the President for meeting King Saud. The U.A.R. did not want the added burden of conflict with Jordan. The King's conduct was only harming himself. The U.A.R. believed that we could stop him. Sir Roger Stevens recalled that the cycle of recrimination started with the death of Hazza' Majali. All our advice to the King about his visit to the United Nations had been in the direction of restraint. But he too was obliged to give satisfaction to opinion at home. Mr. Heikal complained that in Hazza' Majali's press conferences he violently attacked President Nasser as the tool of the Communists. Sir Roger Stevens said that this was by no means our impression of Hazza'.

2. Mr. Beith recalled the situation earlier in the year when there had been an improvement in relations, followed by a setback over the affair of the U.A.R. Consul-General in Jerusalem's exequatur. Could we not get back to the January situation? Sir Roger Stevens hoped this problem could be insulated from our relations with the U.A.R. and that there would not be an intensification of the exchanges between President Nasser and the King. The King could be driven to desperation by the violence of Cairo Radio or by the feeling that he had been abandoned by his friends. We must therefore encourage him to believe that we were his friends, and this enabled us to give him advice which was often unpalatable. He took the opportunity to explain to Mr. Heikal since it was liable to misinterpretation in Cairo, the reasons why the King's forthcoming visit to this country at his own suggestion on his way home from the United Nations had no special political significance. The King felt at home here and would need to relax after some strenuous weeks.

3. Mr. Heikal said the problem of Jordan was involved in U.K./U.A.R. relations. Indeed there were no direct U.K./U.A.R. problems. The U.A.R.'s interest, however, was not in promoting conflict. Evolution not revolution was now needed
/in

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in the Arab world. After what they had seen in Iraq, they did not, for example, want to see revolution in Saudi Arabia and therefore wanted the Royal Family to remain in power. They had quarrelled with the Ba'ath over e.g. Jordan, since the Ba'athists wanted a more activist policy. Sir Roger Stevens wondered if, in that case, U.A.R. propaganda was not doing the Government a disservice. Perhaps they under-rated the effect particularly of their radio propaganda. For example, the success of the Iraqi revolution had been due to the preparatory work done by Cairo propaganda against Nuri Said. Mr. Heikal agreed and said it was necessary to stop the propaganda battle with Jordan before it got out of hand. The President was obliged to counter-attack the King for his U.N. speech and to do it on Arab soil. Then the King would reply and so on. Mr. Beith asked if something could be done about tension on the Jordan/Syrian border and to stop the activities of Jordanian émigrés. Mr. Heikal said this was impossible - their quarrel with President Bourghiba was about émigrés. Saeb Salem had said that King Hussein wanted guarantees from the U.A.R.: but what could they give?

4. Sir Roger Stevens asked what was the position on the extradition of the two messengers involved in the assassination. Mr. Heikal said that the U.A.R. would not give them up, for legal and political reasons. Sir Roger Stevens feared that if they received no satisfaction here the Jordanians would feel bound to seek it in other ways. It was not just a question of propaganda for them but of revenge for a murder. The King needed some satisfaction to restrain the Bedouin element from pursuing a vendetta. If we could tell King Hussein that the U.A.R. at the highest level would welcome a truce, there would then be a real prospect of progress. Mr. Beith wondered whether the U.N. (e.g. Mr. Spinelli) could help. Mr. Heikal said that he would try to confirm through H.M. Chargé d'Affaires, Cairo, that President Nasser agreed to our telling the King that the U.A.R. would be prepared to have a truce.

5. Mr. Heikal said the U.A.R. wanted good relations with us. There were many industrialists who preferred British equipment and it had been found that British trained technicians were the best. Whereas the U.A.R. had used up their loan from West Germany they had only used £24 million out of their Soviet loan of £95 million.

6. Mr. Beith raised the problem of Mr. Zarb's imprisonment. We were depressed about his chances. We hoped that he could be let out of jail on medical grounds. Mr. Heikal said that something could be done but it must be done quietly and it would take time. Sir Roger Stevens pointed out that if there were an improvement in relations there would be criticism here if nothing were done for Zarb.

7. Mr. Heikal said he wished to raise a complaint against the B.B.C. In their review of the Arabic press why did they side with Jordan and pick items out of third-rate Beirut newspapers, particularly P.P.S. papers? It was agreed that it would be helpful if Mr. Heikal could see officials of the B.B.C. Arabic Service. Sir Roger Stevens said there was certainly no intention to be partial.

8. There followed some discussion of United Kingdom interests /in the

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in the Middle East in relation to the U.A.R. Sir Roger Stevens described our basic interests as being access to oil and defence arrangements in case of a global war. Hence our efforts towards the creation of defence pacts. Since CENTO contained no Arab country there was no longer any cause of dispute with the U.A.R. Mr. Heikal agreed. Sir Roger Stevens described CENTO's importance as a deterrent to Russian adventures, and in this it shielded Arab security too. While the Egyptians thought in terms of Jordan, Israel and Arab unity (and - interjected Mr. Heikal - communism) we thought principally of the Communist threat. There was a danger that our bases in e.g. Aden, Cyprus, Bahrain, were mistakenly thought to be directed against Arab nationalism. Mr. Heikal said that while Arab public opinion would not stand for alliances with the Western countries by which they had been occupied, they were by no means neutral in the ideological battle. They had, however, considered that military pacts, because of their disturbing effect on Arab public opinion, were to the advantage of the Soviet bloc. In the Arab countries it was the defence against internal communism which must be given precedence. He agreed that CENTO had proved its value. The U.A.R. had been very worried about Iran because of the threat to Iraq and Syria. CENTO had been helpful in containing communism.

October 7, 1960.

Copy to:

H.M. representatives at:

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V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VG 1051/108

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

FROM Mr Wright, Cairo to Sir Roger Stevens

SUBJECT:

Comments on Sir Moore Crosswaite's letter about U.A.R. policy on Israel.

No. 10311/60
 Dated Oct 4th
 Received Oct 7th

K 51

MINUTES

References
 -/89 -/91 -/98 -/101
 B 1194/21, VG 1023/30
 V 1051/16

I have some sympathy with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this letter, but I think Cairo have overstated the case in support of their main thesis, namely that "our support for Israel is at present the main fundamental reason for U.A.R. hostility and the crucial point is Western arms for Israel." In particular the argumentation in paras. 6 and 7 can be challenged. The basic point, to my mind, is that President Nasser regards H.M.G. as a Government which tried and failed to unseat him by the "Tripartite Declaration". While they remain in power, and until there is proof to the contrary, he expects us to be still seeking his downfall, and meanwhile to work against him everywhere. Thus, as he sees it, we work against him, as occasion offers, by supporting Qasim (hence his anger about our tipping off Qasim about the plot against his life); by strengthening Israel; by inciting King Hussein to cause trouble in Syria; or directly in Syria e.g. by conspiring with the P.P.S. Thus, Cyprus to him is a place from which we have invaded Egypt and might plan to do so again; the question of Israel representation is not the main issue. What he resents about the B.B.C. and the British press is what he regards as a basic animosity towards him and his régime which causes them to take sides against Egypt in any question. This explains why he was angered by e.g. the Tripartite Declaration, P.Q.s, Sir Anthony Eden's memoirs and the Prime Minister's statement that he was proud to have been associated with Sir Anthony.

2. The campaign against Israel is, with anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, a most important rallying point to help him keep the leadership of the Arab world. It is of course more than mere propaganda. He genuinely fears that we intend to use Israel against him. He, and Marshal Hakim Amer and the other founder members of the revolution, also feel deeply about arms; their most serious grievance against the old régime was that it sent them in to fight the Israelis without proper equipment; this explains their hunger for weapons. Thus, Nasser resents it whenever he sees us favouring Israel, as in Africa, where he must conclude that our motive is to diminish his influence.

3. The fact that he is apparently less concerned at

/present

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

309
 11.11.61

21
 31
 8.6.61

present about our positions in Libya, Aden, and the Persian Gulf is not that he does not care. But these positions do not threaten him at the moment, nor do the situations there offer targets for him to exploit - at present. Where his own position is threatened he must react. If he does not at the moment accuse us of being pro-Qasim it is because he feels himself in no great danger from that quarter.

4. Thus, the main reason for his hostility to us is fear that we are still seeking his downfall. So long as this suspicion is there, he is bound to regard us as a potential enemy (just as the Military here regard Egypt as in that category) of him and therefore of Arab nationalism of which he is the symbol. The focus of his hostility changes according to circumstances. At the moment it is Jordan. Israel is in the background all the time, and the arms question, for historical reasons, is a constant preoccupation.

5. As we have recognised, we shall not get far until we have convinced President Nasser that the Government are not out for his blood, and this is the importance of the recent Ministerial conversations in New York.

6. I mentioned Cairo's latest letter briefly to Mr. Crowe, with reference to Sir Roger Stevens manuscript minute within, and he asked if he could see it when he is back in London in November, after we have commented.

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R. Arculus
 (R. Arculus)
 October 10, 1960.

Eastern Dept. *STW 12/12*
 Arabian Dept. *PR*
 P.U.S.D. (Mr. Ramsbotham) *12/10*
 F.O.R.D. (M.E.)

I agree with the above.

Adley 10/11

P. do 1

W. H. R. 10/11

Metoo.

dl
11/12

Mr Crowe
OK

If I may express a thought here, it is that Nasser is a conspirator by training keeping his eyes on one target come failures come successes. He is bound to see H.M.G. in a similar light, as the Arabians so regularly says. It was probably be in consequence

to

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Minutes

to a man with his background
then it is, having once failed
to unseat him, should have
radically altered their policy &
now intend to work with him.
This will remain at the back
of his - & his fellow conspirators' -
minds whatever we may do - but
equally it should, ^{in time} appear decided
by old-fashioned to the next
generation in Egypt - This, I
hope, is an hope.

J. J. James
18/10

18/10

FORD (M.F.) have yet to see.

B.O. Nov. 8 (to show to Mr. Cross).

I would agree with most of
these comments: particularly with
① M. Beckett, that "the focus of
Nasser's hostility changes according to
circumstances; & ② M. Beckett, that
it is necessary to take Nasser's background
into consideration.

2. On ①, I would add that this
is so because Nasser's various campaigns
are only different fronts in the same
war. Zionism is imperialism in Arab
eyes. And on ②, I would say that
the idea of Nasser's background
should be extended to include the

/ J. J. James

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Minutes

Study history of our interventions in Egyptian & Arab affairs since the mid 19th Century. If looked at with Egyptian & Arab eyes it provides sufficient reasons for suspicion and hostility.

3. It will always, I think, be difficult to persuade the Arabs that our past policies are irrelevant to present circumstances. Still they themselves (like the Zionists) are so strongly inspired by historical forces.

[Signature]
 M. FORD M.E.
 26. 8. 60

MRB agree. M: 26/10.
 Mr. Blaffer to see.
 BY as directed.

I think Mr. Green
 saw them pp on Nov. 16, with
 related pp. MRB.
 19/11.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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Mr Crowe *Interested Mr Crane may
caret consultant.*
Mr Butler *JD* *57x*

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION
CAIRO *out 6*

October 4, 1960.

(10311/60)

CONFIDENTIAL

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JG 1051/108

Dear Roger,

I am sorry that we have been so long in sending *1051/98*
our comments on Moore Crosthwaite's letter (1051/50/60
of September 6) and your reply to him of September 8
about United Arab Republic policy on Israel and Arab
nationalism. The delay is not only because we have
been rather hard-pressed in Chancery of late; it is
also due to the fact that the correspondence has raised
some rather fundamental questions in our minds and it
has taken us a little time to sort out our ideas.

2. I think we can accept the "practical conclusions"
which Moore Crosthwaite draws in paragraph 6 of his
letter. It is, however, when the arguments used by
him in earlier paragraphs are extended into the future,
with which as I read it your reply is mainly concerned,
that we enter upon far more tricky ground. For example,
you say that if the Israel question were to be settled
"in some way which satisfied Arab opinion" there would
still be formidable obstacles in the way of Anglo-United
Arab Republic relations. I agree entirely that if
forced to make a judgment at the present time, this is
the only sensible one to make. But the words in in-
verted commas are, I suggest, of great significance,
presupposing a new set of political circumstances in the
Middle East so remote from those at present obtaining
that it is almost impossible to speculate what the
result might be in terms of Anglo-United Arab Republic
relations. Nasser is certainly not going to make peace
with Israel unless he could extract a spectacular
political price for it. But if he were able to bring
this off, and if we had in any way been associated with
such a settlement, its effect on Anglo-United Arab
Republic relations might be so profound as to make the

/other

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

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other difficulties pale into insignificance. I realise of course that to say this is merely to underline the complete dilemma about the Palestine question just as the words per impossibile are underlined in paragraph 2 of your letter.

3. Per contra, to take the other circumstances predicated in your letter, I am not at all sure that a necessary corollary to the expelling of foreign influence from the Middle East would be an increase in the likelihood of Nasser coming to terms with Israel, as you suggest at the end of paragraph 3. Indeed, as seen from here, the reverse might well be the case. The demands of Nasser's internal position together with his constant efforts to project himself as a leader of Arab unity, require some external bogeymen. At the moment, they are represented by Israel plus the imperialists. If you remove the imperialists is it not possible that hostility towards Israel might increase rather than diminish for this reason? Equally, as you yourself suggest, Nasser regards Israel as part of the foreign influence which he is trying to get rid of.

4. I myself regard all these matters as near imponderables. They are the answers to hypothetical questions dependent on so many uncertain factors that I feel it is perhaps unwise to try and answer them at this stage. My very short experience of the Arab world leads me to believe that the only thing that is predictable about it is its unpredictability. And this leads me to the central thought of this letter, which is that the Saving telegrams out of which this correspondence has grown were dealing not only with one particular though admittedly important interview, but were essentially concerned with the position at the present time; and if looked at in this way I have no hesitation whatever in endorsing the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Colin Crowe's Saving telegram No.113 of August 24, namely that our support for Israel is at present the more fundamental reason for United Arab Republic hostility and that the crucial point is Western arms for Israel.

✓91051/91

5. To begin with I do not think that we should draw too firm conclusions from the particular complaints levelled at us from time to time by Egyptians and others. In Cairo members of the regime, like the propaganda machine, vary in emphasis at different times: one day it is Israel (c.f. Colin Crowe's talk with Amer), the next it is our attitude to Arab nationalism (e.g. Mahmud Riad's recent lecture to Geoffrey Arthur), and Nasser gave the Prime Minister a taste of both in New York. It seems to

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✓91051/16

/depend

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depend on what is uppermost in the public mind at the time, what the special interests of the person to whom one is talking happen to be, or even on the way each particular conversation happens to turn.

6. What I am really concerned with in this letter are the practical effects at the present time of Nasser's attitude towards us on the two main counts. As regards our relationship with Arab nationalism Nasser appears to be able to act rationally and pragmatically. For example, he does not attack us over Libya in spite of the existence there of that most obnoxious manifestation of "British imperialism", the military base. He has left us alone for a long time over our position in the Persian Gulf and we hear nothing nowadays of that once familiar bogey, the Anglo-Communist conspiracy in Iraq. Even in Aden and the Protectorates he does not seem to want trouble (c.f. Cairo telegram No. 535 of July 2) and a lot of the Cairo propaganda on this subject is probably due to the fact that he must for political reasons show support for the South Arabian League refugees. In fact it is only where our "Arab" connexion seems to him directly to affect his vital interests, i.e. in Jordan because of Syria, that he reacts strongly and openly against it.

01/19/42
V91023/30

7. Israel is however, a different matter and here Colin Crowe's despatch No. 64 of August 22 is very relevant. Whenever the connexion between Israel and the West is in the news it is impossible to detect any signs of the rational and empirical approach which Nasser seems capable of adopting towards the British connexion with Arab nationalism. The mildest possible mention of the Tripartite Declaration produces violent explosions and even the slenderest unconfirmed rumours of prospective Western arms supplies to Israel send him into a frenzy. Those who listened to his speech at Mansoura on May 7 in which he attacked the United States Senate for Zionism, all say that it was marked by a contempt and fury which "imperialism" does not nowadays arouse. Equally the manner of his break with the Shah and his speech on that occasion seem to us to betray a mind which is incapable of objectivity where Israel is concerned. Although this is perhaps an over-simplification Nasser seems on the surface to be far more concerned about the relatively unimportant appearance of a few Israelis in British possessions in Africa than about the British positions in Libya, Aden and the Persian Gulf!

/8.

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8. There are plenty more such examples and the prevailing tone of the Cairo propaganda machine vis-à-vis the West since the beginning of this year bears out the general thesis. Certainly most of those educated Egyptians who combine being pro-Nasser with being pro-West would agree that Nasser's combination of fury and fear (prompted by the arms supplies) over our involvement with Israel is having a decidedly more far-reaching practical effect on his attitude towards us than his deep-rooted but less explosive belief about our hostility towards Arab nationalism.

9. I am sending copies of this letter to Moore Crosthwaite in Beirut, and to the other recipients of this correspondence.

Yrs ever

Paul

(P.H.G. Wright)

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**RECORD OF A CONVERSATION IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S SUITE
AT THE WALDORF ASTORIA AT 4.30 p.m. ON OCTOBER 3, 1960**

Present:

The Prime Minister	President Nasser
The Foreign Secretary	Mr. Fawzi
Mr. Bligh	Councillor Raid

The Prime Minister asked President Nasser what his plans were. He himself was planning to return to London on Wednesday evening. *President Nasser* said that he was leaving New York on Tuesday, October 4. *The Prime Minister* said it was a difficult and confusing situation in the General Assembly. He understood the aim of the five neutral Powers Resolution. *President Nasser* said that the proposal had been aimed to try to put an end to the deadlock. He did not know if it would be successful. *The Prime Minister* said that he did not despair of useful talks eventually being held at the highest level. He did not think it would be profitable to try to press the matter too hard at present but he thought Mr. Khrushchev might be in the mood for talks next year.

The Prime Minister went on to say he was glad to have established contact with President Nasser. Egypt and the United Kingdom had many common interests and it would be useful if they could re-establish contacts on as many points as possible by the appointment of Ambassadors, increased trade, and so on. *President Nasser* agreed that personal contacts were much more useful than reading reports. He went on to say that Egypt wanted good relations with the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR. They must of course defend themselves but they were at the same time very anxious to press on with their development. They had doubled the national income between 1952 and 1959, in both industry and agriculture, but their population had also increased. Their aim was to double the national income yet again in the next 10 years. Egypt was still a very poor country, especially, say, when measured against the United Kingdom. *The Foreign Secretary* said that the economic experts and advisers were always telling the United Kingdom Government that our national income was not big enough. *The Prime Minister* said he was satisfied that if the relations between the two countries were brought within the normal pattern there would be agreement. *President Nasser* said that Egypt imported more from the United Kingdom than they sold but were anxious that trade should grow both ways. *The Foreign Secretary* said that he and Mr. Fawzi would pursue talks together and see what could be done to get the financial agreement finally tidied up.

Turning to disarmament, *the President* said he had been interested in Mr. Nehru's speech. He had stressed that disarmament and control must go together. Mr. Khrushchev had said that if the West accepted disarmament the Russians would accept control. He found the position difficult to understand. *The Prime Minister* said it was important not to try to do too much at once. There were many different types of weapons which gave rise to different problems of control. But it was important to try to make some progress, if only on a limited front.

The Foreign Secretary said he was puzzled to try and identify in his own mind what under-lay Mr. Khrushchev's thoughts on disarmament. Did he really want to disarm or was he merely finding a convincing way of arguing with the West? It was very difficult to say. *Mr. Fawzi* thought that once a conference had started and had reached some agreement on however limited a point or small

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a scale subsequent agreement would grow. *President Nasser* added that *Mr. Khrushchev* felt the same difficulty in his own mind about the Western leaders, whom he believed secretly did not want disarmament.

The Prime Minister said that it was most important to aim for progress by stages. At no time should anyone feel at any great disadvantage *vis-à-vis* his neighbours. *Mr. Fawzi* thought that a more profitable way of getting people working together would be to pursue international co-operation in the field of economic development. *The Foreign Secretary* agreed and said we had always been sorry that the USSR would not join the International Bank. *President Nasser* said that this was because of the influence exercised by the West on the Bank's policy. *The Foreign Secretary* said that there could be no question of Western Governments influencing the Bank's policy. The money was given to the Bank but thereafter what was done or was not done was a matter of Banking judgment. Reference was made to the Indus Waters as the sort of useful agreement which could be brought about with the help of the Bank. *The Prime Minister* said that there was no question of politics when considering some project like the Volta Dam. It would be a sound economic proposition when completed that would be of help to the area. These were the sort of tests that one applied. *President Nasser* said Russia had, as had been mentioned in the Prime Minister's speech to the General Assembly, been giving help to undeveloped countries since 1955. *Mr. Fawzi* referred to the High Dam. *The Prime Minister* asked if there was much Communist propaganda spread in Egypt. *President Nasser* said there was to some extent but he was not worried. He said people could not be deceived with words that might have been of interest some six or seven years ago. They were now alert. He added that the Russians charged world prices and their rates of interest were much lower than those charged by the Bank. *The Foreign Secretary* said that India had a considerable Communist Party. *President Nasser* agreed that India had grave problems, and they would be bound to have a Communist Party as long as 2 million people slept in the streets. They needed all the help they could get, especially as they were faced with ever-present threats from China. *The Prime Minister* said that perhaps the main problems facing India were that their population grew so fast. *President Nasser* said that education was the only way to deal with this problem. It was no good trying to get widespread birth control adopted until people were educated. *President Nasser* added that Egypt had a population of 25 million to support with 6 million acres. The High Dam would add considerably to their cultivated area. *The Prime Minister* said that King Hussein had made a moderate and restrained speech in the General Assembly. *President Nasser* said King Hussein had neglected to pay attention to what was going on in his own country and blamed the U.A.R. for everything. He had said the U.A.R. were the tools of Communism. He did not think that the General Assembly would be taken in by such talk.

Discussion then turned to the refugee problem. *The Prime Minister* asked whether *President Nasser* thought that this could be settled. The problem fell into two parts—the practical side: could the money be raised, could the people be found places to go, and so on; and the political one: namely, did the Governments concerned have the will to settle it. *President Nasser* said it was not merely a question of money. It was much deeper than that. It was a difficult psychological question. There were 200,000 Arabs in Israel who were second-class citizens and not allowed to work. The refugee problem was terrible. Children born after 1948 belonged nowhere, had nowhere to go, and all the time there was the danger of Israel expanding. *The Foreign Secretary* said that if the Israel frontiers were settled then the dangers of further expansion would then be minimised. It might then be possible for the Arab countries to try to look at some approach to the refugee problems. *President Nasser* said that Israel could not ever be a Jewish country. It was a country in which Arabs and Jews had lived together and would do so again. *Mr. Fawzi* added that the Jews had been out of Israel for 1,000 years and the Arabs for only 15 years, yet there was considerable opinion throughout the world that the Jews had more right to be in the country than the Arabs. He added that the Egyptian Government were trying to keep matters quiet but that was not of course a constructive approach to the problem. *The Foreign Secretary* asked if *President Nasser* had any ideas as to who might take the initiative in making the first move towards solving the refugee problem. It would presumably have to come from outside the Arab nations. *President Nasser* agreed.

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