

V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

VG 1051/87.

FROM Mr. S. H. Crowe, Cairo
 to Mr. P. G. J. Hall
 Confidential
 No. 1092/60.
 Dated August 16.
 Received August 19.

SUBJECT:
 Immediate
 data for news - Israeli £2½ million loan to Nigeria

References
 -/25/29/85.

MINUTES

These papers will be required for the meeting with the Colonial Office at 3.30 p.m. tomorrow in Sir Roger Stevens' room. Mr. Buist and Mr. Aldridge will be coming.
 X165

2. Mr. Crowe's letter within has been answered, since there will be no time to get substantive instructions to Mr. Crowe after our meeting with the Colonial Office and before he leaves.

3. The unfavourable replies from the four East African posts are at VG 1051/79 (Flag A) and our comments in Mr. Rothnie's submission of August 11 at VG 1051/85 (Flag B). The Colonial Office views on Singapore are at VG 1051/75 (Flag C). African Department were consulted during the preparation of Mr. Rothnie's submission of August 11 and do not wish to be represented at the meeting.

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)
 Cpl. Mr. S. H. Crowe, Cairo
 from Mr. P. G. J. Hall Aug 18.

R. Arculus
 (R. Arculus)

August 22, 1960.

The meeting has been postponed
 & will now be arranged when Mr.
 Crowe can be present.

H. 27/8.

B.V. (all) 29/8.

(Action completed)	(Main Indexed)
22/12.10.60.	85 - 5.6

The Colonial Office will attend a meeting which has now been fixed for 3 p.m. on Wednesday, August 31 in Sir Roger Stevens' room.

2. We have also received the views of East African
 J-121 54817-2F

/Governors

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Governors on the liberalisation of visa policy which we asked them to consider - please see minutes on VG 1621/59 below (Flag D).

Mr Crooke ^{2/5}
to R Stevens

R. Arculus
(R. Arculus)

August 29, 1960.

L. Hutchings
Aug 30

Meeting held 31/8. Recorded separately

ll.
3/8

Number of copies.....
Number of copies of enclosures.....

60.



Sir R. Stewart
Mr. Arundell
ENTER

Getting impatient?

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,

CAIRO.
August 16, 1960.

RECEIVED IN
19 AUG 1960
V61051/57

My dear John,

CONSULATES

I am getting rather anxious about the Consulate/Trade Mission position and wonder when we can expect some instructions. I quite realise what a difficult question this is and that it will take time to reach a decision, but it is now seven weeks since Ghaleb's approach to me, and I hope very much that you will be able to let me have something constructive which I can say to him before I go on leave on August 26. He asked me if I had any news when I took Paul Wright to see him on August 4, and will, I have no doubt, do so again when I next see him.

2. I dare say you have seen the announcement made in Jerusalem on August 14 about the Israeli £3½ million loan to Nigeria. This is, I am afraid, just the kind of thing which the Egyptians will seize upon as evidence of our alleged "most favoured nation" treatment of Israel in Africa, and which they will use against us in any subsequent discussions about Consulates.

Yours,
C. T. Crowe
(C. T. Crowe)

J.G.S. Beith, Esq., C.M.G.,
Levant Department,
Foreign Office.

Ref: FD 371/150930

80341

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.I.

August 18, 1960.

In John Beith's absence (he will be back next week) I am replying to your letter of August 16 about consulates.

2. We have been very much aware that we have kept you waiting a long time for our views on Ghaleb's last approach. It has, however, taken an unconscionable time first to seek and then to garner the views of the colonial governments on the idea of a trade office. Replies have in fact now been received and, rather as we expected, they are all very negative. The Deputy Governor of Kenya has, however, suggested that U.A.R. intentions could be tested by our putting it to them that they should, in the first instance, appoint a reputable non-Egyptian local merchant as their honorary trade representative (c.f. the Israelis in Nairobi).

3. We shall be discussing this idea, and indeed the whole question, with the Colonial Office next week but cannot hope to get any instructions to you before you leave. I am afraid therefore that Paul Wright will have to carry on the battle.

4. If, as seems likely, there is some exchange between yourself and Ghaleb on this subject before you leave you can only repeat that the matter has been under constant consideration and that we hope to be able to say something soon. If Ghaleb so interprets this that he says the U.A.R. would be satisfied with no more nor less than the Israelis have got - or in some other way reduces the present U.A.R. bid - so much the better!

(A. K. Rothnie)

C. T. Crowe, Esq., C.M.G.,
CAIRO.

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

161051/82

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Crowe

No. 645
 August 21, 1960

D. 8.22 a.m. August 21, 1960
 R. 9.51 a.m. August 21, 1960

IMMEDIATE
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- 161051/81/9 (A)

My letter to Sir R. Stevens of August 9.

Heikal told me this morning that he had taken up with President Nasser idea of my meeting him. The President was, however, very tied up and would not be able to fit me in before I left. As a compromise, however, the President suggested that I should see Vice-President Field Marshal Amer. Heikal went on to say that Amer would see me on Monday, August 22, in Alexandria. He would want in the first place to thank me for the excellent way you had received the U.A.R. Military Mission and to express his pleasure at the agreement reached. Secondly, he would be glad to hear and discuss any questions I might want to raise. Heikal added that he himself would be present at the meeting and we would be able to follow up the discussion when he came to London in October.

2. It is, of course, disappointing that I am not to see Nasser, but in view of recent developments in U.A.R./Jordan relations, I am not surprised. I should have laid odds against my getting the interview. But after Nasser, Amer is the next best. He is Nasser's crony and is probably closer to him than anyone else, as well as being Viceroy of Syria. I think it should be possible to have a fruitful discussion.

3. The interview will, presumably, be confidential and I hope you will treat it as such unless I inform you that the U.A.R. authorities have revealed that it has taken place.

4. I have just received your telegram No. 775 on the Congo and will speak accordingly.

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 African Department
 Information Policy Department
 News Department



ADVANCE COPIES :-
 Private Secretary
 Sir R. Stevens
 Head of Levant Department
 Resident Clerk

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THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES

CALL

Mr. Kamal Khalil is paying a courtesy call on the Lord Privy Seal at 3.20 this afternoon.

2. Mr. Khalil is a man of the régime and not a professional diplomat. This is his first post abroad. Though young and inexperienced we assume that he has some influence with President Nasser. Formerly a teacher of law at the University of Alexandria, he was described as a "director of research" at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before he came to London. In his first months here he has been active, mainly in complaining about our policy towards Israel, and has also indulged in covert anti-colonial activities.

3. He usually displays considerable nervousness on formal occasions, but once he gets going (e.g. on the iniquities of Israel) nothing will stop him. His English is now quite good.


4. Mr. Khalil's wife is with him. His daughter is at the French Lycée in London while his son remains behind in Egypt at school. They like to go to Hurlingham Club at weekends.

5. We have no inkling when the United Arab Republic may propose to replace Mr. Khalil by an Ambassador (and have no desire to demonstrate eagerness to find out).

Levant Department.

August 17, 1960.

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U.K./U.A.R. RELATIONS: CONSULATES

The replies from the four East African posts have (below) now arrived (VG 1051/79). The Deputy Governor of Kenya is greatly perturbed at the possibility of a U.A.R. trade office being established in East Africa. He argues that at this extremely delicate stage Egyptian subversive activities in the next 12 to 18 months could do "irreparable harm". This view is strongly endorsed by the others. Kenya makes the constructive suggestion that Egyptian intentions could be tested by suggesting that they should, in the first instance, appoint a reputable non-Egyptian local merchant as their honorary trade representative. The Deputy Governor further suggests that the Egyptians should be asked first what they intend to do about Cairo Radio and the so called Kenya Office in Cairo which does "infinite harm" among Kenyan Africans.

2. The Colonial Office naturally share these views and would be unwilling to put pressure on the colonial governors to modify them. They are prepared to attend a meeting at any time to discuss the next step, and in particular would be prepared to explore the Kenya suggestion of an honorary trade representative.

3. We should certainly pursue this suggestion, for we could claim that it matched what the Israelis have in East Africa (an honorary consul in Nairobi who is a British subject). Protocol Department say that such a representative would have a status of an official agent for the U.A.R. and, if the East African dependencies followed the U.K. practice, the only concession made to him would be that of exemption from local income tax. It is not entirely clear whether Kenya would accept this representative being in Nairobi, though the Uganda telegram assumes this.

4. This would of course not be a very substantial concession to form the most attractive item in our package deal. It is

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certainly not enough to enable us to make other conditions e.g. the withdrawal of U.A.R. Government support from the colonial renegades in Cairo or a modification in broadcasting. We could, however, make clear to the Egyptians that whether they advanced beyond the stage of this honorary trade representative would depend not only on his behaviour but on theirs in colonial matters.

5. When we meet the Colonial Office we might also tie up an outstanding point on Singapore - see Mr. Aldridge's letter Flag D of July 13 (at VG 1051/75). I think that course (a) is probably to be preferred. The Egyptians have not in any case much of a case for Singapore and probably little interest in it.

6. I suggest that we might now call a meeting with the Colonial Office in order to explore further Kenya's idea of an honorary trade representative, and put our findings to Mr. Crewe. If he thinks the proposal worth putting forward, we can then get Ministerial approval for the whole package offer before instructing Mr. Crewe to make it.



(A.K. Rothnie)
August 11, 1960.

Copy
Mr. Heath

African Dept. (Mr. Ewart-Biggs)

I do not myself think any of this gets us anywhere; but by all means let us have a meeting.



*Arranged for
Aug. 23 at 3.30.*

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B.W. (all) 22/8. 12/7/8

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RECEIVED IN
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12 AUG 1960

117 Dufourstrasse
Zurich, July 28. 1960

12105/24.

Dear Lord Home:-

I read in the papers of your nomination as head of the Foreign Office.

May I extend my congratulations.

I have absolutely nothing personal to ask you but it is with a feeling of relief that a liberal aristocrat becomes the head of the Foreign Office.

I hate politics, I love my country. The hell I have been through since the outbreak of the second world war for my pro British feelings, I fought Fuad and Farouk, who installed the Nazis and Fascists in Egypt with disastrous results. Farouk poor fool ruined our family and himself.

Lord Kellearn and later on Sir Anthony Eden were right. Well, one must not cry over spilt milk. The world has changed, my British upbringing gave me a certain amount of "gutts" even after my late friend Nourri es Said was killed also the fiancé of my cousin Fazilet, - poor Feisal.

Mr. Macmillan has shown himself to be a great and just leader in the old British traditions.

For the good of civilization may Britain always be on the top.

Yours sincerely

*Said Halim
of Egypt.*

H. M. Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs
Downing Street

L o n d o n W

Ref: FO 371/150930

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Minutes.

Comp.

I am afraid that we have no record of Said Halim. He sounds like a member of a branch of the former Royal Family in Egypt, but is not in the reference books, nor in the Personalities Report, nor is known to Research Department. I think if he had given any important help to us in the past we should have heard of him. A courteous reply is therefore sufficient, and we should exercise caution in case by any mischance this correspondence found its way into the hands of the present régime. I therefore venture to suggest that the personal letter as drafted is too fulsome and could be damaging if it fell into the wrong hands. I would suggest a simple acknowledgment from the Private Secretary (especially as the Secretary of State is away) thanking Mr. Said Halim for his kind letter of good wishes and encouragement.

[Signature]
(R. Arculus)
August 10, 1960.

Mr. Robbins
Private Secy.
[Signature]
11/16

I agree.

[Signature]
[Signature]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



11 AUG 1960 ✓

VG1051/83.

UNCLASSIFIED

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,

CAIRO.

August 8, 1960.

Dear Department,

Under the headline "British soldier writes to the President four years after the aggression to apologise for having fought against our country", yesterday's "Al Gumhuriya" published on an inside page the facsimile and Arabic translation of a letter to President Nasser from a Mr. A.J. Scammell.

2. The letter read as follows:-

"Dear Sir,

I was member of the Allied Forces which invaded your country in November 1956. I was convinced at the time that the war we were waging was justified. I hated the Egyptian nation because they had hurt my national pride. Given the opportunity, I would have killed your people.

I realise now that I was wrong, utterly wrong. I want to apologise to you with all my heart for the hate and bitterness which I had for your nation. War is stupid. It answers nothing. It only creates more and more bitterness. Division is the cause of war because by dividing ourselves one from another, we are creating the opposing sides which will fight.

I realise now that the only way to create a new, united and peaceful world, is to cast out the hates and selfishness and prejudices which are in all of us, and begin on a basis of not WHO is right, but WHAT is right.

My nation is not the nation which the world can use as an example any longer. It too has fallen by the way-side. It is beginning to learn this and in time I feel sure it will make amends for its blindness. I pray that God will heal the wounds which my nation has inflicted on the world and that the Egyptian nation will forgive Britain, and forgive me, for our hatred towards you.

I wish it was possible for me to speak to the entire Egyptian nation and apologise to each and every one of them, but this letter must for now express my deepest regret.

Yours very humbly,
A.J. SCAMMELL."

3. So far there has been no comment, either in "Gumhuriya" or in any other paper, to this letter.

4. We are sending a copy of this letter to POMEP.

Yours ever,
CHANCERY.

Levant Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.


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(1045/60)



BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,

CAIRO.

August 2, 1960.

Dear Department,

The appointment of the Earl of Home as Secretary of State has aroused a certain amount of interest in the Cairo press. Commentators are generally agreed that it will not affect British policy in the Middle East in general, nor British policy towards the U.A.R. in particular. They rejoice that the people of the U.A.R., being now truly independent, need in any case no longer worry who is in office in London. "Al Gumhuriya"'s Palestinian leader writer, Nasser Nashashibi, has taken the opportunity to spread himself in a particularly offensive and inaccurate article about the failings of successive British Foreign Secretaries.

2. The weekly "Rose el Yusuf" asserts that Lord Home's appointment will not lead to any change in Cairo's attitude towards the exchange of Ambassadors with the United Kingdom; to which exchange (the magazine adds) Cairo has the following objections:-

- (a) British supplies of arms to Israel,
- (b) British belief that the U.A.R. is fighting Britain in her African colonies, whereas the U.A.R. is only supporting nations claiming independence,
- (c) British refusal to allow U.A.R. Consulates to be established in certain Persian Gulf sheikhdoms,
- (d) British attacks on nationalists in Oman.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

②

Levant Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

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SECRET & PERSONAL

pw
M: Roffine
ll
10/8

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES
11 AUG 1960
VG 1051/81/19 (A)

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,
CAIRO.
August 9, 1960.

My dear Roger,

Many thanks for your letter (VG 1081/G) of August 3 which arrived most conveniently as I had just fixed an appointment to see Heikal to introduce Paul Wright.

2. After we had discussed our various travel plans - I am writing to you separately about his - I said that I should be reporting to Ministers when I got home and that it would be useful if I could tell them what Nasser himself thought. Heikal did not get the point immediately, but when I went on to say that it might be useful if I were able to see Nasser in person he clicked at once and showed real interest. He said he thought it might be very useful and he would pursue the idea. From his attitude I think we can be fairly confident that he will give it a fair wind.

3. Nasser himself is on holiday near Alexandria at the moment and is not due back until about the 20th or 21st, so it is unlikely that I shall be able to see him before then, though the Soviet Ambassador saw him two days' ago.

4. I am grateful for the briefs and I think I now have enough material from which to talk. I agree with the order in which we might take things suggested in your paragraph 6., but, as you realise, much will depend upon Nasser.

Yours ever,
G. T. Crowe
(G. T. Crowe)

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office.

SECRET & PERSONAL

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SECRET and PERSONAL

Registry No.

FLAG A

Top Secret.
Secret.
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Open.

AKR
20/7

Draft.

letter to:
Mr. Crowe
from:
Sir Roger Stevens

In my Top Secret and Personal letter of June 30 I said that in my view you should certainly try to arrange an interview with Nasser. This idea has now been approved by the Secretary of State.

2. As previous correspondence has made clear, the idea is that you should seek the interview through Heikal, explaining that you are shortly coming back on leave and will be reporting to Ministers on the state of Anglo-U.A.R. relations. It would be valuable for Ministers - and we hope Nasser would regard it as useful from his point of view - for you to have a talk with him before this.

3. The meeting could be as confidential as the U.A.R. desire. There is certainly no question in our minds that we should make any public play with it and still less that we should somehow contrive to use the fact that you had been received by the Head of State to influence the question of exchange of Ambassadors (except insofar as any improvement in confidence between us might lead in that direction).

4. As to the course of the conversation (if it comes off) we must leave it very much to you, especially on what would be a first meeting with the President, to play the hand as you think best. At the worst you would, I suppose, be treated to a monologue by Nasser. Conversely he might leave you to do most of the talking. At the best there could be a real exchange of views.

5. This said, we have prepared the enclosed briefs from which you can draw as you choose

/(and

SECRET AND PERSONAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Nasser - Heikal, Heikal
Tray

Ref: FD 371/150930

8034

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SECRET AND PERSONAL

(and add to, for that matter) on three of the four subjects you suggested:

- (i) Iraq;
- (ii) Libya;
- (iii) Israel; ~~and also on~~
- ~~(iv) A. post-Summit/ and~~
- ~~(v) disarmament please see para. 9 below.~~

John Beith's letter to you No. of July 22 of provides you with a brief on Jordan.

Flag D

6. There is, of course, no special significance in the order of these items though it could be argued that to take ~~(iv) and (v)~~ the wider questions ^{of summitry and disarmament} first might get things off to a good start by (a) dealing with less contentious matters and (b) engendering some feeling in Nasser that we are having exchanges with him on world problems. For the rest, I can only suggest that the knottiest problem, Israel, might be left towards the end.

7. Items (i), (ii) and (iii) and the piece on Jordan are all dealt with in the context of Anglo/U.A.R. relations (c.f. para 8 of my letter of June 13). You will probably wish to preface any discussion of these with a general word on direct Anglo/U.A.R. relations (c.f. paras 2-7 of my letter of June 13). Here I think you have ample material to draw on, including most recently the record of the conversation between the Secretary of State and Zulficar Sabri on July 6 and John Beith's letter to Roger Allen RG 10316/1 of May 30.

VG 1051/60/G.
FLAG B.

FLAG B.

VG 1053/3
FLAG C.

FLAG C.

8. If, as seems likely, the question of our alleged "intelligence" activities in other parts of the Arab world comes up you have more than enough to draw on in reply. You may, however,

/like

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like to say - if a light note is not misplaced - that we are gratified to see that neither has seriously accused the other of interference in the recent Lebanese elections, and all the more gratified because, as we both know, Beirut is the sort of place where there are plenty of people trying to make each of us believe the worst of the other. You might even add that this is equally true of other Middle East capitals.

9. On disarmament, I attach for ease of reference copies of Foreign Office telegrams Nos. 120, ~~121~~ and 123 Saving to Amman which you may use for guidance. On Soviet intentions since the Summit, I enclose for your own background information copies of J.I.C.(60)49 (Final) (which please destroy after perusal) and of Moscow telegram No. 1022 (but not the references in the preamble, since these were taken into account in the J.I.C. paper). On this subject you should adhere closely to the line in the Prime Minister's personal message to Mr. Khrushchev of July 18. You ~~had~~ ^{do} not ^{note} propose discussing Communism as such, but you could of course make the point that there is ^(common) ~~no~~ ground between us and the U.A.R. in resisting ^(in the middle East & Africa) Communist encroachments, both Russian and Chinese. If there were any aspects of Communism into which the President wished to go more deeply, we should be glad to provide you with material.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(though you will appreciate tel: 120. first sentence has been omitted by crs)

attached ready

do

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3/vit

IRAG

Registry No.

Top Secret.
 Secret.
 Confidential.
 Restricted.
 Open.

MC
 GAT

Draft. Brief
 for Mr. Crowe

This will have to be played very much by ear, but the following are points which we should hope could be put across to Nasser.

(1) We want to see a stable and prosperous Iraq free from Soviet domination We do not want anything in the nature of a special position but only to trade and develop cultural relations to our mutual satisfaction. The risk of an early Communist takeover seems greatly to have diminished, partly in consequence of the Communists' own excesses, but they remain well organised.

(2) We are ready to meet (but not stimulate) reasonable Iraqi requests for assistance [e.g. arms and educational facilities] to counter-balance in some degree the Russians. Nasser will probably know that the Iraqis have ~~not~~^{not} bought any of the heavy arms they requested in the spring of 1959. But the fact that we were prepared at the time to supply them was psychologically important. The first blush of uncritical Iraqi enthusiasm for things Russian now seems to have died away and the Iraqis seem to want to develop their relations with the uncommitted countries and the West. We are ready to respond in the cultural field (e.g. recruitment of doctors for Baghdad University). We are also doing our best to meet Iraqi requests for supplies normal ammunition and military courses in the U.K. We are Iraq's traditional suppliers of ammunition and the requests for training facilities (which we also used to provide in the past) seem due to dissatisfaction with the Russians, and a desire ^{to} not to be too dependant on any one country / (3)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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(3) We think that the best prospect of seeing a stable non-Communist Iraq is to leave the Iraqis to settle their own affairs without outside interference. Pressure on Qasim is only likely to make him lean towards the Communists. It might be worthwhile bringing in at this point that Qasim is still quite as suspicious of our motives towards Iraq as Nasser is - though for different reasons. Indeed, Qasim believes H.M.G. to be behind almost any development either inside or outside Iraq which he regards as disagreeable.

(4) The future place of Iraq within the Arab Community is a matter for the Arabs to decide.

H.M.G.'s policy is genuinely to stand aside and to avoid involvement in Inter-Arab affairs [This is the most important point to put across, but we realise that it will be the hardest to make Nasser believe. For your information only, whilst it is true of course that an independent Iraq is probably more in our interests than one merged into a greater Arab unit, we should probably neither be able ^{in no position} ~~nor wish~~ to interfere if such a unit ~~seemed~~ seemed likely to come, or came, into being.]

(5) We welcome the recent improvement in U.A.R.-Iraqi relations and the cessation of the propaganda battle. This has no doubt partly been achieved because Nahdawi's Court has ^{not} recently been sitting. We hope that this rapprochement will be reinforced at the coming Arab League Foreign Ministers' Conference.

(6) Non Involvement We are determined to avoid involvement in Iraqi and inter-Arab affairs as we are certain that this is in the long run the only satisfactory policy for us as well as the Arab world.

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Registry
No.

LIBYA

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

HFTS
28/7

Draft.

brief

We have no interest in raising the subject of Libya with Nasser. If he should raise it, it will presumably be on the grounds that our military presence there, and the introduction of British troops from outside, for training exercises, are designed as a threat to the U.A.R. In particular he may suggest that we have recently been increasing our resident forces and are contemplating a garrison in the Fezzan (the U.A.R. Ambassador in Tripoli has recently questioned Mr. Riches about this).

2. If these questions are raised, the answer should be that our right to station troops in Libya and to conduct training exercises there is clearly laid down in the 1953 Treaty. We have had troops in Libya for a long time and their numbers have not varied during the past two years. When we introduce extra troops for exercises these ^{are of} are of limited duration and of course the plans are carefully worked out with the Libyan authorities so as to avoid any local inconvenience. These affairs are entirely a matter between the Libyans and ourselves and there is no substance in any suggestion that either our resident troops or our special exercises ~~are intended to~~ represent a threat to the U.A.R. Such an idea is clearly disproved by the obvious desire of the Libyan Government to remain in good relations with both the U.A.R. and ourselves.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Ref: FD 371/15D930

80341

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AKR
20/7

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Separate enclosure

ISRAEL

We realise that almost nothing we can say on this subject can be pleasing to the President. But we are anxious at the least to make sure that we are painted no blacker (in his eyes) than the facts warrant and the facts, at their simplest, are these.

2. We regard and treat Israel as we would any other friendly nation. She does not get from us any preferential treatment over and above this. Instances are sometimes alleged e.g. Israel's ability to remit charitable funds from this country, but on examination it is usually found that these allegations are without foundation (and as far as the charitable remittances are concerned the same facilities are available to other countries which can satisfy the Treasury's standard criteria). These, however, are comparatively small matters and we recognise that it is over arms that the biggest misunderstandings arise. This is not the time to enter into discussion of the ^{whole} Arab/Israel problem, and we only wish to comment ^{on arms} insofar as we get drawn into it. Whether the President believes it or not (still less whether he thinks it justified) the Israelis are just as apprehensive of U.A.R. designs on them as the U.A.R. may be of Israel intentions. In such an atmosphere we believe that an Israel which considers herself seriously ^{detrimental} weak ⁱⁿ her ability /to defend

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to defend herself is a threat to the stability of the Middle East in that she may, out of a sense of desperation, ~~seek to lash out in an attempt~~ ^{feel driven to preventive measures} to redress the balance in her favour before it is too late. We make no bones about, nor apologise for, our professed and genuine interest in the ^{stability of the} Middle East and any arms we sell to Israel are designed to promote that stability. In short, we want to see a strong but not too strong Israel.

3. As to details of arms it is not our practice to divulge these but we have made no great secret of what we have sold and, in any case, do not imagine that the quantities are unknown to the U.A.R.. Long ago we announced the sale of two old submarines of our own and in March told the U.A.R. authorities that we had eighteen months previously made an agreement to sell some tanks. But what we have sold the Israelis in no way compares with what we have sold or given to Arab governments in the past. We recognise that we are not the only suppliers of arms to Israel and take that fact very much into account in our assessment of what would best conduce to stability in the Middle East.

4. On Africa the main burden of U.A.R. charges seems to be that we are favouring Israel penetration at their expense. Quite frankly, other things loom much larger in our consideration of African ^{affairs} ~~problems~~ than the Arab/Israel problem and the most important of these is the limiting of Soviet (and Chinese) influence. In this context the Israelis are pulling in the same direction

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as ourselves while this clearly cannot
always be said of the U.A.R.

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Minutes.

Suggested talk between Mr. Crowe and President Nasser

The Secretary of State has agreed that we should try to arrange this interview and I have prepared a draft letter accordingly to Mr. Crowe.

2. As will be seen from paragraph 5 of this letter; Mr. Crowe will need separate briefs on six points. I have prepared the brief on Israel (the one on Jordan is separately under action) to show the tone at which we are aiming. In short, while not being provocative we do not intend to pull any punches but rather to aim at a frank exchange.

3. I should be grateful if the Departments to whom this minute is marked could, without too much delay, attach briefs on:

- (i) Iraq;
- (ii) Libya;
- (iii) post-Summit; and
- (iv) disarmament.

On Iraq there is already material in RG 10316/1 (at present with Southern Dept.). On Libya we have recently sent to Cairo assurances that our troops are not up to anything. On post-summitry and disarmament there are, I imagine, standard pieces already in existence.

A.K. Rothnie

(A. K. Rothnie)
July 22, 1960.

~~Eastern Dept.~~
~~African Dept.~~
~~Western Dept.~~
~~A.E.D.~~

Northern Dept.

We will submit a brief on Iraq separately and we on Libya.
G.F. Hillen 25/7
A.K. Rothnie 27/7

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Minutes.

In the field of 'post-Summitry' the only worthwhile subject at present is the P.M.'s letter to Mr. Khrushchev & our views on the general course of Soviet policy; which is rather for Northern Dept.

NT A Wilburton
27.7

Disarray 1 attach
F.O. Tel. to Amman no
120, 121 & 122-3, also addressed
to Cairo: it sh^d be
possible for Cairo to
make their own pick
out of these Tels.

Christopher Gausy
27/7

{ Post-Summit

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Minutes.

I notice that commission is not one of the subjects which Mr. Cross does not envisage discussing with Nassu. However I agree that he will have to be ready to discuss Senior post-summit position if they come up.

I think we should send Mr. Cross JIC (60) 499 (Final) and Mission file no 1022 (with which we are in agreement) as background material. I attach a copy of each. (It might be worth explaining that the files no 919-921 to which Mission refer to in their 1022 are not being sent because they were taken into account in JIC paper).

For the rest in this it will be sufficient to tell Mr. Cross that in speaking to Nassu he should also address closely to the time in the Prime Minister's personal message to Khrushchev of July 18 of which he will presumably have the text.

Alan Lewin
28/7

Djc. to Carr.

W.P. 21/8. A 4/8.

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Minutes.

A) Mr. Lowe, Cairo, to Sir R. Stevens

August 9.

h. 12/8

BU 18/88.

h. 18/8.

BU 26/8

He only saw Hakim Amer after all. See Cairo file no. 645, 111 Savip & 113 S.

h. 25/8.

UG 1051/88
UG 1051/89
- UG 1051/91

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V41051/81/9

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24 AUG 1960

SECRET
Anglo-UAR relations V41051/81/9

Mr. Crowe's letter of June 27 to Sir Roger Stevens, and Sir Roger's letter under reply, give a comprehensive account of where we stand with the U.A.R. at present and what we may hope to achieve. But the only concrete proposal which emerges is that H.M. Chargé d'Affaires should seek a meeting with President Nasser before he returns to England on leave, which he is due to do in the middle of August. The Department's comments on other details of Mr. Crowe's letter will be found on the jacket. ^{NP.2} Sir Roger Stevens' letter of June 13 was written at a moment when our relations with the U.A.R. seemed totally stagnant. Since then there have been certain encouraging indications. We took considerable pains with the U.A.R. Trade Mission here and went so far as to have a special meeting between the Mission and officials from a number of departments, held in the Foreign Office, to explain any points in official policy on Anglo/U.A.R. trade which might not have been understood. The U.A.R. Services Mission, which has been negotiating in London about the settling up of pre-Suez contracts and outstanding claims, has negotiated with us in a very good atmosphere. There have been approaches to Mr. Crowe from both the Director-General of the U.A.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ghaleb, and also Mr. Heikal which seem to hold out some possibility of a limited agreement on consulates, some settlement of which appears to be a pre-requisite to our moving on to an exchange of Ambassadors.

V41051/81/9

3. In these circumstances there seems more hope that President Nasser might be willing to receive Mr. Crowe. His departure on leave provides a good reason for suggesting this. We have foreseen that President Nasser may prefer a private meeting, which would remain confidential.

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4 As regards the way in which such a meeting should be handled, I suggest that Mr. Crowe should be briefed on all ^{on} points/which we think he ought to be able to express an opinion, including developments after the Summit and in regard to disarmament. But we should not expect that he will have much talking to do. The main point of the meeting will be for him to bring back a first-hand account of President Nasser's attitude and views.

5. I submit that we should instruct Mr. Crowe accordingly. He should not seek an interview, through Mr. Heikal, until he has our brief.

John Sait

(J.G.S. Beith)
July 8, 1960.

Copy

Mr. Profumo.

*I think it would be a
good idea for Mr Crowe to
try to see Nasser.*

John Sait

*Mr Profumo I agree John Profumo 12.7.
SJS 13/7*

Yes re 13/7

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Crowe
No. 651
August 23, 1960

RECEIVED D. 4.26.p.m. August 23, 1960
24 AUG R. 4.43.p.m. August 23, 1960
V6105/58(A) ✓ 61051/88

PRIORITY
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My telegram No. 645, paragraph 3: Interview with Field Marshal Amer.

Fact that interview has taken place is announced in this morning's Press, but without comment. If we are asked by Egyptian Press what transpired we shall simply say that I had not yet called on Amer, though I had on the other two Vice Presidents, and it was desirable that I should do so before I went home. To more responsible papers we are saying that a review of various questions took place.

2. I am reporting this meeting by Saving telegram which I am sending by today's bag.

- DISTRIBUTED TO
- Levant Department
 - African Department
 - Information Policy Department
 - News Department

We should not say more than this, if questioned.



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Thyff.

News Dept. I agree. In fact no questions have been asked. R. 18

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REUTER MD..0014

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2 AUG 1980

REPRESENTATION

CAIRO, JULY 25, REUTER -- THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC DOES NOT WISH HER DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN BRITAIN TO BE RAISED FROM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES TO AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AT PRESENT BECAUSE OF BRITAIN'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE CAIRO NEWSPAPER, AL GOMHOURIA, REPORTED TODAY.
REUTER MD..0015

VG1051/80

Mr. Pothine
Mr. A. Al...
M/E

Ref: FD 371/1SD930

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already V 9/10 5/1/90

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Crowe

No. 112 Saving

V 9/10 5/1/90

August 23, 1960

R. August 25, 1960

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 112 Saving of

Repeated for information Saving to: Washington

Baghdad

FOMEF

UKMIS New York

Beirut

UKDEL NATO

Tel Aviv

HQ BFAP

Amman

Paris

My immediately preceding Saving telegram.

Yesterday morning Mr. Woodrow Wyatt, M.P. received his appointment with President Nasser for an interview on I.T.V. The televised interview will take about a quarter-of-an-hour and will appear in "This Week" next Thursday or the following week. Nothing much was said in it but Wyatt did have a general chat beforehand to run over the ground before the filming began.

2. Wyatt tells me that he began by saying that when he interviewed Nasser over 18 months' ago it looked as though Ambassadors might be exchanged fairly soon. Why had this not happened? Nasser replied that the time was not ripe; the British were still working against the United Arab Republic. He then went on to catalogue his grievances. In Iraq, we had supplied Nasser with information about a plot against his life by the nationalists. In Jordan, King Hussein was attacking the U.A.R. and pretending to form an army to liberate Syria. In the Lebanon, we were also intriguing. Wyatt said he could not comment on the **Iraqi plot**, of which he had never heard, but he was quite sure that the United Kingdom did not control King Hussein. We did not exercise that sort of power any more. As for the Lebanon, it was ridiculous; the Lebanese laughed at

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/any idea

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Cairo Telegram No. 112 Saving to Foreign Office

-2-

any idea that they might be controlled by us.

3. Nasser said that the Trade Mission had been well received, but had not produced much in the way of concrete results; trade with the United Kingdom was very much out of balance. To this Wyatt replied that his understanding, on the contrary, was that things were going much better and we had bought twice as much this year as we had last year, Nasser seemed to be ignorant of this.

4. Next came the B.B.C. which was declared to be hostile. On this Wyatt asked if anybody listened to the B.B.C. in the Middle East. Nasser said 'No', but he saw what it said and it infuriated him. Later on, however, when the question of Consulates in Africa came up, Wyatt mentioned hostile U.A.R. propaganda against us. He said he had asked the Foreign Office whether anybody in Africa listened to Egyptian propaganda. The answer was 'No', but the Colonial Governors saw the report which infuriated them. Nasser was much amused at this. When Wyatt asked him why they attacked us in Africa, where our record was in fact good, he received the feeble reply that Nasser was constantly meeting African leaders and they all seemed either to have been or about to be arrested.

5. Wyatt then asked what could be done to improve the situation. He was sure that Her Majesty's Government were not intriguing and that they accepted Arab nationalism. Nasser replied that perhaps the Foreign Office did, but others did not. The Conservative party were hostile to the Arabs.

6. Finally, Wyatt asked him why the U.A.R. had been so pro-Russian recently. Nasser denied this. They had only been friendly to Russia because the Russians had been friendly to them; this was not so in our case.

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LEWIS SAYING TELEGRAM

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

already V_{9,051/59}

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND
WIDE AREA DISTRIBUTION

Mr Crews
No. 115 Saying
 August 23, 1960

R: August 25, 1960

V91061/79.

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 115 Saying of August 23.

Repeated for information saying to: Washington Baghdad
 POMEP UKMIs New York
 Beirut UKBel NATO
 Tel Aviv Paris
 Amman H.Q. MFAP.

My telegram No. 615 (not to all).

Field Marshal Amer received me yesterday evening at Alexandria, where he is on holiday, for about an hour. Heikal was present. Amer was most friendly but his English was not very good and after the initial courtesies I feared we were going to get nowhere. I tried one or two general subjects such as the Congo, but he was clearly quite uninformed and uninterested.

2. I said that as he knew I was going home on leave, that I would be reporting to you and I wondered if there was anything special that the U.A.R. authorities might wish me to transmit, either in general, or on Anglo-U.A.R. relations, particularly in view of the fact that you had just assumed office. The Field Marshal began by thanking me for the friendly and cooperative treatment accorded to the U.A.R. Military Mission recently in the United Kingdom. They were very pleased with the outcome. I said that I knew you too were gratified. Then, after some embarrassed platitudes about the U.A.R.'s desire to see justice and freedom in the world, he turned to Anglo-U.A.R. relations. The trouble he said was Israel. We were responsible for its foundation and we supported it. From 1952 Israel had been guilty of aggression in every major incident. Now she was being armed by the French with Mirage III's; these aircraft were so new that NATO did not have them; out of a production of 100, the Israelis were to get 65. Israel's armour came from the United Kingdom and France; her anti-aircraft and electronics from the United States and her Navy from the United Kingdom. The Israelis were building up their forces; how could the U.A.R. sit and watch?

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25 AUG 1960
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 WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Cairo Telegram No. 111 Diving to Foreign Office.

- 2 -

Ben Gurion had said that he wanted "Peace by force". Amer came alive when talking of Israel and spoke with eloquence; when he mentioned the Gaza raid of February, 1955, it was with real emotion. I interjected that we had not concluded any recent contracts with the Israelis and, in any case, our supplies of armour to them were much less than had been furnished to the Arab world and even less than had been sent to Egypt in the past. This met with no comment. Amer went on to say that the U.A.R. wanted to spend its money on development, but it had to buy new arms and these were expensive.

3. Next, Amer said that the U.A.R. had suspicions of our policy in some Arab states. I said I presumed he meant Jordan, to which he assented. King Hussein had started attacking the U.A.R. four months' ago in Morocco and now he declared that he was establishing an army for the liberation of Syria; it was almost aggression. I insisted that we could not control King Hussein on this kind of thing and that our aid was given without strings. Indeed, it was against our interest that there should be quarrelling between the U.A.R. and Jordan since we got the blame. We deplored this quarrelling since it seemed to us that the maintenance of an independent Jordan was as much in the U.A.R.'s interest as our own. I went on to say that part of the trouble was caused by U.A.R. suspicions that we were opposed to Arab nationalism. We were not. We wanted stability in the Middle East. The break up of the U.A.R. would only cause chaos, so why should we try to bring about something that would be against our own interests? This was received politely, but unbelievably. Amer said that so long as we supported Israel how could we really be in favour of the Arabs?

4. The subject of Israeli activities in Asia and Africa then came up. Israel had no money of her own so how could she provide loans. I suggested that most of the Israeli assistance was in the form of technicians. This was admitted, but Naikal claimed that they were making a loan of \$20 million to an Asian country, the money being provided by a New York syndicate. I said this was nothing to do with us, and where we were involved we could not discriminate against the Israelis. The reply was that in this the U.A.R. did not make any distinction in Western policy between United States and United Kingdom.

5. Finally, I said that I hoped it would be possible to get these suspicions straightened out. There seemed to be a sort of bogey which haunted Anglo-U.A.R. relations and had done for years. To this both Naikal and the Field Marshal simply retorted "Israel".

SSSSS

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