

Ref: FO 371/150928 80341

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

CONFIDENTIAL

We have troops in both ^{the} Eastern and Western parts of Libya and, in fact, these in the west outnumber the others.

2. There has been no reinforcement of our Forces recently, either in Cyrenaica or in Tripolitania. All the troops flown out for the exercise in Cyrenaica in March had left the country within a short time after the end of the exercise. ~~As~~ The Libyan Government allows the use of military training areas in both provinces. Single units make use of these at intervals; most of the exercises planned for the rest of this year are to take place in Tripolitania.

* Currently one Infantry Battalion in Cyrenaica and one Infantry Battalion and one armed car Regiment in Tripolitania.

(K.C. Thom)

June 23, 1960.

R. Arculus
Levant
Department.

Draft to Cairo.

Arculus
- 23/6.

Arabian Dept. first.

FD
July 1

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VG1051/61G

A. M. Watt CO TO Sir W Luce 4/7
B. Aug. (Cairo) ^{Minutes.} to Levant Dept 5/7

13. 8/7

Arabian Dept. } for obs. first
IRD minute (all)

As regards Aden there have in the past ten days or so been some signs that Cairo above is being moderated both as to volume and tone. But Cairo radio of July 4 still has the Adenis "foisting heinous imperialist conspiracies"

J. G. 8/7

It is too soon to comment on Oman. There was in fact a reduction

lin

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Minutes.

in the quantities of Cairns material
as I saw 5-6 weeks ago, but I
have not noticed further change
since.

W. A. Bullard
8/7

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Minutes

Since our June broadcasts by Cairo Radio & the 'Voice of Free Africa' - as reflected in the BBC monitoring summaries - do seem to have moderated in tone. But the BBC say that in fact this has not been so. Due to staff problems they have not been able to monitor as many Cairo in Swahili & VOFA broadcasts as usual; & have had to summarise & cut out repetitive terms ^{of abuse} such as 'imperialist dogs'. These terms are however still being broadcast. For instance, VOFA on July 7 & 9 referred to 'the setter dogs of N. Rhodesia' & 'white imperialist swine'.

2. Regarding Cairo broadcasts to the Arabian peninsula, the BBC say they have noted no change

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Minutes

The Voice of Free Africa from mid-July onwards has continued its use of abusive terms in discussing the 'sadistic imperialist régime' in British East Africa, and 'imperialist swine and dogs' have almost invariably featured in its programmes (e.g. July 14, 15, August 10). The policy of the Western powers in the Congo has been attacked incessantly. Likewise the South African government. On July 20 the 'imperialists' were accused of 'regarding Africans as monkeys', in their opposition to African self-determination.

2. At the end of July there were two rather more objective talks on the twin dangers of capitalism and Communism. During August the emphasis has been mainly on African unity. There have been extremely vicious remarks about all the powers with interests in the Congo area. The Italians were described as 'bastards, thieves and absolutely filthy' on August 10.

3. There have been repeated calls for a united stand by all Africans against the forces of imperialism in the last few days. The British 'settler dogs' in East Africa have come in for a good deal of abuse for their allegedly 'incessant plots'.

4. In the past few weeks texts of broadcasts have been rarely given in the Summary of World Broadcast, but the B.B.C. Monitoring Unit at Caversham have confirmed our impression that there has been no change in the volume and tone of abuse from the Voice of Free Africa.

(H.M. Carless)
(H.M. Carless)
September 2, 1960

Minutes
- 1/9.
HJ
Sept 7

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Levant ~~*WSP*~~

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*Sir R. Stevens has
not yet seen*

Introducer J.

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ARCHIVES
16 JUN 1960

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,

CAIRO.

June 14, 1960.

Mr. Heath
Mr. Beaumont

L055/60 G.

VG 1051/61 G

My dear Roger,

B1194/17 Green

Your telegram No. 535, about smuggling of arms to the West Aden Protectorate.

2. The Bairam holiday brought everything to a standstill so I was only able to see Murad Ghaleb last Sunday, June 12. I was warned beforehand that he could only see me for half-an-hour as he is heavily committed at the moment. I think this is true since he has no Ministers here at the moment and all departments are engaged in preparing their budgets.

B1194/19

3. Nevertheless, we got through quite a bit in our half hour and I enclose a minute of the meeting. I am afraid it makes pretty dreary reading; it is the same old record with only one or two new bits added. On the main point of the interview, namely the arms smuggling, we have at least made our point and Ghaleb took our piece of paper without any difficulty. He also gave nothing away. His immediate reaction, however, that any supplies smuggled are as nothing to the arms we are furnishing to Israel shows that the Egyptians have given the question some thought and that this will be their main line of defence. They may slow down shipments as a result of our representations, but I am inclined to doubt whether they will, particularly if there is anything in what Mr. El Habashi of the South Arabian League implied to Tony Parsons last night that the real extremists pushing the League are the U.A.R. You will note that Ghaleb said nothing at all about the Yemen or Saudi Arabia.

4. As for the broadcasts, I think Ghaleb was genuinely glad to see the sort of thing that we object to and he fastened on my bits of paper. He made no attempt to deny responsibility for the Voice of Free Africa. Whether this will lead to anything is of course another matter, but I am slightly encouraged by the fact that the Belgians tell me that the Voice of Free Africa has laid off the Congo completely in the last few weeks. But the Congo situation is, of course, rather different from that in our territories.

5. I think this confirms that the two main things that the U.A.R. hold against us at the moment are arms for Israel and interference with the movements of U.A.R. officials, with the corresponding implication that we are facilitating Israeli penetration into newly independent countries. On arms for Israel there is presumably nothing further to be said. I have already expressed my views about the Cyprus and Nigerian cases where I think the Egyptians have valid grounds for wanting access to the countries and where I do not think we do ourselves any good by keeping them out and only leave ourselves open to accusations of favouring the

/Israelis.

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office.

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Israelis. On the visa question as a whole however I am very grateful for the new instructions which you have persuaded the Colonial Office to send out; I think they should be helpful. You must be as fed up as I am with the complaints about Lebanon and Jordan, but they are bound to go on and there is presumably nothing new we can say. The Libyan complaint however is new. Is there any truth in the allegation that we have reinforced our troops?

6. As for further action, you will no doubt let me know if you want me to do anything more about the arms to Aden. In general I shall follow up with Murad Ghaleb when he is less preoccupied and I think it would be a good idea if I were to have a further bash with Heikal, who has been away with Nasser. I suggest it might also be useful if I were to have a go at Aly Sabri. He is away at the moment with the President, but I have an opening to ask to see him in order to invite him to visit the U.K. at the end of the summer (Beith's letter VG 1052/4 of May 27), and this might be a useful occasion for a general run over the ground. I suspect that all of what Murad Ghaleb said comes from Aly Sabri. If you agree, perhaps you could let me know. I don't think I need any general brief but I would be grateful for any ammunition you can let me have e.g. on Libya, and perhaps about visas.

7. I enclose five copies of the record for distribution to whoever you think appropriate.

*Yours etc,
C. T. Crowe*

(C. T. Crowe)

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RECORD OF MEETING WITH UNDER-SECRETARY OF MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON JUNE 12, 1960.

I began by saying that I wanted to talk about Anglo/U.A.R. relations in two particular aspects. Sir Roger Stevens had raised both of these matters with Mr. Khalil in London, but the Foreign Office thought it well that I should discuss these questions here as well as there might have been some misunderstanding. Her Majesty's Government wished to establish relations of confidence with the United Arab Republic, I understood that the U.A.R. wished to do likewise and the only basis on which we could achieve this was by being quite frank with each other. Dr. Ghaleb indicated complete assent. The two matters in question were U.A.R. propaganda to Africa and the Arabian peninsula hostile to the United Kingdom, and the shipment of arms from the U.A.R. to dissidents in the Western Aden Protectorate.

2. I said that I would start with the latter and I proceeded to read the text of points (a) to (c) in Mr. Beaumont's letter to me of May 16. I gave Dr. Ghaleb an aide memoire containing them. I added that we were perfectly capable of dealing with the smuggling, that I was not making a protest, but we were responsible for the affairs of the Federation, and the U.A.R. attitude to this kind of thing was bound to affect our relations in so far as it was an indication of general U.A.R. policy towards the United Kingdom. We would be glad if the U.A.R. would investigate these reports and if they were true put an end to such traffic.

3. Dr. Ghaleb replied that he had of course had a report from Mr. Khalil about his talk with Sir Roger Stevens. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs did not know anything about such shipments of arms, but they would investigate. Meanwhile, he would only comment that the United Kingdom was supplying arms to Israel which were being used to kill U.A.R. citizens. I said that arms supplies to Israel were a different matter; they were supplies between states. No new contracts had been entered into and the supplies that Israel had been receiving dated from old contracts of 1958.

4. I then turned to the question of propaganda to Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. I said that I had already discussed this subject with Dr. Ghaleb on a number of occasions and he knew our views. The propaganda continued to be mischievous, unhelpful and personally insulting to H.M. Ministers, and by inciting to violence was hindering constitutional development. I handed him the attached two pieces of paper with the more violent extracts from Cairo Radio and the Voice of Free Africa as typical of the tone of recent broadcasts. I also read from a recent broadcast of May 27th by Cairo Radio to Somaliland. I added that I had numerous folders at the office which I would be glad to pass on to him. I said I knew that he had denied that the Voice of Free Africa came from the U.A.R., but from direction finding that we had done it seemed clear that it could only come from somewhere near Cairo. Dr. Ghaleb did not deny this. He took the extracts, and in addition the Somali broadcast and appeared glad to have them.

5. Dr. Ghaleb said that the U.A.R. Government felt that we should consider Anglo-U.A.R. relations over the whole field and not in one or two sectors only. They too had grievances against us and felt that there were certain circles in London and in the Foreign Office which were still hostile to the U.A.R.

/s.

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6. In particular, Dr. Ghaleb said we were furnishing arms to Israel; Centurion tanks and submarines were very much more serious weapons than any small arms which might be going to Aden. I repeated what I had said earlier. No new contracts for arms had been made and supplies between states were a different matter.

7. Next, Dr. Ghaleb went on, we were hampering them in the day to day conduct of their affairs. For example:

- (a) we refused to allow the U.A.R. to send anybody to Cyprus to put their Consulate in order in preparation for independence;
- (b) we refused to let the U.A.R. Ambassador in Ghana go to Nigeria to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations on independence;
- (c) we refused to let Fuad Galal go to Nigeria;
- (d) the Israeli Consul in Kenya was extremely active. On this I said that I understood he was a British subject and only an honorary Consul. The reply was that he was nevertheless Jewish and very active in promoting Israeli interests. In general, we were letting the Israelis in and keeping the U.A.R. out.

8. Then there was the Lebanon. Dr. Ghaleb alleged that in the elections we were financing Chamoun who was the bitterest enemy of the U.A.R. Had not certain supporters of his been arrested who had been in touch with us? I said that I could deny this allegation at once. I was absolutely certain that there was no truth whatever in this kind of constant accusation. It was totally against our policy in the Middle East. Dr. Ghaleb referred to a newspaper proprietor who had become very rich on the basis of a circulation of only 2,000 copies. How had this been done? Beirut was an open city in which everything was known. Some papers were financed by the U.K., others by the Americans and others by the U.A.R. I asked if he could give me proof. He said there were documents. I said I would like to see them.

9. Dr. Ghaleb went on to say there was Iraq "of course". Again, I picked him up on this to ask why "of course". I understood the U.A.R. policy now was very similar to our own. Dr. Ghaleb admitted that things were quieter and had changed somewhat, but referred to our working against the U.A.R. in the past.

10. Next was Libya. Our troops were all in the eastern part of the country near the U.A.R. frontier and we had recently reinforced them. Why was this? I said that our troops had always been in Cyrenaica and our air base was, and always had been, at El Adem. It was true that we had held exercises recently, but, as I had explained at the time, these had no political significance. The desert was a good area for exercises. I was quite sure that all the troops who had been involved in recent exercises had gone home.

/11.

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11. Finally, there was Jordan. King Hussein had been making a tour through British territories in Africa and had been making anti-U.A.R. statements. I replied that his major anti-U.A.R. statement, as far as I was aware, had been made, in fact, in Morocco to a newspaper. We really could not keep King Hussein quiet. Dr. Ghaleb said that we could at least prevent his remarks having such publicity. This led me to try to explain the nature of the U.K. press on familiar lines and our inability to direct what they should or should not say.

12. I then said that we really must try to get over this business of accusations and suspicions. This business of Chamoun, for example, was very tiresome. I was absolutely certain there was no basis for the U.A.R. accusations, and I denied them. I would, nevertheless, report them to the Foreign Office and I was sure they would deny them in their turn. But the U.A.R. Government would just go on believing them. How could we ever get anywhere on that basis? I was sure we had important common interests. In particular, there was our common interest in stability in the Middle East. We were not opposed to the U.A.R. They needed stability and so did we. The U.A.R. was some guarantee for stability and for us to try to break it up would be contrary to our own interests. We both had strong interests in the prevention of communism in Africa. Again, there was mutual trade. These common interests surely made it necessary to get over these wild suspicions.

13. At that stage we unfortunately had to break off as he was late for a meeting about which he had warned me beforehand. He said that he was very busy at the present time with no Ministers available and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs budget to prepare. But he would like to resume our discussion as soon as he was able to get clear from the immediate pressure.

(C. T. Crowe)

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,
CAIRO.

June 14, 1960.

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VOICE OF THE ARABS

(i) Aden and the Protectorates

"Trevaskis, the butcher of the South", "the cowardly cavaliers of the British Colonial Office"; (April 17)

"the war criminals and aggressors in Government House in Aden"; (May 21)

"The British do not baulk at using the ugliest and meanest methods". (May 21)

(ii) Oman

"Well organised (British) terroristic campaigns"; (April 24)

"the British authorities tortured these men ... the imperialist authorities tied him up, beat him up and kicked him"; (April 24).

"British imperialism ... its terroristic rule". (April 24).

(There was also a broadcast on Damascus Radio on March 9 alleging that Her Majesty's Government had landed large numbers of British - Jewish soldiers and intended to set up a new Jewish national home in Oman.)

(iii) Somaliland

"British imperialism ... imposed poverty, ignorance and disease"; (April 8)

"no man changes his habits nor does a wild beast stop eating raw meat ...

"British lies are British lies." (January 24).

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VOICE OF FREE AFRICA

"Macmillan, who expressed his pretentious and hypocritical desire to meet African leaders" (March 8)

"imperialist dogs and swine (in East and Central Africa);
(all the time)

"imperialist dogs" (the British in Zanzibar)
the imperialist Iain McCleod"; (April 8)

"we must wage war on the imperialists ...
on the imperialist lackeys and we must overthrow
the constitutions of the imperialists ..." (East and
Central Africa). (April 8).

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(VO 1051/61/0)

July 1, 1960

Thank you for your letter (1055/600) of June 14 about your conversation with Mourad Ghaleb on June 12.

2. The representations about arms smuggling may perhaps be causing the U.A.R. to have second thoughts. We are looking into this and discussing it with the Colonial Office and will let you know if there seems to be any definite result, or if a follow-up is needed.

3. As regards broadcasts, I understand you are now receiving the B.N.C. Monitoring Reports and will thus be kept up to date. We must also keep an eye on speeches by President Nasser and other leading members of the régime. The contrast between the sort of complaints which the U.A.R. Mission are constantly bringing against us, e.g. the American television interview with Moshe Dayan, and the grievances which we have, but have so far soft-pedalled, is striking.

4. Your answers on Libya were quite right. We have troops in both Eastern and Western Libya, the majority in the west. There has been no reinforcement recently either in Cyrenaica or Tripolitania. All the troops flown out for the exercise in March left shortly afterwards. You could confirm all this if Mourad Ghaleb reverts to the point. For your own information, most of the exercises planned for the rest of this year are to take place in Tripolitania, and at present we have one infantry battalion in Cyrenaica and one in Tripolitania together with an armoured car regiment.

5. On visas, there is nothing to report yet about the response to the general appeal sent out by the

/Colonial

C.T. Cross, Esq., C.M.G.,
Cairo.

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Colonial Office and referred to in your paragraph 5. We have at last obtained a reply from Lagos about the Egyptian allegations, and this you will have had already in the form of Levant Department's letter VS 1621/36 of June 23 to your Chancery.

6. I certainly agree with the suggestion in your paragraph 6 that you should have a go at Ali Sabri if you have the chance. I mentioned this to the U.A.R. Charge d'Affaires on June 29, saying that I did not know whether you had yet acted on our authorisation to ask Sabri if he would like to fit in a visit to London in the course of his visit to Europe. Khalil showed a certain interest but said that all he knew was that Sabri was accompanying the President on his visit to Spain. Incidentally he mentioned that his brother, at the Ministry of Communications, might be paying a private visit to him in London in July en route to Sweden.

ROGER STEVENS

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ISD 122/120.

SECRET.

*Over taken
M. W. [unclear]
M. [unclear]
[unclear] 6/vii
4th July, 1960.*

VG1051/61G

I enclose for your information a copy of a note of a discussion in Cairo on 12th June between Crowe and the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which Crowe made representations both about arms smuggling and about propaganda directed against the British in Aden and elsewhere. If there is no further word from the Egyptians about arms smuggling after a few weeks we will consider whether anything more should be done. A factor in this will be whether there is any indication that attempts to move arms into the Protectorate have continued since representations were made. You will no doubt inform us of any signs of such activity.

There remains the question whether any use can be made of the Embassy activity in Cairo to persuade the Federation Ministers that H.M.G. is doing its best on behalf of the Federation. One difficulty here is the chance of leakage from the Federation, which might undo any good achieved by the Foreign Office. We should value your advice on this point, and until we have your views, we should not wish anything said to the Rulers. It is possible, of course, that the Egyptians will call a halt for the time being as long as they do not appear publicly to be giving in to pressure.

(I. Watt)

Sir William Luce, K.C.M.G., K.B.E.,
Government House,
ADEN.

Copy to R.A. Beaumont Esq., C.M.G.
Foreign Office.

SECRET.

CONFIDENTIAL

pw V G



BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,
CAIRO.

July 5, 1960.

RECEIVED BY
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7 JUL 1960
VG 1051/61

(B)

Dear Department,

Would you please refer to paragraph 4 of the Chargé d'Affaires' letter 1055/60G of June 14 to Sir Roger Stevens about U.A.R. VG 1051/61G broadcasts.

2. We get the impression from the B.B.C. monitoring reports that the language of Cairo Radio and Voice of Free Africa broadcasts on Aden, Oman and the British in Africa, has moderated slightly during the past ten days or so. The general content of these broadcasts remains the same, but there seem to have been an absence of references to "war criminals" "imperialist dogs and swine", "British torturers" etc. This may be pure coincidence, but it is just conceivable that our representations in London and here may have had some effect.

3. We should be grateful to learn whether your impressions confirm ours. In any case we will watch this question very carefully, as you are no doubt doing at your end.

Yours ever,

Chancery
R.

Levant Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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(VG 1051/610)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

July 15, 1960.

Dear Chancery,

Your letter 1437/60 of July 5 about Cairo radio and Voice of Free Africa broadcasts.

2. The British Broadcasting Corporation say that the language of these broadcasts has not in fact moderated recently. Because of staff problems they have recently been unable to monitor as many Cairo in Swahili and V.O.F.A. broadcasts as usual; they have chosen to summarise and cut out repetitive terms of abuse such as "imperialist dogs". These terms are, however, still being broadcast and V.O.F.A. on July 7 and 9 referred to "the settler dogs of Northern Rhodesia" and "white imperialist swine". Regarding Cairo broadcasts to the Arabian Peninsula, the B.B.C. have not noted any change or improvement in tone here either.

3. It is rather unsatisfactory that you and we should be dependent on monitoring reports which do not give a correct picture and we are asking the B.B.C. to keep a particularly careful watch over the next two months.

Yours ever,

LEVANT DEPARTMENT.

The Chancery,
British Diplomatic Mission,
Cairo.

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VC108/62.

I paid a courtesy call on Mr. Khalil, the U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires, on June 18. Dr. Jawdat Mufti (Counsellor) was also present. We had a somewhat discursive talk lasting about 45 minutes. Both were cordial but reserved and the conversation was mostly taken up with small talk about our respective careers, life in Cairo, etc.

2. Mr. Khalil made two rather half-hearted attempts to turn on the Israeli gramophone record. I said that I understood how important this problem was to him, but I discouraged him from launching into a full debate on the subject by saying that of course I was not familiar with details of the present situation and that I would in any case hope to see him again before I left when we could perhaps revert to the subject.

3. Mr. Khalil seemed pleased at the way the Trade Mission's visit had begun and made it clear that he attached considerable importance to what he described as "a favourable outcome". Indeed he said at one point that this would give a good start to my tour of duty in Cairo. He gave no very clear idea of what he meant by "a favourable outcome" except to say that of course it was understood that no hard and fast trade agreements could be reached at this stage but rather that the difficulties which had arisen could be properly understood and examined.

4. Both Mr. Khalil and Dr. Mufti displayed considerable interest in my present job. The latter asked at one point whether I had anything to do with "research" (a question which I purposely misunderstood and turned aside). I asked them how they were getting on with the appointment of a Press Counsellor about which I had heard something but was told that they were not going to make such an appointment just yet. Dr. Mufti said however that there was one member of the Mission who concerned himself with information matters. I said that I would be very glad to meet him and give him what help and advice I could before I left my present position.

5. Finally, I think they were a bit suspicious at having learnt that my wife was at one time a member of Parliament. I explained all this bit of family history very carefully, making it quite clear that her time in the House was confined to the wartime years and on a virtually non-party basis, and that she had long since retired from public life to take on the even more arduous duties of housewife and mother. This part of the conversation ended with the rather surprising remark by Mr. Khalil that he thought she would learn Arabic very quickly.

6. On the whole I think that the interview went reasonably well although Mr. Khalil was perhaps disappointed at not being able to let go about Israel. But I was determined not to let our first meeting be spoilt by a pointless political wrangle. It seems, nevertheless, that he is under instructions to say his piece on all possible occasions and it would probably be better to let him get it off his chest some time before I leave. I think my assurances that I wanted to work for improved relations were appreciated and we parted on very friendly terms with a promise to meet again

/both...

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both officially and socially before I left London. Mr. Khalil struck me as intelligent, highly nervous and probably rather suspicious. The difficulty seems to be to get him to relax and I think this may be easier when he is alone or with someone to whom he is more accustomed. I shall follow up the question of information matters with Dr. Mufti (there is a complaint about a B.B.C./TV programme which will give me something to talk about) and I shall of course keep in touch with Mr. Khalil from time to time until I leave.

7. I have sent a copy of this record to Mr. Crowe in Cairo.

P.H.G.

(P.H.G. Wright)
June 20, 1960.

Mr. Beith.

Sir R. Stearns

*ho 27vi
June 21*

Mr 21/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE

DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Crewe

No. 508

June 24, 1960

D: 11.35 a.m. June 24, 1960

R: 1.06 p.m. June 24, 1960

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

VG.1051/63

Consulates.

In the course of a courtesy call that I made yesterday to introduce the Chief Inspector, the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised this question. After referring with gratification to the treatment accorded to the United Arab Republic trade mission, and to the possible improvement in trade relations, he went on to deplore mutual suspicions between us on the political side (e.g. in the Lebanon) which led to action and counter-action. Could we not make a start in breaking out of this vicious circle by dealing with the question of Consulates and the question of access for the United Arab Republic to Cyprus and Nigeria. Murad Ghaleb then referred to the possibility of the United Arab Republic being allowed to set up trade offices at certain places if we could not accept Consulates there. He had mentioned the matter when Beith was here (my letter to Beith of March 21). Would it be possible to explore this idea? He was making a purely informal suggestion because he did not want to get into the position of putting a proposition to us which we might turn down.

-VG.1051/64

2. I replied that, as Ghaleb knew, I too deplored the suspicions between us and we would be delighted to get away from them. I had not followed up the trade office idea with you because I had been waiting to see whether he himself wished to pursue it, but I would be glad to do so now. I asked, however, whether there were any particular posts at which the United Arab Republic would want trade offices, or to which they wished to give priority. I knew that the Minister for Foreign Affairs did

/ not

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25
VG.1051/63



Ref: FO 371/150928

80341

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CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 508 to Foreign Office.

- 2 -

not think there should be any bargaining over this question, but there were certain posts where it would be much more difficult for us to give representation to the United Arab Republic than others - I mentioned Kenya in the context of the hostile United Arab Republic radio propaganda. Ghalib would not be drawn on this; he insisted that he had not cleared the matter with his superiors and wanted to explore the matter informally.

3. See my immediately following telegram.

SSSSS

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Crowe



No. 509
June 24, 1960

D. 2. 26 p.m. June 24, 1960
R. 2. 55 p.m. June 24, 1960

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

My immediately preceding telegram: Consulates.

VG-1051/64 -VG1051/63

It is interesting that the Egyptians should have raised this matter and it seems likely that they would now like to reach some kind of arrangement. They would evidently like to extend their representation as widely as possible in Africa for general reasons, but particularly to counter the Israeli trade drive. As for Cyprus and Nigeria, they wish to make preparations for these countries' independence.

2. From our point of view, I suggest it would also be desirable to break the deadlock and reach some arrangement. We are managing in Damascus and Alexandria, but it is inconvenient and in Damascus particularly it would be useful to have the possibility of direct political reporting and to be able to look after trade matters on the spot rather than from Beirut. Moreover, I doubt whether we will be able to exchange Ambassadors until this question is out of the way. Further, I think this question has taken on a disproportionate psychological importance from the Egyptian point of view in regard to UK/UAR relations. Taken in conjunction with our refusal to permit them to send delegations to Cyprus and Nigeria, our refusal to let them have Consulates means that we are, in fact, discriminating against them (for whatever good and valid reasons). This discrimination is made worse by the fact that we are not imposing similar handicaps on the Israelis.

3. I hope, therefore, you will be able to give the idea of trade offices favourable consideration. Though Ghalib gave nothing away, I do not think that the U.A.R. would insist on offices in all the places for which they have asked in return for giving us Alexandria and Damascus. Equally,

/however,

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CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 509 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

however, I do not think we shall get what we want without giving them something of what they have asked for. It is presumably essential to keep them out of Kuwait, Aden and Kenya; but I suggest that we might think seriously about letting them have a trade office in Tanganyika, and perhaps Uganda. It should surely be possible to restrict the political activities of a trade office more easily than a Consulate (you will recall in the Property Commission we were not allowed our own cyphers) and I suggest that it might give us some kind of hostage. In other words, we could vary the treatment accorded to a trade office according to the tone of Cairo propaganda i.e. restricting its activities if it were violent and easing up if the tone improved.

4. I would suggest, therefore, that :

a) we ask for Consulates for ourselves in Alexandria, Damascus and Port Said. (We do not need Suez or Aleppo, and the extent of our interests remaining there is now less than Egyptian interests in some of the places they have asked for). We could, if necessary, also drop Port Said which we can handle from Cairo without much difficulty;

b) we offer to let the Egyptians have Consulates in Liverpool, Singapore and/or Hong Kong;

c) we offer them a trade office in Tanganyika, and possibly Uganda;

d) we let them send delegations to Cyprus and Nigeria to pave the way for diplomatic relations.

5. As regards (d) above, I have still received no explanation for the refusal of visas to the Egyptian Mission to Nigeria, for which I asked on April 28 (my telegram No. 376). The U.A.R. have a legitimate desire to make preparations for the establishment of missions in Cyprus and Nigeria when they become independent since the one is a neighbour and the other will be the largest African State. I suggest we should not overrate the capacity of the Egyptians to make mischief lest we fall into the same error of which we accuse them when they see our hand in everything.

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The U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Kamal Khalil, lunched with me at the "Travellers' Club" on June 20 to meet Mr. Donald McLachlan of the DAILY TELEGRAPH. As Mr. Khalil arrived 20 minutes late and Mr. McLachlan had to leave for a 2.45 engagement, the time for conversation was limited and its character somewhat strained. I suspected, however, that Mr. Khalil understood why I had effected the introduction. I rubbed in that Mr. McLachlan had previously worked on the TIMES and the ECONOMIST and Mr. Khalil made a note of his name, and will I think put him on his list and perhaps invite him to a meal.

2. After Mr. McLachlan had left, Mr. Khalil raised with me the following points:

(i) He would like to join a club where he could swim and play tennis. I told him we would try to help him and Mr. Beith will try to arrange. I think if the Department can get credit for arranging this it will be all to the good.

(ii) Mr. Khalil said that the U.A.R. Trade Mission had been delighted at their reception by the Secretary of State. He said that they attached importance to the 3 cardinal points which Mr. Rouchdy had raised. They were also anxious to have a letter from the Board of Trade summarizing the results of the visit. They did not expect immediate business to result, only that foundations for facilities and arrangements for future business should be laid. I suggested that if Mr. Rouchdy's main object was to have a letter which he could show to the President it might be better to have something solely for this purpose and not for publication.

Mr. Khalil did not dissent. I said that we would follow this up with the Board of Trade.

Mr. Khalil said that one of the main obstacles to trade at the present time was that if a U.K. firm wanted to sell some U.K. equipment to the U.A.R. they had to find a buyer of Egyptian goods of roughly equivalent amount in order to overcome foreign exchange

/problems. This

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problems. This served as a deterrent. He then went on to suggest rather obscurely that this difficulty could be overcome if a definite sum, say £20 million, could be agreed as a figure within which trade could be conducted. He did not appear to be referring to a ceiling for credit (cf. Mr. Crowe). I told him that I understood the difficulty but the solution appeared to demand some effort on the part of the U.A.R. Government.

(iii) Mr. Khalil then complained about a B.B.C. television programme three days ago on limited wars, which had represented Moshe Dayan and a B.B.C. compere who had laughed a great deal about what Moshe Dayan had said. This had made a very unfavourable impression and he had been instructed by his Government to take the matter up. He had already spoken to Mr. Arculus. I said that this was news to me and I would make enquiries.

(iv) Finally, Mr. Khalil spoke of a recent Admiralty publication, apparently relating to Alexandria, which had said some very damaging things about the U.A.R. and on which his Government put a sinister interpretation. He apologised profusely for bringing this up and was unable to give me chapter and verse, although he said he would do so later. I said that I could not hope to trace the subject of the complaint without further particulars.

Mr Arculus

*and copy (i) to
Mr D. Malcolm*

*RD
June 21*

copied. 1h 21/6.

RP
ROGER STÉVENS
June 20, 1960.

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Ref: TO 371/1SD928

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23 JUN 1960
VCIOSI/60(A)

cut

The following action is in train on the points raised by the U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires with Sir Roger Stevens on June 20 (below).

2. (i) Clubs. Mr. Khalil raised this with me too and I told him that many diplomats belonged to the Saint James's Club. For sporting facilities I mentioned Roshampton and the R.A.C. Sir Roger Stevens has now taken action in respect of the Travellers' Club. The Vice Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps has undertaken to look into the possibilities of a sporting club.

Flag A
Flag B
Flag C

(ii) Trade Mission. We now have the attached draft letter from the Board of Trade which is couched in forthcoming language but fails to deal with the three points raised by Mr. Rouchdy with the Secretary of State. Mr. Chadwick has also pencilled some suggestions. The Treasury have made minor comments. I think that we can only make this letter satisfactory if we build in something more positive, and this we can only do if we succeed in persuading the other Departments, at Sir Roger Stevens's meeting on June 23 at 11 a.m., to yield some concession. I attach an interim draft reply to the Board of Trade. I should say that Mr. Chadwick is not hopeful of our obtaining anything and has only been able to suggest an addition at 'A' on the second page of the Board of Trade draft. I also attach a draft of a note which might serve as a basis for discussion at the inter-departmental meeting.

Flag D
Flag A

(iii) Television programme. Mr. Paul Wright has taken over this enquiry and will give the U.A.R. ~~Counsellor~~ *Mission* a full explanation including a lecture on the B.B.C. and its relationship to H.M.G., which is evidently not understood by the U.A.R. Embassy or in Cairo. Meanwhile Mr. MacCleary, who saw the offending programme, said it was an interview between an American General and Moshe Dayan with an American commentator in the chair - i.e. an American tape-recording used by the B.B.C. There was no offensive reference to President Nasser and in Mr. MacCleary's opinion Moshe Dayan could have said no less than he did. The only delicate point was that he said he hoped that the Israelis could count on American support if they were threatened again. The American General naturally did not commit himself. It is clear that the U.A.R. complaint is frivolous.

Good | Mr. Wright has now seen the U.A.R. Secretary who deals with press affairs & will arrange to have the film run through with both sides present.

(R. Arculus)
June 22, 1960.

✓ Copy: Mr. Chadwick.

I wd like to be present

As regards (i) Mr. Paul Wright is a member of Hurlingham. Will you please make arrangement with him.

*John Smith
June 22*

Mr. Wright please ↑

CONFIDENTIAL

*ll
22/60*

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I understand that Mr Malcolm has fixed up Huntington. But I will take Mr and Mrs Khalil (with my wife) there to lunch one day - the perfect excuse for entertaining them which I have been searching for!

P.W.
23/6

Mr Arculus

h.c. 2/6

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CONFIDENTIALFROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTF

DEPARTMENTALDISTRIBUTION

No. 634

June 27, 1960.

D. 8.00 p.m. June 27, 1960.

PRIORITYCONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 515 [of June 25: Nasser on the B.B.C.].

U.A.R. Mission had already spoken to us about a B.B.C. television programme which was in fact a repeat by the B.B.C. of an American C.B.S. "Small World" programme. An American commentator interviewed an American General and Dayan about the rôle of the Army in the modern world. Korea was discussed and the programme was not primarily about the Sinai campaign.

2. Programme, though evidently displeasing to the Egyptians here, does not appear to have contained anything insulting. However we are seeing it with members of U.A.R. Mission on June 30 and will report further. In the meantime we have spoken firmly to Mission, pointing out constitutional relationship between Her Majesty's Government and B.B.C. and deploring efforts to play up this incident.

3. If meanwhile you wish to say something to Ghaleb, you could tell him the foregoing, adding that we are surprised that the U.A.R. authorities, despite our explanations, saw fit to play this up in Cairo, evidently exaggerating its content and significance, in spite of repeated evidence of our goodwill, for example the reception of the Trade Mission by the three senior Ministers concerned.

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

VG-1051/64

Cyp. er/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Crowe

No. 536
July 2, 1960

D. 12.47 p.m. July 2, 1960
R. 1.21 p.m. July 2, 1960

PRIORITY
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VG-1051/63 VG-1051/64 - Flag B & C

My telegrams Nos. 508 and 509: Consulates.

At a meeting today Heikal, in the course of expressing the desire to get Anglo/U.A.R. relations on to a better footing, brought up the subject of Consulates. He asked whether we could let them have a Consulate-General in Cyprus. I replied that with the advent of independence this would be a matter for the Cyprus Government. He then asked whether, if we disliked the length of the list of Consulates which the U.A.R. had presented to us, we could not let them know those places at which we would be prepared to let them [group undec] Consulates (he mentioned Singapore as a possible example), and they would then apply to open in those places. I said that we too would be glad to get the question of Consulates settled; I had put Murad Ghaleb's informal suggestion about trade offices to you and I would be glad to transmit Heikal's proposal.

2. This approach bears out the views expressed in my telegrams under reference and I think there is now a real desire on the Egyptian side to get this question settled. To do so would also be of benefit to ourselves and I hope, therefore, that you will be able to give early and favourable consideration to the recommendations in my telegram No. 509.

TTTTT



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17 JUL 1960

VA 1051/67
(A.)

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VA 1051/72

U.K./U.A.R. RELATIONS: CONSULATES

Sir Roger Stevens thought you would wish to see the letter on this subject which He signed last week before departing. Since it was written we have had telegram No. 536 from Mr. Crowe and I am working on it as indicated in the attached further letter for my signature to Mr. Crowe.

Flag D
VA 1051/72
Flag A
VA 1051/67
Flag F
VA 1051/67

VA 1051/67

2. This all seems encouraging and suggests to us that we have been following the right policy in refusing to fuss about Damascus and Alexandria *and letting the WAR come to us in their own time.*

John Beith
(J.G.S. Beith)
July 4, 1960.

Hdm
s.2

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

July 4, 1960.

1/10/67
U.A.R. 1/67

We have received and studied with interest your telegram No. 536 about a further conversation you have had on the subject of Consulates, this time with Heikal. We had of course acted on your telegrams Nos. 508 and 509 on the same subject and the result of our efforts is contained in a letter signed by Roger Stevens on July 1 which will reach you by the same bag as this one.

2. Two points have struck us in particular in your latest telegram. The first was the application for a Consulate-General in Cyprus. The way in which you have recorded Heikal suggests to us that more could be squeezed out of this belated concession than if we merely act as suggested in our telegram No. 1105 to Athens. We have in fact already obtained clearance from the Governor to offer visas for a visit by U.A.R. representatives as soon as the Base Agreement has been initialled (possibly on June 6). We are now trying to get clearance through the Colonial Office for a form of words by which we would notify the U.A.R. Government that both the Governor and Cypriot leaders are prepared to accept a U.A.R. Consulate without more ado i.e. before independence.

3. The second point which struck us is that Heikal said nothing about an East African post and took the line, for the first time to our knowledge, that the U.A.R. Government would be prepared to look at a list of what we could offer them. We have never minimised the difficulty of securing even an East African Trade Office, in view of our complaints against Egyptian propoganda to East Africa. Not only would it take some time for the Colonial Office to thrash this out with their Governors but the question would also have to be taken to Ministers. In the circumstances we are hoping to press on with the Colonial Office for a reply on Cyprus, Nigeria, Hong Kong and Singapore and it has occurred to us to wonder whether we might not try and clinch our immediate requirements in Damascus and Alexandria on that basis, while the wind in Cairo is apparently favourable, rather than hold the whole thing up for much longer in an attempt to offer something in East Africa. Possibly you could add, in all honesty, that we were doing our best about East Africa but could offer the others straight away to clinch our two requirements. We would aim at letting you have such instructions within two or three weeks.

4. Will you let us have your views on the alternative packages in the light of the preliminary work we have so far done in London?

(J.G.S. Beith)

C.T. Crowe, Esq., C.M.G.,
Cairo.

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VG.1051/67

(9)

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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, CAIRO.

Commission for British, French and American Affairs.

**Registration No. 7 Secret
File No. 55/20/X his secret**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the Embassy of Switzerland (in charge of British and French interests in U.A.R.) and with reference to its Note dated March 23, 1959 concerning the request to appoint a representative of U.K. Government for the questions relating to the implementation of the agreement signed in Cairo on February 28, 1959 between the Governments of U.A.R. and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, have the honour to inform that while maintaining the principle of reciprocity it is decided that:-

1) The Government of U.A.R. have no objection to receive in Cairo a British Mission whose function would be limited to questions relating to the implementation of the financial agreement signed with Great Britain on February 28, 1959.

It will be called the "Commission of the British property in the Egyptian Region".

2) The designation is approved of Mr. Colin Toddman (now as head of that Commission in his capacity as Representative of the Government of U.K. in questions relating to the implementation of the mentioned agreement.

3) Members of that Commission should be limited to four in addition to its head.

4) The Commission could appoint a limited number of Secretaries not exceeding five. However it could appoint five more Secretaries from among the British Citizens residing in U.A.R. after the approval of the competent authorities of U.A.R.

5) The head of the Commission as well as its members would enjoy the following exemptions and facilities:-

- a) Immunity against legal procedure.
- b) Exemption from customs in application of the stipulation of paragraph 5 Article 9 of the law No. 507/1955.
- c) Exemption of the salaries received by them from their Government from the taxes on profit mentioned in Part III of the law No. 14/1959 and consequently be exempted from the general tax on revenues mentioned in the law No. 99/1949.
- d) Exemption from residence regulation prescribed by the law No. 74/1952 in accordance with Article 19 paragraph 6 of this law.

A new diplomatic identification card will be issued to them by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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- 2 -

6) The Government of U.A.R. agree to accord the exceptions and facilities mentioned in No. 5 above to the French Commission of good offices.

7) The presence of these two commissions in the Egyptian region shall be temporary and would be limited to the termination of their mission.

8) The Embassy of Switzerland shall remain to be the protecting power in charge of British and French interests in U.A.R. and will stay to be the axis of communication between the two commissions and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

9) In application of the principle of reciprocity, the Government of U.A.R. reserves their rights to send to each of France and Great Britain a mission which would receive in both countries the same treatment and be accorded the same exceptions and facilities.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of Switzerland the assurances of their highest consideration.

Cairo, April 23, 1959.

To the Embassy of Switzerland,
Cairo.

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1960

EMBASSY DEPARTMENT

VG1051/68/G

U.A.R.

FROM Mr. Crowe (Cairo)
to Sir R. Stevens

SUBJECT:

Mr. Crowe's views on the present
state of Anglo/UAR relations.

TOP SECRET

Suggests that he should attempt
to meet Pres. NASSER.

No. u/u

Dated 27/6

Received 5/7/60

References

MINUTES

VG1018/24
25

Please see also Mr. Crowe's letter of July 5
in answer to Sir Roger Stevens' of June 30 (Flag B).

VG1016/12.

2. Mr. Crowe does not in fact dissent from Sir
Roger Stevens' analysis; he does not think that
the belief that we are engaged in subversive
activities aimed at disrupting the U.A.R. itself
plays a very large part in our relations.

VG 1051/81/6

(Printing Instructions)

3. What it boils down to is that Nasser has no
very great incentive to improve relations with us
substantially. He is no doubt obsessed with Israel.
He is probably quite happy to have no-one more
formidable than Mr. Crowe to deal with in Cairo
and to see our Embassy Residence still empty. He
can scarcely expect that our desire to improve
relations, which we have made very clear, will lead
us to abandon our positions in the Persian Gulf or
Jordan. Neither can he expect to influence our
policies in Africa, though he will hope to make
it more uncomfortable for us there. For our part we
have nothing very much more to offer. Our trade is
not likely to increase dramatically. The Egyptians are
admittedly keen to obtain consulates in Africa, and
some agreement on this may bring a useful further
improvement in relations, though it is not a really
major matter. For our part we still have considerable
hostages in Egypt in the shape of the Shell Company,
other surviving British businesses and a substantial
British community. Shell may well be a target for
nationalisation one of these days.

(Outward Action)

4. This all points to continuing our present policy;
coming to an agreement on consulates provided that we
get a reasonable quid pro quo; edging forward to the
exchange of Ambassadors which would give us more chance
of frank exchanges of views with Nasser himself; and
strengthening the links between the two countries by
exchanges in trade, education and technology. If we
were represented in Damascus and Alexandria and had
an Ambassador in Cairo by early next year we should be
in a fairly satisfactory position. Our relations
would be good enough: not to cause embarrassment to
other neighbouring countries, and not too good to
cause difficulties with e.g. King Hussein and the
Israelis. Thus our relations with the Egyptians would

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/be

(Action Completed)

(Main Indexed)

5/8

27/6

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be not too bad, and with the Israelis not too good. This would be a reasonable position to hold for some time in the absence of any major developments in the area which would involve changes.

5. I do not think there is anything in the idea of a deal as suggested in paragraph 8 of Mr. Crowe's letter of June 27. Nasser has already agreed, somewhat surprisingly, to stop arms smuggling to Aden. We may be able to induce the Egyptians to earn their consulate in East Africa by moderating their propaganda.

6. The point requiring decision is whether we authorise Mr. Crowe (his paras 12-14) to ask Heikal if an interview with the President could be arranged before he comes on leave. We have for a long time wanted to get Mr. Crowe in to see Nasser and it is satisfactory that he now feels able to try to do so. We should certainly encourage him and provide the necessary briefing in due course. He might also try to keep the way open for a second interview when he returns to Cairo at the end of his leave, having seen Ministers; we could perhaps cook up some sort of message for him to hand over.

R. Arculus
(R. Arculus)
July 7, 1960.

Mr. Bligh
Mr. Wright
Arabian Dept.
E. Dept.
African Dept.

minute
FD
July 8

Mr. Crowe, Cairo, to Mr. Beith July 5th.

M 4/8.

SECRET

enter soon Green

Va 1016/12

You may be interested to read before they are entered two long letters which I have received from Mr. Crowe to-day. One (Flag A) is in answer to my letter to him about Anglo-U.A.R. relations (Flag B); the other (Flag C) gives some indication of developments in the internal situation in Egypt which are quite new to us and are rather disturbing. I also attach copy of a short acknowledgment of the first letter which I have sent to Mr. Crowe by to-day's bag (Flag D).

Mr. Beith has seen these letters, so that when you have read them they could be sent to Levant Division for entry.

W.B. Stevens

June 30, 1960

Sir F. Hoyer Millar

*I'd like to see the
Beith's comments on the 2 letters. I
have thought it a good idea
for the Com to see the papers.*

*S.P. Sean nich
SECRET *ca**

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delay.

Adm.

30.6.

San P. - 540 PD
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5 JUL 1960
VG 1051/68/2

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,

CAIRO.

June 27, 1960.

My dear Roger,

VG 1051/60/K

Very many thanks for your letter of June 13 which raises fundamental questions about Anglo/U.A.R. relations to which we here have also been devoting a good deal of thought.

2. You ask whether any real improvement in Anglo/U.A.R. relations can be expected on the basis of the status quo. I would first of all push this question a bit further and ask whether we can expect to enjoy really good relations with the U.A.R. without modifying our existing positions and commitments in this part of the world. First of all, can Nasser, or indeed any nationalist regime in the U.A.R. or Egypt - and I think we must take it that any regime which might succeed Nasser would be likely to be just as if not more Arab nationalist than he - accept the United Kingdom's positions in the Gulf, in Oman, in Aden, or indeed in Libya or Jordan. We might get them to live with them in certain circumstances, but it seems to me that almost any nationalist Arab would be bound in due course to try to push us out of these positions, particularly when, as in the case of the Gulf, they are so extraordinarily lucrative. Nor do I see that there is much that we can do to make our positions acceptable to Arab nationalists short of putting them in jeopardy. That is not to say there may not be much we can do to strengthen our position in the Gulf by making it more acceptable, say, to world or local opinion; that is not my concern. My point is that I do not see Arab nationalist opinion being satisfied short of our departure.

3. At this point you may ask whether I am not confusing Nasserite Arab nationalism with other kinds of Arab nationalism. On this I can only say that any form of Arab nationalism - whether Nasserite, Iraqi, or what have you - which gained a position of predominance would be bound to oppose our position in the Gulf.

/4.

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,
Foreign Office.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

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TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

- 2 -

4. The second main factor is our commitment to Israel. So long as both sides continue to pursue their present policies our commitment to Israel is bound to lead us into difficulties with the U.A.R. They will not trust us and the degree of mistrust will vary directly in the degree that our relations with Israel are cordial and we supply them with arms. I need only refer you to Nasser's speech at Alexandria on June 24 (see our telegrams Numbers 512 and 513) - VG 1018/25

5. So much for the major factors. So long as these persist in their present form I do not see much prospect of our getting on to really cordial relations with the U.A.R. I do not attach too much importance to anti-Colonial propaganda against us. The U.A.R. is bound to be anti-Colonial; but propaganda can easily be made innocuous towards the recipient while the producer of it maintains his ideological position. Ingrained Egyptian suspicions of us would be difficult to eradicate, but, like you, I would not despair of this provided our interests did not otherwise conflict. In this connection it is difficult to blame the Egyptians for suspecting us in relation to Iraq, because if Iraq and the U.A.R. were really to unite or federate our position in the Persian Gulf would become extremely precarious.

6. The U.A.R. attitude towards us might, of course, change radically if some part of the Middle East or East Africa, say Iraq, and/or Yemen, and/or Somalia, were to go Communist or come under the control of the Soviet Union. In that case self-preservation might swing the neutralist pendulum strongly in the West's direction, and it might come our way too. But we cannot be sure of this. It is possible that the U.A.R. while improving relations with the West might trust to our allies' lack of sympathy for our position in, say, the Gulf to continue to attack

/us..

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

- 4 -

10. It boils down therefore to a question of peaceful co-existence, at a higher or lower temperature. At the moment the temperature is relatively low, but I think we should try to raise it and I think we could do so within the framework of the status quo. The better our relations the more we are likely to pick up useful tricks and the better placed to try to keep Nasser out of Soviet hands. In effect, this means pursuing the policy we are already following. We are conciliatory; we show the U.A.R. we accept their existence; we develop trade; we do not help the Israelis more than we are doing now and we are ready to exchange Ambassadors and Consulates when they are. In return we would like them also to help develop trade, to help on the points in your paragraph 2, to play down subversion and propaganda and to recognize we have a common interest in combatting communism.

11. Here we come to the question raised by your paragraphs 9 and 10; do we make a push to get this improvement or do we let things develop? In my letter of June 18 I was pretty discouraging and on reflexion I think we may have got slightly at cross purposes. I still think you should go on treating Khalil as you do and I am still of the opinion that an official push for closer contacts with ministers here would get a brush off. Nor can I see a U.K. official getting on to a good personal relationship with Nasser like Copeland's. But what I do think we might do is to have a push at my seeing Nasser. He is the man who matters, not his Ministers. We might be able, even if it came from a U.K. official, to start persuading him that we accept the U.A.R.'s existence and are not out to promote Israel, which could only be to the good. It will not be easy - it is not for nothing that practically every time Nasser opens his mouth he still refers to the way British Ambassadors used to make or unmake Egyptian Governments. Nor will even a friendly interview necessarily produce results - Copeland and other American contacts have not enabled the United States to be spared over the 'Cleopatra' or when Israel comes up. Nevertheless, I think we should have a shot because if we can overcome even some of Nasser's suspicions we might be able to obtain concrete benefits.

0015

Ray E

/12.

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TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

- 5 -

12. If you agree, I suggest that the way to go about it would be for me to ask Heikal if an interview could be arranged. I could say that I have been here for some time now, that I shall be going on leave and that it would be useful if I could take home to Ministers some direct impressions of Nasser's views (rather on the same basis as I saw Ali Sabri last year). If he agrees, well and good; if he does not, I do not think it will have done any harm to ask through Heikal, and a refusal in itself would be an indication of Nasser's state of mind. We would, of course, have to be prepared to agree that any meeting would be kept strictly secret unless of course Nasser were willing to let it be known that he had seen me, which I assume we would not mind.

13. As for the subject matter of the talk, I think it would have to be about Anglo/U.A.R. relations. I do not think it would be any use trying to talk about Africa or communism. They might come in as incidentals, but if Nasser were to agree to see me he would want to talk about Anglo/U.A.R. relations and that, after all, is what we really want to talk to him about.

14. I shall be glad if you will let me know what you think about this and, if you think it a good idea, for your instructions. I should need some pretty careful and specific briefing on a number of points, especially Jordan, Iraq and Libya and above all on arms for, and general policy towards, Israel.

15. It would be useful if we could make the right impression at this moment because it does look as though Nasser is in a very anti-Western mood at the moment and the internal situation is fairly critical. (We shall be reporting more fully on this). I have a hunch, it is no more than that for there is no hard evidence, that a tug of war is going on between the wilder doctrinaires and the pragmatists for the ear, perhaps indeed for the control, of Nasser. A reasonably friendly and helpful attitude from us and the West generally may have an influence on the outcome.

Yours etc.

C. T. Crowe

(C. T. CROWE)

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

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TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

VG1051/68G

June 30, 1960.

Many thanks for your Top Secret and Personal letter of June 27, which reaches me on the eve of my own departure on leave. I shall be away until the beginning of August, and ~~I am sending you these preliminary comments,~~ and this is really little more than an acknowledgement of your letter, to catch to-day's bag.

2. I notice you do not comment directly on one question raised in my letter, namely the part played in U.A.R. suspicions of us by the belief that we do not accept the U.A.R. status quo. In other words, that it is still part of our policy to undermine Nasser both in Egypt and Syria. (The point is of some current relevance in view of the slanging match which has developed in the last few days between Nasser and Hussein). I take it, however, from what you say in paragraph 7 of your letter about Syria and in paragraph 10 about showing the U.A.R. we accept their existence that you do not consider that this belief plays a very large part in current misunderstandings. If this assumption is wrong, perhaps you would let John Beith have your further thoughts on the subject.

/3. As regards your

C.T. Crowe, Esq., C.M.G.,
British Diplomatic Mission,
Cairo.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

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3. As regards your suggestion that you should try to arrange to see Nasser before you leave, my personal view is that you should certainly try to do so and also that, if you get an interview, the main subject of your discussion should be Anglo/U.A.R. relations. We will, however, let you have a considered view shortly and also send you the briefs you will require. Incidentally, as seen from here it would be desirable when speaking to Heikal about an interview to emphasise that you will be returning to Cairo after your leave in case there should be any doubt on this score arising from Paul Wright's appointment.

ROGER STEVENS

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TOP SECRET & PERSONAL



enter

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,
CAIRO.

July 5, 1960.

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My dear Sir,

V91051/68/9

In his Top Secret and Personal letter of June 30 about Anglo/U.A.R. relations Roger Stevens said that he took it that I did not think that the belief that it was still our policy to undermine Nasser both in Egypt and in Syria played a very large part in current misunderstandings.

2. I would put it slightly differently. To the extent that the Egyptians find that we do not, or cannot, do things they would like us to do for them, or where they suspect that we must be behind some anti-U.A.R. manifestation e.g. King Hussein, they tend to explain it by saying that we are opposed to Arab nationalism and therefore to the U.A.R. and must work against it. To that extent the point is fundamental and is almost an article of faith. On the other hand, the U.A.R. authorities cannot find any proper evidence that we are trying to undermine their position in either Egypt or Syria, (particularly not in the former) and to the extent therefore that they cannot find such evidence I do not think that a belief that we are engaged in subversive activities aimed at disrupting the U.A.R. itself does play a very large part in our relations here.

3. With reference to Roger's last sentence, I will certainly emphasise to Heikal that I shall be returning after my leave.

Yours ever,

C. T. Crowe

(C. T. Crowe)

J.G.S. Beith, Esq., C.M.G.,
Levant Department,
Foreign Office.

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

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VG1051/69.

Minutes

UNITED KINGDOM/UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

RELATIONS: CONSULATES.

(Cairo (ds. 508 & 509)).

At last we have a dispute with the Egyptians which they seem more anxious to solve than we. Our tactic of playing it slow has been right. We should not lose the advantage we have gained. (They have in fact made no concession of substance in asking for trade missions rather than consulates - either could harbour Egyptian Intelligence Service men.)

2. What is the Egyptian aim? (a) This seems to be a matter which Mourad Ghaleb is pushing, perhaps on his own initiative (he will not specify the posts he wants nor justify the previous Egyptian demands). Nasser may well have intervened so far only to veto our proposal to use our consular offices informally before there was mutual agreement on reopening consulates proper. There also seems to be a high-level directive to keep us out of Damascus.

(b) Ghaleb is certainly not motivated by a desire to improve U.K./U.A.R. relations but rather

- (i) to compete with Israel activity in Africa, especially in near-independent countries;
- (ii) to further anti-colonial activity in dependent territories; and
- (iii) probably to campaign against "imperialist" bases (in e.g. Aden, Singapore, Cyprus).

3. Mr. Crowe's proposed "bargain"

(a) Would it satisfy the Egyptians?

- (i) They are not likely to give much away for facilities in Cyprus and Nigeria which they will count on getting anyway on independence.
- (ii) Hong Kong cannot come very high on their list of priorities, and Singapore they could afford to wait for.
- (iii) The value of the package to them lies in what we might concede in East Africa.

(b) Can we in fact concede what Mr. Crowe suggests?

- (i) He is still proposing a "horse-trade" of the kind we hitherto

/disliked

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disliked because it departs from the principle of granting consular posts on a basis of genuine need;

(ii) The Colonial Office will presumably be less difficult over Cyprus now that progress has been made in the base negotiations. Nigeria really depends on the Nigerian Ministers who are evidently not keen on letting in the Egyptians (who for their part are trying to by-pass us by secret dealings direct with Nigerian leaders);

(iii) The Colonial Office are ready to concede Hong Kong if it is essential to gain us our posts in Damascus and Alexandria. They do not want to concede Singapore as well except for some good reason; and, if there are to be increasing difficulties over our base facilities there, they might well think it wiser to keep the Egyptians out;

(iv) The Governors of Kenya and Uganda will clearly fight very hard indeed to keep the Egyptians out (as their attitude to visa applications shows). In Tanganyika and Zanzibar there may be a degree less hostility. We have however already suggested that an Egyptian consulate might be made harmless by circumscribing its activities etc. and this has been rejected. We might explore the idea of a trade representative in the least delicate place (?Zanzibar) who could cover the rest of East Africa.

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4. What are our important requirements? These are not limited to the consulates. They are

- (a) the release of Mr. Zarb;
- (b) exchange of Ambassadors;
- (c) a post in Damascus (Alexandria is not essential);
- (d) more progress under the Financial Agreement; and
- (e) a diminution in U.A.R. anti-colonial activity.

Mr. Crowe's proposal would gain us only (c) and at the cost of increased opportunity for anti-colonial activity. The present deadlock may be retarding

/progress

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progress on (b), but concessions by us on consulates would not necessarily advance (b), let alone (a). (d) is rather separate.

5. The crux of the problem is really Africa. In general there have been signs that Nasser's influence has passed its zenith. The next year is critical for the development of Africa. The Nigerian example shows that emergent leaders of newly-independent countries may resist U.A.R. domination. It can be argued therefore that we should do well to keep the Egyptians out of Africa for the next year or so. Clearly we cannot expect them to behave better. The U.A.R. Mission in London, working with Fuad Galal who represents the U.A.R. at African conferences, are already engaged in covert anti-colonial activities. Arms smuggling to the Aden Protectorate is the only nefarious activity of which we have been able to accuse the U.A.R. openly so far, but they are certainly up to other mischief too. Cairo radio does not improve. An alternative line of argument is that we should let the Egyptians in and, as it were, give them enough rope to hang themselves.

6. It follows that if, in spite of the considerations in paragraph 5, we are prepared to risk letting them into East Africa on some basis, we should extract some really worth-while quid pro quo.

7. Possible courses of action:

(a) play it long i.e. Mr. Crowe would tell Ghaleb that his request cannot be considered in London unless the Egyptians specify the trade posts they want and the justification for them;

(b) make the condition that Mr. Zarb should first be released;

or (c) insist that this ^(quid pro quo) should be preceded by, or at least be linked with, the exchange of Ambassadors;

or (d) try to secure a diminution of anti-colonial activity (c.f. the Belgians who have persuaded the Egyptians to turn the heat off the Congo in their propaganda);

alternatively,

(e) indicate that a bargain on the lines suggested by Mr. Crowe is possible and find out what is the minimum concession needed on our part to get our posts in Damascus and Alexandria, in the hope that an agreement on this would help towards the attainment of our other objectives (paragraph 4). (Our previous experience is that if we make one agreement in the hope that something else will follow, we shall be disappointed.)

/8. In

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8. In any case we should first find out what flexibility there now is, if any, in the Colonial Office position. African Department, Southern Department, S.E.A.D., Arabian Department and Far Eastern Dept., might also redefine their attitudes towards U.A.R. presence in their areas of responsibility, in the light (especially in the case of Africa) of Mr. Grove's proposal and of the considerations set out above. Reports are now coming in from posts in Africa in response to our request for information on current U.A.R. activity, especially in Black Africa, which will be helpful in assessing the present threat to our interests.

9. The next step is a meeting with the Colonial Office (on Wednesday or Thursday this week, if possible); we will invite the Board of Trade who may be able to comment on the extent of legitimate Egyptian trade interests. Would the under-mentioned Departments please (a) minute their views and (b) say if they wish to attend the meeting.

R. Arculus
(R. Arculus)

June 27, 1960.

- African Dept.
- Arabian Dept.
- Southern Dept.
- S.E.A. Dept.
- F.E. Dept.

please pass by
timed box.

(Advance copies of this minute have been circulated to the above.)

*this will be
useful background
for your meeting* *Smith*
June 27

*This is a useful analysis.
I do not agree with some
of the tactical suggestions.
The basic point is that
Ministers want to try to establish
a basis for better relations*

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with Egypt. Air must be built on confidence. This question of Convolutes has become a test of confidence, we shall not get further eg. with the exchange of Ambassadors, till it is settled. But we are in no immediate hurry.

[Signature]
27/10

African Dept.

We have the impression that the Egyptian capacity for doing harm to our interests in Africa is not as great as it was two years or so ago. Certainly their effort no longer was in harness with the Soviet one. Despite the obvious connexion they do not seem to find W. Africa very fertile ground - the Nigerians in particular are wary of them and I agree that we should have little to lose by letting the Egyptians send an advance delegation to Lagos, if the Nigerian Ministers do not object.

on the one hand the Egyptians still seem to have ambitions ^{in East Africa} - though there also

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They have not made very striking progress.
I think we should only press the Colonial Office at the moment to agree to posts in Pongon, Zamzidar & Yagoda, Hadra or Amman, if there was some real prospect that the Egyptians would exercise their

option over Aden.
3. It should be stated to attend a meeting.
P. Beumont
27/6.

This concerns Arabian Department in respect of Kuwait and Aden. In neither case will a re-think produce a different answer from that previously given.

2. Kuwait is really no longer in our gift, quite apart from the fact that we do not wish to see a U.A.R. consul there.

3. Aden is of course a Colonial Office responsibility. It may be thought desirable to approach them again, but from a F.O. point of view there would also be disadvantage in the establishment of a U.A.R. consul in Aden who would undoubtedly do his utmost to muddy the waters of our improving relations with the Yemen. The possibilities for intrigue in the Yemen from Aden would be very great.

Arabian Dept.

[Signature]

(R.A. Beumont)
June 29, 1960

(received after 4.30 p.m. on June 28)

We have already commented on an advance copy. I do not think we need attend the meeting.

[Signature] 27/6
[Signature]

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Minutes

UAR Consultants

Southern Dept.

Before we agree to any Egyptian coming into Cyprus to pass the way for a diplomatic mission, we must consult the General and Mr. Amery, in order to be sure that they are satisfied from the point of view both of public security and the negotiations. However no comment. I agree that Cyprus is unlikely to be much of a bargaining counter.

J. D. James
27/6
15 27/6

Levant Dept.

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
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F.E. Dept.

If the Colonial office are really prepared to allow a VAO Comulati in Hong Kong (which sounds unlike them) F.E. Dept will not object.

[Signature]
27/6

Levant Dept



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Minutes.

Relations with the UAR

SEA Dept.

We are asked for our views on the paper below. Our only interest is whether we want the UAR to come into Singapore, & hence ^{further} into the area: & whether we want to attend a meeting on this. Fascinating as this is, I doubt if we are very much involved (the CRO & Co. are mainly interested): but I wd. suggest that we mention this at the meeting.

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Minutes.

meeting this week with
Lord Selkirk, & minute on
this paper later.

Nehic
27/6

J. H. ...
27/6

I do not think we want to
attend the meeting. As for the merits
of the proposal, the C.O. will decide. I
do not see any grave objection myself.
I doubt if the Egyptian would carry
much weight.

J. H. ... 28/6

Levant Dept

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UNITED KINGDOM/UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC RELATIONS: CONSULATES

Please see the comments of the other Departments concerned on Cairo telegrams Nos. 508 and 509 below.

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VG1057/69(A)

2. I have consulted the Board of Trade about (a) the extent of U.A.R. (and Israel) trade, particularly in East Africa, and (b) the possibility that the Egyptians might earn sterling by exporting to these British territories. The expert on Africa (Mr. Drukker) said he thought there was little or no Israel or Egyptian trade in East Africa. The Israelis were active in West Africa, not so much with exports as with aid for development programmes and technical advice (especially in Nigeria). Mr. Mackenzie said he thought it was conceivable that sales for cotton textiles and perhaps rice to East Africa could be developed. There might not be any surplus of cotton textiles for this at present, and in any case it would take some years to build up. It was not likely to help us much in our balance of trade with the U.A.R., and the Board of Trade would not wish to press it for this reason. It was primarily a matter for the Colonial Office and there might be import controls and other restrictions involved.

3. I also asked the Board of Trade how important it was to them that we should have a trade office in Damascus. They said that trade was doing pretty well in spite of the improvised nature of the present arrangements. They would certainly like to see a Trade Consul in Damascus, but would not press this if there were political reasons for going slow.

4. The present situation on Cyprus is that we acquiesced in the Colonial Office desire to keep the Egyptians out while the negotiations were in progress (VG 1061/12).

Flag A
VG1061/12

in Ghana

5. On Nigeria, we have informed Mr. Crowe of the report which has at last been received from Lagos, namely that there was no visa application by the U.A.R. Ambassador and five officials; the Ambassador did apply to pay a goodwill visit but was told that the Prime Minister was away from Lagos and a visit during Ramadan would have been inconvenient; a visa for Fouad Galal was granted, not refused. 6. As regards the visit of a circus troop to East Africa, Uganda and Kenya have refused, Tanganyika has agreed, and we are hoping that Zanzibar will also agree, but a telegram is awaited from the British Resident.

Flag B
VG1062/141

NB. Nigeria is very close to independence & we have handed these things over, to all intents.

R. Arculus
(R. Arculus)

June 30, 1960.

*to indicate
June 30*

*ell
30/vi*

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