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
CONFIDENTIAL

*M. A. ...*  
ENTER



BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,  
CAIRO.

March 21, 1960.



*My dear John,*

You will recall that when we discussed Consulates with Murad Ghaleb on March 17 you told him that there were certain general criteria which were usually followed in relation to the establishment of a Consulate in a particular place. These criteria were the extent of the interests of the country applying, the number of its citizens, the amount of its trade etc. Murad Ghaleb took this up and asked whether we wished to receive from the U.A.R. statements in justification of their claims to open Consulates where they had asked to do so. You indicated that this might help in our consideration of the matter and might enable the question to be prized out of the jam in which it now is. Ghaleb was clearly interested and indicated that he might follow this up with me in due course.

2. This letter is simply a note for the record. I will let you know if Ghaleb follows it up.

3. You will also recall that Ghaleb alleged that the Israelis not only have a Consulate in Nairobi, but also Trade Agencies in Tanganyika and Uganda. Can you find out if this is the case? He also asked whether we would see objection to the U.A.R. having Trade Agencies instead of Consulates.

*Yours ever,*

*C. T. Crowe*

(C. T. Crowe)

J.G.S. Beith, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Levant Department,  
Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

1000

V  
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT  
 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

V G 1051/45 ✓

FROM C.T. Crowe, Cairo  
 to Sir Roger Stevens  
 Secret  
 No.  
 Dated March 25<sup>th</sup>  
 Received March 28<sup>th</sup>

SUBJECT:  
 Mr. CRAWFORD's views on Egyptian suspicion of  
 Mr. activities in Syria and Beirut

References  
 7/42  
 6/31

MINUTES  
 This crossed our letter of March 23  
 at -137 below. We agree with Mr. Crowe  
 & will continue to do our best to deal  
 with allegations. I fear President planner  
 will continue for a very long time to think  
 we have a nest of spies & propagandists in  
 Beirut working against him. No reply  
 to Cairo is, I think, needed.

(Printing Instructions)

*Whitney*  
 30/3.

(Outward Action)

1 P. D. R. A. R. / i / i  
 J. R. D. (i) / i / i  
 P. S. D. (i) / i / i  
*Whitney*  
 31/3  
*ll*  
 3/3

(Action completed) (Main Indexed)  
 25- 25-  
 25- 25-

A). Mr. P. M. Dardaine, Beirut to Mr. J. J. J. Smith. April 2.

J-121 54817-2F

Mr. Smith will have disbursed this in  
 Cairo, I think.  
*Whitney*  
 11/4.  
 Vm; dit

Yrs; but to complete the picture in respect  
 edgy to present our letter to Cairn of March 23  
 at 137.

*W. Rottman*  
 12/12

13  
 April 12

Copy as indicated by Mr. Rottman.

12/14

V. Div.  
 action taken on 137

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*Euler*  
✓ *ll*  
*28/3*

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION

CAIRO.

March 25, 1960.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVE
28 MAR 1960
V9 1051/45

*By Dan Roper, V61051/42.*

Moore Crosthwaite has sent me a copy of his letter to you of March 10 about Egyptian suspicions of our activities in Beirut. I share Moore's indignation; indeed, I probably get a good deal more vexed than he does by arguing with people who do not, or affect not to, believe one's denials of any kind of activity by members of H.M. Embassy and others in support of the P.P.S. or other bodies.

2. The trouble is that these suspicions are a great deal more serious than tittle tattle. As such I believe one must try to smoke them out. It may be a losing battle, but if one can get the Egyptians to say exactly what they are suspicious about at any given moment one may be able to show their accusations to be erroneous and thus weaken belief in them. And even if one fails (and belief in the plotting capacity of the "British Intelligence" is almost bottomless) it is surely useful to us to know what the Egyptians are thinking.

3. The basic cause of these accusations is the Egyptian belief that British policy is fundamentally hostile to the only true version of Arab nationalism, i.e. Nasser's version. The Egyptians argue that Britain fears that the triumph of this nationalism will drive her interests and influence out of the Arab world. Therefore Britain cannot tolerate the success of the U.A.R., the principal achievement of Arab nationalism so far, and must be trying to counter-balance it by supporting its external enemies such as Qasim, and to undermine it by supporting its internal enemies such as the P.P.S. Credence is given to the latter point by the fact that Syria is the traditional Middle Eastern playground for intriguers. If, the Egyptians argue, the Israelis, the Turks, the Iraqis, the Jordanians and presumably the Russians, have agents in Syria, then why not the British? This line of argument is perfectly logical to the intelligence-ridden mentality of the U.A.R. It is also possible, I suppose, that adherents of the P.P.S. are claiming that they have British support simply in order to inflate their own importance. Against all this background H.M. Embassy, Beirut, is bound to be the target for suspicions of the kind.

/4.

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office.

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- 2 -

4. I do not need to tell you how infuriating this type of Egyptian argumentation can be, especially when it is accompanied by the smug statement that the interlocutor is not blaming us for following this policy of divide and rule: he would do the same in our place.

5. The danger is that this particular mythology is a political fact here. Mourad Ghaleb has complained to the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires of our hostility to Arab nationalism, and he referred darkly to our support of "certain organisations" when John Beith saw him. We can probably only overcome these suspicions in due course by the proof of our actions. Meanwhile, we must try to bring them out into the open as far as possible where we stand a better chance of demonstrating their absurdity. We shall undoubtedly hear some extremely unpalatable and offensive remarks. But it is perhaps better that we should know what is being thought and said rather than simply to dismiss suspicions of our good behaviour as intolerable.


6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Moore Crosthwaite.

*For com.*  
*Oliver*  
(C. T. Crowe)

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VR1052/26  
VR1052/30

When the U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires called on me on March 31 at my request he raised the question of the Ben Gurion visit. I again went over the ground with him, repeating to him, by reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 482 to Beirut and the record of Mr. Profumo's conversation of March 25 with the Lebanese Ambassador, what had already been said to the latter.

2. As regards the discussion of the Middle East at the Summit, Mr. Khalil said that the position of his Government was that they regarded Middle Eastern questions as matters falling within the concern and jurisdiction of the Governments of the area. They were not the concern of other powers and they did not think that other powers had any locus standi to interfere with their affairs, - this applied as much to the U.S.S.R. as to the West. I told Mr. Khalil that I was already very familiar with this point of view as a result of my period of service in Iran. We would certainly take full note of the attitudes of the Governments of the U.A.R. in the matter.

A Ambassador

3. As regards arms for Israel, Mr. Khalil did not ask me any direct questions. He appeared to have understood from the account which the Lebanese gave him of his conversation with Mr. Profumo that we would not be supplying any further arms to Israel as a result of the visits of Mr. Peres and Mr. Ben Gurion. He said, however, that he had found this rather difficult to reconcile with the answers given by Mr. Allan to Mr. Foot in the House of Commons on March 16. The text is as follows:-

VR1192/56

Mr. Foot asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what requests Her Majesty's Government have received for the sale or transfer of rockets or other arms to the Government of Israel.

Mr. R. Allan: In the view of Her Majesty's Government, as a matter of general principle, it is not in the public interest to disclose whether or not requests for arms have been received from foreign Governments, nor to state the extent, if any, to which particular requests will be met.

Mr. Foot: Will the Minister give an assurance that such requests as this would not in any circumstances be met before the House had had an opportunity of discussing the matter?

Mr. Allan: I could not give such a blanket assurance as that.

Mr. Foot: Why not?

-/After consulting

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After consulting this I explained to Mr. Khalil that the refusal to disclose what requests were made by foreign Governments was standard policy. I was sure that the Government of the U.A.R. would not wish us to disclose publicly any requests for arms which they made to us. Mr. Khalil nodded. As regards the second answer, namely Mr. Allan's refusal to give a blanket assurance, I told Mr. Khalil that the position was complicated by the fact that we were still fulfilling what we undertook to supply in 1958, and that any form of a blanket assurance was therefore inappropriate.

4. I then enlarged somewhat on the basic considerations which affected our arms policy in the Middle East. I quoted the figures of the heavy armaments we had supplied to Egypt and Israel respectively before 1955. I told Mr. Khalil that one of the elements of the problem which we naturally had to take into account were current reports that Egypt was receiving substantial quantities of MIG 19s from the U.S.S.R. He murmured something evasively to the effect that these had not yet been confirmed.

5. I then referred to the U.A.R. request made to Mr. Crowe last September (Cairo telegram No. 375 of September 4, 1959) for ammunition for 5.25 inch calibre guns for coastal defence. I told Mr. Khalil that we had expressed willingness to supply but had heard nothing more from the U.A.R. authorities. Meanwhile, we had been approached by a certain Mr. Vidler of 3 Golden Square, W.1. who claimed to be acting at the request of the U.A.R. Embassy in Madrid. His enquiries related to these 5.25 inch guns and other arms. We were uncertain what to make of this enquiry since we did not know whether or not Mr. Vidler was an authorised agent of the U.A.R. Government. Mr. Khalil undertook to find out. I told him that we would also be writing to Mr. Crowe.

VG 1192/20

6. Mr. Khalil asked me whether we had any news for him about a mission which might come here to discuss the question of old contracts, a subject which he had discussed with Mr. Crowe before his departure. In consultation with Mr. Rothnie, who joined us briefly at this point, I told Mr. Khalil that we were looking into the whole question but that it was a problem of setting our counter-claims against Egyptian claims and there were a number of matters which we had to straighten out before we could suggest to the U.A.R. Government what the terms of reference of the mission should be.

VG

7. I told Mr. Khalil that shortly before he arrived I had heard that B.O.A.C. were encountering difficulties about desequestration. There was a risk that if they did not succeed in being properly desequestered very

/soon

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soon they might have to delay the start of their Cairo service scheduled for April 10. I added that there had been no time for me to brief myself in detail on this question but that having mentioned it in general terms I would follow it up immediately with a letter to him setting out the full facts.

8. Finally, I raised with Mr. Khalil the question of Consular activities at Alexandria and Damascus on the basis of Cairo telegrams Nos. 279-281. In particular I said that I was sorry to think that the U.A.R. Government might believe that through being disobliging over this question it could bring pressure on us over the wider question of the opening of Consulates which, in our view, was a separate matter. We were concerned with trying to find practical solutions to day-to-day questions. If we did not do so the effect on our relations might be adverse. It did not seem probable, and I was speaking on the basis of what I myself had heard in Berne, that the Swiss would carry on for a further period, nor could we really reasonably expect them to do so.

9. Mr. Khalil did not attempt to conceal that in the mind of his Government the two questions were closely connected and that their refusal to allow members of the Cairo mission to operate officially in Alexandria and Damascus was the direct result of our refusal to agree to the Consulates they had asked for. He made it equally clear that they regarded their request as a ~~singular~~ whole and were not prepared to bargain ~~over~~ individual posts. He said that it was a matter of confidence. Their request was the acid test of our confidence in them. If we did not trust them to behave in East Africa how could they be expected to trust us?

10. I told him that we viewed this problem once again from a practical point of view. In Alexandria and Damascus, particularly the former, we had practical requirements. I was quite prepared to believe that they had one of the same kind in Liverpool. In the case of the East African territories it was much harder to see what practical need their Consulates would serve. We had no evidence of any large number of U.A.R. citizens in these territories. He must put himself in the position of our colonial governors, who could see no practical reasons for the U.A.R. request and whose views on U.A.R. policies and intentions were based largely on what they heard over Cairo radio. Against this background it was very difficult to believe that the U.A.R. authorities did not have some sinister motive in insisting on the opening of Consulates in East Africa. Personally I should be delighted if they could satisfy us that they had no such motive. I would certainly be only too ready to listen to anything he had to say. In reply Mr. Khalil argued that the U.A.R.

/was anxious

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was anxious to develop trade with East Africa. This was a practical consideration. As for Cairo radio, he thought our fears were exaggerated. It was, of course, an Arab article of faith that they should stand for the independence and self-determination of dependent peoples. They had not failed to observe that we were moving along this road in Africa and to applaud the fact. These were the principles which were enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and to which he knew we subscribed. He could not see why Cairo's insistence on these principles should be given such a sinister interpretation. Finally, he pointed out that these territories were colonies under U.K. jurisdiction and it should, therefore, be possible for us to ensure that we knew what Egyptian Consuls were up to and thus satisfy ourselves that their presence was in no sense an embarrassment to us.

11. I told Mr. Khalil that this might well be the case and that if we were to find that their activities were as innocent as he suggested this would naturally mark a great advance in the growth of confidence between us. Meanwhile, however, the necessary confidence simply did not exist. I must again draw his attention to Cairo radio, which I thought was to a considerable extent to blame. My impression was that it by no means confined itself to generalities as he had suggested. I would see if I could find some examples of the sort of thing which disturbed us. If so I would show them to him.

12. Mr. Khalil ended our conversation on this subject by saying that according to his information Mr. Crowe had had a conversation with Heikal on this subject within the last few days. I said that we had not yet had a report on this conversation but would certainly study it when we received one.

13. In addition to the above I also discussed with Mr. Khalil the U.A.R. attitude on the Law of the Sea, the U.A.R. candidacy for the Security Council at the end of the Tunisian term (December 31, 1960) and a question relating to tax exemption on funds remitted to Israel. I am minuting separately on these subjects

14. ~~one~~ Conversation with Mr. Khalil takes a long time and he was with me for an hour and forty minutes. But he is beginning to relax and I have the impression that he is honest, industrious, intelligent and capable of absorbing a valid argument, and that he will report faithfully to his Government. I am copying this record to Mr. Crowe.

 ROGER STEVENS

Levant Department

April 1, 1960.

copy to:- Mr. Profumo

SECRET

<p style="font-size: 2em; text-align: center;">1960</p>	<p style="font-size: 3em; margin: 0;">V</p> <p>LEVANT DEPARTMENT</p> <hr/> <p>UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.</p>	<p style="font-size: 3em; margin: 0;">V</p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em;">G. 1051/48. ✓</p>
<p>FROM Mr. J. L. McDermott, P.O.M.E.F. to Sir Roger Stammers</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Secret.</p> <p>No. 102/27. Dated March 21. Received April 6.</p>	<p>SUBJECT:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>MR. McDERMOTT'S visit to Leiria - main points arising out of his visit.</u></p>	
<p>References</p> <p style="text-align: center;">-126.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">MINUTES</p> <p>There is little that is new here. The point made in para. 6 is valid in other under-developed countries where leaders like to see roads, bridges, silos, factories etc. as an obvious symbol of their achievements.</p>	
<p>(Printing Instructions)</p>	<p>2. on the last part of para. 7, we see little prospect of doing a deal with the Rumanians over access for Egypt etc., nor of an improvement in Israel / Soviet etc relations.</p>	
<p>(Outward Action)</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 50px;"> <i>Whites</i>              - 7/4.         </p> <p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 100px;"> <i>Mr. Macleary</i> 24/4.         </p> <p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 150px;"> <i>Mr. Butt</i> 12/4  <i>Mr. Day</i> 21/4  <i>Brigadier Cunningham</i> 20/4         </p>	
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>JLB</i></p>	<p>(Main Indexed)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>JLB</i> 24. 5.61</p>	<p style="text-align: right; margin-right: 50px;"> <i>Mr. Butt</i> 12/4  <i>Mr. Day</i> 21/4  <i>Brigadier Cunningham</i> 20/4         </p>
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


Political Office with the  
Middle East Forces,  
EPISKOPI.

*Levant Dept.*

*Handwritten initials and date: 5/4*

March 31, 1960



SECRET

*My dear Roger,*

I think that my recent visit to Egypt was useful. It was the first visit by a representative of the Joint Headquarters here since the time of the Suez campaign; and it enabled me both to give Colin Crowe and his colleagues an idea of the thinking and atmosphere here, and similarly to report to my colleagues on my return. I got back in time for Lord Mountbatten's visit, and he and his retinue were in the audience when I made my report. The main points which, I hope, might be of interest to you were as follows. I will not bore you with accounts of the differences I observed since I was last in Egypt at the Embassy in 1947.

2. I had not realised quite how rough a time our mission in Cairo had had since their arrival there. Crowe explained to me that even now he is not in a position to see Nasser or his senior Ministers, and that consequently he was not able to answer questions I put to him regarding such matters as the degree, effectiveness, and popularity of Russian training of the U.A.R. armed forces. In fact it is quite clear that we have much more information here, from secret and other sources, on the U.A.R. in general than our mission have in Cairo. Nevertheless, we could always do with more, and not least on Syria. Crowe explained that they had only started political reporting last month, and kindly agreed to copy and repeat to POMEF more of their reports in future. I should be grateful if the Foreign Office would do the same: despatch no.34 of February 2<sup>nd</sup> received in print a few days ago, is a case in point.

*To Cairo,*

3. I was able to reassure Crowe on two points about life here: first, that we are not a pack of "wog-bashers" eager for another go at Nasser; and secondly, that I have never seen a plan of any type based on collaboration with Israel, even in global war. I also said that if he should in due course receive requests from us for help over planning (a) evacuation of British and friendly nationals and (b) psychological warfare in war, he must not be alarmed, as these are routine matters on which we are instructed by London to prepare plans.

4. I had good talks with the Canadian and United States Ambassadors and members of their staffs, and also with General Gyani, who was on a visit to Cairo. These discussions mainly emphasised how much of U.A.R. policy depends on Nasser's personal whim. Here again, we seem to receive in POMEF a good flow of information on his probable policy and intentions, and as you certainly do I will not take up your time with the report that I made on general political questions to my colleagues. The consensus of opinion in Cairo on military matters was that military security was strict and effective inside the U.A.R.; that U.A.R. officers seem to be of no higher quality than before; and that Nasser still lacked confidence vis-a-vis of Israel in the military sphere.

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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5. I remarked to <sup>my colleagues</sup> ~~them~~ that as I motored along the Canal and elsewhere I realised for the first time how true was Nasser's repugnant claim to have won a great victory at Suez. I saw about twenty ships sailing in an orderly manner along the Canal, under about ten different flags. The main roads seem to be kept in first-class order; the cities are kept surprisingly clean. Conspicuous and efficient-looking factories, built by Czechoslovaks and so on, are going up on the outskirts of Cairo. For a man with little real power behind him Nasser seems to be playing off East against West pretty successfully. But of course it is open to the Soviet Government to change its policy of aid to him, or reduce the quantity, and this would hit him hard.

6. On the question of the standard of living of the people it seemed to me - and I am not sure that I have seen the point made in quite this way before - that Nasser is not really interested in it as such. The vast majority live in the old filthy and totally unhygienic conditions, and I have not heard that a serious effort is being made to cope with bilharzia and the other traditional diseases - let alone, of course, over-population. There are still numerous beggars everywhere. When a quite good-looking block of workers' flats was put up in Cairo it was, so I was told, provided with no water or sanitary devices. When a neat-looking little village was built to house people who were to move from their filthy dwellings at Luxor because of further diggings, several of the new houses, built with mud, were so badly made that they developed large cracks before they could be put to use. It seems to me, therefore, that Nasser's first interest is a degree of industrialisation for prestige purposes; the raising of the standard of living of a small proportion of Egyptians which will result from it appears to be only an incidental interest.

7. I had not realised quite to what extent Nasser concentrated power in his own hands, partly because he cannot trust even his closest advisers to keep up the momentum or to steer some of their friends clear of corruption. A sign of authoritarianism is the highly arbitrary and annoying postal censorship. I was told that the criticism of the régime by some of the old politicians and richer people was fairly free, and I certainly got it from one or two of the guides who led me around places of interest. I was able to pass on to my colleagues Crowe's useful observation that, while we should certainly not under-estimate Nasser, we sometimes fell into the error of over-estimating him. If - and it is admittedly a big "if" - he could be more or less contained for, say, the next ten years, the situation could become considerably easier. Clearly an agreement between the West and the Communists to limit arms supplies to the Middle East would be a great help in this connexion; as would also any rapprochement between the Communist states and Israel.

8. I am sending a copy of this letter to Crowe.

*Yours ever,*  
*Geoffrey McDermott.*  
(L. McDermott)

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LEVANT  
~~ARABIA~~

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5 APR 1968  
VG 1051/32

Anglo/Israel/U.A.R. relations

*may?*

The Permanent Under-Secretary will have seen our telegram

Flag A No. 25 to Bogota describing the exchanges we have already had  
VG 1051/32 with the Egyptians on this subject. Since then we have had  
Mr. Ben Gurion's visit which in itself has set us back  
considerably in our relations with the U.A.R. A record of Mr.

Flag B. Ben Gurion's talk with the Prime Minister is attached.

VR 1052/21 G 2. We have carefully considered Mr. Ben Gurion's various  
requests and our tentative conclusions are conveniently set

Flag C. out in Foreign Office telegram to Washington No. 1356 *Savin*

VR 1192/15 G We now await the Americans' views.

3. Consulates in the U.A.R.

Nasser's irritation over Ben Gurion's visit seems to have  
led directly to an unfavourable decision on consulates. Mr. Crowe  
has been told that our proposals for running Alexandria and  
Damascus by remote control from Cairo are unacceptable, and  
consular work outside the Cairo district must cease. We may  
however carry out essential services to British subjects in  
Alexandria from a hotel or private house. Mr. Crowe is at  
present considering urgently how to carry on, assuming that  
the Swiss do nothing for us after the deadline of March 31.

4. There is also a potential troublemaker over 1914/18  
war graves in an I.W.G.C. cemetery at Minya near Cairo; though  
the Municipal authorities have acted incorrectly, the Commission  
have agreed to move the graves to Cairo to facilitate a town  
development scheme at Minya. If this were to leak out it could  
make a sensational story here like the "Moorhouse Museum" affair.  
The question has been submitted to Ministers and we are considering  
with Cairo and the Commission how to minimise the risk of trouble.

5. A propaganda war between Jordan and the U.A.R. looked  
serious but has now subsided. We have done our best in Amman  
to urge restraint on King Hussein who was exposing himself in his  
attacks on Nasser. The point seems to have gone home and the

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/heat

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heat has gone out of the exchanges, at least for the present. On the other hand, the Jordanians say they have arrested a Palestinian sent in by Jordanian émigrés in Damascus with the object of murdering Sherif Nasser (cousin of the King) and the Prime Minister; the Jordanians think that the Syrians must have backed this and that it proves that the U.A.R. are still trying to assassinate Jordanian leaders. Hussein has now gone off on a trip to Morocco and Nasser to India and Pakistan so we can hope for a quiet time.

March 29, 1960.

*Almm*  
—  
34

SECRET

<h1>V</h1> <p>LEVANT DEPARTMENT</p>		<h1>V</h1> <p>91051/60</p>
<p>FROM C.T. Crowe, Cairo to JAS. Beith</p> <p>Confidential</p> <p>No. 1045/60</p> <p>Dated April 7th</p> <p>Received April 14th</p>		<p>SUBJECT:</p> <p><u>ANGLO-U.A.R. Relations</u></p> <p>Mr. Tony PARSON'S conversation with SAAD AFRA - British policy in the Middle East - MUSA SABRI Ben Gurion's visit to London</p>
References	MINUTES	
(Printing Instructions)	<p>Para. 2 is encouraging. As regards X in para. 3 we sent instructions to Mr. Crowe on March 3 (F.O. rel. no. 267 - Flag A) &amp; March 16 (F.O. rel. no. 321 - Flag B) to forestall criticism. The Egyptians worked themselves into a hysterical state over his visit, largely because of (as they saw it) the suspicious concatenation of Tripartite Declaration P.Q., Mr. Pers' &amp; Mr. Ben Gurion's visits, the P.M.'s conversations with President de Gaulle (sic) in Paris etc. They seem to have got over it now, to some extent at least.</p> <p>2. Mr. Allan might like to see the reference to Mr. Healey (para. 4) in view of the ministerial interest in his visit to the</p>	
(Outward Action)		
(Action completed)	(Male Indexed)	<p>J152 55427-1c</p> <p>M.F. <u>M. Healey</u> 13/4.</p> <p>Mr. MacCleary first.</p> <p>Musa Sabri</p>

When Selvin's statement that House feels we "pulled a fast one on him" over Ben-Gurion's visit is absurd. He knew that Ben-Gurion was visiting the United States, and he should have realized that Ben-Gurion would visit London on his return journey. His meeting with the Prime Minister was only to be expected.

S. G. C. 14/4.

We were quite right not to take much Egyptian illumination too seriously.

J. R. P. 19/4.

Saad Agra is a tough guy and a realist (I called on him when in Cairo). His views are interesting.

M. R. A. Agran  
 ✓ to see 01.25.41ae.

L. H. B. 19  
 Apr 19

has seen  
 10/27/4

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~  
 M. R. A. Agran

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*Sw. R. [Signature]* ✓

1045/60.

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,

CAIRO.

April 7, 1960.

11 APR 1960

*My dear John,*

V91061/50

Tony Parsons has had two mildly interesting conversations recently about Anglo-U.A.R. relations, with Saad Afra, the Director-General of the Information Department, and with Musa Sabri, one of the editors of El Gumhouria and a close friend of Salah Salem.

2. Saad Afra said that he was sure the Conservative Government had abandoned their pre-Suez policy in the Middle East. He quite understood that Mr. Macmillan could not avoid supporting Sir Anthony Eden in public and that no politician could be expected to admit openly that his party's policy had ever been wrong. Nevertheless, Mr. Macmillan's actions showed that there had been a change of heart and policy. Mr. Macmillan had clearly realised how lucky Britain had been to get away with the Jordan operation in 1958, and it was now obvious that Britain would never again use force in the Middle East. As regards public opinion, Saad Afra said that he realised that nothing could be done about the British right-wing press, but that this did not bother him.

3. Musa Sabri discussed the recent crisis in Anglo-U.A.R. relations. He said that he did not believe that there had been a serious or permanent deterioration. Nasser had simply behaved as one would expect him to. His main personal characteristic was extreme sensitivity and he always reacted whenever he thought his prestige was in danger or that he had been deceived. Nasser was not hostile to the West and H.M.G. could avoid periodical squalls if they treated him really frankly. For example, Nasser considered that we had pulled a fast one on him over Ben Gurion's visit to London. If Nasser had been told in advance of this visit, before there had been any press publicity, and had been told openly what our attitude would be to Ben Gurion's demands, there would probably have been no attacks on us and no press campaign. H.M.G. must realise that whether they liked it or not, Nasser was the most important figure in the Arab world, and they must treat with him accordingly regardless of his deficiencies.

4. Saad Afra's remarks are, I think, rather encouraging, and in his position, he can be regarded to some extent as a barometer of U.A.R. views. On this occasion, however, I gather that he was to a great extent reflecting what Denis Healey had said to him about an hour before his conversation with Parsons. Nevertheless, it is interesting that he should have trotted it all out again as his own views. There is also a lot in what Musa Sabri said.

*Yours,*  
(C. T. Crowe) *[Signature]*

J.G.S. Beith, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Levant Department,  
Foreign Office.

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES 10 MAR 1960 6/1051/39
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U.A.R.

Mr. Bassiouny, (Second Secretary, called to see me at his request this afternoon, and immediately launched into a discussion on Israel.

2. He said this was an extremely sensitive subject in Cairo, and he could say from his experience in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there that the greatest attention was paid to statements from this side. An unfortunate impression had been given by the number of unpleasant things which seemed to have cropped up at this present time of tension with Israel. There was the Prime Minister's statement that he was proud to have been associated with Sir Anthony Eden; the recent statements about the Tripartite Declaration; the references yesterday by an Admiralty spokesman to U.A.R. submarines as if they were Russian ones; the absence of any comment in London critical of Israel over the border incident for which she had been ~~condemned~~ blamed; and now the series of visits by Israel personalities - Mr. Peres, Mr. Ben Gurion, Moshe Dayan.

3. Clearly it was the visit of Mr. Peres which worried him principally, and he said they had information that we had supplied submarines, torpedo boats, anti-aircraft and 3 inch guns to the Israelis, and they wanted to know what the "new agreement" would cover. I said on this that I had nothing to add to what Sir Roger Stevens had said to the U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires yesterday. In general I was sure that we did not want to add to tension in the Middle East by supplying arms in major quantities. At the end of the interview Mr. Bassiouny reverted to this subject and asked if when there was some agreement the U.A.R. could be informed of what we were going to supply.

4. I denied that there was any significance in the visits of Israel personalities, or in the timing of them, or that we were showing any partiality towards Israel. On the contrary I thought the Israelis had been suffering disappointments and frustration recently. I gave examples of the passage of the I.B.R.D. loan, emphasizing that we had gone along with the Bank in approving it, and the "Astypalea".

5. I said that I thought we had already made adequate explanations about the Tripartite Declaration, but I went over with Mr. Bassiouny what the Secretary of State had said in the House yesterday, and told him that the Secretary of State's aim was to polish this off once and for all. I said I thought that members of the U.A.R. Mission ought to go to the House and find out for themselves how situations of this kind arose, and how it was sometimes impossible to fob off questions with the sort of answer which we should prefer to give. I said I thought that if they did this they would understand how for example the Prime Minister's remark the other day came to be made. On the Admiralty statement to which he took exception, I said that as a matter of fact it had not been cleared with us and was certainly not to be taken as a political statement. To regard submarines which the Russians have supplied to the U.A.R. as being part of the Russian submarine availability in the area was a military man's way of looking at it.

6. We talked a little about the possibilities of a Palestine settlement, and I quoted what the Secretary of State had said

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to the U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires on this subject. On the Arab League meeting, Mr. Bassiouni put the blame on the Jordanians who blocked agreement by insisting on King Hussein's plans. Mr. Bassiouni asked whether I thought there would be a meeting of the Security Council. I referred him to the answer given by the Secretary of State in the House yesterday to the effect that tension had lessened, and said that I understood that Mr. Hammarskjöld had also said that a meeting of the Security Council was not necessary. I asked if the U.A.R. would propose a meeting and he said not.

7. Mr. Bassiouni asked me about the situation in Iraq, and I quoted suitably from F.O. telegram No. 691 to Ankara, which described steps recently taken by Qasim and apparently designed to weaken the position of the Communists and left-wingers.

  
(R. Arculus)  
March 8, 1960.

*Mr. Arculus spoke well.*

*llp*  
*9/3*

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4 MAR 1960  
VG 1501/40

CONFIDENTIAL

Message for President Nasser

Flag A  
VG 1051/8

Flag B  
VG 1057/16

In January we were worried about the slow workings of the Financial Agreement and, arguing that the only way effectively to speed things up was to get at President Nasser, consulted Mr. Crowe on the difficult question of how a mere Chargé d'Affaires could gain access to him. Mr. Crowe replied that he liked our idea of his giving President Nasser a message from the Prime Minister after the latter's tour of Africa, with his views on development in Africa (paragraph 8 of his letter of January 18 to Sir Roger Stevens). He thought the discussion in the interview might cover thoughts about the Summit.

2. The question is whether we now seek to draft some sort of message. As far as the Financial Agreement is concerned, Sir George Rendel has now gone out to Cairo to see what can be done to speed things up and we should, I think, await his return. On the general front our relations with the U.A.R. have undoubtedly suffered a setback in recent weeks as a result of Parliamentary discussion of the Tripartite Declaration and events concerning Israel which have caused suspicion and irritation in Cairo, and angry outbursts from President Nasser which are more than mere propaganda. In these circumstances it would obviously be more difficult for Mr. Crowe to get access to the President.

3. On the other hand we have to recognise that if we delay sending a message, the Prime Minister's visit to Africa will lose its topicality as a peg on which to hang the approach. However, the African Department are not at all keen on the idea of an exchange of views on Africa at the present time. They say that whereas we could point to developments in West Africa it would be difficult for us to give any precise indications of our aims or timetable for East Africa, and particularly tricky to talk about e.g. Nyasaland or Kenya.

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(There may be trouble in Nyasaland when Dr. Banda is released). If we merely concentrated on the parts of Africa which we are willing to talk about, we could hardly avoid questions on those parts which we are not.

4. A possible alternative, with some topicality, would be to send a message about the Summit. Western Department see various objections to this. There is no precedent for it. Even NATO is sketchily informed about summitry. Moreover until after the Western Foreign Ministers' Conference in mid-April we do not really know where we stand. At the very least we would have to consult the Americans before talking to the U.A.R.

5. It is difficult to think of any other suitable major topic. Our consultation in May 1959 on arms for Iraq was a success, but there is hardly enough material at present for a message from the Prime Minister. The Permanent Under-Secretary and the U.A.R. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs are both touring South America, but this would hardly be adequate. Neither would South East Asian affairs. Relations with the Soviet bloc is another major topic of concern to both of us in different ways, but it would be difficult to use as a peg for this exercise.

6. I suppose it would be possible to do a short but wide survey of world affairs, which would enable us to select aspects of African policy about which we have no inhibitions, to say something brief about the Summit, and about the Middle East, and any other topics in the news at the time. This might give enough substance for a message, though Mr. Crowe might be rather exposed in any discussion arising from it. It would not be an easy exercise and hardly striking enough for our first rencontre with President Nasser.

/7.

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7. On balance therefore I do not think we can profitably proceed with this idea at present.

*A.K. Rothnie*

(A.K. Rothnie)  
March 9, 1960.

Copy

Mr. Profumo  
African Dept.  
Western Dept.

*I agree, but think we might explain our difficulties briefly to Mr. Crane.*

*Dkt. to Cairo.*

*AK*

*AK*  
1973.

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

March 11, 1960.

Now that the Prime Minister has returned from Africa, we have been giving some further thought to the idea of your attempting to give President Nasser a message from the Prime Minister with his views on developments in Africa (para. 8 of your letter 09/55 of January 18). You also suggested that the discussion might cover the Prime Minister's thoughts about the Summit.

2. In so far as our immediate concern to gain access to Nasser was to be able to broach among other things the problems of the Financial Agreement, I think we should await Sir George Rendel's return before seeing what needs to be done on that front.

3. Generally, our relations with the U.A.R. have obviously suffered a setback, which we hope will only be temporary, as a result of the recent controversy over Israel. You will have seen from the various records of conversation that members of the U.A.R. Mission here have been attacking us simultaneously at different levels and with some degree of heat. The angry outbursts from President Nasser seem to be more than mere propaganda, and all this makes it difficult at the moment to think of obtaining access to him.

4. One can argue that if we did not act now, or very soon, the Prime Minister's visit to Africa would have lost its topicality. However, there are, on examination, difficulties about using this as a theme. Whereas we could point to developments in West Africa it would be difficult for us to give any precise indications of our aims or timetable for East Africa and particularly tricky to talk about e.g. Nyasaland or Kenya. The Summit is also a difficult topic. We do not usually take countries outside NATO into our confidence, and in any case it is difficult to know what to say at least until after the Western Foreign Ministers' Conference next month. We cannot think of any other suitable major topic. Neither Iraq nor South America (where the Permanent Under-Secretary and Zulficar Sabri are both touring) seem adequate. South East Asia will hardly do. Relations with the Soviet Bloc concern us both, but could not very well be the subject of a message. It would be possible to draft a short but wide survey of world affairs (selective comments on Africa, Summit and the Middle East, and anything else topical), but this might expose you to a range of difficult questions in discussion and would hardly be striking enough to justify access.

5. Unless, therefore, you have any new ideas to suggest, I doubt whether we can at present usefully pursue this. We can revive it again as soon as the prospects improve.

(A.V. Rothnie)

J.T. Crowe, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Cairo.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(1045/60)

Seen.  
9 entries open.  
8.6.60



BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,  
CAIRO.  
March 28, 1960.

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= 4 APR 1960  
VG 1051/40(a)

My dear Mr.,

VG 1051/40

Thank you for your letter of March 11 about the idea of giving President Nasser a message from the Prime Minister on developments in Africa etc.

2. I agree that there is no point in pursuing this idea at present. The subjects which might be discussed would be too artificial to be of value. Any interview with Nasser in present circumstances would almost certainly degenerate into a blast from him about British support for Israel, to which we would have to reply. This might be useful in due course to clear the air but we are not ready for it and, in any case, it would be a very different exercise from what we had in mind.

3. We might revert to the subject again when the situation improves.

*Yours ever*  
C. T. Crowe  
*C. T. Crowe*

A.K. Rothnie, Esq.,  
Levant Department,  
Foreign Office.

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o.841.GB.Eg.02.-

Le Département Politique Fédéral a l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique, qu'en date du 1er mars 1960, l'Ambassade de Suisse au Caire a informé le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères qu'elle cessera son activité en matière de sauvegarde des intérêts britanniques sur l'ensemble du territoire de la République Arabe Unie à la date du 31 mars 1960.

./.  
L'Ambassade de Sa Majesté voudra bien trouver, sous ce pli, copie de la note remise par M. l'Ambassadeur Pahud à l'Ambassadeur Mourad Ghaleb, sous-secrétaire d'Etat au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.


Le Département saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté l'assurance de sa haute considération.

Berne, le 10 mars 1960.

1 annexe

A l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique

B e r n e



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14/3.

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BRITISH EMBASSY  
BEIRUT  
March 10, 1960

Would you please refer to Colin Crowe's letter 1878/60 of March 4 to John Beith and his letter of March 5 to you on Egyptian complaints about the activities of this Embassy.

VG 1051/10/59 -  
P10034/1

2. As Crowe was authorized to tell Heikal "categorically and in complete good faith" at the end of last year (Foreign Office telegram No. 457 of November 6 to Cairo), it is simply untrue that we are financing the Parti Populaire Syrien or indeed have any contact with them. When I spoke to Brown of the Daily Mail about Nasser's remarks to him (Kit Barclay's letter 16713/11/60 of February 18 to Paul Wright) I told him of the accusations made against us last autumn in this connexion and said that I assumed that this old canard was what Nasser had in mind. The denial is as true now as it was when the Foreign Office telegraphed to Cairo in November, and it has been true ever since I got here in October 1958, a few days after President Chehab assumed office. Surely, in view of their own activities here towards the end of the Chamoun regime, it is unnecessary to go back further than that with the U.A.R. authorities.

3. It is not true that everything is known in Beirut; everything is the subject of gossip and speculation, but that is not the same thing. A perfect example of this is provided by Heikal's remarks about Maroun Arab. Arab has worked for the government so long and has so many contacts here that he has come in this myth-loving society to be regarded as the Embassy's éminence grise. In fact he has absolutely nothing to do with information work, local or regional; in particular he has no dealings with newspapers. As far as anti-U.A.R. propaganda, one could, I suppose, hardly open one's mouth on any Middle Eastern question without exposing oneself to that charge from the faithful. But I am quite sure that Arab has been very discreet. Stories about his diabolical activities, which were at their height when I got here, became fewer and fewer and I cannot remember a single instance in the last few months. It seems to me almost intolerable that when Nasser himself is stumping Syria with anti-British speeches, individual members of the Embassy staff here should be singled out for attack. However, moral indignation does not get one anywhere. The line I took at the time when Arab was under fire here was that I was responsible for the conduct of British affairs in the Lebanon, and that if Her Majesty's Government thought that I could not keep members of the Embassy staff in order, they would send out someone else who could. This seemed to go down quite well, and I suggest that Crowe try it out if he is treated to any more impertinent tittle-tattle about Arab's alleged iniquities.

4. Nor do the Information Services here go in for any anti-U.A.R. propaganda. Transmission "X", whose main purpose of course is anti-Communist, carries occasional refutations of some of the more outrageous lies in the U.A.R. broadcasting services about H.M.G. I understand that the Regional

/Information

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,  
FOREIGN OFFICE,  
S.W.1.

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Information Office sometimes make discreet use of these, but that by and large it is their practice to ignore the stream of lies put out against us, and to concentrate on "projecting" British achievements and views. Of Nasser's innumerable targets, I wonder if there is another so long-suffering.

5. Now for anti-Communism. You may remember the letter I sent you when Nasser first openly attacked Communism late in 1958 (1051/11/58 of December 27, 1958), and that my advice was to keep out of the quarrel. Among other things I said:-

V107H/B

"4. In the first place, it seems to me that the quarrel is most likely to go further and deeper if we lie low. The more obvious the pleasure shown by the West, the more reluctant Nasser will surely be to push matters, and the more openly we draw the moral that it was imprudent of him to flirt with the Soviet Government in the first place, the more he will be driven to justifying his past policy. There can be nothing but disadvantage in further arguments now over Israel, arms supplies, the withdrawal of aid from the High Dam project, the Baghdad Pact, the Eisenhower Doctrine etc."

You will also remember my advice that we should keep out of the row between Nasser and Qassem. In both cases as it happened, my suggestions fitted in with what you were thinking in London, and these are the policies which the Information Officers have followed here. They have continued to try to inform people about the dangers of Communism, but have always borne in mind the Iraqi complication and the desirability of avoiding just those reactions to which Heikal has given expression. There has been no gloating over the past. They have been very careful in their use of "X" material. In the Aside series they have, particularly since the P.P.S. accusations, concentrated on anti-Communist comment by the pro-Nasser press. Conceivably it is just this that has annoyed Heikal, since it may make him uncomfortable to hear quotations from his own press on the B.B.C. But short of absolute silence it is hard to see how this difficulty can be got round.

6. I cannot, however, help wondering whether what is at the bottom of these accusations may not be Nasser's dislike of the freedom (which I must say often crosses the border into licence) with which he is criticised by a section of the Lebanese press and public, and his reluctance to believe that such criticism can be spontaneous. If this is so, we cannot expect to get very far by trying to refute any particular mis-statements made to us about this Embassy's activities. Be that as it may, we shall gladly give John Beith any help we can in briefing himself against his visit to Cairo.

7. I am sending Colin Crowe a copy of this letter.

SECRET

<h1>1960</h1>	<h1>V</h1>	<h1>V</h1>
	LEVANT DEPARTMENT UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	

FROM Mr. D. G. Crowe, Cairo  
to Sir Roger Stevens.  
Secret and Personal.

No.  
Dated March 5.  
Received March 7.

SUBJECT:

U.K. - U.A.R. relations  
MR. CROWE'S conversation with HEIKAL - imperialist intrigues against Syria - activities of our Embassy in Beirut.

References

-/35  
VR 1072/16.

MINUTES

see also -/35 below.

(Printing Instructions)  
150926

(Outward Action)  
Dft) Mr. C. F. Crowe Cairo  
from Mr. Rothwell March 23<sup>rd</sup>  
cc) Chancery, Beirut.  
C.F.C./M.C.

We have already made denials about the PPS. We know too well the disadvantages of Mr. Marwan Arife. As regards para. 4, we deliberately avoided crowing over the resumption of diplomatic relations. And on relations with the Soviet bloc our line is to let the Arabs pick out for themselves and point the moral to brutality.

2. Of course the U.A.R. expose themselves to in quopie since they are appointing well-known experts in subversion to their staff in London (I have in mind an expert in his field for Canberra). And their anti-British propaganda is still quite uninhibited.

(Action completed) 25.3.60	(Main Indexed) 28/8/61
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J152 55427-1c 3. However, we should be grateful as a first step for the comments of

*I.P.D. Have our propagandists in the field been overdoing it?*

*Roberts*

*I.P. Dept. / finr*

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There has been no anti-Nasser propaganda on our part in the last nine months. The U.A.R. authorities could be assured of this. (But we should consult I.R.D. and P.U.S.D. first).

2. On the other hand, Transmission "X" has rebutted the lies of Cairo Radio from time to time and we have even placed articles in the Lebanese press (but not many) putting the British point of view. I am not aware of anything else. This may be anti-Egyptian by definition. I do not think it can reasonably be called "overdoing" it, however, and would regard our effort as erring if anything on the side of mildness (but that is doubtless an occupational disease).

3. The propaganda battle in the Middle East is not going very well for the Egyptians just now and they naturally seek excuses. Their propaganda people, who must earn their keep like everyone else, are no doubt looking for alibis too. Moreover, I suspect that our general level of activity if not anti-Egyptian activity, is higher and more apparent. In Beirut everyone bribes the Press and the Egyptians may be mixing up some of our work with that of the Iraqis, Germans, Russians, Chinese and others. Dr. Hill's famous broadcast about "nailing the lie" must have contributed to this effect. This concatenation of circumstances is ~~enough~~ enough to explain the Egyptians' complaints.

4. Now clearly there is no point in our annoying the Egyptians unless it pays us a commensurate dividend, but it seems that merely to be in the business of propaganda in the Middle East entails annoying the Egyptians by being in a field which they regard as their exclusive property. Presumably it is in our interests on balance to stay in business and we can afford the luxury of not pleasing Nasser.

*D.A. Roberts*

(D. A. Roberts)  
March 10, 1960.

*M. Wright: crucial*

*I.R.D. Please comment first*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECRET

*Minutes*

I confirm that there has been no anti-Nasser propaganda originating from I.R.D.

2. Transmission 'X', in pursuing its function of correcting Cairo Radio's inaccuracies, has of course criticised some Egyptian emigre proteges, (e.g. Adenis, Omanis and Africans) who enjoy the use of Egyptian propaganda facilities. In its function of countering communist propaganda it rightly and frequently deals with the dangers of Soviet aid. It has also been more than fair in publicising Egyptian anti-communist pronouncements; but Heikal may regard such support as contaminating.

3. It is not surprising that our anti-communist propaganda embarrasses the Egyptians, since it also refutes their repeated charge of Anglo-Communist collusion; but Heikal's remarks in paragraph 4 are rather interesting when seen against the approach made by the pro-Egyptian journalists in Beirut last October suggesting co-operation. We have not heard how this developed.

*J.O. Wright*

(J.O. Wright)  
March 17, 1960.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*below*

*See now -/42 - Beirut  
have done most of the work  
for us. And Mr. Beith will  
have discussed. Perhaps a  
letter is needed to tidy it all  
up - a false can, incidentally,  
of the point on B 1571/1 attached.*

*Flag A.*

*Att.*

*Alhulub*  
2/3

SECRET

*24/3  
Arabian Dept. 99*

*22E*

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SECRET & PERSONAL

ENTER. ✓

RECEIVED IN A	BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION, CAIRO.
9 MAR 1960	March 5, 1960.
49103/37.	

*My dear Roger,*

In my talk with Heikal to-day I said that I had seen how President Nasser constantly referred to "imperialist" intrigues against Syria and had indicated elsewhere his suspicion of our activities and particularly of those of H.M. Embassy in Beirut: what was it all about and what evidence did they have? Could we not bring this into the open?

2. Heikal replied that there were two aspects to the matter. First, there was the Parti Populaire Syrien. They knew the Bagdad Pact countries and the U.K. had financed the P.P.S. and supplied it with arms from Iraq and Turkey in 1957 and early 1958. The party could not operate on its own and when therefore it became active it must be receiving support from abroad.

3. Secondly, there was Mr. Maroun Arab of H.M. Embassy in Beirut. He handed out money to various papers in Beirut - there was nothing to that, everyone did, including the Egyptians - but he also spread a good deal of anti-U.A.R. propaganda. Beirut was a wide open city, everybody was in the pay of everybody else and everything was known.

4. I said that the former accusation seemed very unlikely. I did, however, know that we did a certain amount of anti-Communist propaganda; surely this did not worry the U.A.R. Heikal replied that it severely embarrassed them. They were fighting an all-out battle against Communism and articles about the dangers of the arms deal with Russia, or on the disadvantages of positive neutralism as opposed to working with the West, did not help. Nor was it useful to be told, on the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.K., that at last the U.A.R. had seen the light and co-operation with the West was the right line to follow.

5. At that point the telephone interrupted us and the subject changed after that, but I do not think Heikal had more to say and I was spared having to comment. I will not do so here because I want to catch the bag. I have already written to John Beith about this so he can brief himself before he gets here.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter to John in Beirut and, of course, to Moore-Crosthwaite as well. It would be useful if we could nail down some of these suspicions while the former is here.

*Yours ever,  
G. T. Crowe,  
(G. T. Crowe)*

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office.

SECRET & PERSONAL

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SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

(VG 1051/37)

March 23, 1960.

*Dear Colin*

I am not sure whether you will be expecting a reply to your Secret and Personal letter of March 5 to Roger Stevens about your talk with Heikal on that date, since you will by now have discussed it all with John Beith, who briefed himself before leaving here and will have had further discussions in Beirut. You will also have seen Moore Crosthwaite's letter to Roger Stevens of March 10 (who had the copy intended for you, and presumes you had the original), with which we agree.

2. You could at your discretion repeat the denial about the Parti Populaire Syrien which you made before, and say that it is still valid. As regards the points in your paragraph 4, you could say that on the re-establishment of diplomatic relations we were very careful to avoid embarrassing the United Arab Republic in our presentation here, and far from representing it as a triumph for western diplomacy were very much on the defensive in Parliament. On anti-communism, you might say that we do not believe in pointing the moral, but in letting people find out for themselves the disadvantages of dealing with communists; we do however put out factual material. In this connexion, you might express surprise at the rather offensive phrase "Anglo-communists" which has come into President Nasser's recent speeches. Finally, you could deny that we have been conducting any sort of anti-Nasser propoganda.

--- 3. As a titbit I enclose a particularly fantastic piece of invention about Oman on the part of Damascus Radio on March 9, which you might use.

*Yours ever,*

*Alan Rothnie*

(A. K. Rothnie)

C. T. Crowe, Esq., C.M.G.,  
CAIRO.

SECRET





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that a Security Council meeting might be useful but ~~that~~ we doubted whether it would in fact help. We knew that the U.S. Government had been helpful in calming down unnecessary suspicion on either side. We hoped that points of friction could gradually be removed. One such was the inability of cargoes to and from Israel to pass through the Canal even under the provisional arrangements thought out by the Secretary-General. Later I said how useful it would be if those arrangements could be made to work. At this stage of the conversation Mr. Mufti, rightly or wrongly, gave a rather plaintive impression and seemed to suggest that his Government were worried about what we and other Western powers might do. It would almost seem as if Nasser has been mesmerised by recent references to the Tripartite Declaration.

7. I told Mr. Mufti that we wanted peace and stability. We wanted to build up relations of confidence with the U.A.R. and to help where we could in solving Middle East difficulties without pushing ourselves forward.

8. I introduced Mr. Mufti to Mr. Rothnie. He wanted to deal with the Department on a question of civil aviation and I said that we hoped to be in close touch with the Mission on any matters of mutual interest even though I should myself be away for three weeks.

Copy to Mr Croft

John Beith

(J. G. S. Beith)  
March 7, 1960.

ll.  
8/3.

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