

14/05/13

Conf.

Minutes

Please see Sir Humphrey Trevelyan's letter of January 22 attached, about U.A.R. Consulates in the Gulf. Eastern Department agree that Sir Humphrey Trevelyan should keep out of this, but that we should put him fully in the picture. Arabian Department say that they hope that the Ruler of Kuwait has set aside, at least for the present, any idea of further foreign consular representation in Kuwait.

2. I submit a draft telegram to Baghdad cleared with Arabian Department, on the lines discussed with Eastern Department.

3. After action Arabian Department might possibly like to consider whether it would be useful to tell Mr. Richmond what passed between Jawad and Sir Humphrey. If the Ruler were to accept an Egyptian Consul he would have indignant Iraqis and Iranians on his doorstep and in fact create in his own backyard a splendid inter-Arab quarrel.

4. What the Egyptians said about Kuwait is in Cairo file no. 600.

Flag A

*R. Arculus*  
(R. Arculus)

January 27, 1960.

Mr. Richmond has the point in para 3 above well in mind, but it would do no harm to send him a copy of the Baghdad letter and my telegram in reply.

*A.R. Walsley*  
26/1

*John Birch*

Jan 26

*ll*  
26/1

Levant Dept  
for action.

Pse copy F.O. file 226 to Baghdad, of the letter to which it refers, to Mr. Richmond at Kuwait. 26/1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

V. Dir.

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(1061/1/60)

*A new twist!  
Sir H.P. should know better than A!*



BRITISH EMBASSY,

BAGHDAD. *Mr Peilin*

January 22, 1960. *WJ*

CONFIDENTIAL

*Dear Roger,*

On January 20 Hashim Jawad showed some anxiety that we might allow Consulates of the U.A.R. in the Gulf as part of a general bargain over Consulates subsequently to the resumption of diplomatic relations with the U.A.R. This rumour has of course been going round for some time and I have always denied it. On this occasion I told Jawad that I thought it was quite out of the question that we should allow U.A.R. Consulates in the Gulf, that he need have no fear of this and that I thought that if the U.A.R. were demanding them, we should prefer to do without Consulates elsewhere rather than agree. I should be grateful for information by telegram which I can pass on to Jawad at my next meeting with him.

I am copying this letter to George Middleton, Colin Crowe and the Chancery in Washington.

*Yours ever.*

*Hamphrey Jellicoe*

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BAGHDAD

Cypher/OTP and by bag

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

No. 226

January 26, 1960

D. 8.40 p.m. January 26, 1960

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Baghdad telegram No. 226 of January 26

Repeated for information Saving to Bahrain No. 21

Cairo No. 74

Washington No. 356

Your letter 1064/1/60 of January 2 to Sir Roger Stevens [U.A.R. Consulates in the Gulf].

We are negotiating with the Egyptians over the reopening of our old Consular posts, particularly Damascus and Alexandria. We attach considerable importance to the letter. The Egyptians <sup>former</sup> produced an ambitious opening bid including Aden, posts in East Africa, Hong Kong and Singapore. They also said they would be approaching the Ruler direct about a Consulate in Kuwait. Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo said this would raise difficulties. It is in fact a matter which we intend to let the Ruler decide, but he is aware of our views on the complications and disadvantages which would arise were he to admit foreign consulates and in particular Egyptians (or Iraqis). The Egyptians have not asked for any other Gulf posts. It seems likely that we may be the end have to offer the Egyptians a new post in order to get Damascus back ourselves, and this might be Hong Kong, if the Colonial Office agree.

2. The foregoing is strictly for your own information. We should prefer you not to discuss the subject further with Jawad. If you have to say something it might be merely that we hope to open our former consular posts in the U.A.R. according as the need develops and subject of course to U.A.R. agreement and that U.A.R. posts in the Gulf were not under discussion between us.

DISTRIBUTED TO:

Levant Department

Eastern Department

Arabian Department

TTTTT

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BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,

CAIRO.

January 22, 1960.

392/60)

*To dear John,*

*VA105/14*

Consulates

*VG1051/12*

The latest developments since my telegram No.30 are as follows:

- (a) When the Swiss Ambassador was seeing Murad Ghaleb on January 21 about some other matter, the latter brought up the question of Consulates. He asked whether the Swiss were still acting for us in Damascus and how much work was involved. Pahud naturally replied in the affirmative and said they had only a small staff. He added that they were also acting for us in Alexandria. Ghaleb then said he was afraid that they would have to go on acting for us for a long time. When Pahud asked whether it would not be at least possible to exchange Consulates in metropolitan territories, Ghaleb replied that the U.A.R. were not really interested in Liverpool.
- (b) At a party I gave last night Geoffrey Arthur was taken into a corner by Matar, the Head of the Consular Department, who lectured him about this question. He concentrated almost entirely on Kuwait. The burden of his argument was that there were 20,000 U.A.R. nationals (many of them Syrians) in Kuwait, which was more than all the British subjects in the whole of the U.A.R. We claimed we needed Consulates on purely practical grounds because of the amount of consular work to be done. We could hardly deny that the U.A.R.'s case on practical grounds was just as strong. He brushed aside Geoffrey's statement that this was a matter for the Ruler. Geoffrey went on to say that other countries did not have Consulates in Kuwait, which was met by the reply that the Americans had one. To the remark that others, Iran for instance, had equal claim to be represented in Kuwait, yet were not, Matar replied that if the Iranians and others had Consular interests, he saw no reason why they too should not have Consuls. We need not fear a U.A.R. Consul: he would be far too busy with his genuine Consular work to have time for mischief. Matar added that we were entirely mistaken if we thought that the policy of exclusion was the best way to maintain our position in the Persian Gulf.

*The number of U.A.R. nationals in Kuwait is 20,000 - 25,000*

/2.

J.G.S. Beith, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Levant Department,  
Foreign Office.

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- 2 -

2. Matar spoke more in sorrow than in anger. He sincerely desired to improve relations with the U.K. where he had spent some of the best years of his life; but if we made no effort to meet them, or to show any confidence in them, relations were bound to stay bad. Geoffrey tried to draw the conversation away from Kuwait by referring to Aden and East Africa, where the U.A.R. radio stations and the lack of genuine consular interests give us easier ground for argument. But Matar did not seem interested in justifying the Egyptian case in those countries; he kept reverting to Kuwait. He did, however, deny, with great emphasis and conviction, that the Voice of Free Africa came from Cairo.

3. I am not at all clear where we go next on all this. We may, or may not, hear from Ghaleb shortly in reply to the representations reported in my telegram No. 23. and I suppose we may get some answer from Singapore or Hong Kong as to whether they can accept a U.A.R. Consulate. I fear, however, that unless we are careful we are going to run into a tiresome deadlock. It may then be best to play the hand long as you suggest. There is generally a lot to be said for not trying to hustle the Egyptians. Much depends on how much they fear our presence in Damascus politically over against the probable Syrian desire for us to be represented on grounds of prestige and convenience. Ghaleb's concentration on Damascus to Pahud suggests the former is dominant at present. (If so, my previous assessment seems to have been wrong). Again, how badly do they want Kuwait, Aden etc? I should say they do want Kuwait, probably do not expect to get Aden, but certainly want some African post for prestige and information reasons. They want to show they are a Power in Africa.

4. On the other hand, we shall probably have to do a horse trade at some stage and it might be worth making up our minds what sort of deal would suit us if there were a nibble from the U.A.R. Moreover, it would be a pity if the Ruler decided to let them into Kuwait (I do not know how likely this is) with no quid pro quo for us. What about Alexandria and Damascus against Liverpool? The U.A.R. attitude may be 'no Kuwait, no Damascus', in which case I presume we stick at Alexandria against Liverpool. But if not, can we have another shot at Nairobi? (I do not, incidentally think that the idea of a local British subject acting for the Egyptians is a starter). If we could throw in Hong Kong and/or Singapore, it would, of course, be even better. I cannot see that the Egyptians can do any harm in either of these places and it is not true to say, as Hong Kong imply, that Egyptian policy is aligned with that of the Soviet Bloc.

5. The above is by way of thinking out loud and I am not ready to make any recommendations, yet, but perhaps you will consider these points and, unless I hear from Ghaleb in the next week, will let me have some fresh instructions on what we ought to do next.

/6.

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- 3 -

6. It would be nice if you could give me some effective ammunition to counter Matar's points over Kuwait. Are his figures for U.A.R. nationals there greatly exaggerated? And are other foreign communities larger?

I am sending copies of this letter to Kuwait, Bahrain, Tehran, Beirut and Washington.

*Yours ever,*


*C. T. Crowe*

(C. T. Crowe)

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U. A. R. - CONSULATES

VG1051/18(A)  
Flag A

Flag B  
VG1051/14  
Flag C

VG1051/12

Flag D  
VG1051/19.

Flag A  
VG1051/18(A)

VG1051/18.

Flag E  
VG1051/12.

Please see Cairo telegram No. 94 in reply to Mr. Beith's letter of January 29. Our telegram No. 116, to which Mr. Crowe refers, was a suggestion by Sir G. Rendel that Mr. Tollinton (H.M. Consul-General in Alexandria designate) might be sent out to join Mr. Crowe's staff in Cairo. Mr. Crosthwaite's views on Damascus are in his letter of February 5.

2. Mr. Crowe is certainly right in assuming that we could not take over responsibilities from the Swiss throughout the U.A.R. and do all our business from Cairo, without Egyptian concurrence. We had not thought that the Egyptians would necessarily turn down such an arrangement out of hand. In view of Mr. Crowe's attitude I think it is clear that he should be instructed to act as proposed in paragraph 5 of his telegram, as a first step.

3. I do not think we can forearm him with arguments to meet the various possible Egyptian replies. Our object should be to see how much ground they may be prepared to give and calculate our next move accordingly. One possibility might well be to try to divorce the question of Alexandria from the much more difficult one (for the Egyptians) of Damascus. We could usefully ask Mr. Crowe for his views on this.

4. I submit a draft telegram on lines discussed with Consular Department.

5. Meanwhile we have had answers about U.A.R. posts in Hong Kong and Singapore. Lord Perth is

/prepared,

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prepared, provided we are satisfied that a U.A.R. Consulate in Hong Kong would not promote Communist activities, to agree, if it is necessary as an inducement to get the posts we need in the U.A.R. Lord Selkirk would offer Singapore if it would be "valuable as a bargaining counter", though "by normal criteria there is no existing justification" and there would be a slight risk of mischiefmaking. Singapore Ministers have yet to be consulted.

3  
 V61051/5.  
 Flag F

*A.K. Rottnie*

(A.K. Rottnie)  
 February 8, 1960.

Copy

Mr. Profumo  
 Sir G. Rendel  
 Head of Consular Dept.  
 Head of E. and O. Dept.  
 Head of Personnel Dept.

However desirable it may be from the political point of view to get someone to Damascus soon, it is really more important from the practical point of view and from the angle of protecting British interests in general, to get the Consulate-General at Alexandria re-opened with the minimum delay. I think it is pretty obvious too that just as we are suspicious of the Egyptians over their desire to establish Consulates in various parts of Africa, so the Egyptians are suspicious of our anxiety to get back into Syria. That being so and given the slow rate at which Anglo-Egyptian relations are improving, I doubt if we shall achieve much if we continue to couple Alexandria and Damascus together. I am inclined to think that before long, we shall have to concentrate on Alexandria and hope that we shall be able to get Damascus later on when, as a result perhaps of the exchange of Ambassadors, the Egyptians are no longer so suspicious of us.

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2. We have not got to this stage yet and Mr. Crowe should certainly make one more effort to get the Egyptians to agree to our present proposals. But it would be useful to know what he thinks of this idea of concentrating on Alexandria. The draft telegram asks him this question.

*F. H. ...*  
February 9, 1960

*Tom ...*  
 I got a reply with ...  
 F. H. ...  
 9/2

V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

V 6 1051/21.

FROM Sir W. Montagu P. M. A. Geneva.

Individual

No. 13.

Dated 14 January 1918.

Received 14 January 1918.

References

1051/18.

V 6 1051/18

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

1/21/18  
 2/21/18  
 1/21/18  
 2/21/18

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

2/21/18  
 2/21/18

-123.

SUBJECT: ...

1. K. - 1. A. 2. ...  
 Subordinate and Sir Roger Stevens called on the President - not interests in Alexandria and Damascus - Swiss suggest end of month in London

MINUTES

Repeated telegraphically to Cairo. Copies by bag sent to Cairo & Beirut.

This fits in well with our latest instructions to Mr. Crowe (P.O. Ref. no. 142 - V 6 1051/18 - Flag A). In responding to our suggestion of splitting Alexandria & Damascus he can take account of these Swiss views (which are more helpful & realistic than their previous statement that they did not want to represent to the Egyptians the anomalies of the present position, which they were content to see endure "indefinitely"). We can await Mr. Crowe's views.

2. If Mr. Crosswait has anything to say on the latter part of para. 3 (Damascus), he has the opportunity to elip in.

Mr. Tollicton to see. 16/2. 1/22/2. 16/2. 1/23 days.

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FROM BEIRUT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Va051/21.

Cypher/OTP

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Sir W. Montagu Pollock

No. 35  
February 12, 1960

D. 4.56 p.m. February 12, 1960  
R. 5.50 p.m. February 12, 1960

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 35 of February 12.  
Reputed for information to Cairo.

Your telegram No. 51 (not to Cairo) ✓ V1015/6.

Following from Sir R. Stevens.

The Ambassador and I called on the President this morning and subsequently had discussions with the Under-Secretary concerned. To both I expressed your warm appreciation of the manner in which the Swiss had looked after our interests.

2. Petitpierre told us that the Swiss authorities were now considering how long they could continue to look after our interests in Alexandria and Damascus and we discussed this subsequently with de Rham. He explained that the Swiss were thinking of suggesting to us a dead line for the end of March, and he suggested that, so long as they carried on, the U.A.R. Authorities would be less inclined to meet United Kingdom requirements as regards consulates.

3. De Rham took the view that it was not for the Swiss Ambassador in Cairo to convey any Swiss decision to the U.A.R. Authorities, now that we had full diplomatic relations. I asked him if he would see any objection to our informing the U.A.R. Authorities, at a time of our own choice, that we understood the Swiss would not continue after the end of March. De Rham said that this would not in any way misinterpret the Swiss position and that he thought it would be to our advantage to do so. He thought this might well bring the U.A.R. Authorities round over Alexandria. He agreed that they would show themselves much more difficult over Damascus; but work in Damascus was limited, and in fact if necessary the Swiss Consulate General there could probably continue to help us out on an informal basis if we could not cover it from Beirut.

/4.

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Berne telegram No. 35 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

4. Obviously we cannot expect the Swiss to continue indefinitely and it might be advisable to make use of their anxiety to withdraw at the present juncture of our discussions with the U.A.R. Authorities about consulates.

Foreign Office pass Cairo as my telegram No. 6.

[Repetition to Cairo referred for departmental decision]

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Sir G. Rendel  
Consular Department  
Personnel Department  
Establishment and Organisation Department

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BERNE

Cypher/OTP and By Bag

DEPARTMENTAL

DISTRIBUTION

No. 68

February 24, 1960

D. 9.10 p.m. February 24, 1960

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Berne telegram No. 68 of February 24.  
Repeated for information Saving to Cairo No. 153  
Beirut No. 81

Your telegram No. 35 [of February 12: Consulates in the U.A.R.].

The Swiss Ambassador saw the Permanent Under Secretary on February 19 and said that his Government had decided they must ask to be relieved of their responsibility for looking after our Consular affairs in the U.A.R. as from March 31. The Permanent Under Secretary explained that we would now be satisfied if as a first step we could reopen in Alexandria, leaving Damascus until later on. We thought it might encourage the Egyptians to get a move on about the reopening of Consulates if the Swiss Government were now to make an official communication in Cairo explaining that they could not carry on after the end of March. M. Daeniker said he thought this was a good idea and he would telegraph to Berne suggesting that the necessary instructions be sent to the Swiss Embassy in Cairo. Please take whatever supporting action you can to ensure that this is done, and that Mr. Crowe is kept informed.

2. The Ambassador also suggested that Mr. Crowe should now be instructed to take some kind of initiative vis-a-vis his Swiss colleague - i.e. to say that he would be prepared to take over these Consular duties as from April 1. The Permanent Under Secretary said that it would be difficult for Mr. Crowe to say this now because we do not know where we stand with the Egyptians on the question of principle and some kind of ad hoc arrangements from Cairo might be necessary; but doubtless Mr. Crowe would be in close touch with his Swiss colleague.

3. I realize that the Swiss Government consider that the Consular work they do for us is a matter between them and us, not between them and the U.A.R. Government; and there is logic

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/in

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Foreign Office telegram No. 66 to Berne

- 2 -

in this view. Since however their work necessarily brings them into contact with the local authorities in this connexion, they surely have some locus standi. Moreover an approach from them might enable the U.A.R. Government to recede from their present position, at least in respect of interim practical arrangements, without appearing to make a concession to us.

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Conference and Supply Department  
Security Department  
Sir G. Rendel

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FROM BERNE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

✓  
20 FEB 1960  
VG1051/21 (A)

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Sir W. Montagu Pollock

No. 44  
February 25, 1960

D. 4.20 p.m. February 25, 1960  
R. 4.47 p.m. February 25, 1960

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 44 of February 25.

Repeated for information Saving to Cairo  
Beirut  
Your telegram No. 68. ✓ VG1051/21.

Action taken. The Swiss will telegraph this evening to Cairo in the sense you desire but suggest that we take nothing for granted until they have Pahud's reactions. They will ask him to keep Crowe informed.

2. Please telegraph to Cairo if necessary.

Foreign Office pass Cairo and Beirut as my Saving telegrams Nos. 1 and 1 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

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Sir G. Rendel

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20 FEB 1960  
V61051/21 (A)

The Swiss Ambassador called on me on February 23. I told him of the action we had taken on his call on the Permanent Under Secretary on February 19 and I gave him an account of my own conversations in Berne. He confirmed that he had telegraphed to Berne as stated in Foreign Office telegram No. 68, and said that he had not yet had any reply.

V61051/21

ROGER STEVENS

February 25, 1960.

V61051/21(A)

On seeing Berne tel: 44 I telephoned to M. Daeniker, who, on the strength of yesterday's conversation was about to send another tel. to Berne. (He is being as helpful as possible over this). He will now hold his hand.

Levant Dept. Feb 26

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2672 12/13



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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

✓  
6105/17.  
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Mr. Crowe

No. 118

February 16, 1960

R. 3.45 p.m. February 16, 1960

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

✓6105/18  
Your telegram No. 142: Consulates.

I saw Murad Ghaleb, Under Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 14. I asked whether he had anything to tell me as a result of our previous discussion. The Swiss were anxious to be relieved and the position was anomalous. Murad Ghaleb replied that in the U.A.R. view, we should leave matters as they stand, i.e. we should have a Consulate in Cairo and then one in London.[groups omitted] in their intentions so they felt that the only thing to do was to leave matters over until we were able to develop sufficient confidence. He then referred to the fact that we had even refused a visa for a trip to Nairobi for the Counsellor of U.A.R. Embassy in Addis Ababa, who moreover had spent some years in London (your telegram 50 to Addis Ababa refers). It was a matter of confidence not (repeat not) of bargaining; the U.A.R. did not (repeat not) wish to trade one post against another.

2. He made no (repeat no) comment when I referred to the danger of publicity about this difference between us and the possible freezing of our positions. As far as the Swiss were concerned, he referred to the conversation he had held with Swiss Ambassador, reported in paragraph 1(a) of my letter to Beith of January 22.

3. He reverted to the question of confidence between us and asked what harm we thought that U.A.R. Consuls could do. I went over some of the points that I had made in my previous interview, to which he replied that there were some people in the / U.A.R.

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Cairo telegram No. 118 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

U.A.R. Government who thought that we would intrigue and do harm to them in Aleppo and Damascus and Suez, but U.A.R. thought that they could take a chance on that.

4. He then went on to speak in more general terms, that U.A.R. were not (repeat not) attempting to drive United Kingdom out of the Middle East. They knew the importance of oil to us and that we had to have it. He said that they had made this clear, even to the most extreme of the Iraqi nationalists, and that it was accepted by them. U.A.R. was a small country dependent upon a balance between the Great Powers. If the United Kingdom lost its interest in the Middle East this would upset the balance and they would be in danger of being swallowed by the other side.

5. He went on to say that events were moving in Africa and many countries were gaining their independence. (He could not (repeat not) help adding that this was done without any Egyptian influence). The U.A.R. as a country in Africa was closely concerned in African developments. They were concerned that if there were not (repeat not) orderly developments towards independence, leadership would fall to the extreme nationalists and the Communists with a consequent threat to the whole continent.

Foreign Office please repeat to Berne.

[Repeated as requested].

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AMENDMENT SLIP

VG 105/aa

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Cairo telegram No. 118 of February 16 to Foreign Office  
[Consulates]

Paragraph 1 line 7

For "[groups omitted]" please read:-

". We had shown a lack of confidence".....

Paragraph 2 line 2

...."his difference" should read:- "this difference".

COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT  
February 17, 1960

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CONFIDENTIAL

**V**  
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT

**V** G.1051/23.

FROM Mr. S. S. Jones,  
 Cairo

*Confidential*

No. 119.  
 Dated February 15.  
 Received February 17.

SUBJECT: Consulates  
 Mr. Jones's remarks on the Swiss views contained in Rome telegram 35 - sublimity.

References  
 141291/3  
 -/21/22.

Flag A  
 Flag B

MINUTES

Please see with paper 22 below. The reference in line 5 of Cairo telegram 119 is obscure. It might refer to Cairo telegram No. 94, but would make more sense if it were to refer to our telegram No. 142.

(Printing Instructions)

2. This is not at all satisfactory, but I think we must for the present accept the advice in para 2 of Cairo telegram No. 119. It is a pity that the Swiss are so sticky about explaining their difficulties direct to the Egyptians in Cairo, and we might have another go at them on this at the next stage. (cf. para. 3 of Rome tel. no. 35 - Flag C).

(Outward Action)  
 1) Rome no. 49 Feb 17  
 2) Beirut no. 85 Feb 22  
 3) Cairo no. 345 to Swiss in Beirut

3. The Egyptians seem to be in a state of great suspicion (compare Nasser's interview with Mr. Brown of the 'Daily Mail'). They even talk about intrigue in Suez, whereas one would have thought we could do little harm there (para 3 of Cairo telegram No. 118).

4. We could now give Mr. Crowe some material for rebuttal particularly on the question of a visa for the U.A.R. Counsellor in Addis Ababa (para 1 of Cairo telegram No. 118). But I think it would be awkward to do anything at this stage since we do not contemplate going back immediately on the question of Consulates. We are separately trying to get a fix on the "Voice of Free Africa" station to prove that it really is operating from Cairo, as we have assumed, and if we get the necessary proof we can arm Mr. Crowe with it and with some extracts from the more virulent items of propaganda. (The station has been attacking the Prime Minister during his tour of Africa and calling Sir Roy Welensky some very rude names). It is perhaps in this context that Mr. Crowe could answer Murad Ghaleb's complaint about Nairobi.

(Action completed) (Main Indexed)  
 287 2/16

5. Both these telegrams should be copied to Beirut for the information of Mr. Crosthwaite.  
 (R. Arculus) *[Signature]*  
 February 17, 1960.

W. Div. for action on para. 5.  
 British Property in Egypt Section (Sir G. Rendel)  
 Consular Department Mr. Cliche *[Signature]* Mr. Tollinton  
 Personnel Department  
 189 4487 Department  
 203  
 Mr. Duggan. I agree that *[Signature]*  
 Mr. Mar. / should

should continue to play the long.

- My minute of Feb. 8 at /20 (para. 5) gives the present position on Hong Kong and Singapore.

Minute

*Abbott*  
18/2

✓  
Feb 18

A. B. C. Minute, no. of J. Hill - February 18.

a). Submission by no. of J. Hill - February 24

Circulate as marked; + BV. 10 days.

1/2/2

V. Div. (continued to the ...)

We have written to Mr. Cross about the "fix"; and give him samples of recent propaganda; there has been developments on Consulates in visas.

No action on this paper.

1/23/3.

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

VG1051/22

Mr. Crowe

No. 119

February 15, 1960

R:3.45 p.m. February 16, 1960

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

My telegram 118. VG1051

Unfortunately I only received Berne telegram 35 to you this morning and I was not (repeat not) able to state Swiss position so categorically. In view of Ghaleb's remarks there seems to be no (repeat no) point in trying the possibility suggested in your telegram 94 [sic] since Egyptians have evidently discounted it. Whether they are sincere or not (repeat not) they are treating the exercise as a matter of confidence. Nevertheless for all Ghaleb's words I doubt if they would insist on their complete list against our complete list, provided they got something they wanted. (I do not (repeat not) think they would be satisfied with Liverpool).

2. For the moment, therefore, I suggest that we can only sit tight and await some change of circumstances. If Swiss insist on pulling out, we may be able to make some arrangement, but I think it would be better not (repeat not) to say anything about this until at least the beginning of March. As regards paragraph 3 of Berne telegram 35 I would prefer the Swiss themselves to inform UAR authorities of their decision. I think it might have more impact and it would after all be their decision.

3. As regards publicity I think it would be desirable to continue to avoid answering questions about this subject, but if it becomes necessary to do so I hope that it will be possible to confine any answer to a simple statement that we are still in negotiation with UAR authorities. If pressed we might perhaps say that they wish to open certain new posts which raises questions of principle.

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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES 26 FEB 1960 VG1051/23(N)
--------------------------------------------------------

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CONSULATES IN THE U.A.R.

-123 You will no doubt wish to read Mr. Arculus' minute below which flags the relevant papers. You yourself will know more about the Swiss intentions than we do here.

-123 2. The purpose of this minute is to indicate briefly where I think we have got to and where we should go from here. First, we are inclined to accept Mr. Crowe's view (paragraph 3 of his letter at VG 1051/14 of January 22 and paragraph 2 of his telegram No. 119 within) that we should display patience and await a more suitable opportunity for trying to clinch the matter on the basis of need i.e. Alexandria first, then Damascus. *Fluye*

-123 3. Secondly, the above mentioned line of action is based on the assumption that it would serve no purpose to throw in Hong Kong and Singapore alone. This certainly seems to be Mr. Crowe's view and the probable availability of Hong Kong and Singapore as inducements was duly mentioned in Mr. Rothnie's submission of February 8 at Flag D, *with out being taken up.*

4. Thirdly, Nasser is evidently in a bad temper with us, no doubt because of the Eden Memoirs which have opened old wounds. He will not talk about Ambassadors and his henchmen are very negative on the consulate question. But, given Nasser's mercurial temperament, it is quite possible that we shall see a change in a month or two, particularly if his memoirs achieve any success.

-123 5. Fourthly, I had thought we ought to raise with Cairo the implications of the Swiss decision to stop at the end of March. But I think that we can assume that Mr. Crowe is working on this problem and would have to modify the advice given in his telegram No. 94 at Flag A, which was drafted before the Swiss told us that they wanted to stop at the end of March. On the point of informing the Egyptians about the Swiss wish, we agree with Mr. Crowe that this is for the Swiss to do.

-123 6. If you agree with this assessment of the situation I think it might on balance be desirable to send a short telegram to Cairo concurring in the advice given in paragraph 2 within *(tel. no 119)*

*John Bate*  
(J.G.S. Bate)  
February 18, 1960.

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U.K./U.A.R. relations: Consulates

RECEIVED  
 11 VES  
 FEB 1960  
 VG1051/23(8)

Please see the Permanent Under-Secretary's minute of Flag P February 19. Sir Roger Stevens has directed that we should inform Berne and Cairo accordingly and I submit draft telegrams for the purpose .

VG1051/23

2. The U.A.R. Chargé d'Affaires, during his call on the Secretary of State on February 23, mentioned the question of the consulates as being one which was held up. He said that the U.A.R. view was that it should be dealt with as a whole - presumably meaning their list of posts against our list of posts. He said that if one post were bargained against another the process would take a long time. Mr. Khalil may well have been briefed on this subject before he left Egypt and his representations no doubt do not mark any new development. Mr. Crowe will be getting a copy of the record of the Secretary of State's conversation by bag, but I have included a brief mention of Mr. Khalil's remarks in paragraph 3 of the draft telegram to Cairo.

*John Beith*

(J.G.S. Beith)  
 February 24, 1960.

Copy

Mr. Profumo.

*ll*  
 24/2

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry No.

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**CYP**

Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s)

(Date) 24/2/60

Despatched 10. Opw

EMERGENCY  
 IMMEDIATE  
 PRIORITY  
 ROUTINE  
 with priority  
 without  
 DEFERRED

Draft.

Telegram to: CAIRO

[Security classification] CONFIDENTIAL

No. 203

[Codeword-if any]

(Date) 24/2/60

Address to Cairo

And to:—

telegram No. 203 (date) 24/2

repeated for information to Saving Berne, Beirut

Repeat to:—

Saving to Bern 57 m Beirut within 82 sav

My telegram [A] to Berne: [consulates].

I agree with the general line suggested in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 119. I assume that, in the light of these views and notwithstanding the difficulties indicated in your telegram No. 94, you have been considering what temporary arrangements could be made to deal with essential work at the posts in question. Clearly we should have to devise arrangements acceptable to the U.A.R. Authorities but the latter would presumably not wish to prevent routine consular work being carried out e.g. the payment of relief to British subjects. Some of the work may indeed be of benefit to U.A.R. nationals.

En Class. Code Cypher V61051/8(A)

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 Personnel  
 Sir G. Rendel  
 G. and S.  
 Security

2. Please also consider what extra staff would be required.

3. Khalil brought up this subject in his talk with me on February 23. He said that you had put in our list of posts and received theirs. In their view the question should be solved as a

/whole

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Handwritten notes in the bottom left margin.

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

whole. It would take a long time if one post were to be bargained against another. I said I thought (the question would need time to sort out and increasing ~~in~~ trust between the two countries was needed. (Record of conversation by bag).

*Distributed to:*  
*21/12*  
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 Sir G. Rendel  
 Comptroller & Supply Dept  
 Security Dept

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V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VG. 1051/25 ✓

FROM Damascus Helsinki  
 to Levant Department

Confidential

No. 105/00.  
 Dated February 11.  
 Received February 18.

SUBJECT:

Attitude to be adopted towards U.A.R. Representatives abroad - request for advice.

References

VG 1053/2 (59)

MINUTES

One would have thought that H.M.R.R. would know how to behave towards U.A.R. colleagues after the resumption of diplomatic relations, and Helsinki is the only post to enquire. It might however be useful to follow up our Circular Despatch at VG1053/2/59 and I attach a draft.

2. If this is overdoing it, we could just tell Helsinki.

*R. Arculus*  
 (R. Arculus)

February 22, 1960.

Protocol Department first

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)  
 Circular Despatch No. 022  
 Representatives No. 24  
 Madrid Office, Mar 17.  
 J. D. Jensen, cd. off.  
 A. W. Redford, c. r. o. Mar 23

It is really a little extraordinary that Helsinki (or any other post) should be in any doubt about the effect of the formal resumption of diplomatic relations on their local behaviour towards U.A.R. Representatives. I see no harm at all in sending the circular proposed, which will resolve any doubts that may

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

28/2/60

DA 28/2/60

may wish (in some days  
 however, I should have  
 expected certain of the  
 mail, Charles of W.M.  
 Ambassador to accuse  
 the op. of seeking to ~~let~~  
 teach wisdom to its  
 grandparents!)

*[Signature]*  
 24/2

Submitted.

*[Signature]*  
 25/2.

*[Signature]*  
 25/2.

Circular 022/24

*[Signature]*  
 Feb 25

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(1051/60)



British Embassy, ✓  
Helsinki.

RECEIVED February 11, 1960.  
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VQ1051/25

Vg 1055/2

Dear Department,

We appear to have received no instructions about the attitude to be adopted toward the representatives abroad of the United Arab Republic since the Circular No. 029 of April 8, 1959. This stated that "pending a resumption of diplomatic relations" the keynote of our attitude should be: formally - unchanged; informally - normal, friendly behaviour. Now that diplomatic relations have been resumed we are presumably justified in being somewhat more forthcoming.

2. We should be grateful for guidance.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY *[Signature]*

Levant Department,  
Foreign Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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[ VG 1051/25 ]

CIRCULAR No. 022

FOREIGN OFFICE,

March 17, 1960.

**Attitude to be adopted by Her Majesty's Representatives abroad  
towards Representatives of the Government of the United Arab  
Republic**

Sir,

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United Arab Republic was announced in London and in Cairo on December 1. On December 9, Mr. C. T. Crowe presented his letter of appointment as Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Zulficar Sabri, and set up his offices in the former Chancery premises at Kasr-el-Dubara under the title of British Diplomatic Mission. The United Arab Republic Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Kamal el-Din Khalil, presented his letter of credence on February 17 to Mr. Profumo, Minister of State.

2. Mr. Crowe has taken over responsibility for the protection of British interests from the Swiss Government, who acted as Protecting Power, but it has not yet been possible to reach agreement with the United Arab Republic Government on the reopening of Consular posts, where the Swiss are carrying on for a short time. For their part, the United Arab Republic Diplomatic Mission in London are preparing to take over the work from the Indian High Commission, but no date has yet been announced for the transfer of Consular responsibility. The United Arab Republic Chargé d'Affaires made his début into diplomatic life by giving a reception to celebrate the National Day of the United Arab Republic on February 22.

3. This means that Her Majesty's Representatives may have normal, friendly official as well as unofficial relations with United

Her Majesty's Representative  
at

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19280--60 56610-3

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2

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Arab Republic Missions and representatives abroad. These should be treated on a par with representatives of other countries with whom Her Majesty's Government are on reasonable terms. On the one hand, care should be taken not to offend representatives of countries in the Middle East and Africa with whom we have special relationships by appearing over-friendly to United Arab Republic representatives. On the other hand, the latter are extremely susceptible to anything which they can interpret as slighting or inferior treatment.

4. This supersedes the guidance given in my circular No. 029 (VG 1053/2) of April 8, 1959.

5. A similar circular has been addressed to Her Majesty's Consular Officers as No. 24.

I am, with great truth and regard,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

SELWYN LLOYD.

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FOREIGN OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W.1.

January 29, 1960.

U.A.R. Consulates

You will have seen a copy of Colin Crowe's letter to me (1892/60) of January 22: a copy of my reply is enclosed herein.

2. We should be grateful for your urgent advice. We have so far taken the position that this is a matter for the Ruler, who will have to consider it in the context of the general question of admitting foreign consuls. We have relied on the fact that he will understand the problems he would create for himself by admitting Egyptians, which would immediately bring claims from the Iraqis and the Iranians, and thus involve him in an inter-Arab problem. This has the disadvantage that we cannot really use Kuwait as a bargaining counter but having - for very good reasons - played it this way, I don't see that we can now change our tactics. What are your views? Have you any indication that the Egyptians have been putting pressure on the Ruler? Do you think he is likely to weaken? Would you think it useful to speak to him again, revealing what has passed in Cairo, and putting him on his guard?

3. While our bull point must remain that it is up to the Ruler to make this decision we should nevertheless be very grateful for ammunition on the lines suggested in Colin Crowe's paragraph 6. The figures given by Matar are clearly exaggerated. According to the 1957 census there were over 26,000 Iraqis, nearly 20,000 Iranians, over 15,000 Jordanians, nearly 7,000 Lebanese, and over 6,000 Muscatis. Syrians and Egyptians together amounted to some 3,800. Can you give the latest figures? Are they all permanent residents? What proportion is accounted for by the Egyptian teachers and their families, and other officials? How much could we make of the point that Egyptian needs are already largely catered for by the Education Mission in Kuwait? How much trade is there?

4. What we would like to do is at one and the same time to take the line that the question of an Egyptian Consulate is one for the Ruler, while ourselves pointing out any weakness in the arguments of Matar? Again what are your views?

5. I am sending a copy of this letter to Colin Crowe in Cairo.

(J.G.S. Beith)

J.C.B. Richmond Esq., C.M.G.,  
KUWAIT.

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*Copy sent to Sir G. Rendel*

FOREIGN OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W.1.

January 29, 1960.

Consulates

We are considering your letter of January 22 (1392/60) about this difficult problem, which gave us useful background.

2. Things are not going well, though there seems to be a similarity between the Egyptian tactics and those they employed over the resumption of diplomatic relations. Then they shilly-shallied because they could not bring themselves to the point of resuming relations, and in the interim raised a variety of points to see what our reaction would be; you will remember the series of "last remaining obstacles" - our alleged support for Kasim, for the P.F.C., and doubts about Israel. In your talks over the consulates, they have pressed for East Africa, then appeared to understand our objections, switched to Hong Kong and now transferred the burden of their attack to Kuwait. This makes one doubt whether we should take all this too seriously.

3. Moreover there are principles involved here. The traditional grounds for the establishment of consulates are the need to protect trade and nationals. There is also the convention that consular facilities are not normally refused where there is a consul of a third country already established. This principle, however, is normally related to the requirements in respect of trade and nationals, otherwise its application could be absurd. One could also argue that these time-honoured principles are somewhat out of date and that the scope of consulates is wider now. For example consular conventions sometimes allow for information work. Moreover secret communications are allowed to consulates in some countries. One might also, I suppose, argue that there is some legitimacy in the Egyptian claim that they should be allowed to establish themselves in countries approaching independence. That, of course, would not apply to Hong Kong.

4. But to barter consulates without regard to the traditional criteria for their establishment sets an undesirable precedent. If we were to agree in bargaining to a post like Hong Kong merely because the Egyptians could not do very much harm there, we should be abandoning firm ground and it would be difficult to know thereafter at what point to take a stand.

5. Kuwait is a special case, where the Egyptians admittedly have some concrete interests. The Ruler's position is also exceptional. As you will see from the enclosed copy of a letter to John Richmond, there should be some useful ammunition to counter Qatar's claims.

6. Since it is difficult to make use of Kuwait as a bargaining counter, and we do not really favour the barter process (in any case we still await a C.C. decision on Hong

G.F. Rowe Esq., C.M.G.,  
British Diplomatic Mission,  
CAIRO.

/Kong

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- 2 -

Kong, and considered views from Singapore) we must think of the next move. One course which has attractive political possibilities, and some possible practical snags, is to take over fairly soon all responsibility from the Swiss throughout the U.A.R. and administer our own affairs from Cairo until we can open up in the other posts. This would put an end to the anomalous position of divided responsibility. It would be difficult to explain in Parliament why with diplomatic relations established we still have to rely on the Swiss operating for us in some places. Moreover we are inhibited from asking the Swiss to take up any new or difficult problems while things are on the caretaker basis. It is unsatisfactory to tell British subjects that in some things they turn to the Swiss and in others to you. I am indeed rather surprised that the Swiss have agreed to carry on indefinitely.

7. We should welcome your early comments on this course. It would involve treating Cairo as having the whole of the U.A.R. for its consular district until further notice, and your staff (appropriately strengthened) would have to make regular visits to Alexandria and Damascus. Would there be any difficulty in frequent visits to Damascus? Would there be any chance of using part of our premises in Alexandria or Damascus? Could one even establish e.g. an office of the British Diplomatic Mission in Alexandria (c.f. Shanghai)? Consular Department are naturally concerned that the work done by the Swiss should continue to be done by one means or another, and provided you had sufficient staff and mobility, could you do it?

8. This tactic would get the Swiss out of the picture once and for all, and perhaps bring home to the Egyptians the absurdity of their hesitations about our being in posts where so many other countries are represented. It has the dual advantage of maintaining a firm but reasonable position vis-a-vis the U.A.R. Government while leaving us free to clinch a bargain should we have something definite to offer and should we be assured that a final settlement could be reached.

9. I am sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Berne (who have not had your letter), Kuwait, Bahrain, Tehran, Beirut and Washington.

(J.G.S. Beith)

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V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

V G. 1051/16.

FROM Mr. J. J. Jones, Cairo  
to Sir Roger Douglas.

Confidential

No. 09/65.

Dated January 18.

Received 22 January 66.

SUBJECT:

U.K. - U.A.R. relations

MR. CROWE'S views on reasons to VASSER and talking to him about the operation of the financial agreement.

References

1005/19.

MINUTES

Para. 8 will require further consideration - cf. p. VG-1051/8, and B.V. similarly.

2. Perhaps British Property in Egypt section could let us know the latest position on improving desegregation. There is a good deal in what Mr. Crowe says, but he ignores a number of things which are unsatisfactory e.g.

- (i) obstruction of BOTC by former employees;
- (ii) Shell's failure to get their hands on their cash yet;
- (iii) appropriation of one of Shell's ships;
- (iv) failure to implement the separate provisions on Mr. Swaha's 37 faddans.
- (v) meagre results, as seen from this end,

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action completed)

1A.C.  
6.4.60

(Main Indexed)

21/18/61  
28

on Article V (transfers);

↳ (vi) nota propro, virtually, in 1951 officials.

There may be other serious deficiencies?

R/S/2.

V. Div. (para. 1) noted.  
JEP Section (para. 2).

The best period for declassification was Dec. 12 - 22, during which 10 days submissions were 269, acceptances 232 & releases 110. Over the whole period Dec. 12 - Feb. 9 (best figures still need confirmation, but sound right) the weekly average (including the good 10 days) was:

Submissions 100  
Acceptances 70  
Releases 50.

2. In the last 2 weeks there has been a slight decline of the average (treating Jan 25 - Feb 9 as 2 weeks) drops to respectively 72, 53 ~~MMMM~~ and 42.

3. Transfers are still ~~pretty~~ <sup>very</sup> unsatisfactory in my view, and provision of records & accounts is poor and is causing complaints from the claimants representatives, while the releases under Article III (g) only total about £125,000 out of about £2 million so far. Pensions, on the other hand, are being now paid better, without deductions in most cases. Wollerton

11/2/60.

↳ Hope I may be able to clean up in this a little & when I see his name next week.

Comptroller del.  
12. ii. 60.

Levant Dept (N. Arables)

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Although it does not bear directly on what Mr. Copeland is coming to talk about I think you may be interested to read the attached letter from Mr. Crowe in advance of Mr. Copeland's visit - particularly paragraphs 7 to 11.

*W.B. Stevens.*  
January 21, 1960

Sir F. Hoyer Millar

*Then*

Mr. Profumo may care to see

*W.B. Stevens 21/1*

*then*

Anti Levant

*Seen from 25.8.60*

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(09/85)

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,  
CAIRO.

January 18, 1960.

*My dear Roger,*

Many thanks for your letter (VG 1051/8) of January 11 about access to President Nasser.

2. There are two aspects of your letter that I should like to comment on; one is how best to secure a meeting with the President and the second is talking to him about the operation of the Financial Agreement.

3. I should like to take the second point first because I am profoundly worried about the danger of a serious misunderstanding between London and Cairo as to what is involved in the Financial Agreement, what we can accordingly expect from the Egyptians in relation to it, and what we would hope to get out of any representations to President Nasser.

4. You say that something should be done to put an end to the whole dreary process of sequestration and to produce a visible effect. This is simply not possible. Up to the present nearly 2,500 applications have been submitted for desequestration of which nearly half have been released, but they are pouring in at a great rate as people suddenly realise that the deadline is getting close. There are many hundreds still to come. The Sequestration tell us that there are still 8,000 bank accounts in their hands for which no applications have yet been received. These are all individual cases. They have all got to be processed and however willing to help the Sequestration may be directed to be, they must still make sure that they are returning the right property to the right people and that the people applying are authorised to do so. This inevitably means powers of attorney, and procedures of some complexity. (cf. those followed by our own Foreign Compensation Commission). As I said in my letter to Rendel, the Sequestration are working at about their maximum rate on desequestration at the moment, and even if they were to recruit a much larger and very much more efficient staff, which is clearly out of the question at this stage, it would be months before they could clear everything off. No directive from President Nasser can affect this. Similarly, transfers under Article V, are going to go on for many months with their attendant problems as people make up their minds what they want to do with their property when they have got it desequestrated. Many of the other problems involved are questions of legal interpretation between the Egyptians and ourselves, where they often have a good point.

/s.

Sir Roger Stevens, K.C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office.

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- 2 -

5. I find myself in an awkward position in arguing this case, lest in trying to straighten out misunderstandings I give the impression that I consider the Egyptians are behaving well over the whole field of the Agreement and that we have no grounds for complaint, or that I am so concerned with our relations that I am not prepared to push things hard enough. I hope you will not think that is the case. It is, of course, true that the Egyptians do not wish to return any more property to the British than they have to. They have in certain cases undoubtedly taken the opportunity to mulct British subjects. The taxation authorities have welcomed their chances. A number of sequestrators have behaved very badly - but, equally, a large number have behaved admirably. Most of the people who either have stayed on in Egypt, or who have come back in order to settle down again, have had to pay out various sums of money to get desequestered, but almost without exception they have accepted their having to do so as part of the Egyptian scene. It did not surprise them, and having done so they have generally got their property back. The Sequestration is a very Egyptian organisation, and, for obvious reasons, probably more inefficient than most. The truth is that most of our complaints concern matters which are peripheral to the agreement, not at its heart.

6. The point I am trying to make therefore is that there is no sharp and decisive gesture that can be made to "settle" the Financial Agreement. We are dealing with thousands of individual cases, many of them of considerable complexity which have to be dealt with individually. (When Joe Walters went to Alexandria last week he had 25 interviews in one day - all small cases and none of them difficult, but raising problems which needed an answer for the people concerned). You cannot sever the innumerable links which bound the British community to the Egyptian economy at one stroke and expect the gash to knit up quickly or with ease. If, therefore, we go to President Nasser expecting to get him to produce some gesture which will put everything straight, we would be deceiving ourselves. In the first place, he might well not accept our contention that the Egyptians are not playing their part, and in the second place even if he did, the problems would still exist and British subjects would continue to have grievances, and our disappointment at having failed to achieve spectacular results would be correspondingly greater, with all its undesirable effects on the wider picture of our relations.

7. Nevertheless, I can see that Ministers may want me to try to get access to President Nasser. Indeed, if it is going to be a few months before we exchange Ambassadors, this will probably be a good thing. I do not think I should be able to get an interview with President Nasser simply to talk about the Financial Agreement. I should probably be referred to Kaissouni. But if I had the chance of a general discussion of Anglo-U.A.R. relations, ranging over both the political and economic fields, this would give me an opportunity to bring up the Financial Agreement. I must confess that I am not very taken with the idea of the Prime Minister seeing Kamal Khalil first, though, as Arnold Smith says, this would undoubtedly help my chances of seeing the President, but unless the

/occasion ..

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- 3 -

occasion arose naturally it might look too much like a ploy. (Of course, if Nasser were to see me, the Prime Minister would have to be prepared later to see Khalil).

8. I like the idea of giving the President a message from the Prime Minister after his tour of Africa, with his views on developments in Africa, and I think this might produce the best atmosphere. I toyed with the idea of suggesting that the Prime Minister's message might also cover his thoughts about the Summit, but, unless there is something special that we can say, it might be better to leave this for the discussion.

9. The danger of saying that I have a message, however, is that I might be told to give it to Ali Sabri, which would, of course, destroy the object of the exercise. Before we were to reveal that we had a message from the Prime Minister, we should need to make sure that the President was ready to receive it and me. Perhaps this is where I could make use of the Heikal channel. I could tell him that you were thinking it would be useful if I were to see the President for a general discussion and that we might even have a message. If his soundings of the President were favourable we could then go ahead, but if not, we should have to think again.

10. I hope we do not come to appeal to Eugene Black. As I have said in the past, I think we should get away from the idea of using him as a mediator, and for the reasons I have given earlier in this letter I do not think his intervention would achieve much, or that he would be happy to make it.

11. I have consulted Arnold Smith over the above. He is not, of course, in a position to comment about the Financial Agreement, but he does agree with my suggestions about seeing the President.

*Yours own.*

*C. T. Crowe*

(C. T. Crowe)

CONFIDENTIAL



V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VG.1051/12.

FROM Mr. J. B. Richmond,  
Kuwait.

Confidential.

No. 71.

Dated February 7.

Received February 8.

SUBJECT:

Egyptian pressure for a bond in Kuwait  
Number of Egyptians and Syrians in Kuwait.  
Kuwait's trade with the U.A.R. - argument  
that the Americans have no consulate.

References

-/14.

MINUTES

This does not help a great deal.  
Any comments on the figures or argument?

R 9/2.

Arabian Dept. first.

I do not agree with the first sentence of para 5.  
I agree with the second sentence. The  
third sentence presumably depends on  
our own attitude towards the admission  
of consuls to Kuwait, particularly of  
a U.A.R. Consul. This is being dealt  
with in BA 1903/10, which Levant  
Dept will see.

A. P. Pemberton  
1972

(Printing Instructions)

Outward Action)

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

12/2/72

987 8/61

BA 1902/11

Now see FO. rel. no. 16 Savings to

BA 1903/11. Kuwait.

R 15/2.

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FROM KUWAIT TO FOREIGN OFFICE

B

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Richmond.

VGros/r.

No. 71  
February 7, 1960.

D: 3.55 p.m. February 7, 1960.  
R: 2.15 p.m. February 7, 1960

PRIORITY  
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 71 of February 7.  
Repeated for information to Bahrain  
and Saving to Cairo

-100.

Beith's unnumbered letter of January 29 (not to Bahrain):  
Egyptian pressure for a Consul in Kuwait.

The 1957 census figures are the only guide available. The Iraqi figure was probably and Iranian figure certainly too low. The Jordanian and Lebanese figures were about right so far as we can tell. The Muscati figure is anyone's guess in confusion over the national identity of peninsular Arabs, but is probably broadly right for Omanis generally.

2. The 1957 figure of 3,839 for Syrians and Egyptians together was probably more accurate than most and seems about right. There may have been some increase, especially of Syrians, but it is unlikely that the total now exceeds 5,000. Of these 676 are known to be Egyptian teachers, and 151 are known to be Syrian teachers. Their families may account for some of the remainder. There are comparatively few Egyptians and Syrians in government service outside the Education and Social Affairs Departments, and practically no Egyptians and few Syrians with oil companies. Most Egyptian teachers and other Egyptian officials seconded stay for no more than three years before being replaced, again largely by Egyptians. The same applies to Syrian teachers though some Syrian businessmen and freelancers tend to stay longer.

3. The Egyptian Cultural Mission controls the destinies of Egyptian and Syrian teachers and officials provided governmentally to Kuwait from Egyptian and Syrian provinces, and strongly influences the destinies of Egyptians and Syrians on direct engagement (not to mention educational policy of Kuwait). That mission in fact operates almost as a covert legation, but

/since

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Kuwait telegram No. 71 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

since we can do nothing about this it would presumably be better not to mention it to the Egyptians in Cairo.

4. Kuwait's trade with the U.A.R. in 1958 was: exports to the U.A.R. rupees 3,115,380 (largely second-hand or cut-price manufactured goods), and imports from the U.A.R. rupees 2,507,130. Imports to Kuwait were largely light manufactured goods and foodstuffs. Imports from the U.A.R. were in the ratio Syrian 3, Egyptian 1. Exports were roughly equal to the two provinces. Incomplete figures for 1959 suggest the same volume.

5. It must be admitted that with all the advantages of hindsight that the Americans have never needed a Consulate here for the few hundred (456 at present) Americans in Kuwait and the neutral zone. The answer for Cairo is that the Americans have a major economic investment here whereas Egypt's investment in Kuwait hardly exists. We could also if we wished tell the Egyptians that other countries have a stronger case to argue and should presumably come first if any departure were made on normal consular basis of need.

6. Please see my immediately following telegram. — BA 1903/10

Foreign Office pass Saving to Cairo as my Saving telegram No. 1.

[Repeated Saving to Cairo]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

Arabian Department.  
Levant Department.  
Economic Relations Department.  
Information Policy Department.

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Mr. Beith.

VC1051/18.  
X803/111/208  
XS  
CC  
107 V

Consulate General at Alexandria and position of Mr. Tollinton.

We spoke about this over the telephone this morning.

2. It is becoming increasingly inconvenient from the point of view of the British Property in Egypt Section to have no one, other than the Swiss, looking after British interests in the Alexandria region from the consular point of view.

3. Meanwhile Mr. Tollinton is being placed in an almost intolerable position, as he has packed all his belongings and given up his flat in the expectation of going out to Alexandria at any moment, but may nevertheless have to wait an indefinite time before making any kind of move. This also makes it extremely difficult for the Department to utilise Mr. Tollinton's services effectively as we never know when he may be going off.

4. As you know, I am myself pessimistic about the prospects of the Egyptians agreeing to the early re-establishment of our consulate general at Alexandria. I may be wrong about this, but it certainly seems possible that there will still be a very long delay.

5. In the circumstances I should like to suggest that we should put it to Mr. Crowe that Mr. Tollinton, as consul general designate at Alexandria, should go out to Cairo and become, for the time being, part of the Embassy staff there, with some title such as "Assistant Counsellor in charge of British consular affairs in the Alexandria region". This title, or something of the kind, would enable him to be a full member of Mr. Crowe's staff with adequate diplomatic privilege, but would at the same time clearly define his sphere of ~~activity~~ ~~individuality~~. As Alexandria is so near to Cairo it should be possible for him to pay frequent visits there, (without necessarily spending a night) to interview British subjects, deal with problems of property (including perhaps the Smouha question, if, as seems likely, that continues to be with us) and do a great deal to help us and Mr. Crowe over the kind of problems which I think are bound to arise in that particular area.

2 I attach a draft telegram for your consideration.

*George Rendel*

(George Rendel)  
February 1, 1960.

*We must attach our letter to Cairo  
and see what is needed in the light  
of that: perhaps principally a reference  
Mr. Aramb*

*WJ  
Feb 1*



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
 Confidential  
~~RESTRICTED~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Draft. \_\_\_\_\_

Telegram to:—  
 Mr. Crowe  
 Cairo.

No. \_\_\_\_\_

(Date) \_\_\_\_\_

Repeat to:—  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

*Jan. 1. 1960*

~~Ex-Glass.~~  
~~Cable.~~  
 Cypher.

Distribution:—  
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F.O.,

(Date) \_\_\_\_\_

Despatched *[Signature]*

[Security classification] CONFIDENTIAL  
 —if any

Addressed to Mr. Crowe, Cairo.

Telegram No. \_\_\_\_\_ (date) \_\_\_\_\_

repeated for information to \_\_\_\_\_

*Beit W. O. H. A.*

Delay in establishing H.M. Consulate General at Alexandria is causing considerable inconvenience, but we clearly cannot count on an early solution.

2. It occurs to us therefore that way out of difficulty might be to send Tollinton, who is Consul General designate at Alexandria, to join you in Cairo as a member of your regular diplomatic staff, with some such title as "Assistant Counsellor in charge of consular affairs in Alexandria region".

3. He could then pay periodical visits to Alexandria without establishing an office there but could interview British subjects with particular reference to their claims under Anglo-Egyptian Financial Agreement of which he has much experience.

4. Please telegraph your views.

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Mr. Crowe  
Cairo.

Mr. Crowe, Cairo.

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3. We could then pay periodical visits to Alexandria without establishing an office there but could interview British subjects with particular reference to their claims under Anglo-Egyptian Financial Agreement of which he has much experience.

4. Please telegraph your views.

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Vc1051/18

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OIP

DEPARTMENTAL  
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No. 116

February 3, 1960.

D. 1.20 p.m. February 3, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

Beith's letter of January 29, paragraph 7: Consulates.

Please also consider whether we should not send out Tollinton, and one or two assistants, as a member of your diplomatic staff, with the rank of Counsellor, until he can become Consul-General in Alexandria. He would deal with the Alexandria consular work, and could also deal with British subjects in that area with property problems, with which he is familiar.

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Sir G. Rendel

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

DEPARTMENTAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Crowe

No. 94

February 6, 1960.

R. 5.10 p.m. February 7, 1960.

IMMEDIATE  
CONFIDENTIAL

Beith's letter of January 29 and your telegram No. 116: Consulates.

If we took over responsibility from Swiss throughout the U.A.R., we should have to administer the affairs of Alexandria and Damascus from Cairo in one of the following ways:-

- (a) by establishing offices of mission in those cities, or
- (b) by appointing to Cairo a Consul-General for whole U.A.R. and giving him extra staff to make regular visits.

2. As I see it U.A.R. have three possible motives for withholding consent to establishment of our Consulates until we allow them into colonial territories or Kuwait:

- (a) they want to keep us out of Damascus;
- (b) they genuinely want some of posts they have asked for;
- (c) they want to get rid of what they call "the inequalities of the past" i.e. they want strict reciprocity.

All three motives probably play their part. Whatever mixture, U.A.R. authorities would at once spot that we were trying to circumvent them if we followed either alternative in paragraph 1. They could put endless difficulties in our way if we tried to operate without their permission (indeed we could not (repeat not) perform consular duties proper without their leave), and they would almost certainly refuse permission if we asked them. If they did grant permission it might well be on a basis of reciprocity, i.e. that they could operate similarly in say East Africa. This would surely be worse than if they had Consulates.

3. For the reasons given above, it would be undesirable to attempt to make such regular visits to Alexandria as would amount to establishing a disguised Consulate. But anything short of visits so frequent that there was always a member of the staff in Alexandria would leave British subjects worse off than they now are with the Swiss in charge. There is too much regular consular work in Alexandria to be done by visiting officers. Furthermore, if we

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Cairo telegram No. 94 to Foreign Office

-2-

let the Swiss go without permanent replacement, we should be admitting defeat, and we should soon find ourselves in a position which would be even more difficult to defend in public than the present one.

4. I do not (repeat not) believe, therefore, that there is any point in sending Tollinton here at present. I think that we must try to take matters further before we consider relieving the Swiss.

5. I suggest that the next step should be for me to see Mourad Ghaleb again with reference to the interview reported in my telegram No. 23. I would repeat that Swiss were pressing to be relieved, that situation was entirely anomalous, and that so many questions were being asked both here and in United Kingdom that we should soon have to give a public explanation. I would stress the importance of getting this irritant to our relations out of the way, and ask whether he had any reply to our proposals for opening of Alexandria, Damascus and Liverpool, and if not (repeat not), what he suggested.

6. If such an approach fails, I think we must either play it long or try a horse trade. I should prefer the former since there is always a slight chance that U.A.R. might reduce their demands. But I fear that time may not (repeat not) be on our side. Both British subjects and Egyptians are continually enquiring about our plans for consular posts. We cannot stall much longer; and as soon as we are forced to admit that we cannot get U.A.R. permission, the Egyptians will almost certainly explain their refusal in detail. Once the whole story is public, the Egyptians' face will be involved, and our chances of getting what we want without conceding most of their requests will diminish and perhaps vanish. Publicity on this question would also damage our relations generally.

7. I should be grateful for urgent instructions.

Foreign Office please repeat as required.

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Consular Department  
Personnel Department  
Establishment and Organisation Department

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Sir F. Hoyer Miller  
Head Levant Department  
Resident Clerk

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

No. 142

February 10, 1960

D:1.30 p.m. February 10, 1960

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 94 [of February 6: Consulates].

Please act as suggested in paragraph 5 of your telegram under reference. You should report Ghaleb's reaction without commitment.

2. We shall then be able to consider the next step. One possibility, on which I should welcome your views, is to try to separate the question of Alexandria from that of Damascus, since our needs are different in each, and so are the political overtones. We might put it quite frankly to the Egyptians that we assume there must be some inhibition on their side, perhaps some suspicion of our intentions as regards Damascus. While we have repeatedly given explanations to disarm various Egyptian suspicions, nevertheless there may be a case for proceeding step by step as mutual confidence is gradually restored. The easiest step which could be taken at once is to reopen the posts where the greatest practical need exists. This in our case is Alexandria. For their part they might wish to open Liverpool.

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Sir G. Rendel

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
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BRITISH EMBASSY  
BEIRUT

1051/5/60)

IMMEDIATE



February 5, 1960

Dear Tom,

Your letter of January 29 to Colin Crowe about Damascus.

As I said in paragraph 5 of my letter 1059/312/59 of November 20, we should not be the only losers if the Swiss gave up and we were allowed no consular representation. Syrians would in particular be put to grave inconvenience over visas, even if we did not risk a visa war by refusing to issue visas to Syrians here in Beirut. But clearly we should be losers, even as compared with the present unsatisfactory system.

2. I wait with interest to see what Crowe thinks of the possibility of a system based on visits from Cairo, but it is hard to believe that anything of this sort would not be worse than the present arrangements.

3. It seems to me therefore that it may be best to carry on for the time being, unless the Swiss themselves go on strike. If they did so, and were prepared to take the onus with the United Arab Republic, that would force the latter to face the issue without an initiative from us which they would resent; a practical settlement might then be easier to reach quickly.

4. A possibility perhaps worth considering (though of course it would not meet the political point) would be to superimpose visits from Cairo on the Swiss sub-structure.

5. But is it not rather inconsistent in the circumstances that the U.A.R. authorities should themselves suggest that our Trade Mission should visit Syria? And seem to assume that we will again participate in the Damascus Fair. Could something be made of this?

6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Colin Crowe.

Yours ever,  
P. M. Crosthwaite

(P. M. Crosthwaite)

J.G.S. Beith, Esq., C.M.G.,

FOREIGN OFFICE.

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