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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Crowe

No. 30

January 18, 1960. 10.10.51/12. R. 10.50 a.m. January 19, 1960.

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

My telegram No. 23: Consulates.

In the course of general conversation last Friday, January 15, in which we touched on mutual mistrust between our two Governments, Ghaleb said that he could see why we hesitated about agreeing to their consulate in East Africa, but what did we think they could do in Hong Kong.

2. I feel sure that it would be helpful if we could agree to a U.A.R. consulate in Hong Kong. I do not (repeat not) see that they could do any harm; on the contrary, I suggest that it might be desirable as helping to inform them better about Chinese Communism.

mmmm

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

of great political importance), and possibly later elsewhere in U.A.R. territory. It is likely that this concession will be needed to clinch the matter.

I hope you can let me have an early answer as the matter is really rather urgent.

John Profumo

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Mr. Macdermot H 512
 (Mr. Profumo should see on return)



COLONIAL OFFICE,
 THE CHURCH HOUSE,
 GREAT SMITH STREET, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

2nd February, 1960.

Dear George

VG1051/12(A)

VG1051/12

Jack Profumo wrote to me on the 22nd January about the opening of an United Arab Republic Consulate in Hong Kong.

The Governor's particular apprehension, as expressed in his telegram No.27 of the 9th January, is that a further change in the foreign policy of the UAR (which has had a rather chequered past history) might result in a Consulate in Hong Kong being used to promote Communist activities. Given Hong Kong's geographical and political position, this would of course make the presence of a UAR Consulate there most undesirable. Provided, however, that you are reasonably satisfied that such a change is improbable, we should be prepared to admit a UAR Consul to Hong Kong if this should be necessary as an inducement to the UAR Government to re-open our Consulates at Alexandria and Damascus and possibly later elsewhere. We are informing the Governor accordingly.

VG1051/5(B)

Yours ever

David

The Most Hon. The Marquess of Lansdowne.

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

VG1051/10 (A.)
FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Crowe

No. 24
January 15, 1960

R. 4.08 p.m. January 15, 1960

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

My telegram No. 23: Consulates.

I do not (repeat not) think that there is anything further for us to do until we have Ghaleb's reply. When I last saw him Swiss Ambassador had not (repeat not) received any instructions from Berne to take action. I gathered, however, that it was Berne, rather than he, who had thought of obtaining special authorization for Swiss to continue. As far as he is concerned, he appears willing to carry on without change while we negotiate with the Egyptians.

2. I will keep in touch with him.

TITTT

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FROM BERNE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

VG1051/10 (8)

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir W. Montagu-Pollock

No. 17
January 25, 1960

D. 2.21 p.m. January 25, 1960
R. 2.32 p.m. January 25, 1960

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 17 of January 25.

Repeated for information to Cairo.

Cairo telegram No. 24 to you.

The Head of the International Organizations' Division of the Political Department asked me to call today. He told me the Swiss Government had decided that now that Her Majesty's Government had reestablished diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic, they did not feel able to act as suggested in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 8. Nor did they think representations on their part would be effective. They would, however, be glad to carry on indefinitely [grp undec? assistance] in Alexandria and Damascus. They had sent instructions to Cairo accordingly.

2. M. de Bham added that he was much looking forward to seeing Sir Roger Stevens here on February 11.

Foreign Office please pass Cairo 5.

^{Repeated}
[Repetition to Cairo referred for
Departmental decision.]

A curious attitude. But 'A' is satisfactory.

SEP Section.
Mr. Blake Consul Dept.
Mr. [unclear] [unclear]
Mr. [unclear] [unclear]
CONFIDENTIAL
(If we had been unlike the
Spaniards to speak on our tel!)

27/1/60
28/1/60
26/1.
27/1

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
BERNE.

(18910/6/60)

January 9, 1960.

VG105/11

Dear Department,

We enclose a copy of the Aide Memoire which we left with the Swiss on January 7 on receipt of your telegram No.8 about consular functions in the United Arab Republic.

VG105/11

2. There is one point we should put to you though you are probably well aware of it. The Swiss are rather touchy lest any suggestion might be made that the Swiss Ambassador should act in any way under guidance from Mr. Crowe. In their view, he acts under instructions from his Government who can receive guidance as to Her Majesty's Government's wishes through us. As you know, they tend to be a little protocolaire in such matters. We have therefore modified slightly the language in paragraph 3 of your telegram.

3. We are copying this letter, with the enclosure, to Cairo.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

R.S.

Levant Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

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- C O P Y -

(18910/3/60)

AIDE MEMOIRE

With reference to the Political Department's request for further information regarding the exercising of consular functions at Alexandria and Damascus, the Foreign Office has stated in a telegram received today that it is regarded as important to get at least the main metropolitan posts of Alexandria and Damascus re-opened as soon as possible and to separate this question from Egyptian demands for new non-metropolitan posts which will take some time to consider.

Her Majesty's Government regret very much any inconvenience which may be involved through the Swiss Representatives continuing to act in consular posts in the meantime, but Her Majesty's Government cannot of course say when the Egyptian Government will give satisfaction.

It might be helpful both to the Swiss Government and to Her Majesty's Government if the Swiss Government could intervene with the United Arab Republic Government on the following lines:-

The Swiss Government are anxious to complete the handing over of the protection of British interests as soon as possible. Divided responsibility is unsatisfactory and inefficient. It could also cause delay and inconvenience to Egyptian interests. The work of handing over responsibility for British interests in Cairo has been completed and the Swiss Government wish to take parallel action in other posts, particularly in Alexandria and Damascus as soon as possible. The United Arab Republic Government would also surely wish to be able to deal with these matters as exclusively. The Swiss Government would therefore welcome an assurance that the United Kingdom posts can be re-opened at a very early date.

If the Swiss Government agrees to act on the above lines, Her Majesty's Government would be grateful if the Swiss Ambassador could keep Mr. Crowe informed of any action which he may take. Her Majesty's Government in any case hope that the Swiss Government will not approach the United Arab Republic Government for specific authorisation to continue in charge of British interests for a further period. This would merely strengthen the United Arab Republic Government's hand in delaying a decision to allow the re-opening of the posts in Damascus and Alexandria.

V

LEVANT DEPARTMENT

ARAB REPUBLIC

V G.1051/12.

FROM Mr. D. G. Amos,
Leiso.

Confidential

No. 30.

Dated January 18.

Received January 19.

SUBJECT: Leiso

Consultation

Conversation with CHANER - would be helpful to allow U.A.R. a consulate in Hong Kong.

References

-/10.

(Printing Instructions)

MINUTES

This is reasonably satisfactory. Our firm attitude on East Africa seems to have had some effect. It is a pity that Mr. Crowe still wants to do a horse-trade, even to a minor extent, since it breaches the position of principle which we have taken up. If we agree to a post in Hong Kong because it does no great harm, although the Egyptians have no valid claim to be there, we may have more difficulty in resisting other claims later on. Nonetheless I have asked the Colonial Office urgently to consider whether we can use Hong Kong as a bargaining counter if it is clear that we shall not get our requirements without it. Mr. Aldridge has given me a preliminary comment, namely that the general feeling of the Colonial Office is against this sort of thing, and Mr. Julian Amery has minuted that no concessions are to be made without reference to him. The question is therefore being submitted to him as soon as possible.

2. See now the Secretary of State's minute on his copy. *[Signature]*
(R. Arculus)
January 20, 1960.

(Outward Action)

23. Mr. D. Watson, c.o. from 19.

Mr. D. Watson, c.o. from 22.

I agree that our firm attitude seems to have had some effect. However, Mourad Ghabab is an unusually reasonable man to deal with and his minister's mutual reaction may be a good deal stiffer than his own. We could conceivably, therefore, be forced to consider a horse-trade on Hong Kong.

[Signature]
20/1.

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

RBT 15.2.60

20/1/60

It will be seen from the minutes above that we are already pressing the Colonial Office to

189 5407-2A

/authorise

authorise us to offer Hong Kong if Mr. Crowe should find it necessary to throw in this concession. This has been done at the departmental level and it occurs to me that we ought possibly to take this up at a higher level, in the light of the Secretary of State's minute, before the Colonial Office attitude crystallises, possibly in an unfavourable sense. I attach a draft.

2. There is one point that I think we ought to make clear in our eventual instructions, should we be able to offer Hong Kong. This is that we cannot engage in bartering one post against another, which will in most cases mean one of our colonial posts against one in U.A.R. territory. If we do offer Hong Kong, we should offer it as a final inducement against which we should expect the U.A.R. Government to allow us to open up where we want on U.A.R. territory. But for the present we would ask only for the Consulates we need immediately viz. Alexandria and Damascus.

J.G. St. Beith
 (J.G. St. Beith)
 January 20, 1960.

I agree with the draft letter as amended.

I do not however go the whole way with Mr. Beith's paragraph 2. Once we have got Alexandria & Damascus, we shall be in a stronger bargaining position, since the U.A.R. will want further posts in the Colonies were there we shall want further posts in Egypt. I think therefore that our immediate tactics shd. be to get Alexandria & Damascus as quickly and as cheaply as possible.

W.B. Stevens
 21.1.

W.B.
 21.1.

4). Part of letter, Colonial Office to the Consuls of Alexandria
 IRD 78/02 - 21 January 2

21.1.60. Sec 20.

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SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Handwritten notes:
 av. 15/1/60
 PW

FROM UGANDA (Acting Governor)

Cypher (O.T.P.)

D. 11th January, 1960.
 R. 11th " " " 17.50 hrs.

Handwritten: VG 1051/S(F)

PRIORITY
SECRET AND PERSONAL
 PERSONAL No. 3.

Addressed to S. of S.
 Repeated to Governor, Kenya
 " " " Tanganyika
 " " British Resident, Zanzibar
 " " Administrator, East Africa High
 Commission (Governor Kenya pass copy
 please).
 No. 2002.

Handwritten: VG 1051/S(F)

Your telegram secret and personal No. 1.

United Arab Republic Consular Representation.

I have no doubt that presence of an Egyptian Consular representative in East Africa, whether honorary or career, could cause this Government serious embarrassment.

2. As you know we are already seriously concerned throughout East Africa at activities of Cairo Radio, the impact of which at present is, however, fortunately slight in Uganda.

3. In addition Egyptian Government is actively supporting Communist inspired (through influence of Afro-Asian Solidarity Council) Cairo office of Uganda National Congress led by Kalekezi. The steady stream of subversive literature (the importation of which is banned) and statements which reach Uganda cannot emanate from this office without the knowledge of the Egyptian Government.

4. Since October, 1958, some 21 Africans are known to have crossed Sudanese border from Uganda without passports with intention of proceeding to Iron Curtain countries for higher education. Of these, nine are known to be behind the Iron Curtain and are believed to have travelled via Cairo, where they probably obtained assistance for their journey from official sources. One such journey is definitely known to have been arranged by Egyptian General Intelligence. Kalekezi is known to be attempting from Cairo to arrange scholarships in U.S.S.R. for six Uganda students at present in United Kingdom. Twentyeight more persons in Uganda are known to be planning to go to Arab or Iron Curtain countries for further studies.

/5.

SECRET

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SECRET

5. I am afraid subversive efforts of Cairo Radio would be encouraged, proportion of anti-British activities of Cairo office of Uganda National Congress would be stimulated, and that clandestine journeys by young Uganda Africans to Iron Curtain countries would be greatly facilitated, by presence of Egyptian Consular representative in East Africa. I do not see how his activities could in practice be so circumscribed as to prevent these activities. Experience in Sudan and elsewhere has shown Egyptians are particularly expert at this kind of under cover subversion.

6. For these reasons I hope everything possible will be done to prevent proposal, although I cannot offer any suggestions as to how this could best be done. If Consulate in East Africa must be accepted in wider interests of Anglo-Egyptian relations, I very much hope its headquarters will not (repeat not) be in Uganda, where, owing to comparative ease of communication with Egypt through Sudan and to position of Uganda at head of waters of the Nile, more harm to British interests could, I suggest, be done than from Kenya or, more particularly, from Tanganyika. Any argument by Egyptians that Consulate must be in Uganda so as to supervise flow of Nile waters (see savingram No. 32 of 27th October from British Property Commission, Cairo, to Foreign Office) could be countered by reference to presence at Jinja for many years past of engineers representing Egyptian Irrigation Department. Howell's letter to Reid of 16th November, 1959, refers. This arrangement has worked very satisfactorily and successive engineers have abstained from political activities.

INB

NIT V

Copy sent to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. R. Arculus

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INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

FROM TANGANYIKA (Sir R. G. Turnbull)

NG1051/S(3)

Cypher (O. T. P.)

D. 13th January, 1960.

R. 13th " " 10.00 hrs.

PRIORITY
SECRET AND PERSONAL
PERSONAL No. 10.

Addressed to S. of S.

Repeated to Governor Kenya

" " " Uganda

" " British Resident, Zanzibar

" " Administrator, East Africa High
Commission

Personal No. 5.

Your telegram secret and personal No. 3.

U.A.R. Consular Representation.

We fully endorse representations made in Uganda telegram Personal No. 3 to you. From a purely Tanganyika point of view a U.A.R. Consular representative would have a fertile field for intrigue in activities of all Muslim Nationals of Union of Tanganyika. He would no doubt seek to blow this up into a much larger force than it is or than it is ever likely to be, in order to discredit Nyerere and moderates. Paragraph 2 of Fletcher-Cooke's letter of 30th October, 1959, to Eastwood about composition of 1960 Visiting Mission explains this point in greater detail.

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Foreign Office

-

Mr. R. Arculus

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Draft.

letter to
C.T. Crowe Esq.
C.M.G.,
CAIRO

from
Mr. Beith

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

John
17/1

Would you please refer to para 1 of Foreign Office telegram No. 19 of January 6 about Consulates. The following is the gist of replies so far received from Colonial Governors.

2. Uganda The presence of an Egyptian Consular representative in East Africa, whether honorary or career, could cause serious embarrassment. The results would be that the subversive efforts of Cairo radio would be encouraged, anti-British activities of the Cairo office of the Uganda National Congress ~~would be~~ stimulated, and ~~that~~ clandestine journeys by young Uganda Africans to Iron Curtain countries ~~would be~~ greatly facilitated. Any arguments by the Egyptians that a Consulate is required in Uganda to supervise the flow of Nile Waters could be countered by reference to the presence at Jinja for many years of engineers representing the Egyptian Irrigation Department.

Kenya It would not be practical so to circumscribe the activities of any Egyptian Consul in East Africa ^{as} to render him in any satisfactory degree harmless. There is virtually no trade with the U.A.R. On the other hand there is a considerable Israeli community, and trade and other relations are increasing. Moreover the Honorary Consul for Israel is a British subject. It might be possible to suggest names of a few local residents who might ^{in the last resort} ~~if necessary~~

/be

SECRET

SECRET

be suitable for appointment as Honorary Consul for the U.A.R.

Tanganyika. A U.A.R. Consular representative would have a fertile field for intrigue in activities of all Muslim Nationals of the Union of Tanganyika.

Zanzibar Relations between Arabs and Africans are always strained and the certain interference by an Arab Consul in political affairs would exacerbate the situation.

Hong Kong The Governor would like to discourage any additional Consular representation unless a valid economic interest exists, which is dubious in the case of the U.A.R. No country whose policies have been, or are likely to be, closely aligned with the Communist bloc at present has Resident Consular representation in Hong Kong.

3. You will see feelings are pretty strong in East Africa, and ~~naturally~~ ^{rather} less so in Hong Kong. The possibility (under Kenya above) of finding a harmless candidate to be Honorary Consul would be a good solution, but unfortunately it is by custom up to the sending state to choose whether to have a career or honorary Consul. We could however make good use of the point that the Israelis only have a British subject acting for them in an honorary capacity.

4. The foregoing is for your own information ^{pending}
~~We await your report~~ ^{you report} on the representations
~~which presumably you will have made on receipt~~ ^{we have asked you to make in}

Foreign Office telegram No. 19.

W
Jan 15

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
SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

FROM KENYA (Acting Governor)

Cypher (O.T.P.)

D. 1st February, 1960.
R. 1st " " " 16.30 hours.



SECRET AND PERSONAL
No.123

Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated " O. A. G. Tanganyika } PERSONAL
" " " " Uganda }
" " British Resident Zanzibar No.62

Paragraph 5 of my telegram Personal No.37.

Proposed United Arab Republic Consular
Representation in East Africa.

The field of possible honorary Consuls is not very promising. We can offer only Ali Abdulla Shikely, an English speaking Arab of about 32, who acted as a nominated member of the Legislative Council in a temporary vacancy two years ago.

2. Shikely is Vice President of Afro Arab Youth League, but he is an acceptable security risk, though I am doubtful whether he is of sufficiently high calibre to be a Consul.

Copy sent to:-
Foreign Office - Mr. R. Arculus

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INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Pw
W
W

FROM SINGAPORE (The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Selkirk)

Simplex D. 4th February, 1960.
R. 4th " " 08.55 hrs.

IMMEDIATE
SECRET
No. 48.

Your telegram No. 34.

VG1051/5(8)

VG1051/5(L)

U.A.R. Consular Representation.

Regret delay in replying. Following are my own views. Those of Singapore Government will be obtained immediately, if you so instruct.

2. We should have to accept slight risk of mischief-making, through (A) intrigue with local Moslems; (B) intrigue with Maldivians to make trouble over Gan; (C) direct espionage. On advice from Special Branch, however, I consider that this is too slight to constitute an objection.

3. By normal criteria there is no existing justification for a consulate. For example: of the two U.A.R. residents, one departed in January; no U.A.R. ships called herein 1959, and such visits generally are few and far between; and no country with such a low total of trade with Singapore has any consular representation here. Against that however, it could of course be argued that increased commerce is desirable.

4. In general, if a consulate here would be valuable to H.M.G. as a bargaining counter, I would not raise any objection.

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Foreign Office

- Mr. R. Arculus

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U.K./U.A.R. RELATIONS: CONSULAR POSTS

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Draft.
brief

for meeting on Jan 1.

Seen by Mr. Smith.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Flags A & B
BA 102/26/27(54).

(7633) 4w.

The Colonial Office have been invited to be represented at Sir Roger Stevens' meeting at 11.30 in his room on January 1. They will be represented by

African and Arabian Departments will probably also be represented.

2. Preliminary soundings have been taken of the various departments' views which are as follows.

Colonial Office

They are likely to resist all the posts named. They would want to consult the Governors in each case.

They did not think they would be able to be more liberal in say a few months' time.

The posts named are objectional^{ly} roughly in the order in which they are named in Cairo telegram No. 600.

African Department

are They interested both in the Nile Waters aspect, and in the general ~~unpleasant~~ baleful influence likely to be exercised by any Egyptian in Africa on Colonial problems, pan Africanism and the furtherance of Communist policy. They will presumably sympathise with the Colonial Office.

Arabian Department (Kuwait)

They consider that the action taken in Foreign Office telegrams No. 894 and 911 to Kuwait attached is sufficient at present.

South East Asia Department

They consider that an Egyptian could do a good deal of harm in Singapore, particularly as he
/would

would doubtless have access to Ministers there.

Far Eastern Department

They do not think that an Egyptian in Hong Kong would affect our relations with the Chinese; and it is up to the Colonial Office to comment on the harm they could do ^{by} ~~in the~~ anti-Colonial and subversive activities.

C.R.O.

They say that the U.A.R. Diplomatic Mission in Kuala Lumpur is causing the Malaysians some embarrassment, and this strengthens ^{the} case against letting them ^{Cypriotes} into Singapore.

3. We have recently consulted the Governor of Aden, who is even more unwilling to have an Egyptian Consulate than was his predecessor in 1954 and considers it even more unjustified. The Colonial Office also recently consulted East African territories about reported Egyptian demands for Consulates in Tanganyika and Kenya, and the reaction was unfavourable.

4. Israeli Consulates

^{In} ~~at~~ the Colonial posts mentioned in paragraph 1 of Cairo telegram No. 600 the Israelis have only an honorary Consulate for East Africa in Nairobi (covering Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar). They have proposed an honorary Consulate in Hong Kong and this is under consideration. They are also interested in Lagos, but the Egyptians have now dropped this from their shopping list, presumably because they expect to get it anyway.

5. On the posts they want the Egyptian case is weak on orthodox grounds i.e. because of ^{few} Egyptian residents, ^{little} trade etc. They have however three reasonable points:

- (1) A claim to be treated as favourably as the Israelis (Nairobi is the only post the Israelis have at present);

Flag C

Flag D

Flag E
Jaws/239 (ca)

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Flag F
VA.1051/240(SA).

- (ii) their desire to establish themselves in countries moving towards independence;
- (iii) Their suspicion that we shall use our posts for spying, just as we know that they will use theirs for subversive activities.

On the posts which we want the Egyptian case is very weak as regards Damascus where very many countries are represented, and which they ~~could~~ ^{cannot} reasonably equate to a Colonial post if Syria is supposed to be an integral part of the U.A.R.

6. Another consideration to be born in mind is the ~~preliminary~~ ^{Parliamentary} difficulty of justifying any concessions to the Egyptians in Africa while they continue to entertain Colonial renegades in Cairo and to pour out seditious propaganda in Swahili, etc. The choice seems to lie between (a) a bargain on the lines suggested by Mr. Crowe in paragraph 4 of his telegram No. 602, which ~~can~~ ^{could} only be done after consultation with Colonial Governments and then after quite a battle, and is in any case open to political objections; or (b) making a determined effort to get the main metropolitan posts open and stall on the remainder.

8. Since the Egyptians cannot really keep us out of Alexandria for long, and Damascus, though highly desirable, is not really essential, I think we should take the more robust line suggested in (b) above, subject to any different considerations which may emerge at the meeting.

9. Possible lines of argument for us with the Egyptians would be the following:

(a) On practical grounds we should get the metropolitan posts reopened as quickly as possible;

(b) It is unreasonable to delay our reopening in Damascus where many countries are represented;

(c)

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(c) the Swiss have current work and responsibility to hand-over to us in Damascus as well as Alexandria and it is anomalous that they should still have to act for us;

(d) The Egyptians cannot argue that ~~the~~ Damascus ^{can} ~~could~~ be equated to colonial posts when they maintain that Syria is just a region of the U.A.R. (like Wales in the U.K.);

(e) The Israelis have no career posts in any of the Colonial territories named by the Egyptians (only an honorary Consul at Nairobi);

(f) We would have to consult Colonial Governments about the Egyptian requirements, and they would take into account not only legitimate Egyptian interests, (if any), but also the U.A.R.'s record ^{and} ~~&~~ present conduct in Colonial matters;

(g) We should have to take into account also public opinion here which would have regard to Cairo's anti-colonial propaganda, anti-colonial activity in international meetings, and the facilities given to Colonial renegades in Cairo.

9. ~~(*)~~ It might also be possible to use the two ~~following~~ following points:

(i) if the Egyptians' claim for representation in East Africa is based upon requirements connected with Nile Waters, then we are willing to discuss ~~these~~ requirements in their proper context (C.O. would have to agree this);

(ii) as regards Singapore, U.A.R. interests in the area would seem to be adequately covered by their Mission in Kuala Lumpur; and the Israelis are not represented there (C.O. have agreed this point).

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

<p>1960</p>	<p>V LEVANT DEPARTMENT ARAB REPUBLIC</p>	<p>V G.1051/8.</p>
<p>FROM Submission by Sir Roger Stevens. Confidential No. Dated January 7. Received January 8.</p>	<p>SUBJECT: EGYPT <u>U.K. - U.A.R. Relations</u> Points raised when SIR ROGER STEVENS dined with MR. ARNOLD SMITH - Consul in Africa. Issues to NASSER - Suez Dam - "Asyutia".</p>	
<p>References</p>	<p>MINUTES Draft letter to Mr. Crowe submitted. H. J. [unclear] 11/11 H. J. [unclear] 11/11</p>	
<p>(Printing Instructions)</p>	<p>John [unclear] 11/11</p>	
<p>(Outward Action) Mr. [unclear] [unclear] from Sir Roger Stevens [unclear].</p>	<p>Jan 4 If you think the suggestion is [unclear], might [unclear] be pursued after the Prime Minister's return or [unclear] be good to help in [unclear] a line. I [unclear] not have thought [unclear] that there was much hope of moving Nasser in our direction on African [unclear].</p>	
<p>(Action completed) A.C. 6.6.60</p>	<p>(Main Indexed) 28/15/61</p>	<p>John [unclear] 11/11 I am inclined to agree with Mr. Arnold-Smith that it would be worth trying E.B. [unclear] 14.1.</p>
<p>-11a</p>	<p>J152 55427-1c Mr. [unclear] 12/17/61 L. B. [unclear] [unclear]</p>	

We do not all present comprehensive high-level representations to Messer. The PM's tour in Africa has not been outwardly an unqualified success, & may not be a very good ^{on which} ~~pep~~ ^{to} bring a lecture to Messer.

h 1/2.

BU 2 weeks

h 5/4.

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Vqios/s

My lunch to-day with Mr. Arnold Smith, Canadian Ambassador in Cairo, produced the following:-

1. Africa

I told him about the U.A.R. application for Consulates at Kampala, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. He agreed that the demand was exorbitant and repeated what he had said to the Secretary of State, namely that he thought that in the face of the growth of Communism the time would come when we could have useful contacts with Nasser about Africa. He suggested that periodical exchanges of view which gave the opportunity for expounding British policy in Africa might help to make Nasser realise the community of interest which he had with us and this in turn might have its effect on Cairo propaganda and even affect the demand for Consulates. I asked Mr. Smith whether he thought it would be useful if at some stage, say after the end of the Prime Minister's tour, we were able to give Mr. Crowe some guidance about our African policy for use at his discretion. He thought that this would be an excellent idea. Just as taking President Nasser into our confidence about arms for Iraq in May had produced a favourable reaction, so he was confident that any move of this kind would be beneficial.

2. Access

This brought us to the question of access to Nasser. Mr. Smith said it was really no use talking to anybody on this subject except to Nasser himself. I said that I assumed that Mr. Crowe would not be admitted to the presence in his capacity as Chargé d'Affaires. Mr. Smith said that this was indeed so and that it was a great stumbling block. I asked him whether he thought that it would help if we were able to arrange - and it might well not be possible - for the Prime Minister exceptionally to see the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires when he arrived and after the Prime Minister returned from Africa. He said that he thought that this would considerably increase the chances of Mr. Crowe seeing the President and that it would be well worth trying.

3. Aswan Dam

We discussed this at some length. I told Mr. Smith that there appeared to be two views about Egypt's intentions as regards the second stage: one was that they continued to look to the Russians and that the Russian loan would cover the bulk of the foreign

/exchange

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exchange expenditure for both stages (Mr. Ruchinski); the other was that they were hoping for Western assistance with the second stage (Mr. Paton). Mr. Smith said he inclined definitely to the second view but it was probable that they had not finally made up their minds until they had seen more of Russian performance on the first stage.

4. 'Astypalea'

Mr. Smith evinced mild regret that the International Bank had not held up approval of the loan for a week or so. Though he has not been in Cairo since that time he deduced from his knowledge of the Egyptian character that the easy passage of the loan while the controversy about the 'Astypalea' was at its height could not have failed to give the Egyptians the impression that they could get away with anything and would thus increase their intransigence in the future (this is also of course the Israeli view).

Levant Department

UP
January 7, 1960.

Copy to:- African Department

*Mr. Robinson
Mr. Arundell
tan)*

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(WG 1051/8)

January 11, 1960

During an interesting talk with Arnold Smith on January 7 I discussed with him the general question of the difficulty of gaining access to President Nasser, and in particular your doing so.

2. Unless the Egyptians decide to send Riad here very soon and we are able to appoint an Ambassador, we may be faced with the need for you to raise the question of the Financial Agreement with Nasser in order to get something done. You are already in correspondence with George Rendel about the inadequacies of the Egyptian performance, and he is asking you for ammunition to deal with the criticisms in Parliament which are expected in two or three weeks' time. It seems to us that matters will have to be taken out of the channels which have been used so far, and this presumably means getting it across to Nasser as directly as possible on the lines that, with the anniversary of the Agreement coming up next month, a real effort must now be made to clear up outstanding questions. Otherwise the Agreement, which marked the beginning of a new phase in our relations, will become the source of continued and increasing friction. If something decisive is not done to bring to an end the whole dreary process of desegregation, and to produce a visible effect, the resulting row in Parliament is bound to have a baneful effect on the further development of Anglo-U.A.R. relations. This would work to the disadvantage of the U.A.R. as well as ourselves since it would make it more difficult for us to be forthcoming and helpful, e.g. in meeting Egyptian requests. Dr. Kaissouni has always been sympathetic and it is not that there are great

/differences

G. J. Grove, Esq., C.M.G.,
Cairo.

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differences of principle which have emerged - it is merely that things do not get done at the lower levels. A directive from the President himself would surely put this straight.

3. Presumably you could not just apply for an interview to make representations of this kind to the President. I asked Arnold Smith if he thought it would help if we were able to arrange - and it might well not be possible - for the Prime Minister exceptionally to see Khalil when he arrived and after the Prime Minister returned from Africa. Arnold said he thought this would considerably increase your chance of seeing the President and it would be well worth trying. This is one possibility. Another would be to draft the instructions in the form of a message from the Prime Minister to the President which you might contrive to deliver. Another suggestion which Arnold Smith endorsed was that after the end of the Prime Minister's tour we might give you some further guidance about our African policy; Arnold thought that, just as taking Nasser into our confidence about arms for Iraq had produced a favourable reaction, so any move of this kind would be beneficial. Here again if our instructions were couched in the form of a message from the Prime Minister, following his tour in Africa, it might give you an entrée.

4. We should be very grateful to have your views about all this. Ministers have yet to consider the position reached on the Financial Agreement and what to do about it, and the question is fairly urgent because of the probability of criticism as soon as Parliament reassembles (January 26). The decision will probably be that the matter should be raised at the highest possible level in Cairo. An alternative would of course be an appeal to Eugene Black as the father of the Agreement, but I doubt whether we should want to appeal to him before we had made a high-level effort in Cairo. Perhaps in your reply you might comment on this also.

5. I am sending you by this bag an advance copy of the

/record

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record of the Secretary of State's conversation with Arnold Smith, which is relevant.

6. Since this was drafted I have seen your letter^{to me} of January 7 about the Financial Agreement. But I have decided that this letter, which deals with the difficult question of access, had better issue just the same; meanwhile we take note of your interim views!

ROGER STEVENS

CONFIDENTIAL

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JGSP
 7/1

Draft. Record of Conversation

Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State and Mr. Arnold Smith, Canadian Ambassador to Cairo on

January 6, 1960

Present

The Secretary of State Mr. Arnold Smith
 Mr. ~~XXXX~~ Beith

The Secretary of State began by saying how grateful he and his colleagues had been for the splendid help which Mr. Smith and his Embassy had given to us over the whole period preceding the resumption of relations. Mr. Smith said that he had been glad to be of service to ~~this country~~ and to ~~Western interests generally~~.

2. The Secretary of State said that he found it difficult not to be exasperated by the way in which the U.A.R. accepted concessions and prevaricated about delivering the quid pro quo. ~~Before the Financial Agreement was signed~~ We had been told that Mr. Zarb would be released ^{after signature of the Financial Agreement} but nothing had been done. The Financial Agreement itself was not being satisfactorily carried out. The U.A.R. authorities had stopped the "Astypales" just at the time the ^{and after agreement between Hammer} World Bank loan went through. ^{of the UAR.}

3. Mr. Arnold Smith agreed that the Egyptians were maddening to deal with but thought that Nasser had learned a number of lessons in the past two years and, with all his faults, represented about the most stable element in the Middle East. On the subject of who exactly was responsible for

/stopping

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

It was little enough return for what we did for Canada all over the world

*L. M. Bair
 7/1
 W. B. Sturme
 7/1*

Private Sec 7

Private

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stopping the "Astypalea" there was some discussion about the relative influence of Fawzi and Zulficar Sabri. Mr. Smith thought that Zulficar might have been responsible for stopping the ship. He could sometimes have his way on short term decisions although he did not necessarily influence Nasser's long term policy. The eclipse of Fawzi had perhaps been due to the latter's disapproval of Nasser's policy of attacking Iraq and a comeback was not to be excluded.

4. In reply to a question, Mr. Smith said that he thought Kaissouni had considerable authority within his own field of economics but that he had no ^{pre}intentions to influence foreign policy in general.

5. The Secretary of State reverted to our dissatisfaction with progress under the Financial Agreement. If only there could be improvement here our relations with Egypt could continue to develop because there was no intention on our part to ^{try to dominate} ~~fight~~ the U.A.R. ~~as a great power dominating a small one.~~ Mr. Smith said that he thought Mr. Crowe had done a very good job in putting over this attitude. He was respected and liked for his informal friendliness. He thought too that the U.A.R. Ambassador designate, Mahmoud Riad, was a good choice. He was intelligent and a confidant~~h~~ of Nasser. Mr. Smith could not with certainty answer the Secretary of State's question as to whether he was an accurate reporter, but he knew that he had a good reputation among those missions which dealt with him.

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6. The Secretary of State said that it was satisfactory that the U.A.R. had now signed a contract for three Comets. But this would not prevent an unpleasant time in Parliament over the carrying out of the Financial Agreement later this month. The storms ~~were~~^{are} mounting and he did not see at present how it would be possible for government spokesmen to avoid saying that the U.A.R. was in breach of the Agreement. It was not so much a question of the money involved as the considerable irritant to United Kingdom opinion. The Secretary of State hoped that it would be possible for Kaissouni to give a strong directive to the sequestration and Mr. Smith commented that Ali Gabri might perhaps be persuaded to give the matter a push.

7. Mr. Smith emphasised that there had been a considerable development in U.A.R. policy. Nasser was now really worried about the threat of Communism and was to that extent less interested in fomenting extreme nationalism in African countries. He had found that students ~~are~~ from Africa and working in Cairo, not only the Moslem students at Al Azhar, were deeply penetrated by Communists and he had recently worked up to the threat represented by the Communist Secretary ~~is~~ General in the Afro/Asian Secretariat. The time had come when we could have useful contacts with Nasser about Africa. His interests and ours were not now so dissimilar.

8. The Secretary of State said that he thought it would be useful for Mr. Smith to be able to talk about the atmosphere he had found in England. There was a genuine desire to improve relations here but we did not want this to be taken for weakness. It would have been quite a popular move if the Government had questioned the loan for Canal development. Our agreement to the loan had been a gesture of friendship. But we did not want good relations at any price nor were we ready to be trampled on in the process. This was where the carrying out of the Financial Agreement was so important. The Agreement had been an act of policy which the U.A.R. Government had, like ourselves, willed. They could not complain of it and they ought to carry it out. Hitherto we had given them the benefit of the doubt and attributed their unsatisfactory performance to administrative delays. Nasser ought to issue a directive to the sequestration. The probable outcry in Parliament did not worry H.M.G., with their strong majority, but it would affect Anglo/U.A.R. relations. That is what he would say to Nasser if he saw him *himself*.

9. Mr. Smith said that he would be glad to tell Nasser of the way in which the Secretary of State had spoken and the Secretary of State concurred. *provided the start - in Nasser's mind*

10. As regards the consequent suspicions *about* of British policy in the U.A.R., Mr. Smith said that the Egyptians would admit that many of these were false e.g. the rumours about

/our

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Smith did not say we could be wrong he was saying

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

our co-operation with the Parti// Populaire Syrien. / The Secretary of State commented that Nasser ought to realise that the United Kingdom wished to disengage so far as possible in the Middle East. We had certain commitments in the Persian Gulf and Southern Arabia which were burdensome but could not be shrugged off. Nevertheless the importance of the Middle East was lessened by the discovery of large sources of oil elsewhere, in Libya, the Sahara and Nigeria. We were much more relaxed about the Middle East ~~than~~ *than people seemed to think*

11. Mr. Smith commented that it would help if we could tell Nasser that we were entirely reconciled to the union of Egypt and Syria. The Secretary of State replied that Nasser could be told that we did not care, one way or the other. Our main feeling was one of sympathy for Egypt in taking on a country reputedly almost impossible to govern *for long.*

12. The Secretary of State commented that Nasser was too much of an opportunist. Did he realise that King Hussein was ~~about~~ ^{represented} the most stable ^{regime} ~~power~~ available to Jordan and that, if he was overthrown, America and England might find it much less easy to foot ~~the bill?~~ ^{for Jordan & the refugees.} Was he prepared to leave Libya alone? Mr. Smith commented that the common assumption in Egypt was that Libya would fall into Nasser's lap on the death of the present King. The Secretary of State said that that might ^{happen} ~~be so~~ but we hoped nevertheless that there was a body of independent opinion /which

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which would keep Libya from becoming a Communist or a Nasserite dominion.

13. There was some discussion about the Egyptian attitude towards the situation in Iraq. Mr. Smith said that, while Nasser had undoubtedly been tempted in the past to give tangible support to ~~the~~ anti-Qassem faction, he had learned his lesson and now did not want to be dragged in. Nevertheless he and his entourage were genuinely worried and simply did not know what to do for the best.

14. The Secretary of State asked Mr. Smith whether Nasser had ambitions to dominate Kuwait. Mr. Smith said that the idea of an Arab Development Bank was of course attractive in view of Kuwait's wealth. Perhaps the Arab League Constitution could be fixed in such a way as to permit Kuwaiti membership. But in general Mr. Smith thought that Nasser understood what a sensitive spot Kuwait was and was too wise to meddle with it. Mr. Smith threw out the idea that if Kuwait could become formally ^{independent} and a member of the United Nations it would be easier to secure international support for her against any subversion or attack. The Secretary of State replied that Kuwait was as good as independent and he did not exclude the possibility. The Ruler at present found it convenient to shelter behind our protection. The essential thing was that he should remain convinced of our capacity to defend his country.

15. Mr. Smith said that he attached importance to Nasser's ~~break~~ break with the Ba'ath
/Party

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Party leaders. These men could be attractive (Mr. Smith liked Michel Aflaq for instance) but they were troublemakers with their extreme pan-Arab nationalism. They were distinctly anti-Western and difficult to deal with and their disappearance would do us no harm. It was a good sign that Nasser no longer needed to neutralise them by giving them jobs.

16. In conclusion, the Secretary of State agreed with Mr. Smith that the basic trend in Anglo/U.A.R. relations was satisfactory but he added that the U.A.R. must realise that they on their side had to make an effort if this trend was to be maintained. Nasser had to show himself a statesman on whose word one could rely. He ought to consider the benefits which had flowed to India owing to Nehru's statesmanship, ~~although~~ ^{the} the latter was by no means a blind supporter of the West. Mr. Smith said that he understood this. His final comment was that the French were somewhat disappointed at having been left behind in the move towards diplomatic relations. The Egyptians had meant to act pari passu with Britain and France but the French had accepted an arrangement for a Consulate-General to expand commercial ^{of the usual} ~~BUSINESS~~, whereas we had not.

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*but Western
governments
knewed his
how
that this will
trust Nasser*

SW

1000

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT

V G. 1051/10.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

FROM Mr. D. G. House,
 Cairo.

Confidential

No. 23.

Dated January 15.

Received January 16.

SUBJECT: **EGYPT**
Consulates.

MR. CROWE saw HOUARD CHALEB - announced that the U.A.R. would not make things difficult for Colonial Governments if they had consulates in Colonial Territories.

References

-10.

MINUTES

A). Mr. D. G. House, Cairo - 24 - January 15.

No. 23 sent to Colonial Office (Mr. Watson - 2 copies).

No. 24 sent to Rome by bag.

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

20). D.M. Watson, C.O. } Jan 18.
 S.W. Redford, C.R.O. }

a). Rome no 25. Jan 19.

This was not too bad. The Swiss are happy to continue in Alexandria & Damascus & have not made representations to the U.A.R. Govt. that this is inconvenient etc. We cannot make them do so if they do not want to. We await a response from M. Chaleb.

(Action completed)	(Main Indexed)
25/1/60	25/1/60

African Dept. 25/1/60

M. Chaleb 18/1.

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see now Cairo Tel. no. 30.
 26/1/60

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FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE VQ1051/10.

Cypher/OTP

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WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Crowe
No. 23
January 15, 1960

R: 4.08 p.m. January 15, 1960

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 23 of January 15.
Repeated for information to: Berne.

✓ V61051/5.
Your telegram No. 19: Consulates.

I could not (repeat not) see Mourad Ghaleb, the Under-Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [?omission] today. I spoke on the lines of your paragraph 3 and said that we should open the leading posts where there was an urgent job of work to be done and where the Swiss were exercising responsibilities for us which they wished to shed. That meant, as far as we were concerned, Alexandria and Damascus, and as far as they were concerned, Liverpool and, if they wanted, Manchester. (Ghaleb interjected that they did not (repeat not) need Manchester now). We hoped we could agree on this as a practical measure for a start.

2. I had, however, to tell Ghaleb that the Colonial Governments found very great difficulty over Egyptian requests. I said that, quite frankly, we feared that the Egyptian consulates would be used for hostile propaganda. U.A.R. were, after all, spreading anti-colonial propaganda; they were providing facilities for colonial renegades in Cairo, and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council, which we believed had strong Communist support, was based in Cairo. At a time when important constitutional developments were taking place the Governments did not (repeat not) wish more disturbing elements than there were already.

3. Ghaleb replied that he fully understood the point that I was making. He could however, assure me that U.A.R. Government had no (repeat no) intention of trying to make things difficult for Colonial Governments. As far as the renegades were concerned, he said that they gave them no (repeat no) support and watched them closely. He referred to the case of Belix Moumiye and said that his presence in Cairo had not (repeat not) prevented U.A.R. from recognising the new Government of the Cameroons. They suspected that he was in touch with Communists and they kept a close eye on his activities. Thus his presence here did not (repeat not) mean that they were following a policy hostile to the new Cameroon Government. Ghaleb admitted that the Afro-Asian

/Solidarity
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Cairo telegram No. 23 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

Solidarity Council had Communist support, but claimed that they had reduced U.A.R. staff and had restricted the Council's activities. Ghaleb went on to say that they realised that new Governments might not (repeat not) necessarily be favourable to their interests. He said that Qasim, who they believed to be an Arab nationalist, had turned out to be more hostile than Nuri Said ever was. He implied, in other words, that U.A.R. authorities had learnt their lesson. He went on to assure me, most solemnly, that it was no (repeat no) part of U.A.R.'s desire to indulge in subversive activities and that this was not (repeat not) their policy. He asked me to be sure to convey these assurances to you.

4. We left it that he would consider our proposals for the immediate opening of Alexandria, Damascus and Liverpool and I would inform him if there were any developments from our side.

Foreign Office please pass to Berne.

[Repeated as requested]

JJJJJ

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FROM BERNE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

Sir W. Montagu-Pollock

No. 4
January 4, 1960.

D: 2.37 p.m. January 4, 1960.

R: 2.46 p.m. January 4, 1960.

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL



Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 4 of January 4
Repeated for information Cairo;

My telegram No. 250.

VG1051/1
VG1051/137(D)

The Political Department tell me that the Swiss Ambassador at Cairo has expressed to them concern that the U.A.R. Government may refuse to recognise his authority to perform consular functions on our behalf in Alexandria and Damascus in the absence of some fresh formal agreement between the Swiss Embassy and the U.A.R. Government.

2. The Department desires, therefore, to learn urgently what our intentions are regarding these two posts and, in particular, how long we estimate negotiations regarding the reopening of the Consulates will take. If the likelihood is that settlement will be reached in the course of the next two weeks, the Ambassador may be able to maintain the present position. Otherwise he feels he must reach an understanding with the Egyptian Authorities. In order to do this he needs guidance from us.

3. I should be grateful for telegraphic reply.

Foreign Office pass Immediate to Cairo as my telegram No. 1.

[Repeated as requested]

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary
Sir F. Hoyer Millar
Sir R. Stevens
Head of Levant Department

HHHHH

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to Mr. G. G.

6

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO BERNE

Cypher/OTP

FOREIGN OFFICE (SECRET) AND
WHITEHALL (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

No. 8
January 6, 1960

D: 8.25 p.m. January 6, 1960

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Berne telegram No. 8 of January 6.
Repeated for information to Cairo. [Priority]

Your telegram No. 4 [of January 4]: Consulates in Egypt].

Please inform the Federal Political Department that we regard it as important to get at least the main metropolitan posts (Alexandria and Damascus) re-opened as soon as possible, and to separate this question from Egyptian demands for new non-metropolitan posts which will take time to consider (see Cairo telegrams 600, 601 and 602, copies in this week's bag). We regret very much the inconvenience to the Swiss involved in their carrying on in the Consular posts in the meantime but we cannot of course say when the Egyptians will give us satisfaction.

2. It might help the Swiss and us if they were themselves to intervene with the U.A.R. authorities on the following lines. They are anxious to complete their hand-over to us as soon as possible. Divided responsibility is unsatisfactory and inefficient. It could cause delay and inconvenience to Egyptian interests. The work of handing over responsibility in Cairo has been completed, and they wish to take parallel action in the other posts, particularly in Alexandria and Damascus, as soon as possible. The U.A.R. authorities themselves would surely wish to be able to deal in these matters exclusively with the United Kingdom authorities in the future. They would therefore welcome an assurance that these United Kingdom posts can be re-opened at a very early date.

3. If the Swiss agree to act on these lines, it would be helpful if the Swiss Ambassador could be instructed to keep in touch with Mr. Crewe, in order to co-ordinate action to the best effect. I would in any case hope that the Swiss Government would not approach the U.A.R. Government for a specific authorization to continue in charge of our interests for a further period.

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Foreign Office telegram No. 8 to Berne.

-2-

This would merely strengthen the U.A.R. Government's hand in delaying a decision to allow us to re-open in Damascus and Alexandria.

CCO

CONFIDENTIAL

<p>1950</p>	<p>V</p> <p>LEVANT DEPARTMENT</p> <hr/> <p>UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND</p>	<p>V G. 1051/3 ✓</p>		
<p>FROM S.D.N., Cairo to Levant Department.</p> <p>No.</p> <p>Dated December 21, 1959.</p> <p>Received January 4, 1960.</p>	<p>SUBJECT: EGYPT</p> <p><u>U.K. - U.A.R. relations</u></p> <p>Note no. 12 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - the British Diplomatic Mission has taken over the functions formerly performed by the British Property Commission</p>			
<p>References VG 1051/67(SA)</p>	<p>MINUTES</p> <p style="text-align: right;">M. 4/1.</p> <p>British Property in Egypt Section.</p> <p>I presume this means that the Certificate demanded of all property owners or their agents will now be Signed by our Mission.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">M. H. H. H. H. H. 7/1. A. D. D. D. D. D. 14/1/60</p> <p style="text-align: center;">R 4/2</p> <p style="text-align: center;">If Jacoby brief also done 2/4</p>			
<p>(Printing Instructions)</p> <p>(Outward Action)</p>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center;"> <p>(Action completed)</p> <p>REF 5.2.60</p> </td> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center;"> <p>(Main Indexed)</p> <p>SM 28/5/60</p> </td> </tr> </table>		<p>(Action completed)</p> <p>REF 5.2.60</p>	<p>(Main Indexed)</p> <p>SM 28/5/60</p>
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No. 12

The British Diplomatic Mission presents its compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic and, with reference to the Ministry's Note of the 23rd of April to the Embassy of Switzerland about the Commission for British Property in the Egyptian Region, has the honour to inform the Ministry that, following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, the Mission has taken over from the Commission the functions hitherto performed by the latter in connection with the implementation of the Agreement signed in Cairo on the 26th of February, 1959, between the two Governments.

The British Diplomatic Mission is also taking over from the Embassy of Switzerland, with effect from today, the functions hitherto exercised by that Embassy in connection with de-sequestration.

The Mission would be grateful if the Ministry would officially inform the Office of the Sequestrator-General of these changes, so that British seals and stamps on documents will be acceptable to the de-sequestration authorities in place of Swiss ones from the date mentioned.

The Mission avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic the assurance of its highest consideration.

C 100

December 21, 1959.

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I paid a courtesy call on Dr. Murad Ghaleb, the newly appointed Under-Secretary in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on December 19. He was most cordial and should be a great improvement on his predecessor, Mr. Saleh Khalil.

2. We did not get on to any serious discussion, but the following points came up:

a) Consulates

Dr. Ghaleb said the Ministry were considering their position on our request. He referred to some alleged remarks by myself to him at a dinner party earlier this year, to the effect that the question of Consulates would be easier after the establishment of diplomatic relations. He went on to imply that they would be asking for Consulates in the dependent territories of Africa to match those we proposed to set up in the U.A.R. (I have no recollection of making any remarks about Consulates beyond repeating what I said to Ali Sabri in reply to U.A.R. complaints that we had not permitted them to establish themselves in Colonial territories before independence and had instead let the Israelis in). A separate telegram is being sent to London about this.

b) Cultural Affairs

In the course of describing my staff, I said that I proposed to have a Cultural Attache, although the British Council would not be opened yet. The Cultural Attache would concentrate on the exchange of students and teachers. I described some of Mr. Dodderidge's discussions here. Dr. Ghaleb said that he welcomed these proposals. He himself, as a medical Doctor, was in favour of scientific rather than of purely cultural exchanges.

c) Economic Relations

Dr. Ghaleb expressed his desire for the development of economic relations. He said that the U.E. was prosperous and he hoped that it would form a good market for U.A.R. products. He said that the U.A.R. Government were wondering about the implications of the European Free Trade Association. Would it help under-developed countries? I said that I thought it probably would be beneficial to them in that it would provide an expanding market for their products. In the E.F.T.A., moreover, as opposed to the Common Market, G.K. and Portuguese Colonies were excluded. I said that if he was interested in E.F.T.A., I would see that he was provided with

/documentation.

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documentation. I knew that my Swedish colleague had much material. (I will get in touch with Mr. Eng).

I stressed that Lancashire would never again be able to buy the former quantities of Egyptian cotton because the industry was structurally smaller, but I hoped that they could develop other exports. It seemed to me important that the U.A.R. should learn how to sell their products, and should send businessmen to the U.K. to study the market. Dr. Ghaleb entirely agreed.

d) High Dam

Dr. Ghaleb said he had seen a number of reports in the press about British firms being interested in the second stage of the High Dam. Was there anything in these reports, or were they press speculation? I said that I thought they were largely press speculation, though, of course, British firms particularly those who had been in the former Consortium, would, no doubt, like to co-operate. As far as U.S. Government was concerned, they had taken no position at all. It seemed to us to be still early days.

3. In conclusion, I said that I would be concentrating primarily upon economic and cultural affairs and on desquestration. It was important for our relations that the latter should be got out of the way.

4. Dr. Ghaleb asked if I had any information about our proposed Ambassador. He said that he had seen a report to the effect that Sir Alwyn Jones might be appointed. Was this true? He was evidently rather concerned. I replied that as far as I knew he could not be dismissed. Sir Alwyn Jones was about to retire. As far as I heard, London had not nominated anybody yet for the post.

(C. F. Croxson)
December 21, 1959

Mr. Arthur
Mr. Davidson
Mr. Phipps

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT

VG. 1051/2

FROM Mr. S. G. Innes, Cairo
 to Mr. J. J. D. Beith.

Confidential.

No. 1402/54.
 Dated December 22, 1954.
 Received January 5, 1955.

SUBJECT: EGYPT

U.K. - U.A.R. relations

Copy of a minute recording Mr. Crowe's first call on Dr. MURAD CHARLES on December 21.

References

Vc.1016/1.

MINUTES

The question of the Consulates has been dealt with separately. Mr. Beith has also written to Mr. Crowe about it. Ambassador to be (is) only saying that a letter will have reached him from P. Dept. 2. Mr. Crowe said the right thing on the Atwan Dam. He will receive copies of P.O. Vols. No. 21 to Bonn & 54 to Washington which will put him in the picture. At present we have nothing else to say. Moussa Arafa is quoted in agency reports today as saying that a British firm (unspecified) is interested. The Egyptian press are giving the impression that Britain, Germany, Japan & Italy are all queuing up to give aid for the second stage. And Arafa is reported to have said (again) that the 2nd stage is completely open. I think the Egyptians want to keep it so. When we hear replies from W. Gov. &

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)

(Action completed)

(Main Indexed)

RET

JH 8/61
 287 8/61

Some in night have something to say to Mr. Cross.

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h.g.

BU 1 week.

The tel. from Washington & Bonn have been sent to Cairo. We have nothing more to say at present.

h. 15/1.

BU 10 days.


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(1902/59)

BRITISH DIPLOMATIC MISSION,
CAIRO.

December 24, 1959.

My Dear John,

I enclose a copy of a minute on my first call on Dr. Murad Ghaleb, the new Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I have already commented on his appointment in my letter of December 19.

2. As was only to be expected, nothing very significant passed at this first interview, but you may be interested to see the points that did come up. We are clearly going to have a tussle about Consulates. I was a bit shattered when Ghaleb referred to my alleged remarks, but on reflection my conscience is clear, since I know that I have not discussed the establishment of Consulates with any Egyptian beyond what I said in connexion with Ali Sabri's remarks.

3. You will be amused about their apprehensions at the appointment of Sir Gladwyn Jebb. I presume there is no intention of appointing him?

4. As for the High Dam, you should know that there has been a great deal in the press recently about British interest, but it all looks to me to be artificially created. Is there any other line that you would like me to take in relation to H.M.G.'s position?

Yours ever,

C. T. Crowe

(C. T. Crowe)

J. G. S. Beith, Esq., C.M.G.,
Levant Department,
Foreign Office, S.W.1.

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Record of Meeting in Sir Roger Stevens' office at 11.30 a.m.
on January 1, 1960.

U.K./U.A.R. RELATIONS: CONSULAR POSTS.

Present

Mr. J.G.S. Beith
in the chair

Mr. N.D. Watson

Mr. A.S. Aldridge, Colonial Office

Mr. R.A. Beaumont, Head of Arabian Department,

Mr. C.T. Ewart-Biggs, African Department

Mr. R. Arculus, Levant Department.

Mr. Beith referred to the problem created by the Egyptian request reported in the Cairo telegram No. 600 for consuls in Aden, East Africa, Hong Kong and Singapore. Our own essential needs were for posts as soon as possible in Damascus and Alexandria. There were three possible ways of proceeding. First we could try to secure the return to the status quo ante, but Mr. Crowe thought this unnegotiable. Secondly we could press for the early re-opening of the metropolitan posts as a matter of practical necessity, without entangling them with the question of new posts. Thirdly we could stand pat on our previous position and refuse to consider any new posts.

2. Mr. Watson said that the Colonial Office could not agree in the case of Aden and East Africa. Egyptian activities through Cairo Radio, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Council and the activities of colonial renegades operating from Cairo were all highly objectionable. The appointment of consuls in Africa would give the Egyptians opportunities to extend the subversive front deep into the continent. It was not worth while consulting Governors again, since their attitude was bound to be strongly negative. In Singapore and Hong Kong there was less scope for Egyptian mischief-making, especially in the latter. In the case of Singapore it could reasonably be argued that Egyptian needs can be met by their existing Mission in Kuala Lumpur. The Colonial Office would be prepared to refer to territories for their views on the possibility of their tolerating Egyptian consulates, and it was agreed that the Colonial Office should undertake this.

3. Mr. Beith enquired whether the proximity of independence in any of the posts concerned would make any difference. Mr. Watson said that there were no early prospects for any of the posts concerned, and 1960 was likely to be a crucial year for colonial development.

4. Mr. Beith pointed to the difficulty of refusing the Egyptians a consul in Nairobi where the Israelis have an Honorary Consul covering Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar.

/Mr. Aldridge

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Mr. Aldridge undertook to ask the authorities in Nairobi about the activities of the Israel Honorary Consul and for their views on whether the activities of an Egyptian counterpart could be so circumscribed as to render him relatively harmless. (There was some discussion of the difference between an honorary consul and a career consul, which is substantial in practice. Unfortunately the choice of whether a career or local consul is chosen depends upon the sending power not upon the receiving power, and therefore it would not be possible for H.M. Government to offer the Egyptians an honorary consul in Nairobi to match the Israeli).

5. On Kuwait, Mr. Beaumont said that Mr. Richmond already had instructions on what he should say to the Ruler about the disadvantages of foreign consulates in general and an Egyptian consulate in particular. In answer to a question by Mr. Beith he said that it was possible that the Ruler might not continue to maintain a firm line.

6. On East Africa, Mr. Ewart-Biggs said that the Egyptians had a legitimate Nile Waters interest, but this was adequately catered for by the technical consultation arrangements already existing. It was agreed that we could say to the Egyptians that if their claim for representation in East Africa were based substantially upon their requirements in respect of Nile Waters, then we considered that their technical representative at Jinja already had adequate facilities, but if there was any point the Egyptians wished to raise in this respect then it should be considered as a Nile Waters and not as a Consular matter.

7. Mr. Ewart-Biggs also asked whether there was any possibility of a bargain under which we would give more favourable consideration to Egyptian requests for consulates in Africa if they would cease their anti-colonial propaganda on Cairo Radio. Mr. Watson pointed out that Egyptian activities through colonial renegades were really more dangerous than the output of Cairo Radio, and it was agreed that no basis for a bargain existed. This should not however preclude us from continuing to make representations about the objectionable propaganda.

8. It was agreed that the Foreign Office would submit the matter to higher authority with recommendations for instructions to Cairo, and that meanwhile the Colonial Office would take the necessary soundings in Singapore, Hong Kong and Nairobi as agreed.

Copy to:

Mr. N.D. Watson
Mr. A.S. Aldridge
Mr. R.A. Beaumont
Mr. C.T. Ewart-Biggs

V
 LEVANT DEPARTMENT
 UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

V G 1051/5.

FROM Submission by Mr. J. J. Smith.
 Secret.
 dated January 4.
 received January 7.

SUBJECT: **EGYPT**
 U.K. - U.A.R. Relations: Consular Posts
 U.A.R.'s request for six new posts in Colonial Territories - Colonial Office's action.

References
 VG 1051/229/240 (59).
 VG 1051/4.

MINUTES

a). Colonial Office (communicated) to Hong Kong 3 - January 5.

CO. have sent (good) Vels. to H. Kong & Singapore. We await Mr. Cross's reply to our instructions. BU. 1 week. W. S. J.

(Printing Instructions)

(Outward Action)
 Mr. P. to Mr. J. in form 10.
 Mr. J. to Mr. P. in form 10.
 Mr. J. to Mr. P. in form 10.
 Mr. P. to Mr. J. in form 10.
 Mr. J. to Mr. P. in form 10.
 Mr. P. to Mr. J. in form 10.

African Dept. 12/11
 F.R. Dept. 12/11
 S.E.A.D. 12/11
 Arabian Dept. 12/11

See now Hong Kong & Zanzibar replies. Nothing from Nairobi yet.

(Action completed)	(Main Indexed)

(contd.)
 Please see now the replies from Tanganyika and Kenya, particularly the latter. Sir P. Renison makes quite a good case, and provides us with two good arguments in paragraph 3, namely that there is a considerable Israeli community as well as trade and other relations between the Colony and Israel, and also that the Honorary Consul for Israel is a British subject. It seems however unlikely that the enquiries described in paragraph 5 of the telegram will help, since it is the sending state which decides whether to appoint a Career

Consul or an Honorary Consul. This is a pity as otherwise that might have offered a useful solution.

2. No action is required until we hear further from Mr. Crowe.

[Signature]
Africa Dept. 11/12
no. 124

[Signature]
(R. Arculus)
January 14, 1960.

[Signature]
14/12

You may like to see this
interim collection of tels.
to *[Signature]*
14/12

I do not find the Nairobi tel.
very persuasive; Kampala is rather
weak so. And what does Sir P. Remain
mean by potential nationals of the UAR
having been deprived of their nationality?
By whom?

I think these tels. or a summary
of them shd go to Mr Crowe to keep
him in the picture.

[Signature]
14/12

- B). Admiral Office (communicated) from Hong Kong 27 - January 7.
- C). Admiral Office (communicated) from Zanzibar 7 - January 8.
- D). Admiral Office (communicated) to Singapore 8 - January 8.
- E). Admiral Office (communicated) to Kenya Pass 2, Kenya Pass 1, Kenya Pass 2, Zanzibar 14 - January 8.

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FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

Cypher/OTP and By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE SECRET AND
WHITEHALL SECRET DISTRIBUTION

No. 19
January 6, 1960

D. 6.55 p.m. January 6, 1960

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Cairo telegram No. 19 of January 6
Repeated for information Saving to Berne No. 10

Your telegrams Nos. 600, 601 and 602 [of December 27: Consulates].

As you surmise the Egyptian demands are very difficult. Kuwait we shall have to leave to the Ruler, to whom our views on the risks of admitting foreign consulates and an Egyptian consulate in particular have been made clear. The Colonial Office have strongly maintained their objections to the Aden and East African posts. They are however prepared to consult Singapore and Hong Kong, where opportunities for Egyptian mischief-making would be less; and also to put to Nairobi the point that it is more difficult for us to resist in that case because of the presence of an honorary Israel Consul there.

2. We had hoped that you would be able to press for a return to the status quo ante, especially as you had previously reported your own and the Swiss Ambassador's view that Damascus would not present undue difficulty. If you think this tactic is now impracticable you should argue on the following lines.

3. We have noted the Egyptian request for posts in London, Liverpool and certain places in Colonial territories. We suggest the first step, on practical grounds, should be to open the leading posts where the main volume of business arises as quickly as possible (but see paragraph 8 below). This means in practice, we think, London and Liverpool for them, and Manchester (a previous Syrian post) if they wish. For us it would mean at least, Damascus and Alexandria. As necessary you could make use of the following points:

(a) there is a job to be done and we do not want everything held up while we travel at the pace of the slowest;

/(b)

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Foreign Office telegram No. 19 to Cairo

- 2 -

(b) it is unreasonable to delay our re-opening in Damascus where very many countries are represented;

(c) the Swiss have current work and responsibilities to hand over to us in Damascus as well as Alexandria and an awkward situation will arise if they have to continue to act for us (off. Berne telegram No. 4 and my reply)

(d) the Egyptians cannot argue that Damascus should be equated to Colonial posts while maintaining that Syria is an integral part of the U.A.R. (like Wales in the United Kingdom).

4. On the Colonial posts, the Egyptians must realise that they present considerable difficulty. Their direct interests in the places concerned are minimal. Their anti-Colonial activities (radio propaganda with its violent and seditious content, the exploitation of Colonial renegades in Cairo, and the furtherance of Soviet and Chinese Communist objectives through the Afro Asian Peoples' Solidarity Council) inevitably suggest that U.A.R. Consulates would be used to disseminate such propaganda. If necessary, you could make use of the following:

(e) the Israelis have no career consuls in any of the posts named by the Egyptians (only an honorary consul at Nairobi);

(f) if the Egyptians' claim for representation in East Africa is based upon requirements connected with Nile Waters, then we consider those already covered by the existing technical consultation arrangements; any point arising from these should be discussed in the Nile Waters context, not as a consular matter; and

(g) as regards Singapore, U.A.R. interests in the area appear to be adequately covered by their Mission in Kuala Lumpur, where the Israelis are not represented.

5. You should avoid giving the impression that if Cairo radio were to moderate its attacks we would then be prepared to grant the Egyptian requests without further ado.

6. You should base your argument in respect of Damascus on practical grounds and on points (a), (b) and (c) in paragraph 3 above, and try to avoid giving the impression that we are eager to get Damascus because of recent developments (resignation of five ministers) or that our objectives are primarily political.

/7.

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Foreign Office telegram No. 19 to Cairo

-3-

7. Since it will undoubtedly be very difficult to give any real satisfaction on the U.A.R. Government's list as a whole it seems important to make a determined effort now to re-open in Damascus and Alexandria on the basis indicated in paragraph 3 above. If at this stage we agree that it is reasonable to bargain over the list of colonial posts we may only encourage the Egyptians to raise their price.

8. If you find that there is no possibility of reaching agreement on the basis suggested above, we can of course await the outcome of the enquiry about Hong Kong and Singapore. However in that case, we might prefer to play the negotiation long in the hope that the U.A.R. would come to realise that our demand for Consulates in Alexandria and Damascus was reasonable.

bbbbb

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AM 1953
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VG1051/5.

U.K./U.A.R. relations: Consular Posts.

The Egyptians have not yet agreed to our re-opening

our old consular posts in the U.A.R. and have raised a request for six new posts in colonial territories in addition to London and Liverpool which they had before. (Cairo

VG1051/239
Flags A, B
and C

telegrams Nos. 600, 601, 602). The new posts are Aden, Nairobi, Dar-es-Salam, Kampala, Hong Kong and Singapore.

VG1051/229(A)
VG1051/240

2. We had hoped that it would be possible to revert to the status quo ante and deal with the question of new posts separately and subsequently. Mr. Crowe considers this impracticable now, and suggests a horse-trade (paragraph 4 of his telegram No. 602).

Flag C
VG1051/240.

3. Whether a horse-trade is possible depends upon what concessions, if any, the Colonial Office are prepared to make. We consulted them at a meeting on January 1 and they maintained strong objections in the case of Aden and East Africa, and said it was unnecessary to consult the governments concerned because they were bound to resist strongly. The Colonial Office regard as highly objectionable and dangerous Egyptian use of colonial renegades in Cairo, radio propaganda and the furtherance of communist ends through the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Council. They did, however, agree to consult Nairobi about the difficulty of denying the Egyptians a post there where the Israelis already have an Honorary Consul for East Africa (the only Israel Consulate at the posts in question). They also agreed to consult Singapore and Hong Kong where the opportunities for Egyptian mischief-making would be less than in East Africa, or Aden. It is possible that we might as a result of this get at any rate Hong Kong to use as a bargaining counter, though it would have little attraction to the Egyptians and Mr. Crowe thinks it insufficient to guarantee us Damascus.

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4. The Egyptian case is, however, a weak one. By the orthodox tests they have minimal interests in the places concerned to justify consular posts. It would be totally unreasonable to keep us out of Damascus where so many countries are represented. Moreover they cannot reasonably equate Damascus to a colonial post if they claim Syria to be an integral part of the U.A.R. Our essential requirements are Alexandria and - of less practical importance but highly desirable and more interesting politically - Damascus. They can hardly keep us out of Alexandria for long, and I suggest that our best course would be to make a determined effort to separate the question of Damascus from that of the new posts. There are a number of arguments which can be adduced, and I submit a draft telegram to Cairo accordingly which has been cleared with the Colonial Office.

J.G.S. Beith
(J.G.S. Beith)
 January 4, 1960.

NB. I also attach a reply to Berne tel. No. 4 at Flag H

Copy
 Mr. Profumo.

VBMS/1

U.B. Stevens

I agree. But I'm not very hopeful of his success in his démarche.

A. Hornum

JW

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S.I.

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SECRET

PW

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

TO HONG KONG (Sir R. Black)

VG1051/5 (A)

Simplex

IRD 78/02

Sent 5th January, 1960. 18.30 hrs.

PRIORITY

SECRET

No. 8.

United Arab Republic Consular Representation.

Consequent upon the resumption of diplomatic relations the U.A.R. have asked to open a number of consulates in British territories in East Africa and the Far East, including Hong Kong. The objections as regards East Africa are strong but there seems less scope for Egyptian mischief making in the Far East. Grateful to know by telegraph whether you see any strong objection to this Egyptian request as regards Hong Kong. If you had no such objection it might be useful to offer this consulate in exchange for a British one in U.A.R. territory, though the matter is entirely open at present.

Cost of telegram £6 12s. 11d.

Copy sent to:-

Foreign Office

- Mr. R. Arculus

SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

FROM HONG KONG (Sir R. Black)

Simplex D. 9th January, 1960.
R. 9th " " " 06.30 hrs.

PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 27.

Your telegram No. 8.

U.A.R. Consular Representation.

From the purely Hong Kong point of view this proposal has little attraction. The size of our Consular Corps (23 career posts, 4 additional Trade Commissioners and 15 Honorary Consuls) is already out of all proportion to the size of the territory or the interests of the countries represented, and this is becoming a real social embarrassment. Generally speaking I would like to discourage additional representation unless a valid economic interest exists and I am advised that such interest in the case of the U.A.R. is dubious.

2. No country whose policies have been, or are likely to be, closely aligned with the Communist bloc at present has Resident Consular representation in Hong Kong. Such representation might be greatly to our disadvantage, and I cannot disregard the possibility in this case of the U.A.R.'s foreign policy changing to the extent that their consulate here might be used to promote Communist activities.

3. However, I appreciate that it may be important to secure the reciprocal advantages in the U.A.R., and would not wish to press the above objections provided that their implications have been duly considered in London.

Copy sent to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. R. Arculus

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SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

FROM ZANZIBAR (Acting British Resident)

Cypher (O.T.P.)

D. 8th January, 1960.
R. 8th " " " 11.50 hrs.

RECEIVED IN
1960
VG 1051/5(c)

IMMEDIATE
SECRET AND PERSONAL
No. 7

Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated " Governor Kenya.
" " " Tanganyika. } by airmail.
" " " Uganda.

Your telegram No. 4 of 6th January.

United Arab Republic Consular Representations.

Strongly opposed to establishment of Consulate in Zanzibar. Special reason for avoiding this is that relations between Arabs and Africans are always strained and the certain interference by an Arab Consul in Political Affairs would be likely to exacerbate this situation. If Consulate in East Africa unavoidable least harm likely to result if it is in Nairobi as this is physically remote from coastal areas and Zanzibar, which are likely to be centre of U.A.R. propaganda and intrigue. It would not be possible to circumscribe activities of a Consul.

Copy sent to:-

Foreign Office - Mr. R. Arculus

Seen by African Dept.

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SECRET
OUTWARD TELEGRAM


FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

TO SINGAPORE (U.K. Commissioner -
The Rt. Hon. Earl of Selkirk)

Simplex

IRD. 78/02

Sent 8th January, 1960. 18.15 hours.



PRIORITY
SECRET
No. 8

United Arab Republic Consular Representation.

Consequent upon the resumption of diplomatic relations with the U.A.R. the Egyptians have asked to open a number of consulates in British territories in East Africa and the Far East, including Singapore. The objections as regards East Africa are strong but there seems less scope for Egyptian mischief making in the Far East.

2. Grateful, if you see no objection therefore if, in accordance with paragraph 2 (b) of despatch dated 6th July, 1959, to Yang di-Pertuan Negara, you would consult Singapore Government and report by telegraph their reaction to this proposal as regards Singapore. It could be argued that U.A.R. interests in the area could be adequately covered by their Mission in Kuala Lumpur (members of which, I assume, have no difficulty in visiting Singapore); but on the other hand it may be useful to allow them this consulate (subject to local views) in exchange for a British consulate in U.A.R. territory. The matter is entirely open at the moment.

(Cost of telegram £10 1s. 8d.)

Copy sent to:-

Foreign Office - Mr. R. Arculus

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SECRET
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Mr. Jenkins
Mr. P.W.

- TO (1) KENYA
 (2) TANGANYIKA
 (3) UGANDA
 (4) ZANZIBAR

RECEIVED IN
 ADDRESSES

Cypher (O.T.P.)

IRD 78/02

✓
 V61051/5 (E)

Sent 5th January, 1960. 23.00 hrs.

PRIORITY (To addressees only)

SECRET AND PERSONAL

- (1) PERSONAL No. 2.
 (2) PERSONAL No. 3.
 (3) PERSONAL No. 1.
 (4) No. 4.

Addressed to Governor, Kenya.
 " " " Tanganyika.
 " " " Uganda.
 " " Acting British Resident, Zanzibar.
 Repeated to Administrator, East Africa High Commission,
 No. 6 (Governor Kenya please pass).

United Arab Republic Consular Representation.

Consequent on re-establishment of diplomatic relations (my telegram Personal No. 291) U.A.R. have asked to open consulates in our East African territories. This is obviously objectionable on many grounds, but position is unfortunately complicated by existence of Israeli Honorary Consul in Nairobi (covering Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar). Egyptians may well argue for parity of at least one similar consulate. Choice however of whether a career or local (honorary) consul is appointed depends upon the sending power and it would not be possible for H.M.G. to offer the Egyptians only an honorary consul to match the Israelis.

2. Grateful to learn your views by telegraph and in particular, whether the activities of an Egyptian consul (honorary or otherwise) could possibly be so circumscribed as to render him comparatively harmless..

Cost of telegram £17 ls. 0d.

Copy sent to:-

Foreign Office - Mr. R. Arculus

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SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

FROM KENYA (Sir P. Renison)

Cypher (O. T. P.)

V(G1051/5(H).

D. 12th January, 1960.

R. 12th " " 17.20 hrs.

SECRET AND PERSONAL
No. 37.

Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated to Governor, Tanganyika
" " " Uganda
" " British Resident, Zanzibar
No. 21.

Your telegram Personal No. 2 to Kenya.

Proposed United Arab Republic Consular Representation
in East Africa.

I view this proposal with dismay. It would not be practicable so to circumscribe the activities of any Egyptian Consul in East Africa to render him in any satisfactory degree harmless.

2. I had always supposed a nation established consulates in another country primarily to look after the affairs and interests of its own nationals who live and work there, and to foster trade relations. Prior to break of diplomatic relations, there was never any suggestion that either of the countries forming the United Arab Republic should have a consular representative in East Africa, and there has never appeared to be any need for it. Almost all potential nationals of United Arab Republic who live in East Africa have been deprived of their nationality, and there is virtually no trade between the two regions. Inevitably, therefore, any (corrupt group) Consulate in East Africa would be a focus for espionage, subversion, and worse, of which we have a foretaste three years ago as was reported to you at the time.

3. "Per contra", there is a considerable Israeli community in Kenya which plays an important part in the economic life of the Colony, and trade and other relations between the two countries are increasing. The Honorary Consul for Israel is a British subject who plays a leading part in local government and the commercial activities of the Colony, and he has served as a Lieutenant-Colonel in the British Army.

/4.

SECRET