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AIR BAG
SECRET
11912/1/87/56

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
March 8, 1956.

Dear Hadow,

1192/310

Tel Aviv reported in their telegram No.18 Saving that there had been fierce attacks on Mr. Dulles' testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24. It is not very surprising. When the Saudi Arabian tank shipment was temporarily cancelled, it was argued by some pro-Israeli quarters here that from their point of view it was unfortunate since, if the tanks had gone, the Administration would have been unable to resist pressure to supply some arms to Israel. When the cancellation was reversed, it was confidently predicted - one might almost say generally assumed in the press both by those writing the pro-Israeli line and others - that Mr. Dulles would have to announce some relaxation of his inflexible stand in regard to arms for Israel. His testimony must have come as a great disappointment.

2. The reaction has certainly been violent in Zionist circles here. As you may have noticed from our telegram No. 187 Saving, the word seems to have gone out that Mr. Dulles himself in particular, and the Administration's policy on the Middle East generally, are to be attacked not because they are unfavourable to Israel but because they are helping to spread Communist influence in the Middle East. The attack on these lines was continued over last week-end, when the Administrative Council of the Zionist Organisation of America met in New York. Dr. Neumann, Chairman of the Executive Committee and a member of the Jewish Agency Executive, called on Americans to "take full cognizance, before it is too late, of the scope and significance of the Communist/Arab conspiracy in the Middle East . . . not aimed at Israel alone but at the United States and the whole free world." The Chairman of the Administrative Council, Dr. Levine, said that Mr. Dulles' policy had been finally revealed as "complete partiality to the Arabs and extreme callousness to Israel." Unless the President personally took a hand, the Dulles policy would bring about complete Soviet domination over a key area of the free world.

3. I have been told by Bergus, the Israel desk officer in State Department, that Mr. Dulles has not let this campaign go unnoticed. When he saw the Israel Ambassador before leaving for the S.E.A.T.O. conference on March 2, he spoke very bluntly to him about the way in which the Israel Government were waging a campaign against the Administration. The meeting had been widely publicised as one at which the Ambassador would deliver an ultimatum demanding a 'Yes' or 'No' answer within three weeks to Israel's request for arms. Mr. Dulles told Mr. Eban that he would have expected that, with the situation in the Middle East what it was, the Israel Government would be interested in discussing with the United States Government the security of Israel and how it could best be preserved, instead of carrying on in this fashion.

/ 4. Bergus

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4. Bergus expressed the opinion that the sustained Israeli pressure on the arms issue had to a certain extent over-reached itself both here and in Israel; it might be effective diplomacy to demand an answer, "yes" or "no" if you were sure of the answer "yes" or could think of something else to do if the answer were "no." But in this case where the demand is being constantly repeated, it merely made the questioner look silly. I think the President's announcement of his readiness to run again will also have been a shock to the Israelis. As long as there was a prospect of the Republican Party approaching the election in a losing posture, the Zionists had good reason to hope that they could shake the Administration's policy.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to Westlake in Tel Aviv, Garvey in Cairo, and Crosthwaite at the United Kingdom Delegation, New York.

*Yours ever,
W. Morris.*

W. Morris.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

PERSONAL AND SECRET



CAIRO. ✓

March 8, 1956.

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V/1192/323

Levant Desk
to Caccia on return
1/3 *10/3*

Dear Evelyn,

Will you please show Harold Caccia on his return the following comments on New Delhi telegram No. 360 recording the Secretary of State's exchanges with Nasser on the question of night fighters for Israel: V/1192/270

(a) I think it would be unsafe to assume that because Nasser made no direct retort to the Secretary of State's statement on the night fighters, he would have no objection. It was difficult for him to raise any vocal objections in the light of his purchase of Communist arms.

(b) I do not understand what is meant by the words "in the light of our general approach". My impression at the time was that the Secretary of State promised to consider the possibility of comparable supplies of Meteors to Egypt, since Hakim Amer said that they still wanted them, in the context of our general policy on supply of arms to the Middle East. I do not know, of course, what impression Colonel Nasser had of the Secretary of State's remarks on this point.

2. I hope that it is not intended to depart from the General principle that supply of arms will be based still on a policy of balance, which, in its up-to-date dress, presumably means a roughly comparable trickle to both sides. If we get off this principle, it seems to me that we shall be in very dangerous waters.

Yours ever,

Hamphrey Jennings

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