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SECRET

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA
(Sent 14.22 hours 9th October, 1956)

CYPHER
IMMEDIATE

No. 2241 SECRET

My telegram No. 2225.

Please deliver following message from Prime Minister to Mr. Nehru. Begins.

I am grateful to you for your message of October 4th I am sorry if there should have been any misunderstanding about our attitude to the efforts which you and the Government of India are making and to the proposals which Krishna Menon put to the Foreign Secretary in London.

I think I can best summarise our attitude towards various proposals that have been put forward as follows:-

(1) Of a number of suggestions that have so far been made from various quarters the 18 power proposals are so far the only basis for negotiation which is acceptable to us and to a considerable number of other Governments.

(2) This does not mean that we refuse to look at any alternative. But such alternative must be clearly defined and specific and must satisfy certain conditions, the principal of which are that they shall not leave Egypt in a position of unfettered control and that they shall contain some means of enforcing whatever arrangements are reached. The difficulty about Krishna Menon's proposals is that, as they were put to us, they did not provide an adequate alternative, since they did not meet these essential requirements. Nor of course did we know the attitude of the Egyptian Government towards them.

(3) As President Nasser has rejected the 18 power proposals it is for him to put forward an alternative. The Egyptian Government have an opportunity to do so now in the Security Council. We do not consider that it would be fruitful to discuss negotiations there or elsewhere without the basis of those negotiations having first been made clear. Otherwise we are likely to be involved in a negotiation about a negotiation and further confusion would result.

With kindest regards,
Anthony Eden Ends.

Copy to:-

D.I

SPECIAL MINISTERIAL DISTRIBUTION

/Foreign Office

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E14211/2112 J.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUEZ - PAKISTAN ATTITUDE

Extracts from a letter dated 3rd October to the Commonwealth Relations Office from the Office of the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Karachi are circulated for information.

9th October, 1956

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CONFIDENTIAL

We reported in our last Fortnightly Summary for the period ending 27th September (paragraph 4 of Part I) that a campaign has been getting under way criticising the Arab world, and particularly Egypt, for its failure in the past to give practical support to Pakistan in her problems. Through the timely procurement of a copy of "Blitz" recording B.K. Sharma's interview with Colonel Nasser, we were able to give this to Hassan, the Joint Secretary in the Ministry to deal with the affairs of Europe and the Middle East, just before his press conference on 25th September. We were therefore privately delighted to see next morning large sections of the interview splashed on the front page of the "Morning News", under the inaccurate caption "Nasser says it again". The point was scathingly illustrated in "Dawn" on 27th September in a cartoon called "Two's company, three's a crowd", in which Colonel Nasser, with his arm round a Nehru in female Arab attire, is sitting fishing on the bank of the Suez Canal and is saying to Nehru "After all this fishing is over, imagine my beloved - the fun we'll have in your enchanted land of Kashmir": in the background a wistful female figure of Suhrawardy qua Pakistan looks on, holding a stone heart inscribed "Our love for Egypt". The Urdu press has however been more restrained in its treatment of this theme.

In retrospect, it seems somewhat naive of the Egyptian Embassy to have issued, as we reported in our last Fortnightly Summary, an official dementi of these alleged remarks of Colonel Nasser without having checked first the facts with Cairo. It now remains to be seen whether we have heard the last of this faux pas, for telegrams are reported to have been sent by local bodies here to Colonel Nasser, challenging him to confirm or deny what he told Sharma.

Despite these rebuffs, however, the Egyptian Embassy here continue to canvas their case and most of the reports (which come from foreign agencies) in the press reflect a pro-Egyptian and anti-Western bias. Among their latest efforts is the issue of invitations to two Bengali journalists to visit Egypt. It is a curious coincidence that the two they have picked were our first selection of journalists to go to the United Kingdom and that they were dropped when the Pakistan Information Department gave us a new list. Perhaps the Egyptian Embassy are trying to exploit any resentment which they imagine these journalists might be harbouring.

We have already sent to you copies of an earlier editorial in the "Morning News" dated 20th September, entitled "Pakistan and Egypt", which was stimulated inaccurately by the report in the Syrian newspaper "Al-Barda". Damascus sent us the relevant extracts from this article, which were passed over to Hassan on an informal basis. Hassan said, however, that he had already had these extracts from the Pakistan Minister at Damascus and he did not think he could make any further use of them here. In passing, I should add that the Syrian Legation also issued a denial but the fact went virtually unnoticed and drew no comparable criticism.

As regards the wider aspects of the Suez dispute, the press is a little less critical of the United Kingdom. This is partly because of the campaign stimulated by the articles to which I have referred above, but also because of our decision to refer the dispute to the United Nations.

In their search for material not only to discredit Egypt but also those Arab countries which agree with her neutralist policies the Government sought to utilise the furore (itself artificially stimulated by local politicians for domestic

(reasons)

reasons) aroused by K.M. Munshi's reproduction of the book "Religious Leaders". A convenient peg was provided by Mr. Nehru's visit to Riyadh. In this respect you will appreciate why "Dawn" was the paper most ready to co-operate. The editorial which set out this campaign most clearly was one which appeared on 27th September under the heading "Vain Expectations". The extent to which the Government has been behind this campaign was frankly admitted to me personally by Hassan. Again the Foreign Minister on 29th September in a private conversation with James, went out of his way to ask if he had seen this "Dawn" editorial. What is of interest and is to some extent, surprising is the fact that in the letters in the correspondence columns which this article has stimulated the line taken by "Dawn" has been supported and not attacked. We are now waiting to see whether Mr. Nehru's assurances to King Saud will be regarded as sufficiently convincing for the campaign to be called off.

It is not easy to summarise briefly all these strands in which domestic and foreign issues become so intertwined; the important point seems to be that opportunities are being sought, and even manufactured by the Government, to lead the public away from the basic belief, so widely held, that fellow-Muslims must be supported, right or wrong, towards an understanding of where Pakistan's true interests lie.

DISTRIBUTION

D.II.

SUEZ CANAL DISTRIBUTION



J

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

October 6, 1956.

CONFIDENTIAL

(14219/71/56)

E14211/2113

JF14211/2077

Dear Department,

We enclose, with reference to paragraph 1 (d) of our Saving telegram No. 280 (S), a translation of an article which appeared in Al Akhbar of October 4 alleging that the British Master of a tanker deliberately stopped his ship's engines in order to sabotage the Canal.

2. Although the article does not say so, we imagine that the reference must be to the S.S. Scotstoun, which in fact, according to the ship's agent, had trouble with her steering gear. You will note that the article also alleges that three other ships tried to join in the sabotage. Even if Mahmoud Younes does not himself believe the story (and even he may), there will nevertheless be many Egyptians who will.

3. We are sending copies of this letter to the Chanceries at Paris, Washington and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

Yours ever,

CHANCELER



African Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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Enclosure to Cairo Chancery letter
14219/71/56 of October 6 to
African Department.

CONSPIRACY TO DISRUPT CANAL NAVIGATION

(Al Akhbar October 4, 1956, page 3)

In a report from Port Said, Al Akhbar quoted Sayed Mahmoud Younis, Deputy Chairman of the Suez Canal Managing Board, as saying that the captain of a British tanker a few days ago stopped the engines of his ship while in transit from Suez to Port Said and claimed he was having engine trouble in order to disrupt the movement of other ships through the waterway.

Al Akhbar also reported that three other ships did likewise and claimed sudden mechanical trouble with the obvious aim of disrupting navigation.

Asked whether these accidents were genuine or staged, Sayed Younis was quoted as saying:

"We do not care whether they are genuine or not. The important thing is that navigation has been running regularly in spite of all these conspiracies. There is one fact which the whole world in general and the countries working against Egypt in particular must realize: while certain countries are trying to disrupt navigation in the Canal by any means and regard this as something they ought to do, we believe that our task is to ensure regular and smooth passage. The whole world knows that they are trying to snarl shipping traffic and that we are at the same time trying to keep it going regularly.

"A few days ago a disaster was averted. A large British tanker piloted by an Egyptian pilot left Suez in the northbound convoy. Before moving out of the harbour, the Egyptian pilot asked the British captain whether there was anything wrong with the ship. That is a traditional question which pilots ask whenever they take over. He was told that all was well, and the ship left Suez harbour along with others in the convoy. At a certain critical point on the way, the Egyptian pilot was surprised to find that the engines had stopped, leaving the ship at the mercy of currents and winds in the narrow Canal. Conscious of the seriousness of the situation, the pilot asked the British captain what the trouble was. The latter shrugged his shoulders and said: 'The engines are out of order. What can I do? That is your job.' Meanwhile, winds started to push the ship towards the Western bank and the next vessel in the convoy was drawing nearer and nearer. The pilot immediately alerted his colleagues on the ships coming behind, and ordered the crew of the tanker to drop anchor. The whole thing took ten minutes and danger was averted. The British captain sat in a corner all the time watching what was going on.

"However, when he found that his plot had failed, he left his place and gave some orders after which the engines started working again. He apologized to the Egyptian pilot and said it was only a slight breakdown which was repaired in a few minutes. The Egyptian pilot said nothing to him but smiled and steered the ship safely to Port Said. He shook hands politely with the British captain before leaving the ship.

/s/You

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- 2 -

"You can see, therefore, that there are attempts to disrupt navigation but we do not care about them at all. Our only concern is free and regular passage. Even before the Western countries withdrew their pilots, they had filled the world with tendentious propaganda and rumours. But their false propaganda and their malicious rumours did us a service. The whole world stood by awaiting the departure of French and British pilots and the disruption of Canal operations. Newspapers sent more than 300 correspondents and photographers to witness the presumed failure of the Egyptians in running the Canal and piloting ships through it and to report on collisions which were expected to happen and on the return of British and French pilots to the Canal to save it.

"Then came the moment which the whole world awaited. But those who anticipated Egypt's defeat heard about Egypt's victory instead. They heard about victory after victory, and saw the world's pity turn into admiration. Instead of mocking at us, the imperialist countries became the laughing-stock of world public opinion. We did not gloat over this, but we carried on with our task and the world acknowledged Egypt's efforts to keep navigation going regularly while the imperialist countries attempted to disrupt it."

Minutes

J

The summary of Signor Martino's article in the OGGI was not enclosed in Mr. Le Quesne's letter but I have been able to procure a copy of the magazine privately. Certainly the article is a remarkably courageous defence of Signor Martino's line at the first London Conference. The gist of it is as follows.

2. The London Conference was not a football match in which one side had to win and in which all the players were expected to show off their form. The Italian Delegation had simply to decide what course of action was most likely to serve Italian interests. It supported the Dulles Proposals, because they were intended to lead to negotiations, and so long as negotiations were in train it was always possible to avoid war.

3. The principle of international co-operation in the management of the Suez Canal can be applied in various ways. The Dulles Plan is sufficiently flexible to permit of a number of solutions which satisfy both the requirements of the Users and the Egyptian desire that her sovereignty should be respected. It is up to Italy to try to bring about the most appropriate solution with the co-operation and consent of all interested nations. Italy could not, however, join in condemning the principle of international co-operation without causing serious and irreparable damage to her own interests.

4. The author takes the Italian Communist Party newspaper to task for saying that not a penny of the vast sums collected by the Suez Canal Company in a year finds its way into the Italian Exchequer and that consequently it is of no concern to Italy whether the Company is nationalised or not. Italy is certainly concerned with the question of freedom of navigation, in view of the amount of traffic to and from Italian ports which passes through the Canal, and in the question of the level of dues which has a bearing on Italy's standard of living. In the past the ~~system~~ and functioning of the Suez Canal Company together with the 1888 Convention has provided the necessary guarantees. This system is now challenged. While it is impossible to put the clock back the most natural and logical course is to try and set up a new system which offers the same guarantees as the previous system, while respecting the sovereignty of Egypt. A distinction can be drawn between Egyptian management and control. (N.B. I suspect that in Italian, as in French, the word control connotes no more than supervision.)

provided.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

where

Minutes

provided, however, that there really is control, that is to say, that those who exercise control are vested with real power. The only advantage of setting up a system of control which was not effective would be that this would hide the fact that Egypt had full power to do what she liked with the Canal. Obviously a solution could be reached on these lines, but on the one hand it would be incompatible with safe and increasing international traffic, which is an Italian interest and, on the other, would create a dangerous area of friction in the eastern Mediterranean.

5. History disproves the theory that Egypt's rights cannot be limited by any consideration of the convenience of others. The Canal started as a venture in international co-operation and this is why it has been able to further the expansion of traffic and relations between the peoples of the world. This co-operation is to be extended and improved. Nationalisation should be the stimulus to new endeavours in the search for international co-operation.

6. Finally, Signor Martino disposes of two schools of critics. He accuses those who hold that Italy ought to have offered mediation by trying to split the Atlantic Alliance, and maintains that Atlantic solidarity in fact serves Italy's interests best. He warns those who imagine that Italy can play the leading rôle in the Mediterranean, that this dream is out of date and that instead of playing at power politics, for which she no longer has the necessary power, Italy must pursue a policy of co-operation and understanding with the Arab peoples. This understanding, however, cannot be achieved at the expense of Europe. If the ties between Western Europe and the Arab world were broken - which would be a blow to the Arabs themselves since they would shortly fall under Soviet domination - Italy, too, would inevitably be cut off from that part of the world.

I asked the Italian Minister the other day why he thought the article had been published in the OGGI rather than in the ESTERI, the fortnightly publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Signor Prunas, who did not seem to have noticed the article, replied that the point was probably that Signor Martino could sign the article if it appeared in an unofficial newspaper. I told him that I was so impressed with the article that I was thinking of showing it to the Secretary of State. This should be borne in mind against the Secretary of State's return.

Bu. Oct. 15.

Adm.
(A. D. M. Ross)
October 9, 1956.

W P 25/4

10 OCT 1956

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



BRITISH EMBASSY,
ROME

September 15, 1956.

CONFIDENTIAL

1423/207

1. Dr Ross
2. encls

11/18/9


E14211/2115

Dear Watson,

I enclose a summary of an article on the Suez question by Signor Martino, which appeared in the weekly magazine Oggi dated September 13. Actually this number of Oggi was on sale in Rome on the evening of September 7, and the circumstances in which the article appears to have been written give an interesting illustration of the cross-currents and opposition to which Martino's policy is being subjected at the moment.

2. As you will have seen from our telegram No.603 of September 5, Fornari's instructions regarding his démarche to Nasser were formulated on September 3 or 4. Although the fact that Fornari had been instructed to make a démarche to Nasser was known, no hint of the substance of his communication reached the press, with the result that practically everyone assumed that he had been instructed to offer Italian mediation. Indeed the Italian Consul General from Jerusalem, who is in Rome on leave at the moment, told me yesterday that he supposed that that was what Fornari had said. It can hardly be supposed that if Fornari had really been instructed to offer mediation the fact would not have leaked to the press, so that it looks as if Martino only got approval for Fornari's instructions by promising to keep them secret. And it is significant in this connection that the substance of his letter of September 11 to the Secretary of State, which reflects the views of the contrary trend, was not kept secret but was known to the press.

3. Although Oggi has a wide circulation and is a respectable weekly, it is a rather curious medium for the Foreign Minister to choose for the exposition of his policy, and it was very noticeable that only the Messaggero of the rest of the press referred to the article, and that not very prominently. The Palazzo Chigi has in effect a private fortnightly in which the official line is usually promulgated, and the fact that Martino did not use that or even the well-tried device of an interview to one of the big news agencies suggests that these media were closed to him. The article, as you can see, is thoroughly sound and we think that it and the manner and timing of its appearance show the basic soundness of Martino's own views on this question and at the same time the difficulties which he is up against in the Government and the Christian Democrat Party.

Yours ever

 (C.M. Le Quesne)

J.H.A. Watson, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

WED. OCT. 3/56

EGYPT SAID TO ASK U. S. CONCERNS AID TO SUPERVISORY ROLE SEEN

Nasser Apparently Aiming to Bolster His Assurances of Free Navigation

By OSGOOD CARUTHERS

Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, Oct. 2—Egypt was reported today to propose that United States oil and shipping concerns take over supervision of Suez Canal development.

CAIRO SAID TO ASK U. S. CONCERNS AID

Continued From Page 1

United States to estimate what they thought would be the immediate and future needs for canal improvement. Egypt then would be prepared to open to contractors the bidding on the development project, informants said.

They added that the Egyptian Government would prefer to have the job supervised and carried out by United States companies to assure the Western world that the canal was properly managed.

The Egyptians are said to be confident that the canal development project will be completed despite their present financial straits, and France on the one hand and the United States on the other. It is believed in Cairo that the Egyptians have collected enough money to start the development of the canal.

The plan was seen as an im-

portant bid by President Nasser to take advantage of the United States' economic aid program.

The Egyptian Government had said it would complete the canal expansion project in two weeks without a single mishap.

Minor Mishap at Canal

A minor delay occurred today when the small British cargo vessel Hendrick went aground in the canal thirty miles south of Port Said. Tugs managed to free the 2,270-ton ship within a short time.

According to figures released today, there was an average of one accident for every 100 ships or about one accident a month under the old canal.

This was the first accident of the new canal since it was opened in 1954.

The accident occurred when the vessel was passing the Suez locks.

The vessel was carrying a cargo of oil and other goods.

The accident was caused by a sudden change in the current.

The vessel was damaged but no lives were lost.

The accident was reported to the Egyptian authorities.

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vessels traversed the waterway last month compared with 1,197 the same month of last year.

Authorities reported that fifty-one ships passed through the canal Monday and forty-five to-

day.

The first of fifteen newly hired pilots took a vessel through the canal today un-

der the command of Ivan Ivanov, 54 years old, who piloted the 6,200-ton Italian tanker Antonio Zotti.

The vessel was carrying a cargo of oil and other goods.

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**SUEZ INVESTMENT
 UNDER DISCUSSION
 BY GROUP IN U. S.**

**Aid and Shipping Executives
 Would Put \$1,500,000,000
 Into Canal Improvement**

VOICE IN CONTROL ASKED

**Right to Collect Tolls
 Concessions Sought—Talk
 With Egyptian Stated**

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT
 Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3.—Executives of some United States shipping companies are working on a plan they think might break the Suez Canal impasse.

Their project is similar to the one by which a consortium of United States and British oil companies came to terms with Iran on oil exploitation in 1954. It would involve the investment of a large sum, possibly as much as \$1,500,000,000, for the expansion and improvement of the Suez Canal over a period of fifteen years.

World-wide oil and shipping interests and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development would be invited to participate.

The plan will be discussed with Dr. Helmy Bahgat Badawy, director general of the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority, who arrived in New York today for talks with oil and shipping concerns.

Plan in Early Stages
 Company officials who know about the plan emphasized that it still was in an early stage. It represents the ideas of important individuals but is not a plan on which there is any concerted agreement in the oil industry.

While certain officials in the State Department are aware of the plan, it has not been taken up formally with the department. Officials, therefore, declined today to express any view about it.

The proposal includes the following features:

¶ In return for its service in expanding the canal to meet the needs of expanding traffic during the next fifteen years, the Suez Canal Authority would grant the new consortium of private oil and shipping interests a concession to take over some parts of Suez Canal operation, including the collection of tolls. The right to collect tolls would give the private interests a guarantee of receiving a return on their investment.

¶ The consortium would absorb the shares of the old Universal Suez Canal Company except for the 40 per cent held by the British Government. To maintain its standing as a private enterprise it would immediately pay off the British shares.

¶ United States oil and shipping interests would welcome participation in the consortium

Continued on Page 3, Column 5

THE NEW YORK TIMES
THURSDAY, OCT. 4/56

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1956

**SUEZ CONSORTIUM
 BEING WORKED OUT**

Continued From Page 1

ably not... by British, French and other oil and shipping interests.

Need for Expansion Noted

Leading United States oil executives have been aware for several years of a need for drastic expansion of the Suez Canal. They believe that the \$50,000,000 expansion program the Universal Suez Canal Company was carrying out when it was nationalized probably would take care of traffic until 1958. But they think that beyond that time requirements will soar at an increasing rate. They emphatically do not believe Egypt could finance the needed expansion out of Suez Canal revenues.

At present the Middle East is producing about 3,500,000 barrels of oil a day, about 1,500,000 barrels of which pass through the Suez Canal. According to Daniel C. Iqn, British oil expert, the area's output is likely to rise to 13,000,000 barrels a day in the next twenty years, and most of that will be for the European market.

The oil and shipping companies are vitally interested in

finding a solution to the Suez problem. Because the canal disputes could upset their business.

The executives who have evolved this plan believe it may prove a means of face-saving for all concerned. For the British and French the functions taken over by an international consortium of oil and shipping companies might be an acceptable alternative to international governmental operating. At the same time, Egypt's sovereign rights and the ultimate authority of her nationalized Suez Canal company would remain intact.

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM TEHRAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTF

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Stevens
No. 792
October 11, 1956

D: 9.47 a.m. October 11, 1956

R: 10.32 a.m. October 11, 1956

E14211/2119



IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 792 of October 11.
Repeated for information to Paris, Washington, Cairo,
BDel New York.

E14216/251

My telegram No. 766 (not to Cairo): Suez Canal Dispute.

When I saw the Shah on October 10, I expressed appreciation of the part which Iran, in her own interests, has played in the Suez discussions. The Shah's line was that it would have been possible for Iran to have ganged up more completely with the Western Powers had this seemed desirable because he now had the Iranian Government, Press and public opinion where he wanted them. He had not done so only because he thought that it might interfere with Iran's usefulness later on. He considered that Iran was in a particularly good position to influence Nasser, not only because she was a Middle Eastern and a Moslem country, but, above all, because of her own experience of nationalization, which had taught her a lesson and might be used at a suitable moment to bring home to Nasser the folly of his ways too. He stood ready to instruct his Ambassador in Cairo to work on Nasser when the moment was ripe.

2. I said that I would report his offer to my Government, who would, I was sure, appreciate his readiness to help in finding a peaceful solution which we could accept.

3. Partly for internal political reasons, the Shah is anxious at the moment to be of service to the Western Powers so as to be able to show that he stands in well with us, and to build himself up in an effective international rôle. Even apart from Iran's interest in finding a settlement, therefore, the offer is not pure altruism. Nevertheless, subject to the views of Sir R. Trevelyan, I believe he may be right in

/ thinking

CONFIDENTIAL

Tehran telegram No. 792 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

thinking that Iran would bring special arguments to bear on Nassery; and you may wish to instruct me if at any time you consider that it would be useful to take up the Shah's offer.

Foreign Office please pass to Paris, Washington, Cairo and UKDel New York as my telegrams Nos. 18, 11, 119 and 8 respectively.

[Repeated to Paris, Washington, Cairo and UKDel New York].

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Mr. Nutting
Lord John Hope
Mr. Ross
Mr. Pisk
Mr. Murray
Head of African Department
Head of United Nations Department
Head of News Department



J

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

~~RESTRICTED~~
(1784/16/56)

E14211/2120

October 5, 1956.

Dear Department,

According to reports appearing in the press here yesterday, a Coptic Conference has been held in Cairo which agreed unanimously that:

- " (1) The Egyptian people stand firmly behind President Gamal Abdel Nasser in his policy of nationalising the Suez Canal which is an integral part of the Egyptian territory.
- (2) The Conference deplores the policy of certain governments and their attempts to infringe Egypt's sovereignty and her legitimate right to realise her independence.
- (3) Members, young and old, are determined to carry on their struggle to defend the country against all foreign interference or aggression.
- (4) The United Nations Security Council should be informed immediately that: The Coptic Conference held in Cairo today, representing Egyptian Christians of all denominations, strongly deplores the flagrant transgressions against Egyptian sovereignty, and confirm their support of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's policy of defending Egypt and her rights against aggression. The Conference is certain that the Security Council will, in the interest of world peace, approve Egypt's act of nationalising the Suez Canal Company.
- (5) These resolutions should be submitted to the members of the United Nations Organisation."

2. There is no doubt that many influential Copts dislike all this intensely but feel that they have no alternative but to swim with the tide.

3. We are copying this letter to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

African Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

For information!



WHITEHALL, S.W.1

Mr. J. J. Jones
CABINET OFFICE,
GREAT GEORGE STREET.

JE14211/2/21

African Dept to pw.
9th October 1956.
10/10

Dear Private Secretary,

The Lord Privy Seal has noted that your Minister has speaking engagements in the near future. He has accordingly asked me to send you the attached background guidance note on Suez for use in preparing your Minister's speeches. It has been produced at the Prime Minister's request, and is intended as an aide memoire rather than as a document for circulation. A limited number of copies are also being made available, by the Conservative Party, to Party spokesmen, as the Prime Minister wishes to ensure that Ministerial and Party speeches and press briefing on Suez should take a positive and consistent line.

If your Minister has any particular points of difficulty arising from this note the Lord Privy Seal would be glad to help in resolving them.

Yours sincerely,

J. J. Jones

Private Secretary to the
Party, under Sec. of State
Foreign Office (Mr Dodds Parker)

THE SUEZ CANAL

1. The Importance of the Suez Canal

The Canal is of paramount importance to the economic life of this country and of Western Europe. World markets will be affected and the standard of living in many countries will fall if the use of the Canal is interfered with. More than half the oil consumed in Western Europe passes through the Canal, and between 60% and 70% of the United Kingdom's crude oil requirements. More than 50 million tons of British shipping carrying British exports have passed through the Canal in each of the last three years.

But the matter is not only of concern to the West; a guarantee of unimpeded transit is no less vital to the countries eastward of the Canal. The adherence of Pakistan, Persia, Japan and Ethiopia to the 18 powers proves this. India has made plain that her second five-year plan will founder if traffic through the Canal is interrupted. Members of the "Afro-Asian" bloc - the Bandung powers - are being held to ransom as much as we are. It does not matter which side of the Canal you live on.

Nasser has declared that revenues from the Canal are to be devoted to the development of Egypt. This can only mean his retaining complete control and raising the transit dues.

The worst sufferers from Nasser's policy are not, however, either Europe or Asia, but the peoples of Egypt and the whole Arab world. The danger to these States which depend, often exclusively, on their exports of oil is clear to all: but every one of the countries in that area is threatened. Nasser in his book: "The Philosophy of the Revolution", has proclaimed his ambition to bring them into his Empire. Their political, as well as economic development is at stake.

/The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom stands for the peaceful and rapid political and economic advancement of this region, which we fought to free from another dictatorship in the last war. We cannot stand by and see people, who are on the edge of development, thrown back into stagnation, jealousy and despair. We may well be caused financial embarrassment: they will be ruined.

2. Why an International Regime has been, and remains, essential

The Canal, therefore, must remain outside national politics and continue under international control. The nations it serves cannot live under a permanent threat of blackmail from one man or one Government. This has been recognised from the very day the Canal was opened, and the Convention of 1888 was only the culmination of this process. It was the intention of the signatories to this Convention that the Universal Suez Canal Company should be indissolubly linked with the "definite system" created by the Convention. The Preamble stated explicitly that the Powers desired to establish "a definite system to guarantee at all times and for all Powers the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal, and thus to complete the system under which the navigation of this Canal has been placed by the Firman of February 22nd, 1866 ... sanctioning the Concessions of His Highness the Khedive". Article 14 of the Treaty provides that the engagements resulting from it "are not to be limited by the duration of the Company's Concessions". This clearly indicates that the Convention was based on the assumption that the Concession would continue for the full period, until 1968. Although the Suez Canal Company is registered in Egypt, it is in law manifestly an international body. Article 16 of the Concession of 1866 provided that in matters relating to its Constitution it should be governed by French law, and that all disputes under that head should be subject to the jurisdiction of the French courts. Egyptian legislation has never been applicable to the Company without its consent. This principle was accepted by the Egyptian Government as recently as 1949.

3. Why Nasser cannot be left in control

The preceding paragraph should in itself suffice to disprove Nasser's claim that his act of nationalisation does not affect the freedoms guaranteed by the Convention of 1888. There are, however, other considerations.

(a) Nasser has shown that no reliance can be placed upon his word, or on his protestations of friendship. On June 10 of this year he signed an agreement with the Company on financial arrangements which were to last until the expiry of the Concession. The Company was encouraged to continue to invest large sums of money in Egypt. Six weeks later, on July 26, he expropriated it. At the time Nasser claimed that nationalisation was a direct reprisal for the withdrawal of financial assistance for the Aswan Dam. Later he admitted that he had planned this act of piracy as long ago as 1954. This was the year in which the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded an agreement in which both parties expressed their determination to uphold the 1888 Convention.

Egypt has also defied the Security Council Resolution of 1951 ordering her to cease interfering with Israeli shipping through the Canal. Moreover, Egyptian batteries have more than once fired on unarmed merchant vessels exercising their right of innocent passage into the Gulf of Aqaba.

Her Majesty's Government have made many gestures of friendship towards Nasser, notably the Suez Base Agreement of 1954. He has consistently abused this friendship and his radio openly proclaims his intention to subvert the British position in the Middle East and Africa.

The 1954 Agreement provided for the prompt payment of compensation to the British officials dismissed in 1951. No payments have yet been made.

/(b)

(b) Whatever Nasser's protestations about freedom of navigation, the Canal cannot be kept abreast of the demands of traffic, now and in the future, without large supplies of capital and technical assistance which can only come from abroad. Nasser's conduct is not likely to secure either from any Western Government. Nor will it encourage investment in any of the other undeveloped countries. The United States and British Governments had been prepared to co-operate in the financing of the Aswan High Dam: they had to withdraw this offer when they realised that Nasser, since December 1955 when the offers were made, had so far pledged Egyptian revenues on increased defence expenditure at home and for the purchase of arms from the Communist bloc that the construction of the Dam was no longer within Egypt's economic capacity. This was before the seizure of the Suez Canal Company. No investment is likely to be forthcoming after it, except from the Soviet Union and the satellites, eager to bring Egypt within the Soviet orbit.

4. The reasons for Her Majesty's Government's policy

Her Majesty's Government have always sought and still seek an internationally acceptable solution by peaceful means. We took the lead in this search and we have never abandoned it. That is why we called the Lancaster House Conference, in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which enjoins that "the parties to any dispute ... shall first of all seek a solution by negotiation ... or other peaceful means of their own choice". In this we are acting consistently with our established policy of support for the United Nations, and are true to the Prime Minister's lifelong devotion to the cause of peace and the perfection of international machinery. Egypt was invited but refused to attend. The Australian Prime Minister led a 5-power mission to Cairo to present to Egypt the eighteen nations' proposals. Egypt rejected them. The second London conference was called, in order to set up
/an interim

an interim organisation to safeguard the minimum rights which user-nations enjoy under the 1888 Convention.

5. Now we have taken the issue to the Security Council, as we intended to do at the proper moment, having made every effort required of us by Article 33. We regard the United Nations as a vital organisation for the maintenance of peace and the upholding of international law. The Egyptian Government, by tearing up a solemn international contract, is defying this law. The Egyptian Minister of Commerce has stated (on July 27) that Egypt refuses to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in this matter. The Suez issue is therefore a test case of the efficacy of the United Nations, and of its members' attachment to the principles of the Charter. We trust that the United Nations will justify our faith in it.

6. The only use of force in this dispute so far has been the initial expropriation by the Egyptians of the Suez Canal Company and the unilateral destruction of a system of international guarantees affecting the livelihood of a large part of the world. It is Nasser who is the aggressor in this matter. We believe that our precautions have already discouraged him from further acts of aggression. Our troops are a deterrent which may still save the peace. Nor can we abandon our other responsibilities. There are over 10,000 British subjects in Egypt. We do not forget the behaviour of the Egyptian mob as recently as 1952, when a large part of Cairo was burned down and many people, including ten British subjects, were massacred. Her Majesty's Government cannot renounce their duty to protect the lives of British subjects. We must therefore remain prepared to safeguard the interests of this country and of the free world, and to maintain the Rule of Law and international morality. If there is no respect for Treaties, the consequences, invariably and inevitably, are anarchy and war.

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COPY

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

25th September, 1956.

Dear Prime Minister,

It is sometimes useful to have an outside opinion from one who has not been involved in the detailed complexities of a long drawn out political issue like Suez. For what it is worth, I give you mine.

Granted that our principal allies, the United States and France, are widely divided in the sense that France would like to settle it by force, and the U.S. are prepared to go to almost any lengths to avoid the use of force, the primary responsibility for the conduct of Western policy now clearly devolves upon us.

In my submission our immediate objective should be to bring Nasser to negotiation, and to obtain sufficient support from the United Nations Organisation to compel him openly to flout world opinion if he still refuses to negotiate.

What should be the basis of such negotiation? He cannot, I think, accept international operation of the Canal without a loss of personal prestige which would make war seem to him a preferable alternative. But is international operation essential from our point of view? I doubt it. Our fundamental

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- 2 -

case is that the free and efficient use of the canal should be guaranteed; and since it is in Egypt, and - unless we garrison it - within the military power of Egypt, neither a private nor a public international operating company can effectively guarantee this. Nasser has in fact proved it during the past ^{w.c.h/o} six months.

It seems to me that what we really need is a treaty, formally deposited with U.E.O., which contains guarantees regarding toll charges, non-discrimination, efficient management and the use of revenues for future development of the canal, with written-in sanctions which can be applied if Egypt fails to implement them. This would require an international advisory body of some kind to watch over the operation of the canal, and to report any such failures to the signatory Powers. It would not necessarily require an international operating company.

It may be argued that, in accepting such a basis for negotiation, we should to some extent be saving Nasser's face. My answer is that it is necessary to save it to this extent if he is to be brought to negotiation of any kind; and that our present objective should not be the overthrow of Nasser himself, but the establishment of certain basic principles in accordance

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- 3 -

with the accepted doctrines of international law. In the final analysis the rights and interests of the users can only be guaranteed by their own power and influence, and this must be related to the amount of unity between them, and the amount of support they are able to obtain from other countries.

Negotiations on this basis, whether their outcome was successful or not, would bring Masser down several pegs; and his subsequent overthrow might only be a matter of time. We should, I think, be well advised to leave his personal fate to the care of future events and of our American allies, who are quite good at dealing with such matters when they are not fighting presidential elections.

I don't think that, apart from essential military precautionary measures, we can look beyond this at the moment. If Masser remains intransigent our moral position will be impregnable, but our difficulties will be almost as great as his. Economic pressure, inadequately or half-heartedly applied by the usual users, would be a long and costly process; and you, more than any man alive, know just how ineffective economic sanctions can be. On the other hand there is this difference between the present situation and that which arose over

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- 4 -

Abyssinia. We then had no real support from the United States, from France, or from the League of Nations. To-day we have massive support; and the political pressure on Masser from the oil-producing countries, and from India, who will see their whole economic future in jeopardy, is bound to increase.

The alternative - an ultimatum from ourselves and France - is now pretty dire. If it came to that, I believe you would have a greater measure of public support than many people think. You would certainly have all mine. But there is no denying the fact that public opinion has shifted in recent weeks; or that there is an invincible reluctance on the part of many people in this country to do anything which might smack of an attempt to pull French chestnuts in Algiers out of the fire. Unfortunately, as I think, there is little public sympathy here for French predicaments in North Africa. And this gives rise to an internal political problem which cannot be left out of account.

I therefore come back to negotiation. Make him negotiate, if you possibly can. If you succeed in doing this, I believe you can win a substantial victory. At Geneva you faced an

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- 5 -

apparently impossible task when they all ran out on you, and achieved it. Let's have a repetition!

Yours ever,

(sd.) BOB BOOTHBY

The Right Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, K.G., M.C., M.P.,
10, Downing Street,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

P.S. I am sending a copy of this letter to Selwyn.

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COPY

10, Downing Street,

S.W. 1.

October 2, 1956.

Thank you for sending me your thoughts on the present state of the Suez question.

I agree with much of what you say. Of course what we have been and are trying to do is to settle this matter by negotiation. But our American as well as our French allies agree that the negotiation must be on our terms. It would be disastrous if the result of negotiation was a settlement which strengthened Nasser's position and increased his prestige. We should then all be finished in Asia and Africa, and in no long time either.

It seems to me, therefore, that we stand a chance of achieving our objective by negotiation only if we show the greatest firmness and resolution. But it is not more than a chance. I know that you agree with this and

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I am especially grateful for what you write if the last resort of force is all that is left to us.

The essential thing is that Nasser should not be judged by the world to have got away with it. I found our French friends vigorous and firm. They are young by our standards - I felt a doyen.

Yours ever,

ANTHONY EDEN

Sir Robert Boothby, K.B.E., M.P.

1956

J
 AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

16-211
 JE14211/2123

FROM Mr. Stuart Kott's
 Peace Pledge Union
 to Mr Dodds-Parkes

Peace Pledge Union

States that the Union has never received the reply to their question as to what international law Colonel Barnett has broken as asserted by the Foreign Secretary.

No.
 Dated Oct 9.
 Received in Registry

References to former relevant papers

-/1006
 SE-1002/47

MINUTES

A copy of Mr. Francis Williams' article in the "New Statesman" is attached (in envelope) perhaps ~~the~~ ^{News Dept} should comment first then the Legal Adviser upon the last paragraph of Mr. Morris's letter. It was previously decided (Aug A) that no reply should be sent "for the present" to Mr. Morris's former enquiry about Barnett's breach of international law.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Dft) Mr. Morris
 Peace Pledge Union, W.C.I
 Mrs. H.R. Dodds-Parkes
 Oct 26

see minute.
 A.R.M.
 News Dept (Mr. Moore)

J.P.S. Phillips
 15/10

Mr. Vallat.

Dept in general ~~that~~ have taken the line that the Egyptian action raised very grave issues of vital importance to N.I.G. They were determined to achieve their objective by peaceful means: ~~rather~~ force was a last resort.

A.R. Moore
 15-10

(Action completed)

(Index)

29/10

20/9/57

References to later relevant papers

49957

There is no short and simple answer to the last paragraph of the P.P.U. letter of Oct. 9. It would be best if we could refrain from an attempt to answer as suggested by Sir S. Fitzmaurice in his minute of Aug 17 (JE 14211/1006).

2. A possible alternative would be to refer to the relevant passages in the Lord Chancellor's speech in the Iraq debate in the House of Lords, and perhaps to Lord Macnaghten's speech.

3. For the record, of course, "force in the last resort" is bad legal doctrine. *Clavallat*

19/10

see new submission
John Williams
 22/1x

In their letter

Number of copies

Number of copies of enclosures

In their letter at JE 14211/2123 (attached) the Peace Pledge Union raise two points:-

(a) Are Mr. F. Williams's assertions true, that the Government privately decided on a policy of force, but decided to test press reactions before publicly committing themselves to it?

(b) What particular international law has Nasser broken?

Flag A

2. The short answer to (a) is "No, Mr. Williams is mistaken in his assertion". This should not need elaboration.

Flag B

3. I do not see how we can avoid answering (b) since Mr. Dodds-Parker undertook to do so, and the P.P.U. have now returned to the charge. Sir G. Fitzmaurice considers it would be far better if the answer was given verbally if it has to be given at all.

4. Perhaps it would be convenient if a representative of the P.P.U. were asked to call on Mr. Dodds-Parker for a verbal reply to the political question at a time when he could be passed on to Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice or Mr. Vallat for a verbal reply to the legal one? (The less desirable alternative is to give a written answer, covering the legal point in the way suggested by Mr. Vallat at para. 2 of his minute).

5. I submit a draft on the lines of para. 2. Perhaps the time of the interview could most conveniently be decided between Mr. Rae and the Legal Adviser direct?

J.F. Phillips
 October 23, 1956

Mr Rae

W. Jelley
 23/10

I agree. Let's aim at a short visit, during which the P.P.U. will enquire the way in a legal direction.

K.J.V.
 23 Oct

After discussing with Mr. Valler the ways + means and effecting the "verbal reply" Mr. Dodd-Parker concluded that the Dept's "less desirable alternative" would in fact be preferable.

Redraft att.

Esmond
23/1

Jan 24/10
Mr. Valler
African Dept x 5 } again

Enter quickly & resubmit with PP
"I renounce war and I will never support or sanction another"
1. Mr Dodds Parker
2. African Department
a JH
10 Oct



PEACE PLEDGE UNION

Dick Sheppard House, 6 Endsleigh Street, London, W.C.1.

TELEPHONE: EUSTON 5501.

Chairman: MICHAEL TIPPETT. Secretary: STUART MORRIS, M.A. Organiser: SYBIL MORRISON. Treasurers: EMKYS HUGHES, M.P., DAME SYBIL THORNDIKE, D.B.E.

JE14211/2123

October 9th, 1956

Mr. Dodds-Parker
Foreign Office
Whitehall
S.W.1

Dear Mr. Dodds-Parker,

You will no doubt have read the contents of Francis Williams's usual article "Fleet Street Notebook" in this week's New Statesman. In it he raises the question as to how far newspapers should permit themselves to be put by any government into a position in which they are in the possession of confidential information which may limit their freedom of action. He claims that throughout the Suez crisis there has been a determined attempt by the Government to do this, particularly in regard to the Prime Minister's determination to make war on Nasser unless he did what he was told.

I would recall to your mind that when you were kind enough to receive the P.P.U. deputation we specifically raised the question of threats of military action and the "precautions" taken by the Government. In reply you said that the Press had tended to write up the military precautions and threats beyond the real intention of the Government, and that the Government could not be blamed if the Press chose to take that line. We understood by your comment that the Government's intentions had been misinterpreted by the Press, but this would seem to be in direct contradiction to what Mr. Francis Williams asserts. As our whole attitude would probably have been very different if we had not accepted your assurances, it is of importance to us to know where the real truth lies. I would therefore be very grateful if you could let me have your comments, and in particular if you would tell me whether Francis Williams is mistaken in the assertion he makes, or whether we misunderstood the Government's attitude as outlined by you.

P.T.O.


Sponsors: Bernard Boothroyd, Vera Britain, Benjamin Britten, C.H., Alex. Comfort, M.A., M.B., Ph.D., Laurence Housman, Aldous Huxley, Professor Kathleen Lonsdale, D.Sc., F.R.S., Stuart Morris, M.A., Minnie Pallister, Claire Sheridan, Dame Sybil Thorndike, D.B.E., Michael Tippett, The Dowager Lady Wedgwood.

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As I am writing, may I remind you that we have never received the promised reply to the question as to what particular international law Colonel Nasser had broken as asserted by the Foreign Secretary.

With every good wish,

Yours sincerely,



Stuart Morris
General Secretary.

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Es Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Sir R. Makins
No. 2098
October 10, 1956.

B. 11.03 p.m. October 10, 1956.
R. 12.16 a.m. October 11, 1956.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2098 of
October 10.

Repeated for information Saving to Cairo, Tel Aviv,
UKDel. New York and Paris.

My telegram No. 2092.

JE14211/2125

Suez Canal: American Press and Radio Comment.

Last night's radio and this Morning's Press were chiefly interested in Mr. Dulles's speech of October 9 and the Security Council's "secret session". Special emphasis was given to Mr. Dulles's remarks that there is little chance of a settlement so long as it is possible for any nation to use the Canal "as an instrument of its distinct national policy".

2. Some correspondents reported that Mr. Dulles's speech had been interpreted "as leaving the door open for a proposed British compromise under which Egypt would continue to operate the Canal". (Hamilton, New York Times).

In a front page article Roberts said that "Britain has made a major switch in its Suez policy by agreeing to accept international supervision instead of international control of the Canal. The new policy... opens the way to a Suez settlement for the first time since [group omitted] and means abandonment of the international control plan adopted by 18 Nations at the first London Conference". Roberts went on to say that "the British idea now is to accept international supervision of the Canal with an important provision - that the new arrangements have 'built-in' sanctions. This is said to mean that if Egypt should violate the new agreement, shippers would have the automatic right to stop paying tolls". This story appears to be gaining wider currency. This afternoon's Washington Star (under a full front-page headline which said that "Britain softens demand on Suez" reported that "Great Britain has made the first move toward compromise in the Suez Canal dispute. As Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld moved

/abruptly into

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Washington telegram No. 2098 to Foreign Office

-2-

abruptly into the mediator role, British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, let it be known in private talks that Britain would no longer insist on 'international management' of the Canal. He is now prepared to settle for a treaty imposing sanctions on Egypt if she obstructs traffic through the Canal".

3. Criticism of Mr. Dulles in the United Kingdom Press yesterday attracted some attention. Middleton (New York Times, from London) reported that "John Foster Dulles has become whipping boy for national feeling of frustration over the Suez crisis and a focus for the rising anti-Americanism has reached a point where it may impair future cooperation between Washington and London". Both Middleton and Smith (C.B.S. from London) quoted from articles in the Daily Express and Daily Telegraph.

4. Editorial comment today was centred on Mr. Dulles's speech. It was agreed that he "put his finger on the weak point in Egypt's proposal for negotiations when he insisted that the principle of an international Canal be upheld" (Philadelphia Inquirer).

"International control is still the basis issue. At the heart of that problem may well lie the question of who or what organisation collects the tolls, uses the proceeds and finances the expanding needs of the Canal. The United States policy can be crucial in this regard, both financially and in firm support for Britain and France" (New York Times).

Other commentators agreed with Daley (ABC Television) when he said that Mr. Dulles has "placed the United States squarely behind British and French demands for international control of the Suez Canal".

A few, like Huntley (NBC) however, thought that the United States had made it clear that it regards the Western plan "only as a point where negotiations might start".

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Cairo, Tel Aviv and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 119, 68 and 373 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Cairo, Tel Aviv and Paris].

UNCLAS

Minutes.

I do not think Nasser's rather
~~ingenious~~ ingenious rationalization
helps us much for in assessing the sort
of settlement he might accept. The
"system" to fulfil the "object" — i.e. to
provide suitable safeguards for freedom
of navigation — was the point about which
it was not possible "to reach agreement."
(He did not try very hard). Nor are we
really in complete agreement with Egypt
about freedom of navigation on the
Canal "without any discrimination".

Egypt

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes

Egypt does at present discriminate
against Israel.

2. However, I think we
should copy this to Sir H. Travelyan,
if only to arm him with such of
Nasser's actual words as can be fixed.
One never knows what use they may be.

SP.

Phil 8/10
R Shepherd 11/10

R.R.
11/x

12/10

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

JE14210/2426

African Dept.

NEW YORK.

CONFIDENTIAL

AR.
8/10

October 5, 1956.

Dear Archie,

As you will know, Nasser gave Ed Murrow an interview lasting over an hour on September 19, which was recorded on tape; and suitable extracts from it, lasting about eight minutes will be broadcast on Sunday along with similar extracts from an interview with the Secretary of State.

Contrary to his usual practice, which is never to show the full transcript to anyone, Murrow on this occasion lent the Secretary of State a copy. It has not, apparently, been shown to anyone else. I looked through it and made the enclosed extracts which seem to me the only two passages to contain anything new.

In particular, the first passage seems to indicate, more clearly than I have seen before in Nasser's words, the sort of settlement which he is suggesting to various would-be mediators. We have had something of this kind from the Indians; and at lunch yesterday the Yugoslav Foreign Minister outlined ideas which fitted in.

May I leave it to you to send a copy to Cairo if you think this worthwhile?

Jim ever
Adrian
(J.H.A. Watson)

A.D.M. Ross, Esq., C.M.G.
Foreign Office.

JEH 11/2/26?
Handwritten
(already entered)

Transcript from tape of interview between
Mr. Edward R. Murrow and President Nasser on
September 19

NASSER:

The main idea of Mr. Menzies and the idea of the two nations [Britain and France] was divided in three parts. We can say the first parts were the -- the objects -- The main objects was to safeguard the sovereignty of Egypt, to keep the sovereignty of Egypt, and in the same time to safeguard and to guarantee the -- the freedom of navigation of the Canal. We were in full agreement about these two points. These were the main objects. And then the second point was to have a system to fulfil this object, and this system was the internationalization of the Canal. We were not able to reach agreement about that point. The third one was the requirements to be fulfilled with this system. That is to be -- to guarantee not raising the tolls or the charges -- to guarantee the development of the Canal, to guarantee the freedom of navigation on the Canal without any discrimination. We were in complete agreement about these points. Really, I believe that in order to reach an agreement about any problem, we must discuss the problem. We must know the problem and analyze it, and after that, we have to reach an -- an -- an agreement, or we have to reach a solution about this problem, but if we put a solution and then after that analyze the problems, it will be difficult to fit the solution with the problems.

MURROW: Why do you think the Americans and the British withdrew their offer of aid for the Aswan Dam?

NASSER: Really, I -- I don't know the main reason but was said that they thought I was playing the East against the West. Really, it is not true. I was always frank and this was one of my problems. I tried to be really adopting political matters. I was trying always to get straight forward to the deductions, and by trying to follow those deductions, I was always in trouble. At the beginning, we were negotiating with the America, and the World Bank and the United Kingdom about the finance of the High Dam, and during these negotiations there was a Russian offer. The Russian Ambassador came to me and said that we are ready really to negotiate with you about the finance of the High Dam. I told him we are now talking with the Americans and the World Bank about it, and we are not ready to get into details. This was really published in the newspapers. I said that to the American Ambassador. I told him that we haven't discussed anything. I said that in my interviews with the newspaper men. After that, we were negotiating until we reached an agreement that United Kingdom and the United States would give us a grant aid about seventy million dollars and the World Bank would give us a loan of two hundred million dollars, and there was some difficulties about the agreement with the World Bank and about the ... aid memoirs ... of the United Kingdom and the United States. It was published in the American newspapers many times that I was playing /the East.

the East with the West also after that. Mr. Shepilov, the Russian Foreign Minister, came here. We hadn't discussed at all the High Dam, and I said that also to the American Ambassador. I told him if you believe that we are playing the East against the West, you will be wrong. But suddenly, we were surprised from the statement from your Foreign Department about withdrawing the offer. Plus that because our economy would not be really able to pay the loans. This is the case as I know it. Because of the main reason I don't know until now.

MURROW

.....

63

E 14211/2127

McRoss J
Enter

SECRETARY OF STATE

has seen
JAC
26/14

I have been reflecting on President Eisenhower's message and the situation which confronts us. I think the following are the main factors we have to weigh:

- (i) If we use force the Americans will not support us and will probably be openly critical.
- (ii) We shall get very little support from any other quarter.
- (iii) The effect in the Arab States and in the Far East will be bad.
- (iv) The economic consequences will be, at the very least, an intolerable burden to our economy.
- (v) On the other hand, we cannot possibly risk allowing Nasser to get away with it.

2. These factors reinforce me in the belief which I have already expressed to you that our best tactics, if Nasser turns down Menzies, will be to begin by economic and psychological measures of pressure. We seem to me to be in a good position to do this because the Americans are so frightened that we may use force that we might bulldoze them into suitable economic and psychological measures simply by threatening that if they do not agree we shall have no alternative but to have recourse to force.

3. This policy would mean, I am afraid, postponing certain military measures. But, inconvenient and dangerous though this may be, I think it would be safer than to charge blindly ahead.

4. Of course if the Americans refuse to associate themselves with any economic and psychological pressure, our course would be clear.

J. A. Patrick

September 4, 1956.

B/F Thorne

W

Enter J

E1421/2128

Mr Emil Bustani's main plea during our discussion to-day was that we should use President Chamoun as a very secret line from Britain to Nasser to work out with him a compromise over the Suez Canal. Mr Bustani said that Nasser had told him a few days ago that he would negotiate with the Users Association. Mr Bustani implied that Nasser was prepared to discuss all future plans except actual control.

(2) I replied that Nasser had given no indication of being willing to negotiate on the essence of the control of the Canal not remaining his, and it was unacceptable to H. M. Government that any one Government should have such control. He asked me to make certain this point was put to the Secretary of State, in case he was unable to receive Mr Bustani in the next few days.

Dods Dodds Parker
 (A. D. Dodds-Parker)
 September 26, 1956

African Department

Copy: Private Secretary
 Mr Beeley
 Mr Ross
 Mr Nutting

There is now quite a lot of evidence that Nasser will not refuse point-blank to deal with SCUA.

Received [unclear] 10/10 [unclear] 27/9

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

En Clair

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL
DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Consul: direct

No. 2108
October 12, 1956.

D. 3.32 p.m. October 12, 1956.
R. 4.18 p.m. October 12, 1956.

IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 4718.

Following is text of questions and answers about Suez at Mr. Eisenhower's press conference yesterday morning.

2. Q. Mr. President,

Dispatches from both London and Paris reflect the rising feeling of Anti-Americanism, our Allies apparently feeling that the Administration's foreign policy is being inhibited by election-year considerations. Do you think there is any basis for such a feeling abroad?"

A. "No, I don't. I don't believe you can talk about these two countries in the same breath and we must be talking about the Suez Canal affair because that is the one that has been alleged to be creating this difficulty. Populations in different countries understand these affairs somewhat differently depending upon their own national traditions, their background, and the, you might say, the closeness to the situation. You will recall, for example, that public opinion in other countries did not at all agree with American public opinion when we announced our determination to protect Formosa and make certain that it did not fall. Public opinion in other countries didn't go along very well with that.

"It has been alleged in respect to this Suez Canal affair that the American policy has not been clear and firm and this is an error.

"From the very first day that we took up this question there were certain principles guided us, and those principles were enunciated in that 18-Power Agreement that was sent by a committee to Congress (sic: presumably Egypt is meant).

/"Those



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Washington telegram No. 2106 to Foreign Office

"These principles were - four in number. As I remember they, of course, respected Egyptian sovereignty, they insisted upon the efficient operation of the Canal and they pointed out as the, you might say, the central principle that the Canal could not be operated for the political purposes of any one single country. They provided also for fair and increasing share of the profits to Egypt and profits to no one else. Now these are the principles that have guided us throughout. The 16-Nation programme that was sent to Cairo was a plan that, it was believed by those eighteen nations, would effectually carry out these principles. But it was never implied by any manner of means that these details were not negotiable as long as the four principles were observed.

"Now I must tell you this: I asked the Secretary of State this morning whether he had ever had any intimation from anyone in British officialdom whom he met, that they were dissatisfied with our stand in this thing or thought that we had been vacillating and not carrying forward as we started out, he hasn't and I assure you that I haven't.

"I do want to make this clear: our friendships with Britain are very, very important to us not only sentimentally but officially, politically, economically and militarily.

"The same goes for France, but France's attitude is somewhat different and I can't say exactly the same thing with respect to them because they are already in a war in North Africa and there you can understand that they are much more tense than even the British population.

"So I think these things arise out of misunderstandings which I hope can be cleared up soon".

3. Later in his press conference in answer to the question:

"If you thought a personal appearance before the United Nations would help solve this Suez crisis would you make such an appearance?"

Mr. Eisenhower said:

"Why, of course, I would. There is nothing in the world that I wouldn't do to preserve peace with justice.

/s/HCW,

Washington telegram No. 2108 to Foreign Office

-3-

"Now, remember, you must have peace with justice or it's not peace. Just to win a peace by saying, 'well we won't fight right now' is not good enough although as long as you are talking and not fighting that is a gain. But what I am saying is, as long as you can get a peace based on justice, I would go anywhere, do anything in the effort to do so."

ADVANCE COPIES

Private Secretary
Sir I. Kirkpatrick
Lord John Hope
Mr. Nutting
Mr. Ross
Mr. Murray
Mr. Pink
Head of African Department
Head of United Nations Department
Head of News Department.

TTT

1956

J
 AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

142
 JE142U/2139

FROM Pharmacy,
 Cairo.

States that "Le Progrès Egyptien" of October 8 carried an interesting item about the activities of the "Peace" Movement in connection with the Suez Canal.

No. 14214/558/56 "5"
 Dated Oct 9.
 Received in Registry—

References to former relevant papers

MINUTES

-2101

One hopes that the Egi Govt are buying up a rod in public by their attitude to the Peace Parisians. We are ^{we} making appropriate propaganda use? *St*

(Print)

St
 18/10.

(How disposed of)

I.P. Dept Presumably I.R.D. will wish to handle this one. *St*

A) H.T.A. Overton, Cairo, to MR. L. Figg, I.R.D., 14214/559/56 219.

M. Overton

Mrs Elance - please write up a short piece on this - one page will do. We will send it to Mr Adams & Mr Welton can use it here.

(Action completed)

(Index)

R. H.

18/10/56

References to later relevant papers

49957

Peace prepared but overtaken by events
 7/8/57

Low R. H.
 10

The remaining Egyptian Communists have been quick to take advantage of world Communist support for Egypt over the Suez Canal Company. The Egyptian left-wing paper, *Asas al Yawm*, reported on August 13 that a delegation of Egyptian "peace" personalities, Kamal el Bindari, known as the Red Pasha, Mrs. Gama Mahrawi, Mrs. Inji Elatoun, Lutfi el Khali and Abdel Rahman el Khamissi, accompanied by the Secretary of the Syrian "Peace" Committee, Dr. Moustopha Amine, had gone to Vienna to discuss the Suez Canal question with the World Peace Council Secretariat. This body issued a declaration supporting Egypt on the Suez question on August 13 and the Egyptian party arrived in Vienna a few days later.

Some of the members of the delegation proceeded to Italy where they were joined by Yusuf Hilmi, an important Egyptian Communist who normally resides in Paris. In Rome a meeting appears to have been held in the office of the Head of the Foreign Service of the Italian Communist Party at which a "Central Committee of the Egyptian Communist Party" was formed. A message from the "Central Committee of the Egyptian Communist Party" was published in the Italian Communist Party organ, *Unita* on September 16th, thanking the Communist Parties of the world for their support for Egypt's cause.

Further information about the Egyptian fellow-travellers' activities in Vienna has now been given by Lutfi el Khali in *la Free Press* edition of October 5th on his return to Egypt with Inji Elatoun after a six weeks' absence. Lutfi el Khali told the newspaper that a committee had been formed under World Peace Council auspices to study and observe the Suez situation and was now in permanent session; El Bindari pasha is the Egyptian delegate. As part of the effort to publicize the Egyptian case, the Bureau of the World Peace Council has printed 5 million copies in English, French, Italian, German and Russian of the White Book on the Canal which is being brought out by the Egyptian Government. These are to be given world-wide distribution. Abdel Rahman el Khamissi, the pro-Communist journalist now writing for the Egyptian Government-sponsored paper *al-Qadisiya*, has suggested the formation of a congress of artists and writers of the whole world to discuss the Suez business and Dr. Moustopha Amine has suggested that there should be a meeting at Damascus of the Peace Committees of France, Great Britain and the Arab world to discuss the same question.

Inji el Khali said how struck he was, when in Vienna, by the importance which was given to Egypt in the Western world in the papers, in the street, in the drawing rooms, everywhere only two events were discussed, Suez and the Mozart festival.

Mrs. Inji Elatoun (a well-known woman Communist) also said that public opinion in Europe was favourable to the Egyptian cause. She praised Gamal Abdel Nasser's "peaceful policy", pointing to his systematic opposition to the Baghdad Pact, his participation in the Bandung Conference, and the Brioni Meeting.

OPS
PR/1
PR/2



J

BRITISH EMBASSY,
CAIRO.

CONFIDENTIAL

14214/558/56"8"

October 9, 1956.

E14211/2139

Dear Department,

"Le Progrès Egyptien" of October 8 carried an interesting item about the activities of the "Peace" Movement in connexion with the Suez Canal crisis. Apparently based upon statements made by members of the Egyptian "Partisans of Peace" organization, it surveys in typical Communist fashion the growth in various countries of a mass movement against imperialist provocation and in support of the Egyptian point of view. It discloses that five members of the Egyptian "Peace" Movement, Kamel el Bindari, Mme. Coza Nabarawi, Mme. Inji Eflatoun, Leutfiel Kheli and Abdel Rahman el Khamissi, accompanied by the Secretary of the Syrian "Peace" Committee, Dr. Moustapha Amine, went to Vienna in August to study a plan of work and propaganda in favour of the Egyptian cause and to give a detailed report on the Suez situation and the general situation in the Middle East. One immediate result was the issue by the World "Peace" Council of an appeal, signed by Joliot-Curie, calling for a pacific settlement of the Suez crisis through negotiation.

2. Of special interest is a statement by Leutfi el Kheuli, reported verbatim, about his activities in Vienna, and the plans hatched there. We enclose a copy. It is news to us that the World Peace Movement is printing and distributing the Egyptian "White Book" on the Suez Canal. (our telegram No. 2428 of today refers).

Yours ever,
CRANGERY.

J E14211/2101

Dho

African Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.



"Le Progrès Egyptien"

Monday, October 8, 1956.

26 Août

"Journée de la Paix"

"Quelques jours après notre arrivée, un comité a été formé pour étudier et observer la situation de Suez, nous dit M. El-Kholi, et la plupart des délégués parmi lesquels M. Joliet-Curie, l'avocat anglais William Britt, Pietro Nenni, le Prof. Bertrand Russell, un ex-ministre du Sénat japonais, le journaliste et champion de la résistance italienne Filicorsi, M. Antoine Tabet, chef du Syndicat des ingénieurs Libanais, notre délégué, Mohamed Kamel el-Bindari, et autres, sont à Vienne en session permanente pour suivre de près l'évolution du problème. De ce fait, ils ont mobilisé les organisations pacifiques d'Europe, d'Amérique du Nord, d'Amérique Latine, sans oublier celle du Moyen-Orient pour que soit diffusée, simplement et avec clarté, la juste cause égyptienne. De son côté, le Bureau du Conseil Mondial des Partisans de la Paix vient d'imprimer cinq millions d'exemplaires (en anglais, français, italien, allemand et russe) du Livre Blanc sur le Canal que vient de publier le gouvernement égyptien pour une large diffusion dans le monde entier. Mon confrère du "Gomhoureya", Abdel Rahman el-Khamissi, a suggéré la formation d'un Congrès des artistes et écrivains du monde entier pour discuter de l'affaire de Suez et enfin le Dr. Monstapha Amine a demandé au Conseil Mondial la réunion, à Damas, des Comités de la Paix de France et d'Angleterre avec ceux des pays arabes pour discuter de la même question. Enfin, à mon tour, j'ai proposé que le 26 août soit, dans tout le Moyen-Orient, la "Journée de la Paix". A Vienne, ce qui a surtout frappé le jeune avocat, c'est l'importance que l'Egypte a prise aux yeux du monde occidental. Dans les journaux, dans la rue, dans les salons, partout il n'était plus question que de deux événements: Suez ... et le festival Mozart!"



J. Putwith

BRITISH EMBASSY,

CAIRO.

October 9, 1956.

14214/559/56

CONFIDENTIAL

EURO INDEXED
JE 14211/2139/19

Dear Leonard,

JE 14211/2139

With reference to our Chancery letter No. 14214/559/56"5" of to-day's date, I think, on second thoughts, you may like to have the full article, which I enclose.

*Your own
H.T.A.*

(H.T.A. Overton)

L. Figg, Esq.,

Information Research Department,
Foreign Office.

J 17/6

