

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/119143			87684				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records leaflet							

S E C R E T

**Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office**

TO: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA

RPTD: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN (ACTING)

(Sent 17.10 hours, 19th September 1956)

CYPHER

PRIORITY

No. 2099    SECRET

JE 14211/1932

Addressed U.K. High Commissioner in Delhi No. 2099,  
repeated U.K. High Commissioner in Karachi No. 1780.

S U E Z

We have been asked if we can corroborate alleged recent statements by Nasser that

- (a) Suez Canal was to Egypt what Kashmir was to India.
- (b) Pakistan with its communal basis was as artificial a State as Israel.

2. Two papers in Beirut quoted on 8th September Amalgamated Press Report from New Delhi of interview between Nasser and P.N. Sharma of "Blitz". Following is text "Nasser according to Sharma also risked incurring Pakistani displeasure by saying Suez is as much Egyptian as Kashmir and Goa are Indian".

3. United Kingdom Ambassador at Cairo has been unable to trace any remarks such as those in paragraph 1 above or similar pronouncements by Nasser in any speech since nationalisation of Canal. Only reference in Egyptian Press to Nasser's interview with Sharma was brief Reuter report on 8th September from New Delhi to effect that Nasser had expressed hope of seeing Nehru when latter visited Saudi Arabia.

4. Please report whether any further details of Sharma's interview with Nasser have appeared in Indian Press.

Copy to:-

D.II

C.R.O.

Foreign Office

Mr. Anderson  
Mr. Golds  
Mr. J.H.A. Watson  
Mr. H.B. Shepherd  
Mr. J.A. Wilton

SOUTH ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST DEPT.  
SA. 190/6/1

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/119143			87684			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
**Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office**

FROM: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA

RPTD: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN PAKISTAN (ACTING)

D: Delhi 18.30 hours 20th September 1956

R: 16.50 hours 20th September 1956

CYPHER

PRIORITY

No. 1230 CONFIDENTIAL

EN 371/1832 (H)  
ENC

Addressed Commonwealth Relations Office No. 1230,  
repeated U.K. High Commissioner in Karachi No. 368

Your telegram No. 2099. JE 1021/1832

S U E Z

Full text of relevant passage in "Blitz" of exclusive interview by Sharma of Nasser is as follows: "If you look at the map you will see that geographically and territorially the Suez is an Egyptian Canal and therefore an internal matter for us. Suez is as much Egyptian as Kashmir and Goa are Indian".

2. There was no repeat no reference in article to Pakistan; nor can we find any reference elsewhere in Indian Press on lines of (B) in your telegram under reference.

3. Text of "Blitz" article goes by today's bag.

Copy to:-

D. II

No. 10 Downing Street  
C.R.O.

Foreign Office

Mr. Bishop

Mr. Anderson

Mr. Golds

Mr. J.H.A. Watson

Mr. H.B. Shepherd

Mr. J.A. Wilton

P.S. to Foreign Secretary

ALLOTTED TO SOUTH ASIA AND MIDDLE EAST DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Gyphar/OTP

E14211/183 FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

Sir C. Duke

No. 1353

D:6.11 p.m. September 21, 1956

September 21, 1956

R:8.09 p.m. September 21, 1956

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1353 of September 21

Repeated for information to: Cairo Damascus  
Bagdad Beirut

and Saving to: Ankara Tripoli  
Tehran Khartoum

Your telegram No. 3239 <sup>DE 14211</sup> to Cairo: Suez Canal.

In Jordan Nasser has steadily been losing ground with the more responsible people, who are beginning to see dangers towards which he is leading them. In addition, the withdrawal of British subjects has induced a considerably more thoughtful attitude among the more moderate elements, especially those who have been adversely affected financially. A further reason for Nasser's losing ground (especially in the army) is the manifest inability of Egyptians at present to offer any opposition to Israel or help to Jordan in case of an Israeli attack. This fact is of course regarded by extremists as the fault of British policy on the Suez Canal, but Nasser's position may be seriously weakened here if he is unable to make any reply to an Israeli attack on the Gaza Strip.

2. To a certain extent I think time is on our side, and that Nasser will continue to lose influence in Jordan as the crisis goes on, provided (a) no hostilities are undertaken against Egypt, and (b) pressure on Egypt is sustained by the Western Powers and [? group omitted] does not appear to be profiting by the seizure of the Canal.

3. However military operations against Egypt would radically change situation and Nasser would gain considerable support especially from those elements of the population who look to him for leadership (refugees, extremists et cetera). Moderate opinion in such a case would not be able or prepared to stand

26 SEP 1956  
against ..

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref.: FO 371/119143		87684				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

CONFIDENTIAL

Amman telegram No. 1353 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

against popular reaction in favour of Nasser. I am also not sure about Ali Abu Nuwar's attitude in such an event; cf. his remarks reported in my telegram No. 1269.

4. As regards S.C.U.A., moderate opinion tends to regard its establishment as a genuine attempt to find a formula which will enable both sides to save face.

5. Details of establishment of S.C.U.A. have been reported very fully in Jordan Press. Editorial opinion, however, has been critical. Please see my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office pass to Cairo 339, Bagdad 362 and Saving to Jeddah 52, Ankara 136, Tehran 57, Tripoli 5 and Khartoum 3.

[Repeated to Cairo, Bagdad and Saving to Jeddah, Ankara, Tehran, Tripoli and Khartoum]

222222

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref:		FO 371/119143		87684			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

SECRET

Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office

FROM: U.K. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA

D: 17th September, 1956  
R: 21st September, 1956

E10211/1835

No. 172 SAVING SECRET

S U E Z - TE 142.

Your telegram Y. No. 245 (repeating Foreign Office Guidance telegram No. 68).

We have been taking exactly the line that you suggest. It may be worth recording that in a talk with Krishna Menon immediately after the House of Commons debate I told him that the debate showed:

- (a) unanimous support for the aim of United Kingdom policy, i.e. an international system in the Canal based on the principles of the 18 nations proposals;
- (b) agreement that the military precautions taken by the Government had been necessary, since the United Kingdom must be in a position to take immediate appropriate military action in case of -
  - (i) attacks by Egyptian crowds on foreigners including United Kingdom citizens in Egypt, or
  - (ii) aggressive action by the Egyptians against ships passing through the Canal, or against other United Kingdom interests, or
  - (iii) enforcement action authorised by the United Nations in case of a breakdown of negotiations.
- (c) agreement that the possibility of a peaceful settlement should be pursued to the utmost in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and
- (d) disagreement mainly on some of the methods (e.g. publicity) which had attended the precautionary military measures.

2. I said that (d) was a comparatively minor matter. The debate had shown firm unity between the Government and the Opposition, and in the nation, on the essentials of the aims and the methods to be pursued.

3. Clark took the same line in a subsequent talk with Dutt.

Copy to:- D. II  
SUEZ CANAL DISTRIBUTION  
SPECIAL MINISTERIAL DISTRIBUTION

ALLOTTED TO SOUTH ASIA & MIDDLE EAST DEPT.



AIR MINISTRY,  
WHITEHALL GARDENS,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

*Mr Sheppard (Africa)*  
*(timed)*

21st September, 1956

*E142M/1836*

*Dear Hancock,*

I enclose a copy of a letter I sent this morning to Bishop at No. 10 covering an extract from the speech my Secretary of State will be delivering at Durham Castle on Saturday. Bishop spoke to me on the phone and asked that you should intimate that you had no objections to what my Secretary of State intends to say before he shows the extract to the Prime Minister. The material for the speech was provided by the Conservative Central Office.

*They want to know to-day*  
*Mac*

I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as you have cleared it.

*Your sincerely,*

*K. C. MacDonald*

(K. C. MACDONALD)  
Private Secretary

P. F. Hancock, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office,  
Downing Street,  
S.W.1.

*Africa Dept have*  
*no comment -*  
*I have told Mr MacDonald of this*  
*21/9/56*

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371/119143			87684			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

21st September, 1956.

You spoke to me on the telephone yesterday and said the Prime Minister would like to see the passage on Suez in the speech the Secretary of State will be delivering at Durham Castle on Saturday.

I enclose a copy of this part of his speech which I have just received from Mr. Birch and I would be grateful to hear from you in the course of the day that the Prime Minister is in agreement with it.

The Secretary of State is spending today and tomorrow visiting several Royal Air Force Stations which are taking part in Exercise 'STRONGHOLD'. If the Prime Minister wishes to speak to the Secretary of State himself about this part of his speech it will be possible for me to contact the Secretary of State so that they can be brought into communication on the telephone.

(K.C. MACDONALD)  
Private Secretary

F.A. Bishop, Esq.,  
10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall,  
S.W.1.

Extract from Speech to be delivered by the  
Secretary of State for Air at Durham  
Castle at 6.30 p.m. on  
Saturday, 22nd September 1956

.....During the weeks since Colonel Nasser started up the Suez crisis many efforts have been made to blur the central issue. It is simply this; if Colonel Nasser's illegal act is not resisted by those who stand for international order then international disorder will prevail.

Everything the Government has done has been in conformity with the spirit and the letter of the United Nations Charter. There can be no doubt of this but many people have failed to grasp it. They have assumed that loyalty to the United Nations requires that every problem and difficulty must immediately be taken to U.N.O. This is not so. The Charter lays down under Article 33 that the parties of any dispute likely to endanger international peace and security should first seek a solution through their own efforts just as any sensible man tries to settle a quarrel with his neighbour before bringing an action against him.

June  
23 -  
Sept 28  
2 lines  
3 months

That was the course adopted by Ernest Bevin in the case of the Berlin Blockade. He waited 3½ months before taking the matter to the Security Council and meanwhile he sought all peaceful means to solve the dispute between the Governments concerned.

The Conservative Government have never refused to invoke the authority of the United Nations. The Prime

/Minister



CONFIDENTIAL

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Cypher/OTP

Sir H. Trevelyan

No. 2294

September 24, 1956.

E14211

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

D. 8.35 p.m. September 24, 1956.

R.10.37 p.m. September 24, 1956.

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2294 of September 24.

Repeated for information to POMEF and Saving to Damascus, Bagdad, Amman, Beirut, Jedda, Ankara, Tehran, Tripoli, Khartoum, Paris and Washington.

Your telegram No. 3239: Suez Canal.

My latest information, particularly since the second London conference, goes to show that Nasser has gained ground especially among the young, who at the beginning of the crisis were roused by the appeal for national mobilization against the threat of invasion and are doubtless now impressed by the new boast in the official Press that Nasser has wiped the eye of the "Imperialists". Even the more thoughtful are at the moment inclined to think that there is no longer any danger of war and that the affair is now virtually over, though they are probably reserving judgment until they see how it finally turns out. Few seem to realise that Nasser is getting less than half the dues. All are impressed by the apparent success of the new authority in running the Canal.

2. The minorities, property owners and older Western-educated intelligentsia are scared by the régime's dynamism, by its disregard of Egypt's friends and credit abroad and by the drift towards greater dependence on Communist Rice support. But they are more frightened still of what the régime might do to them and Nasser has not found it necessary since July 26 to take any special measures to ensure law and order.

/The fellahin



1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref.		FO 371/119143		87684			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo telegram No. 2294 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

The fellahin will go by the cotton prices. The urban proletariat will go by the price of food, which is now stable. Only limited numbers of traders are now suffering from Western financial restrictions.

3. SCUA is regarded as having lost its teeth at birth and as being virtually only a body to negotiate with Nasser. Time is not on our side if the situation is stabilized in its present condition, but the balance may well shift with any clear sign that Nasser has not won the game, such as if the mass of the population really begin to suffer at home or if defections from support of Egypt develop in the Arab world.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Ankara, Tehran, Tripoli, Paris and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 77, 25, 67, 331, and 383 respectively.

[Repeated Saving to Ankara, Tehran, Tripoli, Paris and Washington].

uuuuu



Mr Watson  
L. Carter

J

Tel. Limpsfield Chart 2164

EDGEHILL,  
LIMPSFIELD,  
SURREY.

CONFIDENTIAL

E14211/1850

19th September, 1956

My dear Watson,

SUEZ CANAL COMPANY

Policy of Her Majesty's Government

The Comité de Direction met on Monday 17th September.

2. Suez securities were quoted as under on the Paris Bourse on 17th September:-

	Fr
Actions de capital	67,100
Actions de jouissance	43,800
Parts de Fondateur	41,500

3. Between 26th July and 10th September the transit dues payable on the traffic passing through the Canal, so far as the latter is known, came to ££4,315,000. Of this ££2,641,000 (or 60%) was paid in London and Paris. The average daily number of ships passing through the Canal since 26th July comes to 41.5.

4. A statement is attached which gives the details of the Company's personnel due to be repatriated from Egypt as soon as arrangements for their repatriation can be completed. There is a difficulty about the Greeks as many of them have no passports. The French Government are trying to persuade the Greek Government to allow them to enter Greece without passports. Nine Greek pilots have decided to stay on and take service with the new Canal Authority. The Egyptian authorities have done everything in their power to facilitate the departure of all these people from Egypt. They have been given temporary exit visas so there has been no question of their settling their Income Tax or other dues before they leave. Even Mercier-Ythier whom I mentioned in my last letter has had his exit visa and he is in fact already back in France.

5. Out of some 500 orders pending when Nasser issued his decree the management have been able to cancel 239. This involves however only some 7.7% of the total expenditure involved.

6. Georges-Picot held a conference with Suez Canal pilots on leave in Europe on Saturday morning in the rue d'Astorg. Even he was astonished at the vehemence with which they declared, especially the British pilots, their complete loyalty to the Company and their desire not to be asked to work for any other organisation whatsoever.

/7.

J. H. A. Watson, Esq.,  
Foreign Office,

7. The General Manager then gave the Comité de Direction an account of the talk he had last Friday in London with representatives of the Foreign Office, the Treasury and the Ministry of Transport. He spoke I thought very fairly of the plan for a users' association and when one or two Directors were disposed to jeer at it he was at pains to point out that the plan had merits not perhaps as a practical means of passing ships through the Suez Canal but for other reasons which will be familiar to you and which it would be superfluous to specify here. He then read out the letter which the President had already sent to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and M. Pineau giving thereafter a brief summary of the memorandum or note which accompanied that letter. He went on to explain that a further and more detailed memorandum was under preparation which it was intended to get off by the same evening addressed to the British, French and American Governments. This later memorandum would, he said:-

- (i) explain that Suez Canal pilots were far from being the whole story. The ground services - with full details - were in fact more important than the pilots
- (ii) set forth the Company's attitude about transit dues. The legal right to recover these dues depended on the original Concession and on that alone. It would be impossible for the Company to sign away this right to the users' organisation or to any other body unless there was a formal agreement - formal signatures by at least the three principal Governments were becoming very desirable anyway - specifying that some percentage of these dues would continue to be paid to the Suez Canal Company.

Georges-Picot then set himself to analyse the proposed users' organisation. It could have three conceivable purposes:-

- (i) merely to stop the Egyptians getting the dues
- (ii) as a pilot scheme for the kind of organisation outlined by the eighteen Governments at the London Conference
- (iii) as a sort of co-operative society for finding pilots for its constituents, paying Nasser for all the other miscellaneous services involved in passing convoys of ships through the Suez Canal and handing to the Suez Canal Company such share of the total dues recovered as might be decided to appertain to them.

The first of these, Georges-Picot asserted, had real value but the dues recovered should continue to be paid to the Company. The second too was all right but there was no good reason why the Company as an entity should not be woven into the organisation from the word go. The last was dubiously practicable and it was very doubtful if the Company's pilots for instance would consent to take part in it. They knew better than anyone else how much they depended on the shore services for the safe guidance of ships through the Canal and they had lost all confidence in these shore services as the latter now were, that is to say deprived of their experienced foreign heads. Nevertheless it would be good policy for the Company to co-operate with the three principal Governments over the scheme in any way we could. We had thrown in our lot with them and if they failed in their efforts we were sunk.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref. FO 371/119143			87684				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

8. Thus Georges-Picot in the Comité de Direction. In private he made it clear that he would leave the question of the Westminster Bank to the French Government to thresh out with the British Government. Some relaxation of the Bank's present attitude was of course desirable but for the moment it was not the cash that he wanted. He was most anxious that at some stage or another the Company should get it in writing that the British Government agreed that the Company's balances in London should in all circumstances continue to be their property. It is easy to see what he is getting at here. He does not want the Company's shareholders ever to be compensated by the mere payment to them of the market price of their shares on this or that date. He hankers - he has not said so to me in terms for a long time but I feel sure I am right - after an indefinite prolongation of the Suez Canal Company as some kind of financial corporation. If that is to materialise it is essential that his own plan for compensating the Company, which has already got the support of the French Government, should one day or another prevail. Compared with that objective the question of obtaining freer access now to the Company's balances in the custody of the Westminster Bank becomes of only secondary importance.

9. In short I got the impression:-

- (i) that Georges-Picot will co-operate in setting up the users' scheme,
- (ii) that there will be no excessive difficulty in getting pilots - particularly the British pilots - to help to get the scheme going and
- (iii) that the quid pro quo that Georges-Picot will try to get out of it is the maximum public recognition that the Company still exists and more particularly that whatever happens they must have a share of the dues recovered by the proposed new body.

10. At a late stage in the discussion in the Comité de Direction two Directors (the Vicomte de Rohan and Vice-Amiral Durand-Viel) began to express serious doubts about the legality of all the things that the Board and the Comité de Direction had done since 26th July. This was very much up the President's street as he dreads having to face the shareholders on 15th October. He goes round nowadays asking all his colleagues if they think we shall get majority support from the shareholders and whatever reply he gets seems to do little in the way of reassuring him. Even Georges-Picot, who certainly hasn't lacked courage these last six weeks, thinks that there is a definite possibility that the Directors may be sued by some ill wishing shareholder or group of shareholders before the extraordinary meeting can be convened. This is I suppose the more likely if between now and say 10th October the impression got around that the efforts of the western Governments were making such little progress that a stalemate, with Nasser in possession of the Canal, was a possibility.

11. And it is the beginnings of some such feeling that I think inspired the frightened talk by the two Directors in yesterday's Comité de Direction. The talk went further too. Durand-Viel suggested that if the Governments were going to fail miserably would it not be better for us to start negotiating with Nasser ourselves? Isaacson had left the room by the time this precious suggestion was mooted and I took no part at all in the discussion.

/When

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref:		FO 371/119143		87684			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

When the meeting was over however the President drew me aside to ask me if I thought the Company would get anything out of Nasser if they went to him direct. I said that the very idea was fantastic. The only people competent to handle the situation were the Governments and we should stay with them at all costs.

12. Copies of this letter and of its enclosure are being sent to Johnston, Bird, Stock, Isaacson and Cadogan.

Yours sincerely,

Francis Wylie

## PARLIAMENT'S ROLE

### WHY SUEZ DEBATE REVEALED

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—May a student of politics who was present in the Gallery of the House throughout the Suez debate on Thursday, comment upon Mr. Hugh Gaitskell's attempt to continue that Debate in your columns?

He makes the point that the exact nature of the Prime Minister's assurance about the Security Council was difficult to grasp because, as he puts it, "Hansard records an interruption." Surely this is a little disingenuous. The Prime Minister's speech, like that of the Foreign Secretary opening the debate, was rendered almost inaudible at times by constant noise and interruption from the Opposition benches. I do not say that guilt in this respect falls on one side of the House only, but certainly the Opposition took the lead in making what should have been an attempt to find a common ground which could be presented to the country and the world simply an occasion for a display of party rivalry. One may ask whether it was worth recalling parliamentarians from the ends of the world for this purpose.

What struck the observer was not simply the apparent inability of parliamentarians to follow sustained argument but the actual indications of their feelings which their interruptions or cheers for their own speakers appeared to show. Opposition speakers made a good deal of the fact that some Conservatives have failed to realize the changed nature of the world in which we live and the limitations upon Britain's ability to secure unaided those international solutions she feels to be most appropriate, and no doubt there is substance in this charge. On the other side, a good deal of unnecessary fuss was made about the alleged inconsistencies in Mr. Gaitskell's own attitude to the crisis. What was far more important was the evidence that the debate—noise and all—provided that although Mr. Gaitskell's attitude has been based throughout upon the same premises, he is not by any means in this fully representative of the rank and file of his parliamentary followers.

Mr. Gaitskell made it plain once more that he and his colleagues in the Shadow Cabinet start by accepting the Government's view that Colonel Nasser's action was both illegal in itself and damaging in its implications, not only to the prosperity of this country but to any prospect of wider international aid for the underdeveloped countries. Therefore, for him and his colleagues, the differences to be explored concerned only the method by which the damage done could at least to some extent be remedied. But many of his followers appear to deny altogether this aspect of the matter, to regard Colonel Nasser as the heroic defender of the rights of small nations and to fail to see any connexion between what is happening in Suez and either the welfare of their own constituents or the prospects of those Asian and African peoples for whose progress they express especial concern.

If these observations are well-founded, it would seem that the debate on Thursday, though it helped to some extent to clarify the attitude of this country, did very little to advance public understanding of the issues involved or make possible the much greater measure of agreement within the country that is necessary if policy is to be fruitful. In so far as this relates to the Conservative Party, one may say that having to bear the actual burden of negotiation, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary and other senior Ministers can be forgiven for neglecting, as I believe they have, the necessity of expounding their policies to the country and the world, but the Opposition leadership has no such excuse to offer for the fact that in the many weeks which have occurred since Colonel Nasser's step they have found it impossible to explain, even to their own followers, the substance of the case and have led their followers to believe that the outdated slogans of anti-colonialism are a substitute for constructive thought.

It may be, finally, that we are witnessing a decline in the role of Parliament for quite a different reason. It was obvious enough that much of the difficulty in explaining the Government's policy to the satisfaction of Mr. Gaitskell and his friends arose from the very fact which they themselves emphasized, namely, Britain's dependence upon the agreement of other countries before specific steps can be taken. It would therefore seem necessary if parliamentarians are to play a useful role, that they should be acquainted with the tenor of thought in allied countries as well as in their own, and there would seem to be something lacking in the sphere of international organization when no way can be found of bringing our own members of Parliament into contact with members of the legislatures of friendly countries upon an occasion such as this one. If each Foreign Minister had brought, for instance, to the London Conference half a dozen representative figures from the different parties in his home legislature, might not some of last Thursday's debate have been carried on in an atmosphere less removed from reality?

I remain, Sir, yours truly,

MAX BELOFF

Nuffield College, Oxford, Sept. 15/

JE 11/21/1856 (A) Minus.

Edw. J

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

\* Council of Europe correspondent in the left.

You may have seen the attached letter from Max Beloff in "The Times" of September 18, and its suggestion at the end, that there might be an advantage in bringing the Parliamentarians of each country represented at the Suez Conference into closer consultation and into contact with each other.

2. Mr. Woolrych\* telephoned me this afternoon to say that he had had warning from the Secretariat in Strasbourg that President Dehousse's approval was being sought by the Secretariat to a letter to "The Times" under the signature of Dehousse and four others, taking up this point of Max Beloff's and saying "here we are, why not use the Council of Europe?" This letter was to be dictated to him over the telephone this evening at 5 o'clock, and will probably appear in "The Times" the day after to-morrow.

3. I see no harm in this. M. Dehousse will probably get the answers he deserves. We might even consider putting it in the heads of one or two M.Ps to reply in the sense of our tel 1726?

*W. N. Hugh-Jones*  
 (W.N. Hugh-Jones)

September 20, 1956

Let us see whether M. Dehousse's letter is published and what it says

✓  
 No sign yet, though V. Woolrych says/...



## BRITISH CHESS WIN AGAINST SWISS

### PENROSE OUTPLAYS HIS OPPONENT

FROM OUR CHESS CORRESPONDENT  
MOSCOW, SEPT. 17

The British Chess Federation won their sixth-round match in the international team chess tournament here after a hard struggle with Switzerland. The British team won by 2½ points to 1½, though at one time it looked as though the solid Swiss team might win by three points to one, for both Wade and Phillips got into lost positions, while Golombek and Penrose only maintained equality.

The turning point came on the second board, where Penrose once again showed his great worth to the side by beating Bhend. The British player had a good position out of the opening, a Ruy Lopez in which he had black, and for some time the position was level. But Penrose completely outplayed his opponent in some middle game complications, and won first the exchange and then a pawn. Bhend resigned on the thirty-eighth move.

### WADE IN DIFFICULTY

Meanwhile Wade, who with white in an English Opening had rather mismanaged the opening variation, was in considerable difficulties against Keller on the third board. He had what looked like a lost position because of the force of Keller's king-side attack, but the Swiss player failed to find a way to clinch the issue and contented himself with a draw by perpetual check.

On the bottom board Phillips played Johner, who began with a variation of the Ruy Lopez that was a favourite with Phillips himself. Phillips made a serious blunder that gave him much the worse game, and his opponent appeared to have an easy win when he relaxed his efforts. Phillips then obtained sufficient counter-chances in a king-side attack to force a draw. On the top board Golombek played the Catalan system against Blau and had a promising game out of the opening, but instead of building up his positional advantage he embarked on an attempt at a mating attack which was easily repelled by Blau, who is in excellent form in this tournament, having beaten both Filip and Unzicker with black in preceding rounds of the final group. Both players now combined in points round the centre, and it was Blau who emerged appropriately enough with chances of a mating attack. Golombek was just able to parry this and bring about a drawn ending after 46 moves.

### OTHER RESULTS

Other results were Argentina 2½, Hungary 1½, Denmark 2, Roumania 1 and one adjourned; West Germany 1½, Yugoslavia 1½ and one adjourned; Czechoslovakia 1½, Israel ½ and two adjourned; Russia 2½, Bulgaria 1 and one adjourned.

Scores in the top group.—Russia 16 and one adjourned; Yugoslavia 15 and one adjourned; Hungary 14½; Argentina 13½; Czechoslovakia 11½ and two adjourned; West Germany 11 and one adjourned; Switzerland 10½ and one adjourned; B.C.F. 10½; Denmark 10 and one adjourned; Roumania 9½ and two adjourned; Bulgaria 9 and three adjourned; Israel 4 and four adjourned. Adjourned game result, Round Five.—Yugoslavia 3, Denmark 1.

Results, Round Six, middle group.—Holland 3, Belgium 1; Chile 2½, Sweden 1½; Norway 2½, Iceland 1½; Poland 2½, East Germany 1½ and one adjourned; Colombia 2½, France 1½; Austria 3, Finland 1. Scores.—Sweden, 15; Holland, 14½; Austria and Iceland, 14; Belgium and Colombia, 13; East Germany, 11½ and one adjourned; France, 11½; Finland, 11; Poland, 9½ and one adjourned; Chile, 9; Norway, 7.

Results, Round Six, bottom group.—Greece 2, Mongolia 2; Persia 3½, Luxembourg 1; Saar 2½, Philippines 1½; India 3½, Puerto Rico 1; Scotland 2; Ireland 1 and one adjourned. Scores.—Saar, 15½; India, 15; Scotland, 14 and one adjourned; Philippines, 14; Persia, 13½; Mongolia, 11½; Puerto Rico, 10½; Greece, 10; Ireland, 7½ and one adjourned; Luxembourg, 7½. Adjourned games results, Round Five.—Scotland 2½, Greece 1½; Saar 4, Luxembourg 0.

## ECCLESIASTICAL NEWS

### CHURCH APPOINTMENTS

The following appointments have been announced:—

The REV. R. G. C. BROWNING, curate of Walthamstow, diocese of Chelmsford, to be vicar of St. Paul's, East Ham, same diocese.

The REV. J. SAVAGE, vicar of Rathmell, diocese of Bradford, to be rector of Bolton-by-Bowland, same diocese.

The REV. D. E. POWELL, curate of Mächen and Rudry, diocese of Monmouth, to be vicar of Llanishen with Trellech Grange, same diocese.

### DIOCESE OF BRISTOL

The REV. G. TOMLINSON, vicar of St. Peter's, diocese of Lincoln, to be

R 25 1956

## CHRIST CHURCH MEADOW

### SOLVING OXFORD'S ROAD PROBLEM

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—I have expressed no opinion in all the controversy about Oxford's roads, and I do not mean to do so now. I wish to confine myself to a constructive suggestion.

Could the long narrow meadow lying immediately north of Magdalen Bridge, between the Cherwell and another small stream, be brought into the scheme—as some compensation for the loss on the south side, undeniable though it may be unavoidable?

At present the long meadow between Magdalen and St. Clement's is not used by anybody, though it is quite large and is an attractive open space. I realize that it is low-lying and liable to flood; but could not raised walks be made all round it, thereby giving both university and town some compensation for the damage to Christ Church Meadow? This last may be necessary: I express no opinion as to that.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.,

A. L. ROWSE

St. Austell, Cornwall.

Sir,—In view of Mr. Sandys's threat to nationalize Christ Church Meadow, the local users' association might well consider the opportunities for consultation afforded by Mr. Krishna Menon's visit, before referring the matter to the United Nations.

Yours faithfully,

A. L. N. RUSSELL

Dowlands, Cranleigh, Surrey.

### DEBATE AT STRASBOURG

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—The last paragraph of Mr. Beloff's letter published on September 18 raises a fundamental point with which a few would disagree. It is, however, a trifle astonishing that Mr. Beloff omits to mention the fact that, for the "friendly countries" of Europe at least, a way of bringing the legislatures in contact has existed and has been put to increasingly useful effect since 1949; these contacts are in fact the *raison d'être* of the Strasbourg Assembly which includes, along with certain others, all European countries invited to the London Conference with the exception of Spain and Portugal.

It is an open secret that at a recent meeting the bureau of the assembly had considered the convocation of an extraordinary session devoted exclusively to Suez. This would have been the occasion for parliamentarians not merely to become acquainted with the tenor of thought in allied countries (though that is certainly important in itself) but perhaps to reach an agreed view which would much strengthen the confidence and position of the west in this dispute. In the event, it was decided that such a confrontation of views, if it were to have maximum use, would best proceed on the basis of a report from the Governments, and preferably with the participation of their representatives; this there was no time to obtain. The debate on Suez will therefore take place in the course of the ordinary session which opens at Strasbourg on October 15.

Perhaps Mr. Beloff will claim that for his point to receive full satisfaction the contact should extend not only to European countries but to all those having a direct interest in the speedy settlement of the Suez question. One thinks in particular of the United States and the Commonwealth countries. May I remind him that parliamentary observers from such non-member nations are welcome at Strasbourg at all times, and that yet further possibilities exist? One joint meeting with a delegation from the United States Congress has already taken place; it is my firm hope that it will be repeated and will indeed become a regular feature, with the participation of Canadian representatives also. Nor is the participation of other like-minded nations wishing to profit from the system of contact and consultation organized by the Council of Europe by any means to be excluded.

I am, Sir, yours faithfully,

FERNAND DEMOUSSE, President,  
Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe,  
Strasbourg.

### UNMARRIED MOTHERS

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—The work of the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and her Child, started by Mrs. H. A. L. Fisher at a meeting at the Mansion House just over 38 years ago, is now too well known, at least to all interested in the most human of sociological problems, for any detailed recapitulation. It has fought, and won, its battle against ignorance and prejudice and is widely and officially recognized for what

may be termed its saving grace. It helps to save innumerable children from what might, through no fault whatsoever of their own, often otherwise be a miserable existence; it saves also the mothers from the desolation and despair that so constantly falls upon them for lack of help, guidance, and understanding; it enlightens the public and seeks to bring to the fathers recognition of their responsibility.

Its burdens are heavy and, though it has certain modest sums generously given to it for special purposes and is not insolvent, its finance is always a great anxiety; its state, financially, has been truly described as being like walking up an escalator that is going down.

Mrs. H. A. L. Fisher, its founder, died on February 14, 1956—38 years to the day, as it strangely chanced, since its foundation. We who are responsible for the continuance and growth (for nothing can continue successfully and not grow) of this beneficent and greatly needed work are deprived both of her counsel and experience and also of the practical help she annually contrived to bring to it. For each and all of these reasons we feel that we may now justly appeal afresh not only to those who knew and worked with Mrs. Fisher but also to the wide public who understand and appreciate the value of the work of the council which is really her child.

There was one aspect she had especially at heart: among those mothers determined to keep and support their children, there are some who could do so more successfully if only they could be helped to take a training. Thanks to the generosity of the Lord Mayor's Fund, the council has for some years been able to provide this help but this donation is now exhausted. There could, we feel, be no memorial which Mrs. Fisher would more greatly have desired than the establishment of a fund in her name for that purpose and for the council's support. May we, therefore, its present officers, invite its friends to subscribe now to this as generously as they can?

Yours very faithfully,

GORELL, President, National Council for the Unmarried Mother and her Child;  
ZOE LAVALLIN PUXLEY, Chairman,  
Committee of Management; B. G. K.  
ALLSOP, Chairman, Finance Committee.

21, Coram Street, W.C.1.

### LARGE SCHOOLS

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir,—An aspect of these large schools which receives little consideration is their impact on local transport. There appears to be a singular lack of coordination between education and transport authorities in this matter. In my district, for example, morning travel by bus in term time entails endless waiting. An adequate service has been rendered inadequate in the morning peak hour because buses are filled with the pupils of these immense schools.

Yours faithfully,

H. J. BROOKS,  
70, Dudley Avenue, Kenton, Harrow,  
Middlesex.

Other correspondence on page 4



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WARSAW.

September 15, 1956.

No. 202 ✓  
(1420/15/9)

UNCLASSIFIED

JE 14211/1857

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a press interview given by President Nasser to two Polish newspaper representatives on the 12th of September which was published on the front page of "Trybuna Ludu" on the 14th of September.

2. I am sending a copy of this Despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

*J. D. Curran*

The Right Honourable

Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., M.P.,

etc., etc., etc.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref:		FO 371/119143		87684			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

-9-

Egypt will not relinquish the Administration  
of the Suez Canal to any one  
Interview of President Nasser for "Trybuna Ludu"  
Trybuna Ludu No. 257 September 14

The President of the Republic of Egypt, Abdel Nasser granted an interview on September 12th to the special envoys of Trybuna Ludu, Editor M. Berezowski and of PAP, Editor B. Rayzacher.

The interview had the character of a free and friendly conversation which lasted over an hour and in the course of which President Nasser answered several questions.

At the outset, President Nasser expressed his pleasure that he was able to grant an interview to the Polish press. At the same time he pointed to the distortion of facts, of which Western journalists were often guilty.

Referring to the recent talks with the "Committee of Five", the President said that ever since the nationalization of the Suez Canal the Western Powers had refused to base the discussion on the sole legal basis, i.e. the unquestionable rights of Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal and administer it.

This negative attitude - President Nasser said - was adopted by the Western Powers before the Cairo Conference, during and after it. At the beginning of the Cairo talks President Nasser asked Menzies whether the Western proposals recognized the sovereign right of Egypt to administer the Canal. The President also asked on what legal basis the Western plan was based. Menzies was not able to answer either of these questions.

Egypt recognizes freedom of navigation on the Canal

President Nasser emphatically stressed that Egypt recognized the Constantinople Convention of 1888 as the only international formula concerning the freedom of navigation on the Canal. Egypt is closely observing this Convention and is prepared to conclude on this matter a new international agreement of a similar character. Egypt maintains the standpoint that the Suez Canal constitutes an integral part of its territory, which was recognized, i.a. in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1954. At the same time Egypt does not deny at all that the Canal possesses an international significance, from the economic, commercial and strategic point of view.

The President recalled that the former Suez Canal Company had received a concession for 99 years from the Egyptian Government as an Egyptian Company by which fact it was completely subject to Egyptian law. At the session in

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref: FO 371/119143			87684				
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

-10-

Cairo President Nasser drew attention to the fact that after the expiration of the concession the administration of the Canal, it would pass into the hands of the Egyptian Government anyhow. Menzies' reply clearly implied that the western countries planned to maintain the former state of affairs even after the expiration of this concession.

Although much is being said now about Egypt's inability to assure freedom of navigation - said the President - even in the past responsibility for the freedom of navigation rested not with the former Suez Canal Company but only with the Egyptian Government. Now attempts are being made to impose on Egypt an "international administration" for the control of the Canal. But these attempts are based not on any law but merely of the "right" of force and prevalence which certain western powers desire to apply to smaller countries. In the London announcement, published after Eden's talks with Mollet, it is said that a serious situation has arisen because Egypt has not accepted their demands. But Egypt holds the opinion that this serious situation is created by the desire to take the Canal away from Egypt. Egypt will not consent, however, to renounce its sovereign rights, and will not relinquish the administration of the Canal to anybody.

We believe, declared the President, in the justice of our cause.

We can discuss any agreement - continued the President - concerning the freedom of navigation, fees for transit and guarantees against discrimination in the utilisation of the Canal. But this is a problem of not only the countries represented by Mr. Menzies. Poland, for example, is interested in this matter as one of the more important users of the Suez Canal.

#### The question of the withdrawal of pilots

President Nasser then referred to the announced withdrawal of the British, French, Dutch, Italian and Norwegian pilots which is to take place on September 15th. We rely - President Nasser said - on our own strength, and also on the assistance of countries which desire real international co-operation. We expect, for instance, the arrival of 13 pilots from Poland. In addition, we have now about 70 Egyptian pilots, who expressed their readiness to work, if necessary, without stop, in order to prevent any stoppages on the Canal.

The President said that the recall of the foreign pilots in order to create difficulties in the Canal management, was to "prove" that Egypt was unable to operate the Canal. The Egyptian administration of the Canal has been expecting for over a month now the development of a situation of this kind, and accordingly has taken appropriate measures, bearing in mind that the problem is not only a technical, but also a political one.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	2
Ref: FO 371 / 119143			87684			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet						

-11-

Replying to a question concerning the non-Egyptian personnel employed in other work on the Canal, the President expressed the view that replacing this personnel if need be should not be difficult. If necessary, Egypt would approach Poland, for example, with a request for specialists to be sent.

Referring to the possibility of transferring the Suez Canal issue to the United Nations, President Nasser said Egypt will not oppose this. The U.N. Charter did not permit interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States, nor the application of force. But the "international control" which the West demands is nothing but an expression of collective colonialism.

Lines of the economic development of the country.

President Nasser next replied to the question concerning the illegal economic sanctions applied against Egypt by the Western Powers. "For three years Egypt has been striving to become independent of unilateral ties with the West", said the President. "For this purpose, foreign currency reserves, so far untouched, amounting to more than 60 million Egyptian pounds in gold, have been collected on the territory of Egypt. In addition, Egypt is expanding trade relations with the Bandung and socialist countries. At the same time, Egypt is eliminating to an ever greater extent, international clearances in £ Sterling, changing to domestic currency. In order to prevent certain difficulties in financing imports, the Egyptian Government has introduced restrictions on the import of luxury articles. The President expressed the conviction that in the present situation, there were many possibilities of expanding economic cooperation between our two countries.

President Nasser next outlined the lines of the development of the Egyptian economy. Egypt must deal simultaneously with the question of increase in agricultural production and the industrialization of the country. The construction of the Assuan Dam will contribute to the solution of both these problems. Apart from this, the Egyptian Government intends to expand heavy and light industry, paying particular attention to electrification, steel foundries and the production of artificial fertilizers. Searches for mineral reserves in the Western Desert, hitherto not explored geologically have been started. The Egyptian Government is drawing up plans for economic development, both current and long-term (five and ten year plans).

In reply to a question about the method of financing the construction of the Assuan Dam, President Nasser stated that about 50 (fifty) percent of the income from the Suez Canal will be allocated for this purpose. He also pointed out that in the course of ten years, (this is how long the construction of the dam will last), these sums will exceed by more than 100 million dollars the aid previously proposed by the West.

-12-

In addition, Egypt will not have to pay any interest, no - what is more important - will it be tied by any political or economic conditions.

The President will visit Poland.

In conclusion, President Nasser expressed regret that the development of the situation caused by the policy of the colonizers made it impossible for him to pay a visit to Poland. The President stated that he would visit our country as soon as the situation permitted.

Verbatim

+ + + + +

Victims of the Balloon Provocation.  
Trybuna Ludu No. 257, September 14, 1956.

On August 3rd, a jet plane UFiMIG-15 proceeding on a normal routine flight crashed near Sochaczew, and two pilots, Captain Roman Lachcik and 2nd Lt. Jozef Raze (photos) were killed on the spot. A thorough investigation of the cause of the accident revealed that the plane UFiMIG-15 crashed as a result of colliding with a balloon filled with hydrogen and carrying a cargo of leaflets. So much for the announcement of the Government of the Polish People's Republic of September 6th.

+ +

Two young pilots were killed in peace time. They were killed because during their routine flight they collided in the clouds with a polyethylene balloon, the same as the hundreds of balloons sent to our country every day by the "Free Europe" Committee operating with the silent support of the U.S. State Department. Soaring after launching from airfields in West Germany, the balloons threaten the life of pilots and constitute a grave danger to the safety of flights.

Captain pilot Roman Lachcik, born in Tarnobrzeg was one of our excellent young pilots, and at the same time a valued educator of airforce cadres. On the tragic day of August 3rd, Captain Lachcik was flying in difficult weather. His second flight on that day was with a young pilot 2nd Lt. Jozef Raze, the son of a railwayman from Lublin. In the clouds the plane of Captain Lachcik and 2nd Lt. Raze collided with a balloon of "Freies Europa" ...

Leaflets breathing hatred to People's Poland were found near the remnants of the plane.

Verbatim

+ + + + +



1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	ins	1	1	2
Ref:		FO 371/119143		87684			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON.

CONFIDENTIAL

September 15, 1956

(My dear Selwyn),

Mr. Menzies, who arrived looking rather exhausted after a long transatlantic flight yesterday afternoon, went immediately to see the President and Mr. Dulles. Later he saw the New Zealand and Canadian Ambassadors and myself at the Australian Embassy and we had a long talk.

He said, as he has no doubt already said in London, that on the first day of his discussions with Nasser in Cairo he thought he had shaken him a bit, particularly as to whether or not force would be used by the West. But on that very day the President had given his Press Conference in Washington at which he had indicated that he was opposed to the use of force and this in Mr. Menzies' opinion had pulled the rug completely from under him. Mr. Menzies said he did not see how the West could deal with a man like Nasser if they threw all their trump cards into the wastepaper basket. I asked Mr. Menzies if he had spoken in this vein to the President and Mr. Dulles, and he said that he had, going to the limits of politeness in doing so. He thought the President had been impressed and appeared much concerned, he was certainly most apologetic. Mr. Menzies contrasted the verbosity of Washington with the reticence of London. He was obviously most appreciative of the latter.

Mr. Menzies made some remarks about the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons to which he had listened from the Gallery. He said that he was a critical judge of oratory, and that it was in his view an absolutely first class performance and the finest speech he had ever heard the Prime Minister make. I told him what Mr. Dulles had said on the same subject and we all deplored the lamentable treatment of the speech in the world press. I might have added in my telegram yesterday that one of Mr. Dulles' comments was that the Press had taken the slant which the Opposition had sought to give to the proposal for a Users' Club.

While we were talking Mr. Dulles rang up and endeavoured to persuade Mr. Menzies to return to London for the Conference of the Eighteen. Mr. Menzies promised to think it over. Mr. Dulles rang me up before breakfast this morning to ask whether I could do anything to persuade Mr. Menzies to act as he suggested. I undertook to pass his hopes along but said in my judgment Mr. Menzies could not put off any longer his return to Australia. I did in fact report this conversation to the Australian Ambassador who let Mr. Menzies know about it, but the latter had last night already decided that he must continue on his homeward way.

/I have just

The Right Honourable  
Selwyn Lloyd, C.B.E., T.D., Q.C., M.P.

1	2	cms	PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE	Ins	1	1	2
Ref.		FO 371 / 119143		87684			
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the Public Record Office's terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed 'Terms and Conditions of supply of Public Records' leaflet							

I have just seen Mr. Menzies off at the airport. He seemed to have recovered his health and spirits.

I do not think that I need record Mr. Menzies' observations about the talks in Cairo because I feel sure that he has talked to the Prime Minister and yourself in much greater detail.

(Yours ever)

Roger Makins.